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TRAVELCopyright © Open THREAT Briefing, 2017 ASSESSMENT

COUNTRY: TRAVELLER: CLIENT:

PREPARED BY: CHRIS ABBOTT REVIEWED BY: PAUL OWENS DATE COMPLETED: 10 OCTOBER 2017

Disclaimer: In compiling this assessment, Open Briefing has relied on the veracity of public information available at the time of publication. Open Briefing accepts no legal, equitable or other Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 liability whatsoever for any actual or consequent loss incurred by the client in relation to this assessment or for the accuracy of any statement herein. Some of the information in this document is by necessity generic in nature, and the client must update it to reflect the situation on the ground as soon as possible.

Contains information from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Contains public domain information from the US Department of State. CONTENTS

Traveller profile 1

Threat assessment 3

Priority threats in the Central African Republic 5

International relations 10

Political violence 12

Civil unrest 16

Kidnap 18

Crime Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 19 Environment 21

Infrastructure 22

Medical 24

Fraud and corruption 26

Local laws and customs 28

About Open Briefing 29

Appendixes:

1. Map of travel advice for Central African Republic 30 (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

2. Map of violence and displacements in CAR 31 (European Commission)

3. Map of UN, NGO and Red Cross locations in CAR 32 (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)

4. Humanitarian situation in CAR infographic 33 (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)

TRAVELLER PROFILE

Name

Employer

Job title Researcher/analyst,

Age 35

Blood group Not provided

Nationality Dutch

Ethnicity White

Gender Copyright © OpenFemale Briefing, 2017 Sexual orientation Heterosexual

Medical history None declared

Insurance company Services provided by

Dates of travel

Country Central African Republic (CAR)

Entry requirements Business visa Six month’s passport validity One blank page on passport Return air ticket Yellow fever certificate

Location(s)

Purpose of trip

History in country Traveller has not visited CAR before, but is familiar with francophone Africa, fragile states and the presence of armed groups. conducted assessments in CAR in and , and published a report in . This trip will be the second time that staff have travelled to the country for research on

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 1 Local partners/contacts

Local emergency number 610 600

There has reportedly been some success working with the French embassy medical officer. Call 7221 3530

Consular assistance Dutch embassy in Sudan: Copyright © OpenStreet Briefing, 47, no. 2017 76, Khartoum 2, Khartoum [email protected], +249 183 480 315, +249 912 130 041

French embassy in Central African Republic: Avenue Charles-de-Gaulle, [email protected] +236 21 61 30 00

EU delegation in Central African Republic: Avenue Barthélémy Boganda, BP 1298, Bangui [email protected] + 236 75 20 29 24

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 2 THREAT ASSESSMENT HIGH

Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017

Figure 1. Dutch foreign ministry travel advice for the Central African Republic.

The Central African Republic is a high-threat operating environment (see table 1). Both the Dutch foreign ministry and the US state department have travel warnings in place for CAR, and advise against all travel to the country. The Netherlands does not have consular representation in the country, which is covered by its embassy in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. As an ‘unrepresented EU citizen’, the traveller will have to rely on the French embassy – the only EU embassy in Bangui – for emergency assistance in CAR. should also confirm with the EU delegation in Bangui or the European External Action Service headquarters in Brussels what assistance – if any – they might provide in an emergency.

Although working for a US organisation, the traveller will not be able to rely on the US embassy for assistance, as she is not a US citizen. In any case, consular services for US citizens in CAR are provided by the US embassy in Yaounde, Cameroon. Furthermore, the US state department advises all US citizens who are in CAR to leave the country, and those who remain to have safety and evacuation plans that do not rely on assistance from the US government.

If she has not done so already, the traveller should complete a hostile environment awareness training (HEAT) course – that includes first aid training – prior to travel to the Central African Republic.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 3 Unlike most Westerners in CAR, the traveller will not have the in-country support and emergency assistance that those working for a multilateral organisation, international humanitarian aid agency or multinational corporation will have. In addition, , the service provider for ’s current travel insurance, is under no obligation under their terms of service to provide assistance in Central African Republic, as there is a US state department travel warning in place for the country (though they have rescued clients from CAR in the past). should contact to confirm what insurance arrangements are in place for CAR.

will need to conduct a security risk assessment based on the 17 priority security, safety and health threats to the traveller that Open Briefing has identified in the Central African Republic. These threats are highlighted in the box over the page.

These threats, combined with the lack of consular assistance and other in-country support in CAR, make it essential that develops a robust security plan for the Central African Republic Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 if the trip goes ahead. This should include standard operating procedures (SOPs) and contingency plans. At a minimum, the SOPs should cover a PACE (Primary, Alternative, Contingency, Emergency) communications plan, a check-in schedule with procedures for escalating missed check-ins, and field travel procedures (convoys and checkpoints/roadblocks). The contingency plans should include, at a minimum, hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans, including medevac.

Table 1. Summary of threat ratings for the Central African Republic.

Threat area Score Threat rating

International relations 8 High

Political violence 9 Critical

Civil unrest 9 Critical

Kidnap 8 High

Crime 9 Critical

Environment 6 Medium

Infrastructure 9 Critical

Medical 8 High

Fraud and corruption 8 High

Overview 8.2 High

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 4 Priority threats in the Central African Republic

1. Traveller is involved in a serious road traffic accident while travelling between locations in CAR.

2. Traveller is kidnapped by armed bandits at an unofficial roadblock while travelling in rural areas between locations in CAR.

3. Traveller is robbed by Zaraguinas (armed bandits) at an unofficial roadblock while travelling between locations in CAR.

4. Central African security personnel rob or attempt to extort a bribe from the traveller at an improvised checkpoint.

5. Central African security personnel intimidate traveller in an attempt to stop her work in CAR. Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 6. Armed militia attack the traveller in an attempt to stop her work in CAR.

7. Traveller is caught up in violence between ex-Séléka and anti-balaka fighters.

8. Traveller is caught up in indiscriminate mob violence in Bangui or other major town.

9. Traveller is assaulted during anti-Western demonstration outside US or French embassy or UN headquarters in Bangui.

10. Traveller is targeted by armed civilian groups while travelling to or from the international airport in Bangui.

11. Lack of GSM cell phone coverage outside Bangui makes it difficult to call up emergency assistance.

12. Extremely limited healthcare facilities in CAR leads to inadequate emergency treatment.

13. Traveller contracts Zika virus from mosquito bite while pregnant or planning pregnancy.

14. Traveller contracts malaria from mosquito bite.

15. Traveller contracts hepatitis A, cholera or typhoid by consuming contaminated food or water.

16. Traveller contracts meningococcal meningitis while in .

17. Traveller’s travel insurance is invalidated under the terms of service due to there being a US state department travel warning in place for the Central African Republic.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 5 The Central African Republic has endured decades of political instability resulting in numerous insurgent movements, high levels of crime, protracted civil unrest and an extremely underdeveloped infrastructure. The government has failed to tackle numerous insurgencies in the country, and sectarian violence is widespread. Over recent years, the responsibility for enforcing order has lay with various foreign forces from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the African Union, France, the European Union and the United Nations, which have failed to effectively disarm the rebel groups.

Successive governments in CAR have failed to assert their authority over the country and have been vulnerable to repeated coups and rebellions. The government of Faustin-Archange Touadéra, in power since March 2016, is not supported by functioning institutions or an effective military, and a stable polity will remain elusive without sustained international assistance.

This problemCopyright is exacerbated © Open by widespread Briefing, violence2017 between former Séléka coalition fighters (known as ex-Séléka), who temporarily seized power in a coup in March 2013, and Christian ‘anti- balaka’ militias. Following the resignation of the Séléka president, Michel Djotodia, in January 2014, the Muslim Séléka influence in the capital has declined, but reprisal attacks by Christian anti- balaka militants have increased nationwide. While the rebels continue to clash, high levels of indiscriminate violence make operations and internal travel in CAR difficult.

The violent conflict has affected nearly the entire population of CAR, and there is a severe humanitarian crisis in the country. Some 2.4 million people, over half the population, are in dire need of assistance. As of August 2017, there are nearly 600,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in the country, and over 480,000 CAR refugees. Half of households in CAR face food insecurity. A quarter of the people living in the capital, Bangui, are food insecure. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has received less than a third of the nearly $500 million it requires for the emergency response plan for the country. CAR is the lowest ranked country on the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (see table 2).

The failure of security forces and international peacekeepers to halt the spread of violence has resulted in rising levels of mob violence. Large crowds of people armed with machetes and knives frequently raid villages throughout the country, burning and looting property and lynching people who obstruct them. Riots occur periodically on the outskirts of the international airport in Bangui, posing an elevated security risk to transits to and from the airport. The traveller should ensure that her flight arrives in Bangui during daylight hours and arrange for a local contact to collect her from the airport.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 6 Table 2. Social, political and economic rankings for the Central African Republic.

Index Ranking

Economic freedom Mostly unfree Heritage Foundation, 2017 #151 out of 180 countries (51.8/100

Press freedom Not free Reporters without Borders, 2017 #113 out of 180 countries (36.12/100)

Civil and political rights Not free Freedom House, 2017 (10/100)

Corruption perception Corrupt Transparency International, 2016 #159 out of 176 countries (20/100)

Ease ofCopyright doing business © Open Briefing, 2017Not conducive to business operations World Bank, 2016 #185 out of 190 countries

Human development Low human development UN Development Programme, 2016 #188 out of 188 countries (0.352)

Crime poses an additional threat to stability in CAR. Criminal networks, diamond smugglers and bandits are prominent in the northeast region of the country. Ethnically opposed rebel groups compete for diamonds in the area, burning down mining villages and extorting taxes from inhabitants. The government lacks the resources or incentives to address this issue and without a functional army, the prevalence of crime in the area is likely to continue undiminished. Official and unofficial road blocks occur in both Bangui and in rural areas. Travellers may be forced to hand over cash and valuables in order to pass through them. There is also a kidnap risk at these roadblocks. should review its kidnap and ransom policies and confirm the kidnap negotiation services provided under its travel insurance.

Operations in CAR are likely to be further undermined by the country’s severely underdeveloped infrastructure. Power supply and mobile communications are non-existent outside of the capital, forcing international travellers to rely on electric generators and satellite communications. The traveller should ensure that they have both suitable communications devices and the ability to charge them while travelling outside the capital. Poorly maintained roads and airports make both domestic and international travel difficult and this issue is exacerbated by annual flooding during the May-October rainy season. The long-term weather forecast for CAR from onwards is an average of 32°C (89.6°F), with thunderstorms most days. Petrol is expensive, and can be difficult to locate outside the capital.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 7 Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017

Figure 2. Map of the Central African Republic showing potential locations the traveller will visit.

Although infrastructure in Bangui is better developed than the rest of the country, it is still severely limited. The majority of roads are unpaved and companies are typically forced to rely on their own electricity supply. Power supply is inconsistent, outages are common and businesses usually rely on diesel generators to produce their own electricity. In addition, despite the presence of monetary exchange services, there are very few ATMs in Bangui and credit cards are not widely accepted.

Travellers in Bangui face a myriad of security threats. Rebel and criminal violence is pervasive and following the coup in March 2013 there have been several incidents of murder, rape and looting in the capital. Amid rising levels of violence and poverty, civil unrest frequently breaks out in Bangui, disrupting travel to and within the city.

Armed violence remains a perennial concern in Bangui. Despite the leader of the Séléka rebel coalition, Michel Djotodia, resigning as president in January 2014 and the arrival of international peacekeepers in the city, violence between supporters of the Muslim Séléka rebellion and Christian militias has continued unabated. Reprisal attacks by the anti-balaka militias on the Muslim population have increased following the departure of Djotodia. The anti-balaka raids in Bangui are supported by the ousted president François Bozizé, who provides the militias with mercenaries and heavy infantry weapons, including machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. The proliferation of arms in the capital is likely to continue to undermine security.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 8 Rising anger over the government’s failure to prevent the escalation of violence in the capital has led to numerous street protests, riots and mob violence. Large-scale demonstrations occur regularly and are prone to disrupting travel to and within Bangui. Flights to and from the capital are often delayed or cancelled due to security concerns. In addition, roads are frequently blocked by protesters. Large street demonstrations have increased since the Séléka coup in March 2013, and while food prices rise and the government fails to restore stability to the capital, they are likely to continue.

There are incidents of demonstrations with distinctly anti-Western sentiment taking hold in the capital. There is a risk that amid the ongoing crisis in CAR, anti-Western attitudes will be directed at foreign travellers in the capital. This is particularly likely in the event that Western-backed peace initiatives either fail to restore security or provoke a backlash among the local population.

According to ACAPS, the security situation remains volatile across Haute- and Basse-Kotto, Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 , Nana-Mambere, -Pende and Nana Grebizi. Security has deteriorated in the southeast of the country, with significant fighting over May-June in Basse-Kotto, Haute-Kotto, and Haut-Mbomou. This continued through July and August and violence is also escalating in Ouham since end of July. Outbreaks of violence are largely due to power struggles between armed groups, and also banditry, mainly attacks on cattle traders. An increasing number of residents have been resorting to vigilantism as security forces are lacking.

We provide a more detailed analysis of the international relations, political violence, civil unrest, kidnap, crime, environment, infrastructure, medical and fraud and corruption threats present in the Central African Republic in the following pages.

The traveller should sign up to the 24/7 BZ Information Service Extended from the Dutch foreign ministry in order to receive email and SMS alerts about the security situation in the Central African Republic and assist emergency response in a crisis. https://informatieservice.nederlandwereldwijd.nl

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 9 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HIGH

Central African Republic’s inability to prevent violence spilling across its borders have fuelled tensions with its neighbours. Rebel groups from several neighbouring countries have used CAR’s largely ungoverned territory as a base to conduct further attacks from. This has prompted frequent incursions from neighbouring countries attempting to secure their border regions. In addition, the UN, AU, ECCAS and the former colonial power, France, have all deployed forces to CAR in a bid to protect their interests and secure the country.

Chad has a long history of interference in CAR. Chadian rebel groups allied with CAR insurgency movements in the northeast of the country in 2010, and the Chadian president, Idriss Déby, has ongoing concerns that instability in CAR will affect his territory. This has prompted him to intervene in CAR onCopyright numerous occasions.© Open FrançoisBriefing, Bozizé 2017 came to power in 2003 in a coup orchestrated from N’Djamena, and it is widely reported that Chad facilitated the Séléka’s rise to power and the coup that took place in March 2013. Chadian peacekeepers were deployed in the country as part of the AU mission there until April 2014, when N’Djamena withdrew the troops. It is unclear what provoked the withdrawal, but the announcement came amid repeated allegations that Chadian troops were acting on behalf of Muslim militias and abusing their power in the country. The withdrawal came less than a week after an incident in which Chadian peacekeepers opened fire on civilians in a Bangui market, killing at least 30 people and wounding more than 300 others. The UN has since stated that the attack was unprovoked, fuelling anti-Chadian sentiment in CAR.

Bangui’s relationship with Cameroon is precarious. The Cameroonian government was concerned in the aftermath of Bozizé’s overthrow that his supporters had infiltrated Cameroonian territory and were intending to set up bases there. In August 2013, the Cameroonian government closed its border with CAR and in September 2013, Yaounde deployed troops to its eastern border to prevent infiltration by CAR militias. Cameroonian border posts are on high alert, and it is unlikely that this tension will dissipate until the rebellions in north-western CAR have been quelled. On 17 July 2017, Cameroon once again at least partially closed its border with CAR in response to the ongoing violence between ex-Séléka and anti-balaka militias.

Uganda deployed some 2,500 troops to southern CAR in September 2012 to deter the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) presence in the area. Eight hundred Ugandan soldiers remain in CAR, though these will be withdrawn by May 2018.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 10 France had 2,000 troops in CAR, which were supported by around 1,000 EU troops, with a mandate to restore stability and support the AU mission in the country. The French government claimed to have made some progress in protecting civilians, assisting the transitional government and demobilising rebel groups. On 30 October 2016, France announced it officially ended , though about 300 French soldiers remain in the country to assist the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and EU training mission.

Regional troops from both the AU and ECCAS were also operating in CAR. The ECCAS peacekeeping force, the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in CAR (MICOPAX), merged with AU troops in the region in March 2013, creating a joint force of 6,000 troops.

In April 2014, the European Union Force RCA (EUFOR RCA) began operations in Bangui under a UN-mandate, and took over security at the international airport in Bangui. The mission ended its Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 mandate in March 2015. The EU currently has a training mission in CAR (EUTM RCA), which aims to reform the security sector by training the future CAR army.

The UN struggled to come to an agreement with the AU over the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission to CAR, and spent six months debating the issue in the Security Council. In April 2014, following the withdrawal of Chadian AU peacekeepers from CAR, the UN announced that it would send 10,000 troops and 1,800 police officers to the country in September of that year. The mission assumed authority from the AU mission there and re-hatted the 6,000 active AU troops under the UN mandate to restore stability to CAR. The arrival of the mission raised hopes the security situation would stabilise and the United States reopened its embassy in Bangui in September 2014, though attacks continue in the capital and instability persists. In March 2015, the UN added a further 1,000 troops to the mission amid widespread criticism that it was failing to prevent outbreaks of violence and restore stability to the country.

MINUSCA currently deploys nearly 13,500 personnel to CAR, including 9,700 soldiers and 2,000 police. The current UN Security Council authorisation expires on 15 November 2017.

Both MINUSCA and Operation Sangaris have faced dozens of allegations of physical and sexual abuse by soldiers in the Central African Republic. French soldiers were accused of sexually assaulting children in an IDP centre in M’Poko near Bangui in early between December 2013 and June 2014; however, the panel of French judges investigating the claims did not seek charges against the soldiers. At least one other allegation of French soldiers sexually abusing children in the country has come to light. In total, almost 100 girls in the Central African Republic have said that they were sexually abused by international peacekeepers. Most of the allegations relate to contingents from Burundi and Gabon in the Kemo region between 2013 and 2015.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 11 POLITICAL VIOLENCE CRITICAL

Political violence has undermined stability in CAR since it gained independence from France in 1960. Large areas of the country are outside the reach of the central government, allowing numerous rebel groups to emerge unchallenged. In March 2013, a coalition of three rebel groups known as the Séléka alliance seized Bangui and overthrew the president, François Bozizé, leading to a complete breakdown of state authority and plunging the country into chaos.

The influence of the Séléka coalition in Bangui was reduced by the resignation from the presidency of its leader, Michel Djotodia, under considerable international pressure in January 2014, though he was later reinstated as the coalition’s leader in July 2014. The rebel group dispersed from the capital following the inauguration of Catherine Samba-Panza as interim president in January 2014. However,Copyright the insurgents © regroupedOpen Briefing, in the centre 2017 of CAR, in the towns of Bria and Kaga-Bandoro, and the group continued to pose a significant security threat in the northwest of the country. The transitional government attempted to re-launch the army after its collapse following the Séléka rebellion. However, the loyalty, discipline and effectiveness of the army remains uncertain.

The reduction in the presence of the Muslim Séléka coalition in Bangui, resulted in a rise in reprisal attacks by Christian militias, known as anti-balaka. These groups receive support from Bozizé, who has provided them with mercenaries and heavy infantry weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns. The anti-balaka launch frequent attacks on Muslim villages, and became increasingly prominent in the capital following Djotodia’s resignation. The group is also active outside of the capital, and there are numerous reports of anti-balaka elements attacking and burning rural Muslim villages.

Logistical challenges and ongoing clashes between various anti-balaka and ex-Séléka militias resulted in repeated decisions to postpone planned presidential and parliamentary elections aimed at ending the tenure of the transitional government. General elections were eventually held on 30 December 2015 to elect the president and national assembly. However, none of the presidential candidates received more than 50% of the vote and the Transitional Constitutional Court annulled the results of the national assembly elections. A second round of the presidential elections and a re-run of the parliamentary vote took place on 14 February 2016, with parliamentary run-offs on 31 March 2016. Bozizé’s former prime minister, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, of the Union for Central African Renewal won the second round of the presidential election, and assumed office on 30 March 2016.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 12 Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017

The current government has been unable to contain the militia violence that has plagued the country. Attacks are regularly reported, though the full extent of violence in many rural areas is uncertain due to the difficulty of accessing the region. The government lacks the military capacity to deal with this threat, and ex-Séléka raids continue unchallenged by state authorities. Armed groups are currently in control of around 70% of the country.

Although several rounds of peace talks between the ex-Séléka and anti-balaka militant groups have been held, little genuine progress has been made. As the groups have become increasingly factionalised, negotiations have become less effective and violence has persisted despite some agreements. A peace agreement was signed by both the anti-balaka and the ex-Séléka in Nairobi in April 2015, though the terms of the agreement were not disclosed. A round of negotiations took place in May 2015 when politicians and rebel groups initiated a national reconciliation forum aiming to end the conflict in the country. The forum discussed security, justice and governance and included the AU, France and the UN. However, little lasting progress was made and several weeks later militias clashed in Bangui. In October 2016, some of the ex-Séléka factions reunited under the Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central Africa (FPRC); however, this has already reportedly split into two factions in Bria.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 13 A new armed group emerged in the western part of CAR in late 2015. The Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation group (3R) was initially formed to protect the minority Puehl population from attacks by Christian anti-balaka militias, but its real goal appears to be to profit from the crisis. The group’s violence has displaced thousands of people in the Ouham Pende region. In a recent development, 3R has occupied the north-western city of since 23 September 2017. Government troops and MINUSCA are reportedly monitoring the situation.

In addition, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is active in the southeast of CAR. The group is estimated to currently have only 100 fighters, but still has the capacity to cause havoc in rural parts of the country, where it has kidnapped, raped and murdered civilians. The severe weakness of Central African Armed Forces has allowed the LRA to operate in remote areas largely unchallenged. The LRA’s leader, Joseph Kony, has been rumoured to be in poor health since 2013, andCopyright in November © of Open that year, Briefing, there were 2017 reports that the Djotodia government was negotiating his surrender. However, Kony remains at large today. In April 2017, both the United States and Uganda ended their hunt for Kony and the LRA in the Central African Republic, as the group no longer poses a security threat to Uganda. The move is likely to bolster the LRA in CAR, and lead to a rise in attacks on civilians and aid workers in the country. For example, on 27 April 2017, the remains of a local aid worker were discovered in Selim after he had been abducted by suspected LRA gunmen while travelling between Selim and Rafai.

On 8 September 2017, the UN human rights working group on mercenaries and foreign fighters published a report warning of escalating violence in CAR if the ex-Séléka, anti-Balaka, and newly formed groups, such as 3R, were not effectively dismantled. Amnesty International also warned of a surge in violence along sectarian lines and the UN’s emergency relief coordinator, Stephen O’Brien, said that the country was demonstrating early signs of genocide. Violence has significantly increased recently in south-eastern CAR, where splintered former anti-balaka groups are targeting each other and Muslim civilians. The UN registered at least 10,000 refugees from the city of Bema in August. Areas such as Basse-Kotto, which have enjoyed periods of relative calm over the past few years, have also recently returned to violence. On 5 October 2017, Human Rights Watch reported that rape and sexual slavery have been used as weapons of war by both the ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka.

Armed groups have repeatedly targeted Humanitarian aid workers in the Central African Republic. According to the Aid Worker Security Database, 12 nationals working predominantly for local NGOs and the Central African Red Cross Society have been killed and two others injured so far this year in CAR.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 14 On 6 May 2017, A UN spokesperson said four unnamed international aid groups were withdrawing from the northern region of the country and moving to Bangui due to increasing attacks against them in the area. The UN humanitarian office in Bria reported that assailants looted their offices after clashes broke out on 20 June, which killed up to 100 people according to estimates by local authorities. On 26 June, unknown armed men shot and killed a Red Cross volunteer in the organisation’s compound in . Médécins sans Frontieres (MSF) suspended operations in Bangassou and in July due to rising insecurity. On 3 August, six Red Cross aid workers were killed during a crisis meeting at a medical centre in Gambo, 75 km northeast of Bangassou. Nine peacekeepers where reportedly also killed in the attack. Mercy Crops evacuated workers from the villages of Niem and Yéléwa in the western regions on 29 August after threats to staff. On 4 September, an aid worker working for an international NGO was stabbed and critically injured in front a hospital in Bria. Three days later, another aid worker working for an international NGO was killed in BogidiCopyright when ex ©-Séléka Open gunmen Briefing, intercepted 2017 his vehicle on the road from Batangafo to .

Part of the problem is that the UN integrated mission is blurring the line between political, military and humanitarian action, and aid workers are finding it difficult to present themselves as independent to the other international agendas. Armed groups also often target UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic. On 8 May 2017, four African peacekeepers were killed and eight others injured (with one still missing in action) when anti-balaka fighters attacked a convoy near Yogofongo village, close to the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. On 21 February 2017, four UN peacekeepers were wounded when their patrol was ambushed by ex-Séléka fighters outside of in Ouaka prefecture.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 15 CIVIL UNREST CRITICAL

Extensive poverty, unemployment and ongoing instability have created ideal conditions for civil unrest in CAR. Street demonstrations calling for more effective government, better living conditions and an end to widespread political violence frequently attract large crowds. The government lacks the resources to respond effectively to large protests and mob violence, and they typically take place unchallenged by the authorities.

Although most protests are directed at the government, there have been occasional incidents of demonstrations conveying anti-Western, in particular anti-French, sentiment. For example, in December 2012, protesters marched to the US embassy carrying clubs and stopping cars with foreign nationals inside. The demonstrators also threw rocks at the French embassy, calling for the Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 French government to do more to prevent the increasing spiral of violence in the country.

The widespread perception that security forces have failed to halt rebel violence has resulted in a significant rise in street protests and mob violence. These demonstrations frequently disrupt travel to and within CAR. In August 2013, between 5,000 and 6,000 people gathered at Central African Republic’s main international airport, Bangui M’poko, to complain about the poor security situation in the country. The protesters spontaneously occupied the runways and prevented several flights from landing, forcing planes to be diverted to Cameroon. Sporadic rioting often turns violent and is rarely controlled by any state-security force. In September 2013, between 2,000 and 3,000 rioters took to the streets of Bangui to demand a peaceful resolution to the crisis, while a further peace march, involving thousands of participants, took place in Bangui in August 2014.

On 6 July 2017, thousands of protesters took to the streets in and Bria to demand the departure of the Mauritanian and Moroccan contingents of MINUSCA. The protesters in Bambari demanded the dismissal of the Mauritanian contingent, which they accuse of abuses against non- Muslim civilians. In Bria, demonstrators protested against Moroccan soldiers, which they claim support the former ex-Séléka forces in the region. The protesters voiced their support for the Portuguese, Congolese, Burundian and Gabonese troops.

Demonstrations of this scale impede movement within the capital, making many roads impassable and resulting in widespread violence, looting and burning of buildings. As high levels of insecurity persist amid rising food prices and widespread unemployment, spontaneous unrest will remain an operational concern across the country.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 16 Tensions between Christian and Muslim communities have resulted in mob violence and revenge killings. Groups of civilians have murdered those they hold responsible for ongoing instability in the country. Mob violence is particularly prominent in Bangui. The presence of armed civilian gangs has resulted in a deterioration of security in the area surrounding the international airport in Bangui, where the country’s largest refugee camp is located. Vigilante groups have repeatedly targeted the camps in looting, robbery and murder operations, prompting thousands of people to flee and elevating the risk of violent attacks when transiting to and from the airport. International troops have been unable to halt the persistent rioting and the threat of indiscriminate violence remains high.

The ongoing political crisis has left few functioning businesses in the capital, and industrial action is rare. Nevertheless, there are intermittent reports of transport workers going on temporary strikes over violence directed at their workers, often causing significant travel delays. Central African law provides Copyrightfor all workers, © exceptOpen for Briefing, senior-level 2017 civil servants and members of the security forces, to join unions and bargain collectively without prior authorisation. However, strikes require extensive prior notice and lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Most unions must provide eight days prior notice before going on strike. The government reserves the right to arbitrarily cancel strikes, on the basis that it is not in the public interest, though it rarely invokes this measure.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 17 KIDNAP HIGH

There is a high risk of kidnapping in CAR. This is closely associated with the activities of rebel groups and widespread lawlessness affecting much of the country.

Abductions in the country predominantly target Central African nationals. These tend to involve armed groups of criminal gangs either forcibly recruiting local nationals or holding them for ransom. There has also been a recent uptick in kidnappings at improvised roadblocks in rural areas across the country. Although it is rarer, there is also a precedent for foreign nationals to be abducted. Westerners, and in particular French expatriates, have been abducted in the past. In November 2009, a Sudanese armed group, Freedom Eagles of Africa, abducted two French aid workers in . The victims, who worked for Triangle Charity, were taken over the border into Sudan and freed four months later. It is unclear whether a ransom was paid for the hostages, but this is the most likelyCopyright explanation © for Open their release. Briefing, The 2017incident prompted six NGOs to temporarily suspend their work in CAR. Another French aid worker was abducted on 19 January 2015 in Bangui, but was released unharmed four days later.

Attacks on foreign nationals are not always financially motivated. In October 2014, militants kidnapped a Polish missionary working in Baboua. The militants, who belonged to the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC), demanded the release of their leader, who was being held in Cameroon, in exchange for the release of the missionary. The missionary was released in November 2014, after a raid by the Cameroonian Army on towns being held by the FDPC in the western region of CAR. The Cameroonian government later released the group’s leader in exchange for tens of other hostages being held by the FDPC.

Kidnappings have also previously targeted government officials and intergovernmental authorities, typically in exchange for the release of imprisoned members of militant groups. In January 2015, suspected ex-Séléka militants kidnapped Mayor Thomas Ndomete and at least 10 other government officials at a roadblock around 10 km outside the town of Kaga Bandoro. The incident occurred on the same day that suspected anti-balaka militants kidnapped the Central African youth and sports minister in Bangui. The incidents took place just days after suspected anti-balaka militants abducted a UN employee in Bangui, though she was released hours later and it was unclear what the motivation for her abduction had been.

Highways in CAR are high-risk areas for kidnapping. Armed bandits, locally referred to as Zaraguinas or coupeurs de route, abduct the children of cattle herders on roads across the country and demand extortionate ransom payments from their families. The groups are particularly prevalent during the dry season and on the highways in the northwest of the country. Although CAR nationals tend to be the main target of Zaraguinas, anyone travelling internally on the country’s highways is at risk.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 18 CRIME CRITICAL

Successive governments in CAR have been unable to provide law enforcement in large parts of the country. The further one gets from Bangui, the more loosely laws are enforced and more subjectivity applied. Crime, including street-level crime, gang violence, smuggling and illegal mining, is rife. The lack of an effective police force or judiciary has intensified some of these issues. Crime can be directly attributed to continued political instability. When coupled with poor infrastructure, ethnic/religious conflict, and a less than effective central government, there are few options for the country’s youth. Many individuals turn to militias and rebel groups to earn a living, often illegally.

Street-level crime as well as rebel and gang violence is pervasive in Bangui. The abundance of Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 guns in the capital has exacerbated this problem. Reports of looting, rape and murder are widespread.

There is a record of residential crime targeting expatriates in CAR. Companies working in the region are forced to rely on 24-hour private security guards to protect offices and private property. Break-ins tend to be opportunistic and conducted by small groups of armed bandits while guards are sleeping. However, there are reports of more sophisticated attacks involving thieves collaborating with security personnel to gain access to property.

Within Bangui, crimes against foreigners occur periodically. Neighbourhoods where government leaders, business professionals, NGOs and foreign diplomats, while to some degree safer because of the increased security presence, are still susceptible to being targeted by criminals. Home/compound invasions occur most often where security is the weakest, where poor exterior lighting exists, and/or where there is poor access control. Generally, criminals do not kill their victims, but the threat of force or the use of force is not uncommon. Attempts to resist criminals are often met with violence. If possible, should complete building risk assessments for traveller’s accommodation prior to travel. If this is not possible, the traveller will need to carry out dynamic risk assessments during her stay.

Outside the capital, NGO staff members and other expatriates are regularly the victims of crimes (armed robbery, aggravated battery, homicide). Along the main supply route from Cameroon to Bangui, criminal activity, especially banditry, is constant.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 19 Drug use and smuggling in CAR has become increasingly commonplace amid the absence of effective government and security authorities. In June 2015, customs officials seized 21.3 tonnes of drugs and counterfeit medicines on roads leading to neighbouring Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It was not immediately clear if the drugs were being brought into CAR or smuggled out, but the incident is indicative of the prevalence of drug smuggling routes throughout the region. Note that penalties for the use and possession of drugs in CAR are severe.

The crime risk to international staff in CAR is greatest in remote areas of the northeast. Governments have had limited success in administering regions beyond the capital and the northeast has become a launching pad for armed groups involved in smuggling and poaching from neighbouring countries. Smugglers from Chad, Sudan and CAR operate around the diamond districts surrounding Ndele. The rebels regularly rob towns and steal diamonds from miners. Note that buying diamonds or precious stones is prohibited except through agents authorised by the government.Copyright Many villages © Open in north Briefing,-eastern CAR2017 have set up self-defence units to combat the crime, and clashes between these groups and armed rebels are common.

Travel within CAR is impeded by bandits. Known locally as Zaraguinas or coupeurs de routes, armed bandits attack traffic throughout the country and demand taxes. The groups pose the greatest threat to vehicles travelling in the east of the country, obstructing trade routes from CAR into Sudan and South Sudan.

Security has become largely privatised in CAR due to the undermanned national police force, even in Bangui, and the limited gendarmerie presence in rural districts. There have been reports that some law enforcement officers are perpetrators of crimes. They use their weapons and uniforms in the commission of crimes, further weakening confidence in law enforcement. For example, corrupt security personnel are known to establish improvised ‘official’ roadblocks, and demand money and valuables – sometimes at gunpoint – in order for the travellers to continue.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 20 ENVIRONMENT MEDIUM

The main environmental threats in CAR concern flooding, usually during the rainy season. From June to September in the northern regions and from May to October in the south, there are daily rainstorms and many roads can become impassable. Access to food and water deteriorates rapidly during the rainy season and health crises are also common. Heavy rains in Bangui in 2005 destroyed the homes of nearly 20,000 people. Heavy rains that began on 26 August 2017 destroyed more than 2,000 homes in and around Bangui, particularly the commune of Bégoua. Many streets in the area were inaccessible due to the floods.

The long-term weather forecast for CAR from onwards is an average of 32°C (89.6 °F), with thunderstorms most days.

EarthquakesCopyright are another © Openenvironmental Briefing, risk in2017 CAR, though these are not normally powerful. The southwest of the country is particularly prone to seismic activity. Boda experienced four earthquakes between 3.9 and 4.7 magnitude in 2005. The quakes caused no infrastructure damage or casualties. There was a 5.5 magnitude earthquake near in Kémo prefecture in 2007. There have been no tremors recorded in CAR in the last 10 years.

Finally, indiscriminate burning to clear land and to dispose of rubbish creates smoke to a level that can obscure airport runways around the country. This effectively closes air transportation.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 21 INFRASTRUCTURE CRITICAL

Weak governance, years of conflict and the absence of public funding have severely undermined infrastructure development in CAR. There is a critical shortage of electricity and mobile phone coverage, transport and banking facilities are in short supply, and clean water and sanitation is limited. There is a noticeable lack of infrastructure outside Bangui, and rural areas are particularly badly affected. Amid continued investor concerns over the political and security environments, there is an extremely low chance of any major investment in infrastructure projects in the near future.

Travelling internally in CAR is challenging, particularly during the wet season (May to November). Road conditions are extremely poor, and only 700 km of 5,376 km of national roads are surfaced. The flow Copyrightof traffic is disrupted © Open by numerousBriefing, pothole 2017s, degraded areas and flooding during the rainy season. Petrol is expensive, and can be difficult to locate outside the capital. There is no railroad infrastructure in CAR, and buses are the main form of public transport, though these are often dangerously overcrowded. Road accidents occur regularly in the Central African Republic as passengers crowd cargo trucks due to a lack of public transport and poor road conditions. At least 78 people were killed on 5 July 2017 when a cargo truck carrying passengers overturned on the road between Bambari and Ippy.

Traffic controls and street lights are limited in Bangui and non-existent in the rest of CAR. Traffic police may be found at busy intersections in Bangui but are poorly trained and are often ineffective. Many drivers ignore traffic laws and any attempt to enforce them. Traffic accidents are common, especially at intersections where traffic controls do not exist.

The British foreign office reports that armed patrols have currently set up several roadblocks across the country, including in Bangui and outlying areas. There have been indiscriminate and violent attacks on travellers in remote areas. Vehicles have been fired on, and passengers killed or injured. In many of these cases, victims have been robbed or taken hostage and vehicles taken or burnt.

CAR is poorly connected internationally. The only international airport, located in Bangui, has dilapidated runways and is in need of major maintenance works. The airport does receive international flights, but these can be cancelled or delayed due to ongoing security concerns. The nearest port is in Doula, Cameroon, which is 1,700 km away. The road to Douala is closed during the rainy season, and there is no railroad link to the city.

In the event of unrest in the country, airport, land border and road closures may occur with little or no notice.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 22 CAR lacks adequate banking infrastructure to ensure cash flows, a situation that was aggravated by widespread looting of banks during the coup in March 2013. There are very few ATMs, even in Bangui, and credit cards are not widely accepted. All purchases must be made in cash, including airline tickets and hotel rooms. Facilities for monetary exchange only exist in Bangui.

Electricity in CAR is unreliable, there are frequent outages and power supply is absent in most rural areas. Only Bangui benefits GSM coverage, and international staff often have to rely on satellite communications as an alternative (note that sat phones should be registered with the Bangui or regional Agence chargée de la Régulation des Télécommunications offices).

Access to sanitation and safe water in CAR is among the worst in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sewage networks do not exist, and the country is dependent on boreholes and traditional latrines.

Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 23 MEDICAL HIGH

Medical facilities are extremely limited in CAR. Protracted instability has forced many aid agencies to stay away from the region, and although basic provisions exist in Bangui, many medicines are not available or may be counterfeit. The traveller must ensure that they have adequate supplies of any medication they require. There are regional UN hospitals that may provide some level of care. There are few ambulance services, and none that meet international standards. Primary health care workers, especially in rural areas, lack adequate professional training, supplies and equipment, and instances of incorrect and improper treatment regularly occur. Most serious medical conditions or injuries require evacuation to Europe.

There are three private hospitals in Bangui that provide limited medical facilities, and the National UniversityCopyright Hospital Center © Open has some Briefing, French 2017military medical officers on the staff. The French embassy in Bangui also has a medical centre, which should be considered in an emergency. However, should confirm in advance with the arrangements for emergency medical treatment in CAR.

The traveller should complete or update their first aid training as required, and carry a comprehensive individual first aid kit (IFAK), including antibiotics and equipment to manage catastrophic bleeding. If not done so already, the traveller should establish their blood group.

Intense political volatility has resulted in extensive population movements and a shortage of crops. Consequently, there is a high risk of health and food crises in CAR, and cases of malaria, tuberculosis and diarrhoea are increasing. Epidemics of cholera are common throughout the country.

Outbreaks of yellow fever also occur periodically in CAR. There were three fatal cases of yellow fever in 2009 following an epidemic of the disease in Yaloke-Bossembelle, Ombella Mpoko, Bagamongone, and Basse Kotto. A valid yellow fever vaccination certificate is a requirement for entry into CAR.

A variety of other vaccine-preventable diseases are present in CAR, including cholera, diphtheria, hepatitis A, hepatitis B, measles, meningococcal meningitis, polio, rabies, tetanus, tuberculosis and typhoid. In addition, non-vaccine preventable diseases, including malaria, HIV, sleeping sickness and schistosomiasis, are present in CAR.

The Dutch National Coordination Centre for Travel Advice (LCR) recommends the following vaccinations for those travelling to the Central African Republic:

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 24 • Yellow fever • Hepatitis A • Diphtheria • Measles

The LCR suggests discussing vaccinations for hepatitis B, tuberculosis, rabies and meningococcal meningitis with a medical professional. Note that Batangafo in north-western CAR lies within the African meningitis belt, and experienced meningitis outbreaks in 2004 and 2016; however, the disease is most common during the dry season (November–May). The LCR also recommends taking steps to prevent mosquito-borne diseases, such as Zika, dengue and malaria. Malaria is responsible for 13.8% of all deaths in CAR, with 26,000 cases reported in the first four months of 2017 alone. The traveller will need to take malaria chemoprophylaxis before, during and after the proposed trip (noting that there is chloroquine drug-resistance in CAR). CopyrightAfter discussion © Open with their Briefing, doctor, the 2017 traveller should also consider taking a course of Coartem 80/480 high-strength malaria treatment with them to CAR, and self-administer the drug at the first signs of malaria symptoms. Other insect-borne diseases present in the Central African Republic include lymphatic filariasis (elephantiasis) and sleeping sickness (African trypanosomiasis).

The World Health Organization states that pregnant women should not travel to the Central African Republic because Zika infection during pregnancy can cause serious birth defects. In addition, the traveller should speak to her doctor before travelling to CAR if she is planning pregnancy. WHO also recommends that routine vaccinations are up-to-date and that most travellers should have the typhoid vaccine and consider the cholera vaccine if travelling to an area of active cholera transmission. The CAR government declared a cholera epidemic in the country on 10 August 2016.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 25 FRAUD AND CORRUPTION HIGH

Corruption is rife in CAR. The government has made weak attempts to overcome the problem, but the prevalence of nepotism within the civil service and the lack of an independent judiciary have hindered these efforts. Bribery and embezzlement are common, particularly within the mining industry. Transparency International routinely ranks the country near the bottom of its Corruption Perceptions Index (159 out of 176 countries in 2016).

The government has made superficial attempts to combat these issues. François Bozizé made the fight against corruption one of his principal political aims during his time in office. In 2008, he created a permanent Anti-Corruption Committee which, despite being markedly underfinanced, was intended to investigate claims of wrongdoing within public institutions. However, rampant Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 corruption persisted at all levels during Bozizé’s tenure, and nepotism remains widespread within the civil service and the security forces.

Officials, security personnel and armed groups routinely engage in extortion in CAR. Security forces often set up impromptu checkpoints on the roads, at which they harass motorists for bribes. This is increasing in prevalence as irregular government salary payments continue. Additionally, the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey 2011 (the most recent data) reports that more than 40% of companies operating in the region are expected to give gifts to secure a government contract, while 16% of companies must do so in meetings with tax inspectors. These charges add additional bureaucratic costs to running a business in CAR and place companies at risk of prosecution under overseas anti-corruption legislation in the United States and elsewhere.

There is a severe lack of transparency in the mining and timber industry in CAR, where embezzlement is pervasive. Successive governments have tried to monopolise the diamond sector and use the revenues to buy political loyalty. In 2008, Bozizé arbitrarily closed large numbers of diamond exporting companies in an attempt to gain further control over the market. CAR’s chances of improving transparency within the mining sector were diminished in April 2013 when the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) suspended CAR’s status as EITI compliant, following the March 2013 coup. CAR remains suspended amid the current instability. There is virtually no regulatory oversight of the extractive industries, leaving them prone to endemic corruption, and companies in the sector are extremely vulnerable to extortion by armed groups and government officials.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 26 The government’s allocation of aid and grants has also come under scrutiny. In October 2014, authorities arrested the then prime minister, Mahamat Kamoun, over his involvement in the disappearance of a $2.5 million Angolan grant to the country. Officials said the grant could not be accounted for. The government claimed that it had distributed it throughout various agencies, but this was never independently verified.

The regulatory and political environment in CAR is underdeveloped and largely unenforceable. The judiciary lacks independence and the government does little to prevent the emergence of monopolies or ensure property rights. In addition, tax rates are punitive and procedures for setting up businesses are complicated. The World Bank ranked the Central African Republic 185 out of 190 economies in terms of overall ease of doing business in 2016.

The executive has traditionally wielded significant influence over the legislature and judiciary in CAR. Courts are subject to frequent interference. A severe shortage of resources further hinders Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 the work of the judiciary, reducing its capacity to implement decisions. A culture of impunity prevails, and unless effective legal mechanisms are established, companies have limited means to resolve business disputes.

Although property rights are legally protected in CAR, political instability and the limited territorial reach of the government prevent it from enforcing these rights satisfactorily. Bangui has a record of reclaiming assets. In addition, the state is unable to protect private property in rural areas where its jurisdiction is weak, and plundering is a common occurrence.

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 27 LOCAL LAWS AND CUSTOMS

The traveller should carry a certified copy of their passport at all times. Failure to produce ID can lead to detention by the police.

Penalties for the use and possession of drugs are severe.

Buying diamonds or precious stones is prohibited except through agents authorised by the government. All cultural artefacts are subject to an export tax.

Be careful when taking photographs in public places, as permission is often required. Photographing government property, uniformed law enforcement officers or military installations and personnel may lead to detention, fines and confiscation of the camera.

Taking photographsCopyright that © theOpen authorities Briefing, deem 2017 as damaging the image of the country (street children, people with disabilities, etc.) is not permitted.

The situation is more relaxed outside of the capital, where people are generally open to having their picture taken, but the traveller should ask first. A permit for more serious photography can be obtained from the tourism ministry.

Sat phones should be registered with the Bangui or regional Agence chargée de la Régulation des Télécommunications (ART) offices.

Homosexuality is not widely accepted in Central African society, and some sexual acts between members of the same sex are illegal.

Medical facilities are extremely limited in CAR, and strikes by government workers have affected medical services and hospitals. The emergency phone number in CAR is 610 600.

It is easier to exchange euros rather than US dollars to the Central African Franc (CFA). Travellers cheques may be exchanged at banks.

There are no international ATM machines, and very few places (including hotels) accept major international credit or debit cards.

The current exchange rate for CFA is:

1 EUR = 655.96 CFA / 1 CFA = 0.0015 EUR

1 USD to 556.66 CFA / 1 CFA = 0.0017 USD

TRAVEL THREAT ASSESSMENT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 28 ABOUT OPEN BRIEFING

Open Briefing is a groundbreaking non-profit organisation launched in 2011. We support human rights defenders, humanitarian aid workers, peacebuilders, environmental defenders, independent journalists and others striving for social and environmental justice or protecting vulnerable communities.

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PLAN, SFCG, OIM ALIMA, OCHA UNFPA, UNHCR, Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 Briefing, Open © Copyright MDA, NRC WVI UNICEF, WFP,WHO CRCA ACTED, COOOPI, CRS, IMC, MSF-H, ARND, COOIAP ACTED, AHA, AIRD, SFCG CARITAS, CEJP AHA, ALIMA, ASA, ACF, COHEB, COHEB, COOPI, DCA, COOPI, CONCERN, ARND, COOIAP, INTERSOS, JH, COHEB, COOPI, FCI, HI, IMC, INSO, CRS, SFCG, PLAN, EMERGENCIA JUPEDEC, MDA, CONCERN JRS, MC, MSF-H, RT, TEARFUND NRC SOLIDARITE TGH, WC UK JUPEDEC, MVAD/CA ASA, COOPI, AFJC, AIEC-MS, ACDES, AEPA, AFPE, ACPS, BATA GBAKO, DIRECTAID, AMICAL BE OKO, CARITAS, IDEAL, ACCES, APSUD, CIEDD, CODICOM, TEARFUND CARITAS, ECT, PNRM, VITALITE+ CARITAS, ESPER- DARDP, DEDD, ECHELLE, JUPEDEC, ANCE, JUPEDEC, NDA, ECHELLE CARITAS OCPDD, OJIS, NOURRIR, MTM VITALITE+ REPROSEM, *Toutes les organisations humanitaires travaillant en RCA possède un bureau à Bangui.

Les frontières et les noms indiqués et les désignations employées sur cette carte ne signifient pas l'approbation ou l'acceptation officielle par les Nations Unies. Date de création 23 avril 2017 Sources: Tous les partenaires humanitaires. Commentaires: [email protected] 50Km www.unocha.org / www.reliefweb.int / https://car.humanitarianresponse.info République centrafricaine: Aperçu Humanitaire (au 20 Mars 2017)

L’insécurité continue de générer de nouveaux déplacements, 100 000 nouveaux 2,2 M 1,6 M 401K 463K déplacés au cours des six derniers mois. La présence des groupes armés constitue un personnes personnes personnes réfugiés frein à l’accès aux populations vulnérables. La communauté humanitaire continue de dans le besoin ciblées par le HRP déplacées mener des plaidoyers en faveur du respect du droit international humanitaire et de internes VAKABA sensibiliser les éléments des groupes armés aux principes qui fondent l’action humani- 574 74 taire. incidents incidents 1K 274K La communauté humanitaire en Centrafrique se mobilise activement pour la mobilisa- sécuritaires sécuritaires TCHAD tion des fonds qui permettront de sauver des vies. en 2016 depuis le début de l’an 2017 71K BAMINGUI-BANGORAN fi 3K Le nancement de l’action humanitaire est en baisse comparé aux années précé- dentes alors que le regain de violence dans de nombreuse regions génère de NANA- nouvelles crises humanitaires. 259K OUHAM GRIBIZI 8K OUHAM PENDE 17K 23K EVOLUTION DU FINANCEMENT DU HRP 28K OUAKA CAMEROUN 13K HAUTE-KOTTO 14K 555,4M$ 613M$ 31K 13K 48K 531,5M$ NANA-MAMBERE KEMO 3K 23K MBOMOU 17K HAUT-MBOMOU OMBELLA MPOKO 399,5M$ BASSE- 11K 68% KOTTO 53% 2K 377,9M$ MAMBERE-KADEI 16K 38% BANGUI 7K manquant LOBAYE 20K 5,4% 21,6M$ # PDIs sur site 8K reçus # PDIs en famille d’acceuil 2017 54K 2014 2015 2016 32K TYPES D’INCIDENTS SECURITAIRES [au 24 Mars 2017] XX Réfugiés SANGHA- Mouvement de population MBAERE 102K des incidents sécuritaires dépuis 2016 sont des: # Incidents sécuritaire par Préfecture 3K 85% 583824840 REPONSES / BESOINS 29K REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Attaques Vols/Pillages Combats 47% 20% 18% Les acteurs humanitaires apportent une reponse dans tout les CONGO secteurs. Cependant les incidents sécuritaires affecte la reponse Les incidents sécuritaires se concentrent principalement humanitaire dans les préfectures les plus touchése. Les secteurs dans les Préfectures de l’Ouham Pendé, l’Ouham, la Ouaka, de la nutrition , la protection, la nutrition, l’accès humanitaire 90 440K Evolution du nombre de PDIs par incidents sécuritaires Nana-Gribizi et la Haute-Kotto, entrrainant un fort taux de demeure une preoccupation majeur dans ces préfectures. 430K 80 personnes déplacés internes. 420K 70 Sécurité Accès 410K 60 Education alimentaire Santé Nutrition Protection Abris Humanitaire 400K 50 22,5% 390K 40 de la population locale

OUAKA 380K 30 dans ces préfectures Copyright © Open Briefing, 2017 Briefing, Open © Copyright )

# Personnes déplacées internes déplacées Personnes # ) # Incidents sécuritaires Incidents # est déplacée )) ) 370K 20 ) ) HAUTE-KOTTO ) ) ) OUHAM-PENDE ) ) ) ) HAUTE-KOTTO 360K 10 OUHAM-) ))NANA-) NANA-) ) ) ) ) OUHAM) ) ) ) OUHAM-) ) GRIBIZI) )GRIBIZI) )PENDEOUHAM ) OUAKA) ) ) ) ) ) ) PENDE) OUAKA ) 350K 0 ) ) )) )) ) ) ) ) ) )) JFMMAJJASON D J F ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) HAUT-MBOMOUOUHAM 2016 2017 ) ) ) HAUT-MBOMOU )) ) )) Les mouvements de populations depuis 2016, ont connus des variations. Les incidents sécuritaires notam- ) NANA-GRIBIZI ment les attaques contre les civils entrainent l’augmentation du nombre de personnes déplacées. Ces % de PDIs par rapport à la population locale par Préfecture mouvements sont proportionnels aux nombres d’incidents, notamment en province. Ces incidents ont 46261572 relativement augmenté à partir de d’octobre 2016. ) Répartition des principaux incidents sécuritaires Date de création: 20 Mars 2017 Sources: OCHA, OCHA sitrep Commentaires: [email protected], [email protected] Web: http://car.humanitarianresponse.info www.reliefweb.int Les frontières et les noms indiqués et les désignations employées sur cette carte n'impliquent pas l'approbation ou l'acceptation officielle par les Nations Unies.