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Ÿþm Icrosoft W Angola Angola Paulo Jorge MPLA-Director of Information Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (Luanda, 15 April 1996) Tor Sellstr6m: When did you come into contact with the Nordic countries? Paulo Jorge: After fleeing from Portugal, I started to work for MPLA in Paris in 1962. I then became aware of the contacts that our organization had with solidarity groups in Sweden. From 1968-69, I was sent to Sweden to meet them. One was the Africa Groups. I formed part of a delegation that also established contact with people from the Swedish Social Democratic Party. But it was not until 1971 that I got a deeper knowledge of the relations between MPLA and the Swedish solidarity groups and the Social Democratic Party. At that time, I had been transferred to our eastern front, which covered the province of Moxico (the so- calle d third political-military region), the Lundas (the fourth region) and Bi6 (the fifth region). I had left the second political-military region in the Cabinda province. Between 1971 and 1973, I learned about the aid from Sweden and other Nordic countries, such as Finland and Norway. TS: Was the support from Norway for the Ngangula school? PJ: Precisely. It started to arrive at the same time as the support from Denmark. It was humanitarian assistance, such as clothes and school equipment. Of course, as a matter of principle, there were no military items. Only humanitarian. TS: Including means of transport, vehicles? PJ: Yes. The humanitarian assistance and the vehicles were very important and added to other support that we were receiving. Whenever deliveries arrived from a country-such as Sweden and the other Nordic countriesMPLA would inform its soldiers and members about the assistance so that they would understand the meaning of solidarity and know which countries were our friends. We always gave this information through our radio broadcasts. We had two programmes, one from Brazzaville and the other from Lusaka, called 'Angola in Combat' ('Angola Combatente'). TS: How did you explain then that two of the Nordic countries were members of NATO? PJ: It was very simple. To avoid problems, we always said that the assistance came from solidarity organizations, support committees and so on. We never spoke of parties or governments. When we received assistance, we said: 'We received this from solidarity organizations in friendly countries'. Up to a certain time, we never mentioned the name of the parties. TS: But how could MPLA's leadership explain that the movement received humanitarian support from the Nordic countries, which were part of the Western bloc? PJ: Our understanding was the following: These governments had their relations, accords and agreements. It was not for us to tell them that they could not be part of this or that European organization. Our interest was that they found a way of helping us and that they did not interfere in the war. We knew that the Nordic countries never interfered directly in the military process on Portugal's side. That was the most important aspect. There was a kind of neutrality from the Nordic countries, as well as others, towards the war and Portugal's military actions against us. TS: Did you experience any political conditions related to the Nordic support? PJ: No. TS: Was it strictly humanitarian? PJ: Absolutely. There was never any condition imposed on us. We received the assistance and we stayed in contact. I went to Sweden a couple of times, once to Norway and once to Finland before independence. Of course, the assistance opened a channel for discussions. We held meetings without major publicity, because we did not want to cause any trouble for those who supported us. We also received some support from other European countries. I should underline that as far as I know the assistance from Sweden was always larger than that from Norway, Denmark or Finland. We received the goods and distributed them. There were never any conditions attached. In our contacts with the political parties, it sometimes also happened that there was some monetary support involved. For example, Liberation in Southern Africa -Regional and Swedish Voices when we visited Sweden there were certain groups that paid for our stay. TS: The Swedish Social Democratic Party gave MPLA financial contributions from its solidarity fund. PJ: Exactly. I remember very well that our President Agostinho Neto informed us about the financial support from the Nordic countries and that he mentioned precisely that fund. In the period between the end of 1971 and 1974, we received a lot of humanitarian assistance from the Nordic countries, in particular from Sweden. The largest amount was from Sweden and a considerable part from Denmark. The Africa Groups played an important role for the mobilization of these funds and also with regard to the financial help that the Social Democratic Party gave us. TS: Do you think that the fact that Sweden assisted Cuba and Vietnam facilitated your relations with the Nordic countries? PJ: Yes, but it was not only that. Sweden also attracted our attention because it already had dose relations with the liberation movements in Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, namely FRELIMO and PAIGC. We were aware of these relations. It is also true that a certain independence and neutrality concerning, for example the Cuban question, helped. It made it easier for us to receive the support. In the case of Angola, the information we had, moreover, was that the support from the Nordic countries was basically for MPLA and not for the other movements. TS: As regards Sweden, Holden Roberto visited a couple of times, but FNLA never received official assistance from the government. PJ: Exactly. That clear position of independence-I call it an independent position-by Sweden and the other Nordic countries helped the liberation movements that were really fighting. Sweden was very wise in this regard because it supported those that they knew were fighting, that is PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA. That was important. We could see that Sweden's position was in favour of the authentic movements, those which really were involved in the struggle for independence and the creation of a new independent state. Sweden took a very dear and wise stand. We saw that. TS: Do you believe that Olof Palme played an important part in this context? PJ: I had the privilege of meeting Olof Palme a couple of times. It was obvious that he took a very special position towards the liberation movements on the African continent. There was a very interesting episode. I do not recall the year, but at that time I was Foreign Minister of Angola and there was a meeting in Maputo. Prime Minister Olof Palme attended that meeting. At a dinner given by President Samora Machel, I was seated at a table with Machel, Palme, Joaquim Chissano, the Foreign Minister of Mozambique, and other leaders. On that occasion, something happened that underlined Palme's involvement for the liberation of the African continent. And because of his involvement and commitment towards the liberation movements, he was given an honorary title. We began to address Prime Minister Olof Palme as an 'honorary freedom fighter'. TS: Despite the fact that Sweden never supported the armed struggle? PJ: Of course. The aim of the assistance was to help the people. There was never any military support. When that dinner took place in Maputo, Angola and Mozambique were al ready independent countries. In this context, I also remember something which it is important to point out. In 1978, I made an official visit to Sweden as Foreign Minister. At the end of the visit, the first cooperation agreement was signed between Angola and Sweden. At that time, Ola Ullsten from the Liberal Party led the Ministry of International Cooperation. We signed the first agreement, through which SIDA pledged to give Angola a nonreimbursable grant of 50 million Swedish Kronor. I was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1976 until 1984. When my mandate ended in 1984, the assistance from SIDA was dose to 200 million. It was increased a little every year. It was almost automatic. SIDA's assistance constituted an extraordinary economic and social support. I was pleased because the first agreement between independent Angola and Sweden was signed by me and the minister from the Liberal Party. TS: Do you believe that AmfIcar Cabral played a part in the establishing of relations between MPLA and Sweden? PJ: I do not know if there was a personal intervention by him. What happened was that MPLA, PAIGC and FRELIMO-later also CLSTP of Sao Tom6 and Principe- had very Angola dose relations within CONCP. Amilcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos used to go to Sweden and, of course, they also discussed the struggle in Angola. If it was a leader from MPLA-Mario de Andrade, Agostinho Neto or Lacio Lara-who went, they would, naturally, similarly discuss the progress of the struggle in Guinea-Bissau or Mozambique. There was a very dose relationship. We met annually and we discussed strategies together. It was quite natural that when Amflcar Cabral went to Sweden he would talk about MPLA and support for MPLA. He would certainly make the same contribution as Marcelino dos Santos when he went to Sweden and talked about PAIGC and MPLA. TS: In a letter from Agostinho Neto to Olof Palme, written after the Inter- Regional Conference in 1974, Neto mentioned a certain 'misunderstanding' that had occurred at the level of the Swedish embassy in Lusaka. Do you know what that was about? PJ: There was the so-called Eastern Revolt led by Daniel Chipenda.
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