INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Issues 8-9 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Winter 1996/1997 NEW EAST-BLOC EVIDENCE ON The Cold War in the Third World and the Collapse of Détente in the 1970s In January 1976, during several days of negotiations in secretive setting. This time, in the fall of 1981, at the height of with Kremlin leaders, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger the public hostility between the Reagan Administration and pleaded for a Soviet gesture to ease the superpower confrontation in ’s , Haig was clandestinely meeting the , where the USSR’s airlift of military equipment and Cuban Cuban Vice President, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, in a Mexico troops had allowed the leftist in to withstand an City suburb. And one key subject for debate was a review of assault by guerrilla forces backed by South Africa. The action could recent history: How had Cuba become involved in Africa, and do “irreparable damage” to detente, Kissinger warned, undermining why did U.S.-Cuban relations begin to “go very poorly” in supporters of that policy (above all Kissinger himself) in the United 1975-76 and continue to deteriorate thereafter? (The record of States. And that would be a “tragedy” since neither Moscow nor that meeting remains classified in U.S. and Cuban archives, Washington had any significant interests in Angola, and “Five years but the Cold War International History Project Bulletin in this from now it will make no difference.” issue publishes a translated transcript obtained from the Rus- According to recently declassified transcripts of the talks, ob- sian archives.) tained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National While Haig, repeating charges made during the Carter Security Archive, Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Le- Administration, insisted that Cuba had acted as a Soviet proxy onid I. Brezhnev and Foreign Minister rebuffed or puppet by intervening in Angola and the Horn of Africa, the American’s increasingly plaintive entreaties with the curt re- Rodriguez maintained just as stoutly that Havana had acted sponse that any complaints should be taken up with Havana, since independently, out of its own interests, albeit (especially in the the Cuban intervention was the result of decisions made between latter case) in coordination with Moscow; if anything, he two sovereign states, Angola and Cuba, and the USSR could not declared, far from Moscow pulling the strings, it had been speak for them. At a Friday morning session with Gromyko at the Castro, not Brezhnev, who had been the most ardent advocate Foreign Ministry’s Tolstoi House, Kissinger finally gave up, wist- of sending military support to revolutionary leaders in Africa. fully calling it “a pity that this has come to pass when many “The outward geopolitical character of these events is opportunities existed for two great powers to settle this in a far- completely at odds with the essence of the true facts . . . History sighted way.” will bring all of this to light,” Rodriguez is quoted as telling “It wouldn’t be the first time in history,” he rued, “that events Haig, adding: “One fine day, all of this will come to light. You that no one can explain afterwards give rise to consequences out of can believe me or not, but some day this will be common proportion to their intrinsic significance.” knowledge.” Five years later, détente had indeed collapsed, in large measure That “fine day” has not quite arrived—much remains due to a series of superpower conflicts in the Third World—over classified or hidden in archives and memories on all sides of Angola, the Horn of Africa, Cuba, and , among other the events—but with this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, it has locations—and another U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, come palpably closer. Jr., confronted another communist interlocutor in an even more continued on page 4 *FOR IMPORTANT SUBSCRIBER ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: * NEW EVIDENCE ON SOVIET INFORMATION, SEE INSIDE BACK * MORE NEW EVIDENCE DECISION-MAKING AND THE 1956 COVER (P. 421) !!! ON THE COLD WAR IN ASIA POLISH AND HUNGARIAN CRISES *VISIT THE CWIHP WEBSITE: * MORE RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS * RESEARCH NOTES—SOVIET http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/cwihp ON THE NUCLEAR HISTORY 2 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

The Cold War International History Project

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and receives major support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation. The Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak. The Outgoing Director of the Cold War International History Project and Outgoing Editor of the Bulletin is Dr. James G. Hershberg; the Incoming Director is Prof. David Wolff (Princeton University), and the Incoming Associate Director is Christian F. Ostermann. The project is overseen by an advisory com- mittee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. (Ohio University-Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University). Readers are invited to submit articles, documents, letters, and Update items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies are available free upon request.

Cold War International History Project Bulletin Issues 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997) Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 1000 Jefferson Drive, SW Washington, D.C. 20560 Tel.: (202) 357-2967 Fax: (202) 357-4439

Editor for this Issue: James G. Hershberg Assistant Editor: Christa Sheehan Matthew Research Assistant: Andrew Grauer Incoming Director: David Wolff Incoming Associate Director: Christian F. Ostermann

Visit our Website! http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/cwihp COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS

New Evidence on the Cold War in the Third World and the Collapse of Detente in the 1970s

Editor’s Introduction...... 1 New Evidence on the Cold War in Southern Africa Havana’s Policy in Africa, 1959-76: New Evidence from Cuban Archives, by ...... 5 Fidel Castro’s 1977 Southern Africa Tour: A Report to Honecker...... 8 Moscow and the Angolan Crisis: A New Pattern of Intervention, by Odd Arne Westad...... 21 Soviet Documents on Angola and Southern Africa, 1975-1979...... 32 Anatomy of a Third World Cold War Crisis: New East-bloc Evidence on the Horn of Africa, 1977-1978 Introduction, by James G. Hershberg...... 38 The Horn, the Cold War, and New Documents from the Former East-bloc: An Ethiopian View, by Ermias Abebe...... 40 Moscow, Mengistu, and the Horn: Difficult Choices for the Kremlin, by Paul B. Henze...... 45 East and the Horn Crisis: Documents on SED Afrikapolitik, by Christian F. Ostermann...... 47 Russian and East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 1977-1978...... 50 U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980: New Russian & East German Documents Introduction, by James G. Hershberg...... 103 Russian and East German Documents...... 104 New Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan Concerning the Situation in “A”: New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, by Odd Arne Westad...... 128 The and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives...... 133 U.S.-Cuban Relations and the Cold War, 1976-1981: New Evidence from Communist Archives Introduction, by James G. Hershberg...... 185 Russian and East German Documents...... 186 Cuba as Superpower: Havana and Moscow, 1979, by Jorge I. Dominguez...... 216 A “Moment of Rapprochement”: The Haig-Rodriguez Secret Talks, by Peter Kornbluh...... 217

More New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia Introduction, by James G. Hershberg...... 220 More on Mao in Moscow, Dec. 1949-Feb. 1950...... 223 Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1950, by Odd Arne Westad...... 224 Translated Russian and Chinese Documents on ’s Visit to Moscow, December 1949-February 1950...... 226 The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the : A Chinese Scholar’s Reply, by Shen Zhihua...... 237 Stalin, Mao, Kim and Korean War Origins, 1950: A Russian Documentary Discrepancy, by Dieter Heinzig...... 240 Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Split, by William Taubman...... 243 A New “”: Suslov’s Secret Report on Mao, Khrushchev, and Sino-Soviet Tensions, December 1959...... 244 A Crucial Step toward the Sino-Soviet Schism: The Withdrawal of Soviet Experts from , July 1960, by Chen Jian...... 246 The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives, by M.Y. Prozumenschikov...... 251 New East-bloc Documents on the Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959 & 1962...... 258

More New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis More New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives, by James G. Hershberg...... 270 More on Bobby and the Cuban Missile Crisis, by James G. Hershberg...... 274 Russian Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis...... 278 The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version...... 320 The “Lessons” of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Nuclear Operations, by Mark Kramer...... 348

Special Feature: New Evidence on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises Conferences in , Potsdam Spotlight Cold War Flashpoints...... 355 Togliatti on Nagy, 30 October 1956: Missing Cable Found...... 357 New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises, by Mark Kramer...... 358 The “Malin Notes” on the Crises in Hungary and , 1956, translated and annotated by Mark Kramer...... 385

Research Notes The Russian Nuclear Declassification Project: Setting up the A-Bomb Effort, 1946, by G.A. Goncharov, N.I. Komov, and A.S. Stepanov...... 410 Khrushchev’s 1960 Troop Cut: New Russian Evidence, by Vladislav M. Zubok...... 416

IMPORTANT SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION: TO KEEP RECEIVING THE BULLETIN, TURN TO PAGE 421 4 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

CONTINUED FROM FRONT COVER pp.) and a major conference organized by dinary group of people from around the CWIHP and hosted by Hong Kong Univer- world. Even more than the historical infor- In this issue, the Bulletin presents evi- sity in January 1996; mation it has gathered and disseminated, dence from communist world archives— * More Russian Evidence on the Cu- CWIHP’s greatest achievement, I think, has Russian, East German, Cuban—on many of ban Missile Crisis, providing another se- been the creation of an international com- the same issues that so bedeviled U.S.-So- lection of declassified documents from the munity of Cold War scholars, especially viet relations in the 1970s: Angola, the Horn Russian Foreign Ministry archives and other those who, on a daily and sometimes hourly of Africa, Afghanistan, Cuba, et al. materials to supplement those printed in Bul- basis, 24/7, constitute the CWIHP “net- In large measure, the evidence presented letin 5 (Spring 1995); work”: Tom Blanton, Malcolm Byrne, Vlad here stems from the labors of the “Carter- * New Evidence on Soviet Decision- Zubok, Mark Kramer, Jim Blight/janet Brezhnev Project”: a multi-year, multi-ar- Making on the 1956 Polish and Hungar- Lang, Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, David chival, international academic effort to ex- ian Crises, featuring an authoritive transla- Wolff, Christian Ostermann, Kathryn plore the causes, consequences, and lega- tion and annotation of the so-called “Malin Weathersby, Hope Harrison, John Gaddis, cies of the collapse of superpower detente Notes” of key Kremlin meetings during the Bill Taubman, Warren Cohen, Aleksandr in the 1970s. The project was spearheaded crises, along with an introductory essay, by Chubarian, Mikhail Narinsky, and the by Drs. James G. Blight and janet Lang of Mark Kramer of Harvard University—a re- “group” in Moscow, Bill Burr, Ilya Gaiduk, the Thomas J. Watson Institute for Interna- markable window into how the Soviet lead- Leo Gluchowski, Csaba Bekes, Norman tional Studies at Brown University (orga- ership responded to a challenge to the com- Naimark, Priscilla Roberts, Sven nizer of similar conferences on the Cuban munist empire that in many ways foreshad- Holtsmark, Bob Brigham, Ray Garthoff, Missile Crisis), with the active participation owed the terminal crisis of 1989; and finally Vojtech Mastny, Kostia Pleshakov, Allen of an informal consortium of scholarly part- * Research Reports on Soviet Nuclear Greb, Maxim Korobochkin, Mark ners, including the National Security History: documents on the origins of the Doctoroff, Piero Gleijeses, Daniel Rozas, Archive, a non-governmental research in- USSR’s atomic project and on Nikita Peter Kornbluh, and many others who have stitute and declassified documents reposi- Khrushchev’s 1960 troop cut. made the last five-and-a-half years such fun tory located at George Washington Univer- ***** that the exasperation paled by comparison. sity; CWIHP; the Norwegian Nobel Insti- And above all, thanks to Annie for putting tute; the Institute for Universal History, the This Bulletin marks my final issue as up with everything and coming along for Foreign Ministry archives, and the Center Editor and as Director of the Cold War In- the ride. —Jim Hershberg for the Storage of Contemporary Documen- ternational History Project; beginning in tation in Moscow. (A report on some of the January 1997 I took up a position as Assis- Project’s early findings, on U.S.-Soviet re- tant Professor of Diplomatic History and In- THE FALL OF DETENTE: lations at the outset of the Carter Adminis- ternational Affairs at George Washington SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS tration, appeared in CWIHP Bulletin 5 University. I am pleased to report that the IN THE CARTER YEARS (Spring 1995), 140-154.) Project is passing into able, enthusiastic, Many of the documents in this Bulletin more linguistically-gifted, and perhaps more Readers interested in the materials on the Cold War in the Third World and the Collapse of De- were obtained and translated by the Carter- organized hands: David Wolff, formerly of tente in the 1970s should also consult a newly Brezhnev Project in preparation for a series Princeton University, the author of a major published volume which also emerges from the of conferences on the breakdown in U.S.- forthcoming study of Northeast Asian his- work of the Carter-Brezhnev Project: Odd Arne Soviet relations in the late 1970s, held in tory, and fluent in Russian, Chinese, Japa- Westad, ed., The Fall of Detente: Soviet-Ameri- Georgia in May 1994 (on the SALT II pro- nese, German, and French, becomes can Relations in the Carter Years (Oslo: Scandi- cess), in Ft. Lauderdale in March 1995 (on CWIHP’s new Director; and Christian F. navian University Press, 1997). superpower rivalry in the Third World), and Ostermann, research fellow at the National The volume includes interpretive essays as in Lysebu, Norway in September 1995 (on Security Archive, a frequent contributor to well as key U.S., Russian, East German and other documents on SALT and Bilateral Relations, Re- the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan); the Bulletin of reports on new evidence from gional Conflicts, and Afghanistan and After. For other translations, as well as accompanying the East German archives, and the author of ordering information within North America, con- articles and commentaries, were solicited by a forthcoming study on relations between tact the Scandinavian University Press North the Bulletin. (All documents obtained by the German Democratic Republic and the America, 875 Mass. Ave., Ste. 84, Cambridge, the Carter-Brezhnev Project are available for , becomes Associate Director. MA 02139, USA; tel: 617/497-6515; toll-free: research at the National Security Archive.) I am also glad to say that I plan to remain 800/498-2877; fax: 617/354-6875; e-mail: Readers interested in these topics will closely associated with CWIHP, collaborat- [email protected]; e-mail orders out- also wish to obtain the first book to emerge ing with my successors on transitional ac- side North America: [email protected] Essays in the book include: Odd Arne Westad, from the Carter-Brezhnev Project: Odd Arne tivities, contributing to future endeavors, “The Fall of Detente and the Turning Tides of Westad, ed., The Fall of Detente: Soviet- editing CWIHP’s Book Series, and perhaps History”; Olav Njolstad, “Keys of Keys? SALT American Relations in the Carter Years (see even finding time after five years of admin- II and the Breakdown of Detente”; Carol R. box), which contains interpretive essays by istration to do more of my own research and Saivetz, “Superpower Competition in the Middle noted scholars as well as recently declassi- writing on Cold War history. So this is not East and the Collapse of Detente”; Dan Caldwell, fied U.S. and East-bloc materials; other vol- good-bye. “The Demise of Detente and US Domestic Poli- umes are planned. Nevertheless, I would like to express my tics”; Odd Arne Westad, “The Road to Kabul: This Bulletin double issue also contains gratitude to CWIHP’s creators, supporters, Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 1978-1979”; John Lewis Gaddis, “Why Did the Cold War Last as several other major chunks of important new friends, and collaborators for the chance to Long as It Did?” evidence from communist archives: participate in the thrilling experience of For additional information, contact Odd Arne * More New Evidence on the Cold peering behind (and trying to rip down en- Westad, Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel War in Asia, following up on the previous tirely) the curtain of the last half-century of Institute, Drammensveien 19, 0255 Oslo, Nor- Bulletin (no. 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, 294 world history, and to work with an extraor- way; fax: 47-22 43 01 68. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 5 Havana’s Policy in Africa, 1959-76: New Evidence from Cuban Archives

by Piero Gleijeses1 cal ploys of a client state—that prevails Frequently the edited lines contained in the United States. Yet it has attracted the remarks of a foreign leader criticiz- The dearth of documents and his- virtually no attention. It is a significant ing his own political allies; thus, to ex- torical context has hampered rigorous lacuna. As a Cuban official told me, plain why half a page had been sani- analysis of Cuba’s intervention in “Cuba’s intervention in Angola cannot tized [Doc. 5], Risquet wrote, “the con- Angola in 1975. Despite the interest be understood without looking at our versation that followed was about in- 2 scholars have shown in the episode, the past.” ternal MPLA matters that [Angolan lack of Cuban documents and the closed Whereas those who publish in the President Agostinho] Neto discussed nature of Cuban society have prevented Bulletin generally use archives that have with [Cuban official Díaz] Argüelles. It them from being able to accurately de- been opened, the Cuban archives I have would be unethical to make them pub- scribe Cuba’s actions. I have gone to used are still closed. This requires, then, lic.”3 In the case of three intelligence Havana six times, for a total of six an explanation of my modus operandi. documents, the sanitized paragraphs months, since 1993 to research Cuban There was no established declassi- would have revealed sources. In other policy toward Africa, and I have gained fication process in Cuba when I began cases the lines (or words) sanitized in- access to the archives of the Central my research. Mindful of the fact that cluded comments about African or Committee of the Communist Party of the documents I cited would not be Asian countries that, the censors be- Cuba (CC CPC), the Instituto de readily accessible to my readers, I de- lieved, would unnecessarily complicate Historia de Cuba, the Centro de cided that I would never use a document Cuba’s foreign relations. Información de la Defensa de las unless I was given a photocopy of the I have also interviewed 63 Cuban Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, and original. I badgered Cuban officials protagonists, many of them repeatedly the Ministerio para la Inversión relentlessly, arguing that in the United and in relaxed settings. While inter- Extranjera y la Colaboración Econ- States their word has no credibility, that views without documents would be of ómica. Armed with documents from their testimonies are only valid if sup- little use, interviews with documents these closed and never before used ar- ported by documents, and that while one can be extremely helpful. Furthermore, chives, supplemented with interviews, document would suffice to criticize many of the interviewees gave me let- a close reading of the press, and U.S. Cuba, five would be necessary to say ters and journals from their own per- documents, I can shed new light on the anything positive. Jorge Risquet, a sonal collections, and they alerted me Angola affair. member of the Central Committee, un- to documents in the government ar- The new documents clarify the derstood. I owe a great debt to his in- chives, which made it possible to be evolution of Cuba’s involvement in telligence and sensitivity. We have very specific in my requests to Risquet. Angola and answer the critical question come a long way since the day in 1994 The Cuban authorities were well aware of whether the Cubans sent troops be- when I asked him for all the reports of my freewheeling interviews and to fore or after the South African interven- written by the Chief of the Cuban Mili- the best of my knowledge they did noth- tion. They also address the vexing ques- tary Mission in Angola between August ing to hinder me. Currently I am tion of Havana’s motivation, particu- and October 1975 only to be told, “You complementing my research in Cuba larly whether or not it was acting as a aren’t writing his biography. One will with research in the United States, Eu- Soviet proxy. They document Cuba’s be enough.” Two years later, I received rope (particularly Moscow, , and longstanding relationship with the all the others. The Cubans established ), and, of course, Africa. Popular Movement for the Liberation a procedure of which I could only ap- Cuba’s pre-1975 Africa policy can of Angola (MPLA), and they place the prove: any document they expected to be divided into three major phases: pre- Angolan crisis in the broad context of be declassified they allowed me to read 1964, when the focus was Algeria; Cuban policy toward Africa. From in its entirety, whether in Risquet’s of- 1964-66, when Cuba’s attention was 1959 to 1974 the Cubans intervened in fice or in the archives themselves. Then suddenly riveted by sub-Saharan Af- Algeria, Congo Leopoldville, Congo the waiting would begin. It could take rica—a heady time characterized by Brazzaville and Guinea-Bissau. More less than a hour or more than a year. As Che Guevara’s three-month trip through Cubans fought in Africa during these I write, there are several hundred pages the continent and the dispatch of Cu- years than in Latin America, and Cu- of documents that I have been allowed ban columns to Zaire and Congo ban policy was far more successful in to read but have not yet been given. Brazzaville; and post-1966, a period of the former than in the latter. The story About 80 of the more than 3,000 growing maturity, highlighted by the of these fifteen years challenges the pages of documents that I have received long and successful Cuban involvement image of Cuban foreign policy—cyni- were sanitized after I had read them. in Guinea-Bissau (1966-74). Before 6 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

discussing Cuba’s role in Angola in Guinea as well, but what matters is that request of that country’s government, 1975-76, I will briefly touch on each of a powerful guerrilla movement has which lived “in fear” of an attack by these phases. taken hold in the Congo.”6 (To avoid the Congo’s mercenaries; the column Cuban leaders saw similarities be- confusion, Congo Leopoldville will be could also, perhaps, assist Che in the tween the Algerian revolution against referred to in this essay as the Congo, Congo. “It constituted . . . a reserve French rule and their own struggle and its neighbor as Congo Brazzaville.) force for Che’s column, which it would against both Cuban Fulgencio To save the Congolese regime, the join if necessary, at the right time.”12 Batista and the United States. In De- Johnson Administration raised an army Overall, 400 Cuban volunteers were in cember 1961, a Cuban ship unloaded a of more than 1,000 white mercenaries Central Africa in the summer of 1965. cargo of weapons at Casablanca for the in a major covert operation that was ob- But Central Africa was not ready Algerian rebels. It returned to Havana vious to all but the U.S. press and pro- for revolution. By the time the Cubans with 76 wounded Algerian fighters and voked a wave of revulsion even among arrived in the Congo, the rebels’ 20 children from refugee camps.4 African leaders friendly to the United strength had been broken. The story of The aid continued after Algeria States.7 The Cubans saw the conflict as Che’s column is not one of great battles, gained its independence. In May 1963, more than an African problem: “Our but of 120 people thrust into an impos- a 55-person Cuban medical mission ar- view was that the situation in the Congo sible situation, in a totally alien world, rived in Algeria. And, as would be the was a problem that concerned all man- who retained their humanity until the case for all the missions that followed kind,” Che Guevara wrote.8 end. Their experience is recorded in (until 1978), the aid was free. “It was In December 1964, Guevara went several documents: the manuscript that like a beggar offering his help, but we to Africa on a three-month trip that sig- Che wrote in the Cuban embassy in Dar- knew that the Algerian people needed nalled Cuba’s growing interest in the es-Salaam (and which, he said, would it even more than we did, and that they region. In February 1965 he was in Dar- not be published “for a long time”13); deserved it,” said the then-Minister of es-Salaam, Tanzania, which was then, the journal of his right-hand-man, Public Health, José Ramón Machado as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Víctor Dreke; and the diaries of several Ventura.5 And in October 1963, when pointed out, “a haven for exiles from of his men. Guevara could only pre- Algeria was threatened by Morocco, the the rest of Africa . . . plotting the over- side over the agony of the rebellion until Cubans rushed a special force of 686 throw of African governments, both the rebels’ collapse left him no choice men with heavy weapons to the Algeri- black and white.”9 After a general but to withdraw in November 1965. ans’ aid, even though Morocco had just meeting with the liberation movements In Congo Brazzaville, meanwhile, signed a contract to buy one million tons [see Doc. 2], Che met separately with Risquet’s column saved the host gov- of Cuban sugar for $184 million, a con- each, and three times with the Congo- ernment from a military coup in June siderable amount of hard currency at a lese rebel leaders Laurent Kabila and 1966 through bluster and diplomacy, time when the United States was trying Gaston Soumialot.10 without having to shed blood.14 Then to cripple Cuba’s economy. “[Kabila] impressed me,” wrote it withdrew, against the wishes of their Cuba’s interest in sub-Saharan Af- Che. “I offered him, on behalf of our hosts. Risquet understood, and made rica quickened in late 1964. This was government, about thirty instructors and Havana understand, that there was no the moment of the great illusion, when all the weapons we could spare, and he revolution in Congo Brazzaville. “He the Cubans, and many others, believed accepted with delight; he urged us to was able to get us out at the right mo- that revolution beckoned in Africa. hurry, as did Soumialot, in the course ment,” observes his second-in-com- Guerrillas were fighting the Portuguese of another conversation. Soumialot also mand. “He was flexible.”15 Although in Angola; armed struggle was acceler- asked that the instructors be black.” the Cubans withdrew in 1967, they left ating in Portuguese Guinea and begin- Cuba had “offered aid on condition that “something useful in their wake”:16 the ning in Mozambique. In Congo Tanzania approve,” Guevara explained. doctors attached to the column con- Brazzaville, a new government was “It did, so we went ahead. The aid was ducted the first vaccination campaign loudly proclaiming its revolutionary given unconditionally and with no time in the country against polio,17 and 254 sympathies. And, above all, there was limit.” Che left Dar-es-Salaam with young Congolese had gone to Cuba to Congo Leopoldville (later called Zaire), “the joy of having found people ready study, all expenses paid.18 where armed revolt had been spread- to fight to the finish. Our next task was The late 1960s were a period of ing with stunning speed since the spring to select a group of black Cubans—all deepening maturity in Cuba’s relation- of 1964, threatening the survival of the volunteers—and send them to help in ship with Africa. No longer deluded corrupt pro-American regime that Presi- the struggle in the Congo.”11 that revolution was around the corner, dents Eisenhower and Kennedy had la- In April 1965, a Cuban column of the Cubans were learning about sub- boriously put in place. “The struggle some 120 men under Guevara began Saharan Africa. In those years—indeed, has just begun, these are its first entering eastern Congo through Tanza- through 1974—the main focus of flames,” wrote the Cuban weekly Verde nia. A few weeks later a second Cuban Havana’s attention in Africa was Olivo. “It will, no doubt, be a long column under Jorge Risquet arrived in Guinea-Bissau, where the rebels of the struggle, in Angola and Portuguese neighboring Congo Brazzaville at the Partido Africano da Independência da COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 7

Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) were Zaire, Congo Brazzaville, and Guinea- sible role of . I don’t re- fighting for independence from Portu- Bissau were volunteers. They were cap- call any concern about a Cuban role. Be- gal. The PAIGC was “the most effec- tivated by the mystique of guerrilla war. fore I left, when people in the Africa Bu- tive of the liberation organizations in “We dreamt of revolution,” one muses. reau [of the State Department] talked of the Soviet bloc role in Angola, they the Portuguese African territories,” U.S. “We wanted to be part of it, to feel that 19 thought of the Soviets, the East Germans, reports stressed time and again. At we were fighting for it. We were young, not of Cuba. I don’t recall that we knew the PAIGC’s request, Cuban military in- and the children of a revolution.” Fight- of Cuba’s ties with the MPLA, but even structors arrived in Guinea-Bissau in ing abroad, they would defend the revo- if we knew it didn’t worry us.26 1966, and they remained there through lution at home. “In all those years we the end of the war in 1974. This was believed that at any moment they [the These ties had begun in 1965, when the longest Cuban intervention in Af- United States] were going to strike us; Che Guevara had met , rica before the dispatch of troops to and for us it was better to wage the war Lucio Lara, and other MPLA leaders in Angola in 1975. It was also the most abroad than in our own country.”23 Brazzaville in a “historical encounter,” successful. In the words of Guinea- The volunteers received no public as Raúl Castro called it.27 “We spoke, Bissau’s first president, praise in Cuba. They left “knowing that we discussed,” related Lara. “We wanted their story would remain a secret.”24 only one thing from the Cubans: instruc- we were able to fight and triumph be- They won neither medals nor material tors. The war was becoming difficult cause other countries and people helped rewards. Once back they could not and we were inexperienced ... Guevara us ... with weapons, with medicine, with boast about their deeds, because they promised that he would speak with his supplies ... But there is one nation that were bound to secrecy. Party and his government so that they in addition to material, political and dip- 28 lomatic support, even sent its children This secrecy notwithstanding, would send us instructors.” to fight by our side, to shed their blood through all these years U.S. officials Risquet’s column trained MPLA in our land together with that of the best knew that Cubans were in Africa—in guerrillas in Congo Brazzaville in 1966- children of our country. Algeria, then in Zaire, in Congo 67 and several of its members joined the This great people, this heroic people, Brazzaville, and finally in Guinea- MPLA in the Angolan enclave of we all know that it is the heroic people Bissau. And yet they paid little atten- Cabinda as advisers, instructors, and of Cuba; the Cuba of Fidel Castro; the tion to it. As Robinson McIlvaine, the combatants.29 There were moments of Cuba of the Sierra Maestra, the Cuba of U.S. ambassador in Conakry, Guinea, frustration for the instructors who had Moncada ... Cuba sent its best children from October 1966 through August here so that they could help us in the learned their trade in the exacting school technical aspects of our war, so that they 1969, remarked, “The State Department of Fidel Castro’s Rebel Army and who could help us to wage this great struggle was not particularly concerned with the found themselves in a completely alien ... against Portuguese colonialism.20 Cuban presence. It was not a big worry culture with a very different concept of for us.” This complacency, which con- discipline, and there were also warm Some 40-50 Cubans fought in trasts starkly with Washington’s reac- moments of humanity in that inhospi- Guinea-Bissau each year from 1966 tion to even the rumor of Cuban com- table forest. “I looked at them all,” wrote until independence in 1974. They batants in Latin America, is explained the Cuban Rafael Moracén after deliv- helped in military planning and they by the fact that U.S. officials were con- ering a particularly severe scolding in were in charge of the . Their fident that a handful of Cubans could which he had given vent to all his frus- contribution was, as President Nino, not be effective in distant, alien Afri- trations, “and I was moved, I felt love who had been the senior military com- can countries. In discussing Commu- for them. . . . They had such dignity that mander of the PAIGC, said, “of the ut- nist subversion in Africa, the CIA barely I felt it was worth dying with them if I most importance.”21 mentioned Cuba.25 had to.”30 Bonds were forged that Just as the only foreigners who This helps explain why the United would never be forgotten, and which fought with the PAIGC in Guinea- States was stunned by the Cuban inter- explain why, ten years later, in late 1975, Bissau were Cubans, so too the only vention in Angola in 1975. “In the 1960s Moracén pestered Raúl Castro to be al- foreign doctors were Cubans (with one there was no sense of a Cuban danger lowed to return to Angola. “I am an brief exception), and there were no na- in Africa; their intervention in Angola Angolan,” he pleaded.31 tive doctors until 1968. From 1966 to was a real surprise,” observes former In 1966, the MPLA withdrew its 1974 there were, on average, seven State Department official Paul O’ Neil. forces from Cabinda and opened a new Cuban doctors in Guinea Bissau. “They front in eastern Angola along the Zam- really performed a miracle,” observes During my tenure as Director of South- bian border. This meant that there was Francisca Pereira, a senior PAIGC of- ern Africa Office [of the State Depart- no reason for the Cubans to remain in ment from July 1973 to June 1975] we ficial. “I am eternally grateful to them: the Congo, and they were unable to send were aware that there was some Soviet/ not only did they save lives, but they East European support for the MPLA, instructors to eastern Angola, as the also put their own lives at risk. They but I don’t recall any discussion of a MPLA requested, because of Zambian 22 were truly selfless.” Cuban role before I left. Aside from the opposition. Over the next few years, The men who went to Algeria, Soviet Union, we would discuss the pos- until the end of 1974, relations between 8 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Cuba and the MPLA were friendly but stronger than the MPLA in the short FIDEL CASTRO’S 1977 less close, and Cuba’s support for the term, the MPLA was building for the SOUTHERN AFRICA TOUR: movement was limited to training a long haul, and this would bear fruit. A REPORT TO HONECKER handful of MPLA fighters in Cuba and, “This movement,” they wrote, “is the as the MPLA was convulsed by inter- best structured politically and militar- Editor’s Note: In early 1977, Cuban nal strife, to giving unwavering support ily, [and] as a result it enjoys extraordi- 32 34 President Fidel Castro took a an exten- to the group around Agostinho Neto. nary popular support.” Time favored sive tour of Africa and then continued on Lack of space precludes an in- the MPLA. to Europe and the USSR. During a stop depth discussion of the 1975 Cuban in- The report also included a letter in , Castro recounted his ex- tervention in Angola. I will focus in- from Neto specifying the aid he sought periences to East German Communist stead on two particularly controversial from Cuba [see doc. 4]. But Neto was, leader . The record of issues: when Cuba sent its military in- in fact, uncertain about what he wanted those discussions was located in the ar- structors and when it sent its troops. I from Cuba. He told Pina and Cadelo chives of the former ruling Socialist Unity will also comment briefly on some of that “once we know what weapons the Party of Germany (SED) by Christian F. the points raised in Odd Arne Westad’s Soviets are going to give us, we will Ostermann (CWIHP/National Security article about the Soviet role in Angola have to adjust our military plans; ex- Archive). in this issue of the Bulletin. actly what we ask from Cuba will be 35 The following excerpt—from a dis- The basic outline of the story is contingent on this.” A recurring idea cussion on 3 April 1977 at the House of well known. Upon the collapse of the of military instructors floated in the air the SED Central Committee in East Ber- Portuguese on 25 April but was not precise. As Cadelo noted, lin—contains Castro’s impressions of the 1974, there were three rival indepen- “Even though Neto gave us a letter with situations in several southern African dence movements in Angola: Agostinho some concrete demands, it was not re- countries, (e.g., Tanzania, Angola, Neto’s MPLA, Holden Roberto’s Na- ally clear what the best form of coop- Mozambique, People’s Republic of the tional Front for the Liberation of Angola eration with Cuba would be, or how and 36 Congo), and several guerrilla or libera- (FNLA), and Jonas Savimbi’s National when it should be implemented.” On tion groups in the region, such as the Af- Union for the Total Independence of one point, however, Neto was definite: rican National Congress (ANC), then Angola (UNITA). On 15 January 1975, he wanted Cuba to provide the funds to struggling for power in South Africa, and Portugal and these three movements ship the weapons the MPLA had in Dar- two groups fighting to rule Zimbabwe- agreed that a transitional government, es-Salaam, its major arsenal, to Angola. Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African Na- under a Portuguese High Commis- Neto “said that he was confident that tional Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe sioner, would rule the country until in- they would receive Soviet aid, but that African Political Union (ZAPU). Also in- dependence on 11 November 1975. it would not arrive for five months and cluded are Castro’s assessments of indi- Before independence would come elec- that it was therefore imperative to move vidual political leaders, remarks about tions for a Constituent Assembly which their material and equipment from Dar- 37 coordination with Moscow, and an over- would elect Angola’s first president. es-Salaam to Angola.” Neto told all conclusion that Africa was the place The first high-level contact be- Cadelo and Pina that he would need 38 to inflict a major blow against world im- tween the MPLA and Cuba following $100,000 for the task. perialism. (For Castro’s remarks at this the coup in Portugal was in late Decem- But Cuba did not send the money, meeting on the situation in the Horn of ber 1974, when two senior Cubans ar- and nothing happened beyond the ar- Africa, see the excerpts printed later in rived in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania: rival of ten to twelve Angolans in Cuba this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.) Carlos Cadelo, the Communist party for special training in March and 39 official whose portfolio included April. There is no indication in the Transcript of Honecker-Castro, Angola, and Major Alfonso Pérez Mo- Cuban documents I have seen that the Meeting, 3 April 1977 (excerpts) rales (Pina), who had served, with great MPLA renewed its requests until May, distinction, with the PAIGC guerrilla when Neto met Cuban Deputy Prime Minutes of the conversation between fighters in Guinea-Bissau. They met Minister Flavio Bravo in Brazzaville, Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Neto and other MPLA leaders in Dar- “and asked [Cuba’s] help to transport Fidel Castro, Sunday, es-Salaam and asked permission to some weapons, and also asked about the 3 April 1977 between 11:00 and 13:30 travel to Angola. Neto approved: “He possibility of a broader and more spe- and 15:45 and 18:00, House of the asked us to verify everything he had told cific aid program.” In late June, Neto Central Committee, Berlin. us so that we could get an objective met with Cadelo in Maputo, view of the real situation in Angola.”33 Mozambique, and renewed his re- 40 Participants: Comrades , After two weeks in Angola, Cadelo quest. , Paul Verner, Paul and Pina met Neto again. Their subse- Three weeks later the United States Markowski (with Comrades Edgar Fries quent report was lengthy (42 pages) and decided to greatly expand the CIA’s and Karlheinz Mobus as interpreters), optimistic: the elections would take covert operation in Angola (increasing Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Osmany Cien- place; while the FNLA was militarily aid to the FNLA and initiating support continued on page 18 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 9 for UNITA), but there is no evidence Cuba decided to offer Neto almost five claim that Cuba did not move sooner to that Cuba and the MPLA knew about times more instructors than he had re- help the MPLA because the Soviet it. What they knew—and indeed it was quested. In Risquet’s words, “If we were Union did not want it to. But can one public knowledge—was that the pro- going to send our men, we had to send seriously argue that Cuba needed So- American Zairean government of enough to fulfill the mission and to de- viet permission to send $100,000 to Mobuto Sese Seko had sent troops into fend themselves, because too small a Neto? Others may repeat the canard northern Angola on Roberto’s side. By group would simply have been over- that Cuba sent 200 military instructors May, Portugal was no longer making whelmed.”46 to Angola in the spring of 1975,51 but any attempt to police even the main Contrary to the widespread image the evidence flatly contradicts this. In crossing points with Zaire and it was of the Cuban intervention in Angola, the absence of a satisfactory explana- reported that over one thousand Zairean Havana had been slow to get involved. tion, one can only note that the Cuban soldiers were in northern Angola.41 The documents that I have seen do not leaders were focusing on domestic mat- Angola, warned Neto, “was being sub- explain this delay, and I have not been ters and that relations with the MPLA jected to a silent invasion by soldiers able to interview those protagonists who since 1967 had not been intense. In July from Zaire.”42 could provide an answer, notably Fidel Cuba finally shifted gears. It was as if By late July, Angola was in the and Raúl Castro. Perhaps there was, the music had suddenly changed; Cuba throes of civil war and Havana finally on Cuba’s part, a reluctance to be drawn had made its choice, and Operation geared into action. From August 3-8, a into what could become an open-ended Carlota was born. seven-man Cuban delegation, led by a conflict. Perhaps there was reluctance On August 21, Díaz Argüelles was very senior military officer, Raúl Díaz to jeopardize relations with the West back in Luanda as the head of the fledg- Argüelles, was in Angola. “Their mis- when, after a long period of isolation ling Cuban Military Mission in Angola sion was to pin down on the ground with and hostility, they were markedly im- (MMCA). He reported to Abelardo the leaders of the MPLA exactly what proving: for the first time, the United (Furry) Colomé, the first deputy minis- aid they wanted, the objectives they States was interested in a modus viv- ter of the Armed Forces. His reports expected to achieve with this aid, and endi with Cuba;47 the Organization of from late August through October (all the stages in which the aid should be American States was preparing to lift handwritten) are kept in the archives of given.”43 They also brought Neto the its sanctions; and West European gov- the Centro de Información de la $100,000 he had requested six months ernments were offering low interest Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas earlier. [See doc. 5] loans. Perhaps Cuba had feared that the Revolucionarias and are a very impor- Neto wanted Cuban military in- dispatch of military instructors would tant source on the evolution of the Cu- structors. He did not have a precise fig- offend even friendly African countries ban presence.52 ure in mind, but he was thinking of no like Tanzania; or perhaps the attention Díaz Argüelles’ first order of busi- more than a hundred men who would of the Cuban leaders was distracted by ness was to obtain Neto’s approval for be spread out among many small train- the preparations for the first Congress the 480-man military mission and four ing centers. He also wanted Cuba to of the Cuban Communist party that large CIRs. “Comrade Neto accepted send weapons, clothing, and food for would be held in December. “The revo- our offer with great emotion,” he in- the recruits. On the basis of this request, lution was institutionalized in 1975,” formed Colomé in late August. “He was Díaz Argüelles drafted a proposal for a remarks Risquet. “It was a year of moved. He asked me to tell Fidel that military mission “that would include 65 never-ending work. This may have they accept everything.”53 officers and 29 noncommissioned of- played a role. And the situation in The members of the MMCA began ficers and soldiers for a grand total of Angola was quite confused. In the first arriving in late August, and they kept 94 compañeros.”44 months of 1975 there was very little coming through September, all on com- This plan was reworked in Havana discussion in the sessions of the Politi- mercial flights. There were slightly after Díaz Argüelles returned. The re- cal Bureau about Angola. Our focus over 100 by early October. The others vised plan contemplated the dispatch of was on domestic matters.”48 came aboard three Cuban ships that had 480 men who would create and staff None of these explanations is very left Havana on September 16-20: the four training centers (Centros de persuasive. By preparing to host a con- Vietnam Heroico and the Coral Island Instrucción Revolucionaria or CIRs). ference for the independence of Puerto docked at a beach near Puerto Amboim Some 5,300 Angolans would be trained Rico, Cuba was signalling that there “where no one lives” on October 5 and in these CIRs within three to six months. were limits to the price it would pay for 8 respectively; the La Plata reached Cuba would send the weapons for the improved ties with Washington.49 By Punta Negra (Congo Brazzaville) on the instructors and for the recruits in the sending troops to Syria in October 11th. Díaz Argüelles described their ar- CIRs, as well as enough food, clothing, 1973—troops that might well have be- rival in a lengthy report to Colomé.54 camping gear, toiletries, medicine, cots, come involved in a major clash with the The three ships brought the weap- and bedclothes for 5,300 men for six Israelis—Cuba had demonstrated its ons and equipment for the CIRs, includ- months. The CIRs would begin oper- continued willingness to take risks for ing 12,000 Czech rifles for the ating in mid-October.45 In other words, a cause it believed just.50 Some may Angolans. (They could not give them 10 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Soviet weapons because in 1965 Mos- CIA). “Well armed, the army of the vention.” It held key areas in eastern cow and Havana had signed an agree- FNLA has but one obsession: Luanda,” Angola (including virtually all the dia- ment that Cuba would seek the Sovi- reported Le Monde in late August. One mond-rich Lunda district). From its ets’ permission before sending weapons of Roberto’s lieutenants boasted, “We positions along the southern coast it was it had received from them to a third have . There is no force that can extending its control “well into the in- party.) They also brought the trucks to stop us from entering Luanda ... We will terior,” threatening UNITA’s core areas. transport the men and materiel to the take Luanda and it will be a blood- Finally, the report pointed out, “Of ma- CIRs. (The Cubans had correctly sur- bath.”57 In mid-September, the head jor political significance is the fact that mised that the MPLA would be unable of the CIA Task Force on Angola wrote, the MPLA controls 9 of Angola’s 16 to provide sufficient transportation.) “Mobutu committed his elite Seventh district capitals and is contesting a 10th There were problems, however, with the and Fourth Commando Battalions ... at Luso in eastern Angola.”63 trucks that came aboard the Vietnam and the tide swung back in favor of the By mid-October, with the MPLA Heroico and the Coral Island, which FNLA north of Luanda.”58 The MPLA continuing to gain ground, a conserva- “arrived in poor condition,” Díaz stopped their advance on September 26, tive British newspaper observed, Argüelles told Colomé, just north of the village of “FNLA and UNITA know that they Quifangondo—at Morro do Cal, 26 ki- must improve their positions by No- and we had to repair a great many of lometers north of Luanda. As indepen- vember 11 or risk being left out in the them. . . . When I told you how impor- dence day (November 11) approached, cold,” while the Rand Daily Mail re- tant it was that the equipment arrive in Roberto’s impatience grew. “The ported that the MPLA was “making a good condition I was thinking about this troops of the FNLA ... will be in the vigorous fourpronged drive on Nova kind of problem, because I knew that we would have to transport most of the capital on Tuesday,” he declared on Fri- Lisboa,” Savimbi’s capital in the cen- men and material in our own trucks. The day, October 17. Over the next few tral highlands, and the South African distances here are very great . . . and days, he kept repeating that his troops military instructors attached to UNITA there are neither mechanics nor spare would enter Luanda “within 24 mused disconsolately “that the UNITA parts ... Comandante, this is the largest hours.”59 forces . . . are not in a position to offer operation we have ever undertaken and On October 23, Roberto’s forces— the necessary resistance to the FAPLA we are doing it in the worst conditions about 3,500 men, including some 1,200 [the MPLA armed forces] without and circumstances. With little time for Zairian troops60—attacked Morro do help.”64 Meanwhile the Portuguese planning and with almost no knowledge Cal. But the 1,100 defenders, which military was pulling its units back to- of and experience in the country . . . we have had to improvise as we go along included about 40 Cubans, held firm. ward Luanda in preparation for with- . . . It is a task of enormous magnitude This was the first time that Cubans par- drawal by November 11. . . . I have taken the steps necessary to ticipated in the fighting. Five days later, It has been said that the MPLA was start the training on October 15 . . . so a group of Cuban instructors fought winning because of the Cuban troops. that the troops will be ready on Novem- again, with the MPLA, east of But there were no Cuban troops, only ber 5.55 Quifangondo to recover the village of instructors, and none had participated Quiangombe.61 in any fighting until the handful fought By October 18-20, almost on The MPLA had been gaining at Morro do Cal on October 23. The schedule, the instructors, recruits and ground on the other fronts. “The present real explanation for the MPLA’s suc- equipment were in place and the four military situation favors the MPLA,” cess is perhaps provided by the Zambia CIRs were ready to start operations. On wrote Díaz Argüelles on October 1.62 Daily Mail, which was unsympathetic paper, the MMCA had 480 men, 390 of U.S. intelligence agreed. In a lengthy to the movement. After noting that the whom were instructors in the four CIRs September 22 report, the Bureau of In- MPLA was “almost certain to emerge and seventeen of whom were a medical telligence and Research of the State as the dominant force” once the Portu- brigade. (There were 284 officers.) Ac- Department warned: “Since the out- guese departed, it stated: “There is a tually, there were almost 500, because break of fighting in Angola in March, sense of purpose and a spirit of belong- a few civilian pilots had been sent at the MPLA has achieved an almost un- ing among MPLA members and sym- Díaz Argüelles’ request to fly the small broken series of military successes ... It pathizers which the two other move- civilian planes that the MPLA had ac- is in complete control of Luanda and ments cannot match.”65 quired and some specialists in air traf- the surrounding areas ... In the past two The imminent victory of the MPLA fic control and handling cargo at ports months it has won virtually complete forced South Africa, which had been 56 were also attached to the MMCA. control of the coast from Luanda south providing weapons and military instruc- Meanwhile, the civil war contin- to the Namibian border and thereby has tors to the FNLA and UNITA since late ued. The FNLA controlled Angola’s gained unimpeded access to five major August, to make a decision. “The choice two northern provinces bordering on ports.” It was also in control of lay between active South African mili- Zaire, where it had its supply line in men Cabinda, from which it could not be tary participation on the one hand and— and material (which included, begin- dislodged “without strong outside back- in effect—acceptance of an MPLA vic- ning in August, equipment sent by the ing—i.e., direct Zairian military inter- tory on the other,” writes a South Afri- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 11 can military historian. Prodded by Africa and the whole campaign was rican troops had nothing to do with it] UNITA, the FNLA, Mobutu and the beginning to look more South African greatly admired the courage of what United States, Pretoria decided to es- than Angolan.”71 they said were mercenaries from Cuba calate. “The go-ahead was given on The South Africans, however, ech- fighting with the MPLA.” The official October 14.” 66 oed by the entire Western press, abso- South African historian of the war That day, a South African column lutely denied that their troops were writes, “The Cubans rarely surrendered crossed into Angola from northeastern fighting in Angola and attributed the and simply cheerfully fought until Namibia (South-West Africa). For the victories to a revived FNLA and death.”78 By late December, the Cu- first few days the column moved west UNITA. The MPLA, on the other hand, bans finally reached rough numerical just north of the border. Then it veered denounced the South African invasion parity with the South Africans and pre- north-west deep into Angola.67 The as early as October 22.72 pared to go on the offensive. [doc. 6] South Africans advanced at full speed, As the South Africans were clos- According to Westad, “After the sixty or seventy kilometers a day, meet- ing in on Benguela, the MPLA’s Politi- creation of the MPLA regime [on No- ing scant and ineffectual resistance. Sa cal Bureau “met in an emergency ses- vember 11] the [Soviet] Politburo au- da Bandeira (Lubango) fell on October sion” and listened to Neto’s proposal: thorized the Soviet General Staff to take 24; Moçamedes, the major port of to ask Cuba for troops. “There was direct control of the trans-Atlantic de- southern Angola, on the 28th. unanimous agreement,” states a well- ployment of additional Cuban troops, At first Díaz Argüelles underesti- informed account. Central Committee as well as the supplying of these troops mated the gravity of the threat. There member Henrique Santos, who had with advanced military hardware.”79 were no Cubans in the area, and he had studied and trained in Cuba in the The Cuban evidence, however, tells a no clear idea of the strength of the en- 1960s, immediately flew to Havana different story. Until January 1976, the emy. “The MPLA still has the advan- bearing the MPLA’s request.73 The Cu- it indicates, all Cuban troops and weap- tage, only ten days before indepen- bans’ response “was, I can say, imme- ons were transported to Angola on Cu- dence,” he concluded at the end of Oc- diate,” writes an MPLA leader.74 On ban ships and Cuban planes (Britannias tober. “The enemy, ill-prepared and November 4, Cuba decided to send and IL-18s) without any Soviet involve- dispirited, including the Zairian army troops to Angola. “That same day the ment. It was the Cubans’ inability to units ... is giving us the breathing space head of the MMCA was instructed to find friendly places in which to refuel to train the [MPLA] battalions.”68 make arrangements with the MPLA for their planes that led them to seek So- On November 2 and 3, Cubans par- our planes to land in Luanda.”75 viet help in late December. The ticipated in the fighting for the first time The first Cuban troops—158 men Britannias and the IL-18s needed to re- since the battles for Morro do Cal and from the elite Special Forces of the fuel twice en route to Luanda. The sec- Quiangombe on October 23 and 28. Ministry of Interior—left aboard two ond stop presented no problem: Guinea- This time, the military instructors joined Cuban planes on November 7, arriving Bissau was steadfast in its support. The in the fight to defend Benguela from the in Luanda two days later.76 Through the problem was with the first stop. Ini- advancing South Africans. “We were rest of November and December the tially, Barbados agreed, but under U.S. facing the best organised and heaviest Cubans succeeded in holding a line less pressure it withdrew its permission on FAPLA opposition to date,” wrote a than two hundred miles south of Luanda December 17; thereafter the Cubans South African, Cdr. Jan Breytenbach, even though the South Africans enjoyed used, in quick succession, Guyana and who led one of the invading units.69 superiority in numbers and material. the Azores.80 In early January, the Outgunned and outnumbered, the (North of Luanda, the Cubans swiftly Soviet Union agreed to provide its IL- defenders of Benguela withdrew. defeated Roberto’s motley horde.) 62s, which could fly directly from Cuba Savimbi crowed: “Some time ago I There were numerous skirmishes and to Bissau. The first IL-62 left Havana promised you that there would be mili- two small battles as the South Africans on January 9 with Cuban troops and tary surprises in Angola,” he told the attempted to break through: at Ebo, on Soviet pilots. (The Cubans had not yet press in Kinshasa. “We are now wit- November 23—“Black Sunday,” ac- been trained to fly the plane.)81 nessing the disintegration of Neto’s cording to a South African historian— Risquet states that on 16 January troops on Angolan territory. Today I the Cubans scored a significant vic- 1976, Cuba and the USSR signed a mili- promise you even greater surprises be- tory;77 and on December 12, at Bridge tary protocol in which the Soviets fore November 11, because we know 14, fourteen miles south of the strate- agreed to transport weapons for the that there are only nine days left.”70 On gic village of Catofe, the South Afri- Cuban troops in Angola.82 I have not November 6, Benguela was in South cans took their revenge, but the Cubans seen the protocol. I have, however, two African hands. The next day Lobito, quickly regrouped and stopped them documents that support Risquet’s state- twenty miles north of Benguela and before they could reach Catofe. The ment: a January 29 letter from Risquet Angola’s major commercial port, fell. South Africans were impressed: the to Castro [doc. 7] and a January 30 note “We were, evidently, on our way to Cape Times reported on November 21 stating that two Soviet ships had left for Luanda,” writes Breytenbach. “Fresh that “FNLA and UNITA commanders Angola with the first shipment of weap- troops were being deployed from South [maintaining the fiction that South Af- ons for the Cuban troops there.83 12 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

It is important to put Westad’s com- Africa. In Algeria, for example, the Cuba’s policy in Africa was guided ments in context. He writes that “. . . Soviets had no objection to Cuba’s very by Cuban national interest and ideol- the Soviet General Staff ordered about close relations with Ahmed Ben Bella’s ogy—a fact which U.S. analysts well sixty of their own officers to join the regime and seem to have welcomed understood. When Che went to Africa Cuban forces from Congo. These men Cuba’s decision, in October 1963, to in December 1964, U.S. intelligence started arriving in Luanda on the send a military force to help Algeria followed his trip closely. “Che evening of November 12.” In the Cu- rebuff Morocco’s attack. Similarly, in Guevara’s three-month African trip was ban documents in my possession there Congo Leopoldville the Soviets must part of an important new Cuban strat- are only six references to Soviet offic- have welcomed Guevara’s column, egy,” wrote Thomas Hughes, the direc- ers in Angola, and all of them are re- since they were themselves helping the tor of Intelligence and Research at the lated to the dispatch of Soviet weapons rebels. These parallel and often mutu- State Department. This strategy, he ar- to Angola [for one, see doc. 7]; none ally supporting tracks are even more gued, was based on Cuba’s belief that a mentions any Soviet input into military evident in the case of Guinea-Bissau. new revolutionary situation existed in strategy. Furthermore, I have seen an The Soviets began giving aid to the Africa and that Cuba’s own interest lay additional file of documents that would PAIGC in 1962, well before Cuba did. in the spreading of revolution there be- prove conclusively how little Soviet From June 1966, the Cuban military cause in so doing it would gain new officials had to do with Cuban military presence complemented and enhanced friends who would lessen her isolation strategy and tactics. These are cables the Soviet role, since the Cubans were and, at the same time, weaken U.S. in- from Fidel Castro to the Cuban com- in charge of the increasingly sophisti- fluence. There was only one reference manders in Angola. They demonstrate cated weapons provided by the USSR. to the Soviet Union: “Cuba’s African the extraordinary degree of control that It follows, some may say, that the strategy,” concluded Hughes, “is de- Castro exerted over the conduct of the Cubans were mere cannon fodder for signed to provide new political lever- war. In February 1996 I was allowed Moscow. But the fact that their poli- age against the United States and the to read these cables, but, unfortunately, cies ran along parallel tracks during this socialist bloc. . . .The Cubans doubt- they may never be released—not be- period did not make Cuba a Soviet agent less hope that their African ties will in- cause they contain controversial mate- or proxy. In fact, Cuba was following crease Cuba’s stature in the nonaligned rial (even the most ornery Cuban cen- its own policy, a policy that happened world and help to force the major so- sor would be hard put to find much to to dovetail with that of the USSR. The cialist powers to tolerate a considerable sanitize in them), but because only Fi- case of Algeria is illustrative. The Cu- measure of Cuban independence and del Castro can declassify them and he bans, at their own initiative, began sup- criticism.”86 This was a fair analysis is busy with other matters. porting the Algerian rebels in 1961. of the pragmatic aspect of the policy, My failure to obtain copies of these Havana’s decision to send troops in but it omitted the strong idealistic mo- cables is all the more frustrating since 1963 was taken less than two hours af- tive that also marked Cuban policy in many, particularly Americans, may read ter a direct appeal by Ben Bella, mak- Africa. Havana firmly believed that it this story of the early relationship be- ing it unlikely that Castro would have had a duty to help those who were strug- tween Cuba and Africa and reflexively had time to consult the Soviets even if gling for their freedom; it was this be- ask, what about the Soviet Union? he had wanted to.84 In the Congo, like- lief—not pragmatism—that led Cuba to Wasn’t Cuba acting as a Soviet proxy? wise, Cuban policy was evidently not help the Algerian rebels and risk the It is a frustrating question, for it coordinated with Soviet policy. The wrath of de Gaulle. As a PAIGC leader requires one to prove a negative on the conclusion is suggested by the fact that said, “The Cubans understood better basis of incomplete information. Since Che, his men, and their weapons trav- than anyone that they had the duty to no available documents bear directly on elled to Tanzania via the cumbersome help their brothers to become free.”87 the question, I can only offer an in- method of taking commercial flights This policy would not have been formed opinion. There are two ways to even though they could presumably possible without the volunteers—men address it. One is to look broadly at have arrived on the Soviet ships that at who freely chose to risk their lives and Cuba’s Africa policy and its overall re- about the same moment were docking endure sacrifices in order to serve Cuba lationship to Soviet policy. The second at Dar-es-Salaam.85 A firmer indica- and help others. Just as Havana was is to analyze Cuban motivations in Af- tion of this lack of coordination appears not bowing to Soviet pressure by inter- rica. in “Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria vening in Africa, so too did individual During the period under consider- (Congo),” the secret manuscript that Cubans volunteer of their own free will. ation, Cuban and Soviet policies ran Guevara wrote upon leaving the Congo. In Angola as well, Havana was not act- along parallel tracks in Africa. This was And certainly the Soviets played no role ing on behalf of the Soviet Union, even not a given: they could have been at log- in the Cuban decision to withdraw. though President Ford and Secretary gerheads, as they were in Latin America Castro left the decision to Guevara, his Kissinger liked to speak of “the Soviet through the mid-1960s because of friend and commander-in-the field. [See Union and their Cuban mercenaries.”88 Cuba’s support for armed struggle there. doc. 3] The Soviet Union was not in Rather, as former Soviet ambassador to No such clash, however, occurred in the picture. the United States Anatoly Dobrynin COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 13 writes, the Cubans sent their troops to weapons. And so we are going to face the money and time that it took—and the un- Angola “on their own initiative and bizarre situation of having to go to war certainty that the resulting combatants without consulting us.” His testimony against Soviet weapons! Some of the Alge- would indeed prove useful to the movement. is supported by other Soviet officials.89 rian officers are not only worried ... but in- I explained our experience in the Sierra dignant. They ask, and rightly so, how can Maestra, where, for every five recruits we To try to impose a Soviet dimen- the Soviet comrades help feudal kings like trained, we ended up, on average, with only sion on the relationship between Cuba Hassan and not understand that a real revo- one good soldier and for every five of these and Africa regarding the period and lution, like Cuba’s, is taking place here ... soldiers, only one was really good. I argued events examined in this article seems As for the socialist countries of east- as vehemently as I could in front of the ex- to me to warp reality to satisfy an ideo- ern Europe, the less said the better. Accord- asperated “Freedom Fighters” that the logical bias. Robert Pastor, the National ing to compañeros here, “They have be- money invested in training would be largely Security staff member who oversaw haved like greedy shopkeepers who want to wasted; one cannot make a soldier in an Latin America during the Carter Admin- be paid in dollars (and at higher prices than academy and much less a revolutionary sol- istration, wrote much the same to his the Yankees) for the help the Algerian people dier. This is done on the battlefield. need.” ... I proposed to them, therefore, that the boss, National Security Advisor If you consider it useful, I think you training not take place in faraway Cuba, but , in September should share these impressions of mine with in nearby Congo [Che is therefore propos- 1979: our good friend Alejandro [Aleksandr ing that the recruits of non-Congolese guer- Alekseyev, the Soviet ambassador to Cuba]. rilla movements fight in the Congo] ... I As we embark on another anti-Castro I know that this is not the first time that the explained to them why we considered the period, let me suggest that we try to use Algerian problem has been raised. I believe war for the liberation of the Congo to be of a different term to refer to the Cubans that Fidel discussed it there [during his visit fundamental importance: victory there than that of “Soviet puppet.” My prin- to the Soviet Union in spring 1963], but would have repercussions throughout the cipal concern with that phrase is that it there is no harm in raising it again. Our continent, as would defeat. Their reaction strains our credibility and gets people Algerian friends have their own customs and was more than cold; even though most re- into debating the wrong issue. . . . The their pride. They don’t like asking for help, frained from making any comment, some word “puppet” suggests that the Cubans and they say that they would rather fight bitterly reproached me. They stated that their are engaging in revolutionary activities with knives than ask again. They say that people, ill-treated and abused by the impe- because the Soviets have instructed they have already explained the problem, rialists, would object if they were to suffer them to do it. That, of course, is not the which in any case is not difficult to under- losses to free not their own, but another case . . . I fear that if you or the Presi- stand. ... country. I tried to make them understand that dent use the term “Soviet puppet” in the Aldo [Santamaria, the head of the Cu- the real issue was not the liberation of any future, you might just open yourselves ban navy], who has left for Oran, and Papito given state, but a common war against the to unnecessary charges that our infor- [Serguera] send you greetings. I think that common master, who was one and the same mation or analysis is faulty.90 our “ebullient” ambassador [Sergio in Mozambique and in Malawi, in Rhode- Serguera] has scored a great victory and has sia and in South Africa, in the Congo and in As former U.S. Undersecretary of saved not our prestige—which was very Angola, but not one of them agreed. Their State George Ball has written, “Myths high—but that of the entire socialist camp. goodbyes were polite and frosty. are made to solace those who find real- We will continue to keep you informed. ity distasteful and, if some find such Flavio [Source: Guevara, “Pasajes,” 13-14.] fantasy comforting, so be it.”91 [Source: Centro de Información de la DOCUMENT 3: On 4 November 1965, Defensa de las Fuerza Armadas Che Guevara, who was in the Congo, re- DOCUMENTS Revolucionaries (CID-FAR), Havana.] ceived a cable from Oscar Fernández Padilla, head of the Cuban intelligence DOCUMENT 1: Flavio Bravo, deputy DOCUMENT 2: Excerpt from Che station in Dar-es-Salaam. The cable said: commander of the Cuban forces in Alge- Guevara’s “Pasajes de la guerra ria, to Raúl Castro, Algiers, 21 October revolucionaria (Congo)” on his meeting I am sending you, via courier, a letter 1963, pp. 2-3. with African liberation movement lead- from Fidel. Its key points are: ers in Dar-es-Salaam in February 1965. “1. We must do everything except that My dear Raúl: which is foolhardy. Yesterday, we found out that Efigenio I decided to try to get a sense of the “2. If Tatu [Guevara] believes that our [Ameijeiras] and 170 compañeros are go- “Freedom Fighters’” state of mind; I had in- presence has become either unjustifiable or ing to arrive tomorrow at 3:00 in two planes tended to do it in separate meetings, in pointless, we have to consider withdrawing. and that today, finally!, the ship is going to friendly conversations, but because of a “3. If he thinks we should remain we arrive.92 ...93 mistake at the embassy, there was instead a will try to send as many men and as much The situation demands that the entire “monster” meeting with at least fifty people material as he considers necessary. socialist camp send aid. Unfortunately, representing movements of at least ten coun- “4. We are worried that you may however, our friends here are not receiving tries, each divided into two or three factions. wrongly fear that your decision might be this aid: promises and more promises, but I addressed them, discussing the requests for considered defeatist or pessimistic. the weapons never arrive. Meanwhile, financial aid or training that almost all of “5. If Tatu decides to leave [the Congo], [King] Hassan [of Morocco] has a battalion them had made to us; I explained the cost he can return here or go somewhere else of Soviet tanks, MIGs and other Soviet of training a man in Cuba—the amount of [while waiting for a new internationalist 14 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

mission]. Angola to Prime Minister Fidel Castro. the $100,000. “6. We will support whatever decision In the course of this conversation, the [Tatu makes]. [Source: Neto, “Necesidades urgentes. Angolans complained about the paucity of “7. Avoid annihilation.” Lista dirigida al: Comité Central del aid from the socialist camp, and they pointed Partido Comunista de Cuba,” 26 January out that if the socialist camp does not help [Source: Rafael [Fernández Padilla] to 1975, Anexo no. 3, pp. 22-23, in “Informe them, no one will, since they are the most Tatu, 4 November 1965, Archives of the sobre la visita realizada por el mayor progressive forces [in the country], whereas Cuban Communist Party CC, Havana. See Rodobaldo Díaz Padraga a Angola en los the imperialists, Mobutu and ... [one word also Guevara, “Pasajes,” 118-19.] días del 16.11.75 (Frente sur),” n.d., Centro SANITIZED] are helping the FNLA in ev- de Información de la Defensa de las Fuerzas ery way possible. They also complained that DOCUMENT 4: Letter from Neto to Armadas Revolucionarias, Havana.] the Soviet Union stopped aiding them in Cuban leadership, Dar-es-Salaam, 26 1972 and that although it is now sending January 1975 DOCUMENT 5: Raúl Díaz Argüelles to them weapons, the amount of assistance is the Armed Forces minister [Raúl Castro], paltry, given the enormity of the need. In Dear Comrades, 11 August 1975 general, he [Neto] wants to portray the situ- Given the situation on the ground of ation in Angola as a crucial struggle between our movement and our country, and taking Report on the visit to Angola and on the the two systems— and Social- into account the results of the exploratory conversations held with Agostinho Neto, ism—in order to receive the assistance of trip of the official Cuban delegation [Cadelo president of the MPLA, and the Political the entire socialist camp. We believe that and Pina], we are sending you a list of the Bureau of the MPLA, as well as with chiefs he is right in this, because at this time the urgent needs of our organization. We are of the army staff of the FAPLA [the MPLA’s two camps in Angola are well defined, the confident that you will give it immediate armed forces]: FNLA and UNITA represent reaction and consideration. world imperialism and the Portuguese re- 1. The establishment, organization, and 1. We arrived at Luanda, Angola, on Sun- actionaries, and the MPLA represents the maintenance of a military school for cad- day, August 3 and established contact with progressive and nationalist forces. res. We urgently need to create a company the MPLA. They immediately took us to a We agreed that we would meet again of security personnel, and we need to pre- hotel. When President Neto heard about [our the next day, because we needed to finalize pare the members of our military staff. arrival], he sent for us and put some of us the exact timetables, quantities and details 2. We need to rent a ship to transport up in his house and the rest of the delega- etc. of the requests they had made. the war material that we have in Dar-es-Sa- tion in another compañero’s house. [Half a page SANITIZED—trans.] laam to Angola. The delivery in Angola, if In our first conversation with Neto we We believe that [the MPLA] enjoys the this were a Cuban ship, could take place greeted him on behalf of the Commander- general support of the population; the popu- outside of the territorial waters. in-Chief [Fidel Castro] and the Minister of lation is organized and ready to fight, but 3. Weapons and means of transporta- the Armed Forces [Raúl Castro], we gave lacks weapons, as well as food, clothing and tion for the Brigada de Intervención that we him the present and the note from the Com- basic gear. We believe that we must help are planning to organize, as well as light mander-in-Chief and then we explained the them directly or indirectly to remedy this weapons for some battalions. purpose of our visit. situation which is in essence the resistance 4. Transmitters and receivers to solve We based our explanation on the fol- of an entire people against the forces of re- the problem of communication among lowing points: action and imperialism. widely dispersed military units. a) The request made by the MPLA Revolucionariamente, 5. Uniforms and military equipment for when it was visited by a delegation from 10,000 men. our party and our government in January [Source: CID-FAR.] 6. Two pilots and one flight mechanic. [Cadelo and Pina] and the request made later 7. Assistance in training trade union in Mozambique by Cheito, the chief of staff DOCUMENT 6: Risquet to Fidel Castro, leaders. of the FAPLA. Luanda, 30 December 1975 8. Cooperation in the organization of b) These requests were somewhat con- schools for the teaching of Marxism (to tradictory: during the January visit they Commander-in-Chief, solve the problems of the party). asked for aid and the training of cadres in I have just returned from a tour of 9. Publications dealing with political Cuba and in Angola, and later in Quibala, Catofe, Conde, Ebo, Gabela, Point and military subjects, especially instruction Mozambique they asked only for the train- Amboim. The morale of the [Cuban mili- manuals. ing of cadres in Cuba. tary] commanders with whom I spoke (Polo 10. Financial assistance in this phase c) We were coming to clarify the aid [Leopoldo Cintra Frías], [Manuel] of establishing and organizing ourselves. we should offer, given the FNLA’s and Cervantes, [Armando] Saucedo etc. at the We also urge that the Communist Party Mobutu’s aggression against the MPLA and southern front headquarters; [Romérico] of Cuba use its influence with other coun- the possible course of events before inde- Sotomayor, Calixto Rodríguez Proenza and tries that are its friends and allies, especially pendence in November. We knew that the René [Hernández Gatorno]; [Jesús] Oviedo from the Socialist camp, so that they grant forces of reaction and imperialism would try in Point Amboim) is very high: they are useful and timely aid to our movement, with all their might to prevent the MPLA optimistic and full of ideas about how to which is the only guarantee of a democratic from taking power, because it would mean strike the enemy. The morale of the sol- and progressive Angola in the future. a progressive government in Angola. There- diers and officers with whom we spoke was Comrades, accept our revolutionary fore we were bringing Neto the militant soli- equally high. [Fernando] Vecino [Alegret], greetings and convey the good wishes of the darity of our Commander-in-Chief, our [Luis Alfonso] Zayas and, for the first part, combatants of the MPLA and of the new party and our government, and we gave him Furry [Abelardo Colomé Ibarra], accompa- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 15 nied me. said that he would inform the Political Bu- 1 I would like to thank the John D. and Catherine This high morale, the large number of reau of this increase [of men and arms], and T. MacArthur Foundation for helping to support this research. our troops and the large supply of material, appeared very satisfied with it, as an addi- 2 the nature of the terrain, and the material tional guarantee to counter whatever the Interview with Manuel Agramonte, Havana, 2 July 1994. The only two studies worth citing are and psychological condition of the enemy South Africans, the Zairians and the Impe- William Durch “The Cuban Military in Africa and lead me to conclude that there are no big rialists might do. the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola,” Stud- problems for our [defensive] line at In this meeting, Furry itemized some ies in Comparative , Spring/Summer Amboim-Ebo-Quibala-Cariango; that we of the men and materiel that were coming 1978, 34-63 and Gisela García, La misión have recovered the initiative in the south; aboard the Cuban ships. He spoke of a regi- internacionalista de Cuba en Argelia (1963-1964) that in the next few days our “active de- ment. [The Internationalist Mission of Cuba in Algeria fense” will gain ground in the south. ... 3. Nevertheless, taking into account the (1963-1964)] (Havana: Fuerzas Armadas Risquet.94 concern you expressed in your cable of yes- Revolucionarias, 1990). A garbled account of Che 96 Guevara’s struggle in Zaire, based on his unpub- terday, in the meeting that Oramas and I lished manuscript, is Paco Ignacio Taibo et al., [Source: Archives of the Cuban Communist had today with the president to discuss other El año que estuvimos en ninguna parte [The Year Party Central Committee, Havana.] matters (SWAPO, Katangans, etc.), I re- We Were Nowhere] (Mexico City: Planeta, 1994). turned as if in passing to this matter, and I 3 Jorge Risquet, note to author, Havana, 13 July DOCUMENT 7: Risquet to Fidel Castro, gave him a list of the weapons that will be 1996. Luanda, 29 January 1976 arriving on future Soviet ships and that are 4 For full information on sources for Algeria, see for the Cuban troops. Piero Gleijeses, “Cuba’s First Venture in Africa: Commander-in-Chief, I added that all the weapons that had Algeria, 1961-1965,” Journal of Latin American Regarding the Cuban weapons deliv- arrived in Soviet ships (the 73 tanks, the 21 Studies (February 1996), 159-95. 5 ered by the USSR in Luanda: BM-21s, etc.) so far, as well as the ten MIG- José Ramón Machado Ventura, note to author, We have explained the situation clearly to 17s, belonged to the People’s Republic of Havana, 12 July 1995, 1. 6 Verde Olivo (Havana), 28 June 1964, 51-52. President Neto, who understood it perfectly Angola. 7 See Piero Gleijeses, “‘Flee! The White Giants without expressing any doubts. [I stressed] that the MIG-21s that were Are Coming!’ The United States, the Mercenar- 95 1. “Furry [Colomé] and I spoke with coming in the AN-22 planes as well as the ies, and the Congo, 1964-1965,” Diplomatic His- Neto alone the day after Furry’s return [from weapons that were arriving in the Soviet tory, Spring 1994, 207-37. Moscow where he had gone to report to Fi- ships and that were enumerated in the list 8 Che Guevara, “Pasajes de la guerra del Castro, who was attending the Twenty- that I had given him were acquired by Cuba revolucionaria (Congo)” [Episodes of the Revo- fifth Congress of the Communist Party of in the USSR and delivered to Cuba by the lutionary War], Dar-es-Salaam, late 1965, 13 (pri- the Soviet Union], and we informed him of USSR in Luanda. vate collection, Havana). 9 CIA Special Memorandum, “Implications of your decision to send more troops, fully We told him that the Cuban troops, with Growing Communist Influence in URTZ,” 29 armed, in order to amass the forces neces- all these weapons, would remain in Angola September 1964, 11, Freedom of Information Act sary both fully to accomplish the goal of for as long as it took and for as long as he request (hereafter FOIA) 1977/91F. freeing the country from the South African considered necessary, and that we would 10 Interviews with Godefroid Tschamlesso, an and Zairian invasions and also to be in a po- take care of the training of the Angolan per- aide to Kabila (Havana, 30 June 1994) and sition to counter any possible increases in sonnel, so that they would be able to oper- Marcelino dos Santos, a Mozambican rebel leader (Havana, 27 June 1994). their forces. ate the tanks, the planes, Katyushas [rocket- 11 We told him [Neto] that some of the propelled grenade launchers], mortars, can- Guevara, “Pasajes,” 12-13, 120, 14. 12 Quotations from CIA, Office of Current In- new Cuban troops will arrive by boat with nons, etc. And that if the weapons deliv- telligence, “Brazzaville’s Move to the Left,” 30 their weapons and the rest will come to ered to the PRA [People’s Republic of October 1964, 5, National Security File Country Luanda by plane, where they will pick up Angola] were to prove insufficient for the File: Congo, box 83, Lyndon B. Johnson Library weapons that the Soviet Union is going to future Angolan army, the USSR would al- (hereafter LBJL), Austin, Texas; and “Discurso send for them. ways be ready to provide what was required, pronunciado por Raúl Castro Ruz en acto por el We explained to him that this will al- etc., etc. XX aniversario de la construcción de las columnas low us to avoid the unnecessary time, ex- That is, our conversation was abso- de combatientes internacionalistas cubanos que pense and risk of having the Soviets send lutely brotherly and without the smallest cumplieron misiones en el Congo Brazzaville y el Congo Leopoldville” [Speech by Raúl Castro these weapons to Cuba and then having to misunderstanding or reproach. However, Ruz on the 20th anniversary of the creation of transport them to Angola with the troops. we wanted to be absolutely clear—and we the columns of internationalist Cuban fighters Neto understood and approved with- left the list as written evidence—so that there who went to Congo Brazzaville and Congo out any qualm or hesitation. could be no misunderstandings, now or in Leopoldville], 11 November 1965, 7, Archives 2. Three days later, the Soviet general the future. of the Central Committee, Havana. [head of the Soviet military mission in We consider this matter to be totally 13 Guevara, “Pasajes,” 10. 14 Angola] told us he too would like to inform clear and settled. Let me know whether you See Jorge Risquet, “Brizna de paja en la oreja” [Neto], on behalf of the USSR, about the believe that this task has been accomplished [Straw in the ear], Brazzaville, 12 July 1966, Ar- chives of the Central Committee, Havana. delivery of the Soviet weapons to the Cu- or whether you think it is necessary to do 15 Interview with Rolando Kindelán, Havana, bans in Angola. We agreed that the most something more about it. 11 March 1996. appropriate way would be that he, Furry, and Greetings, 16 Rodolfo Puente Ferro, head of the medical I meet again with Neto alone. And so we Risquet brigade attached to the column, in Luis Hernández did. The general explained in some detail and Félix López, “Africa mía,” what weapons were being sent. [Source: Archives of the Cuban Communist (Havana), 3 December 1995, 8-9. 17 Neto raised no objection whatsoever, Party Central Committee, Havana.] Helenio Ferrer and Rodolfo Puente Ferro to wrote down the most important weapons, Machado Ventura, 19 May 1966, Archives of the 16 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Ministry of Public Health, Havana; Ferrer, sources: a) Luís Cabral, Crónica da Libertação de Cuba a la R.P.A. [Summary of the history of “Informe sobre campaña de vacunación [History of the War of Liberation] (Lisbon: the internationalist assistance given by Cuba to (Continuación)” [Report on the vaccination cam- Edições O Jornal, 1984), 253-54 and passim and the P.R.A.],” n.d., 3, Archives of the Instituto de paign (Continued)], 27 May 1966, ibid.; inter- Hugo Spadafora, Experiencias y pensamiento de Historia de Cuba, Havana. (Hereafter “Síntesis”) views with Jorge Risquet (Havana, 20 June 1994); un médico guerrillero [Experiences and Thoughts 33 “Conversación con Agostinho Neto, día 31 with the Cuban doctors Rodolfo Puente Ferro of a Guerrilla Doctor] (Panama City: Centro de de diciembre de 1974 [Conversation with (Havana, 21 June 1994) and Rodrigo Alvarez Impresió Educativa, 1980), 15-79; b) interviews Agostinho Neto, 31st of December 1974],” Ap- Cambra (Havana, 12 March 1996); and with Tirso in Bissau (29 April-2 May 1996) with the fol- pendix no. 6, enclosed in “Informe sobre la visita Arcide Reyna (Havana, 5 March 1996), a Cuban lowing Guinean doctors and physician’s assistants realizada a Angola” [Report on the Visit to soldier who helped in the campaign. who served in the war: Paulo Medina, Venancio Angola], 21 March 1975, 31, CID-FAR. (Here- 18 See Empresa Cubana de Navegación, [record Furtado, Gaudêncio de Sousa Carvahlo, Ernesto after “Informe sobre la visita”) of the Luis Arcos Bergnes], Manifiesto de Lopes Moreira and Paulo Alves; c) interviews in 34 “Informe sobre la visita,” 1. pasajeros congoleses, Centro de Información de Havana with the Cuban doctors Luis Peraza (5 35 “Conversación con Agostinho Neto al finalizar la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revo- July 1994), Milton Hechavarría (20 July 1995), la visita a Angola” [Conversation with Agostinho lucionarias, Havana (hereafter CID-FAR); J’ Raúl Candebat (12 July 1995), Pablo Pérez Neto at the conclusion of his visit to Angola], en- Transporte U/M 1546 to J’ Servicios U/M 1546, Capdet and Rubén Pérez de León (both on 28 closed in “Informe sobre la visita,” 32-33. 15 February 1966, CID-FAR; Estado Mayor Gen- February 1996). 36 Cadelo, note to author, Havana 15 July 1995, eral de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, 23 Interviews with Estrada (Havana, 7 Decem- 7. “Relación de personal especial que se encuentra ber 1994) and Oscar Cárdenas (Havana, 5 De- 37 Conversación con Agustinho Neto, día 31 de en El Cano,” 24 February 1966, CID-FAR. Inter- cember 1993). diciembre de 1974,” enclosed in “Informe sobre views with the Cubans doctors Alvarez Cambra, 24 Interview with Víctor Dreke (Havana, 26 June la visita,” quotation on p. 31; interviews with Puente Ferro and Julian Alvarez (Havana, 5 April 1994). Cadelo and Alfonso Pérez Morales (Pina) (Ha- 1994) and with two other Cubans who partici- 25 Interview with Robinson McIlvaine, Wash- vana, 28 February 1996). pated in the operation: Ulises Estrada (Havana, ington, D.C., 5 February 1996. See also Gleijeses, 38 “Conversación con Agostinho Neto al finalizar 30 March 1994) and Rafael Orlando Duany (Ha- “‘Flee!’” 220-21; CIA, Directorate of Intelli- la visita a Angola,” enclosed in “Informe sobre la vana, 12 March 1996); (Havana), 5 July gence, “Cuban Meddling in Africa,” 24 March visita,” 33. 1966, 1. See also René Gauze, The Politics of 1967, 4, FOIA 1996/605; U.S. CIA, Directorate 39 Interview with Cadelo. Congo-Brazzaville (Stanford: Hoover Institute of Intelligence, “Some Aspects of Subversion in 40 Andrés González Ballester, “Estudio de la Press, 1973), 205. and “Brazzaville — Cuba’s Africa,” 19 October 1967, 9, National Security colaboración militar cubano-angolana, 1975- new base?” African Review, August 1966, 10. File Country File: Union of South Africa, box 78, 1976,” Havana, Instituto Superior de Relaciones 19 “Policy Planning Memorandum No. 1,” 9, LBJL; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, “The Internacionales, 1989, quotation on p. 10; Cadelo, enclosed in Department of State to all African Liberation Movements of Southern Africa,” 24 note to author, 10. Diplomatic Posts, Lisbon, London, , Rome, November 1967, National Security File, NIE, box 41 See The Observer, 20 April 1975, 11, and 18 2 December 1971, FOIA 1982/0426. See also 8, LBJL; Knight (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 19 May 1975, 5; Le Monde, 3 May 1975, 6. Bennett (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 3 April 1968, October 1971, 2, FOIA 1982/1889; “Policy Plan- 42 Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka), 21 April 1975, FOIA 1982/0392; Bennett (Lisbon) to SecState, ning Memorandum No. 1,” enclosed in Dept. of 1. 16 July 1969, FOIA 1983/0449; Dept. of State, State to all African Diplomatic Posts, Lisbon, 43 “Informe sobre las actividades ejecutadas por Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Portuguese London, Paris, Rome, 2 December 1971, FOIA el Partido Comunista de Cuba y Gobierno Guinea: Talks About Talks,” 3 March 1970, FOIA 1982/0426; Knight (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 7 Revolucionario para dar cumplimiento a la ayuda 1982/1049; “Portuguese Guinea: Guidelines for January 1972, FOIA 1982/2672. solicitada por el Movimiento Popular para la Policy,” enclosed in Irwin to U.S. Embassy 26 Interview with Paul O’Neil, Washington, D.C., Liberación de Angola [Report on the actions taken Lisbon, 2 October 1970, FOIA 1982/1879. 20 February 1992. by the Communist party of Cuba and the Revo- 20 President Luís Cabral, Nõ Pintcha (Bissau), 27 “Discurso pronunciado,” 2. lutionary Government to deliver the aid requested 22 January 1977, 4-6. On the Guinea-Bissau 28 Lucio Lara, “A história do MPLA” [A His- by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of story, see Piero Gleijeses, “The First Ambassa- tory of the MPLA], n.d., 100. I would like to thank Angola],” (hereafter “Informe sobre las dors: Cuba’s Contribution to Guinea-Bissau’s War Dr. Christine Messiant of the Centre d’Etudes actividades”), CID-FAR, 1 (quoted); “Síntesis,” of Independence,” Journal of Latin American Africaines of Paris for sharing this important, 5; interviews with Cadelo and Víctor Schueg Studies (forthcoming, February 1997). unpublished document with me. Colás (Havana, 27 February 1996), who were 21 Interview with João Bernardo Vieira (Nino), 29 Rafael Moracén, who fought in Cabinda, al- members of the delegation. Bissau, 1 May 1996. The conclusions in this para- lowed me to photocopy his diary, “Diario de 44 “Síntesis,” 6. graph are based on: a) a great number of Cuban campaña de Humberto Vazquez Mancevo.” In 45 See “Síntesis,” 6-7 and “Informe sobre las documents in my possession, the most important addition to Moracén (Havana, 21 June 1994), I actividades,” 1-2. of which are “Ayuda brindada por la República also interviewed several other Cubans who fought 46 Interview with Risquet, Havana, 15 February de Cuba al Partido Africano por la Independencia in Cabinda: Osvaldo Fuente Veitía (Havana, 25 1996. de Guinea y las Islas de Cabo Verde (PAIGC)” June 1994); Rafael Orlando Duany (Havana, 12 47 See the trailblazing article by Peter Kornbluh [Help given by the Republic of Cuba to the Afri- March 1996); Fernando Galindo (Havana, 12 and James Blight, “Dialogue with Castro: A Hid- can Independence Party of Guinea and Cape March 1996); Tirso Arcide Reyna (Havana, 5 den History,” The New York Review of Books, 6 Verde], CID-FAR, and Ministerio de las Fuerzas March 1996). See also: César Augusto Kiluanji, October 1994, 45-49. Armadas Revolucionarias (hereafter MINFAR), Trajectória da vida de um guerrilheiro [The Life 48 Interview with Risquet. In his capacity as a “Realización de la Operación ‘Amílcar Cabral,’” of a Guerrilla] (Lisbon: Editorial , member of the Secretariat of the PCC, Risquet (1974), CID-FAR; b) interviews in Havana with 1990), 29-34. attended the sessions of the Political Bureau. over 20 Cuban protagonists; c) interviews in 30 Moracén, “Diario de campaña,” entry of Sep- 49 The preparatory meeting for the conference Bissau (25 April-1 May 1996) with the follow- tember 1965. was held in Havana in late March 1975. The ing senior PAIGC officials: Nino, Leopoldo 31 Interview with Moracén. Conferencia Internacional de Solidaridad con la Alfama, António Borges, Fidelis Cabral, Arafam 32 Interviews with Carlos Cadelo, the Commu- Independencia de Puerto Rico was held in Ha- Mané, Joseph Turpin, Vasco Cabral. nist party official whose portfolio included Angola vana on September 5-8. (See Granma, 1, 5, 15 22 Interview with Francisca Pereira, Bissau, 25 (Havana, 7 July 1995), and with Félix Véliz April 1975, all 1; 5 September 1975, 1; 6 Sep- April 1996. The exception was the Panamanian Hernández (Havana, 3 July 1995) and Luis Mario tember 1975, 8; 9 September 1975, 2.) doctor Hugo Spadafora from July 1966 to May Burgos (Havana, 24 June 1994), who were pre- 50 The mission to Syria (October 1973-January 1967. In addition to the sources listed in the pre- paring to leave for eastern Angola; MINFAR, 1975) is briefly described in MINFAR, “Las vious footnote, I rely on three major groups of “Síntesis histórica de la ayuda internacionalista misiones internacionalistas desarrolladas por las COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 17

FAR en defensa de la independencia y la soberanía 62 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 1 October 1975, the mission to Angola on November 4-18]”), n.d., de los pueblos” [Internationalist missions of the 11, CID-FAR. CID-FAR; Raúl Pérez Millares and Eliseo Matos FAR in defense of the independence and the sov- 63 Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Andreu (representatives of Cubana de Aviación ereignty of other peoples], n.d., 26-34, Archives Research, “Angola: The MPLA Prepares for In- in Barbados) to Olivio, 17 December 1975, CID- of the Instituto de Historia de Cuba, Havana. dependence,” 22 September 1975, 4-5, FOIA FAR; González Bellester, “Estudio de la 51 Le Monde, 14 January 1976, 8; Kissinger’s Collection, National Security Archive, Washing- colaboración,” 12-13. On the U.S. campaign to testimony of 29 January 1976 in U.S. Senate, ton, D.C. close airports for the Cuban airlift, see the fol- Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommitteee 64 Quotations from: Daily Telegraph (London), lowing documents, all in FOIA collection, Na- on African Affairs, Angola, 94th Cong., 2d 10 October 1975, 16; Rand Daily Mail tional Security Archive: U.S. Embassy Port of sess.(Washington, DC: Government Printing Of- (Johannesburg), 23 October 1975, 1; Spies, Spain to SecState, 19 December 1975; Kissinger fice, 1976), 17; New York Times, 5 February 1976, Operasie Savannah, 82. to U.S. Embassy Georgetown, 20 December 12; Sunday Telegraph (London), 30 January 1977, 65 Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka), 9 October 1975, 1975; SecState to all American Republic Diplo- 8; Fred Bridgland, “The Future of Angola,” South 4. matic Posts, 20 December 1975; Kissinger to U.S. Africa International, July 1988, 32; Christian Sci- 66 Quotations from Helmoed-Römer Heitman, Embassy Georgetown, 24 December 1975; ence Monitor, 22 January 1976, 9. South African War Machine (Novato, Calif.: Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Lisbon, 22 Decem- 52 See Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, n.d. [late Au- Presidio Press, 1985), 170 and Dirk and Johanna ber 1975; and U.S. Embassy Lisbon to SecState, gust 1975], 4; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 2 Sep- de Villiers, P.W. - A Biography of South Africa’s 8 January 1976, FOIA, MF 8904623 S.1. The fact tember 1975, 14; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 3 President P.W. Botha (Cape Town: Tafelberg, that the Cubans were in charge was well reported September 1975, 9 (signed by Díaz Argüelles but 1984), 251. On the controversial issue of in the Western press: see, e.g., Economist, 27 De- the handwriting is Cadelo’s); Díaz Argüelles to Washington’s role, a good starting point is Chester cember 1975, 26; Daily Telegraph, 19 December Colomé, n.d. [late September 1975], 5; Díaz Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making 1975, 4; Le Monde, 18 January 1976, 1; Chris- Argüelles to Colomé, 1 October 1975, 15; Díaz Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: tian Science Monitor, 22 January 1976, 9; Wash- Argüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975, 26; Díaz Norton, 1992), 49. ington Post, 10 March 1976, 15. Argüelles to Colomé, 16 October 1975, 2; 67 See Spies, Operasie Savannah, 87-95 and du 81 MINFAR “Conversación con el embajador “Situación militar en Angola. Octubre/75” [Mili- Preez, Aventuur, 65-72. For the South African soviético,” 6 January 1976, CID-FAR; Gustavo tary Situation in Angola, October 1975], Novem- campaign, see Cdr. Jan Breytenbach, Forged in Chui (deputy chief of the Puesto de Mando de ber (1?), 1975, 13. Díaz Argüelles also cabled Battle (Cape Town: Saayaman & Weber, 1986); Angola in the EMG) to Comandante de Brigada specific requests. See MINFAR “Solicitud de idem, They Live By the Sword (Alberton, S.A.: Rogelio Acevedo, 9 January 1976, CID-FAR; Argüelles,” 25 August 1975 through 26 Septem- Lemur, 1990), 18-66; Spies, Operasie Savannah; Raúl Castro to Severo Aguirre, 31 January 1976, ber 1975, CID-FAR. After Cuba decided to send du Preez, Aventuur. CID-FAR. troops to Angola on November 4, a more senior 68 Díaz Argüelles, “Situación militar en Angola. 82 Interview with Risquet. officer, Leopoldo Cintra Frías, replaced Díaz Octubre/75,” November (1?) 1975, 10, CID-FAR. 83 See Chui (Subjefe del Puesto de Mando de Arguelles as head of the MMCA. He arrived in 69 Breytenbach, Forged in Battle, 72. Angola en el EMG) to Cdte Juan Escalona (Jefe Angola on November 11. 70 Elima, 3 November 1975, 1. del Puesto de Mando), 30 January 1976, CID- 53 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, n.d. [late August 71 Breytenbach, Forged in Battle, 108-09. FAR. 1975], 1, 4, CID-FAR. 72 For the Western press, see Rand Daily Mail, 84 See Gleijeses, “Cuba’s First Venture,” 174. 54 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975, 8 November 1975, 8; Cape Times, 13 November 85 See CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, weekly 2, CID-FAR. 1975, 1; London Times, 6 November 1975, 5; reports, “The Situation in the Congo,” 10 March 55 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975, Washington Post, 7 November 1975, 7; Guard- 1965, 5-6, 31 March 1965, 4, and 14 April 1965, 5, 9-11, 12, CID-FAR. See also MINFAR, ian (Manchester), 4 November 1975, 3; New York 4, all in National Security File Country File: “Composición de fuerzas y medios de la unidad Times, 9 November 1975, 18. For the MPLA’s Congo, box 87, LBJL; CIA, Office of Current In- incluyendo el incremento del Punto 4,” n.d. [late denunciations, see FBIS, VIII, 23 October 1975, telligence, “Tanzanian Support for the Congo October 1975]. On the 1965 agreement: interview E2 and Granma, 25 October 1975, 8. Rebels,” 7 April 1965, 4, ibid. with Estrada, who was a senior intelligence of- 73 Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola 86 Hughes to SecState, “Che Guevara’s African ficer at the time, Havana, 18 December 1994. in the Frontline (London: Zed Press, 1983), 30. Venture,” 19 April 1965, 1-2, National Security 56 MINFAR, “Composición de fuerzas y medios 74 Paulo Jorge, “Resposta célere dos cubanos ao File Country File: Cuba, box 20, LBJL. de la unidad incluyendo el incremento del Punto apelo de Agostinho Neto,” Jornal de Notícias 87 Interview with Turpin. 4,” n.d. [late October 1975]; MINFAR “Solicitud (Lisbon), 14 November 1995, 14. 88 Ford, quoted in New York Times, 11 February de Argüelles,” 25 August 1975 through 26 Sep- 75 “Informe sobre las actividades,” 5. 1976, 1. According to press reports, Kissinger tember 1975, CID-FAR; “Informe sobre las 76 MINFAR, “Batallón de Tropas Especiales,” believed that the Cubans had intervened on their actividades,” 3; “Síntesis,” 11-12. nd, CID-FAR; Lucas Molina to Colomé (“Informe own initiative, but he chose the politically more 57 Quotations from Le Monde, 20 August 1975, del cumplimiento de la misión en Luanda entre rewarding course of claiming that Cuba “was act- 4 and 19 August 1975, 3. The best analysis of the los días 4-18.11.75”) [Report on the mission in ing merely as the ‘client state’ of the Soviet US role in the is Raymond L. Luanda on 4-18 November 1975], n.d., 7, CID- Union.” (New York Times, 5 February 1976, 12.) Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American- FAR; “Resumen de los cables recibidos. See also Kissinger’s 29 January 1976 testimony Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (rev. ed., Noviembre 75” [Summary of the cables received], in US Senate, Angola, 6-55, quotation on 8. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 556-93. entry of 9 November 1975, CID-FAR. The Cu- 89 In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to 58 John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA ban planes, two aging Britannias, refuelled twice America’s Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Story (New York: Norton, 1978), 163. en route to Luanda. Times Books, 1995), 362. See also Arkady 59 Quotations from Elima (Kinshasa), 21 Octo- 77 Du Preez, Aventuur, 142. Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow (New York: ber 1975, 1, and 23 October 1975, 1. 78 Quotations from Cape Times, 21 November Knopf, 1985), 271-72; Yuri Pavlov, Soviet-Cu- 60 See F.J. du Toit Spies, Operasie Savannah. 1975, 1, and Spies, Operasie Savannah, 108. ban Alliance: 1959-1991 (New Brunswick, NJ: Angola 1975-1976 (Pretoria: S.A. Weermag, 79 See Westad article in this Bulletin. Transaction Publishers, 1994). 1989), 132 and Sophia du Preez, Aventuur in 80 See “Informe sobre la visita realizada por el 90 Pastor to Brzezinski, 21 September 1979, Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate mayor Rodobaldo Díaz Padraga a Angola en los White House Central File, box CO-21, Jimmy in Angola 1975-1976 [Adventure in Angola: The días del 16.11.75 al 26.11.75 (Frente sur)” [Re- Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia. Carter called Story of South Africa’s Soldiers in Angola 1975- port on the visit to Angola by Major Rodobaldo Castro “a Soviet puppet”; Brzezinski dismissed 1976] (Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik 1989), 113. Díaz Padraga on 16-26 November 1975 (South- the Cubans as “proxy military forces” and CIA 61 Díaz Argüelles, “Situación militar en Angola. ern front)], n.d., CID-FAR; Lucas Molina to director Stansfield Turner blithely spoke of “Cu- Octubre / 75,” November (1?) 1975, 3-5, CID- Colomé (“Informe del cumplimiento de la misión ban mercenaries.” See Carter, Keeping Faith: FAR; “Síntesis,” 14-17. en Luanda entre los días 4-18.11.75 [Report on Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam 18 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Books, 1982), 479; Brzezinski, Power and Prin- CASTRO’S TRIP TO AFRICA Lanka, at the Nonaligned Summit Confer- ciple: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser continued from page 8 ence in August 1976]. After that we sent a 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 56, 146, 187; and Turner, Secrecy and De- fuegos, Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes Cuban delegation to Mozambique and I was mocracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston: [Honecker welcomes Castro, invites him to invited to visit. FRELIMO accepted all of Houghton & Mifflin, 1985), 86, 92. take the floor—ed.] our suggestions for the visit. It was kept 91 George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Fidel Castro: [sections omitted—ed.] discreet, which was convenient for me. Memoirs (New York: Norton, 1982), 374. Cuba’s role in Shaba and the Horn go beyond the scope We visited Tanzania because of an old Samora Machel was really a surprise for me. of this essay. For Cuba and Shaba, see Piero commitment. We have built three schools I learned to know him as an intelligent revo- Gleijeses, “Truth or Credibility: Castro, Carter there, sent a medical brigade, and given help lutionary who took clear positions and had and the Invasions of Shaba, “International His- in other ways. Nyerere had invited us to talk a good relationship with the masses. He re- tory Review, February 1996, 70-103. 92 The 686 men of the Grupo Especial de about economic matters above all. The rise ally impressed me. We spoke with each other Instrucción (GEI) arrived in Algeria aboard two in oil prices had affected Tanzania tremen- for one and a half days. We support special flights of Cubana de aviación that left dously. Tanzania needs 800,000 tons of oil Mozambique. Machel asked us to send 300 Havana on October 21, and on two ships, the a year. The entire harvest of peanut, sisal and technicians. He was interested in Cuba’s Aracelio Iglesias and the Andrés González Lines, which reached Oran on October 22 and 29 re- cotton crops has to be used for the purchase experiences, especially economic ones. Be- spectively. Efigenio Ameijeiras was the com- of oil. The Chinese are still present in Tan- fore this we did not know for sure what in- mander of the GEI. zania. They have built a few things there, in fluence the Chinese had on him. Now he is 93 In this article the ellipsis is used to indicate particular the railroad. The armed units of getting closer to the Soviet Union and other author’s editing. Any sanitized words or sentences are clearly indicated as such. the ZANU are trained by the Chinese. Tan- socialist countries. He got a loan from the 94 On 3 December 1975, Risquet flew to Angola zania also carries some responsibility for the Soviets for weapons of 100 million rubles. as head of the Cuban Mission in Luanda. As such, split of the liberation movement of Zimba- In particular, the Soviets deliver aircraft and he was above the ambassador (Oscar Oramas) and bwe into ZANU and ZAPU. In South Af- anti-aircraft batteries. We were very pleased at the same level as the chief of the MMCA. 95 “Because of the growing scope of our help to rica armed fighting has begun. with our visit to Mozambique. I want to say the MPLA,” on 25 November 1975 the first vice- The ANC fighters are trained in Angola. that we consider this very important. minister of the armed forces, Abelardo Colomé The Chinese had also offered training here. [Zambian President Kenneth] Kaunda Ibarra, had flown from Cuba to Angola to become Tanzania considers the developments in also wanted me to visit him. I had been in the head of the MMCA. (“Síntesis,” 23-24.) 96 Oscar Oramas, a senior foreign ministry offi- Zimbabwe in terms of prestige. [Its involve- Africa for a long time, however, and did not cial and former ambassador to Guinea Conakry ment] allows it to negotiate with Great Brit- want to extend my stay. Besides which the (1966-73), had arrived in December 1975 to serve ain and the United States over Zimbabwe imperialist penetration has advanced far in as Cuba’s first ambassador to Angola. and to define a role for itself. Zambia. In the Angola matter, Zambia took The ZANU has 5000 men in fighting a very wrong position, in spite of the fact Piero Gleijeses is Professor of U.S. For- units trained by the Chinese. The liberation that she was not forced to do so. We had eign Policy at the Johns Hopkins Uni- fighters in Namibia are also trained in agreed with Angola not to visit Zambia. A versity School of Advanced Interna- Angola, however. Cuba and the Soviet few days before my visit to southern Africa tional Studies in Washington, D.C. He Union have both set up training camps for the Katanga [Shaba] battles had begun and is the author of, among other works, this purpose. The ZAPU is supported by [People’s Republic of the Congo President Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revo- Angola. Marien] N’Gouabi was murdered. I had lution and the United States (Princeton, We flew directly from Tanzania to been invited to Madagascar, but did not want NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). Mozambique. There used to be differences to stay in Africa any longer. During a press between us and the FRELIMO, going back conference in Dar Es Salaam I had categori- to the times when FRELIMO was in Tanza- cally denied that Cuba was in any way in- INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC nia and Che Guevara had spoken to volved in the Katanga battles. I explained ARCHIVES ASSOCIATION [Mozambique Liberation Front head that the situation in Angola was different Eduardo] Mondlane there. At the time from those in Zimbabwe and Namibia. I had Scholars interested in conducting research Mondlane did not agree with Che and said answered all questions in very general terms. in Moscow at the Russian Foreign Minis- so publicly. Thereafter news articles against Things are going well in Angola. They try Archives—the Archive of Foreign Mondlane were published in Cuba. Later achieved good progress in their first year of Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF)—may Mondlane corrected himself, but only inter- independence. There’s been a lot of build- contact the International Diplomatic Ar- nally and things remained somewhat up in ing and they are developing health facili- chives Association (IDAA). The Associa- the air. FRELIMO took good positions dur- ties. In 1976 they produced 80,000 tons of tion assists scholars in locating relevant ma- ing the liberation struggle in Angola. But in coffee. Transportation means are also being terials, setting up research visits, obtaining our opinion they were not sufficiently com- developed. Currently between 200,000 and passes for research, declassification proce- bative. For a time FRELIMO got close to 400,000 tons of coffee are still in ware- dures, photocopying, etc. Inquiries: I. [Tanzanian President Julius] Nyerere. [Cu- houses. In our talks with [Angolan Presi- Boukharkin, President, International Dip- ban Vice President] Carlos Rafael dent Agostinho] Neto we stressed the abso- lomatic Archives Association, fax: (7-095) [Rodriguez] had spoken to [Mozambican lute necessity of achieving a level of eco- 230-2130 (new fax number). President] Samora Machel in Colombo[, Sri nomic development comparable to what had COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 19 existed under [Portuguese] colonialism. tically not organized. The Soviet advisers complicated. Over 300 Cubans are working in the health are primarily concerned with planning. Neto The number of our civilian advisers system. Fishing is recovering and the sugar wanted us to take the entire army in hand. and experts will rise to 4,000 this year. Un- plantations are almost all back in produc- In practical terms that might have been the til now this aid has been provided free of tion. The reconstruction of the transport sys- best solution, but not politically. The Soviet charge. Starting in 1977, however, Angola tem is to be completed within 6 months. In Union is the chief weapons supplier and the is committed to paying for the living ex- education a lot is being done as well. The Angolans must speak directly to the Sovi- penses of our specialists, with an additional MPLA [Movement for the Popular Libera- ets. Neto himself must solve these problems. increase in financial responsibilities sched- tion of Angola] is doing a good job with We also cannot commit our troops to the uled for 1978. Our military aid will remain mass organizing. Women are politically very fight against bandits because women and free of charge. The Soviet Union has com- active. There are no grounds for dissatisfac- children are being killed in these battles and mitted itself to supplying the entire mate- tion there. Angola has good hard currency we cannot take on such a responsibility. rial needs of the Angolan and our units. earnings. Oil revenues are about 500 mil- Neto made a very good impression. He While in Angola I also dealt with the lion dollars a year, without them having to is an outstanding personality, very clever question of the liberation movements in do anything. They also generate about 300 and decisive. He is increasingly the leading Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. million from coffee. Now they are setting figure in the Angolan leadership. There are Namibia’s liberation fighters are good, they up a Party in Angola. The fundamental de- also opportunists in Angola, however. are also helping Angola with the anti-ban- cisions in domestic and foreign policy are Sometimes they try to approach us or the dit battles. The South African ANC is a se- correct. We are still concerned about one Soviets and to spread certain opinions. We rious organization. Its president, Oliver area: the development of the Army. The De- are very clearly taking a line in favor of Tambo, is a serious politician. Three quar- fense Ministry is doing hardly anything to Agostinho Neto. There is also evidence of ters of the ANC Central Committee mem- fight bandits in the north and south of the black in Angola. Some are using the bership is communist. They have a very country. The bands are particularly active hatred against the colonial masters for nega- clear political position with regards to in the center of the country. With our help tive purposes. There are many mulattos and Angola, the Soviet Union, and other social- they could deliver heavy blows against whites in Angola. Unfortunately, racist feel- ist countries. The people have taken up the them. The Soviet military advisors are ac- ings are spreading very quickly. Neto has struggle in South Africa, in time the ANC tive at the highest levels. Our advisers are taken a balanced position here, naming both will be a serious power. active at the Brigade level and we are help- whites and mulattos as ministers. Neto is of The situation is most complicated in ing them with the training of military cad- course ready to contribute to this question Zimbabwe. The ZANU have 1,000 armed res and the fight against the bandits. The decisively. He is open to suggestions and fighters. The Chinese and Nyerere are in- Angolan Defense Ministry underestimates arguments. The Defense Minister is not as fluential with the ZANU. The ZAPU, how- the fight against the bandits [and] they are strong. He does not have high standards. ever, haven’t had any military forces of their not deploying regular troops against the ban- Because of this a lot of cadres do not have own. The best man in the ZAPU, General dits. We understand that the Soviet military the right attitudes. There are cases in which Secretary [Jason] Moyo, was murdered [in advisers are primarily requested to help them the military commanders have not visited Zambia in January 1977]. During the to organize the regular army and are not in- their military district for five months. Many Angolan war of liberation, the Angolan lead- terested in helping in the fight against ban- ministers were appointed because they were ership could not give its support to the lib- dits. It is difficult for us to fight against the old war comrades of Neto’s. A fact remains: eration movement in Zimbabwe. At the time bandits on our own. Our comrades have had the army and general staff are not working Mozambique was leaning against Tanzania a lot of difficulties and have spent many bit- properly. Cadres overall are being developed and supported the ZANU. Today things are ter hours fighting them. The Cubans cannot well throughout Angola, but the Army is the different. Angola’s influence is increasing do it alone. The state of the army unsettles most important. Things are going well, with and Mozambique is growing closer and us. In one region a brigade has been with- the exception of the army. closer to Angola. The Patriotic Front in Zim- out a commander or chief of staff for a long We are giving Angola a great deal of babwe is made up of both the ZANU and time. Until now the Cuban units have been military support. At the end of the libera- the ZAPU, but this is only a formality. the only ones fighting the bandits. The ma- tion war, 36,000 Cuban troops and 300 tanks [ZAPU leader Joshua] Nkomo is supported jor share must however be carried out by were deployed. The South African merce- by Angola, the Soviet Union and the other the Angolans themselves. The Cuban troops naries were quickly demoralized. The USA socialist countries. [ZANU leader Robert] are above all concentrated in Cabinda and talks about 12,000 Cuban soldiers. We are Mugabe is supported by Tanzania and the in the defense of the capital, Luanda. I spoke reducing our troop strength continuously. Chinese. Now there are possibilities for de- with Neto about the situation of the army This year we plan to leave 15,000 men sta- priving the Chinese and the Tanzanians of and told him that things had to change. The tioned there. By the end of 1978 there should their influence in Zimbabwe. Zambia is sup- Defense Minister [Cdr. Iko Teles Carreira— be only 7,000, although it’s probable that porting the Zimbabwean liberation move- ed.] is a good old fighter with the MPLA, the reductions won’t proceed quite as rap- ment for the prestige factor that’s involved but that hasn’t helped. An army general staff idly. The main force is stationed in the south. and because it wants to counteract Angola’s does not really exist. The country may have If the Cuban military were not deployed in influence with Nkomo. With the positive 70,000 men under arms but the army is prac- Angola the situation would be a lot more development of Angola and Mozambique 20 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the prospects of the liberation movement in They know very well that there are no Cu- the Libyans we have not yet come to a deci- Zimbabwe can only improve. It is possible ban units involved. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez sion. that Angola, Mozambique and Zambia will is charged with speaking to the French and I had consultations with [Houari] move forward together. The ZAPU must es- Belgian ambassadors to protest against their Boumedienne in Algeria and asked for his tablish its own armed forces as soon as pos- countries’ involvement and to pressure them opinion. He assured me that Algeria would sible. There are today 6,000 ZAPU men in to stop. We want them to be worried, so never abandon . Algeria is very con- Angola, and one could make an Army out when they are organizing their mercenar- cerned with the situation in the Mediterra- of them. That would facilitate uniting the ies, and to think that our troops are very near. nean because of its security interests. It is ZAPU and the ZANU. I told Neto about this Angola has a certain moral duty, and a in favor of supporting Libya, as long as mili- and he agreed. Above all that would be a desire, to support the Katanga liberation tary aid is confined to the socialist camp. way to roll back China’s influence. Nkomo movement. They also desire it because the That is not only a question between Cuba also understands this. He is very intelligent Angolan leadership is angered by [Zairian and Algeria. If we are to succeed in strength- and talks to Samora Machel a great deal. leader] Mobutu [Sese Seko]’s behavior. ening the revolution in Libya, , Unfortunately he is very fat, and so his Angola has asked us and the Soviets to give Mozambique, the PDRY [People’s Demo- health is not good. them weapons for delivery to the Katangans. cratic Republic of ] and Angola we I told him and others that the personal We should wait for developments, however. must have an integrated strategy for the safety of all the liberation leaders was in Mobutu is an incompetent and weak politi- whole African continent. danger. The imperialists would be moved cian. It’s possible that he will not survive Angola is becoming closer to the so- to try and murder them all. They’ve already this crisis. The frontline states are now in cialist camp. It bought 1.5 billion rubles of murdered N’Gouabi and Moyo. Because of favor of supporting Katanga, while Angola weapons from the Soviets. Boumedienne this it is absolutely necessary to take steps favors direct aid. We don’t want to be in- thinks that [Egyptian President Anwar] to increase security measures for the lead- volved in order not to give the USA an ex- Sadat is totally lost to us. In Syria there is ers. cuse to intervene. As I mentioned we will also no leftist movement any more, espe- The liberation struggle in Africa has a try to put pressure on and France. cially after the Syrians defeated the progres- great future. From a historical perspective It will be a great event if Mobutu falls. sive powers and the PLO [Palestine Libera- the facts are that the imperialists cannot turn In the People’s Republic of the Congo tion Organization] in Lebanon. things back. The liberation struggle is the there is a confusing situation following [Indian President] Indira Gandhi most moral thing in existence. If the social- N’Gouabi’s murder. The interior and de- gambled away the elections. ist states take the right positions, they could fense ministers are competing for the lead- In Africa we can inflict a severe defeat gain a lot of influence. Here is where we ership. There are also pro-Westerners in the on the entire reactionary imperialist policy. can strike heavy blows against the imperi- military council. It is practically certain that We can free Africa from the influence of the alists. The liberation army in Katanga the rightists murdered N’Gouabi. But the USA and of the Chinese. The developments [Shaba] is led by a general. These people left wing was also dissatisfied with him as in Zaire are also very important. Libya and used to favor Katanga’s secession from well. In other words there was a relatively Algeria have large territories, Ethiopia has Zaire. Later they went to Angola, were uncertain situation there. We sent Comrade a great revolutionary potential. So there is a trained by the Portuguese and fought against Almeyda to the funeral, and hope that the great counterweight to Sadat’s betrayal in the MPLA, until they went over to Neto’s situation will stabilize. We were also asked . It is even possible that Sadat will be side; now they could not fall out with Neto. to send a military unit to Brazzaville. The turned around and that the imperialist in- They are good soldiers. Its military leader internal problems of the country must be fluence in the Middle East can be turned is a general in the gendarmerie who now solved by the Congolese themselves how- back. wants to make a revolution in Zaire. These ever. We have stationed a small military unit This must all be discussed with the So- people are now saying that they are good in Pointe Noire, and another one in Cabinda. viet Union. We follow its policies and its Marxist-Leninists and that they no longer There were several requests for mili- example. advocate the secession of Katanga. They tary aid from various sides: [Libyan leader We estimate that Libya’s request is an went off in four different directions with four Moammar] Qadaffi, Mengistu, and the Con- expression of trust. One should not reject battalions. We didn’t know about this, and golese leaders. During our stay in Africa we their request. Cuba cannot help it alone. we think that the Angolans didn’t either. The sent Carlos Rafael Rodriguez to Moscow to [subsequent sections omitted—ed.] frontline states were split 50/50 in favor of confer with our Soviet comrades and to supporting the Katanga liberation move- Havana for consultations with our leader- [Source: Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien und ment. We gave them a categorical explana- ship. In order to find the best solution we Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen tion that Cuba was in no way involved in must think through this question quietly and DDR im Bundesarchiv” (Berlin), DY30 JIV this. The armed groups are marching for- thoroughly and consider it in terms of the 2/201/1292; document obtained by Chris- ward. Their commander sends an open [pub- overall situation of the socialist camp. tian F. Ostermann (National Security lic] daily telegram to the Angolan leader- Above all we must do something for Archive); translated for Carter-Brezhnev ship and to the Soviet and Cuban embassies Mengistu...[section on Ethiopia printed in Project by David Welch with revisions by in Luanda describing his advances and ask- “Horn of Africa Crisis” section—ed.] ...With Ostermann; copy on file at National Secu- ing for support. The Yankees are wavering. regard to military aid for the PR Congo and rity Archive.] COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 21 Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976: A New Pattern of Intervention by Odd Arne Westad1 Was it the possibilities for expan- There are, in particular, two aspects sion within the world system of states of the Soviet materials on the Angolan For a period of roughly twenty which prompted Moscow’s involve- civil war which point away from expla- years—from the formation of the Cu- ment in Africa and Asia? Some ana- nations generally offered by realist ban-Soviet alliance in the early 1960s lysts, such as Francis Fukuyama, have scholars. First, there is the issue of the until the Red Army got bogged down argued that it was the U.S. foreign nature and importance of ideology in in the valleys of Afghanistan in the early policy of detente and the defeat in Viet- Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet offi- 1980s—the Soviet Union was an inter- nam which more than anything else cials who designed the intervention in ventionist power with global aspira- paved the way for Soviet expansionism. Southern Africa were driven by ideas tions. The peak of Soviet intervention- Recent memoirs and Moscow’s own de- of promoting their model of develop- ism outside Eastern Europe was in the classified documents lend support to ment abroad. Their early contacts with mid- and late 1970s, and coincided this view by showing that the mid-70s the Angolan left-wing rebels had shown roughly with the rise of detente and the was the high-point of a wave of opti- them that the Movimento Popular de effects of the American defeat in Viet- mism in Soviet foreign policy—”the Libertação de Angola (People’s Move- nam. This period witnessed significant world,” according to one former senior ment for the Liberation of Angola or efforts by Moscow to expand its power official, “was turning in our direction.”4 MPLA) was a likely adherent to Soviet abroad, especially in the Middle East, Other scholars have concentrated ideas of state and society. As the around the Indian Ocean, and in South- on the immense expansion of Soviet Angolan group came under pressure ern Africa. But it was also a period in military and infrastructural capabilities from its enemies, many Soviet officials which the traditional cautiousness of during the late 1960s as a cause for So- used opportunity, capability, and stra- Soviet Third World diplomacy was cast viet involvement in the Third World. tegic interest as rationalizations of a away at a peril: By the mid-1980s, many This instrumental explanation empha- desire to uphold a regime willing to link had started to question the sizes in particular the growth of the up to the Soviet experience. costs of the Kremlin’s imperial ambi- Soviet navy, the development of a large Second, there is the ability of So- tions.2 fleet of long-distance transport planes, viet allies—in this case the Angolans What was behind the new Soviet enlarged training facilities, and im- and the Cubans—to influence interventionism of the 1970s? Which provements in global communica- Moscow’s actions. Luanda and espe- perceptions and motives led Soviet tions.5 cially Havana pushed successfully for leaders to involve themselves deeply Analysts have also pointed to Moscow’s involvement in the civil war, into the affairs of countries outside Eu- changes in leadership and political or both demonstrating leverage far in ex- rope or their immediate border areas? institutional conflicts within the Soviet cess of their putative “power.” In 1975, As the doors to the archives of the Com- elite. Samuel Huntington suggests that Fidel Castro initiated Cuban armed sup- munist Party of the Soviet Union each of the Soviet advances into new port for the MPLA without Moscow’s (CPSU) open, albeit slowly, we are get- foreign policy arenas antedated the agreement or knowledge, and thereby ting new insights into the old problems emergence of a new leader and became reduced the Soviet leaders’ role for sev- of Moscow’s foreign policy behavior part of the new leader’s claim to power. eral crucial months to that of spectators through CPSU documents on a multi- Brezhnev is the prototype for such a to a war in which the Cubans and their tude of international crises. This article leader, and the Soviet policy changes Angolan allies gambled on prospective attempts to address some of the issues in the 1970s must then be seen as part Soviet support to win. Although it cer- relating to Soviet interventions by re- of Brezhnev’s international agenda. tainly was the direction of Soviet for- visiting one of the main African con- Parallel with Brezhnev’s rise to power, eign policy itself which poised Moscow flicts of the 1970s: the 1975-76 Angolan the International Department for its Angolan adventure, it was Castro civil war. (Mezhdunarodnyi otdel or MO) of the and MPLA President Agostinho Neto In the dominant realist interpreta- CPSU Central Committee (CC) who conditioned and shaped the inter- tion of international relations, the So- strengthened its position as a maker of vention. viet elite is seen primarily as pursuing Soviet foreign policy at the expense of The main foreign policy aim for a set of interests on the international the Foreign Ministry, and, while the Soviet involvement in Africa was to arena. The primary interest of the elite Ministry was preoccupied with the tra- score a series of inexpensive victories is the preservation of the Soviet state— ditional arenas for Soviet foreign in what was perceived as a global con- an interest which in foreign policy leads policy—Europe and the United test with Washington for influence and to caution at most times, and expansion States—the MO increasingly empha- positions in the Third World. Political when possible.3 sized the Third World.6 theory—Marxism-Leninism—did play 22 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

a role in selecting who should be the plans in Angola in late 1975 that the especially Angola and Guinea-Bissau Soviet allies in the area, and the large Soviet Union finally made a major in- had great potential strategic importance deposits of mineral resources in South- vestment in one of its Southern African for the Soviet Union, and that both the ern Africa also played a role (prima- alliances, and thereby made the MPLA United States and China were trying to rily in terms of denying these resources a regional ally second in importance increase their influence with the libera- to the US and its allies), but these were only to the African National Congress tion movements in these countries.9 subsidiary parts of the equation. (ANC) of South Africa. The intelligence organizations saw As the Moscow leadership devel- The “African strategy” was devel- Soviet rivalry with Beijing over influ- oped its links with the liberation move- oped by the KGB and received the sup- ence in Africa as a major element be- ments, it created African expectations port of the Soviet leadership—and hind their policy recommendations. of further support as well as a sense of Brezhnev—in the summer and fall of The main military intelligence bureau— commitment in its own ranks. This 1970. The KGB reports emphasized the GRU—reported that China was tar- sense of commitment was particularly that the regimes and liberation move- geting countries and movements which strong among the cadre of the CPSU ments of Southern Africa were search- already received aid from the Soviet CC International Department that ing for international allies, and under- Union. China, the GRU stressed, would handled most of the contacts with Af- lined the “simplistic” approach most Af- use its resources to the maximum to at- rican organizations. In addition, the rican regimes had to world affairs, un- tract African supporters, and could, Cuban leadership—who had been in- derstanding neither the conflict between within a few years, build its position volved in African affairs since the mid- the two camps nor the nature of Ameri- sufficiently to control large parts of 1960s7—viewed the early Soviet in- can imperialism. The black political Africa in a loose coalition with the volvement as a harbinger of a much leaders of Southern Africa felt that their United States.10 wider East-bloc engagement on the efforts to gain aid from Washington had KGB chairman also continent. failed, and that the Soviet Union was had other reasons for recommending an Still, a larger Soviet operation in the only major power which could as- increase in Soviet involvement in black Africa was slow in coming. sist them in reaching their political and Southern Africa. Summarizing a report Moscow’s ideologically inspired at- social goals.8 on Western estimates of Soviet policy tempts to influence the policies of the The Portuguese colonies—Angola, in Africa, Andropov stressed that West- local revolutionary movements com- Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape ern experts believe that although the plicated the building of stable alliances Verde—were particularly interesting Soviet Union will strive to strengthen with these groups, and often frustrated from a Soviet point of view both for its position in Africa, “in the coming Soviet foreign policy aims. The links political and strategic reasons. The years [it does] not plan a ‘broad offen- which the Soviets—often wrongly— KGB noted the Nixon Administration’s sive’,” limiting itself to “securing posi- assumed existed between many Afri- renewed alliance with Portugal, and the tions [already] achieved.” These West- can militants and the People’s Repub- recent military setbacks for the colonial ern estimates, Andropov found, were by lic of China contributed to Moscow’s forces in their war against the libera- themselves good reasons why the So- caution. It was not until the Soviet and tion movements. KGB Deputy Chair- viet Union should step up its African Cuban leaders agreed on their military man Viktor Chebrikov explained that operations.11 The new emphasis on Africa in NOBEL INSTITUTE FELLOWSHIPS Soviet foreign policy was immediately put into practice in the case of Angola. ON COLD WAR HISTORY 1998-99 After a number of unsuccesful MPLA The Norwegian Nobel Institute will award ment, and the purchase of specific research appeals for increased support in the a limited number of fellowships in its guest materials for the Nobel Institute Library. spring of 1970, Agostinho Neto was researchers program for the spring and fall Fellows must be free to devote full time to startled by the scale and scope of what terms of 1998 and the spring term of 1999. study and writing and will be expected to the Soviets offered in mid-July. Soviet The fellowships are for scholars of any na- spend most of their time at the Institute. ambassador to Zambia D. Z. Belokolos tionality in history, social sciences, and in- The general theme for the 1998-99 pro- proposed a series of plans for Moscow ternational law. Both senior fellowships (for gram is Reviewing the Cold War: Interpre- to assist the MPLA in terms of military distinguished scholars with a substantial tations, Approaches, Theory. Contact Dr. hardware, logistical support, and politi- record of publication in her/his field) and Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, The cal training. In addition, the Soviets general fellowships (for scholars in the ear- Norwegian Nobel Institute, Drammensvn. were willing to send military advisers lier stages of their post-doctoral careers) are 19, N-0255 Oslo, Norway (fax: 47-22 43 and offer political support for Neto’s available. 01 68; e-mail: [email protected]), or send a movement in its conflicts with the Stipends will be given in accordance with brief project description, a c.v., and two let- neighboring African states: Zambia, 12 the individual needs of approved applicants ters of recommendation to the above ad- Zaire, and Congo. and availability of funds. The Institute will dress. Review of applicants’ credentials will The MPLA leadership responded also cover travel expenses, office equip- begin February 15, 1997. avidly to this Soviet largesse. In his COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 23 meetings with Belokolos, Neto Holden Roberto’s Frente Nacional de promising substantial Soviet support to downplayed MPLA relations with Libertaçâo de Angola (FNLA). The a united MPLA—but to little avail. The “capitalist countries and social-demo- Soviets held on to Neto as their main “unification congress,” held near cratic parties,” and stressed that the Angolan connection, assuring a trickle Lusaka in mid-August, broke down Soviet Union was the party’s main in- of military and financial support for the when Neto’s supporters walked out of ternational ally. Neto especially wanted besieged leadership. More importantly, what they considered a staged attempt the Soviets to know that he saw no Moscow invited an increasing number to remove the party leadership.19 grounds for working closely with of Neto’s associates to the Soviet Union In the meantime, the MPLA’s ri- China. The Soviet ambassador, in his for military and political training. Still, vals had substantially strengthened their communications to Moscow, believed the Soviets also gave some assistance positions in Angola. Roberto’s FNLA, that the MPLA leadership’s positions to Chipenda’s group, and continued to having received supplies, weapons, and reflected the general sentiment in the invite Chipenda for “confidential” con- instructors from China, moved its movement—that the Soviet Union was versations at their Lusaka embassy up troops across the northern border from their only likely source of major mili- to 1974.16 Zaire and started operations in the tary support.13 As Soviet criticism of Neto’s lack northern provinces. The youngest of the In spite of their new-found enthu- of flexibility in the unity talks mounted, liberation movements, Jonas Savimbi’s siasm for African affairs, the Soviet their support for his movement gradu- União Nacional para a Independência leaders in the 1971-73 period found it ally declined. In March 1974, just a Total de Angola (UNITA), signed a increasingly difficult to work out effec- month before the Lisbon military coup with the Portuguese in June tive ways of collaborating with their suddenly threw the political situation in and started recruiting large numbers of favored Southern African liberation Angola wide open, the Soviet ambas- Angolans for military training in their movements, and particularly with the sador in Brazzaville drew a bleak pic- base areas in the east. In spite of its MPLA. The Soviets found that Neto’s ture of the situation in the MPLA. For diplomatic efforts, the Soviet Union movement had more than its fair share all practical purposes the movement had seemed to be losing out in the battle for of the poor communications, bad orga- stopped functioning, and there was little influence in post-colonial Angola.20 nization, and widespread factionalism hope of Neto bringing it together again. In October the Soviets decided to which, as seen from Moscow, charac- The only bright spot was the existence drop the idea of forcing the MPLA fac- terized all the liberation movements in within the MPLA of a number of “pro- tions to unite, and threw their weight Southern Africa—with the possible ex- gressively oriented activists” who squarely behind Neto’s group. Accord- ception of Moscow’s favorite partner, wanted close relations with the Soviet ing to what ambassador Afanasenko the ANC.14 Union.17 told José Eduardo dos Santos, there By early 1974, the MPLA had split The April 1974 overthrow of the were two main reasons behind this de- into three factions: the Tanzania-based Caetano regime by a group of radical cision. First, Neto had in late Septem- leadership under Agostinho Neto, the Portuguese officers sent Soviet Africa ber managed to convene a rump con- Zambia-supported group of Daniel policy into high gear. By May, Mos- gress inside Angola, in which the main Chipenda (known as Revolta do Leste cow was already convinced that the MPLA guerilla commanders took part. [Eastern Revolt]), and a Congo-based Portuguese colonial empire would soon The political manifesto passed by the faction calling itself Revolta Activa (Ac- collapse. Concerning Angola, the So- congress was to the Soviets’ liking. tive Revolt). As John Marcum points viet policy was to strengthen the MPLA Second, the new head of the Portuguese out, the discord was not so much due to under Neto’s leadership, thereby mak- military administration in Angola, Ad- doctrinal differences as “faulty commu- ing the movement the dominant part- miral Rosa Coutinho, was a left-winger nication, military reverses, and compet- ner in a post-colonial coalition govern- who openly sympathized with Neto’s ing ambitions.” The MPLA had never, ment. Disregarding previous reports on views. But however Afanasenko pre- even at the best of times, been especially the situation in the MPLA, the CPSU sented the Soviet views, Neto’s people well-organized or cohesive, and pres- International Department and the Mos- must have been aware that if Moscow sure from Portuguese counter- cow Foreign Ministry instructed Soviet wanted to maintain some influence in offensives, ethnic tensions, and chal- embassies in Brazzaville, Lusaka, and Angola, it had little choice but to sup- lenges to Neto’s leadership split the Dar-es-Salaam to “repair” the damaged port the “reconstructed” MPLA.21 movement. Chipenda, typically, drew liberation movement.18 The events of the two last months most of his support from his own This salvage operation turned out of 1974 seemed to indicate that Mos- Ovimbundu ethnic group in the central to be exceedingly difficult. The MPLA cow had made the right move. On Oc- and eastern parts of Angola.15 factions’ views of each other did not tober 21, the MPLA signed a cease-fire The Soviet envoys spent much time change much with the waning of Por- with Portugal, and on November 6, and effort trying to restore unity to the tuguese power. The Soviet ambassa- large crowds greeted the MPLA veteran MPLA and create some kind of libera- dors tried their best in meetings with Lucio Lara when he arrived to open an tion front between it and the main tra- Neto, José Eduardo dos Santos, office in Luanda. About the same time, ditionalist independence movement, Chipenda, and other MPLA leaders— forces of the newly organized MPLA 24 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

military wing—the FAPLA (Forças and large segments of the petty bour- that the further increase in Soviet “tech- Armadas Popular para Libertação de geoisie.24 nical, military, and civilian assistance” Angola)—took control of most of the In spite of the skirmishes which which the Brazzaville ambassador oil-rich enclave of Cabinda in the north. had already begun between MPLA and promised José Eduardo dos Santos on In the main Angolan cities, MPLA or- FNLA forces in late 1974, African heads January 30 would arrive in time. But ganizers, now free to act, started set- of state succeded in convincing the three in addition to their material assistance, ting up strong para-military groups in Angolan movements to join in negotia- the Soviets also tried to push the MPLA populous slum areas, drawing on the tions with Portugal and thereby attempt to mend its negotiation strategy. Mos- appeal of their message of social revo- an orderly transfer of power in Luanda. cow now hoped that a new alliance be- lution.22 These negotiations led to the 15 Janu- tween the MPLA and Savimbi’s UNITA Moscow in early December 1974 ary 1975 Alvor Agreement, in which 11 could get their Angolan allies out of the drew up an elaborate plan for supply- November 1975 was set as the date for difficult spot they were in.27 ing the MPLA with heavy weapons and the Portuguese handing over power to Moscow was joined in its wish for large amounts of ammunition, using an Angolan coalition government. an anti-FNLA alliance by many of the Congo (Brazzaville) as the point of tran- None of the parties took this last attempt independent states in southern Africa. sit. Ambassador Afanasenko got the at avoiding civil war too seriously, and Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere at- task of convincing the Congolese of sporadic fighting continued. The Alvor tempted to get the Soviets to increase their interest in cooperating. This was Agreement was also undermined both the pressure on the MPLA leadership not an easy task. Congo had never been by the Soviet Union and the United to make the necessary concessions to a close ally of the Soviet Union—in the States, who decided to expand their pro- forge such an alliance. Nyerere,—sym- ruling were many who grams of military support for their pathetic to the MPLA’s political aims,— sympathized with the Chinese—and it Angolan allies.25 was exasperated by Neto’s unbending had for some time sponsored both The Soviets were prodded in their demands in the negotiations. The Neto’s MPLA rivals and a Cabinda widening commitment to the MPLA by Angolan leader was “a good poet and separatist group. The latter issue was the Cuban leaders. Cuba had supplied doctor,” Nyerere told the East German particularly problematic, and Agostinho the MPLA with some material support ambassador, but “a bad politician.” Neto had on several occasions criticized since the mid-1960s, and Havana had Nyerere also warned the Soviets against the Congolese leader Colonel Marien increasingly come to regard Agostinho direct involvement in the Angolan con- Nguabi for his support of Cabindan in- Neto as its favorite African liberation flict. African countries would react dependence. Still, on December 4 leader. The Cubans told Moscow that sharply against any form of foreign in- Nguabi gave his go-ahead for the So- Neto would not, and should not, accept tervention, Nyerere said.28 viet operation.23 sharing power with the other move- By early summer, 1975, the FNLA Though noting the flexibility of the ments. Cuba would itself concentrate troops had mounted limited offensives Congolese government, Afanasenko more on Africa (i.e., Angola) in its for- against the MPLA both along the coast knew that the job of reinforcing the eign policy, and expected the Soviets and in the northern part of Angola. MPLA would not be easy. In a report to upgrade their support for the MPLA. Then, in July, as another African- to Moscow he underlined the problems Moscow would not be bettered by Ha- brokered attempt at negotiations broke the MPLA faced on the military side. vana. Afanasenko told the Cuban am- down, the MPLA counterattacked. By Both the FNLA, now joined by Daniel bassador to Brazzaville that “the Cen- the middle of the month, local FAPLA Chipenda’s MPLA rebels, and UNITA tral Committee of the CPSU is atten- forces were in control of Luanda, and held strong positions and would be tively watching the development of MPLA troops began attacking the equipped further by the Americans and events in Angola and reiterates [its] FNLA strongholds in the north. The the Chinese. In the civil war which the unity with the progressive forces, in Soviets had not foreseen the MPLA ambassador predicted, the “reactionar- order to smash the cherished adventures military success, although the ies” would initially have the initiative, of foreign and domestic reaction.”26 Brazzaville embassy already in April and the MPLA would depend on “ma- The Soviet Union was also aware foresaw an improvement of FAPLA terial assistance from progressive coun- of the increase in the U.S. Central In- fighting capabilities because of the So- tries all over the world” just to survive. telligence Agency’s covert support for viet aid. However, it did not expect a Politically, however, Neto’s group, as the FNLA starting in late January 1975. full scale civil war to break out before the “most progressive national-libera- The Soviet embassy in Brazzaville con- Angola achieved its independence in tion organization of Angola,” would cluded that the American assistance November.29 enjoy considerable support. On the or- would lead Holden Roberto to make an Moscow now seemed to have the ganizational side, one should not think all-out bid for power very soon. The recipe for success in Angola. By a lim- of the MPLA as a vanguard party, or embassy experts realized that there was ited supply of military equipment, it had even as a party at all, but rather as a little the Soviet Union could do to as- secured the MPLA the upper hand in loose coalition of trade unionists, pro- sist the MPLA resist the initial attacks the fighting. As the date for indepen- gressive intellectuals, Christian groups, by Roberto’s forces. Their hope was dence approached, Moscow expected COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 25 that the rival movements, or at least Castro—who had close connections plan for a direct military intervention. UNITA, would return to the negotiat- with the Congolese leaders—to act as a Lucio Lara, the senior MPLA under- ing table and become part of an MPLA- facilitator for assistance to the MPLA. ground leader in Luanda, on August 17 led coalition government. The Soviet The Soviet leaders got more than they appealed to Ambassador Afanasenko experts did not believe that the United bargained for. The Cubans had since for the dispatch of Soviet staff officers States would stage a massive interven- early spring tried to get Moscow to sup- to the MPLA General Command, which tion, nor did they give much credence port an armed strategy on behalf of the had just moved from Brazzaville to to MPLA reports of direct South Afri- MPLA. Already in February, the Cu- Luanda. “The MPLA Command needs can or Zairean involvement. Their main ban ambassador to Dar-es-Salaam had qualified advice on military questions worry was the Chinese, who had told his Soviet colleague that “The at the strategic level,” Lara said. stepped up their FNLA assistance pro- choice of the socialist road in Angola Afanasenko, however, could only gram from bases in Zaire. Moscow must be made now. . . . In October it promise technical experts, but agreed found particularly disturbing the fact will be too late.” In late summer, Castro to invite MPLA’s defense minister des- that the Chinese were joined as instruc- used the new Soviet request as a stimu- ignate, Iko Carreira, to Moscow in late tors in these camps by military person- lus for launching his own plan for the August for talks with the CPSU CC In- nel from Romania and .30 intervention of Cuban forces in ternational Department, the Defense The Ford Administration was, Angola.33 Ministry, and the Armed Forces Gen- however, not willing to let Neto’s Cuba had sent military instructors eral Staff.36 MPLA force a solution to the nascent to work with the MPLA in its camps in In spite of their policy to support civil war in Angola. In mid-July 1975, Congo for several years before the col- Neto’s MPLA, the Soviet leaders were the U.S. president authorized a large- lapse of the Portuguese colonial empire. not pleased with the content of the Cu- scale covert operation in support of the By early summer 1975 these advisers ban plan. First of all, they objected to FNLA and the UNITA. Over three numbered about 250, and—in spite of the use of Soviet officers and even So- months, the CIA was allocated almost not participating in combat—they viet transport planes in Angola prior to $50 million dollars to train, equip, and played an increasingly important role independence. The Soviet leaders wor- transport anti-MPLA troops. In early in planning MPLA operations. The ried that such a move would damage August, South African forces, at first in Cuban officers functioned as a kind of the policy of detente with regard to the limited numbers, crossed the border into general staff for Neto and the MPLA United States. They also knew that southern Angola, while regular Zairean leaders. Through their operational most African countries, including some troops joined FNLA forces fighting in training, Castro’s instructors supplied close to the Soviet Union, would react the north. By mid-August the MPLA the necessary know-how which the against a direct Soviet involvement, as offensives in the north had been turned Angolan forces lacked, especially re- would some of their political friends in back, and Neto’s forces were retreating garding communications, supply-lines, Portugal. Second, the Cubans were, in toward Luanda.31 and coordinated operations.34 the Soviet view, not sufficiently aware In addition to its flagging fortunes On August 15, Castro sent a mes- of how even a Cuban intervention could on the battlefield, the MPLA ran up sage to arguing the upset great power relations, since the against increasing problems in securing need for increased support for the Ford Administration would see Cuban their Soviet lifeline through the Congo. MPLA, including the introduction of forces as proxies for Soviet interests. The flamboyant and independent- Cuban special troops. The Cubans had Third, Moscow was still not sure that minded Congolese leader, Colonel already developed a fairly detailed plan the military situation in Angola war- Nguabi, had been angered by Neto’s for transporting their troops to Luanda ranted a troop intervention in support persistent criticizm of Brazzaville for (or Congo), for supplies, and for how of the MPLA.37 sheltering Cabindan separatist groups. the Cuban soldiers would be used on In spite of their displeasure, the In an irate message to the Soviet am- the ground in Angola. Castro wanted Soviet leaders found it difficult to make bassador, Nguabi informed Moscow Soviet transport assistance, as well as their objections known to Castro. Mos- that he would no longer accept that the use of Soviet staff officers, both in cow knew that the Cuban leader was Neto, “on the one hand, demands assis- Havana and Luanda, to help in planning wary of the Soviet policy of detente, and tance from Congo, [and] on the other the military operations. The Cubans their experience with Havana told them makes accusations against us.” By early underlined to the Soviets the political to tread carefully so as to avoid episodes August the Congolese had informed strength of the MPLA, and the threat like the 1968 near-break between the Afanasenko that they would not accept which foreign assistance to the FNLA/ two allies. Still, Brezhnev flatly refused Soviet plans for large-scale support of UNITA alliance posed to and to transport the Cuban troops or to send the MPLA through Congolese terri- independence in Angola.35 Soviet officers to serve with the Cubans tory.32 The Cuban initiative was coordi- in Angola. The Soviet General Staff It was the threat to the “Congo con- nated with the MPLA leaders, who now opposed any participation in the Cuban nection” which, in early August, in turn tried to put pressure on the So- operation, and even the KGB, with prompted Moscow to ask Fidel viets to get involved with the Cuban whom the policy of paying increased 26 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

attention to Africa originated, in August ers into Angola by mid-December to MPLA was fighting for its very exist- 1975 warned against the effects of a defeat the South Africans and assist the ence only a few miles north of Luanda. direct Soviet intervention on US-Soviet MPLA leaders in building a socialist In the battle of Quifangondo valley the relations.38 party and state.41 Cuban artillerymen proved to give Havana would not be deterred by The Soviet perception of the wid- FAPLA the crucial advantage over its Soviet hesitation. The first Cuban com- ening role of the CIA in assisting FNLA FNLA-Zairean opponents. Soviet-sup- bat troops arrived in Luanda in late Sep- forces from bases in Zaire also played plied BM-21 122 millimeter rocket tember and early October onboard sev- a role in Moscow’s reevaluation of its launchers devastated the attacking eral Soviet aircraft and rebuilt pre-revo- Angolan policy. The KGB station in forces and sent them on a disorderly lutionary Cuban cruise-ships. They Brazzaville supplied vital information retreat toward the northern border, giv- immediately fanned out into FAPLA on the dramatic increase in U.S. assis- ing the MPLA and the Cubans a free units in the Angolan countryside, and tance, and Andropov believed that the hand to turn on the South African and took charge of much of the fighting Americans had a long-term strategy of UNITA forces approaching from the against the MPLA’s enemies. But the equipping large groups of Angolan, south.45 infusion of Cuban troops was not Zairean, and Western mercenary troops During the week before indepen- enough to sustain the MPLA conquests to be sent into Angola. It was also dence, large groups of Cuban soldiers from early summer against the new on- likely, the KGB said, that U.S. “experts” had started arriving in Luanda onboard slaught of its combined enemies.39 would increase their own cross-border Soviet aircraft. The Soviets had orga- In September the MPLA continued activities.42 nized and equipped these transports, its retreat, hard pressed by Zairean and The reaction of most African coun- although the operation was technically mercenary-led FNLA troops in the tries to the South African invasion led directed by the Cubans themselves. north and UNITA forces, supported by the Soviets to believe that it would be Moscow had made it clear that the pri- advisors and material from South Af- less dangerous than before to intervene mary objective of these forces was to rica, in the south. Savimbi’s incongru- in the Angolan conflict. Julius Nyerere, contain the South Africans along the ous alliance with Pretoria had given his an African leader who Moscow re- southern border and that they should not military units the equipment they badly spected in spite of his often blunt criti- be used for general purposes in the civil needed, and they could now exploit cism of its Africa policies, told the So- war. For the same reason the Soviet their substantial ethnically-based sup- viet ambassador on November 3 that in General Staff ordered about 60 of their port in central and eastern Angola. The spite of deploring the war in Angola, own officers to join the Cuban forces MPLA, meanwhile, was by mid-Octo- Pretoria’s intervention had made out- from Congo. These men started arriv- ber entirely dependent on its support in side support for the MPLA necessary. ing in Luanda in the evening of Novem- the western Luanda-Mbundu regions He hoped that many African countries ber 12.46 and in the cities. It controlled less than now would aid Neto’s movement. Still, The ensuing two weeks saw the one-fourth of the country, and was los- he warned against a too open Soviet rapid advance toward Luanda of the ing ground, in spite of Cuban reinforce- support for the MPLA, and hoped that UNITA army led by about 6.000 regu- ments.40 Moscow would channel the bulk of its lar South African troops. By late No- The foreign alliance policies of the aid through African governments. The vember, these forces had reconquered MPLA, and thereby its possibilities for Soviet ambassador, untruthfully, re- all the territory which Savimbi had lost winning the struggle for power in sponded that such would be the case.43 to the MPLA over the preceding Angola, were saved by Pretoria’s Oc- The Soviet military preparations months. They had occupied every ma- tober decision to launch an invasion. for the airlift of Cuban troops to Angola jor port south of the capital except Porto Moscow knew of the South African intensified in early November. The Amboim, taken control of the Benguela plans in advance of their implementa- CPSU secretariat met on November 5 railway, and were attempting to set up tion in mid-October, and the Kremlin and decided to send Soviet naval units their own civilian administration in leadership discussed how to respond. to areas off the Angolan coast. In Huambo. Both the Soviets and the Cu- The CPSU CC International Depart- Brazzaville, in a striking reversal of bans concluded that if the MPLA re- ment considered the new stage of the roles within less than two months, the gime was to survive, the Cuban forces anti-MPLA operations in Angola a joint Soviet ambassador now exhorted his would have to attack in the south as U.S.-South African effort, and believed Cuban colleague to “intensify” soon as possible.47 the Soviet Union had to come to the aid Havana’s preparations for combat in After the creation of the MPLA of its ally. In the third week of Octo- Angola. “But a Cuban artillery regi- regime the Politburo authorized the ber, Moscow decided to start assisting ment is already fighting in Luanda,” the Soviet General Staff to take direct con- the Cuban operation in Angola imme- Cuban ambassador responded, some- trol of the trans-Atlantic deployment of diately after the MPLA had made its what incredulously.44 additional Cuban troops, as well as the declaration of independence on Novem- Agostinho Neto declared the inde- supplying of these troops with advanced ber 11. The Soviet aim was to infuse pendence of the People’s Republic of military hardware. The massive opera- enough Cuban troops and Soviet advis- Angola on November 11, just as the tion—the first Soviet effort of its kind— COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 27 transported more than 12,000 soldiers instance in the case of Zambia, where that disaster had struck again and again by sea and air from Cuba to Africa be- President Kenneth Kaunda switched because of the Vietnamese leaders’ in- tween late October 1975 and mid-Janu- over to the MPLA’s side after substan- ability to follow Moscow’s advice).54 ary 1976. In the same period it also tial Soviet pressure.51 The Soviet cadres in Angola were, provided FAPLA and the Cubans with In terms of control of the central by 1976, very satisfied with the way hundreds of tons of heavy arms, as well regions, the Angolan war was over by both Angolans and Cubans had re- as T-34 and T-54 tanks, SAM-7s, anti- early March 1976. The capital of the spected Moscow’s political primacy missiles, and a number of MiG-21 anti-MPLA forces, Huambo, fell to during the war. According to the em- fighter planes.48 FAPLA forces on February 11. Holden bassy, Neto realized his dependence on It is still not possible to chart in any Roberto had already in January returned Soviet assistance and, equally impor- detail the logistics of the Soviet opera- to exile in Zaire and the FNLA had tant, that it was Moscow, not Havana, tion. What we do know is that the gov- given up its military activities. Jonas who made the final decisions. Even ernments of several African countries Savimbi had returned to the bush areas though the embassy still did not trust agreed to assist with the enterprise. of southeastern Angola with about Neto fully, they admitted that he had Congo was the main staging ground for 2.000 guerillas and their U.S. and South performed to their liking during these personnel and arms arriving from Cuba African advisers, and although he was battles. In the spring of 1976 he con- and the Soviet Union (although in some to fight his way back to international tinued to press for more Soviet military cases An-22 transport planes flew di- prominence by the early 1980s, in 1976 instructors, an attitude which the charge rectly from the southern USSR or from Savimbi himself realized that he could d’affaires in Luanda, G.A. Zverev, held Cuba). Algeria, Guinea, Mali, and Tan- not effectively challenge FAPLA and up as a sign of the Angolan president’s zania cooperated with the efforts in dif- the Cubans.52 dedication to the new alliance, even if ferent ways, even if the Soviets on some In the spring of 1976 the Soviet Neto had not yet consented to request occasions had to push hard to get their leaders felt—with a high degree of cer- permanent Soviet military bases.55 cooperation. Moscow also had to push tainty and self-congratulation—that As to the Cubans, the Soviet rep- some of its East European allies to rush they had won the Angolan war. The resentatives often expressed a certain to the defense of “African liberation and Kremlin was impressed that the logis- degree of surprise to Moscow at how global anti-imperialism” by supporting tics of the operation had worked so well: harmonious were relations with the the MPLA.49 over 7,000 kilometers from Moscow the small Caribbean ally. The Soviet-Cu- By the end of November the Cu- Soviet Union had conducted a cam- ban “close coordination in Angola dur- bans had stopped the South African-led paign in support of its allies against the ing the war has had very positive re- advance on Luanda, and in two battles power of the United States and its strong sults,” Zverev told his superiors in south of the Cuanza river in December regional supporters, and come out on March 1976. Soviet diplomats and of- the southern invaders suffered major top. For Brezhnev himself Angola be- ficers lauded the Cubans for their brav- setbacks. Pretoria then decided to with- came a benchmark for “active solidar- ery and for their ability to function as a draw towards the border, partly because ity with the peoples of Africa and Asia” link between Moscow and Luanda of its military problems and partly be- and evidence that the Soviet Union while at the same time “respecting” the cause the U.S. Senate voted on Decem- could advance socialism in the Third paramount role of the CPSU leadership. ber 19 to block all funding for covert World during a period of detente with The overall Cuban-Soviet relationship operations in Angola. Pretoria would the United States.53 improved significantly in the wake of not accept being left in the lurch by What did the Soviets believe they the Angolan operation, up to a point Washington, with its own men held hos- learned from the Angolan conflict? which had not been reached since the tage to a conflict they no longer believed From the reports coming in to the CPSU 1962 missile crisis.56 they could win.50 CC International Department, the most Moscow and Havana also agreed Just as it had opened the gates for important lesson at the time seems to on strategy in Angola after the main African acceptance of Soviet-Cuban aid have been that the United States could battles had ended in the spring of 1976. to the MPLA, the by now defunct South be defeated in local conflicts under cer- Both countries wanted to wind down African intervention also paved the way tain circumstances. First, the Soviet their military involvement as soon as for African diplomatic recognition of armed forces must be capable of and possible, “avoid broad military clashes the new Angolan regime. By mid-Feb- ready to provide, at short notice, the with South Africa, and attain their goal ruary 1976, most African states had of- logistics for the operation needed. by means of political and diplomatic ficially recognized Neto’s government, These tasks were primarily assigned to struggle.” In May, Raul Castro told the as had the Organization of African the navy and the air-force, both of which Soviet General Staff that he wanted to Unity (OAU), in spite of attempts by were commended for their efforts in start withdrawing Cuban troops right its chairman, Ugandan President Idi Angola. Second, the Soviet Union must away, and that he expected almost Amin, to have the decision postponed. be able to organize and control the anti- 15,000 Cubans to have left by late Oc- Soviet diplomatic efforts contributed imperialist forces involved (unlike in tober. The Cuban leaders asked Mos- significantly to this development, for Vietnam, where the Soviet leaders felt cow to inform Pretoria of their inten- 28 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tions, well knowing that such a demili- Propaganda Department.60 Angolan foreign policy in the future,” tarization of the conflict—albeit with a The transformation of the MPLA Raúl Castro told his Soviet colleagues. MPLA government in place—was what turned out to be an infinitely more dif- He instructed Risquet to “on all ques- the Soviets had wanted all along. Ha- ficult task for the Soviets than the dis- tions inform the USSR embassy in vana knew how to placate the great semination of Lenin busts. Neto’s in- Angola and maintain close contact with power, although, as we will see below, dependence of mind and his claim to the Soviet comrades.” Castro also cas- they exacted their price for doing so.57 be a Marxist theoretician in his own tigated some of the Angolan leaders The second lesson the Soviets be- right rankled the Russians and made it whom the Soviet distrusted; Lucio Lara lieved they had learnt from the Angolan increasingly difficult for them to con- “displays a certain restraint on questions adventure was that the Soviet Union can trol the MPLA as soon as the military [of] broadening the collaboration with and must rebuild and reform local anti- situation stabilized. Some of the the socialist countries. He is reserved capitalist groups in crisis areas. The Angolan leaders whom Moscow dis- and not frank . . . . [and] has avoided MPLA, local Soviet observers postu- liked, for instance FAPLA veteran com- us,” Castro told Ponomarenko.63 lated in 1976, was saved from its own mander and defense minister Iko But even such measures could not follies by advice and assistance from Carreira and MPLA general secretary always convince the Soviets of Cuban Moscow, which not only helped it win Lucio Lara, who was strongly influ- loyalty. Reporting on Neto’s visit to the war, but also laid the foundation for enced by the European left, strength- Havana in July 1976, the Soviet em- the building of a “vanguard party.” The ened their positions after the war was bassy noted with disapproval that Fidel Angolan movement had earlier been over. According to the embassy, the Castro had told the Angolans that Cu- plagued by “careerists and fellow-trav- influence of such people delayed both ban troops would remain in Africa “as ellers,” but, due to Soviet guidance, the the necessary changes in the MPLA and long as they are needed,” and that Neto “internationalists” were in ascendance. the finalization of the development had asked for Cuba’s assistance in These new leaders—men like Lopo do plans on which the Soviets and Cubans building a Marxist-Leninist party. Even Nascimento and Nito Alves—under- were advising.61 worse, Castro had spoken of Angola, stood that the MPLA was part of an in- Differences between the Soviet and Cuba, and Vietnam as “the main anti- ternational revolutionary movement led Cuban perceptions of the political situ- imperialist core” of the world. That the by Moscow and that they therefore both ation in the MPLA did not make things Cuban president had also mentioned the then and in the future depended on So- easier for Moscow. Part of the price “central role” of the Soviet Union was viet support.58 which Castro exacted for his general not sufficient to please the Soviet ob- It was these “internationalists” who deference to the Soviets on the Angolan servers, particularly since Castro Moscow wanted to assist in building a issue was the right to argue for Angolan coupled his statement with an endorse- new MPLA, patterned on the experi- political solutions which were to his lik- ment of Neto’s own “paramount role” ence of the CPSU. Noting the poor state ing. Preeminent in Castro’s political in the MPLA.64 of the MPLA organization in many ar- equation was the leadership of As Philip Windsor has observed eas, the Soviet party-building experts Agostinho Neto: whom he considered about the , the rela- suggested that this was the field in a brilliant man and a great African tionship between the Soviet Union and which do Nascimento, Alves, and oth- leader, as well as a personal friend. The its allies approximated the roles of a ers should concentrate their activities. Cubans therefore missed no opportunity king and his vassals in medieval natu- By taking the lead in constructing the to impress the Soviets with their view ral law. The Cubans and the Angolans party organization they would also be that the MPLA president was the only could set their own agenda, so long as the future leaders of the Marxist- solution to Angola’s leadership prob- they subordinated themselves to the Leninist party in Angola.59 lems, well knowing of Moscow’s sus- general purpose of Soviet foreign policy The Soviets supplied very large picions of him. “We have the highest and used the proper code of address amounts of political propaganda to be regard for President Neto,” Raúl Castro when reporting to Moscow’s represen- disseminated among MPLA supporters told Soviet Vice-Minister of Defense tatives. For Soviet cadre at the local and used in the training of cadre. The I.F. Ponomarenko. “Cuba wants to level the real character of the Moscow- ordinary embassy staff sometimes strengthen Neto’s authority,” the head Havana-Luanda relationship compli- found the amounts a bit difficult to of the Cuban party’s International De- cated their efforts at reforming the handle—a plane-load of brochures with partment, Raúl Valdés Vivó, told the MPLA, as shown in excess by the spec- Brezhnev’s speech at the 25th CPSU Soviet chargé in May.62 tacle of the May 1977 coup attempt congress, two plane-loads of anti- The Cubans were, however, always against Neto, when Nito Alves—a So- Maoist literature—but in general the clever at sweetening their tough posi- viet favorite—found his bid to oust the embassy could put the materials to good tion in support of Neto by underlining president blocked by Cuban tanks.65 use (or so they claimed in reports to that the Soviet Union of course was The belief of many Soviet leaders Moscow). By summer 1976 they had Angola’s primary international ally. that they could control domestic politi- run out of Lenin portraits, and had to “Relations with the Soviet Union will cal developments in Third World coun- request a new supply from the CPSU become a more important aspect of tries was a misperception with fateful COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 29 consequences for Soviet foreign policy Angola if they had been convinced that come, in spite of much contrary infor- in the late Brezhnev era. The Angolan Washington would respond in force. mation. In the case of Angola, this be- intervention played an important part in The conventional realist approach to lief contributed significantly to the in- upholding this misperception, as the interventions provides adequate expla- tervention and sustained the decision to reporting from Luanda shows. In hind- nation for this side of Soviet interven- commit additional men, money, and sight, one of the main managers of tionism: the Brezhnev leadership saw material to the country in subsequent Moscow’s African and Asian policies an opportunity for unchecked expansion years. It even led Moscow’s local rep- in the late 1970s, Karen Brutents, has and made use of it.68 resentatives to sum up Angola as a suc- claimed that it was Angola which led On local factors, which were cru- cess, thereby over time encouraging to Ethiopia which led to Afghanistan, cial in the case of Angola, some schol- further Soviet “limited interventions” in not in terms of the circumstances and ars have argued that great power inter- Africa and Asia, culminating in the Af- structure of the interventions—which ventions are grounded not so much in ghanistan disaster.71 certainly varied—but in terms of the misperceptions—the “slippery slope” We need much more evidence from inflated pretensions of control over for- theory of growing commitment—as in Russian and foreign sources in order to eign left-wing movements which were what Charles Kupchan calls the generalize about the nature of Soviet stimulated by the Angolan affair. “reputational and intrinsic interest,” of Cold War involvement in Africa, Asia, Brutents’ point is a good one, although the intervening power.69 This is an at- and Latin America. From what we see we should still be careful in generaliz- tempt to rescue the case for an interest- so far, the two faces of Soviet associa- ing about the direction of Soviet foreign driven decision-making process in cases tion with Third World radicals—revo- policy during that period until we have where there is a significant discrepancy lutionary patronage and distrustful cau- more documentation on the discussions between the prior expectations of an tion—correspond closely with two of the Politburo and General Staff.66 intervening power and the outcome of faces of Russian culture and history. On the other hand, as I have argued its action—an argument which of One is the elite tradition which has elsewhere, what Morton Kaplan terms course can only be tested through the sought to bring into a Europe- the “loose bipolar structure” of the Cold evidence. anized society of states. The other is War international system often gave In the case presented here, would the tradition of defiance of the West, a Third World revolutionary parties a a clearer perception of the conditions radical and, in European terms, sectar- chance to enter into alliances with one inside the MPLA—and of Soviet inabil- ian approach to Russia’s international of the great powers, a chance which they ity to change these conditions—have role. Both are visible during the last may not have been offered in a more prevented an intervention? Possibly, not phase of the Soviet experiment: CPSU complex global constellation of states. least since much of Moscow’s histori- officials seem to have felt as uncom- As the aspiring, anti-systemic power, cal experience pointed away from such fortable at meetings in the White House the Soviet Union was particularly likely an adventure. Soviet diplomacy was at as when visiting PLO training camps to be the candidate for such alliances most times very cautious outside its own in Syria. Both for historians and politi- from a Third World perspective. The core area, preferring mutually advanta- cal scientists, the opening of Russian leaders of some African movements, geous links with established regimes archives offers opportunities to revisit including the MPLA, knew of these rather than with revolutionary move- these motives of Soviet foreign policy possibilities and sometimes knew how ments. Up to the Angolan intervention, and to expand our understanding of their to exploit them. In addition to its so- the Soviet Union never gave decisive role in the international history of the cial and economic message, this poten- support to a revolutionary movement Cold War. tial for a powerful ally was one of the outside its neighboring countries. One 1 assets of African communism during can indeed argue that the United States I am grateful to Ilya Gaiduk and Maxim Korobochkin for their assistance in locating ma- the 1970s, an asset which increased in has supported more successful revolu- terials in Moscow. My thanks also to the former importance as their revolutions high- tionary movements, even since the mid- head of the State Archives Service of the Russian lighted the idea of a socialist victory in 1970s, for instance in Nicaragua and in Federation, Dr. Rudolf G. Pikhoia, and to the staff the Third World in Soviet foreign policy Afghanistan.70 of the Tsentr khraneniia sovremennoi 67 dokumentatsii (Center for the Preservation of ideology. What prevented a “clear view” of Contemporary Documentation; hereafter There is enough evidence in the the obstacles to long-term successful TsKhSD) in Moscow for their help during my materials on Angola, and elsewhere, to intervention was primarily Soviet for- archival research. Piero Gleijeses, Geir indicate that the Soviet leadership was eign policy ideology. Its mix of Rus- Lundestad, and Iver B. Neumann offered helpful comments on a draft version. very much aware of the strategic op- sian exceptionalism, Marxist-Leninist 2 See , The Future Belongs portunities which the post-Vietnam theory, and the Soviet experience of to Freedom (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991); anti-interventionist mood in the United economic and political development, Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich: States afforded Moscow for activism in created a fertile ground for believing Droemer Knaur, 1993); Francis Fukuyama, Moscow’s Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the regional conflicts. It is likely that the that difficulties associated with the char- Third World. RAND report no. 3337-USDP Politburo would have been much less acter of the movements and societies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1986); Andrei inclined to interventions like the one in targeted for intervention could be over- Kolosov, “Pereosmysleniie politiki v ‘tretiem 30 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

mire’” [Rethinking Policy in the Third World], ish Conservative Party. The GRU, in a major re- (ambassador, Brazzaville) to MO, 30 March 1974, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’ 4 (April 1990). port on U.S. strategies in Africa, noted that the political letter: “O polozhenii v ‘Narodnom 3 A classic summary is Hans J. Morgenthau, “To continent had become more important for the dvizhenii za osvobozhdenie Angoli’ (MPLA) [On Intervene or Not to Intervene,” Foreign Affairs Americans both strategically and in terms of its the situation in ‘The People’s Movement for the 45 (April 1967). George W. Breslauer has an ex- natural resources. “Capitalist states,” said the Liberaton of Angola’ (MPLA)],” TsKhSD, f. 5, cellent survey of recent literature on Soviet inter- GRU, “are putting pressure on African countries op. 67, d. 758, ll. 37-45, 40. ventions in “Ideology and Learning in Soviet to enter into base agreements and military assis- 18 Iu.A. Iukalov (chargé d’affaires, Dar-es-Sa- Third World Policy,” World Politics 44: 3 (July tance plans.” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 71- laam) to MO, 22 May 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 1987), 429-448. 90, 80. 67, d. 758, ll. 70-71; E.I. Afanasenko to MO, 8 4 Karen N. Brutents, former first deputy head of 10 General’nyi shtab voorushennykh sil SSSR June 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 78- the CPSU Central Committee’s International De- [General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR] 81. partment, interview with author, Moscow, 5 Oc- (Glavnoe razvedivatelnoe upravlenie [Main in- 19 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 245- tober 1993 (hereafter “Brutents interview”). For telligence directorate]; hereafter GRU) to MO, 48. a discussion, see Steven R. David, “Soviet In- 15 September 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 20 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 249- volvement in Third World Coups,” International ll. 63-68; GRU to MO, “Po meropriiatiiam, 50; George Wright, U.S. Policy Towards Angola: Security 11 (Summer 1986), 3-36. napravlennym na oslablenie pozitsii KNR v The Kissinger Years, 1974-1976 (Leeds: Univer- 5 Celeste A. Wallander, “Third World Conflict Afrike [On Measures (and) Directions to Weaken sity of Leeds, 1990), 18-23. in Soviet Military Thought,” World Politics 42:1 the Positions of the PRC in Africa],” TsKhSD, f. 21 Afanasenko to MO, 10 October 1974, (October 1989), 31-37; Bruce D. Porter, The 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 96-101. TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 121-122; see also USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and 11 KGB (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 251-253. Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980 (Cambridge: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 32-35, 35. 22 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 253; Cambridge University Press, 1984), 36-59. See 12 V.N. Bezukladnikov (counsellor, Lusaka) to Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in also Samuel P. Huntington, “Patterns of Interven- MO and attached letter from Neto to CPSU CC the Frontline (London: Zed, 1983), 109-122, pre- tion: Americans and Soviets in the Third World,” concerning request for receiving MPLA members sents the MPLA view of events. The National Interest (Spring 1987), 39-47. for military training, 24 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. 23 Afanasenko to MO, 4 December 1974, 6 Huntington, “Patterns of Intervention,” 43; on 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 99-102; D.Z. Belokolos to TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 11-12. Raymond Soviet interest groups, see Jan S. Adams, “Incre- MO, 14 July 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, Garthoff correctly concludes that the Soviet de- mental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: ll. 195-200. cision “preceded the American funding in Janu- The Role of the International Department of the 13 Belokolos to MO, 25 July 1970, TsKhSD, f. ary 1975, although it probably followed the mili- CPSU Central Committee,” Slavic Review 48: 4 5, op. 62, d. 536, ll. 215-218; Embassy, Lusaka tary efforts of the FNLA in November.” Détente (Winter 1989), 614-30 and, for an insider’s view to MO, political letter: “Perspektivy razvitiia and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations of one of the institutions, former head of the KGB borby naroda Angoly protiv portugalskikh from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: First Chief Directorate Leonid V. Shebarshin, kolonizatorov [Perspectives on the Development Brookings Institution, 1985), 507. Ruka Moskvy: Zapiski nachalnika sovetskoi of the Angolan People’s Struggle Against the Por- 24 Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 25 December razvedki (Moscow: Tsentr-100, 1992). This ar- tuguese Colonizers,” n.d. (October 1970), 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 10-21, ticle is in part based on the archives of the Inter- TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, ll. 219-228, 224. 21, 17. national Department, now kept in TsKhSD. The The Soviet intelligence services still suspected 25 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 257- International Department archives contain a large that Neto kept the China option in reserve. See 58; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, 533-34. collection of materials important to understand- KGB to MO, 8 October 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 26 S.A. Slipchenko (Soviet ambassador, Dar-es- ing Soviet foreign policy history—among them 62, d. 536, l. 212. Salaam) to MO, 30 December 1974 (Conversa- embassy reports, documents created for the Po- 14 Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January tion with Oscar Oramas, Cuban Foreign Minis- litburo or the party Secretariat, intelligence sum- 1973, “K voprosu o primirenii mezhdu FNLA i try; later ambassador to Luanda), TsKhSD, f. 5, maries, and records of conversations with foreign MPLA [On the question of reconciliation between op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 3-7; Afanasenko to MO, 10 leaders. A small portion of this material—docu- the FNLA and the MPLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. January 1975 (Conversation with Cuban ambas- ments which the Politburo or the heads of the MO 66, d. 843, ll. 4-9; Belokolos to MO, 10 October sador A. Columbio Alvarez), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. wanted to have available for reference purposes— 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, ll. 121-123. 68, d. 1962, ll. 17-18, 18. See also Jorge I. is held in so-called osobye papki or “special files,” The CPSU CC archives hold large amounts of Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolu- most of which are still unavailable to scholars. documents on Soviet relations with all liberation tion: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: 7 See the article by Piero Gleijeses elsewhere in movements in Southern Africa, especially the Harvard University Press, 1989), 130-137; Will- this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. ANC and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union iam M. LeoGrande, “Cuban-Soviet Relations and 8 KGB to MO [International Department of the in addition to the MPLA (see footnote 6). Cuban Policy in Africa,” Cuban Studies 10:1 CPSU CC], 13 April 1970, TsKhSD, fond (f.) 5, 15 John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution. Vol- (January 1980), 1-48. opis’ (op.) 62 delo (d.) 535, listy (ll.) 7-9. This ume 2: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962- 27 B. Putilin (first secretary, embassy report, primarily an analysis of the preparations 1976 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 199. Brazzaville) to MO, n.d. (late January, 1975), for the third summit conference of non-aligned 16 MPLA (Pedro Van Dunem) to CC CPSU, 11 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 10-21; nations in Lusaka, also notes that this conference December 1972, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, l. Afanasenko to MO, 30 January 1975, TsKhSD, will mean a step forward for Soviet diplomacy, 22; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 26. U.S. support for that China’s influence within the group is reced- 1973, “K voprosu o primirenii mezhdu FNLA i Holden Roberto—with whom the CIA for sev- ing, and that the United States is increasingly iso- MPLA [On the question of reconciliation between eral years had had “an intelligence gathering re- lated in the Third World. See also KGB the FNLA and the MPLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. lationship”—was limited to “non-lethal equip- (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, 66, d. 843, ll. 4-9; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to ment” up to July 1975; see “Talking points for op. 62, d. 535, ll. 32-35. On the KGB’s influence MO, 12 April 1973, “K voprosu ob otnosheniiakh secretary Kissinger. NSC meeting on Angola, Fri- on Brezhnev’s thinking: author’s interview with mezhdu MPLA i FNLA [On the question of rela- day, June 27, 1975.” National Security Archive Oleg Troianovskii, former Soviet UN ambassa- tions between the MPLA and the FNLA],” (NSArchive Angola collection of documents ob- dor, Moscow, 14 September 1992. TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, ll. 54-57; Neto to tained through the Freedom of Information Act 9 KGB to MO, 4 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. CC CPSU, 23 June 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, (hereafter “National Security Archive Angola 62, d. 536, ll. 73-76; KGB (Chebrikov) to MO, d. 844, ll. 91; Belokolos to MO, 7 February 1974 FOIA collection”). The Archive, a non-govern- 26 November 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, (Conversation with ), TsKhSD, mental research institute and declassified docu- ll. 115-118. The latter report is based on an evalu- f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 5-8. ments repository, is located on the 7th floor of ation of European policies toward Portugal, origi- 17 Belokolos to MO, 25 October 1973, TsKhSD, the Gelman Library at George Washington Uni- nating with an analysis of materials from the Brit- f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, ll. 118-120; E.I. Afanasenko versity in Washington, D.C.); Robert E. Gates, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 31

From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story Press, 1980), and the aforementioned Gleijeses 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 313-320; Iu.K. Naumov to of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold article. MO, 20 October 1975 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 65- 35 M.A. Manasov (chargé d’affaires, embassy, 1982, ll. 280-281. See also comments by 69, has a useful account of CIA initiatives on Havana) to MO, 15 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, Kornienko, Brutents and others in Lysebu tran- Angola. op. 68, d. 1941, l. 122. This document is a record script; and Jiri Valenta, “Soviet Decision-Mak- 28 Slipchenko to MO, 6 February 1975, TsKhSD, of the conversation between Manasov and Oscar ing on the Intervention in Angola,” in Albright, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 48-54, 51; Slipchenko to Cienfuegos, an assistant to Fidel Castro, who ed., Communism in Africa. Several of the MO MO, 24 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. brought the Cuban leader’s message to the So- documents dealing with this issue are not yet de- 1982, ll. 238-246. viet embassy. No copy of the message itself has classified. 29 Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 14 April 1975, been found in the MO records. Georgi M. 42 Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 15 September TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 50-53, 53. For Kornienko, former first vice-foreign minister, 1975 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, l. 118 (the the relationship among the Angolan groups, see interview with author, Moscow, 5 October 1993 Brazzaville station also underlined that the FNLA Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, The Decolonization Con- (hereafter “Kornienko interview”); Brutents in- as late as August 1975 was still receiving assis- flict in Angola, 1974-76: An Essay in Political terview; Brutents in Odd Arne Westad, ed., Work- tance from Romania and North Korea); Sociology (Geneva: Institut universitaire de hautes shop on US-Soviet Relations and Soviet Foreign Kornienko interview. etudes internationales, 1979). Policy Toward the Middle East and Africa in the 43 Slipchenko to MO, 3 November 1975 (con- 30 V.V. Aldoshin (chargé d’affaires, embassy, 1970s, Oral history transcript, Lysebu, 1-3 Octo- versation with J. Nyerere), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 20 April 1975, TsKhSD, ber 1994 (Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1994, d. 1962, ll. 305-307. f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 153-156; Institut Afriki hereafter “Lysebu transcript”), 68-69. 44 Secretariat card index, 192 meeting, 5 No- Akademiia Nauk SSSR (Africa Institute, USSR 36 Afanasenko to MO, 17 August 1975, TsKhSD, vember 1975, TsKhSD; Afanasenko to MO, 4 Academy of Sciences) to MO, 19 June 1975, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 196-203, 196. November 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, “Protsess dekolonizatsii v Angole i politika 37 Kornienko interview; Brutents interview. ll. 230-231. imperialisticheskikh derzhav [The Decolonization 38 Ibid. On the 1968 tensions in Soviet-Cuban 45 Klinghoffer, Angolan War, 26-27; Garthoff, Process in Angola and the Policies of the Imperi- relations, see Philip Brenner and James G. Blight, Detente and Confrontation, 512. alist Powers],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. “Cuba, 1962: The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Rela- 46 G.A. Zverev (chargé d’affaires, Luanda) to 87-110; Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 14 April tions: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,” MO, 1 March 1976, political report: “Nekotorye 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 50-53. CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 1, 81-85. voprosy voenno-politicheskoi i ekonomicheskoi 31 Nina D. Howland, “The United States and 39 Georgi Kornienko, the deputy foreign minis- obstanovki v Angole” [On Some Questions Con- Angola, 1974-88: A Chronology,” in Department ter, later recalled that the Soviet leadership tried cerning the Military-Political and Economic Situ- of State Bulletin 89:2143 (February 1989), 16- to stop the Cubans: “I read a cable from our am- ation in Angola], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513 19; John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA bassador in Conakry [Guinea] which said, among (hereafter “Zverev report”), appendix. In look- Story (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978), 40-57; many other things, that the Cuban ambassador ing at Cuban documents, Piero Gleijeses finds no Paul L. Moorcraft, African Nemesis: War and had told him that the next day some planes with trace of Soviet support for the airlift before Janu- Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010 (Lon- Cuban troops will land in Conakry for refueling ary 1976. don: Brassey’s, 1990), 76-81. See also Assistant on the way to Angola. I asked [Soviet Foreign 47 Ibid.; Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 87-91. Secretary of State for African Affairs Nathaniel Minister Andrei] Gromyko, do you know any- 48 Zverev report, appendix; Moorcraft, African Davis to Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, 12 July thing? He called Andropov, he called Grechko. Nemesis, 90. 1975, and Sisco to Deputy to the National Secu- Nobody knew anything. All of them were against 49 Zverev report, pp. 13-23; V.N. Rykov (am- rity Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 15 July 1975, both it and reported it immediately to the Politburo and bassador, Algiers) to MO, 20 December 1975, in National Security Archive Angola FOIA col- suggested that we stop Castro. It took some hours TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 1-4; CPSU CC lection. The American covert military aid was in to write the report, to get the decision, and to send Secretariat card index, 197 meeting, 23 Decem- addition to U.S. civilian assistance and military the message to Castro. By this time the planes ber 1975, TsKhSD. See also Moorcraft, African and financial aid procured by the United States were in the air. You could rightly ask: How could Nemesis, 90. The archive of the Soviet General from U.S. allies in the region, notably Zaire. (See it be—Soviet planes, stationed on Cuba, but it Staff is still not open for scholarly research. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of was Soviet planes and we had quite a few mili- 50 Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, “The the Committee on International Relations, House tary people there. . .I checked. Well, technically, Case of Angola: Four Power Intervention and Dis- of Representatives, 95th Congress, Second Ses- our people were involved, our planes were there engagement,” in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. sion, 25 May 1978; also Raymond L. Garthoff, for Cuban use, our advisers were involved, but Jentleson and Larry Berman, eds., Foreign Mili- Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Re- they were completely convinced that a political tary Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted lations from Nixon to Reagan, rev.ed.; (Washing- decision had been taken [in Moscow]” Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, ton, DC: Brookings, 1994), 560-70). (Kornienko interview). See also Gabriel García 1992), 163-208. 32 Afanasenko to MO, 14 June 1975, TsKhSD, Márquez, “Operation Carlota: Cuba’s Role in 51 B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27 f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, l. 137; Afanasenko to MO, Angolan Victory,” 4:5 (February March 1976, report: “O polozhenii v MPLA [On ibid., ll. 180-82. 1977), 1-8; Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Angolan the Situation in the MPLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 33 Afanasenko to MO, 4 July 1975, TsKhSD, f. War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World 69, d. 2513, ll. 29-34; Klinghoffer, Angolan War, 5, op. 8, d. 1962, ll. 136-38; Slipchenko to MO, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 109-20. 61-71. 10 February 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 40 Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 15 September 52 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 227-248; ll. 44-47, 46. (For an alternate view based on 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 118-121; Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa Cuban sources, see the article by Piero Gleijeses see Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 83-84. The mili- (London: Coronet Books, 1988), 174-181. elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.) tary situation in Angola at the time of the Cuban 53 Brutents in Lysebu transcript, pp. 76-77. 34 Iu. K. Naumov, (councellor, Dar-es-Salaam) intervention is still under dispute. Piero Gleijeses, 54 Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 May to MO, 2 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. who has studied the Angolan war based on Cu- 1976, report on discussions during meeting be- 1982, ll. 226-27; record of conversation, ban documents, believes that through the first half tween Raul Castro and Jorge Risquet (Cuba) and Afanasenko-Congolese Prime Minister Henri of October the MPLA was winning the war I.F. Ponomarenko and A.I. Dubenko (USSR Min- Lopez, 17 June 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68 , d. (Gleijeses, personal communication to author). istry of Defense), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513 1962 , ll. 113-14. On the Cuban role, see also The MPLA reports to Moscow (and presumably (hereafter “Castro discussions”), ll. 42-48; on Putilin to MO, 14 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. also to Havana) are much less optimistic (see Vietnam, Mikhail Kapitsa, former vice-foreign 68, d. 1941, ll. 50-53. See also Klinghoffer and Naumov to MO, 3 and 20 October 1975, TsKhSD, minister, author’s interview, Moscow, 7 Septem- Edward Gonzalez, “Cuba, the Soviet Union, and f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 268-270, 280-81). ber 1992. See also Galia Golan, The Soviet Union Africa,” in David E. Albright, ed. Communism in 41 Kornienko interview; Brutents interview; and National Liberation Movements in the Third Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Slipchenko to MO, 30 October 1975 TsKhSD, f. World (New York: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Mark 32 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought Brutents in Lysebu transcript, p. 77. SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 67 Morton Kaplan, “Intervention in Internal ANGOLA AND SOUTHERN 1982); Neil Matheson, The “Rules of the Game” War,” in James N. Rosenau, ed. International of Superpower Military Intervention in the Third Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton Uni- AFRICA, 1975-79 World, 1975-1980 (Washington, DC: University versity Press, 1967), 110-11; Odd Arne Westad, Press of America, 1982). “Rethinking Revolutions: The Cold War in the Ed. note: Following are illustrations 55 G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political Third World,” Journal of Peace Research 29:4 of Russian archival documents on Soviet report: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi (1992), 455-64. See also Edward Kick and David i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole” [On Kiefer, “The Influence of the World System on policy toward Angola and Southern Africa Some Questions Concerning the Military-Politi- War in the Third World,” International Journal in the 1970s. Most were culled from the files cal and Economic Situation in Angola], TsKhSD, of Sociology and Social Policy 7 (1987), 34-48; of the Center for the Storage of Contempo- f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, ll. 13-23, 15-16. and Kick, “World System Properties and Mili- rary Documentation in Moscow (TsKhSD; 56 Ibid., 23; Castro discussions, ll. 42-48. For tary Intervention-Internal War Linkages,” Jour- the history of the Cuban-Soviet relationship, see nal of Political and Military Sociology 11 (1983), the repository for records of the Central Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolu- 185-208; Oran R. Young, “Intervention and In- Committee of the Communist Party of the tion, 78-84. ternational Systems,” Journal of International Af- Soviet Union [CC CPSU] from 1952 thru 57 G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political fairs 22:2 (1968). 1991) and declassified in early 1995 in con- report: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi 68 For other examples, see Alexei Vassiliev, Rus- i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole” [On sian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism nection with the “Carter-Brezhnev Project.” Some Questions Concerning the Military-Politi- to Pragmatism (Reading: Ithaca, 1993), and This international project, led by the cal and Economic Situation in Angola], TsKhSD, Margot Light, ed., Troubled Friendships: the Thomas J. Watson Institute for Interna- f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, ll. 13-14; G.A. Zverev to MO, Moscow’s Third World Ventures (London: Brit- tional Studies at Brown University, orga- report on conversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó (Head, ish Academic Press, 1993). General Department for International Relations, 69 Charles Kupchan, “Getting In: The Initial nized a series of conferences bringing to- Cuban Communist Party) - Zverev, 28 May 1976, Stage of Military Intervention,” in Levite et al., gether former U.S. and Soviet officials, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 53-54; Castro eds., Foreign Military Intervention, 259. For Af- scholars, and newly-declassified documents discussion, l. 45. ghanistan, see Odd Arne Westad, “Prelude to In- to explore the reasons behind the collapse 58 B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27 vasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Com- March 1976, report: “O polozhenii v MPLA [On munists, 1978-1979,”International History Re- of superpower detente in the 1970s and its the Situation in the MPLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. view 1:1 (February 1994), 49-69. possible lessons for current and future Rus- 69, d. 2513, ll. 29-34. 70 The possible exception is of course Vietnam, sian-American relations. (These documents 59 Ibid. but even there it is unlikely that Soviet aid was were among a much larger collection spe- 60 Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 21 June 1976, decisive for the outcome (see Marilyn Young, The Report: “Ob informatsionno-propagandistskoi Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: cifically declassified by Russian authorities rabote za II kvartal 1976 g.” [On Information and HarperCollins, 1991), 232-253). On perceptions, in preparation for a conference on super- Propaganda Work in the Second Quarter of 1976], see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception power rivalry in the Third World held in Ft. TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 60-62. The em- in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Lauderdale, Florida, in March 1995.) bassy did, however, find it difficult to dispose of University Press, 1976). “several” sets of Lenin’s collected works in 71 On Soviet foreign policy ideology, see Stephen The Cold War International History French—not surprisingly, since more than 90 per- Shenfield in Ideology and Soviet Politics, edited Project and the National Security Archive— cent of all Angolans were illiterate and those who by Stephen White and Alex (London: a non-governmental research institute and were able to read mostly did so in Portuguese. Macmillan, 1988), 203-24. declassified documents repository located 61 Castro discussions; F.D. Kudashkin (councellor, Luanda) to MO, 30 July 1976, CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS at George Washington University—cooper- TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 82-83. By the ated with the Carter-Brezhnev Project and end of 1976 Soviet authorities were hard-pressed The Cold War International History played a major role in obtaining the release to find the Marxist-Leninist avant-garde in of these Russian documents and supporting Angola. See N.P. Tolubeev (Soviet ambassador, Project awards a limited number of fellow- Havana) to MO, 10 December 1976, memoran- ship for scholars from countries on “the the translation of some of them into English. dum of conversation Jorge Risquet - Tolubeev, other side” of the Cold War to conduct up to The full set of photocopies of Russian, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 121-123. one year of archival research in the United American, and East German documents 62 On Fidel Castro: Marquez, “Operation States. Recipients are based at the Institute obtained by the Project may be examined Carlota,” 1-2; Castro discussions, l. 46; G.A. for European, Russian, and Eurasian Stud- by interested researchers at the National Zverev to MO, 28 May 1976, memorandum of ies, George Washington University, Wash- Security Archive, which is located on the 7th conversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó - Zverev, ington, D.C. Applications should include: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 49-54. floor of the Gelman Library, George Wash- 63 CV; letter of nomination and three letters of Castro discussions, ll. 43, 47. ington University, 2130 H St. NW, Washing- 64 Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 August recommendation; research proposal, indi- 1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513. cating topic to be investigated and sources to ton, DC 20037; tel. (202) 994-7000; fax: 65 Philip Windsor, “Superpower Intervention,” be utilized; writing samples in English wel- (202) 994-7005. in Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Poli- comed, though not required. Applicans tics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 54. Michael should have a working ability in English. * * * * * Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Front Preference will be given to scholars who Line (London: Zed, 1983), 85-99, is a generally have not previously had an opportunity to do reliable account of the Alves coup. Soviet Ambassador to the People’s research in the United States. Applications 66 George W. Breslauer, “Ideology and Learn- Republic of Angola E.I. Afanasenko, may be sent or faxed to: David Wolff, Direc- ing in Soviet Third World Policy,” World Politics Memorandum of Conversation with 39 (April 1987), 429-48; Richard F. Herrmann, tor; Cold War International History Project; “Soviet Behavior In Regional Conflicts: Old Woodrow Wilson Center; 1000 Jefferson President of the Movement for the Questions, New Strategies, and Important Les- Dr. SW; Washington, D.C. 20560 USA; Popular Liberation of Angola sons,” World Politics 44: 3 (April 1992), 432-65; fax: (202) 357-4439. Agostinho Neto, 4 July 1975 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 33

From the diary of SECRET propaganda efforts prior to the establishment tionaries. Neto also included the FNLA in E.I. Afanasenko Copy No. 2 of radio broadcasting facilities in the coun- that group. Ser. No. 181 try, broadcast of the radio program “Struggle The president of the MPLA said that 21 July 1975 of Angola” will be resumed in Brazzaville. the military conflict which took place last The president of the MPLA stated that June demonstrated the strength of the Record of Conference with one of the main points in the negotiations MPLA’s military detachments. Notwith- President of MPLA Agostinho NETO with the KPT was the issue of Cabinda. The standing the numerical superiority of the 4 July 1975 PRC made the decision not to support the FNLA’s forces, the MPLA is no weaker than demand of autonomy for Cabinda at the the FNLA in military terms. Neto declared We received a visit from President of OAU assembly which had been advanced that the MPLA commands great political in- the MPLA Agostinho Neto. I informed him by the Congo and Zaire last February. As fluence in the country which is continuing that the Central Committee of the CPSU was to the change of their position on the to grow. At the same time, he acknowledged closely following the development of cir- Cabinda question, the Congolese assured the that two northwest provinces of Angola have cumstances in Angola. The MPLA delegation that they would terminate been controlled by the FNLA since last June. are interested in the victory of democratic assistance to the nationalist Cabindi orga- In addition, UNITA commands major influ- forces in Angola. In 1975, significant aid nization FLEC. Inasmuch as the parties had ence in Bie and the surrounding regions, has been provided to the MPLA. Pursuant reached an agreement on the Cabinda issue, where a large portion of the country’s popu- to instructions from the Central Committee the PRC allowed the MPLA to use its terri- lation lives. of the CPSU, we had a conference with the tory for the transport of arms, military equip- Neto characterized UNITA as an orga- President of the PRC [People’s Republic of ment and other cargo supplied to the Move- nization representing the interests of white the Congo] M. Nguabi, in which the issue ment by the Soviet Union and other friendly farmers with reactionary leanings. How- of rendering aid to the MPLA was discussed. countries. In addition, the Congolese con- ever, UNITA does not command significant Neto thanked the Central Committee firmed their decision to close their land bor- military forces and is attempting to play a of the CPSU for the rendering of assistance. der with Cabinda for the MPLA. In order role as an intermediary between the MPLA He stated that the leadership of the MPLA to export supplies to Angola, they allotted and the FNLA. The president of the MPLA had recently expanded its contacts with gov- the port and airfield at Pointe-Noire. Trans- spoke in favor of a tactical alliance with ernments of the African countries. In the portation of cargo is to be carried out by the UNITA. The desirability of such an alli- course of these discussions, the MPLA is land and sea forces of the MPLA. Neto was ance was advocated to the leadership of the attempting to increase the number of its sup- outspoken in his appraisal of the results of MPLA by numerous heads of African gov- porters in Africa. One of the immediate the negotiations with the Congolese. He ernments, first and foremost, by the PRC. objectives of the MPLA is to prevent the emphasized that the refusal of the Congo to The president of the MPLA expressed discussion of the issue of Cabinda at the up- support the Cabindi demand for autonomy doubts about fulfillment of all the agree- coming assembly concerned about the fact represented an important step forward in the ments signed in Nakuru (). One of the that this year [Ugandan leader] , normalization of relations between the reasons for the likely breakdown of those who collaborates closely with [Zairian MPLA and the KPT. agreements is the aggression of the FNLA, leader] Mobutu [Sese Seko], will become The president of the MPLA proceeded which is unlikely to give up its armed provo- the Chairman of the OAU [Organization of to characterize the domestic situation in cations. All of this, Neto emphasized, re- African Unity]. We anticipate, said Neto, Angola. He pointed out that the existence quires the MPLA to continue the develop- that the president of will come for- of three national liberation movements in ment of its armed forces. In this connection ward at the OAU assembly with a proposal the country was creating a favorable oppor- it is counting on aid from the Soviet Union. to discuss the issue of Cabinda. Our meet- tunity for reactionary forces in the country, The MPLA has decided to address the Cen- ings in Nigeria and our ongoing negotiations which in turn was leading to a further inten- tral Committee of the CPSU with a request in the Congo with president M. Nguabi, sification of political, social, and economic to furnish additional military and financial Member of the Politburo of the Central conflicts. Neto pointed to two groups of aid. At the end of this July, an MPLA del- Committee of the KPT [the Russian acro- reactionary forces acting against Angola. egation will be dispatched to the USSR, nym for the Congolese Workers’ Party] A. The first group he attributed to domestic headed by member of the Politburo of the Lopez, member of the Central Committee Portuguese reactionaries. This group is fo- Central Committee of the MPLA Iko Kareira of the KPT Obami-Itu, and Foreign Minis- menting tensions in the country and provok- (commander in chief of the MPLA). ter [Charles-David] Ganao, said Neto, are ing a mass emigration of the white popula- Neto reported that last June, a delega- directed to this very question. tion from Angola. The departure of large tion of the MPLA visited the PRC [People’s Negotiations between the MPLA and numbers of technical specialists has resulted Republic of China] at the invitation of the the KPT are proceeding successfully. An in serious damage to the country’s economy. Chinese government. Zambia, Tanzania, agreement has been reached to maintain The white reactionaries are capitalizing on and the PRC [People’s Republic of the ongoing consultations between the MPLA the support of the present Supreme Com- Congo] also took part in the organization of and KPT with the aim of developing a com- missar of Angola and a large portion of the that trip. In the course of negotiations in mon policy and the conduct of joint efforts Portuguese officers. The second group of the PRC, the Chinese assured their delega- in Africa and Angola. In order to enhance reactionary forces consists of foreign reac- tion that they would terminate all forms of 34 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

military aid to all three Angolan national lib- share his thoughts in connection with the The president further stated that the eration movements until the granting of in- upcoming meeting and requested his assess- Politburo of the MPLA, by special dispen- dependence to Angola. ment of conditions in the national liberation sation, had empowered Politburo member I thanked the president of the MPLA movement and of the position of other Afri- and Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento, for the interesting information. I promised can countries. Neto reported that it had been with responsibility for all important issues to communicate to the Central Committee determined to hold the meeting of the five of foreign policy, to prepare additional pro- of the CPSU the request of the MPLA to presidents ahead of schedule (that is, not on posals on the issue over further development furnish additional military and financial aid. September 15 as referenced above), and that of contacts by the PRA with Sao-Tome and The conference was attended by mem- in just two hours he was flying to Dar-es- Principe. He requested the Soviet Ambas- bers of the Politburo of the Central Com- Salaam. The principal theme of the meet- sador to provide him with detailed positions mittee of the MPLA Lucio Lara and Jose ing would be the meeting between [U.S. of the Soviet side on the issue over the situ- Eduardo, member of the governing council Secretary of State Henry A.] Kissinger and ation in the South Atlantic and relations of of the MPLA Pedro Van-Dunen, as well as [South African Prime Minister John] Vorster Lopo do Nascimento with the ROZM and the first Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in and its implications for Africa. He, Neto, the DRSTP. the PRC Comrade B. G. Putilin. still did not know exactly what position to Neto stated his desire for a continual propose at the meeting, what policy to adopt. exchange of information between the PRA Ambassador of the USSR to the This being his first opportunity for partici- and the USSR on international questions, People’s Republic of the Congo pation in this sort of a conference (Tanza- in particular those concerning the situation /s/ E. Afanasenko nia, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana in Africa and the South Atlantic. He stated have already met repeatedly on these issues), that he intended to address these questions [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. it is apparent that Neto needs to hear the in his conferences in Moscow. 157-159.] opinions of his colleagues at the meeting, and only after that will he be in a position to USSR AMBASSADOR TO THE Soviet Ambassador to the People’s formulate his position. For example, it is PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Republic of Angola B.S. Vorobiev, not entirely clear to Neto why the participa- /s/ B. VOROBIEV Memorandum of Conversation with tion and assistance of Kissinger is neces- President A. Neto, 4 September1976 sary. He also does not understand the in- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 65, d. 2513, ll. consistency of [Zambian] President [Ken- 100-101.] From the diary of SECRET neth] Kaunda on the issue of the intermedi- B.S. VOROBIEV Copy No. 1 ating role of Kissinger in contacts with Soviet Ambassador to Angola, Ser. No. 286 Vorster. V.P. Loginov, Memorandum of Neto indicated further that, lacking a Conversation with candidate-member Record of Conversation with full understanding of the positions held by of the Politburo Secretary of the CC President of PRA A. NETO Tanzania and the other participants in the MPLA-PT for international issues conference, he is presently having difficulty P. Luvualu, 27 June 1978 4 September 1976 articulating any concepts on these issues, although after his return from the meeting, From the journal of SECRET On 4 September 1976, I visited Presi- these issues will be clearer to him, and he V.P. Loginov Copy no. 2 re: no. 222 dent A. Neto at his invitation. expects to be able to inform us about them, 20 July 1978 Neto inquired as to whether any infor- so they can be communicated to Moscow. mation had been received from Moscow In the course of our discussion I in- RECORD OF CONVERSATION regarding the Soviet position on issues re- formed the president about the response re- with candidate-member of the Politburo lating to the national liberation movement ceived from Moscow regarding the attitude Secretary of the CC of the MPLA-PT for in southern Africa, and whether that infor- of the Angolan side toward the issue of the international issues mation could be imparted to him, if possible, situation in the South Atlantic, conveyed P. LUVUALU in connection with the upcoming meeting through the Soviet Ambassador by of the presidents from five countries [Angolan] Prime Minister Lopo do 27 June 1978 (Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Nascimento. and Botswana), scheduled for September 15. President Neto expressed his apprecia- [I] visited candidate-member of the I said to him in general that no infor- tion for the speedy response. He declared Politburo, Secretary of the CC of the MPLA- mation had yet been received. Based on his full agreement with all of the positions PT [Popular Movement for the Liberation materials received from the center [Mos- held by the Soviet side and emphasized that, of Angola—Partido Trabajo] for interna- cow], I told him about the ongoing confer- in the recent past, new facts had emerged tional issues, P. Luvualu at his invitation. ence in Moscow of delegations from three indicating an increased interest by the USA P. Luvualu informed me that at the cur- national liberation movements from south- in the ROZM [Republic of Cape Verde] and rent time the leadership of the People’s Re- ern Africa. by France in the DRSTP [Democratic Re- public of Angola has sent several delega- For my part, I asked the president to public of Sao Tome and Principe]. tions to various African countries in order COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 35 to explain the Angolan position with regard groups of Lunda nationality from Angola ciliation of the central Kinshasa authorities to Zaire and to gather information on the into Zaire and back, since the border be- with the Lunda nationality in order that for- real nature of the events in the Zairian prov- tween Angola and Zaire stretches out for eign monopolies might without resistance ince of Shaba. The delegations should once approximately two thousand kilometers. exploit the wealth of the province of Shaba. again underscore that neither Angola, nor P. Luvualu underscored that Mobutu, And, finally, the Western countries persist the Soviet Union, nor Cuba bear any rela- in every instance when an internal conflict in seeking the reconciliation of Zaire with tion to the events in the province of Shaba, arises, strives by using false pretexts, to in- Angola in order to renew the transport of and that these events are an internal Zairian ternationalize it. The Secretary of the CC natural resources from the province of Shaba problem. MPLA-PT [referred to] the interference of along the Benguela railroad. The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT Western powers—the members of NATO in P. Luvualu remarked in this connection declared that there are objective factors the previous conflict in the province of that the president of the People’s Republic which facilitate the continual occurrence of Shaba and their proposal to create an inter- of Angola, A. Neto, in his declaration of July conflicts and tension in this region. The African armed force which would be used 9, announced that the Zairian refugees will colonizers, when they drew the borders be- not only to resolve the current tasks of put- be led from the Zairian borders into the in- tween states, did not take into account the ting down the revolt of the Lunda national- terior of Angola, that Angola will disarm the ethnic make-up of the population. As a re- ity, [but also for] the preservation of the detachments of the FNLC [Front for the sult, the significant nationality of the Lunda Mobutu regime, and the possibility for for- National Liberation of the Congo] which was broken up and in the current time lives eign monopolies to continue to exploit the retreat from the province of Shaba into in three countries — Zaire, Angola and Zam- resources of the province of Shaba. Angola, and that the Angolan government bia. Moreover, at the current time there are The fact, declared P. Luvualu, that the proposes that Zaire, in turn, draw off the over 250,000 Zairian refugees in Angola, Republic of South Africa has expressed a UNITA, FNLA, and FLEC bases away from who are mainly of the Lunda nationality and desire to take part in the inter-African forces the Angolan border. The President of the among them from 20,000 to 30,000 are confirms our evaluation of the neo-colonial People’s Republic of Angola in this an- former soldiers, the so-called Katanga gen- nature of these forces. This evaluation is nouncement also underscored that the refu- darmes. After the war of independence, the also confirmed by the fact that China has gees may live in any country according to central authorities in Zaire began to perse- sent military instructors to Zaire and has of- their choice. This position, said P. Luvualu, cute members of the Lunda nationality who fered equipment for arming the inter-Afri- is in complete accordance with the charter lived in the province of Shaba. Unlawful can forces. of the Organization of African Unity and arrests took place as well as the execution In the estimation of P. Luvualu, this international law. of Zairian soldiers of the Lunda nationality. issue concerns armed forces of international Then the Secretary of the CC MPLA- It is necessary to take into account the imperialism which are being created by PT raised the problem of Namibia. He in- fact that the province of Shaba is the richest NATO with the aim of supporting reaction- formed us that, in appraising the aggression of all Zairian provinces and provides a sig- ary, unpopular regimes in Africa as well as of the Republic of South Africa toward nificant part of the hard-currency goods supporting the struggle against progressive Angola at Cassinga, immediately following which enter the country, and that some of African countries and national liberation the important victory of SWAPO [Southwest the largest foreign monopolies have invested movements. African People’s Organization] in the UN, capital in the exploitation of the natural re- The long term goals of the Western the Angolan leadership came to the conclu- sources of the province. countries consist of strengthening the posi- sion that the aggressive actions of the Re- The catastrophic condition of the tion of NATO in the central part of Africa in public of South Africa were made in pur- Zairian economy, the dizzying rise of prices, order to break through to the Indian Ocean, suit of the following goals: to weaken the corruption which has enveloped the i.e. for the neo-colonial conquest of Africa. SWAPO and force it to accept the plan of whole machinery of state, including the The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT the 5 Western powers for Namibia; to gain army, the unbearably serious condition of declared that the evaluation by the Angolan time, in order to create in Namibia a puppet the population, particularly of national mi- leadership of the events in Zaire is con- political force which would be able to norities and the greater part of the military, firmed likewise by the resolution of the counter SWAPO; to scare the People’s Re- aggravates the conflict between the Western countries to offer Kinshasa eco- public of Angola and weaken Angolan sup- Kinshasa government and the Lunda nation- nomic assistance. The Western countries, port for SWAPO. ality, and lead to the revolts which occur as is well known, as a condition for grant- P. Luvualu remarked that events had from time to time among the soldiers of ing such assistance demanded, first, a re- fully confirmed the correctness of this ap- Lunda nationality in the Zairian army. Dur- form of the management of the Zairian praisal of the Angolan leadership. For ex- ing moments of acute conflict the Lunda economy and finances according to which ample, in the present time in Namibia, the refugees in Angola seek to assist their fel- representatives of the USA, France, Bel- Republic of South Africa has created the so- low-tribesmen in the province of Shaba. gium, and the Federal Republic of Germany called democratic party with the help of the Moreover, all of the refugees in Angola, it would have full control over the economy, renegade [Andrea] Chipanga and the so- goes without saying, would like to return to finances, and the actions of the administra- called National Front of Namibia. Vorster their homeland in Zaire. It is practically tive apparatus from top to bottom. Secondly, feverishly attempts to prepare elections, impossible to control the movement of they put forward a demand for the recon- which are falsified from the very beginning, 36 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

and to achieve an internal settlement on the the leadership of the People’s Republic of we had received from our embassies in a model of the internal settlement of Rhode- Angola. He likewise expressed his gratitude number of African countries is of a subjec- sia with the aid of puppets like Chipanga. for the gift of the CC CPSU. tive nature. In this connection I [Valdes The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT In the course of our exchange of opin- Vivo] was given the task of becoming ac- declared that the People’s Republic of ions on international problems P. Luvualu quainted with the situation on location, to Angola will continue to support SWAPO. asked that I give information about the situ- have discussions with the leaders of Angola, The Angolan leadership, he said, considers ation in after the unsuccess- Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ni- that for the peaceful resolution of the ful government coup. geria, and likewise with the Soviet ambas- Namibian problem the Republic of South Embassy advisor S. S. Romanov was sadors in these countries, in order to receive Africa should: officially define a deadline present during this discussion. more complete and more objective informa- for the transfer of Walvis Bay to the authori- tion about the state of affairs in southern ties of Namibia, after declaring the indepen- USSR AMBASSADOR TO THE Africa. dence of that country; for a period of transi- PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA I was tasked, he said, to convey to tion draw off its troops, which are now con- /s/ V. LOGINOV J[oshua]. Nkomo [leader of the Zimbabwe centrated on the border with Angola, to bases African Political Union, ZAPU] and R. in the South of Namibia; immediately lib- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1148, ll. Mugabe [leader of the Zimbabwe African erate all political prisoners in Namibia. P. 71-75: translated by Sally Kux; copy on file National Union, ZANU], that Cuba is un- Luvualu likewise remarked that Angola con- at National Security Archive.] able to satisfy their request to send pilots curs with the proposed role of the UN in the for the repulsion of air attacks on the train- transitional period in Namibia. Memorandum of Conversation between ing camps for the Patriotic Front armed In conclusion P. Luvualu underscored Minister-counselor of the Soviet forces; to clarify the possibility of unified that the maneuvers of Western countries Embassy in Havana M. Manasov and action between ZAPU and ZANU; to lay around Angola will not succeed in forcing Cuban Communist Party CC member out before their leaders and the leadership the MPLA-PT to turn from the path it has Raul Valdes Vivo, 7 May 1979 of the front-line governments the Cuban chosen. We, he declared, have made a firm plan for the creation of a provisional gov- and final choice of friends. This is the So- From the journal of SECRET ernment in Zimbabwe. viet Union, Cuba, and other socialist coun- M.A. Manasov copy no. 3 R.V. Vivo meanwhile remarked that in tries. With the assistance and support of re: no 265 Angola at first there had not been clear co- socialist states, and first and foremost of the “24” May 1979 operation between Cuba and the USSR, Soviet Union and Cuba, Angola will follow whereas in Ethiopia our countries have its chosen path. RECORD OF DISCUSSION achieved the full coordination of our joint [I] thanked the Secretary of the CC with member of the CC actions. The policy of Cuba and the Soviet MPLA-PT for this information. From my Com[munist]Party of Cuba Union with regard to southern Africa should side I handed him the text of the Declara- comr. Raul Valdes Vivo likewise be coordinated, he underscored. tion of the Soviet Government on Africa (in My interlocutor laid out the essence of Portuguese). I underscored that this is an 7 May 1979 the Cuban plan, which is summarized as important political action in defense of the follows. The declaration of a provisional independence of African governments, in I met with R.V. Vivo in the CC of the government in Zimbabwe is realized not in the solidarity of the USSR in the struggle of Party and, referring to the instructions of the exile, but in a part of the liberated territory the peoples of the continent against the im- Soviet ambassador, informed him of the dis- of the country; J. Nkomo is proposed for perialist interference in their affairs. I noted cussion in the International Section of the the post of president of the country, R. that the appraisal contained in it of the situ- CC CPSU with the members of the Execu- Mugabe for prime minister; the program ation in Africa coincides with the position tive Committee of the Jamaican People’s platform of the provisional government pro- of the People’s Republic of Angola. Then I National Party (PNP). vides for the realization of a series of so- gave him a translation into Portuguese of R.V. Vivo, having thanked me for the cial-economic transformations, secures the the Pravda article regarding the external information, noted the significance of this interests of those countries which recognize policies ofthe USA. meeting, which will enable the development its government; the rights of the white part I handed [him] a film on the first con- of the connection between the CPSU and of the population are guaranteed, elections gress of the MPLA-PT and the sojourn in the PNP and, first and foremost, opens the are planned for the legislative organs of the the People’s Republic of Angola of the So- possibility for the preparation of PNP cad- country; constitutional guarantees are pro- viet party delegation headed by Comrade res in the Soviet Union. claimed, etc. A.P. Kirilenko. Then, in the course of the discussion, According to the words of R.V. Vivo, P. Luvualu expressed his gratitude to R.V. Vivo spoke about his recent trip to sev- J. Nkomo and R. Mugabe have agreed with the Soviet government for its unflagging eral African countries, which was carried out this plan, as have the leaders of the front- support of progressive forces in Africa. He on the orders of F. Castro. This trip was line states. The provisional government, in said that he would immediately bring the undertaken, continued my interlocutor, be- the estimation of the Cuban side, would text of the Declaration to the attention of cause of the fact that the information which possibly be recognized at first by 30 coun- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 37 tries. COUNSELLOR-MINISTER OF THE The active interference of England in EMBASSY OF THE USSR the affairs of Zambia may ensure the vic- IN THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA tory of the puppet government, which would /s/ M. MANASOV possibly lead to a conflict between ZANU and ZAPU if the unity of their actions are [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 834, ll. 82- ZUBOK, PLESHAKOV not achieved, noted my interlocutor. 84.] WIN GELBER PRIZE He reported that the armed forces of the ZANU and the ZAPU include in total Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo The Cold War International History 24 thousand people (12 thousand in each Meeting, 18 October 1979 (excerpt) Project congratulates Vladislav M. organization), but unfortunately, these forces Zubok and Constantine M. Pleshakov, are as yet inactive. In the ranks of merce- [...] two Russian historians who have been naries there are 3 thousand blacks and 2 9. Telegram from Havana Spec[ial]. # associated with the Project since its in- thousand whites. 741 and 744 ception, for receiving the 1996 Lionel R.V. Vivo briefly set forth the content Gelber Prize for their book, Inside the of his discussion with the Soviet ambassa- SUSLOV. Comrades, you have read Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to dor in Mozambique. According to his these telegrams. In one of them a question Khrushchev, published by Harvard Uni- words, during the discussion of the situa- is raised that in a conversation with our am- versity Press. Zubok is currently based tion in southern Africa, our ambassador bassador, Raul Castro told about difficul- at the National Security Archive, a non- noted that according to the theory of Marx- ties that had emerged with regard to replace- governmental research institute and ism-Leninism, it is impossible to accelerate ment of the Cuban troops in Ethiopia. In declassified documents repository lo- events in a country where there is not a revo- the second conversation Raul Castro said the cated at George Washington University; lutionary situation and where there is not Angolans in all probability would appeal Pleshakov lives in Moscow, where he until recently worked as a researcher at civilization. “To that I responded in jest to [probably to us] with a request to take over the USA/Canada Institute of the Rus- the Soviet ambassador,” said R.V. Vivo, the maintainance [i.e., costs—trans.] of the sian Academy of Sciences. “that if comrades L.I. Brezhnev and F. Cuban troops in Angola. Secondly, he said Established in 1989, the $50,000 Castro decide that our countries will take that the Angolans treat the Cuban represen- Lionel Gelber Prize, given by a Foun- part in the operations in Rhodesia, then we tatives rather tactlessly. dation named for the late Canadian dip- will participate in them.” The next question concerned the assis- lomat, historian, and writer, is awarded By my request R.V. Vivo briefly in- tance with arms to SWAPO. He remarked, annually to the winning author of a non- formed me about the work of the last ple- that Soviet comrades assist SWAPO with fiction book in the field of foreign rela- num of the CC Comparty of Cuba. He re- arms but the SWAPO men absolutely do not tions. It was presented to Zubok and ported that the plenum summed up the ful- fight and do not want to fight. Then one Pleshakov in Toronto on 7 October fillment of the resolutions of the First Party wonders, why we should help them with 1996. The jury citation read: Congress, revealed the deficiencies in the weapons[?] In one word, there are a num- development of the national economy of the ber of very important principled questions “Zubok and Pleshakov, two members country, and set its course to overcome them. which we should consider. I think that we of the young generation of Russian his- In view of the fact that the project for the should order the Defense Ministry and the torians, have mined recently available resolution of the plenum on the given ques- International Department of the CC to con- documents to provide new insights into tion did not reflect all aspects of the eco- sider these questions advanced in these tele- the inner workings of the Kremlin dur- nomic situation, the corresponding section grams, taking into account the exchange of ing the critical postwar period. Theirs of the CC of the Party was tasked with its opinions that took place at the meeting of is a significant contribution to the lit- reworking and with its publication. the Politburo, [and] the proposals will be erature: a fresh and superbly researched With regard to the resolution of the ple- introduced to the CC. appraisal of the ideological, strategic num of the CC concerning the appointment ALL. Agreed. and human foundations of the Cold War, of Lionel Soto [Prieto] as a member of the from the Soviet side. This is a praise- Secretariat of the CC of the Party, R.V. Vivo [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25, dok. 6, ll. worthy book in the best traditions of what Lionel Gelber sought to encour- spoke very highly of him (“He is no Garcia 1-1; copy obtained by David Wolff; trans- age on behalf of readers everywhere: Pelaes,” he said) and reported, that L. Soto lation by Vladislav M. Zubok.] impressive without being intimidating; will be occupied with the issues of the party learned without being impenetrable; leadership of the country’s economy; along engaging without being superficial.” the party line he is tasked with responsibil- ity for Khuseplan, the National Bank, GKES [State Committee for Economic Coopera- tion], and other central organs of the national economy. 38 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

ANATOMY OF A THIRD WORLD COLD WAR CRISIS: NEW EAST-BLOC EVIDENCE ON THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1977-1978

Editor’s Note: The Russian and East German documents presented below illuminate the “other side”—other sides, really—of one of the key events that hastened the collapse of U.S.-Soviet detente in the mid-1970s: the Horn of Africa Crisis of 1977-78, in which a regional rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as domestic political instability in both countries, became entangled with super- power rivalry and competition for influence in the Third World. While Ethiopia and Somalia had a long-standing dispute over their borders, the immediate causes of the crisis dated to 1974, when a leftist revolution overthrew Ethiopian leader Emperor , who had been a pillar of Western influence for decades, and to early February 1977, when the Ethiopian revolution took a more militant course when Haile Mengistu Mariam seized control of the ruling “” and eliminated his chief rivals for power, including Teferi Bante, the revolution’s erstwhile leader. The Ethiopian Revolution opened up new possibilities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region, where its chief ally had been Somalia, with whom it had concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. As the documents show, the Soviet Union and its allies, notably Cuban leader Fidel Castro, attempted persistently to keep both Ethiopia and Somalia within the socialist camp. This, in practice, meant trying to damp down Ethiopian-Somali hostility and, in particular, the territorial ambitions of Somali leader Mohammed Siad Barre, who claimed that ethnic Somalis were being persecuted in the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia and deserved liberation and incorporation into Somalia proper. In the course of trying to mediate the dispute, Moscow and Havana found that appeals to socialist international solidarity could only go so far in overcoming deep-seated national and even tribal disagreements. Still—as demonstrated by a relatively cordial discussion between U.S. and Soviet diplomats in in early 1977—the simmering regional hot-spot did not erupt into a full-blown superpower clash until the late summer, when Somalia launched an offensive to capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia. By then, sensing that the Ethiopian leadership was tilting toward Moscow, both the Siad Barre regime in Mogadishu and the Carter Administration in Washington were exploring the possibility of improving U.S.-Somali ties to the detriment of the Soviet Union, and Siad Barre evidently believed that Washington had flashed him at least a dim green light to attack Ethiopia (a claim which U.S. officials denied). The Somali attacks of July-August 1977, shattering a Soviet mediation effort then taking place in Moscow, quickly achieved major success at thrusting into Ethiopian territory; by September-October, Somali or Somali-backed forces had captured most of the Ogaden. The Somali advances prompted desperate pleas from Mengistu for Soviet-bloc military support, and at some point that fall the Soviet Union and Cuba, which had already been providing some weapons to the Derg, decided that it would be unacceptable to allow Ethio- pia—a strategically significant country seemingly poised to become an important member of the socialist bloc—to suffer a military defeat at the hands of a country (Somalia) which despite protestations of socialist orientation seemed to be quickly shifting into the “imperialist” camp. The decision by Moscow and Havana to come to Mengistu’s rescue became evident between November 1977 and February 1978, as Soviet planes and ships transported roughly 15,000 Cuban troops and large supplies of Soviet weaponry, and a USSR military mission led by Gen. Vasilii I. Petrov helped direct Ethiopian-Cuban military activities. The massive Soviet-Cuban airlift spurred an Ethiopian counter-offensive which evicted Somali forces from the Ogaden and entrenched the Mengistu regime in power. At the same time, these developments cemented both Somalia’s defection from the Soviet-bloc (in November, Mogadishu abrogated a 1974 Somali-Soviet friendship treaty) and Ethiopia’s dependence on that same Soviet-bloc for military aid, and elevated the conflict to a superpower crisis, as Washington charged Moscow with employing Cuban proxy forces to expand its influence in Africa. Moscow and Havana maintained that they had only helped Ethiopia defend itself from a U.S.-backed assault from Somalia (and various “reactionary” Arab countries supporting it), whereas Carter Administration hardliners (notably National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) as- serted that the Horn crisis, coming on the heels of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, revealed a rising international assertiveness on the Kremlin’s part, a danger requiring a tough American response—if not a direct military involvement to stem the Soviet-Cuban recapture of the Ogaden (or a perceived threat to Somalia), then in the form of a closer relationship with the People’s Republic of China, the USSR’s bitter communist foe. This new dispute between the USSR and United States flared up in late 1977 just as it seemed that, after a rocky start, the Carter and Brezhnev leaderships were finally beginning to make some progress toward improving relations, and, most importantly, toward conclud- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 39

ing a SALT II treaty. Instead of finishing up the arms control treaty—which the Soviets had made a prerequisite for a Carter-Brezhnev summit meeting which the American leader eagerly desired—the Horn Crisis exacerbated superpower tensions and, just as important, seemed to tilt the balance of power within the Carter Administration away from Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, who stressed reaching agreements with Moscow, and toward Brzezinski, who favored “linkage” between progress toward bilateral accords and Soviet behavior in the Third World. The charges and countercharges between Washington and Moscow, along with disagreements on other areas such as human rights, the Middle East (where the Kremlin accused Washington of backing off an agreed-approach in favor of backing a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli accord), and relations with China, helped stall progress in the SALT II negotiations and generally embitter U.S.-Soviet relations in the first half of 1978. Thus was it said that SALT, or more generally detente, “lies buried in the sands of Ogaden.” Exploring why the U.S.-Soviet detente of the mid-1970s was side-tracked by such seemingly obscure and peripheral issues as the regional crisis in the Horn of Africa was one purpose of the “Carter-Brezhnev Project.” Spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of the Center for Foreign Policy Development at the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, the Carter- Brezhnev Project gathered scholars, former Soviet and American officials, and newly-released documentation for a series of oral history conferences to examine the reasons behind the collapse of detente, and whether those events suggested any lessons for current and future Russian-American relations. Among the scholarly organizations supporting the Project’s efforts to obtain fresh evidence from American, Russian, and other archives were the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University, and the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), based at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. In this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, we are pleased to present a sampling of the Russian and East German documents on the 1977- 78 Horn of Africa Crisis that were gathered for the Carter-Brezhnev conference on U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third World, held in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, on 23-26 March 1995. (A much smaller selection was included in a briefing book assembled by the National Security Archive and CWIHP for use during the conference.) Both the Russian and East German documents were obtained and translated via the collective efforts of the National Security Archive, CWIHP, and the CFPD. Most of the Russian documents printed below emanated from the Center for the Storage of Contempo- rary Documentation (TsKhSD in its Russian acronym), the repository for the post-1952 records of the Central Committee of the Commu- nist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), located in the former Central Committee headquarters in Old Square in Moscow; some additional documents came from the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF); all were specially declassified by Russian authorities for the Carter-Brezhnev Project. For their assistance in working out the details of locating and obtaining these materials, CWIHP would like to thank N.G. Tomilina, Director of TsKhSD, and her staff, and Vladislav M. Zubok and Malcolm Byrne of the National Security Archive. The East German documents printed below are drawn from a larger collection obtained from the East Berlin-based archive of the former ruling party of the German Democratic Republic, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), and translated from German, by Christian F. Ostermann, a researcher based at the National Security Archive and the incoming CWIHP Associate Director. These East German documents include reports of communications with Soviet and Cuban officials—including a lengthy excerpt from the transcript of an April 1977 conversation between East German leader Erich Honecker and visiting Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who had recently attempted a mediation effort between Somalia and Ethiopia—and accounts of an abortive East German effort in 1978 to mediate the ongoing dispute between the central Ethiopian government and the separatist Eritrean guerrilla movement. As with the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, both contestants in the Ethiopia-Eritrea clash professed allegiance to socialism, and Moscow hoped to subsume their differences in order to consolidate an anti- on the Horn of Africa. All of the photocopied Russian and East German documents printed below, and many other, still-untranslated East-bloc documents (as well as declassified U.S. government documents) concerning the Horn Crisis, are on file and available for scholarly research at the National Security Archive. The Archive is located on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037, and can be reached at (202) 994-7000 (telephone); (202) 994-7005 (fax); and [email protected] (e-mail). To assess the significance of these materials for understanding the Horn of Africa Crisis, the CWIHP Bulletin has solicited commen- taries from three scholars: Ermias Abebe, an Ethiopian-born scholar who obtained his Master’s degree at Moscow State University and recently received his Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, has completed a dissertation on Soviet foreign policy in the Third World in the 1970s, using Russian, American, and Ethiopian sources; Paul B. Henze, author of The Horn of Africa from War to Peace (Macmillan, 1991) and during the Carter Administration a staff member of the National Security Council, and currently a researcher affiliated with the Washington, D.C.-office of the Rand Corporation; and Christian F. Ostermann, currently completing a dissertation for the Univer- sity of Hamburg on U.S.-East German relations in the 1950s, is a researcher based at the National Security Archive and the incoming CWIHP Associate Director. Their commentaries begin below, preceding the section of translated East-bloc documents. In the future, CWIHP hopes to organize additional activities, including a scholarly conference or workshop, to gather further sources and perspectives on the international history of the Horn of Africa Crisis. These would include still-missing pieces of the puzzle from the Russian and American archives, materials from the region such as Ethiopia and Somalia, and, if possible, Cuban records that could clarify Havana’s actions and motivations during the crisis. —James G. Hershberg 40 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

THE HORN, THE COLD WAR, laboration would not only enable the allies apparently hoped to anchor them- AND DOCUMENTS FROM THE new Ethiopia to take deserved credit selves firmly on the Horn in an attempt FORMER EAST-BLOC: from the international scholarly com- to position themselves to play impor- AN ETHIOPIAN VIEW munity, but also to reap the intellectual tant political and/or military roles in the reward of a better understanding of a whole volatile region. by Ermias Abebe regime that it fought so gallantly and Nevertheless, at the beginning of The materials presented here as with immense sacrifice to topple. the Ethiopian Revolution in 1974, Mos- part of a collection of recently declas- My specific comments on these cow was slow to react to the overthrow sified documents from the former East- documents will focus on three major of imperial rule and the military take- ern bloc begin to shed invaluable light themes—Soviet influence on: (a) the over in Addis Ababa led by the Provi- on the intricacies and evolution of military regime; (b) the Ethio-Somali sional Military Administrative Council former Soviet, East German, and Cu- war and; (c) the Eritrean secessionist (PMAC) or Derg. This hesitancy might ban interpretations of and influence on movement. be explained by a legitimate Soviet re- the politics of the Horn of Africa be- luctance to antagonize Somalia, espe- tween 1977-1978. The word begin is I. Soviet relations with the PMAC cially in light of recent setbacks the emphasized because, at the same time, and Egypt, where Moscow had these documents are far from compre- Soviet interest in winning a posi- lost influence in spite of massive eco- hensive in that a number of very criti- tion of strength on the Horn of Africa nomic and military aid to these coun- cal events and developments during this dates from the 1960s. Probably, the tries. It must be remembered here that period find scant or no mention. Some major explanations are related to the Somalia had a territorial dispute with of these issues will be mentioned in this area’s strategic value. First, two impor- Ethiopia over the Ogaden and that the commentary. Nevertheless, reviewing tant international confrontations cut USSR, at this time, had already culti- these documents, it will be difficult in- across the Horn: the Arab-Israeli con- vated a strong presence in Somalia. deed to underplay the crucial signifi- flict, and the Sino-Soviet rivalry, whose That presence was cemented with Gen. cance of the East-West standoff which geographic expression involved the Mohammed Said Barre’s successful served as the context in which the whole area stretching from the Western military coup in October 1969 after former USSR and its allies compre- Pacific, to Southeast and South Asia, which he turned his country’s orienta- hended and attempted to shape the poli- and into the Indian Ocean littoral. Also, tion sharply toward Moscow, signing a tics of the region. Ultimately, this prism the Horn’s strategic location along East- Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and led to the gradual choice of cultivating West communication and transportation Cooperation in 1974. Under the treaty, close ties and rendering decisive sup- routes enables it to serve as a critical the Somali government was generously port to the military government in vantage point to command or interdict supplied with military aid and the So- Ethiopia beginning in 1976. In turn, this oil shipments from the Middle East and viets acquired access to the strategic choice molded that regime and guaran- elsewhere. Furthermore, in the post- port of Berbera. With all this at stake, teed its survival until 1991 when only colonial setting, newly liberated Afri- Moscow had reason to be prudent in the end of the Cold War and diminished can states had increasingly become tar- assessing the PMAC’s reliability before Soviet support coupled with the Eritrean gets for Marxist-Leninist ideological considering a new commitment. and Tigrean liberation front victories led expansion to alienate “Western imperi- The PMAC, on the other hand, had to its collapse. alist states.” As Soviet leader Leonid I. two serious problems of its own which The publication of these documents Brezhnev had once remarked, “Africa inhibited it from seeking an immediate should therefore serve as a valuable [had become] a main field of battle for embrace from Moscow. One was that stimulus for international scholarship on communism.”1 Moreover, in one of the initially it was unclear about its ideo- superpower involvement in Africa dur- documents published here, Cuba’s Fi- logical preference and international ori- ing the Cold War and also arouse schol- del Castro reinforces this idea in an entation. An illuminating account of ars on Ethiopia in particular to reexam- April 1977 meeting with his East Ger- this confusion is provided by Major ine and enrich conventional wisdom man counterpart, Erich Honecker, by Dawit Wolde Giorgis, a high ranking about the political history of the stating that “in Africa we can inflict a official of the military regime who later Mengistu era. Furthermore, the fact that severe defeat on the entire reactionary defected to the United States and wrote the country now has a completely dif- imperialist policy. We can free Africa a book. In it he stated that the PMAC ferent leadership which is not tainted from the influence of the USA and of was so “ignorant in the realm of ideol- with the atrocities of Mengistu and the the Chinese . . . Ethiopia has a great ogy that at one point in the early stage Derg means, at least theoretically, that revolutionary potential . . . So there is a of the revolution delegations were sent it will have nothing to lose by collabo- great counterweight to [Egyptian Presi- to Tanzania, Yugoslavia, China, and rating in international research efforts dent Anwar] Sadat’s betrayal in Egypt India to shop for one for Ethiopia.”2 It and releasing pertinent documents from . . . We must have an integrated strat- is important to note that the Soviet Ethiopian archives (unlike Angola for egy for the whole African continent.” Union was apparently not even consid- example). On the contrary, such a col- Thus, the Soviet Union along with its ered as a possible source of ideological COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 41 inspiration by the military rulers at an ation. With the help of the chief of the Ethiopian leadership prior to the coup early stage. palace security force commander, he which is implied between the lines of The other problem was that the essentially carried out a mafia-style one of the discussions of the CPSU Council engaged in three major succes- coup by simply ambushing and execut- Third African Department Report. This sive rounds of bloody power struggles ing the ringleaders of the restructuring refers to a late-1976 Cuban and South before Mengistu emerged as the uncon- who were unsuspectingly preparing for Yemeni initiative to provide mediation tested leader. In providing a very short a regular Council meeting in the palace in the Ethio-Somali dispute. The report account of these struggles, an important grounds. The following day he was mentions that the Somali government, point to underline at the outset is that “unanimously voted” chairman by the while not rejecting the proposal, had unlike some of the contenders he ulti- remaining PMAC members. spoken out in favor of including direct mately managed to annihilate, Mengistu The documents from the Commu- Soviet participation in the negotiations. had neither educational exposure to nor nist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Ethiopia, on the other hand, the report interest in communist ideology and/or and Socialist Unity Party of [East] Ger- notes, regarded the mediation initiative the Soviet Union prior to the PMAC’s many (SED) presented here begin with favorably, but “did not express an analo- formation. As he admitted in one inter- activities dating from early February gous wish” (about Soviet participation) view, his first encounter with Russians 1977. Notably, the first two documents, and thus the Cubans and Yemenis (on happened only after the revolution. Per- the memorandum of conversation be- their own) were taking diplomatic steps haps one of his phenomenal abilities lay tween Soviet Counselor-Minister in to organize mediation. Could this have in his capacity to understand quickly Ethiopia S. Sinitsin with the Political been a factor causing Soviet apprehen- and adopt new ideas when they served Counselor of the US Embassy in Ethio- sion about the Ethiopian leadership’s a useful purpose in his quest for power. pia Herbert Malin as well as the CPSU’s reliability prior to Mengistu’s consoli- The first round of weeding out op- Third African Department Report on dation of power? The answer at this ponents was carried out in November Somali-Ethiopian territorial disputes are point can only be conjecture. 1974 when Gen. Aman Andom, the first both dated February 2, i.e., one day be- The first from the PMAC chairman, along with a few fore Mengistu’s bloody coup. It will communist bloc to meet with Mengistu other members of the Council and more be recalled that at the time it was widely after his coup was Castro. He visited than 50 former high-ranking officials, reported that the USSR Ambassador to Addis Ababa on March 14-15, just a were summarily executed, shocking Ethiopia Anatolii Ratanov was the first little more than a month later. On March both Ethiopians and the international person to congratulate Mengistu imme- 16 he then flew across the Red Sea to community. The second round of ex- diately after the carnage, leading to Aden, South Yemen, to co-chair a joint ecutions occurred in July 1976. This speculation by some Western authors Cuban-Yemeni mediation effort to settle time the victims were active educated that the Soviets might have had a hand the Ethio-Somali dispute to which officers within the PMAC, like Major in the affair by providing intelligence Somali’s Barre as well as Mengistu Sisay Habte and Lieutenants Bewiketu support or, at least, had prior informa- were invited. It is not clear from the Kassa and Sileshi Beyene, who main- tion and might have provided tacit ap- documents whether this meeting had tained connections with radical ele- proval before the killings occurred.3 If been prearranged before the coup or ments among university students, teach- that were the case, certainly these docu- whether it was hastily scheduled after ers, and labor organizers and who were ments shed no light. In fact, the first it. Whatever the case, a few weeks later, instrumental in initially steering the document distinctly mentions the visit on 3 April, Castro went to East Berlin Council to the Left from its original of an Ethiopian delegation to Moscow to report about his African mission and nationalist orientation. A major restruc- in July 1976 and the resulting joint So- consult with the East German leader turing of the PMAC in December 1976, viet-Ethiopian communique as the pre- Erich Honecker. The transcript of that when its members voted to strip lude to closer ties between the two meeting presented here records Castro’s Mengistu of power and institute “col- countries after the Ethiopian revolution. vivid first impressions about Mengistu, lective leadership,” served as the pre- On the Ethiopian side, that delegation revealing the latter’s apparent success lude to the third and decisive round of was led by Mogus, one of the casual- in winning over both the heart and sup- killings. The architects of the restruc- ties of Mengistu’s coup. It seems the port of the Cuban leader in such a rela- turing included respected PMAC mem- Soviets would have been unlikely to tively short time. Castro spoke of bers like the nominal chairman who highlight this information had they Mengistu as a “quiet, honest, and con- succeeded Aman Andom: Gen. Teferi known about the impending events. Of vinced . . . revolutionary leader . . . an Banti, Maj. Alemayehu Haile and Capt. course, one can also argue that given intellectual personality who showed his Mogus Wolde Michael. Again, espe- that the Soviet Counselor-Minister was wisdom on February 3.” His massacre cially the last two, like those mentioned dealing with his American counterpart, is portrayed and condoned as “a turn- earlier, were important figures in intro- disinformation would have been the ing point in the development of the ducing socialism to the Council. How- order of the day. Ethiopian revolution when . . . a conse- ever, on 3 February 1977 Mengistu It might be valuable to point out a quential decision was made to meet the embarked on a sudden and swift retali- possible Soviet displeasure with the challenge by rightists” in the PMAC. 42 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

To the extent that the communist states alist positions. By contrast to him, with Beijing to the minimum and to shared information with each other and Berhanu Bayeh and Fikre Selassie as devise measures against Chinese ideo- with Moscow to devise and coordinate well as Legesse Asfaw and others are logical penetration in Ethiopia. That policy, as it is assumed they did, marked by although they same month, yet another conversation Castro’s account provided an excellent are faithful to him . . . I emphasize record, this time between Mengistu and report card for Mengistu. Furthermore, again, we have to apply maximum cau- Ratanov, reveals Soviet apprehension as it is known from other sources that tion, circumspection and tactfulness to- about the dissemination of anti-Soviet Castro later flew to Moscow to report ward Mengistu so that the nationalists (Maoist) literature in Addis Ababa. That on his trip, one may presume that he will not grasp him by the throat. September, the Ethiopian Foreign Min- presented the same glowing assessment ister Felleke Gedle Giorgis “especially of Mengistu to the Soviet leadership. According to the views of many dwelled on the Chinese position on the Mengistu also indulges in a diplo- Ethiopians, including former insiders in Ethiopian Revolution” in his talks with matic contribution to widen the emerg- the Mengistu regime such as Dawit Ratanov. Admitting to PRC economic ing rift between Somalia and the social- (cited above), nothing could be further aid at the initial stage of the revolution, ist states by discrediting the revolution- from the truth except for the remark on he noted the changing Chinese stand as ary potential of its leadership. In one loyalty. First of all, between February the revolution deepened (perhaps allud- record of conversation held on March and November 1977 Mengistu had con- ing to the forging of closer ties with the 18, his head of foreign affairs, Maj. solidated absolute power. Secondly, he USSR). China then began to render Berhanu Bayeh, quotes the Egyptian was raised and trained in the traditional comprehensive assistance to Somalia newspaper Al-Ahram to point out to Amharised Ethiopian military tradition during the military conflict. By Febru- Sinitsin the possibility of Somalia join- and therefore, by background, the most ary 1978, according to a joint report by ing Sudan, Egypt and Syria in a unified ardent nationalist of them all. After the the CPSU Third Africa Department and political command. He adds that Barre revolution he had repeatedly and suc- the Political Department of the GDR had been on record declaring that So- cessfully maneuvered between dressing Embassy in Moscow, the Soviets noted malia achieved its revolution indepen- up as an ideologue and as a nationalist (presumably with satisfaction) Beijing’s dently and can acquire help from other whenever each was politically expedi- hostile attitudes toward the Ethiopian countries besides the Soviet Union and ent. Mengistu evidently fostered this leadership as well as the minimal popu- its allies. Given the recent Soviet loss misperception apparently to bolster his lar support enjoyed by pro-Maoist of Egypt and Sudan, this information own image (as an internationalist) and, groups in the country. was probably intended to arouse at the same time, to limit demands and Another noteworthy issue dis- Moscow’s apprehension. pressures from the socialist community. cussed in three documents concerns Supporting his own professed com- Interestingly, Mengistu’s regime “Operation Torch”—an alleged impe- mitment to Marxism-Leninism and the repeatedly employed the “China card” rialist conspiracy spearheaded by the Soviet Union with practical deeds, at to attract Soviet support. In one docu- CIA to assassinate Ethiopian leaders the end of the following April Mengistu ment discussing Ethiopia’s desire to ac- and destabilize the revolution in Sep- ordered the closure of the U.S. commu- quire U.S.-manufactured arms from tember-October 1977 with the help of nications station in Asmara, the U.S. Vietnam with Soviet help, Berhanu regional forces hostile to the country. Information Service (USIS) center, and emphasizes that “in contrast to the past Again allegedly, Ethiopian authorities the American military assistance advi- the PMAC intends to consider this is- received a letter revealing the pending sory offices, and abrogated the Ethio- sue with the Vietnamese directly, rather plot from unknown sources in Africa U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agree- than running to the People’s Republic and then conveyed this threat to the ment—the official treaty of alliance of China [PRC] for mediation.” The ambassadors of the socialist countries. with the United States dating from reference to the past alluded to the left- A few days later, the Permanent Secre- 1953. It is also remarkable how ist elements of the Military Council who tary of the Foreign Ministry, Dawit Mengistu was apparently successful in were liquidated in the coup. In another Wolde Giorgis, visited the Soviet em- projecting himself to the Soviets as a conversation report, in July 1977, bassy and provided a copy of the letter genuine, pro-Soviet, revolutionary Cuba’s military specialist in Addis to Ratanov. Interestingly, Dawit men- leader constantly challenged by nation- Ababa, General Arnoldo Ochoa, con- tions this incident in his book.4 He alist elements within his own Council. veys to Soviet Ambassador Ratanov notes an unsuccessful attempt by the In one May 1978 conversation report, that Mengistu had personally assured Ethiopian government to verify the let- Rotislav Ulianovskii, an influential se- him about the decline in Ethiopian-Chi- ter through follow-up inquiries and de- nior Third World policy analyst in the nese relations following the PMAC’s scribes the great sense of panic and sus- CPSU, instructs his East German coun- finding that the PRC was providing picion it had created in the Foreign Of- terpart Friedel Trappen, arguing: military assistance to the Eritrean fice. Moreover, while he alludes to the People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). possibility that the letter may have been Mengistu deserves to be regarded by Mengistu, according to Ochoa, had ex- fabricated, he unfortunately does not us as a man who represents internation- plained the decision to limit all relations state a likely source. The mysterious COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 43 letter provides the names of two Ameri- because of Mengistu’s resistance, and Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen. can officials, alleged masterminds of the to the disappointment of the Soviets, the In his meeting with Honecker the fol- plot, with their ranks and positions at party didn’t come into existence until lowing month, Castro provides a de- the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. 1984. Two documents presented here tailed report about the attitudes of the If it is true, as Paul Henze asserts in this refer to Soviet anxiety about repeated two leaders, Mengistu and Barre, to- publication, that even the names are fic- delays from the Ethiopian side in ac- ward the proposal. Mengistu is referred titious, it is odd that the Ethiopian au- cepting the arrival of “a specially se- to in glowing terms while Barre is de- thorities convened a socialist ambassa- lected group of experienced CPSU scribed as a chauvinist whose principal dors’ meeting in panic instead of easily comrades” to help in the party forma- idea is nationalism, not socialism. The verifying through elementary diplo- tion process. One of them notes that report vividly shows Castro trapped as matic inquiry and concluding that it had “Mengistu apparently has no concept of a victim of his own ideology. Having been a fabrication. The theory of a cha- the cooperation with the advisers [and erroneously assumed an absolute con- rade—a make-believe drama enacted on that] it is necessary to convince him that nection between perceived global false information—will thus have to they could be a real help and relief.” trends—depicting socialism as the include the Ethiopians as well as So- Obviously, at this early stage in the world’s dynamic force—and the local viet authorities as actors if it is to be revolution, the Soviets did not realize situation in the Horn, he had expected considered a plausible explanation. that Mengistu was intentionally pre- a successful outcome to his efforts. His In addition, a few other documents venting Moscow’s infiltration into his sharp disappointment in Barre’s person- provide accounts of some early reser- power structure before completing a ality, on which the report dwells, should vations the Soviet Union and its allies prolonged process of weeding out po- have been subordinated to the more cru- had about Mengistu’s handling of cer- tential contenders and adversaries. cial realization that national and ethnic tain issues. It should be noted that in rivalries peculiar to the region had earlier Western writings, some of these II. Ethio-Somali War doomed the confederation from the out- reservations were usually associated set. Also in this document, the Cuban with a later period, after Gorbachev as- A substantial number of the docu- leader, perhaps for the first time, force- sumed power in Moscow in 1985. But ments presented here address the So- fully raised the impending dilemma fac- as early as December 1977, a conver- viet bloc’s involvement in the conflict. ing the Soviet bloc in the Horn of Af- sation between the East Germans and Indeed, for Moscow, Barre’s aggression rica. He tells Honecker, “I see a great Ratanov points toward the need for against Ethiopia, which began in early danger . . . if the socialist countries help Ethiopia to adopt a mixed economy 1977 under the guise of a Western So- Ethiopia, they will lose Siad Barre’s along the lines of the Soviet NEP (New mali Liberation Movement and which friendship. If they don’t, the Ethiopian Economic Program) of the 1920s. The escalated into full-scale intervention the revolution will founder.” Faced with leadership’s perception of the national following July, was both a welcome an either/or situation within six-eight bourgeoisie as an enemy of the revolu- event and a potentially dangerous de- months, Moscow bet on Ethiopia at the tion and the alienation and exclusion of velopment. On one hand, it provided risk of irretrievably losing Somalia. this group as well as of the liberal- the Soviets with the opportunity to rap- Another issue warranting mention minded functionaries of the state appa- idly penetrate Ethiopia, the prized state is a probable justification for the ratus from the economy and national life of the Horn, while, on the other hand, it Kremlin’s massive air- and sealift of is criticized as a dangerous trend with entailed a potentially painful risk of los- military equipment (worth about one negative consequences. In another con- ing another state where Moscow had billion dollars), 12,000 Cuban combat versation the following February, a cen- already built a presence: Somalia. The troops, and about 1500 Soviet military tral player in the CPSU’s Africa policy documents help in tracing Moscow’s advisers to Ethiopia in November-De- group, , expressed his policy in the region which began in cember 1977. This measure immedi- concern over extremes in the Ethiopian 1976 as a strategy of courting “Social- ately followed Somalia’s unilateral ab- Revolution—the mass executions of ist Ethiopia” without disturbing its rogation of the 1974 Treaty of Friend- prisoners and the government’s Red longstanding friendship with Somalia. ship and Cooperation with the USSR. Terror—directing the transmittal of By 1978 it had gone through a complete Why was such an overwhelming show these concerns to Mengistu using vari- somersault with the Soviet ejection of force necessary? Moscow’s appar- ous channels. from Mogadishu and its entrenchment ent objective in this spectacular move Finally in this section, the issue of in Addis Ababa after a massive supply was to guarantee the swift and decisive Moscow’s relentless prodding of of arms which decided the outcome of end of the Ethio-Somali war with a Mengistu to set up a Marxist-Leninist the conflict in favor of Ethiopia. My quick and unconditional withdrawal of vanguard party to institutionalize the comments, however, will only briefly Somali forces from Ethiopian territory. revolution as well as to transform the focus on three particular issues. Two documents, the joint memorandum country into a reliable Soviet ally is a One is on the 16 March 1977 Cu- of the CPSU Third Africa Department subject addressed by many authors and ban-Yemen effort at creating a Marx- and the Political Department of the the focus of my own study.5 Primarily ist-Leninist confederation consisting of GDR Embassy in Moscow, and the So- 44 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

viet Foreign Ministry/CPSU CC Inter- understanding of the Soviet dilemma: have any relations with the USSR, but national Department report on the So- rendering military assistance to Ethio- it went on record as advocating Alba- mali-Ethiopian conflict, shed light on a pia at the risk of losing its opportunity nian-style socialism, thus relations with probable motive: “to avoid a situation in Somalia. He also articulates Albania or China are not altogether in- analogous to the one in the Middle Ethiopia’s revolutionary indebtedness conceivable. The few documents pre- East”—where Sadat was taking his own and obligation to take Moscow’s inter- sented here shed some light on Soviet spectacular initiative in making an un- est in the region into account. The docu- and East German links with the EPLF precedented visit to Jerusalem—from ment doesn’t make clear whether he and its much smaller rival organization arising in the Horn. was responding to a Soviet request; but, in Eritrea—the Eritrean Liberation According to the documents, the particularly if he raised the issue on his Front (ELF)—in the context of the two Soviet Union wanted to avert at all costs own initiative, the fact he makes such socialist countries’ efforts at facilitat- the internationalization of the conflict an indirect commitment appears to have ing mediation with the Mengistu re- and the possible involvement of the UN been subtle and timely maneuver to at- gime. In particular, in 1978 the East Security Council which it believed tract Moscow toward Ethiopia. Germans had arranged two direct high- would be in the interest of Western pow- level talks between Mengistu’s repre- ers. Such an outcome, Moscow argued, III. The Eritrean Secessionists sentative, Berhanu Bayeh, and EPLF would be possible if an armistice were leader Issaias Afeworki, the results of reached without the withdrawal of So- An interesting paradox in the which were promptly communicated by mali troops from occupied Ethiopian Ethiopian revolution can be noted. With Honecker to Brezhnev. territory while Western powers simul- the exception of the Ethiopian Demo- What is clear from these docu- taneously pushed for Security Council cratic Union (EDU) (an entity associ- ments is the fact that the EPLF had ap- involvement. A takeover by the Secu- ated with the remnants of the Selassie parently maintained well-established rity Council, moreover, would delay a era), the other four major organizations contacts with the SED and Issaias talked resolution of the conflict in a similar which struggled to topple Mengistu’s directly with Honecker as a leader of a fashion as in the Middle East, possibly regime all ironically professed alle- revolutionary party. This level of con- increasing the danger for superpower giance to Marxism-Leninism, just like tact may well not have been to confrontation as the West and other un- their principal adversary. While two of Mengistu’s liking. On the other hand, friendly states demanded Soviet exit them, the Ethiopian People’s Revolu- Moscow apparently exhibited sensitiv- from the region as a precondition and tionary Party (EPRP) and the All Ethio- ity to the views in Addis Ababa in that blame it for causing the conflict. The pian Workers’ Movement (MEISON), the ELF and its leader Ahmed significance of this logic is better ap- all but perished during the violent con- Mohammed Nasser were less closely preciated when recalling Sadat’s dra- frontations of the late 1970s, the other linked with Moscow through the matic announcement in early Novem- two, the Eritrean People’s Liberation USSR’s Solidarity Committee. More- ber that he would visit Israel. It was a Front (EPLF) and the Tigrean People’s over, in one of the documents, move that crushed plans for multilat- Liberation Front (TPLF) ultimately suc- Ulianovskii rejects an East German pro- eral talks on the Middle East at Geneva ceeded in coordinating their efforts to posal that Issaias meet with him in and suddenly removed the Soviets from renounce Marxism after the late 1980s, Moscow so that the CPSU could exert a direct role in the Arab-Israeli peace dislodge Mengistu from power in 1991, pressure on the EPLF to compromise talks. In the face of such a setback, and establish two independent states— with Mengistu. Nevertheless, it is clear Moscow apparently showed its deter- Eritrea and the Federal Democratic that both Berlin and Moscow had ap- mination to anchor just at the other end Republic of Ethiopia—by 1993-1994. parently coordinated a concerted effort of the Red Sea from in a To what extent these various (pre- at finding a political solution to the desperate attempt to balance, in some viously?) revolutionary organizations Eritrean problem by pressuring both the degree, the loss of influence in Egypt had forged parallel relations with Mos- government of Mengistu as well as the by consolidating a strong presence in cow and other socialist countries re- rebel movements toward constructive the greater Middle East conflict zone. mains an interesting question to explore. dialogue. The results, however, had not The final issue of interest in this The EPRP claims to have established been encouraging. section addresses one of Mengistu’s contacts with the CPSU as early as In conclusion, the documents pre- first reactions about the possible Soviet 1972.6 MEISON had purportedly de- sented here are indeed important con- use of Ethiopian port facilities in the veloped links through associations with tributions to the study of the politics of likely event of the Somalia’s denying European Communist parties in the the Horn during 1977-1978 in the con- Moscow access to the port of Berbera. 1970s.7 Until the Ethiopian revolution, text of the Cold War. Their value is not He addresses this issue with Ratanov the EPLF had been openly assisted by so much in the amount of “new” infor- in a conversation dated 29 July 1977. countries like Cuba, possibly offering mation they present, although there is He, interestingly, doesn’t provide a clear indirect ties to Moscow. The TPLF, as some. Rather, they are priceless in pro- cut commitment to provide the USSR an organization founded after Ethiopia viding unique first-hand insight into the access to its ports. Instead he states an joined the Soviet orbit, probably didn’t perceptions and attitudes of the major COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 45

actors involved in the decisions that MOSCOW, MENGISTU, AND plicit references to this action in these shaped political outcomes. THE HORN: DIFFICULT documents, Soviet Ambassador Interestingly, the documents from CHOICES FOR THE KREMLIN Anatolii P. Ratanov was reliably re- the Russian archives appear to have ported at the time to have been the first been carefully selected to elide signifi- by Paul B. Henze to congratulate Mengistu after the spec- cant “blank spots” even on the issues tacular bloodbath in the Derg when sev- and period covered. By contrast, the The Russian and East German eral challengers of Mengistu, most no- former East German materials, though documents reproduced here constitute tably Head of State Teferi Bante, were limited in number, seem more insight- a useful contribution to the history of shot. As a result, Mengistu emerged ful in the concentrated details they pro- the Horn of Africa during the critical into the open as the dominant figure as vide on one issue in particular: the events of 1977-78. They provide in- Chairman of the Provisional Military Ethio-Eritrean high-level mediation. sights into the Soviet relationship with Administrative Council (PMAC), i.e. Nevertheless, within the two-year the authoritarian leaders of Ethiopia and the Derg. period covered in these documents there Somalia at that time, Chairman The documents provide useful in- are significant issues that find scant Mengistu Haile Mariam and President formation on the activities of Cuba as coverage. From the Soviet side these Mohammed Siad Barre, as well as into junior partner to the Soviets in Ethio- include materials pertaining to the motivations of these men and some pia during this period. A long near-ver- Moscow’s intelligence assessment and of their associates. batim report from the archives of the possible involvement during the Ethio- Both Mengistu and Siad Barre former German Democratic Republic of pian power struggle; relations with or- were stubborn and ambitious leaders a meeting between Fidel Castro and ganizations other than the PMAC; mili- who confronted the Kremlin with diffi- Erich Honecker on Castro’s return from tary reports from General Petrov and cult choices, which it tried to avoid for Africa in early April 1977 gives us vivid others in the Ogaden; and early mili- as long as possible. Siad comes across detail that confirms what has long been tary planning involvement in Eritrea. as a more blatant liar than Mengistu, generally known of Castro’s unsuccess- From the East German side, materials who appears to have been more genu- ful effort to mediate the developing related to its assistance in restructuring inely devoted to “socialism.” While Horn crisis in mid-March 1977. A sub- the Ethiopian security services would Siad seems totally mendacious and de- sequent briefing by Soviet Ambassador be of high interest. Beyond 1978, So- vious in his manipulation of the Sovi- Ratanov of Cuban Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa viet and other socialist countries’ in- ets, Mengistu is shown with his back to provides a remarkably frank, and not volvement in the Ethiopian vanguard the wall. He was determined to win entirely positive, appraisal of Ethiopia’s party formation process would, of Soviet support by vigorously profess- military and political predicament and course, be of critical importance. ing his loyalty to “socialism” and mak- performance as of mid-summer 1977. ing clear his readiness to serve Soviet The Soviet Union was remarkably 1 Cited in P. Margushin, “Sovetskii Soyuz aims throughout the Horn and in the uncreative in its efforts to deal with the v Afrike,” Novoe Russkoe Slovo, 4 October world at large. The documents occa- situation provoked by Siad Barre’s at- 1979. sionally reveal Soviet concern that tack on Ethiopia. Siad felt his way cau- 2 Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears: Fam- Mengistu and his Derg associates were tiously at first, operating behind a fa- ine, War, and Revolution in Ethiopia, (Tren- moving too fast, and these concerns cade of what he claimed were only guer- ton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1989), 21. were sometimes expressed to him. But rilla operations. But by July 1977, So- 3 Robert Patman, The Soviet Union in the as the Horn crisis developed, they be- malia was openly invading Ethiopia Horn of Africa (Cambridge, Eng.: Cam- came more concerned about preserving with regular military forces.1 Never- bridge University Press, 1990), 193; Rene Mengistu’s power than Siad’s. The rea- theless, Somali officials adhered to the Lefort, Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution? son, undoubtedly, is that Ethiopia was pretense well into 1978 that the opera- (London: Zed Press, 1983), 206. a much more important country than tion was entirely the initiative of guer- 4 Giorgis, Red Tears, 35-36. Somalia. The Soviets originally estab- rillas. Even though Soviet officials in 5 Ermias Abebe, “The Vanguard Party: Im- lished themselves in Somalia because both Somalia and Ethiopia had to be perial Instrument of Soviet-Third World they were unable to do so in Ethiopia. well aware of what was happening, Policy (1976-1986),” Ph.D. Dissertation, To those knowledgeable of the de- Moscow—on the surface at least—per- University of Maryland (College Park), tails of Ethiopian history during this sisted on the course adopted early in the 1994. period, enthusiastic Soviet references to year: trying to bring the Somalis and 6 See EPRP founding member Kiflu the “decisive action” Mengistu took on Ethiopians together to compose their Tadesse’s The Generation, (Silver Spring, 3 February 1977 are noteworthy. In differences. Long reports by Soviet MD: Independent Publishers, 1993), 98. spite of repeated protestations of peace- Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid 7 Bereket Habte Selassie, “Political Lead- ful desires, these references show that Ilychev of almost four weeks of meet- ership in Crisis: The Ethiopian Case” Horn Soviets had no reservations about ap- ings with a Somali delegation in Mos- of Africa 3:1 (Jan.-Mar. 1980), 7. proving violence as a means of settling cow from late July through the third differences. Though there are no ex- week of August chronicle an elaborate 46 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

charade of negotiations. Unfortunately to provide Ethiopia support to defend tensified. We get no comparative evalu- the documents available to us here do itself against Somalia, but details have ations of officials with whom the Sovi- not include parallel reports of dealings not been declassified. This, neverthe- ets were dealing in Mogadishu and with the Ethiopian delegation that was less, appears to be the point at which, Addis Ababa. in Moscow during the same period, but de facto, Moscow finally made an irre- The documents also lack any direct it appears that the Somalis and the vocable decision to opt for Ethiopia reference to intelligence. It is hard to Ethiopians never even engaged in pre- over Somalia. believe that Soviet officials did not re- liminary face-to-face talks. The reason Whether or not Ambassador ceive extensive KGB and GRU report- why is easy to see in written statements Ratanov agreed with Moscow’s contin- ing from agents in both Somalia and each delegation gave the Soviets of its ued insistence on further efforts to bring Ethiopia. There is, in fact, good reason country’s position, for neither left any the Somalis and Ethiopians together in to believe that the Soviets were re-in- room for compromise or even discus- negotiations at “the expert level,” he suring themselves during this period by sion with the other. followed Moscow’s orders and repeated maintaining contacts with political While the independence of erst- this position as late as 23 August 1977 groups opposed to Mengistu in Ethio- while French colony of Djibouti caused in a meeting with Cuban Ambassador pia as well as opponents of Siad Barre immediate worry, both Ethiopia and to Ethiopia Perez Novoa. The Soviets in Somalia. They, the East Germans, Somalia behaved with caution. Ratanov were even more hesitant on the ques- the Cubans, and perhaps other socialist did not react to an offer by Mengistu to tion of manpower, for the main purpose countries must also have had contacts support intervention in Djibouti. Ethio- of this meeting with the Cuban envoy among Eritrean factions. We do find pia lacked the strength to intervene was to chastise him for permitting Cu- tantalizing references to opposition to alone. ban Gen. Ochoa to promise Mengistu the Derg and to the strain under which The biggest problem looming in that more Cuban technicians would be Mengistu found himself as a result. At the background of the discussions re- coming: “The decision to send Cuban times the Soviets seem to be more ap- ported in these documents is Eritrea. It personnel to Ethiopia does not depend prehensive of Mengistu’s staying power was already the most intractable prob- on Havana, but on Moscow.” Ratanov than U.S. officials were at the time. lem of all for Moscow in its relations expressed the Soviet fear that a large- The final portion of Ratanov’s 18 with Mengistu. Ethiopian military per- scale introduction of Cubans into Ethio- March 1977 meeting with Berhanu formance in meeting the Somali inva- pia could provoke the Eritreans or So- Bayeh sheds indirect light on attitudes sion was inhibited by the predicament malis to call in troops from supportive among the Ethiopian public. Major which Mengistu had got himself into in Arab countries such as Egypt. Berhanu asks to have the Soviets ar- Eritrea. The Soviets were not impressed Taken as a whole, these Russian range for a scholarship for his younger with the performance of Mengistu’s documents seem to have been made brother to study in Moscow and ex- army in Eritrea. An East German docu- available to give a picture of a well-in- plains that the young man has been un- ment from December 1977 reveals what tentioned and relatively benign Soviet able to complete his work at a presti- appears to be Ambassador Ratanov’s Union confronted with a situation it gious Addis Ababa secondary school irritation at Mengistu’s intransigence on neither anticipated nor desired. The because, as the relative of a Derg mem- Eritrea as well as the hope that some- Soviets are shown to be surprised by ber, he became the object of harassment how a basis for negotiation with the the crisis, reluctant to choose between by other students. Even at this relatively rebel movement there might be devel- Ethiopia and Somalia, and trying to early stage of the Derg’s history, its oped. This became a major Soviet aim delay hard decisions as long as possible. popularity with the student population during the next decade and led to re- This does not fit with the general atmo- seems to have been quite low. peated East German efforts (and some sphere of Third World activism charac- Nevertheless, most of the basic Italian Communist attempts) to bring teristic of the Soviet Union at this time. questions about Soviet policies and cal- Eritrean and Ethiopian Marxists to- While there seems to be no reason to culations during 1977 which I identi- gether. question the authenticity of the docu- fied as still needing clarification in my In response to Mengistu’s urgent ments themselves, there are obviously discussion of this period in a 1991 pleading, the Soviets agreed during July large gaps in this documentation. We study3 remain open so far as these docu- 1977 to send in urgently needed trans- find nothing about differing views ments go. The Russian documents stop, port equipment to enable the Ethiopi- among Soviet officials or various ele- for the most part, at the point when hard ans to utilize some of the tanks and guns ments in the Soviet bureaucracy, nor Soviet decisions about action and the Soviets had already provided as a about different interpretations of devel- implementation began to be made: at result of agreements reached during opments between the Soviet establish- the end of September 1977. For ex- Mengistu’s December 1976 and May ments in Mogadishu2 and Addis Ababa. ample, they shed no light on how these 1977 visits to Moscow, but the Krem- We see no reflection of options and decisions were arrived at and carried lin was still apparently hoping to limit courses of action that must have been out, or how risks were assessed. The its commitment. Politburo minutes of discussed in the Soviet embassies in the massive airlift and sealift of Cuban 4 and 11 August 1977 confirm decisions Horn and in Moscow as the crisis in- troops and equipment that startled the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 47 world from November 1977 onward, or make them more amenable to Soviet EAST GERMANY AND THE the decision to send General V. Petrov manipulation. In its crudity, it is insult- HORN CRISIS: DOCUMENTS to Ethiopia to oversee operations ing to the intelligence of the Ethiopi- ON SED AFRIKAPOLITIK against the Somali forces, get scant ans. They did not take it seriously mention, as does Mengistu’s “closed” enough to bring it to the attention of the By Christian F. Ostermann or secret trip to Moscow in October United States toward which they were 1977 at which the imminent Soviet- showing some warmth at this very pe- The documents from the archives Cuban military effort was undoubtedly riod in hopes of getting previously or- of the former Socialist Unity Party of the chief topic of conversation. [Ed. dered military equipment and spare Germany (SED)—the Stiftung “Archiv note: Both are mentioned in passing in parts released. It is hard to believe that der Parteien und Massenorgan- the 3 April 1978 Soviet Foreign Minis- a seasoned and experienced officer such isationen der SED” im Bundesarchiv, try background report on Soviet-Ethio- as Ratanov was not engaging in a cha- Berlin—included in the selection of pian relations printed below; a gener- rade in reporting this grotesque scheme Russian and East German materials on ally-worded Soviet report to the East and discussions of it with senior Ethio- the Horn of Africa crisis in 1977-78 German leadership on Mengistu’s trip pian officials to Moscow.4 demonstrate the usefulness of is also included.] Likewise these docu- Limited as they are in what they multiarchival research for an under- ments are devoid of reference to the reveal of the debates and actions of standing of Soviet and Cuban policy. decision to shore up Ethiopian forces Soviet officials in Ethiopia, Somalia, Given the difficulties with access to the by transferring South Yemeni armored and Moscow in 1977-78, these Soviet- Soviet and Cuban archives, the formerly units to Ethiopia in late summer 1977 bloc documents are worth more detailed top-secret documents from the East to blunt the Somali advance. examination and analysis, a task which German Communist party archives, The most curious aspect of this I hope to undertake at greater length and among them high-level discussions be- batch of documents concern three that also encourage others to do. More such tween CPSU, SED and Cuban party op- deal with “Operation Torch”—an al- documents may eventually become eratives, help to understand Moscow’s leged American plot to assassinate available, as well as a potentially rich and Havana’s interests and actions, in Mengistu and attack Ethiopia from collection of Ethiopian materials from ways that usefully supplement and go Sudan and Kenya. Ethiopian leaders this period that has been assembled in beyond what is currently available from presented what they described as docu- Addis Ababa for use in the trial of those countries, in this regional flare- mentation of the plot to Soviet-bloc dip- former Derg officials (the future status up that become a superpower crisis. lomats in early September 1977, and of these documents is unclear, but it is The documents also provide new claimed that it was planned to be to be hoped that they will be made avail- insights into the East German role in launched on 1 October 1977. The text able to scholars). Access to these ma- the Cold War in Africa. By the mid- of the description of the plot, suppos- terials, as well as additional U.S. gov- 1970s, Africa had become an increas- edly conceived and directed out of the ernment documents still awaiting de- ingly important arena for GDR foreign U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, reads like a classification and still-inaccessible Cu- policy. Prior to the “wave of recogni- fourth-rate pulp thriller. Nothing in it, ban and other sources, may enable a far tion” following the Basic Treaty be- including the names of the American better understanding of the Horn of Af- tween East and in 1972, officers who were supposedly directing rica Crisis of 1977-78. East Berlin’s primary interest in Africa it, bears any relation to known or plau- was to enhance its international stand- sible facts. Perhaps the oddest feature 1 Though Siad told me on meeting with him in ing and prestige. The decolonization of “Operation Torch” is its lack of di- Mogadishu in September 1977 that Somalia had process seemed to offer plenty of op- no regular military personnel in Ethiopia, the rect connection with Somalia or with United States never took his claims seriously. portunities for the regime of SED first Eritrean rebels. Neither, so far as we can tell, did the Soviets. secretary to undermine If the Soviets actually took this “re- 2 Moscow had up to 4000 advisers in Somalia as and circumvent the “Hallstein doc- port” seriously, why did they not chal- of the beginning of 1977. There was also a siz- trine,” Bonn’s post-1955 policy to con- able Cuban presence in Somalia. lenge all the countries supposedly co- 3 Chapter 5, “Crisis and Degeneration”, pp. 133- sider the establishment of diplomatic operating in mounting it—Kenya, 167 in The Horn of Africa from War to Peace relation with the GDR by any third Sudan, and the United States? It bears (London/New York: Macmillan, 1991). country to be an “unfriendly act” to- 4 all the marks of a disinformation op- I served as the officer responsible for Horn af- wards the Federal Republic. Grounded fairs in the U.S. National Security Council dur- eration of the kind that the Soviets (of- ing this period. No scheme remotely resembling in the belief that the West German gov- ten through or Czechoslova- “Operation Torch” was ever considered by the ernment was the only government truly kia) frequently undertook during this U.S. Government. representative of the German nation, the period. Whatever specific purpose it “” effectively man- was designed to serve is unclear. One aged to deny the GDR international le- possibility is that it may have been in- gitimacy outside the Soviet bloc. tended to heighten the paranoia of East German efforts to subvert the Mengistu and his Derg colleagues and Hallstein doctrine in Africa by gaining 48 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

diplomatic recognition were only par- ported East Berlin’s claim to a to reassure the new leader of the Soviet tially successful. In the wake of the Sonderrolle (special role) within the so- bloc’s and, in particular, the GDR’s, 1956 , East Berlin managed cialist camp as Moscow’s most trusted continued interest in close relations. to get its foot in the door in Egypt, and perhaps most significant ally. At the Within weeks, a representative from the largely because of its outspoken con- same time, increased trade with Afri- GDR Ministry for State Security was demnation of West German support for can countries decreased the GDR’s de- sent to Addis Ababa to negotiate mili- Israel as well as its demonstrative soli- pendence on Soviet economic support tary (and intelligence) support (includ- darity with the Egyptian people in the and provided valuable foreign curren- ing the sending of East German mili- form of large long-term loans. Such cies and markets. Finally, the GDR’s tary cadres) for the Mengistu regime. overt support did not go unnoticed in increased presence on the African con- As the documents show, East Berlin’s Cairo. In the months after Suez, Egyp- tinent reflected a growing East German high hopes for Mengistu were soon tian President Gamel Abdul Nasser Sendungsbewusstsein (missionary zeal) crushed by his reluctance fully to adopt agreed to the establishment of an Egyp- among many SED officials who per- the Soviet model and in particular his tian trade mission in East Berlin. Shortly ceived the export of Soviet-style social- refusal to establish an avant-garde afterwards, the East German trade mis- ism to Africa to be a crucial element in Marxist-Leninist party. Given its pres- sion in Cairo was upgraded to a consu- the growth and eventual success of ence on the scene, and the missionary late-general. Under special plenipoten- world communism. zeal and the long-standing ties of its tiary Ernst Scholz, the mission soon East German leaders seized the emissaries, East Berlin was determined developed into East Berlin’s African opportunity for increased involvement to change Mengistu’s mind. Following headquarters for its quest for recogni- on the Horn of Africa when the end of several personal visits by Lamberz to tion. imperial rule in Ethiopia in 1974 threw Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian leader Despite increased East German the region into turmoil. Despite the suc- agreed to receive a SED Central Com- propaganda against the “imperialist” cess of the New Democratic Revolution mittee mission which would work to- Federal Republic in the 1960s, however, in Ethiopia in April 1976, Moscow’s wards the formation of a workers’ party. Ulbricht’s efforts continued to fall short position in Addis Ababa remained East Berlin’s efforts in socialist nation- of formal recognition, largely due to deeply troubled. To the south, Somalia’s building, however, proved futile. Fed up West German economic pressure and putatively socialist leader, Mohammed with Mengistu’s intransigence, his all- the threat of the Hallstein doctrine. Most Siad Barre, took advantage of encompassing preoccupation with the African leaders, even the ones rated Ethiopia’s weakness and seized the wars with Eritrea and Somalia, and the “progressive,” were indifferent to com- Ogaden region from Ethiopia. Despite PMAC’s suspicion against any rival or- plexities of the German question. Les its interest in the strategically important ganization, the East German mission querelles allemandes, however, persis- Somalia harbor of Berbera, Moscow left in November 1978 after a nine- tently plagued East Berlin’s relations grew increasingly uncertain and wary month stint in the Ethiopian capital.2 with African countries. Alhough Willy of its close relations with Siad Barre. The East German presence in the Brandt’s Neue freed the More significantly, Moscow’s long- region - and East Berlin’s longstanding GDR’s interlocutors from the fear of standing support of the Eritrean libera- ties with Siad Barre in particular - also West German political sanctions, any tion movements against Addis Ababa proved advantageous when Soviet re- rapprochement with East Berlin still now had to be balanced with its inter- lations with Somalia plummeted in the bore the risk of economic reprisals.1 est in the survival—and thus territorial course of the Somali-Ethiopian War Africa remained a field for com- integrity—of the Ethiopian Revolution, (1977-1978). Soviet military support of petition with the Federal Republic fol- led, until early 1977, by a military junta the Mengistu regime and Moscow’s in- lowing the diplomatic breakthrough of of uncertain ideological convictions. creasing suspicions regarding Siad the early 1970s, but with recognition Not until February 1977, when Lt.-Col. Barre’s collusion with the West exacer- widely secured, other aspects of the Mengistu Haile Mariam, the First bated tensions between the two coun- GDR’s African policy assumed greater Deputy Chairman of the Provisional tries, and in November 1977 Siad Barre importance. GDR political, ideological, Military Administrative Council, seized expelled Soviet and Cuban advisers and and military support for liberation the post of PMAC chairman, did Mos- abrogated the three-year old Treaty of movements and countries with a social- cow throw its full weight behind the Friendship and Cooperation with the ist orientation demonstrated to Moscow Ethiopian regime. USSR. By contrast, Somali-East Ger- and other East-bloc countries East The GDR’s embroilment in the cri- man relations initially remained stable, Germany’s growing importance and al- sis was to some extent the result of for- providing Moscow with an ongoing lowed the SED leadership to develop a tuitous circumstance. Walter Lamberz, channel of communication. As more distinct international profile, en- SED politburo member and Erich Honecker explained to Castro in April hancing both the regime’s international Honecker’s trouble shooter for Africa, 1977, “we are pursuing the goal of keep- and domestic legitimacy. Close cultural- happened to be in Addis Ababa on the ing up the dialogue with Siad Barre and ideological ties and economic-military eve of the coup which brought Mengistu tieing him to us as much as possible.” cooperation with African states sup- to power and was immediately on hand Nevertheless, GDR aid to Ethiopia soon COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 49 surpassed previous commitments to prove futile. Mengistu had no confi- 2 See the confidential “Memorandum of Conver- sation between Comrade Hermann Axen and the Somalia. dence in the talks with the Eritreans, and head of the SED Central Committee Working East Germany’s increased stature the “Cuban comrades have doubts as Group in Ethiopia, Comrade Herbert Graf, on 2 on the Horn was also reflected in the well,” Lamberz reported to Berlin.7 August 1978 in the CC Building,” Stiftung SED’s efforts to mediate between the Disaster struck in March 1978. “Archiv der Parteien und Massorganisationen der SED” im Bundesarchiv, Berlin (SAPMO- PMAC and the Eritrean liberation Lamberz, whose personal relationship BArch) DY 30 IV 2/2.035/127. movements. Preliminary talks with with Mengistu had made the talks pos- 3 East German drafts of the envisioned agreement Mengistu, held in late 1977, and with sible, died in a helicopter crash in Libya. can be found in SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV 2/ Siassi Aforki, general secretary of the The negotiations in March proved ever 2.035/127. See, e.g., Klaus Willerding (Dep. For- Revolutionary People’s Party of Eritrea more acrimonious. With the war with eign Minister) to Lambert, 30 January 1978, ibid. 4 “Memorandum on the Conversation between and deputy general secretary of the Somalia subsiding, the PMAC, by June, the General Secretary of the CC of the SED, Erich Eritrean People’s Liberation Front went on the offensive in Eritrea, rout- Honnecker, and the Delegation of the Provisional (EPLF), in January 1978, led to three ing the EPLF forces. The SED was, Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia sets of secret negotiations between the CPSU officials informed their SED (PMAC), headed by Berhanu Bayeh on 31 Janu- ary 1978, in the Residence of the Central Com- warring parties in East Berlin in Janu- counterparts, trying to “square the mittee,” Berlin, 31 January 1978, ibid. ary/February, March, and June 1978. circle” in Ethiopia. Once the PMAC 5 Both parties agreed to seek a peaceful solution Eager to avoid further Eritrean-Ethio- was on the offensive, the Soviets ad- of the conflict. “Information on the Conversa- pian confrontation that would only vised, “an attempt on our part to stop tions between the Representatives of the Provi- sional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) serve Western interests, the SED sought the Ethiopian leadership in its military of Socialist Ethiopia and the Eritrean People’s to engineer a peaceful and comprehen- course is a very delicate problem.”8 Liberation Front (EPLF) under participation of sive settlement that included Eritrean With interest in a political settlement representatives of the Socialist Unity Party of autonomy and Ethiopian territorial in- waning on all sides, the third round of Germany (SED) at the end of January/early Feb- ruary 1978 in Berlin,” Berlin, 6 February 1978, 3 tegrity. The fact that the PMAC and talks (10 June 1978) in Berlin was ibid. EPLF agreed to negotiations at all—the doomed to fail. The SED had to ac- 6 Memorandum, 23 March 1978, ibid. first since the conflict had erupted 17 knowledge that “the meeting reflected 7 Memorandum of Conversation between Com- years earlier—was in itself a remark- a further hardening of the positions and rade Lamberz and the Cuban Ambassador in Ethiopia, Comrade Pepe, on 3 March 1978 (based 9 able achievement. SED leaders spent mutually exclusive positions.” More on notes by Comrade Gen. Maj. Jaenicke),” 4 much energy and personal leverage in clearly than the second meeting, the March 1978, ibid. swaying both sides to the negotiating self-appointed SED mediators had to 8 “Memorandum of Conversation between Com- table, at one point causing Berhanu acknowledge, “it was evident that the rade Friedel Trappen and Comrade R.A. Uljanowski on Thursday, May 11, 1978, 11:00 Bayeh, a member of the PMAC Execu- PMAC has the intention to seek a mili- am to 1:30 pm in the CPSU Central Committee,” tive Committee to agree to meet Aforki tary solution.” According to an internal ibid. “since he, as we can tell, appeals to you SED report, Berhanu now considered 9 Information on the Third Meeting between the [the East Germans].”4 the “liberation of Eritrea, of course representatives of the PMAC of Socialist Ethio- pia and the EPLF in Presence of the delegate of 10 Getting both sides to negotiate in through force,” as the only option. the SED Central Committee on 10 June 1978 in Berlin was one thing, substantive The East Berlin negotiations on Eritrea Berlin, ibid.; on 10 June 1978 in Berlin, ibid. progress another. Despite a successful thus ended in failure. The “best result 10 Ibid. 11 first round,5 SED expectations soon so- of the meeting[s] was that the SED com- Memorandum by Hermann Graf on a 16 June 1978 Conversation with Valdez Vivo, 21 June bered. Mengistu remained more inter- rades are starting to give up on their il- 1978, ibid. ested in a military solution of the lusions,” one Cuban leader, somewhat Eritrean problem and proved unrespon- gloatingly, related Berhanu’s reaction to sive to East Germans calls to conceptu- the break-down of the Berlin talks.11 alize a political solution that would ac- Subsequent mediation efforts commodate Eritrean interests. The proved similarly futile, and the issue Eritreans, for their part, remained stead- was not resolved until 1991—when the fast in their desire for full independence, military defeat and overthrow of the unacceptable to both East Berlin and Mengistu regime allowed the Eritrean Addis Ababa. Following the second rebel forces to triumph and achieve na- round of talks in Berlin on 23 March tional independence, which was subse- 1978, “the opposing points of view re- quently ratified by popular referendum. mained unchanged,” the East German negotiators noted.6 1 For a good survey of the East-West German ri- East Berlin’s efforts to mediate be- valry in Africa see John Winrow, The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa (New York: Cam- tween the warring factions raised eye- bridge University Press, 1989), 54-120. See also brows, at least in Havana. As the Cu- Jude Howell, “The End of an Era: the Rise and ban ambassador in Ethiopia, Pepe, told Fall of G.D.R. Aid,” The Journal of Modern Af- Lamberz, the GDR’s efforts would rican Studies 32:2 (1994), 305-328. 50 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN RUSSIAN & EAST GERMAN DOCUMENTS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1977-78

of USA Embassy in Ethiopia of its partial reorganization in the end of ABBREVIATIONS USED HERBERT MALIN December [1976] with the aim of reinforc- IN THE DOCUMENTS ing “collective leadership” of the country, 2 February 1977 the opinion predominates in Addis Ababa APRF—Archive of the President of the that the policy of the PMAC will acquire a Russian Federation I met today with Malin in the USA “more moderate” character. However, to CC—Central Committee Embassy by preliminary arangement. The judge by the declarations of Teferi Banti, CPSU—Communist Party of the Soviet following points of interest were discussed. that has not occurred. Union Concerning the situation in Ethiopia, In sum, according to Malin’s opinion, ELF-RC—Eritrean Liberation Front (Revo- Malin noted the tension of the situation circumstances in Ethiopia will continue to lutionary Command) caused by the activation of forces opposed be complicated and tense for a long time to EPLF—Eritrean People’s Liberation Front to the Derg, especially in the northwestern come. EPRP—Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary region of the country which is siding with For his part, he noted that the deterio- Party the Sudan. He directed attention to the ration of existing circumstances in the coun- EDU—Ethiopian Democratic Union “harsh pronouncements” of the Chairman try is tied in significant part to the open in- FTAI—French Territory of the Afars and of the PMAC, Teferi Banti, of January 29 terference in the internal affairs of Ethiopia Issas, i.e. Djibouti and 30 of this year, addressed to the leaders by the community of Arab countries and MEISON—All-Ethiopia Socialist Move- of the Sudan and Somalia, who are pursu- other forces, who are aligned in hostility to ment ing an anti-Ethiopian policy, as well as to the policy of the PMAC and are supporting MFA—Ministry of Foreign Affairs his call for a union of “all progressive and forces opposed to it. He noted further that, OAU—Organization of African Unity patriotic forces” for the defense of “the revo- in the final analysis, what is at issue is not PDRY—People’s Democratic Republic of lution and the fatherland,” in this connec- merely Ethiopia itself, but the situation in Yemen, i.e. South Yemen tion not mentioning the anti-government the region as a whole, the efforts of certain PMAC—Provisional Military Administra- leftist organization “Ethiopian People’s Arab circles to establish complete control tive Council (of Ethiopia); the Derg Revolutionary Party” (EPRP). However, over the Red Sea, which constitutes an im- PRC—People’s Republic of China Malin feels that the EPRP will hardly agree portant international maritime route, and the SAPMO-BArchSA—Stiftung “Archiv der to support the call of Teferi Banti, due to its possible eruption here of a completely tense Parteien und Massenorgan-isationen der disagreement with the policy of the Derg. situation and even armed conflict. In this SED” im Bundesarchiv, Berlin At the same time, he continued, the connection the opinion of Malin on the con- SDR—Somali Democratic Republic opposition forces are not united and their dition of American-Ethiopian relations and SED—Socialist Unity Party of East Ger- joint opposition to the existing regime has a prospective development of circumstances many temporary and tactical character. Even if in the given region was of interest. SRSP—Somali Revolutionary Socialist the opposition forces should succeed in Malin said that until now the Ameri- Party overthrowing this regime, a struggle for can administration, owing to the presiden- TsKhSD—Center for the Storage of Con- power will erupt between them, especially tial elections, had not had an opportunity to temporary Documentation, Moscow between the pro-monarchy “Ethiopian involve itself to the extent warranted in the UAR—United Arab Republic; Egypt Democratic Union” and the “Ethiopian development of its policy in this region. UN—United Nations People’s Revolutionary Party” and other Since the change of regime in Ethiopia in UNGA—United Nations General Assembly leftist groups. The PMAC, in his opinion, 1974, American-Ethiopian relations have continues to be the only real common na- had a relatively complex and contentious Memorandum of Conversation between tional power in contemporary Ethiopia, al- character. The USA cannot ignore the peri- Soviet Counselor-Minister in Ethiopia though its policy does not enjoy support odic outbreaks of anti-American activity in S. Sinitsin with Political Counselor of among a significant portion of the popula- the country. Thus, on 27-28 January of this the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia tion. It is further undoubted that, despite year, in the course of anti-government dem- Herbert Malin, 2 February 1977 the declarations of the Sudanese and Soma- onstrations by young protesters in Addis lis, present day Ethiopia does not harbor “ag- Ababa, glass was broken and gas bombs From the diary of SECRET, Copy No. 2 gressive designs” in relation to its neighbors, were hurled at the department of the USIS S.Y. Sinitsin 4 February 1977 and in any event lacks the opportunity for [United States Information Service] build- Ser. No. 41 the same in view of its complex internal ing, in addition to which leaflets of the problems. “Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party” NOTES OF CONFERENCE Concerning circumstances in the Mili- were distributed. Similar bombs were with Advisor for Political Issues tary Council itself, after the implementation hurled at the building of the MAAG [Ameri- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 51 can Military Advisory Group]. In the course and is against the partition of Ethiopia. The in connection with the negative, as he un- of a demonstration of by a group organized USA, it is understood, is interested in the derstands it, attitude of Somalia toward the by the Military Council on 3 January in guarantee of stability in that region and free- prospective development of Soviet-Ethio- Addis Ababa in connection with the above- dom of navigation in the Red Sea. pian cooperation. noted pronouncements of Teferi Banti, anti- Responding to pertinent questions, he I told Malin that our traditionally American performances by an array of ora- said that the American-Ethiopian agreement friendly relations with Ethiopia have a ten- tors were also seen, along with anti-Ameri- of 1953 “on mutual security guarantees” dency to develop further, as evident from can placards and so forth, although official concerned the preferential supply of assis- the joint Soviet-Ethiopian communique of declarations, including those by Teferi Banti tance by the USA to the armed forces of 14 July 1976, resulting from the visit to himself, contained no such direct anti- Ethiopia and the guarantee of “certain Moscow of an Ethiopian state delegation; American missives. American interests,” first and foremost of the growth of Soviet technical assistance to At the same time, Malin continued, the which was the operation of the “center of Ethiopia (teachers in the University, doctors, Ethiopian government displays an interest communications” in Asmara, which was of etc.); the work here during the second half in continuing to receive various forms of great importance at the time (that center has of last year by Soviet economic experts, and assistance from the USA, especially mili- now been curtailed in significant part); but, so forth. It was pointed out that the con- tary assistance, and frequently talks about as he understands it, [the agreement] does tinuation of contacts between the two coun- the timetable for the delivery of military not call for the direct involvement of Ameri- tries at a high level would be the natural supplies and so forth. Prior to the change can armed forces in the defense of Ethiopia’s procedure under such conditions, although, of regime in Ethiopia, American military security, for example, in the case of aggres- however, that question had not come up in assistance was at an annual level of 10-12 sion against it or a threat to its territorial in- respect to a concrete plan. I said further that million American dollars and was adminis- tegrity. we are aware of the disagreements between tered preferentially on an uncompensated Concerning the present deterioration in Somalia and Ethiopia, and that our unwa- basis (deliveries of arms, ammunition, spare Ethiopian-Somali relations, as far as Malin vering position in that connection is to serve parts, etc.). In recent years, owing to the new knows, the USA has not undertaken any dip- as a motivation for both countries to move policy of the USA in the area of military lomatic steps toward its normalization or towards a peaceful resolution of these dis- cooperation with foreign governments, restraint of anti-Ethiopian actions by the agreements at the negotiating table, in or- American military assistance to Ethiopia has Arab countries, and in fact the Ethiopian der to prevent a deterioration of circum- been granted preferentially on commercial government itself has not raised the issue stances in this region. This relates as well terms, and it includes several types of more with the USA. to our position in connection with the cur- advanced armaments, in connection with One of the potential sources for an rent complication in Sudanese-Ethiopian re- which the value of the assistance has grown. eruption of a conflict in that region, in lations. As concerns the future of develop- Thus, the signing of a multi-year contract Malin’s opinion, is the independence of ments in Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation, it is in 1975 envisions the supply of armaments, Djibouti that has emerged this year, inas- understood that this cannot be directed spare parts and ammunition in the approxi- much as a serious disagreement exists be- against Somalia, with whom we are also mate sum of 250 million American dollars. tween Somalia and Ethiopia regarding the developing friendly relations, as the Somali Already in 1976 the USA supplied Ethiopia future policy of Djibouti. In recent months, leadership is well aware. with part of those arms, including several the Somalis have succeeded in reinforcing Malin asked, in my opinion, in what “Phantom” fighter planes. This year a sup- their political influence in Djibouti, and their spheres would the interests of the USA in ply of several additional fighter planes is ties with its present leaders, which has seri- Ethiopia not be counter to the interests of contemplated, as well as supplies for the ously worried the Ethiopians. It is evident, the Soviet Union. Ethiopian navy, and radar defenses. as well, that after its declaration of indepen- I replied, that in my view, these spheres Malin noted further that the new Ethio- dence, Djibouti will enter the League of would first and foremost encompass the pian administration is pursuing a policy of Arab Nations, both in political and economic conduct of a policy of respect for the sover- seeking methods of receiving military as- respects, inasmuch as the position of eignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia; sistance from other sources as well, possi- Djibouti will be complicated following the noninterference in its internal affairs; a re- bly on terms more advantages to it, includ- departure of the French. An array of Arab alistic approach to the social-economic and ing from the USSR (he is aware of the visit nations has already established consulates political transformations taking place in the by the Ethiopian military delegation to Mos- there. The USA also intends to do this prior country by the will of the people; the build- cow in December of 1976), as well as the to the declaration of independence, having ing of peace and security and a halt to the PRC [People’s Republic of China], although requested appropriate permission from the growth of tensions and conflicts between the he doubts that the Chinese are capable of government of France. countries of that region; and adherence to supplying Ethiopia with “serious arma- In the course of the discussion, Malin the principle of unrestricted navigation in ments.” expressed interest in the state of Soviet- the Red Sea, in accordance with recognized The USA, Malin emphasized, does not Ethiopian relations, having come upon ru- standards of international law and the inter- oppose the “socialist choice” of new Ethio- mors concerning the upcoming visit to the ests of peaceful relations in general. pia and, as before, firmly supports the prin- USSR of First Deputy Chairman of the Thanking me for the conference, Malin cipal of respect for its territorial integrity, PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam, and also expressed a desire for continuation of fur- 52 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

ther contacts and exchanges of opinions re- dents broke out (in the regions of Washen, of Djibouti to quick and unconditional in- garding the questions discussed, as to which, Bongol, Dolo, and others) which were dependence, and also contained an appeal for his part, he stated his agreement. smoothed over by peaceful means. to all states to “desist from any claims what- The tension in relations between Ethio- ever on that territory and declare null and COUNSELOR-MINISTER TO THE pia and Somalia many times attracted the void any actions in support of such claims.” USSR EMBASSY IN ETHIOPIA attention of the Organization of African Both Ethiopia and Somalia voted for that /s/ S. SINITSIN Unity. However, efforts to find a mutually resolution. acceptable solution to the territorial argu- At the same time the government of [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll. ment between Ethiopia and Somalia within the SDR does not hide its hopes that once 28-33; translated by Bruce McDonald.] the framework of the OAU so far have having become independent the population yielded no result. of Djibouti will come out in favor of unifi- Third African Department, Soviet At the session of the OAU Assembly cation with Somalia. This was displayed, Foreign Ministry, Information Report which took place in Addis Ababa in Janu- in particular, at the XIII Assembly of the on Somali-Ethiopian Territorial ary 1976, two meetings took place, at Siad OAU (July 1976), where the Somali repre- Disputes, 2 February 1977 Barre’s initiative, between him and the chair- sentatives did not support the demand of man of the PMAC of Ethiopia, during which Ethiopia for a joint declaration to repudiate SOMALIA’S TERRITORIAL the question of bilateral relations was raised. territorial claims, asserting that the sover- DISAGREEMENTS WITH ETHIOPIA The leaders of both countries asserted that eignty of Djibouti should not depend on AND THE POSITION OF THE USSR the exchange of opinions was productive, “threats of police actions from the power- (Brief Information Sheet) and expressed the intention to continue the guarantors.” In December 1976, President dialogue. Practical steps in this direction, Siad, in a communication to the heads of Somalia claims a significant part of however, were not undertaken. African states, declared even more precisely Ethiopian territory (the Ogaden region) on The Somali leaders, though they stress that “if the goal of these guarantees will the basis of the fact that a large number of that the issue must be resolved by peaceful force Somalia to reject our blood ties, the Somalis live there (around 1 million people). means, as in the past do not repudiate the common history and culture which tie us Ethiopia totally rejects the territorial demand about the unification of the Ogaden with the people of Djibouti, then we declare, claims of the SDR, basing its position on with Somalia. According to available in- that is impossible.” the fact that the borders with Somalia were formation, the Somalis continue their activ- Nonetheless, Somalia, just like Ethio- set by international agreements, particularly ity in the Ogaden, throwing their armed de- pia, voted for the resolution of the XXXI the Agreement on the demilitarization of the tachments in there under the command of session of the UN GA of 23 November Ethiopia-Somalia border, which was signed line officers. 1976, on Djibouti, which once again af- in 1908 between Ethiopia and Italy. They The new Ethiopian leadership, refus- firmed the right of the people of that terri- also refer to the resolution of the OAU ing to discuss the territorial issue, expresses tory to independence. Representatives of which was accepted in Cairo in 1964, which readiness to conduct negotiations on the both countries to the UN declared that their says that all African states must recognize demilitarization of the existing border and governments will recognize, respect, and the borders which existed at the moment speaks out in favor of the development of observe the independence, sovereignty, and when they were granted independence. economic, cultural, and other relations with territorial integrity of Djibouti after it re- The tension in relations with Somalia the SDR. ceives independence. led imperial Ethiopia to draw close to Kenya Relations between the two countries However, in the course of the discus- (the Somalis did not decline either from are becoming more complex also because sion at the UN General Assembly session, demanding the unification with Somalia of of Djibouti - a French territory of Afars and the speeches of the Somalia and Ethiopia the Northern border region of Kenya, which Issa (FTAI), to which France intends to grant delegations showed that, as in the past, se- is populated by Somalis) on an anti-Somali independence this year. For Ethiopia this rious disagreements remain between these basis. In 1963 there was a Treaty on joint territory represents a vital interest in view countries about the ways to resolve the defense signed between the two countries. of the fact that Djibouti is the terminus of Djibouti problem. They showed particularly At the beginning of 1964 a direct mili- the railway from Addis Ababa, by way of on the issue of the return to the territory of tary confrontation broke out between Ethio- which the basic part of Ethiopia’s foreign political refugees. The Ethiopians accused pia and Somalia, although the conflict was trade freight is carried. The Somalis, for the Somalis of intending to send to Djibouti soon settled through the mediation of the their part, consider the FTAI, or, as they call their own citizens, disguised as refugees, so OAU. The Soviet government also called that territory, “French Somalia,” one of five as to ensure as a consequence its joining with on both sides with an appeal to quickly cease parts of “Greater Somalia,” in view of the the SDR. fire and to resolve all disputed issues in a fact that its population to a significant ex- The position of the Somali leadership peaceful way. tent consists of tribes which are related to regarding Eritrea also leaves a negative im- During 1970-71 a series of Ethiopia- the Somalis. print on Somalia-Ethiopia relations. Pro- Somalia negotiations were conducted which At the XXX session of the UN GA, a viding support to Eritrean separatists, So- ended without result. At the end of 1972- resolution was accepted in which was as- malia, to all appearances, is counting on the beginning of 1973 a series of border inci- serted the unconditional right of the people fact that the separation of Eritrea from Ethio- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 53 pia will lead to a split of the multinational eral relations. In this regard each of them is Ethiopian state, which will facilitate the uni- counting on the Soviet Union to support Third African Department fication of the Ogaden territory with Soma- precisely their position, using for this its MFA USSR lia. authority and friendly relations with the The Somali government recently has opposing side. [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1632, ll. activated its propaganda against Ethiopia In January 1976, Siad Barre informed 39-44; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff; and its activity in the international arena, the Soviet government of [Somalia’s] inten- note revisions to this document added in late with the goal of enlisting support for its po- tion to enter into negotiations with the Ethio- May-early June, printed below.] sition vis-a-vis the new Ethiopian regime, pian leadership about the creation of a Fed- which, as it believes, is conducting in rela- eration of Somalia and Ethiopia. In this re- Memorandum of Conversation between tion to Somalis the former imperial “colo- gard the President requested the Soviet side Soviet Ambassador in Ethiopia nial policy.” This point of view was ex- to join the negotiations as a mediator. Inso- A.P. Ratanov and Cuban Ambassador pressed by the vice president of the SDR far as the goal and character of a federation, in Ethiopia Jose Peres Novoa, [Gen. Mohamed Ali] Samantar during his as well as the possible position of Ethiopia, 10 February 1977 visit last year to a number of European so- were not clear, it was decided to avoid de- cialist countries and to Cuba. However, in fining our attitude to this initiative and me- TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2 no instance did it meet with understanding. diation on this issue. In November 1976 From the diary of “30” March 1977 Somalia is also taking certain steps in Arab Siad Barre expressed the wish that the So- RATANOV, A.P. Issue No. 129 countries so as to receive support for its viet side would report to the Ethiopian lead- claims to Ogaden and Djibouti. In this re- ership about the wish of the SDR to begin a RECORD OF CONVERSATION gard the Somalis point to the fact that the peaceful dialogue with Ethiopia on the dis- With the Ambassador of Cuba in Ethiopia joining of Djibouti to the “Arab world” puted issues which they have. This wish JOSE PERES NOVOA (SDR is a member of the Arab League) was brought to the attention of the Chair- 10 February 1977 promises it not insignificant benefits in re- man of the Committee of the PMAC for alizing plans to turn the Red Sea into an political and foreign affairs through the So- During a conversation which took “Arab lake.” viet Embassy in Addis Ababa. place in the Soviet Embassy, Jose Peres Arab reaction supports and heats up the At the end of 1976 the Cubans and Novoa reported that on 8 February he had aspirations of the Somalis, with the goal of South Yemenis came out with an initiative visited Mengistu Haile Mariam at the latter’s putting pressure on the progressive Ethio- to provide mediatory services towards a request. pian leadership. President of Somalia Siad settlement of Somalia-Ethiopia relations. Mengistu requested that the Ambassa- intends in the beginning of 1977 to com- The Somali government, not rejecting this dor pass on to Fidel Castro a verbal mes- plete a trip to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the proposal, spoke out in favor of the Soviet sage in which the PMAC requests Cuba to United Arab Emirates, Sudan and several Union as well participating directly in the provide assistance to the Ethiopian People’s other Arab countries. As he left in January mediation. The Ethiopian side, regarding Militia via deliveries of small arms. In this 1977 for Khartoum to prepare for this visit, the mediation initiative favorably, did not regard Mengistu declared that the Ameri- Member of the Politburo of the CC of the express an analogous wish. Cuba and the cans had already refused to provide spare Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party PDRY through diplomatic channels are tak- parts for tanks, [and] had suspended deliv- [Ahmed] Suleiman [Abdullah] public ex- ing certain steps to organize meetings be- eries of spare parts for all kinds of weap- pressed himself in vulgar anti-Ethiopian tween the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia. ons, and that the PMAC expects the USA, thrusts. Suleiman openly spoke out in sup- The position of the Soviet Union on after the events of 3 February to apply even port of the Eritrean separatists, and also in the question of the Ethiopia-Somalia terri- harsher sanctions against Ethiopia. At the favor of a proposal to move the headquar- torial dispute, which many times has been same time the USA is providing military ters of the OAU from Addis Ababa to an- brought to the attention of the governments assistance to Sudan, [and] Kenya, and is other capital, a proposal for which Sudan of both countries, is that Ethiopia and the encouraging officials of the these and other and several African countries with a pro- SDR must take all possible measures to countries to act against the Ethiopian re- Western orientation recently expressed sup- settle their disagreements by means of ne- gime. port. gotiations and to find a way to lessen the The PMAC, reported Mengistu, in- Beginning in the 1960s, in almost ev- tension in Ethiopia-Somalia relations. tends to follow Cuba’s example of creating ery instance of a serious aggravation of The friendly advice of the USSR gov- in factories and agencies, and in villages, Ethiopia-Somalia relations, Ethiopia and ernment, aimed at a settlement of Ethiopia- committees for defense of the revolution, Somalia have appealed to the Soviet gov- Somalia relations, has been favorably ac- which will act in close contact with detach- ernment with a request to assert influence cepted by the governments of both coun- ments of the people’s militia, which are on the government of the other country with tries. In responses to our appeals both Ethio- formed under the supervision of urban and the goal of normalizing the situation. Re- pia and Somalia have announced their readi- rural associations. However, the effective- cently, both Somalia and Ethiopia have re- ness to resolve all disputed issues by means ness of these measures will depend on peatedly called for more active participation of negotiations and not to allow the unleash- whether the PMAC has available and at its by the Soviet Union in settling their bilat- ing of a new armed conflict. disposal the necessary quantity of weapons. 54 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

lutionary Socialist Party (SRSP). The del- pia and characterized the Ethiopian leaders USSR AMBASSADOR IN ETHIOPIA egation comprised: CC Member Kurt Tidke, as chauvinists, and as connected to Zionist /s/ A. RATANOV Candidate-Member of the CC Eberhard forces. Progressive forces in Ethiopia, in- Heidrich, Deputy Chief of the CC Section cluding Marxist-Leninists, are persecuted [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, l. Freidel Trappen. and destroyed. 85; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff.] In accordance with its instructions, the In the course of further conversation, delegation conveyed from the Secretary in particular after the statement setting forth Soviet Embassy in East Germany, General of the CC SED Erich Honecker to our position regarding the necessity of Report for CPSU CC Summarizing the Secretary General of the SRSP and to reaching agreement between progressive Visit to Somalia on 31 January-1 the President of the Democratic Republic forces in Somalia and Ethiopia, and of the February 1977 by Delegation of the of Somalia, Mohammed Siad Barre, a mes- inadmissibility of any possibility that the GDR Socialist Unity Party (SED) CC, sage in response to the letter from Barre imperialists should profit from the discord 18 February 1977 dated 24 November 1976, and concluded an between the two states, Barre declared that agreement on collaboration between the he was prepared to study seriously any USSR EMBASSY IN SED and the SRSP for 1977-78. proposition of the Ethiopian leadership, in GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC The delegation received Mohammed particular, from Mengistu. (Attachment 1). SECRET, Copy no. 1 Siad Barre, with whom they engaged in a [not printed—ed.] (During the meeting be- 18 February 1977 detailed discussion. tween members of the Somali party and state Werner Lamberz conveyed greetings leadership and the delegation, at which am- TO THE SECRETARY OF THE from the Secretary General of the CC SED bassadors of the socialist countries were also CC CPSU comrade B. N. PONOMAREV and Chairman of the State Council of the present, the Soviet ambassador to GDR, Eric Honecker, and conveyed some Mogadishu informed me that at the end of We send to your attention according to explanations regarding his message. At the January [1977] comrade Brezhnev had like- classified procedures this report concerning same time he stated the SED position with wise sent a message to Siad Barre, contain- the trip to Somalia, Mozambique, and Ethio- regard to the progressive development in So- ing an urgent request that Barre reconsider pia (January 31 - February 11 of this year) malia and reported on the decisions of our the Somali position with regard to Ethiopia by a delegation from the German Demo- party leadership, which were made as a re- and that they avoid any exacerbation of the cratic Republic, headed by Politburo mem- sult of the discussions of comrade [GDR conflict.) ber, Secretary of the CC SED, comrade W. Vice President Willi] Stoph in Somalia with During the discussion of the project for Lamberz. comrade Samantar in the GDR. It was de- a party agreement proposed by the SED, at clared that the SED will now and in the fu- first clarity was achieved with regard to the ATTACHMENT: above-mentioned docu- ture, to the extent of its abilities, offer sup- notion that the central content of such an ment of 41 pages, secret. port to the Republic of Somalia. At the same agreement should be cooperation in the po- time, particular attention was drawn to the litical-ideological area and that cooperation USSR AMBASSADOR TO concurrence of the party. between our parties comprises the nucleus GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC Mohammed Siad Barre expressed his of all relations between our states and thanks for the message from Eric Honecker peoples. However, the SRSP delegation, /s/ P. ABRASIMOV and expressed his gratitude for the GDR’s headed by Politburo Member Ahmed manifestation of solidarity with the anti- Suleiman Abdullah, came forward with a [attachment] imperialist liberation struggle. Somalia con- request which greatly exceeds the ability of siders the help, which has been offered by the SED (to build five fully equipped re- SECRET, Copy no. 1 the SSNM brigade in the preparation of spe- gional Party schools, to equip 82 regional Attachment to no. 122 cialists, to be particularly useful. Siad Barre Party committees with radio technology and 18 February 1977 in detail elucidated the internal situation in supply with typographical machines, to ac- Translated from German Somalia and, at the same time, particularly cept an exceedingly large number of stu- underscored the difficulties in realizing the dents for study at SED institutes of higher REPORT party program. education, etc.), with which it was not pos- concerning a trip to the Democratic In connection with the statement by sible to agree. In spite of these unrealistic Republic of Somali by a delegation from Werner Lamberz concerning relations be- requests, we succeeded in concluding an the CC SED from tween the SDR and Ethiopia, Barre first and agreement which is realistic and which rep- 31 January-1 February 1977 foremost affirmed the necessity of reaching resents significant assistance and support for a peaceful settlement of the problem with the Somali Party (Attachment II).[not From 31 January to 1 February a del- Ethiopia. However, at the same time, it was printed—ed.] egation from the CC SED, headed by Polit- notable that his position on this question was It was strikingly apparent that, both buro member, Secretary of the CC, Werner contradictory and not free of nationalist fea- during the time when our delegation toured Lamberz visited Mogadishu at the invita- tures. He expressed doubt about the revo- around the city and during the negotiations tion of the leadership of the Somali Revo- lutionary nature of development in Ethio- on a Party agreement, mention was made COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 55 repeatedly of the assistance and support viet Union, as we understand it, the Presi- SDR was not going to start a war with Ethio- which Somalia receives from China. dent said, is trying to help Ethiopia stabi- pia over the Ogaden, stressed the President. According to various [sources of] in- lize on the road of socialist orientation, and Such a conflict would be detrimental to both formation, apart from a strongly progressive those goals of the Soviet Union completely countries. Only imperialists and the Arab re- core in the Somali leadership, there is also coincide with Somali interests. The SDR has actionaries would win in such a case. We a pro-China force which leans to the side of an interest in having a socialist, not a capi- understand this very well, said Siad. How- reactionary Arab states. (Last year Somalia talist, neighbor. ever, we will support the struggle for unifi- was accepted into the Arab League as its Characterizing Chairman of the PMAC cation with the Fatherland of the Somalis youngest member.) H.M. Mengistu, President Siad called him living in the Ogaden, emphasized the Presi- /s/ comr. R. A. Ulianovskii a firm and consistent proponent of the pro- dent. He said that the people living in the gressive change in Ethiopia. However, ac- Ogaden were their brothers and sisters, and [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 77, d. 1618, ll. 1- cording to Siad, Mengistu does not abide that his leadership could not reject them if 5.] by Leninist principles in the nationality is- they appeal to them for help. The people of sue. He must give the nations living in Somalia would not understand its leaders if Memorandum of Conversation between Ogaden, including both the Eritreans and the they were to suppress their struggle for lib- Soviet Ambassador to Somalia G.V. Somalis, the right to self-determination. eration from the Ethiopian colonial yoke. Samsonov and Somali President Siad According to the President, it is important I explained to Siad the CPSU policy Barre, 23 February 1977 that Mengistu resolves the territorial prob- on the nationality issue. lem right now, or at least gives assurances Responding to my question concern- EMBASSY OF THE USSR IN THE that he is ready to consider this question ing Somali-American contacts, the President DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF positively in the future. Siad alleged that the told me about his meeting with USA repre- SOMALIA struggle for power in the Ethiopian leader- sentative at the UN [Andrew] Young in Zan- ship was still going on, and that there were zibar in early February 1977. He mentioned From the journal of Secret. Copy No. 2 no positive changes in the state apparatus that the meeting was held at the American G.V. SAMSONOV Orig. No. 101 of that country. The President thinks that initiative. According to Siad, Young in- 11 March 1977 Mengistu is unwilling to meet with him. He formed him about the “new approach” of mentioned the fact that the Chairman of the the Carter Administration in their policy to- NOTES FROM CONVERSATION PMAC did not give an immediate response ward Africa, and stressed the USA readiness with President of the Democratic Republic to the [Tanzania President Julius] Nyerere to cooperate with all African countries. Siad of Somalia letter, which was delivered to Addis Ababa Barre said to Young that the peoples of Af- MOHAMMED SIAD BARRE by Vice President [Aboud] Jumbe of Tan- rica will judge the “new” American policy zania, and in which, according to Siad, the by the practical actions of the American 23 February 1977 idea of his meeting with Mengistu was put administration. First of all, the United States forth. must withdraw its support for the white mi- Today I was received by President Responding to the Soviet remarks con- nority regimes in South Africa. Respond- Siad. cerning statements of certain Somali states- ing to Young’s question, why the SDR was In accordance with my orders I in- men in Sudan, President Siad alleged that always acting from an anti-American posi- formed him about the considerations of the member of the Politburo CC SRSP Suleiman tion, Siad said that it was the United States Soviet leaders, and Comrade Brezhnev per- had only expressed an opinion on the situa- that was always conducting a vicious anti- sonally, concerning the situation develop- tion in Ethiopia, and that Minister of Public Somali policy. The SDR decisively con- ing around Ethiopia. Health Rabile God was just giving his per- demned the USA position on the Middle The President thanked me for the in- sonal views, and that his statement was, al- East, and also the support that the USA gave formation. Then he pointed out that certain legedly, provoked by the Sudanese. The to various reactionary forces in their struggle people in the SDR, encouraged from abroad, main threat to Ethiopia was arising from against progressive regimes, and the foment- speculated that Soviet cooperation with Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kenya, not ing of military conflicts in various regions Ethiopia was allegedly carried out to the from the SDR, emphasized the President. of the globe. detriment of Soviet-Somali relations. Ac- According to a reliable source, Siad said, The President told me that recently a cording to Siad, he had to condemn such a the internal reaction, represented by the representative of the USA State Department point of view in his speech at the Khalan Ethiopian Democratic Union headquartered visited Mogadishu, arriving from Khartoum. Military School in particular, he had to say in London and supported by the CIA, was He had a meeting with General Director that such statements should be considered carefully preparing a broad terrorist cam- Abdurrahman Jama Barre of the MFA of the anti-Somali propaganda aimed at subversion paign against the leadership of the PMAC SDR. The American requested to have meet- of the Somali revolution. The President and against other progressive Ethiopian ings with several Somali state leaders of his emphasized that the assistance that the So- leaders. Siad denied the information that choice, including First Vice President viet Union and other socialist countries pro- special units trained in the Somali territory, Samantar. His request was denied. Accord- vide for the Ethiopian revolution was not which also included Somali servicemen, ing to the President, the American left the only justified, but also necessary. The So- were being transferred to the Ogaden. The SDR dissatisfied. 56 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Touching upon his initiative for coop- According to the President, he gave direc- pia, called Ethiopia a “colonial power,” and eration between the USSR and the SDR, the tives to certain Somali organizations to pre- declared that Somalia will continue its cur- President repeated the suggestion he made pare official requests on the questions just rent policy in relation to Ethiopia, “while earlier (17 January 1977) that the Soviet mentioned. all Somalians have not received freedom.” Union take on the development of the lands President Siad expressed his warm Siad Barre displayed disrespect to Mengistu of the Fanole project. According to the Presi- gratitude to the CC CPSU for the decision Haile Mariam, crudely saying that that he dent, Somalia had neither the necessary ex- to provide assistance in construction of the allegedly is carrying out the same policy as perts, nor technology, nor resources, and that party school at the Central Committee of the had Haile Selassie. The Somali leader also it would be incorrect to invite other coun- SRSP. He said he considered that assistance declared that if Ethiopia considers itself a tries to carry out those tasks. Siad said that a show of fraternal care from the CPSU for socialist state, then it must rapidly transfer the provision about development of those the SRSP which was undergoing a difficult the Ogaden to the SDR. As the basis of a lands had not been included in the original formative period. He also thanked Moscow settlement of the Ethiopian-Somali disagree- agreement on Fanole project construction for the attention to the request for more So- ment, Siad Barre suggested the creation of only because of the incompetence of the So- mali citizens, especially for people from a confederation of the two countries on an mali representatives who signed that docu- Djibouti, to be given an opportunity to study “ethnic basis,” i.e., with the preliminary ment. in the Soviet Union, and for the decision to transfer by Ethiopia of the Ogaden to The President also reminded me of his satisfy the request in the 1977-78 academic Somalia’s benefit. This proposal was re- request concerning construction of a naval year. jected not only by Mengistu Haile Mariam, base in the region of Mogadishu, and also but Fidel Castro and Rubayi also expressed of docks in Berbera and Kismayu, which AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR themselves against such an approach, which was stated in the memorandum delivered to IN THE SDR /G. SAMSONOV/ served as grounds for disrespectful state- Moscow by First Vice President Samantar. ments to them by Siad Barre. Those projects are still in force and the So- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1621, ll. In the words of Berhanu Bayeh, in the mali leadership is expecting the Soviet gov- 10-14; translation by S. Savranskaya.] course of the meeting Siad Barre declared ernment to examine them favorably. that if the socialist countries want to split Speaking about the military airfield in Memorandum of Conversation between with Somalia, that is their affair: the Soma- Berbera which had been opened recently, Soviet Acting Charge d’affaires in lian people carried out its revolution with- Siad said that it had been built without tak- Ethiopia S. Sinitsin and Ethiopian out outside help and “if the socialist coun- ing into account the prospects of its possible official Maj. Berhanu Bayeh, tries will not help the Somalis, then reac- civilian utilization. This airfield should serve 18 March 1977 tionary countries can help them.” not only the interests of the USSR, but the At the meeting Mengistu Haile Mariam interests of the SDR also. In order for this TOP SECRET Copy No. 2 stressed the necessity of a consolidation of airfield to be used by civil aviation in the From the journal of 30 March 1977 progressive forces in this region so as to future, it would be necessary additionally SINITSIN, S.Ia. Issue No. 124 oppose jointly the maneuvers of reaction and to build a control tower for air traffic con- imperialism. In this regard, he underlined trollers, a room for transit passengers, other RECORD OF CONVERSATION that no genuine revolution can successfully necessary services of a modern airport, and with the member of the Permanent develop without the support of other pro- also a hotel for 200-300 rooms in the city, Committee of the PMAC gressive, especially socialist, states. in which the Soviet air crews and naval Major BERHANU BAYEH Despite such results of the meeting, crews could also stay. Those additional con- 18 March 1977 Berhanu Bayeh said, the Ethiopian leader- structions would serve as a kind of cover ship believes that the meeting brought an for the military airfield. This evening I visited Berhanu Bayeh indisputable diplomatic success to Ethiopia, Having given a high evaluation of the in the office of the PMAC at his request. insofar as it visibly and in the presence of Soviet assistance in the organization of fish- Referring to an instruction of the lead- the leaders of Cuba and the PDRY revealed ing cooperatives, President Siad made a re- ership of the PMAC, he informed me for the true position of Somalia not only towards quest that the Soviet side provide resources transmission to Moscow of the following. Ethiopia, but also in regard to the general in the form of commodity credits to cover I. The meeting in Aden which took tasks of the struggle with imperialism and the local expenses in those cooperatives, place March 16 between Mengistu Haile reaction. In the opinion of Berhanu Bayeh, since the SDR was experiencing shortages Mariam and Siad Barre, with the participa- which, he said, is expressed also by the Cu- not only of material, but also of financial tion of [Cuban President] Fidel Castro and ban comrades, Siad Barre had taken such resources for those projects. Specifically, the [People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen an uncompromising position at the meeting Somali leadership was asking the Soviet President] Rubayi [Ali], ended without re- with Mengistu Haile Mariam, that he appar- Union to take responsibility for providing sult in view of the position which Siad Barre ently had previously secured promises of the minimum living standard for the fami- took at the meeting. support from reactionary Arab states. lies of transfer workers in the cooperatives, As Berhanu Bayeh said, the President 2. In the evaluation of the leadership and to apportion up to 10 shillings per of the SDR in arrogant terms expressed of the PMAC, Berhanu Bayeh continued, worker per day, mentioned the President. Somalia’s territorial claims against Ethio- in light of the results of the Aden meeting it COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 57 is possible to assume a sharp activization of particularly underlining the significance of possible. The level of his education — 12th anti-Ethiopia activity by Somalia in close the early deliveries of Soviet arms. (graduating) grade of high school[;] how- cooperation with reactionary Arab states. In the words of Berhanu Bayeh, at the ever, because he currently is not able to at- According to information which the PMAC present time the PMAC is confronted with tend classes (he studies at home with a received from Mogadishu, the President of the critical issue of the uninterrupted sup- teacher) and take the examinations, he evi- Sudan [Ja’afar Mohammed al-]Nimeiry ply to the Ethiopian Army of ammunition dently will not manage to receive an offi- should arrive in Somalia in a few days. In and spare parts for weapons which it pos- cial certificate for finishing high school (he this regard the PMAC pointed to a report in sesses. The Americans are procrastinating studies in the Wingate school, where until the Egyptian newspaper “Al Ahram” to the on previously-agreed deliveries, and also de- recently instruction was led by teachers from effect that in current conditions the possi- liveries of weapons on a commercial basis, England). bility is created that Somalia with join the referring in this regard to a required review I told Berhanu Bayeh that I would bring political command of Sudan, Egypt, and of certain contracts in view of an increase his wish and thoughts regarding his brother Syria. It is also well known, said Berhanu in prices for these or some other types of to the attention of the Soviet ambassador. Bayeh, that Saudi Arabia is continuing to weapons. The leadership of the PMAC, as On a personal plane, I noted that resolving seek an end to Somalia’s cooperation with in the past, is counting on the Soviet Union that issue would require consultation with the Soviet Union, including in the military to provide Ethiopia with the necessary var- the appropriate Soviet agencies. area, promising in exchange to provide So- ied military assistance, but it understands malia with the necessary assistance. that time will be required to master Soviet MINISTER-COUNSELOR OF THE The leadership of the PMAC also is on military equipment. Therefore, the PMAC USSR EMBASSY IN ETHIOPIA guard about the intensified infiltration in the is now urgently seeking out the possibility /S. SINITSYN/ Ogaden by Somali armed groups, which of receiving weapons, ammunition, and moreover now include regular Somali troops spare parts of American manufacture, inso- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll. disguised in civilian dress, armed with mod- far as the Ethiopian Army for now is armed 93-97; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff.] ern weapons. This, observed Berhanu by the USA. Bayeh, has determined the extremely stub- To this end, said Berhanu Bayeh, the Report from CPSU CC to SED CC, born nature of recent armed conflict in the PMAC in the coming days will send its own Results of N.V. Podgorny’s Visit to regions of Harar and Jijiga, as a result of delegation to the Socialist Republic of Viet- Africa, late March 1977 (excerpts) which the Somalis managed to put out of nam, which has at its disposal significant action several armored vehicles of the Ethio- reserves of American trophy weapons. In Strictly confidential pian Army. On 17 March, a Somali Air this regard Berhanu Bayeh in the name of Force MiG fighter plane completed a pro- the PMAC leadership expressed a wish that On the results of an official visit of N.V. vocative flight over Ethiopian territory in the Soviet side will convince the Vietnam- PODGORNY to Tanzania, Zambia, the region of Jijiga. ese comrades to provide, according to their Mozambique, and also of an unofficial In light of all this, Berhanu Bayeh capabilities, the necessary assistance in visit to Somalia and a meeting with the reguested that a PMAC request be sent to American arms, either on a grant basis or leaders of the national-liberation organiza- the Soviet government to take all possible on a combined grant and commericial ba- tions of the South of Africa that took place measures to restrain Somalia from anti- sis. In this regard he noted that in contrast in Lusaka on 28 March [1977] Ethiopia actions. The PMAC does not ex- to the past the PMAC intends to consider clude the possibility that Somalia at the this issue with the Vietnamese directly, [Received on 19 April 1977] present time may be preparing a serious rather than running to the PRC for media- armed provocation against Ethiopia, and tion. For my part, I promised to send During the negotiations between N.V. therefore would be grateful for any infor- through channels the wishes and requests Podgorny and the leaders of the mentioned mation about that which it could receive which had been expressed by Berhanu countries they discussed issues of bilateral from the Soviet side. Bayeh. relations and relevant international issues. From my own side I pointed out to At the end of the conversation Berhanu The main results of the visit were covered Berhanu Bayeh the need in this situation for Bayeh made a personal request that his in published communiques, as well as in Ethiopia to display fortitude. Further, I un- brother Abraham Bayeh (19 years old) be joint declarations. In addition, we would like derlined the principled line of the Soviet accepted into one of the educational insti- to inform You in a confidential manner about Union of all-round support for the Ethio- tutions of the Soviet Union. Counter-revo- the following.... pian revolution and our diplomatic steps in lutionaries, including among the student During the talks they discussed the issues this regard which were taken recently in population, threaten his brother with reprisal of the situation in the African Horn with re- states which border on Ethiopia. for familial relations with the “fascist junta,” gard to the aggravation of Ethiopian-Somali Berhanu Bayeh said that Ethiopia does because of which Abraham cannot go to relations. The presidents, particularly not intend to aggravate its relations with school and must hide at another brother’s Nyerere and [Mozambican President Somalia or to toughen its own position. house (Fisseha Bayeh, jurist). In these cir- Samora] Machel, voiced their concern at the With satisfaction he noted the support of the cumstances it would be desirable if Abraham growing enmity between the two progres- Soviet Union for the Ethiopian revolution, Bayeh could be sent to the USSR as soon as sive countries and expressed regrets regard- 58 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

ing the unfriendly position of the Somali and translated from Russian by V. Zubok.] and the imperialist countries. Samantar is leadership towards the “revolutionary re- losing influence. Everything seems to indi- gime” in Ethiopia. In the opinion of Nyerere, Transcript of Meeting between East cate that he is being driven into a corner by for the foreseeable future one cannot expect German leader Erich Honecker and the right. the establishment of a friendly relationship Cuban leader Fidel Castro, East Berlin, My first evening I wanted to clarify my between Somalia and Ethiopia. The maxi- 3 April 1977 (excerpts) thoughts about Siad Barre and the Somali mum one can achieve is to avoid an open revolution. No serious political discussion clash between Ethiopia and Somalia, by per- Minutes of the conversation between Com- took place at this dinner; [Siad] Barre ex- suading both sides of the need to maintain rade Erich Honecker and Comrade Fidel plained to me the evolution of the Somali mutual restraint. Nyerere and Machel said Castro, Sunday, 3 April 1977 between 11:00 revolution. The next day, we had an exten- that satisfaction of the territorial demands and 13:30 and 15:45 and 18:00, House of sive sight-seeing program. We went to a of Somalia would automatically result in the the Central Committee, Berlin. Cuban-built militia training center, an agri- collapse of the progressive regime in Ethio- cultural school, a school for nomad children, pia. All three leaders evaluated very highly Participants: Comrades Hermann Axen, etc. We were taken around for hours, al- the position of the Soviet Union and agreed Werner Lamberz, Paul Verner, Paul though we had not yet had a political dis- with our opinion that progressive states must Markowski (with Comrades Edgar Fries and cussion, and a mass demonstration had been more actively come out in support of the Karlheinz Mobus as interpreters), Carlos scheduled at noon in the stadium. I under- Ethiopian revolution and advocate the nor- Rafael Rodriguez, Osmany Cienfuegos, stood that they wanted to avoid such a con- malization of Ethiopian-Somali relations.... Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes versation prior to the demonstration. As the The main topic of conversation [of Comrade Erich Honecker warmly wel- demonstration began, Siad Barre and I had Podgorny] with Siad Barre was the issue of comed Comrade Fidel Castro and the Cu- still not had a private conversation, and be- the relationship between Somalia and Ethio- ban Comrades accompanying him to this in- cause of this I was very careful. Siad Barre pia, and also the situation emerging in this ternal conversation on behalf of the Central was very arrogant and severe; maybe he region of Africa in connection with activi- Committee. wanted to intimidate us. ties of reactionary Arab forces. Exchange We are very pleased about your visit In my speech to the mass meeting I of opinions revealed that the Somali leader- to the GDR and the opportunity to exchange talked about imperialist policy in the Middle ship adheres to its old positions regarding views about the result of your visit to sev- East, the reactionary role of Saudi Arabia, its territorial demands on Ethiopia. Siad eral African and Arabian countries. On be- and the actions of other reactionary pow- Barre justified this stand [by referring] to half of the Politburo I want to repeat that ers. I did this even though I knew that there the pressure of internal nationalistic circles we consider your visit to these countries as was a considerable trend in the country in of Somalia. important. I ask Comrade Fidel Castro to favor of closer relations with these coun- At the same time Siad Barre did not deny take the floor. tries. I talked about the PLO’s struggle, the that there were progressive developments in [first 16 pages omitted--ed.] Ethiopian revolution, and the Libyan revo- Ethiopia. He distanced himself from reac- Statements by Comrade Fidel Castro: lution, and of progressive Algeria that they tionary leaders of Arab countries: Sudan, [...] Before my departure from Aden we dis- want to isolate. I talked about Mozambique, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, who sought to liqui- cussed with the PDRY leadership the need and only at the end about how imperialism date the progressive regime in Ethiopia. Siad to do everything possible to arrive at an un- is doing everything to reverse the progres- called the President of the UAR [Anwar] derstanding between Somalia and Ethiopia. sive order in Somalia. Siad Barre introduced Sadat a convinced adherent of , a I was well received in Somalia. I had asked me to participants of the mass meeting with- reactionary, anti-Soviet schemer. In the them not to have any public demonstrations. out saying a political word. opinion of Siad, Nimeiry is a man without Siad Barre was very friendly during our first Before the mass meeting they had principles who fell under the influence of dinner. Prior to my arrival, I had received played half of a soccer game. It is unknown Sadat [and] the leadership of Saudi Arabia, his reply to a letter of mine regarding the whether the soccer game was simply an ap- as well as the Americans and the British. question of relations between Somalia and pendage to the demonstration or vice versa. Siad declared that Somalia, now as be- Ethiopia. I had also sent an envoy to Soma- My speech went against the right wing ten- fore, seeks to expand cooperation with the lia for discussions with Vice President dencies and supported the left wing. We USSR. He said that he deems it advisable Samantar and Interior Minister Suleiman. observed that almost all of the Central Com- to hold a meeting with Mengistu with the Samantar held to leftist positions, while mittee members applauded, with the excep- mediation of the USSR and underscored that Suleiman was a representative of the right tion of Suleiman and his people. Samantar only the Soviet Union which possesses great wing. The discussion of our representative was very satisfied, and even Siad Barre authority and experience could help Soma- with him was very severe. I had already seemed content. Nevertheless, the mass lia and Ethiopia to work out “a formula of received considerable information in the meeting was not broadcast live on radio or honor” that would allow both countries to PDRY regarding the situation in Somalia. TV. find a road to reconciliation without losing The power and influence of the rightist Only that evening did we begin to dis- face.... group continue to increase. The Interior cuss specific problems, at my residence. It Minister, Suleiman, is doing everything pos- was clear to me that we had to be careful [Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202 584; obtained sible to bring Somalia closer to Saudi Arabia because surely the interior minister had in- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 59 stalled bugs. This same evening Siad Barre for 500 years. nial times. I have made up my mind about finally talked about Ethiopia. He compared Mengistu strikes me as a quiet, seri- Siad Barre, he is above all a chauvinist. it to the Tsarist Empire and said that Ethio- ous, and sincere leader who is aware of the is the most important factor in pia was the only surviving colonial power. power of the masses. He is an intellectual him. Socialism is just an outer shell that is Thanks to Lenin’s wisdom, the Tsarist Em- personality who showed his wisdom on 3 supposed to make him more attractive. He pire had disappeared, but it lived on in Ethio- February. The rightists wanted to do away has received weapons from the socialist pia. He had proposed to the Ethiopians, with the leftists on 3 February. The prelude countries and his socialist doctrine is [only] some time ago, to establish a federation or to this was an exuberant speech by the Ethio- for the masses. The Party is there only to even a unification of the two countries. pian president in favor of nationalism. support his personal power. Ethiopia had not reacted then, but was now Mengistu preempted this coup. He called the In his case there is a bizarre symbiosis itself proposing this solution. He spoke very meeting of the Revolutionary Council one of rule by military men who went through enthusiastically about his efforts to reach a hour early and had the rightist leaders ar- the school of colonialism and social appear- solution with Ethiopia. I used the occasion rested and shot. A very consequential deci- ances. Something about socialism appeals to tell Siad Barre that I would travel to Ethio- sion was taken on 3 February in Ethiopia. to him, but overall there is still a lot of in- pia the next day and asked him if he would The political landscape of the country equality and unfairness in the country. His be willing to meet with Mengistu. He changed, which has enabled them to take principal ideas are nationalism and chauvin- agreed. steps that were impossible before then. Be- ism, not socialism. The next day I flew on to Ethiopia. We fore it was only possible to support the left- His goal is old fashioned politics: had earlier agreed that there would be no ist forces indirectly, now we can do so with- sweet, friendly words. Siad Barre speaks like great reception for me, since at the time they out any constraints. a wise man; only he speaks. He is different were still fighting the civil war. Shots con- I asked Mengistu whether he was will- from the many political leaders that I know. stantly rang out. Mengistu took me to the ing to meet with Siad Barre in Aden. We [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat, [Alge- old Imperial Palace and the negotiations agreed. After concluding my talks I flew on rian President Houari] Boumedienne, began on the spot. I found the information to Aden. [Mozambique President Samora] Machel, that I already had to be confirmed. We con- Siad Barre had arrived in Aden that [Angolan President Agostinho] Neto and tinued our negotiations on the following day. morning. Mengistu did not arrive until the many others are strong characters. They can Naturally we had to take extensive security afternoon. I had a conversation with Siad also listen and do not take a dogmatic atti- precautions. The Ethiopians had come up Barre in which he bared his claws. He told tude. One can speak with them. Siad Barre with a division, and I had brought a com- me that if Mengistu was a real revolution- really thinks that he is at the summit of wis- pany of Cuban soldiers with me. The day of ary he should do as Lenin, and withdraw dom. Until now everything has gone my arrival there were rumors of a coup. It from his territory. Siad Barre took a very smoothly for him. The Italians and the Brit- did not happen. hard position. I asked him whether he felt ish made him a general. The revolution was I developed the impression that there that there had been no real revolution in accomplished in a minute, with hardly a shot was a real revolution taking place in Ethio- Ethiopia and that Mengistu was not a real fired. He put on a socialist face and got eco- pia. In this former feudal empire, lands were leftist leader. He told me that there had been nomic aid and weapons from the Soviet being distributed to the peasants. Each no revolution in Ethiopia. While in Union. His country is important strategi- farmer got 10 hectares. There were also re- Mogadishu he had shown me a map of cally, and he likes prestige. Barre is very forms in the cities. It was established that Greater Somalia in which half of Ethiopia convinced of himself. His socialist rhetoric each citizen could only own one house. Plots had been annexed. is unbearable. He is the greatest socialist; were made available for housing construc- After my talk with Siad Barre, I told he cannot say ten words without mention- tion. Mengistu about Barre’s attitude, and asked ing socialism. There is also a strong mass movement. him to remain calm. I already felt bad about With this tone he began to speak in the In the capital, 500,000 people can be rap- having invited Mengistu to Aden while there meeting with Mengistu. He began giving a idly mobilized. In February, our study del- was still a powder keg situation back in his lecture on Ethiopia and demanded from egation, after inspecting the army divisions, country and that in such a tense situation he Mengistu to do as Lenin had done: do away had determined that of the hundreds of gen- was to hear out the Somalis’ territorial de- with the . Mengistu re- erals, all but two should be chased out. The mands. mained quiet; he said that Ethiopia was officers and NCOs have taken over the lead- With regards to my question about the ready and willing to find a solution and that ership of the country. Currently, the leader- situation of the Ethiopian army, Mengistu there needed to be the first concrete steps ship is considering creating a Party. There said that there were still difficulties but that on both sides to achieve a rapprochement. is a harsh class struggle against the feudalists he didn’t think that there was an acute dan- Siad Barre theatrically responded that in the country. The petit bourgeois powers ger of a coup. he was disappointed with Mengistu and that are mobilizing against the Revolution. A When the meeting started, Siad Barre he displayed the same attitude as the Ethio- strong separatist movement exists in Eritrea. immediately began speaking. Siad Barre is pian Emperor. The Ethiopian revolutionary Threats are coming from the Sudan, while a general who was educated under colonial- leadership had the same mentality as Haile Somalia claims 50% of Ethiopia’s territory. ism. The revolution in Somalia is led by gen- Selassie. The meeting had begun at 11 PM There have been border clashes in this area erals who all became powerful under colo- and a solution was not in sight. 60 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

[Cuban Vice President] Carlos Rafael small, would be termed by Siad Barre as a had no intention of cutting itself off from Rodriguez then proposed the establishment betrayal. the Somali Revolution, rather, we supported of a standing commission with representa- 3. In what kind of a situation would it. The whole meeting ended without any tives from Ethiopia, Somalia and the PDRY this put the PDRY, about to support Ethio- results. to find ways to a solution. All the other par- pia with tanks, trucks and artillery with the If we now give our aid to Ethiopia, Siad ticipants drafted us against our will into this help of a Soviet ship? Barre will have no moral right to accuse us commission. In addition, Siad Barre had not only of betrayal, etc. I told him very clearly that Siad Barre carried on with his great been insulting, he was resorting to subtle there was a revolution in Ethiopia and that wise man act, as the great Socialist, the great threats. At a certain point he said that one we had to help it. Marxist. At the same time he spoke dema- could not know where all of this could lead. In any case I had detected during my gogically as only one member of the “col- Because of this, I spoke up. I explained meetings with Siad Barre a certain irritation lective leadership” with a mandate from the that Siad Barre did not believe that there had on his part with the Soviet Union. He was Politburo and the need to consult with them been a real revolution in Ethiopia, that the agitated that the Soviet Union was not de- on all matters. After a brief recess for con- events of 3 February had totally answered livering spare parts or tractors and that oil sultations with his delegation he proposed this question and that Mengistu was a revo- came too late from the Soviet Union, in spite direct talks between Mengistu and himself. lutionary leader. I went on to say that we of repeated promises. The Soviet ambassa- Mengistu, who had already become considered the events in Ethiopia as a revo- dor has explained the state of affairs to us. more insulted and mistrustful during Siad lution, that the events of 3 February were a The Somalis were repeatedly changing their Barre’s previous statements, said that he was turning point, and that Mengistu is the leader minds about their requests, which had de- willing to do so, but not at this time. First of a profound transformation. I declared that layed the matter. In addition, unfortunately the question of the commission had to be we could not possibly agree with Siad the Soviet oil tanker had sunk on its way to resolved. Barre’s position. I said that Siad Barre’s Somalia. We continued the meeting at 3.15 in position represented a danger to the revolu- As I told Siad Barre this, he called the the morning. Siad Barre had prepared the tion in Somalia, endangered the revolution Soviets liars. He said this was not the posi- text of an agreement in which the idea of in Ethiopia, and that as a result there was a tion of the Soviet politburo, but rather the the commission was accepted but which di- danger of isolating the PDRY. In particular result of sabotage by bureaucrats. His irri- rected that its main purpose should be to I emphasized that Siad Barre’s policies were tation and criticism of the Soviet Union also solve the outstanding territorial questions aiding the right wing in Somalia itself in its showed in other cases. He went on to say between Somalia and Ethiopia. The com- efforts against socialism, and to deliver So- that there was not enough drinkable water mission would thus take this approach from malia into the arms of Saudi Arabia and Im- in his country and that cattle were dying, the start. How were the Ethiopians supposed perialism. the bananas were ripening too late, all be- to react to such a provocative proposal? I said that these policies were weaken- cause the pumps provided by the Soviets did During the break I had spoken with ing Somalia’s relations with the socialist not work. Mengistu, who did not hide his rejection of countries and would have to lead to the col- Because of this attitude of Siad Barre I Siad Barre. I also spoke with Siad Barre and lapse of the revolution in Somalia. I ap- see a great danger. That is why I considered asked him whether he was really interested pealed to Siad Barre’s and the entire Somali it appropriate to give you my impressions in finding a solution. He said that Mengistu leadership’s sense of historical responsibil- truthfully, without euphemisms. would have to answer that. He went on with ity. I said that I did not think that this would I wanted to discuss my point of view his revolutionary rhetoric, about how real come to a war between Somalia and Ethio- frankly. The socialist countries are faced socialists, revolutionaries, and Marxists pia but that I was worried, since war would with a problem. If they help Ethiopia, they could not deny realities. He said that be a very serious thing. I do not believe that will lose Siad Barre’s friendship. If they do Mengistu was in fact a drastic man, one who there are people who would provoke a war not, the Ethiopian Revolution will founder. has taken drastic measures: why could he between the peoples. That was the most important thing about not decide similarly drastically right here Immediately after my speaking so these matters. and now to resolve the question? frankly, Siad Barre took the floor. He said [comments on southern Africa, omitted here, In this setting I was faced with the com- that he would never want war and that as a are printed earlier in this Bulletin--ed.] plicated question of either speaking my socialist and revolutionary he would never There were several requests for mili- mind about Siad Barre’s position or keep- take this path. If the socialist camp wanted tary aid from various sides: [Libyan Leader ing it to myself. I concluded that I had to to cut itself off from Somalia then that was Moammar] Qadaffi, Mengistu, and the Con- speak out for the following reasons: the affair of the socialist camp. I had put golese leaders. During our stay in Africa we 1. Keeping quiet would have meant pressure on him, Siad Barre, but not de- sent [Cuban Vice President] Carlos Rafael endorsing the chauvinistic policy of Soma- manded from Mengistu, to come to this Rodriguez to Moscow to confer with our lia, and its consequences. It would also have meeting. Soviet comrades and to Havana for consul- meant supporting the rightists in Somalia. Now, I pointed out that I had supported tations with our leadership. In order to find 2. Not responding to Siad Barre would the summit between Siad Barre and the best solution we must think through this mean that any subsequent aid from social- Mengistu but did not talk about Siad Barre’s question calmly and thoroughly and con- ist countries to Ethiopia, no matter how insults vis-a-vis Mengistu. I said that Cuba sider it in terms of the overall situation of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 61 the socialist camp. Above all we must do influence of the USA and of the Chinese. pected time for the USA and raised the ques- something for Mengistu. Already we are col- The developments in Zaire are also very im- tion of the formulation of a new USA policy lecting old weapons in Cuba for Ethiopia, portant. Libya and Algeria have large na- towards Ethiopia in light of these conditions. principally French, Belgian and Czech hand- tional resources, Ethiopia has great revolu- This policy, Malin stated, was not yet for- held weapons. About 45,000 men must be tionary potential. So there is a great coun- mulated. Although the Ethiopian authori- supplied with weapons. We are going to send terweight to Egypt’s betrayal. It might even ties exhibited the necessary correctness to- military advisers to train the Ethiopian mili- be possible that Sadat could be turned wards personnel assigned by American or- tia in weapons-use. There are many people around and that the imperialist influence in ganizations, and with the exception of press in Ethiopia who are qualified for the army. the Middle East can be turned back. campaigns, no hostile actions whatsoever We are supporting the training of the mili- This must all be discussed with the against American citizens were observed tia. Meanwhile the situation in Eritrea is dif- Soviet Union. We follow its policies and its here, nonetheless the Embassy of the USA ficult. There are also progressive people in example. is aware that the USA would find it difficult the liberation movement, but, objectively, We estimate that Libya’s request is an to institute stable business-like relations with they are playing a reactionary role. The expression of trust. One should not reject the current Ethiopian regime. The closing Eritrean separatist movement is being sup- their request. Cuba alone cannot help it. of the USA economic assistance mission ported by the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and [remainder of conversation omitted--ed.] here [USAID] cannot be excluded. Obvi- Egypt. Ethiopia has good soldiers and a good ously, relations in the military sphere will military tradition, but they need time to or- [Source: Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien und be broken off, although some Ethiopian ganize their army. Mengistu asked us for 100 Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen military personnel continue to be trained in trainers for the militia, now he is also ask- DDR im Bundesarchiv” (Berlin), DY30 JIV the USA (pilots, etc.). Under the present ing us for military advisers to build up regu- 2/201/1292; document obtained by Chris- conditions, Washington probably will not lar units. Our military advisory group is ac- tian F. Ostermann and translated by David hurry to name a new ambassador to Addis- tive at the staff level. The Ethiopians have Welch with revisions by Ostermann.] Ababa. economic means and the personnel neces- According to Malin, however, all this sary to build up their army. Rumors have Memorandum of Conversation between does not mean that the USA intends to “get been spread lately that the reactionaries will Soviet Acting Charge d’affaires in out of Ethiopia,” considering the signifi- conquer Asmara in two months. The revo- Ethiopia S. Sinitsyn and Political cance of this country for the African conti- lution in Ethiopia is of great significance. Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in nent and the strategically important Red Sea With regard to military aid for the PR Congo Ethiopia, Herbert Malin, 9 May 1977 region. The USA, as before, is opposed to and the Libyans we have not yet come to a splitting off Eritrea from Ethiopia and in decision. From the journal SECRET, Copy No. 2 favor of the freedom of navigation in the I had consultations with Boumedienne of Sinitsyn, Ya.S. 26 May 1977 Red Sea, and has made the Ethiopian gov- in Algeria and asked for his opinion. He as- Original No. 203 ernment aware of this repeatedly. At the sured me that Algeria would never abandon same time the USA is concerned about the Libya. Algeria is very concerned with the RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION possibility of the development of a crisis situation in the Mediterranean because of its with the Political Counselor of the USA situation between Ethiopia and neighboring security interests. It is in favor of support- Embassy in Ethiopia, Herbert Malin countries and about the obvious lack of trust ing Libya, as long as military aid is confined 9 May 1977 by the Ethiopian government in American to the socialist camp. That is not only a ques- policy in this region. tion between Cuba and Algeria. If we suc- Today at the reception at the Pakistani Malin considered the visit [to Moscow] ceed in strengthening the revolution in Embassy, Malin (acting Charge d’Affaires by Mengistu to be a “Soviet success” and a Libya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the PDRY, in connection with the recall of the latter to reflection of the transition by the current and Angola, we have an integrated strategy a meeting in Abidjan of USA ambassadors) Ethiopian regime to an orientation prima- for the whole African continent. characterized the state of Ethiopian-Ameri- rily towards the Soviet Union, above all in Algeria would move closer to the so- can relations in the following manner: the military sphere and with the specific aim cialist camp. It bought 1.5 billion rubles of The decision of the PMAC about the of obtaining modern weaponry. In his view, weapons from the Soviets. Boumedienne closing in late April of a number of Ameri- however, the Ethiopian-Soviet rapproche- thinks that Sadat is totally lost to us. In Syria can organizations in Ethiopia (a group of ment could complicate relations between the there is also no leftist movement any more, military attaches, the strategic radio center USSR and Somalia and some other Arab either, especially after the Syrians defeated in Asmara, a biological laboratory of the states, and, at the same time, enhance insta- the progressive powers and the PLO in Leba- USA Navy, and an information center in bility in the region. non. Addis Abba), and also the abrogation be- For my part, I told Malin that our policy [Indian President] Indira Gandhi ginning on 1 May of this year of the 1953 towards Ethiopia is principled, not directed gambled away the elections. agreement “On the preservation of mutual against any third countries, and responds to In Africa, however, we can inflict a se- security” (the Embassy received a verbal the interests of strengthening peace and se- vere defeat on the entire reactionary imperi- communication from the Foreign Ministry curity in the region. alist policy. One can free Africa from the of Ethiopia about this) came at an unex- NOTES: In private conversations with 62 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

us, American representatives, relying on tions of friendly relations and cooperation Mengistu voiced profound satisfaction “various sources in Washington,” do not between the USSR and Ethiopia, [the two with the meeting and the frank, comradely hide the fact that they are irritated by the sides] also signed an agreement on cultural character of the talks. “Ethiopia’s recent anti-American actions,” and scientific cooperation, a consular con- During negotiations with N.V. Podgorny, and this country’s lack of trust in the USA. vention, a protocol on economic and tech- A.A. Gromyko, and other Soviet comrades At the same time, comments by Western- nical cooperation which envisages assis- the head of the Ethiopian delegation in- ers reveal that in the back of their minds they tance to Ethiopia in [construction] of a num- formed them about the roots of the Ethio- are wondering whether the Soviet Union ber of industrial and agricultural objects, pian revolution and its course at the present “could assume the entire burden of assis- provision of buying credit and the commis- stage, about internal and external difficul- tance to Ethiopia.” sion of Soviet experts. ties the new leadership of the country expe- It is obvious that, pursuing a policy to According to the wishes of the Ethiopian riences today. Mengistu said that the Ethio- the detriment of the Ethiopian revolution, side, an agreement was signed on some ad- pian leadership stands on the platform of the USA and other Western countries will ditional deliveries of armaments and mili- Marxism-Leninism and regards the Ethio- still try to maintain certain spheres of influ- tary equipment to Ethiopia. pian revolution as part of the world revolu- ence in this country. Thus, during the ses- The visit of the Chairman of the PMAC tionary process. He stressed his intention to sions of the IBRD’s [International Bank for Mengistu Haile Mariam to the USSR had create a working class party in Ethiopia. Reconstruction and Development’s] “Inter- an obvious goal - to establish direct personal However, he said, the Ethiopian revolution national Development Association” a no- contacts with the Soviet leaders and to en- is going through a complicated, one can interest credit of $40 million was extended sure the support of the Soviet Union for the even say, critical phase. Rightist, as well as to Ethiopia for the purpose of road building cause of the protection and development of ultra-leftist elements, are rising, de facto, in and irrigation. the national-democratic revolution in Ethio- a united front against the revolution. They pia. unleashed a virtual civil war in some prov- ACTING CHARGE D’AFFAIRS On May 6 of this year Mengistu was re- inces of the country. These actions of do- OF THE USSR IN ETHIOPIA ceived by General Secretary of the CC mestic counterrevolution are linked to the /s/ S. Sinitsyn CPSU L.I. Brezhnev. At this talk he in- activities of imperialism and other external formed L.I. Brezhnev on the activities of the reactionary forces directed against the new [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll. new Ethiopian leadership who took a course Ethiopia. Mengistu underlined that a spe- 142-144; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.] toward the socialist orientation of the coun- cial role in these coordinated activities be- try. On behalf of the Ethiopian people the long to the anti-Communist regime of CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on Chairman of the PMAC expressed profound Numeiri, and behind its back lurk reaction- Visit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to gratitude for the assistance the Soviet Union ary Arab countries, first of all Saudi Arabia Moscow, 13 May 1977 renders to Ethiopia in the defense of [its] and Egypt. revolutionary conquests. The head of the Ethiopian delegation said Confidential L.I. Brezhnev underscored our principled that Ethiopia will not overcome external and position with regard to progressive transfor- internal counterrevolution alone, and for that ON THE RESULTS OF THE OFFICIAL mations in Ethiopia and declared that the reason it relies on support on the part of the VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION OF Soviet Union, which from the very begin- Soviet Union and other socialist countries. THE ETHIOPIAN STATE DELEGA- ning came out in favor of the Ethiopian revo- He expressed a wish to develop all-faceted TION LED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF lution, intends to continue this course and cooperation with the USSR. THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY to give, as much as it can, political, diplo- Mengistu supplied detailed information ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL (PMAC) matic, and other forms of assistance to the on the policy of the Ethiopian leadership on OF SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA new leadership of Ethiopia. L.I. Brezhnev the nationalities question, on his intention MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM drew Mengistu’s attention to the fact it was to resolve it on a democratic basis in the important, in order to advance the revolu- framework of the unified multinational state. In the course of negotiations the Soviet tionary process, to create a party of the The Ethiopian side judges that the separat- leaders and Mengistu discussed the issues working class, the intention that the leader ist movement in Eritrea, which receives of bilateral relations and relevant interna- of the Ethiopian state had voiced, and to the massive support from the Arab countries, tional questions. necessity to activate the international affairs acquired a reactionary character after the The main results of the visit were cov- of Ethiopia with the aim of foiling the en- victory of the national-democratic revolu- ered in the Declaration signed on the initia- croachments of imperialist and other reac- tion in Ethiopia. tive of the Ethiopian side about the founda- tionary forces. L.I. Brezhnev expressed con- Mengistu spoke with concern about the tions of friendly relations and cooperation cern about the continuing deterioration of position that the Somali leadership took to- between the USSR and the Socialist Ethio- relations between the two progressive states wards the Ethiopian revolution. He favored pia, and in the joint communique, as well as that are friendly to us - Ethiopia and Soma- normalization of relations between Ethio- in the published news releases on the course lia, and pointed to the urgent need to take pia and Somalia and the united efforts of of the visit. measures for the improvement of these re- the two progressive states in the struggle Beside the declaration about the founda- lations. against imperialism and reaction. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 63

The Soviet side expressed understanding M. Zubok.] May 1977, the Ethiopian side was informed of the difficulties the new Ethiopian leader- of N.V. Podgorny’s recent conversation with ship encounters inside the country and out- Additions to 2 February 1977 Report by Siad Barre. In accord with the wish of Presi- side its frontiers. The Ethiopian delegation Third African Department, Soviet dent Siad, we proposed to Mengistu that was informed about the measures the So- Foreign Ministry, on “Somalia’s through our good offices we organize and viet leadership undertakes in support of Territorial Disagreements with Ethiopia conduct in the Soviet Union a summit meet- Ethiopia in the international arena, in par- and the Position of the USSR,” ing for the establishment of good-neighborly ticular in connection with the anti-Ethiopian apparently in late May-early June 1977 relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. position of the ruling circles of Sudan and Mengistu accepted that suggestion with sat- to the arms supplies to the Eritrean separat- [...] On 16 March 1977, a meeting took isfaction and expressed agreement with the ists from a number of Arab states. The So- place in Aden between President Siad and thoughts that had been expressed to him in viet Union was said to continue henceforth PMAC Chairman Mengistu with the partici- this regard. However, in a conversation with to give assistance to the new Ethiopia. pation of Fidel Castro and the Chairman of the Soviet Ambassador on 17 May of this [The Soviet side] explained our position the Presidential Council of South Yemen, year, President Siad declared that he is not on major international issues, including the Rubayi-i-Ali. ready at the present time to sit at the negoti- relaxation of tensions, the situation in the Mengistu appealed to Siad for the co- ating table with Mengistu. [...] South Africa, in the Middle East; in response ordination of actions to rebuff imperialist to the Ethiopian side we informed her about and reactionary forces which simultaneously [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1619, ll. Soviet-American and Soviet-Chinese rela- threaten both Ethiopia and Somalia. Siad 61-68; translated by Paul Henze.] tions. Mengistu spoke about common views held to an intransigent position, putting forth between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union on the annexation of the Ogaden to Somalia as Report from CPSU CC to SED CC, the crucial issues of international affairs. He an immutable condition for normalizing Information about the Visit to the said that he shared the viewpoint of the So- Somali-Ethiopian relations. He demanded Soviet Union of Somalia Vice President viet side regarding the essence of differences that the issue of the transfer of the Ogaden Samanta, late May-early June 1977 between the USSR and China and, on his to Somalia be quickly resolved, with the part, pointed out to the difference of posi- subsequent formation of a federation be- Strictly Confidential tions between Ethiopia and China on a num- tween Somalia and Ethiopia. At the meet- ber of issues, including the situation in the ing Siad declared that if the socialist coun- [notation: “EH 6.6.77”] African Horn. tries would not support Somalia on the ter- Mengistu gave the impression of a seri- ritorial issue, then he would be required to I N F O R M A T I O N ous figure who firmly believes in his cause, appeal to Arab and Western states for assis- on the visit of the First Vice-President of although he still lacks sufficient political and tance. Somalia Mohammad Ali Samantar to the state experience. In particular, it seems that The representative of South Yemen put Soviet Union in the end of May-early June he and other Ethiopian leaders do not de- forward a proposal to create a committee vote due attention to vigorous measures in made up of high-ranking representatives of At first Samantar was in Moscow unoffi- the international arena in order to foil the Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and Cuba cially, then at joint agreement it was decided attempts to drive Ethiopia into international for resolution of disputed Somali-Ethiopian to publicize the fact of his presence in the isolation, [and] to win over world public issues. Siad refused to work in that com- Soviet Union. opinion, first of all in the progressive states mittee. However, until now that proposal Samantar held conversations with the CC of Africa. remains in force. CPSU Politburo member, Minister of For- Mengistu and the members of the Ethio- [...] eign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and the alter- pian delegation estimated highly the results At a meeting of the Chairman of the nate member of the CC CPSU Politburo, CC of the negotiations in Moscow and ex- Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, CPSU Secretary B.N. Ponomarev. Upon pressed thanks for the understanding with N.V. Podgorny, with Siad Barre which took conclusion of these talks Samantar was re- which the Soviet side addressed their needs. place at the beginning of April of this year ceived by General Secretary of the CC They expressed the opinion that the results during his brief visit to Somalia, Siad ex- CPSU L.I. Brezhnev. They discussed on a of their visit will contribute to the further pressed readiness to continue the search for principled level the main directions of the improvement of Soviet-Ethiopian relations. a mutually acceptable formula for resolv- Soviet-Somali relations and reaffirmed a We in the Soviet Union believe that the ing the problems facing Ethiopia and So- political line of the USSR and the SDR, visit and talks with the Ethiopian state del- malia and requested the Soviet Union to aimed at the development of cooperation egation was fruitful and useful. provide help in organizing a meeting with between them in various fields. The Ethiopian leadership, in our opinion, Mengistu. In the course of conversations in Mos- should be granted the support of the Social- At Soviet-Ethiopian negotiations cow, aside from the issues of the Soviet-So- ist Commonwealth. which took place during the official visit to malian relations, a major focus was on the the Soviet Union of the official Ethiopian issues connected to the situation in the area [Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202/583; obtained delegation headed by the Chairman of the of the African Horn, on which [issues] our and translated from Russian by Vladislav PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam during 4-8 side laid out the position that is well known 64 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

also to the Ethiopian leadership. Soviet- In response to our direct question when and, as authorized by the Center [Moscow], Ethiopian relations, for understandable rea- and on which level the Somalian side would outlined the Soviet position on Ethiopian- sons, took a special place in the conversa- expect to hold such a meeting, he said that Somali relations, highlighting the threat that tions. any time would be good for them, but did military conflict between Ethiopia and So- Samantar concentrated his attention on not mention any dates. In Samantar’s opin- malia would pose to the revolutionary the disagreements between Somalia and ion, at first there could be a ministerial meet- achievements in both countries. Ethopia on the territorial question. In justi- ing, and a final stage could be held as a sum- Mengistu then thanked the Soviet lead- fying the positions of the SDR he mentioned mit. At the same time, Samantar let us un- ership for its efforts in pursuit of the nor- the well-known Somalian arguments. derstand that before the organization of such malization of Ethiopia-Somali relations and Samantar did not dispute the revolutionary a meeting we should define a range of is- stated the following: character of the regime of Ethiopia, as the sues for discussion, by emphasizing that for The PMAC’s position on Ethiopian- Somalis have done before. Yet he hinted that the Somalis in the focus is still the territo- Somali relations remains unchanged - it sup- not everything is normal in the domestic rial issue. Concerning the participation of ported and continues to support the improve- situation in Ethiopia, that the rights of the Soviet representatives in a meeting, ment of relations with Somalia through ne- persons of Somalian extraction who live in Samantar did not define their level, did not gotiations and the restoration of cooperation Ogaden are still allegedly impinged upon. say that it [the level] should be high. with this country in the struggle against a Samantar said that the leadership of Ethio- Second. Of great importance is common enemy - imperialism. In light of pia, instead of turning to persuasion as the Samantar’s declaration that the Somali lead- this, the PMAC assumes that, unlike Sudan, main tool of bringing the population [of ership would not on its own initiative un- which completely went over to the side of Ogaden] over to its side, all too often re- leash an armed conflict with Ethiopia. He imperialism, Somalia remains a country sorts to arms. said it twice during his meetings with A.A. which claims to adhere to scientific social- Our side repeatedly underscored the idea Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev. He made a ism and has friendly relations with socialist that the main thing now is to avoid military similar pronouncement in his conversation states, a situation which would create favor- confrontation between Somalia and Ethio- with L.I. Brezhnev. able conditions for the restoration of friendly pia. We drew [his] attention to the perver- True, Samantar spoke about a scenario of relations and cooperation between Somalia sity of a situation when two states - Soma- provocation of such a conflict on the part of and Ethiopia, and also influences the study lia and Ethiopia - who set themselves on the external imperialist forces or their helpers. of Marxism-Leninism and the establishment path of revolutionary development are at To this we reacted in the following way: if of close cooperation with the Soviet Union loggerheads. Of course, we know about the such forces were around, then both sides, and other socialist states. differences of opinion between Somalia and Somalia and Ethiopia, should not respond In response to the appeal from the So- Ethiopia, first of all on the territorial issue. to such a provocation, but should display viet government, the PMAC would like to But if a war breaks out between them, only state wisdom and vigilance. emphasize once more that Ethiopia does not imperialist forces would gain from this. On the whole, the visit of Samantar to have any aggressive intentions with respect Such a war not only would lead to grave Moscow was, in our opinion, usful. It shows to Somalia. The PMAC already informed consequences, it would also turn against that the leadership of Somalia does not drop the Soviet government that it has accepted Somalia and would allow reactionary forces the idea to begin, with assistance of the So- the proposal by Siad Barre to organize a So- to put a noose around its neck. viet Union, a dialogue with the leaders of mali-Ethiopian meeting on an expert level. L.I. Brezhnev stressed in this regard that Ethiopia in order to normalize relations be- Clearly, Ethiopia will not go to this meeting one should not allow a military confronta- tween the two countries. as a supplicant, but as an equal partner. tion to flare up between the two progres- Ethiopia is prepared to contribute to the sive states of Africa, and that all issues and [Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202 584; obtained efforts of the Soviet Union to prevent So- disputes between them should be resolved and translated from Russian by V. Zubok.] malia from shifting to the right, as can be in a peaceful way, at the negotiation table. observed today. As far as Ethiopia is con- As to the domestic situation in Ethiopia, Memorandum of Conversation between cerned, Somalia is already engaged in sub- we declared it was not our business to dis- Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. versive activities against it in the guise of a cuss such issues. The Ethiopians themselves Ratanov and Mengistu, 29 June 1977 Front for the Liberation of Western Soma- should resolve them. lia, the headquarters of which is located in In our opinion, there were two important SECRET, copy No. 2 Mogadishu. Armed units of this front have points that surfaced in the course of the From the journal of 18 July 1977 taken some villages in eastern Ethiopia. discusions. Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 255 These units are even armed with Soviet- First. If earlier we had the impression that made anti-aircraft missiles. Naturally, the Somali leadership vacillated with regard RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION Ethiopian forces must combat the units of to a meeting with the leadership of Ethiopia with the President of the PMAC, this force. and to a mission of good-will on the part of MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM In conclusion, Mengistu made a re- the Soviet Union in the organization of such 29 June 1977 quest to the Soviet government to lend its a meeting, now Samantar declared that the support to efforts to achieve a withdrawal Somalis are ready for this. Today I visited Mengistu Haile Mariam of Somali forces from Ethiopian territory. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 65

Responding to a question from the Soviet ticipate directly in the military actions. It is ists and the Arab countries who support them ambassador, Mengistu said that relations significant that the Ethiopian command did would have to agree to a political settlement between Ethiopia and the Republic of not take measures for building a defensive and accept internal autonomy for Eritrea. Djibouti were not bad, but that the leader- barrier in the regions adjacent to Somalia. In the Ogaden the detachments of the ship of this Republic, fearing annexation by Apparently, the PMAC was concerned that Front of for the Liberation of Western So- Ethiopia or Somalia, agreed to a French such measures could be perceived by So- malia (up to 5 thousand people), introduced military presence. Under these conditions, malia as an Ethiopian refusal to settle their mainly from Somalia, have recently estab- said Mengistu, if it were possible to restore disagreements with Somalia peacefully. lished control over the most part of the ter- cooperation between Ethiopia and Somalia, 3. Overestimated its own military ca- ritory. The front is engaged in combat near then these countries could affirm that they pabilities. Did not take into account the fact the cities of Harar, Jijiga, Gode, Dire Dawa. guarantee the independence and territorial that the old army practically did not go The PMAC has up to 10 thousand integrity of the Republic of Djibouti, which through the school of revolutionary struggle people in the Ogaden. Currently detach- would facilitate the withdrawal of French even though it took part in the revolution, ments of the people’s militia are being trans- forces from Djibouti and the development since the main demands of the rank and file ferred there. The Ethiopian command con- of this state along a progressive path. soldiers were for a raise in pay and for im- siders the situation in the Ogaden most dan- provement of the retirement pensions, and gerous since Somalia continues to transfer AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR a certain part of the officer corps was against its military personnel and heavy weaponry IN SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA the Revolution altogether. to that region. /s/ A RATANOV It should be also mentioned that in re- Therefore, the PMAC has a opportu- lation to Eritrea, during the three years since nity to change favorably the military situa- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. the Revolution the Ethiopian command has tion in Eritrea as well as in the Ogaden, 74-75; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.] never attempted any offensive military op- However, it would need to solve the follow- erations against the Eritrean armed forces, ing problems. Memorandum of Conversation between and that the troops of the Ethiopian regular 1. To provide the armed forces with the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia army were practically dwelling in their quar- means of transportation (helicopters, trucks, A.N. Ratanov and Cuban military ters. etc.) for a quick transfer of the reserves official Arnaldo Ochoa, 17 July 1977 Only two or three months ago the when and where they are needed. PMAC, having received weapons from the 2. To create fuel reserves and to obtain TOP SECRET Copy No. 2 socialist countries, hastily began to organize means of transportation for them. From the journal of 24 August 1977 new units of the regular army, and the 3. To create reserves of food and medi- A.P. RATANOV Orig. No. 297 people’s militia. cines. Currently the armed forces of Ethio- Also it is necessary to strengthen the REPORT OF CONVERSATION pia consist of 6 divisions of the regular army political work in the armed forces, for which with the head of the Cuban military (55 thousand people), 8 divisions of the they would need cadres of political work- specialists Division General people’s militia (about 100 thousand ers, which are currently insufficient. ARNALDO OCHOA people), and police formations (40 thousand In socio-political terms the forces of 17 July 1977 people). However: the revolution predominate over the forces During the discussion held at the So- 1. The Ethiopian army is inferior to the of the counterrevolution. Still, even though viet Embassy, the Soviet Ambassador out- Somali army in the quality of armaments. the PMAC undertook certain measures for lined the following considerations on the 2. The members of the people’s militia the organization of the peasant and urban military and political situation in Ethiopia. have not had a sufficient military training population (peasant and urban associations The capture of several strategically yet. have been created everywhere), the level of important objectives in Eritrea and in the All this led to the situation where the political consciousness of the broad masses eastern regions of Ethiopia by the separat- separatists were able to establish control of the population (mostly illiterate) remains ists and by the Somalis has showed that the over 75-80% of the Eritrean territory, includ- very low. PMAC: ing the cities of Keren, Nacfa, Karora, Elements of confusion can be observed 1. Underestimated the military capa- Decamere, Tessenei. Their armed forces in the Defense Council. Mengistu Haile bilities of the Eritrean separatists, and thus consist of 18 thousand people. Mariam still remains the main leader of the did not take serious measures to strengthen The Ethiopian command in Eritrea has Ethiopian revolution. The PMAC needs to the group of troops in Eritrea. At the same 20 thousand soldiers of the regular army, and solve the following political tasks: time the PMAC was hoping that it would it is currently transferring there 5 divisions 1. To take additional measures to be able to persuade the leadership of the of the people’s militia. This should give it strengthen its social base. In order to achieve Eritrean organizations to take part in nego- the opportunity to establish control over this it is necessary to make the socio-eco- tiations on the political settlement of the Eritrea assuming that Sudan does not intro- nomic policy more concrete, so that it could Eritrean problem. duce its armed forces there. assure the peasants that the land would re- 2. Did not expect that the units of the If the military effort in Eritrea is suc- main in their possession, and that the regime Somali regular army in Ogaden would par- cessful, the PMAC hopes that the separat- would not rush with collectivization. In ad- 66 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

dition, some measures in order to, as a mini- cording to the agreements signed earlier. and Soviet Officials in Moscow, mum, neutralize the national bourgeoisie, Arnaldo Ochoa told Mengistu that such a 25-29 July 1977 (excerpts) are necessary to assure it that the regime light-headed approach to serious business would not expropriate its property. might undermine the prestige of the Mili- From the journal of Secret. Copy no. 10 2. To develop the nationality policy and tary Council. Arnaldo Ochoa had the feel- L.F. Ilichev 11 August 1977 to make it more concrete (to create autono- ing that Mengistu understood what he No. 2148/GS mous national regions), even though now it meant. would not be an easy task because cadres Another example of such a light- Record of a Conversation from non-Amhara nationalities which headed, even irresponsible, approach to the with the Minister of Mineral and Water were discriminated against before the revo- military questions is the idea that somebody Resources of Somalia, Head of Delegation lution have not been prepared yet. is suggesting to Mengistu about the neces- of Experts 3. To create a political party and a broad sity of preparation of a offensive on Hargeisa HUSSEIN ABDULKADIR KASIM people’s front with participation of not just (Somalia), which would give Somalia a rea- (first level) workers and peasants, but also with the na- son to start a more massive offensive in the tional bourgeoisie. Ogaden with tanks and aircraft, not to men- The Somali Delegation of Experts arrived 4. To conduct a more active foreign tion the catastrophic political consequences in Moscow on 24 July 1977. Meetings took policy, especially toward African countries, of such a step for Ethiopia. place at the residence of the Somali Del- to provide support for Mengistu’s state- Arnaldo Ochoa said that the military egation from 25-29 July 1977. ments at the OAU Assembly in Libreville failures in Eritrea led to certain disagree- [Gabon] that Ethiopia was not going to ex- ments within the PMAC. A significant part 25 July port its revolution, and that it would follow of the Council proposes that they should the course of nonalignment; to make the now, before any military measures are taken, In a one-on-one conversation which program for political settlement of the Ethio- try once more to engage in negotiations with took place on the initiative of H. A. Kasim, pian-Somali disagreements more concrete. the Eritrean organizations. The majority of before the beginning of the first meeting the In the course of further discussion we the Council, however, thinks that in the ex- Minister announced that the Somali delega- came to common conclusions that the diffi- isting circumstances, when the separatists tion had arrived in Moscow with a feeling cult situation dictated the necessity of cre- are on the offensive, they would not agree of good will and with absolute faith in the ating in some form a state defense commit- to negotiations, or they would present ulti- efforts of the Soviet Union to offer its good tee, which would be authorized to mobilize mata demanding the separation of Eritrea. services toward the resolution of disputed all forces of the country for the defense of Therefore, the majority of the Council be- issues between Somalia and Ethiopia. The the revolution; of organizing the highest lieves a combination of military and politi- Somali delegation, in the words of Kasim, military command, and at a minimum, of cal measures should be undertaken, i.e. to experiences doubt, however, as to the can- two fronts (Northern and Eastern) with cor- propose negotiations to the Eritrean organi- dor and good intentions of the Ethiopian responding command and headquarters zations only after having achieved some side, taking into account that Somalia had structures. military successes. repeatedly proposed to Ethiopia to resolve We also agreed that the current struc- Arnaldo Ochoa also informed me that the disputed issues within the framework of turing of the armed forces should be reor- in one of their recent conversations creating a federation of the two govern- ganized in the future according to modern Mengistu said that Ethiopian-Chinese rela- ments, to which Ethiopia reacted by pub- military concepts applicable to Ethiopian tions were becoming more and more com- lishing the protocols of secret negotiations realities. However, the military incompe- plicated with every day. The PMAC found between the two sides and by carrying out a tence of the officer corps and conservatism out that the PRC was providing military as- campaign attacking Somalia in the press. of a certain part of it present obstacles to sistance to the People’s Front of Eritrean As is well known, other African and this restructuring. For example, the General Liberation. In relation to this, the PMAC non-African countries attempted to play the Staff currently nurtures ideas of creating made a decision to limit all relations with role of mediator in the settlement of the dis- tank divisions and an anti-aircraft defense Beijing to the minimum without engaging puted questions between the two countries, system of the country by removing those in an open confrontation, and to devise mea- but these efforts were not crowned with suc- kinds of weapons (tanks, anti-aircraft sures against Chinese ideological penetra- cess. launchers) from existing infantry divisions. tion in Ethiopia. The Somali delegation considers that On July 16 the Cuban comrades found the object of discussion at the forthcoming out that at the last moment before the group AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR meeting of experts, in addition to the sub- of [PMAC General Secretary] Fikre Selassie IN SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA stance of the disputed issues between the Wogderes was about to leave for Moscow [signature] /A RATANOV/ two countries, should include neither the it was decided to ask the Soviet Union to tension in relations between the two coun- supply tanks, armored cars, and the like at a [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. tries, nor the questions of demarcation or of time when they have not yet prepared their 141-146; translated by S. Savranskaya.] changing the borders, but rather the colo- cadres for work with the technology they nial situation which currently characterize were receiving from the Soviet Union ac- Record of Negotiations between Somali a part of the Somali territory and the popu- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 67 lation living there, which is under the colo- resolving the disputed questions by means ing Somali-Ethiopian meeting would lead nial government of Ethiopia. The Somali of the application of force, particularly given to positive results. I said, that it would not delegation considers that no country should the contemporary global situation. I took be candid for us not to say that the current call itself a socialist country, or a country note of the real danger that such tension situation in the region had grown compli- which adheres to a socialist orientation, if might be used by enemies of Africa, enemies cated and that decisive and immediate mea- this country continues the colonial oppres- of progressive transformations in Somalia sures were necessary. We would hope that sion of a people and a part of the territory of as well as in Ethiopia. I remarked that there the two delegations would strive from the another country. This colonial situation are no questions in the interrelations of so- very beginning to create a business-like at- arose in the time of the existence of the cialist countries or countries of socialist mosphere, to show their good will, [to take Ethiopian Empire and up to Somali inde- orientation, which could not be resolved a] constructive approach and not to take pendence. In the opinion of the Somali side, without the application of force, by peace- categorical positions, which have the nature the changing of the name Abyssinia to Ethio- ful means. The Soviet side, offering its good of ultimatums, and would rule out even the pia, and the Ethiopian Empire to Socialist services, sees its task at the forthcoming slightest possibility of conducting negotia- Ethiopia did not change in the slightest de- meeting of the delegations of experts in the tions. gree the state of affairs. This is why the following: We are convinced that the normaliza- Somali delegation considers that the central 1) To create an atmosphere of good- tion of the situation in the Horn of Africa question for discussion at the forthcoming will between the two countries; and the establishment of friendly relations meetings of the delegations of experts from 2) to ensure an understanding of the with Ethiopia is in the interest of Somalia. the two countries is the question of grant- fact that it is impossible to resolve dis- It is clear that a peaceful situation, and ing self-determination and independence to puted questions through force; friendly ties with Ethiopia would create the oppressed Somali minority, which lives 3) to undertake efforts to ensure that more favorable conditions for the success- within the borders of Ethiopia. as a result of the meetings of experts ful resolution of complicated problems per- At the forthcoming negotiations, con- there would be recommendations taining to the national economy, which con- tinued the Minister, there are two alterna- elaborated to the governments of both front this country, in its attempts to raise the tives: either [his aforementioned proposed of these countries with the goal of cre- well-being of the Somali workers. topic, or] to limit the discussion to a range ating a situation of friendship and good I said that we would like hear the full of secondary problems, which would be tan- relations as a basis for resolving the opinion of the Somali delegation concern- tamount to simply beating about the bush. disputed questions which exist between ing the range of questions, which the del- Somalia considers, that the military actions Somalia and Ethiopia. egation considers necessary to submit to a currently being conducted are the actions of I indicated that the Soviet side did not joint discussion, and likewise concerning the Somali patriots in the colonial territory who intend to impose any particular resolution procedure for the meeting, in particular, with are struggling for their right to self-deter- of the disputed questions between the two regard to its general duration, and other pro- mination and independence, therefore the countries. cedural questions. From our side, we have first question on the agenda of the forthcom- After the conclusion of the one-on-one no intention of imposing any temporal limit ing meeting of experts should be the ques- conversation a meeting of the Soviet repre- on the meeting and are prepared to take into tion of decolonialization, and, only having sentatives and the Somali delegation of ex- account, insofar as it is possible, the wishes resolved that question, will it be possible to perts took place. of the two parties in this regard. move on to the discussion of other second- I greeted the delegation of Somali ex- I noted further that, as we know, the ary questions, such as the lessening of ten- perts and expressed satisfaction with the fact Somali side proposes to discuss the issue of sion in relations between the two countries. that the Somali and Ethiopian parties had the Ethiopian government’s concession of H.A. Kasim noted that the currently decided to begin a dialogue toward the nor- the right to self-determination of national existing situation is a result of the fact that malization of their relations in Moscow. groups. We are unable to predict before- Ethiopia, over the course of many years, I announced that, having concurred hand what might be the position of the Ethio- violated the territorial integrity of Somalia, with the request of President Siad that we pian government, but we can surmise, that [and] oppressed and annihilated Somalis, offer our good services in organizing and such a formulation of the question will most living in the colonized territory. leading the meetings between representa- likely be interpreted by the Ethiopian gov- In conclusion, H.A. Kasim under- tives of Somalia and Ethiopia in Moscow, ernment as interference in the internal af- scored the readiness of the Somali delega- the Soviet side was guided exclusively by fairs of a sovereign state. tion to assist the Soviet side in fulfilling its its international obligations to offer assis- We know, as you do, that the Ethio- mission of offering its good services at the tance to countries with whom we are on pian leadership in its programmatic docu- meeting of the delegations of experts from friendly terms, by its interests in the devel- ments announced its intention to resolve the Somalia and Ethiopia. opment and strengthening of all-around co- nationalities question on a democratic ba- For my part, I declared that the tension operation with them. sis. It goes without saying that the realiza- which has been created in the relations be- I noted that we treat the parties with- tion of such a program requires the appro- tween two countries, with both of whom we out biases of any sort, in a friendly and can- priate conditions. are friendly, is the cause of great alarm and did manner. To our mind, the examination of the anxiety. I underscored the impossibility of I expressed the hope that the forthcom- issue of normalizing relations between the 68 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

two countries at the meeting of experts, and friendly relations; tion the declaration of President Siad that precisely this, as we understand, is their first 4) the efforts of the two countries to Somalia would never, not under any circum- and foremost task, should not be made con- take measures which are directed at de- stances, attempt to resolve disputed ques- ditional upon the preliminary resolution of veloping economic, trade, and cultural tions with the assistance of arms. This was fundamentally disputed questions. This is relations, at developing connections discussed in the message to L.I. Brezhnev, a point of view which we have expressed between voluntary organizations in the and the same declaration was made by the more than once to the Somali leadership and two countries, the exchange of experi- Somali party-state delegation which visited it was not met with objections by their side. ence, etc., and, in particular, the readi- the USSR in the previous year. In a word, The meeting of the delegation with the ness of the two sides to conduct regu- we have been assured of this more than once good services of our side would be genu- lar mutual consultations at all levels. and on various levels. We have treated this inely successful if it was concluded by the It goes without saying that first and declaration with complete faith. elaboration by the experts of recommenda- foremost it is necessary to cease military However, certain information we pos- tions to their governments concerning the activities on both sides. sess bears witness to the fact that open mili- steps which would lead to the normaliza- The principled efforts of the Soviet tary actions have currently commenced. tion of Somali-Ethiopian relations. Union toward the development of all-around Regular military units in Somalia, using The Soviet side is prepared to cooper- cooperation with the Somali Democratic Re- tanks and aviation, have crossed the Somali- ate and to offer all possible assistance to the public are well known. Our country has Ethiopian border. I want to stress, that we experts of both sides in their elaboration of never been guided in its policy by opportu- are discussing concrete facts, not conjecture. recommendations for their governments, but nistic considerations. The Soviet Union will From our point of view, in order to re- does not plan to insist on any particular po- continue in the future to strengthen its solve any sort of problem which has arisen sition. We are prepared to assist actively in friendship and revolutionary solidarity with between states, first and foremost it is nec- the search for a mutually acceptable resolu- the nation of Somalia, to offer assistance and essary to have a favorable atmosphere. We, tion. If the desire should be expressed, the support in full accordance with the Treaty as the party which is offering its good ser- Somali and the Ethiopian delegations may of Friendship and Cooperation between our vices, consider that the central task should meet without the participation of the Soviet countries. now comprise the cessation of military ac- representatives. tions. This is the appeal we make to both We would be prepared after the meet- July 26 the Somali and the Ethiopian sides. ing with the Ethiopian delegation, if it It is our opinion that the issue currently should be deemed necessary, to engage in [...] [I] Remarked for my part, that the stands as follows: either the Horn of Afri- further discussion with the Somali experts interlocutor repeated all of those factors, can will become an arena where imperialist with the objective of working out a unified which had been expressed by him during and reactionary intrigues are carried out, or approach, of identifying a range of ques- the previous discussion. Meanwhile, the by our common efforts we will succeed in tions, which would be appropriate to dis- situation in the Horn of Africa continues to turning the Horn of Africa into a region of cuss, and likewise of identifying procedural become more complicated and explosive. friendly relations and peace. questions. We think that this situation dictates the ne- We appeal to both delegations to take The views which might be expressed cessity of introducing certain amendments a seat at the negotiating table, to speak forth in this connection by our delegation, may to the considerations of the two parties. their own views and, correspondingly, to lis- be reduced, in summary, to the following; From the declaration of the Somali ten fully to each other’s point of view, hav- 1) the acknowledgment that the con- delegation it follows that the delegation pos- ing devoted their full attention to the search tinuation of tensions between the two sesses the authority to discuss only territo- for a path to the normalization of the rela- countries is not consistent with the in- rial problems. We were told that the efforts tions between the two countries. terest of the Ethiopian and Somali na- of the Somali leadership, the efforts of the This is our point of view. tions; leaders of certain African countries, and like- [...] Returning to the bilateral Somali- 2) the renunciation by the two sides of wise the efforts of Comrade F. Castro in the Ethiopian meeting, H.A. Kasim said, that if the use of force in the resolution of dis- settlement of the disputed problems of So- the question should be raised concerning the puted questions; the attempt to apply mali and Ethiopia did not meet with suc- military actions of Somalia against Ethio- every effort to their settlement by cess. From this [fact] should the conclu- pia, that the Somali delegation would have peaceful means, by means of negotia- sion be drawn that, insofar as the efforts of nothing further to discuss at the negotiating tions; third countries have not been successful, the table. A war is going on between Ethiopia 3) the obligation of the two sides to disputed questions must be resolved with the and the liberation movement of the Somali maintain peace and security on their assistance of arms, by means of open mili- people who live in occupied territory. The borders, to abstain from every sort of tary actions? Our point of view is that all struggle is being conducted precisely by this hostile activity, from engaging in hos- disputed questions should be resolved by movement, and not by the Somali Demo- tile propaganda against one another by peaceful means, by means of negotiations. cratic Republic. means of the mass media and to foster, For the sake of this objective no efforts of What military actions should be in every possible way, those efforts any sort should be begrudged. ceased? After all we are discussing a which will lead to the development of The Soviet side regarded with satisfac- struggle for liberation, and, as is well known, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 69 from the moment of the Great October so- their efforts in the struggle against the should take the appropriate steps and should cialist revolution the Soviet Union has in- common enemy, imperialism. stop the escalation of tension. variably supported liberation movements in 5) The two parties express their agree- all corners of the globe. The very activities ment to establish and maintain contacts [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1620, ll. 3- of the Soviet Union in the United Nations with each other at a variety of levels in 31; translation by Sally Kux.] are a testimony to this fact. the interests of reaching the above- I would like to repeat once more that mentioned goals. Memorandum of Conversation between we are prepared to sit down at the negotiat- [I] underscored the fact that we regard Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. ing table, if the Ethiopian side will discuss this as a working document which contains Ratanov and Mengistu, 29 July 1977 the territorial dispute as a fundamental is- the recommendations of the Soviet side, sue, but if the Ethiopian side will only put which is fulfilling its mission to offer good TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2 forward the issue of the alleged Somali mili- services. It goes without saying that we are From diary of 9 August 1977 tary actions, then there will not be any proceeding from the assumption that it will A. P. RATANOV Ser. No. 276 progress either in the work of this meeting, be brought to the attention of the Somali or in our bilateral relations. government. NOTES OF CONVERSATION I do not know, H.A. Kasim said in con- H.A. Kasim declared that the Somali with Chairman of PMAC of Ethiopia clusion, whether the Soviet Union will be delegation had nothing to add to the con- HAILE MARIAMOM MENGISTU able to do anything under these circum- siderations which the delegation had ex- 29 July 1977 stances. Unfortunately, we have the dismal pressed earlier, and offered his assurance example of the mediation of F. Castro, when that the recommendations which were ex- We received a visit from Mengistu and Mengistu Haile Mariam declared the inex- pressed by the Soviet side, would be brought transmitted to him a message from Com- pedience of raising the territorial question, to the attention of the Somali leadership. rade L. I. Brezhnev in response to a com- but was prepared to discuss any other ques- [...] [I] thanked H.A. Kasim for his munication from Mengistu, which was pre- tions of secondary importance. communication and said that I would like sented to Comrade Brezhnev for Comrade Trust in our candor, we will regret it if to make note again of certain elements, A. P. Kirilenko by the General Secretary of the good services of the USSR do not lead which were contained in the message of re- the PMAC, Fikre Selassie Wogderes. to a positive result. sponse from L.I. Brezhnev to Siad Barre’s Mengistu asked that we convey to appeal to him in May of this year. “In agree- Comrade Brezhnev his deep appreciation for July 29 ing to offer our good services,” announced the fraternal and candid message. We L.I. Brezhnev, “we approach this matter with agreed, and conveyed to Mengistu the ad- [...] Taking into account the separate ex- seriousness and a sense of responsibility. We vice contained in the communication. changes of opinion taking place with the think that it should be possible to begin a Mengistu placed great value on the fact main Somali and Ethiopian delegations, the dialogue on a broad basis with the goal of that the Soviet Union is rendering support Soviet representative, by way of offering his establishing good relations between Soma- to Ethiopia, notwithstanding that this is lead- good services, will introduce for consider- lia and Ethiopia. We consider that the key ing to definite complications in Soviet-So- ation in the course of the work an idea of which might open the road to cooperation mali relations. We understand, said the first steps, which would lead toward the in the search for a settlement to difficult dis- Mengistu in this connection, that the Soviet normalization of relations between Soma- puted problems lies in neighborly relations Union is confronted with a complex di- lia and Ethiopia: in the Horn of Africa.” lemma: rendering military assistance to 1) The renunciation of the application It is hardly necessary for me to com- Ethiopia, it risks a loss of its opportunity in of force in the resolution of disputed ment on this text; it speaks for itself. Somalia (e.g., Berbera). We are consider- questions. The assumption of imme- The Soviet Union offered its good ser- ing these questions, said Mengistu, and con- diate measures in the cessation of mili- vices even before the exacerbation of rela- sider ourselves accountable to the revolu- tary and other hostile activities. tions between Somalia and Ethiopia. But tionary debt inhering in the obligation to take 2) The assumption by both parties of even after this exacerbation we consider it into account the interests of the Soviet Union the obligation to maintain peace and necessary to continue our mission, in order in this region. Together with this, he ob- security on the borders. to achieve the improvement of relations be- served, we hope that the victory of the Ethio- 3) To abstain from conducting hostile tween the two countries, to create a favor- pian anti-imperialist revolution will contrib- propaganda against one another by able atmosphere for the successful discus- ute to the common revolutionary cause. means of the mass media, to encour- sion of all disputed issues. In response to the representations of the age efforts which would lead to the de- Meanwhile, while our consultations are Soviet Ambassador (the conference with velopment of friendly relations. going on, the Soviet leaders have appealed Mengistu was one on one) that it is neces- 4) The acknowledgment by both par- twice with a personal message to President sary to struggle not against Somalia, but in ties of the fact that maintaining tensions Siad. As recently as yesterday, L.I. support of Somalia, Mengistu said that he between Somalia and Ethiopia is not Brezhnev sent President Siad a personal agreed with this. So far, for example, the consistent with the interests of their message, the substance of which, in brief, PMAC has not rendered support to the peoples and impedes the unification of consisted of his desire that the Somali side forces in Somalia which are operating 70 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

against Siad Barre and seeking assistance publishing houses. AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO in Ethiopia. We are not organizing, said Mengistu declared that implementation SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA Mengistu, partisan movements in Somalia, of the program of propaganda of Marxist- /s/ RATANOV although specific opportunities for that have Leninist ideas has indeed been unsatisfac- presented themselves and continue to do so. tory. For this reason, the PMAC has reor- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. At the same time, representations of Eritrean ganized the Provisional Bureau of Mass 113-116; translated by Bruce McDonald.] organizations have been established in Organization Affairs [POMOA] and re- Mogadishu, along with a people’s revolu- placed its leadership. Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo tionary party, the Ethiopian Democratic Concerning the Chinese, Mengistu Meeting, 4 August 1977 (excerpt) Union, and Fronts for the Liberation of noted that they are not only disseminating Tigray and Oromia, not to mention the head- literature, but are rendering direct support Top Secret quarters of the “Revolutionary Front of to Eritrean separatists and extremists. Single copy Western Somalia.” In the course of the discussion, a num- Minutes In response to the representations of the ber of questions were touched upon in con- Soviet Ambassador, following on the direc- nection with the structure of the Ethiopian MEETING OF THE tives of communications from Comrade L. armed forces. CC CPSU POLITBURO I. Brezhnev, concerning the need for pres- In conclusion, Mengistu stated as fol- ervation of a dialogue with Somalia, lows: “We are attentive to the advice of our 4 August 1977 Mengistu proclaimed that he was in agree- Soviet comrades in connection with the ment with the concepts and representations search for political solutions to both domes- Chaired by: Com. KIRILENKO, A.P of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. We accepted, tic and foreign problems. We will continue he continued, the suggestions of the Soviet to strive for this in the future, and have al- Attended: Comrades Y.V. Andropov, F.D. Union regarding the organization of a So- ready been required to execute many per- Kulakov, K.T. Mazurov, A.Y. Pel’she, P.N. mali-Ethiopian meeting in Moscow, when sons or place them in prison. At the present Demichev, B.N. Ponomarev, M.S. Somalia cut short its subversive activity in time I, for example, am restraining those Solomentsev, M.V. Zimianin, Y.P. Ryabov, the Ogadan, and [we] are agreeable to con- who are proposing repressive measures, in- K.V. Rusakov. tinuing those discussions now, even as So- cluding those against errant organizations malia has stationed a portion of its regular who proclaim their adherence to Marxism- 8. About the address to the leadership of the troops on the territory of Ethiopia. Together Leninism but who are struggling against the progressive African states in relation to the with this, the PMAC will not grant territo- PMAC. The main goal at the present time sharpening of Somali-Ethiopian relations. rial concessions to Somalia, although this is to create a political party and a new is because in such a case the present Ethio- worker-peasant army, inasmuch as the old KUZNETSOV reports that the Ethio- pian government will fall. Already at this army has displayed its weakness, and it turns pians have sent a complaint to the Organi- time, Mengistu noted in this connection, out that in military terms the counter-revo- zation for African Unity, and that our ad- there is talk among the people, and even in lution is stronger than the PMAC had sup- dress to the leadership of the progressive right-wing circles, to the effect that the posed.” African states with an appeal to take steps PMAC is not up to the task of defending For his part, the Soviet Ambassador toward the normalization of Somali-Ethio- either Ethiopia or the Ogadan, and that it again laid emphasis on the need to preserve, pian relations would be very tlmely. should therefore be deposed. Berhanu no matter what, contacts with the leadership PONOMAREVsupports Kuznetsov’s Bayeh, Mengistu continued, has been sum- of the SDR. proposal. moned to Addis Ababa for consultation, and The Soviet Ambassador additionally KIRILENKO: The situation which we afterward he will return to Moscow with- directed Mengistu’s attention to the fact that have here with these two countries is ex- out delay, inasmuch as the PMAC has en- the representations in his letter to Comrade tremely complicated. We have no reasons gaged and continues to engage in friendly Brezhnev concerning the supposed inad- to quarrel with either the Somali side or the negotiations with the Somalis over questions equacies of military supplies did not corre- Ethiopian side, but we have only limited relating to the establishment of multi-fac- spond to reality. capabilities to influence their mutual rela- eted Ethiopian-Somali cooperation. Mengistu responded to that by stating tions. We need to make a decision. Mengistu promised to consider the form (for that, evidently, the translation of those re- example, his interview with the Ethiopian marks was inexact, inasmuch as he had in [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 37, ll. 44, news agency) for additional presentations mind not the inadequacy of supplies of one 48; translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.] of the PMAC program for peaceful resolu- or another sort of weapon, but rather a re- tion of Ethiopian-Somali disagreements, as quest to augment them with supplies of a Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. well as the Eritrean problem. different technical sort, in particular, that the Ratanov, Memorandum of Conversa- The Soviet Ambassador directed supply of tanks be augmented with supplies tion with Mengistu, 5 August 1977 Mengistu’s attention to the anti-socialist and of trailers for their transport from port, con- even anti-Soviet (Maoist) propaganda which veyance to their place of destination, etc. SECRET, copy No. 2 is being disseminating by certain private From the journal of “11” August 1977 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 71

Ratanov, A.P. Issue No. 284 In conclusion Mengistu requested that French have begun use their aircraft to de- he be kept informed of possible steps that liver French arms to Mogadishu. The RECORD OF CONVERSATION the Soviet Union would take. Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, under the with Chairman of the PMAC of Ethiopia During the course of the negotiations, cover of Eritrean separatist organizations, MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM the Soviet ambassador informed Mengistu are transferring their detachments and arms 5 August 1977 about the decision of the Soviet government into Eritrea. Sudan is supplying the sepa- to deliver trailers for the transport of tanks, ratists with American arms as well as arms I visited Mengistu at his invitation helicopters, and vehicles, from the port of they have recently received from the (Berhanu Bayeh, a member of the Perma- entry to their destinations. People’s Republic of China. nent Committee of the PMAC, also took part Our struggle, Mengistu underscored, in the conversation). AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR has the nature of a class struggle, and we After thanking the Soviet Union for TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA are doing all we can to defend the revolu- rendering assistance to Ethiopia, including (signature) /A. RATANOV/ tion and to bring it to a victorious conclu- the decision about the delivery of trailers, sion. At the same time, taking into account helicopters, and vehicles, Mengistu asked [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. that the Ethiopian revolution is just a part me to convey the following to the Soviet 127-128; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.] of the larger revolutionary struggle, leadership and to comrade Brezhnev in par- Mengistu continued, I feel a need to con- ticular: Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. tinue the consultations with Comrade L.I. The PMAC has attentively studied the Ratanov, Memorandum of Conversa- Brezhnev which began in May of this year. advice in comrade L.I. Brezhnev’s reply, and tion with Mengistu, 7 August 1977 I likewise appealed, he noted at the same will follow it, in particular: to aim for the time, with a letter to Comrades Fidel Castro political resolution of Ethiopian-Somali dif- and Erich Honecker in which I proposed that ferences. On August 8, Berhanu Bayeh, as I meet with them in Berlin in the hope that well as governmental advisers Mikael Imru From the journal of TOP SECRET together we might travel to Moscow to meet and Getachew Kibret, will fly to Moscow A. P. RATANOV Copy no. 2 with Comrade L.I. Brezhnev in order to dis- to continue negotiations with the Somali del- 16 August 1977 cuss in greater detail the situation in the in- egation. re: no. 292 terior and exterior of Ethiopia. Despite this, Mengistu continued, So- Mengistu did not answer the question malia is continuing its escalation of mili- Record of Conversation of the Soviet Ambassador as to whether the tary actions against Ethiopia. At present it with the Head of the PMAC current situation would allow him to leave is conducting systematic bombing raids on MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM the country. He confined himself to the re- cities in the Ogaden (Dollo - on the border 7 August 1977 mark that the old machinery of State re- with Kenya), and the PMAC is anticipating quired replacement[;] however, the PMAC that Harar, Dire-Dawa, etc. will be bombed. I visited Mengistu Haile Mariam was currently not yet in a position to do this As a consequence of these bombing raids, (Legesse Asfaw, member of the Permanent due to the lack of revolutionary cadres, etc.... industrial and agricultural firms and infra- Committee of the PMAC, also took part in In the course of further conversation structure are being destroyed. Thus far the conversation). Mengistu asked [us] to examine the possi- Ethiopian air forces have limited their bomb- 1. In accordance with my instructions bility of offering assistance likewise in for- ing raids to Somali tanks and artillery, and from the Center [Moscow], I informed tifying the region of the Red Sea coast (sup- air battles with Somali planes, and has re- Mengistu about the measures taken by the plying coastal batteries). frained from bombing Somali cities because Soviet leadership in support of Ethiopia. Mengistu likewise spoke out in favor this would create a major military confla- Mengistu requested that I convey his of sending a Soviet military delegation to gration in this region. We do not intend to deep gratitude to the Soviet leadership and Ethiopia in the immediate future in order to attack Somalia, Mengistu emphasized. personally to L.I. Brezhnev for the infor- strengthen contacts between the armed In connection with his statement, mation about these measures. We deeply forces of the two countries in accordance Mengistu requested that the Soviet govern- trust the Soviet Union, he said, and are re- with the previously approved plan of ex- ment consider taking additional measures to lying on its future support, since the situa- changes in the area of the military. In his influence Somalia, even some type of eco- tion in the border regions of Ethiopia is be- opinion, an Ethiopian military delegation nomic sanctions, and at the same time con- coming more and more complicated. So- might visit the Soviet Union with the goal vey to the Somali government that Ethiopia malia continues daily to bomb the cities of of familiarizing themselves later, when the is prepared to hold talks with Somalia with Dolo and Barre [sic]. There are Somali military situation had been stabilized. the participation of the Soviet Union. What troops in the western Ogaden and we are 2. [I] carried out my instructions re- is important now is to bring about a halt in now observing the movement of Somali garding the question of the Soviet-Ethiopian Somali air attacks because these attacks de- units into the northern part of this region. negotiations on opening a direct sea route moralize the army as well as the peaceful Ethiopian troops have seized arms which between the ports of the Soviet Union and population and could cause a political cri- appear to be NATO arms. According to cer- Ethiopia. sis in the regime. tain, as yet unverified information, the Mengistu spoke in favor of the open- 72 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

ing of such a route and of concluding an military government of socialist Ethiopia Ethiopia and Somalia, in accordance agreement on this issue as well as on the received a communication from the Soviet with the provisions and principles of issue of an intergovernmental agreement on ambassador in Addis-Ababa that the meet- the Charter, to cease all military ac- shipping. ing would take place in Moscow on an ex- tions. 3. [I] carried out my instructions re- pert level from 26-28 July 1977. The same 3) Affirms the non-agreement of the garding the question of the Republic of communication noted that prior to and dur- OAU with intervention by any foreign South Africa’s impending nuclear arms test- ing the course of the meeting both Ethiopia powers, and, in particular, by non-Af- ing. Mengistu welcomed the Soviet Gov- and Somalia should refrain from any steps rican powers, in the internal affairs of ernment initiative on this issue (TASS an- that would complicate matters. Ethiopia member-states of the OAU; calls for nouncement). At the same time he remarked also received assurances that Somalia would the rejection of any non-sanctioned in- that at the last OAU [meeting], Ethiopia had not begin military actions. tervention in accordance with the de- proposed to include on the agenda for the 3. On 23 July 1977, three days before cision of the XIV assembly of the heads Assembly the issue of the threat of the cre- the beginning of the Moscow meeting, So- of states and governments. ation of a nuclear arsenal in the Republic of malia began open and direct aggressive ac- 4) Calls upon all states to refrain from South Africa with the assistance of Western tion against Ethiopia, thereby repudiating any actions which could be detrimen- powers; however, the bloc of the so-called those very conditions necessary for the suc- tal to the achievement of understand- Francophone countries rejected the Ethio- cess of the meeting. ing between the sides in the conflict, pian proposal. At the current time, said 4. The Ethiopian delegation, headed increase tension and conflict, and Mengistu, it is imperative that the socialist by Major Berhanu Bayeh, of the permanent threaten the peace, security, and terri- and progressive African countries develop committee of the Provisional Military Ad- torial integrity of the two neighboring a campaign to prevent the fortification of ministrative Council, came to Moscow at states. the military power of the Republic of South the appointed time to explain to the Soviet 5) Recommends in connection with the Africa which threatens all of Africa. government that the situation that had arisen serious proposal by the executive or- In conclusion, Mengistu requested at that time as a consequence of Somalia’s gans of the president of the Commit- once again that we convey his gratitude to actions involved a range of factors which tee of the OAU to offer its good of- the Soviet leadership and to Comrade L.I. would have a negative impact on the pro- fices to enter into contact with the Brezhnev. posed meeting, and, accordingly, that there heads of state of Ethiopia and Somalia was no practical purpose in holding such a in an effort to achieve a cease-fire and AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR meeting. create a situation that would be con- TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA 5. The Ethiopian delegation noted its ducive to the peaceful resolution of the /s/ A.RATANOV/ surprise at the fact that Somalia insisted on problem.” discussing what it called the “territorial 7. Taking the aforementioned into ac- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, l l . question.” Ethiopia has no territorial dis- count, it was decided that the Ethiopian del- 102-104.] pute with Somalia; moreover, Ethiopia con- egation should take part in the Moscow dis- siders it inappropriate to hold talks under cussions on the basis of the recommenda- Ethiopian Aide-Memoire to Soviet duress. tions of the OAU, made in Libreville, and Officials in Moscow, 11 August 1977 6. The working document that the So- the Soviet working document consisting of viet Union presented to the Ethiopian del- the following ideas about the first steps nec- Delivered by the Ethiopian egation was studied attentively and deliv- essary for the normalization of relations be- delegation to the Soviet ered to Addis-Ababa. It was also taken into tween Ethiopia and Somalia: delegation at the reception account that the situation which led to ag- 1) The two sides should refrain from on 11 August 1977 gressive actions by Somali had not changed. the use of force to resolve their dis- The OAU’s offer of its good offices to Ethio- putes. Measures should be taken to end Translated from English pia and Somalia at the Committee session military and other hostile actions. from 5-8 August 1977 in Libreville, Gabon, 2) The two sides should take steps to AIDE-MEMOIRE is very significant; at the session a series of preserve peace and security on their recommendations were passed, which re- borders. 1. During the course of discussions solved the following: 3) They should refrain from hostile between comrades Mengistu Haile Mariam “1) Affirms resolution 16(1) and reso- propaganda in the mass media against and in April 1977 in Mos- lutions 27(2), obligating member- one another and stimulate efforts which cow, the Soviet Union first came up with states, in accordance with the OAU would lead to the development of the idea for a joint meeting of the leaders of charter, to respect the borders existing friendly relations. Ethiopia and Somalia in an effort to dimin- at the time of independence, and also 4) The two sides should recognize the ish the possibility of conflict and create the to respect the basic principles of the fact that continued tension between preconditions which could lead to harmo- inviolability of sovereignty and terri- Somalia and Ethiopia is not in the in- nious cooperation between the two states. torial integrity of member-states. terest of their peoples, and presents an 2. In mid-July 1977 the provisional 2) Calls on the sides of the conflict, obstacle to their combining forces in COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 73

the struggle against the common en- filled the assignment. search for a mutually acceptable resolution, emy - imperialism. MAZUROV, ANDROPOV, PELSHE directed at the normalization of Somali- 5) The two sides should agree to the emphasize the importance of the proposed Ethiopian relations. establishment and maintenance of con- measures for assistance to Ethiopia. At the same time, I ascertained, as a tacts between them on various levels The resolution was adopted. result of the separate meetings and conver- in the interests of achieving the stated sations which had taken place with the So- goals. [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 37, ll. 51, mali and the Ethiopian delegations, that both It would be desirable to maintain the 56; translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.] parties still maintained uncompromising and order of the points, as they were writ- virtually mutually exclusive positions. ten in the working document. Record of Soviet-Somali Talks, Moscow, Nonetheless, the Soviet delegation 8. The Ethiopian delegation hopes that 12 August 1977 (excerpts), with Somali considers, as before, that in the development agreement to the aforementioned will lead aide-memoire, 10 August 1977 of events nothing has happened which to a cessation of military actions as well as would make unrealizable the execution of to the liquidation of the consequences of ag- From the journal of Secret. Copy no. 8 the Soviet working document. This docu- gression in the context and spirit of the cor- L.F. Ilichev 26 August 1977 ment remains valid and in fact acquires even responding decisions of the OAU. No. 2289/GS more significance, insofar as the escalation of military actions continues. It goes with- Translated by S. Berezhkov (signature) Record of a Conversation out saying that the Soviet side is aware of with the Minister of Mineral and Water the difficulties which have arisen and un- Original No. 2290/GS Resources of Somalia, derstands the approach of each of the del- Head of Delegation of Experts egations in their consideration of the cur- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1635, ll. HUSSEIN ABDULKADIR KASIM rent issues. But it would obviously be hasty 55-57; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.] (second level) to come to conclusions of any sort which would “slam the door.” On the contrary, CC CPSU Politburo transcript, The head of the [Somali] delegation the door is open to the search for a rational 11 August 1977 (excerpt) returned to Moscow from Mogadishu on 7 solution to the questions which stand be- August 1977. Meetings took place at the tween the two countries, with both of whom Top Secret residence of the Somali Delegation from 8- the Soviet Union has friendly relations. Single Copy 12 August 1977. On 13 August the head of I expressed my gratitude to my inter- Minutes the delegation returned to Mogadishu. locutor and to the members of the Somali delegation for their cooperation with the MEETING OF THE 12 August Soviet side. The discussions which took CC CPSU POLITBURO place were characterized by candor, as be- 11 August 1977 [H.A. Kasim stated:] [...]As regards the fits discussions between friends. I also ex- position of the Soviet delegation, it has be- pressed the hope that, after their consulta- Chaired by: Comrade KIRILENKO, A.P. come clearly defined for us in the course of tions with their leadership, the Somali del- the conversations which have taken place. egation would once again return to Moscow Attended: Comrades Y.V. Andropov, F.D. We have noted your reaction to the Somali in order to continue this exchange of opin- Kulakov, K.T. Mazurov, A.Y. Pel’she, P.N. point of view concerning the Soviet work- ions. Demichev, M.S. Solomentsev, I.V. ing document. In conclusion, I inquired as to when the Kapitonov, M.V. Zimianin, Y.P. Riabov, K.V. We would like, in the spirit of com- Somali delegation intended to return to Rusakov. radeship, H.A. Kasim added, to express our Mogadishu. deep thanks to the Soviet side for the enor- H. A. Kasim responded, that the del- [. . .]11. On additional measures for normal- mous efforts which it has made in the search egation would depart on the Aeroflot flight ization of the situation in the Horn of Africa for a common platform at the Somali-Ethio- on Sunday, August 13. and on assistance and support for the lead- pian meeting. Our delegation fully shares Having expressed his thanks for the ership of Ethiopia. (The issue was presented the view that the Soviet mission of good hospitality which was accorded to the So- by comrades Andropov, Kuznetsov, services is continuing. However, given the mali representatives in Moscow, H. A. Sokolov). current situation the Somali delegation con- Kasim requested that we continue our dis- siders it imperative to return to Mogadishu cussion privately. KIRILENKO: Leonid llych to report on the situation, which has taken In a tete-a-tete conversation, H. A. [Brezhnev] requested that the Ethiopian shape during the negotiations to the CC Kasim said the following. appeal be considered as soon as possible, SRSP and to the government of Somalia. First: The Somali delegation had re- and to do everything possible to give them [I] underscored that the Soviet Union ceived an alarming communication about the necessary assistance. He entrusted Com- intends to continue its good services mis- certain schemes concerning Ethiopia. As is rades Gromyko, Ustinov, and Andropov to sion. I thanked my interlocutor for his high well known, Somalia values the fact that prepare proposals. The Comrades have ful- estimation of the efforts of the USSR in the Ethiopia maintains friendly relations with 74 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the Soviet Union and that Ethiopia has pro- this. irreversibility of which would be fraught claimed the principles of socialist orienta- [I] expressed thanks for the informa- with serious consequences. tion. In spite of the fact that Somali dis- tion. I noted that the initial communication Therefore the Soviet leaders, as friends, agrees with Ethiopia’s evaluation of these of the Somali delegation was of an exces- advise your leaders to weigh all of the cir- principles and that, in the Somali view, sively general nature. The schemes of im- cumstances and to approach this matter from Ethiopia has not yet found the path of genu- perialist and reactionary Arab circles and a broad public and international position. ine anti-imperialism, nonetheless, one may their intentions are generally well known. The Soviet Union hopes to avoid a conflict hope that the steps which Ethiopia has taken Imperialism and reactionism intend to strike in the relations of two countries, with both at the present time will lead to constructive a blow not only at Ethiopia, but also at So- of whom it has friendly relations. The most results. malia. They are not happy with the social- important task now is to stop the escalation Although the available information ist course which has been proclaimed in both of tension, to put an end to the bloodshed. presents a picture which is far from com- of these countries. Naturally, it is impera- It appears to us that there is no other basis plete, it is considered in Mogadishu that tive to be vigilant. for a settlement now than that one which Ethiopia could “slip through our fingers” The situation, which has developed in was proposed by the Soviet side in the work- and go over to the other camp. It would be the relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, ing document, which the Ethiopian side has shameful for history if, at the very moment in the view of the Soviet side, is favorable accepted and which, unfortunately, the So- when efforts are being undertaken to orga- to the realization of the goals of imperial- mali side has refused to accept. nize negotiations between Somali and Ethio- ism and reactionism. The path down which Up to this point the course of negotia- pia concerning significant issues, Ethiopia Somalia has started with the aim of creat- tions, as it appears to us, does not satisfy should return to the camp of its traditional ing, in your words, a “socialist monolith” your two delegations, but the Soviet side is allies in the West. in , is likely to undermine the also not satisfied, although the Soviet side [My] Interlocutor said that as the So- goals you have placed before yourself. We is taking all possible steps. Nonetheless, we viet side knows, Somalia hopes to create a are aware of the fact that in Ethiopia there consider it imperative to continue our ef- strong government in East Africa, which are reactionary forces, that there is an inter- forts toward reaching a turning-point in the would unite Ethiopia and Somalis on a so- nal counter-revolution, that there is a events which would be satisfactory to the cialist basis. This hope is expressed not with struggle going on in Ethiopia. interests of the forces of progress and so- the intention of tossing about catchwords, However, according to our informa- cialism. but on the strength of the fact that these two tion, the core leadership of Ethiopia is tak- H.A. Kasim noted that Siad Barre, in a countries are close in terms of ethnicity, ge- ing a progressive course. Here, unfortu- conversation with the Soviet ambassador, ography, and, Somalia hopes as before, ideo- nately, we disagree with you in our evalua- had indeed said that Somalia did not object logically. If the creation of such a united tion. to assistance, including military assistance, government should be successful, it would As is well known, in a discussion with offered by the Soviet Union to Ethiopia. represent a force and a buttress which is the Soviet ambassador, Siad Barre declared However, he also spoke of the necessity of imperative for the socialist development of that the Somali government did not oppose maintaining proportions. My interlocutor East Africa. the granting of assistance to Ethiopia by the declared that he would like to express his This is why in Somalia we are con- Soviet Union within the framework of the candid hope that the Soviet Union would cerned by such communications and con- agreement which exists between the two approach with understanding the issue that, sider it imperative to bring them to the at- countries. We offer assistance to Ethiopia, until the time has arrived when the question tention of the Soviet side. just as we offered assistance to Somalia, but, of the part of Somali territory has been re- Second: Ethiopia has come forward as you are aware, this assistance is intended solved, the Somali revolution will be in dan- with rather resolute declarations in the press to serve the aim of defense, not aggression. ger. Moreover, this danger does not come and on the radio to the effect that Ethiopia [I] said that I had not happened to see from within, but rather from the very part intends to teach Somalia a lesson which in the press declarations of the Ethiopian of the Somali territory which is now under Somalia will never forget, and also to the leadership to the effect that they intend to Ethiopian rule. A similar danger is caused effect that Ethiopia intends to lead an open “teach Somalia a lesson.” It is possible, that by the enormous efforts to achieve national war against Somalia, having received in the this matter is the work of the mass media. liberation made by Somalis, who are living meantime, assistance from socialist coun- Unfortunately, the mass media in both coun- on territory which does not form a part of tries, including, among others, the Soviet tries has strayed too far in their mutual ac- Somalia. In order for Somalia to contribute Union. The Somali delegation would like cusations. Therefore the Soviet Union has to the building of socialism all over the to ask the Soviet representatives, in their appealed not to give free rein to emotions, world, all of the Somali nation must stand capacity as friends, if there is a measure of but rather to act with reason, proceeding not firmly on its legs. truth in this. The Somali side considers that from national interests, but rather from in- At the meeting of Siad Barre with the a force is at work in Ethiopia, if not in gov- ternational interests, from the interests of former president of the PMAC of Ethiopia ernment circles, then in other sorts of circles strengthening the position of progressive Tefere Bante, it was proposed that the latter in Addis Ababa, which is creating a war hys- forces. A dangerous situation has now been should become the leader of a federation of teria. That is why the delegation considers created and if it is not gotten under control Somalia and Ethiopia in order that this might it imperative to inform the Soviet side about it may develop into a serious conflict, the resolve the national question. However, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 75

Ethiopia responded negatively to this propo- Likewise taking into account the concur- tion, is in clear contradiction to this noble sition and, as a result, the situation which rence of the USSR in carrying out its inter- principle; has been created in Western Somalia is al- national socialist obligations to undertake a The Somali delegation proposes the ready getting out of control. H.A. Kasim similar mission of good services after re- following in the capacity of a basis for dis- expressed the hope that the Soviet side fully ceiving the full concurrence of the govern- cussion: understands the meaning of these words. ments of Somalia and Ethiopia; “The decolonialization of the Somali [I] declared that I could only repeat Taking into consideration that the govern- territory and its population, which finds it- what I had already said and that I hoped that ment of the Somali Democratic Republic has self under Ethiopian rule.” its meaning was correctly understood by the empowered this high level delegation to rep- Somali side. I added, that it is necessary to resent itself in discussions and negotiations * When the head of the Somali delegation realize all of the responsibility which will on the aforementioned question; delivered the document, he called it a work- lie on Somalia, if there is no cessation of Taking into consideration likewise, the ex- ing message, laying out the views of the military actions. change of opinions between the Soviet and delegation regarding the principal question.- The following people were present at the Somali sides in the course of the last -S.B. the discussions: on the Soviet side was the week of July and 8 August 1977; head of the DPO of the USSR Ministry of Responding to the appeal of the Soviet rep- Translated by S. Berezhkov Foreign Affairs, O. N. Khlestov; the head resentative, made to the Somali delegation of the Third African Department of the on 8 August 1977 to present a working docu- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1620, ll, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V. A. ment which might serve as the basis for dis- 32-59; translated by Sally Kux.] Ustinov; on the Somali side was member of cussions; the CC SRSP, Director of the Somali De- Recognizing the fact that the colonialization Record of Negotiations between Somali velopment Bank, Jama Mohammud; mem- by Ethiopia of a significant portion of So- and Soviet Officials in Moscow, ber of the CC SRSP, Head of the Depart- mali territory and its population represents 15-19 August 1977 (excerpts) ment of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry the sole reason for the tension which has of the CC SRSP Ahmed Mohammed Duale, been created at the current moment in the From the journal of Secret. Copy No. 8 the Ambassador of the Somali Democratic Horn of Africa and that such tension with- L.F. Ilichev 31 August 1977 Republic to the USSR, Ali Ismail Warsma, out any doubt is not consistent with the in- No. 2325/GS the Military Attache of the Somali Demo- terests of the people of the given region, but cratic Republic to the USSR Salah Hadji. rather only serves the interests of their com- Record of Conversation The discussions were translated by the mon enemy, international imperialism and with the Minister of Mineral and Water Third Secretary of the Translation Depart- neocolonialism; Resources of Somalia, ment of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Af- Being firmly convinced that the primary Head of Delegation of Experts fairs, S. V. Berezhkov, and transcribed by cause of the lengthy dispute between So- Hussein Abdulkadir Kasim the Third Secretary of the Third African malia and Ethiopia is the continuing (third level) Department of the USSR Ministry of For- colonialization and military occupation by eign Affairs, R. A. Ibragimov. Ethiopia of a significant portion of Somali The head of the Somali delegation of territory and its population and that the experts returned to Moscow on 14 August Deputy Minister decolonialization of this territory takes ab- 1977. Meetings took place at the residence USSR Foreign Affairs solute priority over all other questions; of the Somali Delegation from 15-19 Au- (signed and typed) L. Ilichev Taking into consideration the fact that a dis- gust 1977. On 20 August the delegation cussion of the consequences of the colonial returned to Mogadishu. [attachment] occupation, which is being carried out at the present time by Ethiopia, without a discus- 15 August Delivered by the Somali sion of the central question of decolon- delegation to the Soviet ialization makes it impossible and futile to [...] Moreover, in confidence it had delegation at the meeting of conduct constructive negotiations; been said to the head of the Somali delega- 10 August 1977* Proceeding from the Leninist principle of tion, that the Soviet leaders and L.I. the inalienable right of all peoples to self- Brezhnev in person had appealed once again Translated from English [into Russian] determination, human dignity, liberty and with a message to President Siad, in which national sovereignty, a principle which is was expressed the point of view of the So- Taking into account the fact that the Somali clearly fixed in the United Nations Charter viet side with regard to the events, which government has appealed to the government and which was subsequently reflected in were taking place in the region of the Horn of the USSR to offer its good services to- Resolution 1514 of the UN General Assem- of Africa. This had been done before the ward the resolution of the territorial dispute bly, and likewise from the fact that any publication of the TASS statement. between Somali and Ethiopia with the ob- policy of Ethiopia, which is directed at the [...] jective of reaching a fair, peaceful, and stable perpetuation of colonial rule over the afore- resolution of this territorial dispute; mentioned Somali territory and its popula- 17 August 76 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

rialist propaganda. 23 August 1977 [...] [I] underscored that the Soviet good At the same time he expressed alarm services mission, as follows from the ex- at the “avalanche of declarations and com- During the course of the conversation, change of messages between L.I. Brezhnev mentary appearing in the Soviet press,” be- which took place at the Soviet Embassy, Jose and Siad Barre, is not charged with facili- ginning on 14 August, noting, that such dec- Perez Novoa, on his own initiative, opened tating the discussion of any particular con- larations are pouring oil on the fire of impe- the conversation with a question about send- crete question or questions which have rialist propaganda at the very moment when ing Cuban military personnel to Ethiopia in arisen in relations between Somalia and the Soviet Union is conducting a good ser- accordance with Mengistu’s request. After Ethiopia, such as, for example, the territo- vices mission, whose aim is to assist in find- this he asked the following: “You had di- rial question, for the parties which are in ing a solution to the situation which has been rected attention to the inappropriateness of conflict are more familiar with the substance created in East Africa. Such reports hardly the announcement by the leader of the Cu- of the matter. In the current situation it is further the fulfillment of the good services ban military specialists in Ethiopia, Arnoldo difficult to imagine how it will be possible mission and they could not have been Ochoa [to the effect that] ‘you were right to resolve any sort of concrete question. printed without the consent of the Soviet that the decision to send Cuban personnel After all, in order for that to happen it is government. In his words, the campaign in to Ethiopia does not depend on Havana, but necessary to create the appropriate condi- the Soviet press does not promote the cre- on Moscow.’ This was the case, as the Cu- tions. Therefore the Soviet side sees its good ation of a situation which would be favor- ban ambassador to Addis Ababa found out. services mission first and foremost in as- able to reaching a peaceful resolution of the Raul Castro, in the course of his recent con- sisting in the creation of conditions, under questions which have arisen between Soma- sultations with Soviet leaders in Moscow, which it would be possible to resolve all lia and Ethiopia. If this campaign does not did not raise the issue of the possibility of questions at the negotiating table. cease, said my interlocutor, the Somali sending Cuban military personnel to Ethio- people will begin to ask why statements in pia, and, consequently, A. Ochoa did not 18 August the Soviet press contain accusations ad- have any basis to make the aforementioned dressed at Somalia and why the Somali gov- statement to Mengistu. We decided to tell A tete-a-tete conversation took place ernment does not react to them. you this because we would like our relations at the request of the head of the Somali del- He assured me further, that Somalia with Soviet comrades to be open and clear.” egation. would not be deceived by any such ruses of I thanked Jose Perez Novoa. Concern- H.A. Kasim reported that: imperialist propaganda, but warned that oth- ing the essence of the matter, I noted that 1. He was charged by the Somali gov- ers might swallow the bait. the question of inviting Cuban military per- ernment to inform the Soviet government [I] asked about the degree of trustwor- sonnel is a difficult one not just for socialist that new factors had arisen in the develop- thiness of the intelligence which served as states, but also for the leadership of the ment of the situation in East Africa, which the basis for the declaration that, “Cuban PMAC, in that the invitation of combat units bear witness to the attempts to expand in- military officials were involved in the mili- from foreign powers, particularly non-Af- ternationally and to escalate the conflict and tary conflict.” Is it possible that you are rican ones, could be used by Somalia and also to the interference of non-African gov- swallowing the bait of imperialist propa- the Eritrean separatists to involve military ernments in the conflict. Several days be- ganda? Moreover, would it not be prefer- personnel from the Arab states in military fore President Siad in his declaration had able to clarify this sort of question directly actions at much greater levels than is oc- spoken of the interference of a friendly with our Cuban comrades? curring now. country, part of the socialist community, H.A. Kasim. We are not speaking idly. Jose Perez Novoa did not try to dis- whose leaders and policy enjoy great author- Contacts have already been established with pute the Soviet ambassador’s statements. ity in Somalia. According to information the Cubans as regards this question. This time he also did not dispute the Soviet received by Mogadishu, Cuban military of- ambassador’s statements about the neces- ficials are involved in the conflict between [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1620, ll. sity of working with the Ethiopian leader- the Western Somali Liberation Front and 60-80; translated by Sally Kux.] ship to continue the Somali-Ethiopian ne- Ethiopia. As President Siad declared fur- gotiations in Moscow on an expert level. ther, Somalia does not intend to remain neu- Memorandum of Conversation between In the course of the conversation Jose tral in the face of this situation, when citi- Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov Perez Novoa assured that [he would con- zens of Somali nationality in the Ogaden are and Cuban Ambassador to Ethiopia vey] to all Cuban diplomats and specialists perishing at the hands of non-Africans. Jose Perez Novoa, 23 August 1977 the instructions given to him about the ne- 2. He discussed the campaign of insinu- cessity of clarifying the decisive importance ations which was being carried out inthe SECRET, Copy No. 2 of the assistance rendered by the Soviet imperialist press and declared that Somalia From the journal of 6 September 1977 Union to defend the revolutionary achieve- will not become the victim of such a cam- Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 324 ments of the Ethiopian people and the terri- paign, that, as before, Somalia will adhere torial integrity of the country. to socialist principles and to the course of MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION strengthening friendly relations with the with the Cuban ambassador to Ethiopia USSR AMBASSADOR Soviet Union, in spite of the ruses of impe- JOSE PEREZ NOVOA TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 77

(signature) /A. Ratanov/ appearance” of that leadership, in compari- During the discussion, Tienkin did not son with the PMAC. try to reproach the Soviet Union and did not [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. - Of all of Ethiopia’s domestic prob- even show any interest in Soviet military 118-119; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.] lems, the most difficult is Eritrea; in com- aid to Ethiopia. He was most interested in parison with this even the problem of the the issue of Soviet-Somali relations (the re- Memorandum of Conversation, Soviet liberation of the Ogaden seems easy. sults of Siad Barre’s trip to Moscow, etc...) Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. Ratanov - Ethiopia, of course, will not be dis- with U.S. Charge d’Affaires A. Tienkin, membered and will secure its border with AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO 3 September 1977 Somalia, however, he (Tienkin) did not see SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA /s/ A. Ratanov any possiblity for the normalization of TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2 Ethiopian-Somali differences, insofar as [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. From the journal of 6 September 1977 Somalia is unlikely to renounce its territo- 136-138; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.] Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 339 rial pretensions to Ethiopia. - American-Somali relations. They are Memorandum of Conversation between MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION improving. The USA even “agreed in prin- Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov with USA charge d’affaires in Ethiopia ciple” to the delivery of defensive weap- and Mengistu, 5 September 1977 A[RTHUR] TIENKIN ons. The USA announced, however, that 3 September 1977 these deliveries cannot take place at present From diary of SECRET because of the military actions in the A. P. Ratanov Copy No. 2 By previous agreement I met with A. Ogaden. The USA also emphasized that 6 September 1977 Tienkin at the Soviet Embassy. During the their agreement to military deliveries does discussion he made the following com- not mean that they do not recognize the ter- MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION ments. ritorial integrity of Somalia. with Chairman of PMAC of Ethiopia - American-Ethiopian relations. They - Tienkin is aware of the rumours that HAILE MARIAMOM MENGISTU are not as good as they could be. Nonethe- Israel is supposedly rendering military aid 5 September 1977 less, there have been some signs of improve- to Ethiopia, but he did not see any clear in- ment in these relations recently, [which is] dications that would confirm these rumors. I received a visit from Haile Mariam what the USA has been seeking. For ex- However, even if Israel were doing some- Mengistu (Berhanu Bayeh, a member of the ample, the other day the USA announced thing like this, said Tienkin, it would be Permanent Committee of the PMAC, took its readiness to continue economic aid to doing this on its own initiative, i.e. without part in the discussion) and, pursuant to in- Ethiopia. We raised the issue of maintain- consultation with the USA on such ques- structions, informed him about the results ing staff at the embassy in Addis-Ababa, tions. of the visit of President Siad Barre of the above all staff in the economic and trade sec- For his part the Soviet ambassador SDR to Moscow. tions (the PMAC, as is well-known, in May emphasized that the Soviet Union supports 1. Having listened, Mengistu asked to of this year liquidated a group of American Ethiopia, but at the same time aims to con- convey his appreciation to the Soviet lead- military attaches and a military adviser, and vince Somalia and Ethiopia of the need to ership, and personally to Comrade L. I. demanded that the embassy staff be reduced seek peaceful regulation of the Somali- Brezhnev, for the correct line followed in by one half). This time, it seems to Tienkin, Ethiopian conflict and that the Soviet Union discussions with Siad Barre, and for the the Ethiopian government will be inclined considers Ethiopia to be a non-aligned state, comprehensive assistance rendered to Ethio- to satisfy the American request. having the right, as all other states do, to pia. In this connection, Mengistu noted that The USA informed the Ethiopian gov- have normal relations with socialist states at the present time, especially in regard to ernment that it does not and would not in- as well as with the Western states. He added Soviet supplies of trailers for the transport terfere in the domestic affairs of Ethiopia, that the support of the Soviet Union for of tanks, the balance of forces between including in Eritrea. At the same time, said Ethiopia’s socialist orientation is defined by Ethiopia and Somali was beginning to move Tienkin, given Ethiopia’s current socialist the fact that it [this policy] was chosen by in favor of Ethiopia. policy, the USA is not convinced that it Ethiopia itself and answers to the needs of Assessing the demarche of Siad Barre (Ethiopia) is able to maintain normal rela- its socio-economic development. However, as a political maneuver (departing for Mos- tions with capitalist countries. this policy of socialist orientation presup- cow, Siad Barre issued an order for an at- - In the American view, the PMAC “is poses normal economic and trade ties with tack on Jijiga), Mengistu announced that an going too fast” on questions of social trans- all countries, the existence of a private sec- essential condition for Ethiopian-Somali formation, and in Ethiopia there are forces tor, mixed state-private firms, etc. negotiations would be the complete with- which would like to go even faster than the Tienkin remarked that he agreed with drawal of Somali forces from Ethiopian ter- PMAC along the path of turning Ethiopia this, that the Ethiopians themselves chose ritory. Siad Barre is now attempting to lead into a socialist state. In particular, the greater the path of socialist orientation. In Tienkin’s astray not only the Soviet Union, but also radicalism of the leadership of the All-Ethio- view, the Ethiopian leaders have really be- the PDRY, the intermediation of which he pian Socialist Movement [MEISON], as gun to emphasize their non-aligned course had only recently requested, as well as Tinkin suggests, was a reason for the “dis- more than they had in previous statements. Madagascar. However, said Mengistu, al- 78 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

though the Soviet comrades and comrades Ethiopia is supporting the People’s In- from PDRY are taking a principled line in dependence Movement and advising that AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, friends in the party to unite with the National Union for TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA Republic of Madagascar do not understand Independence for the establishment of an in- /s/ A. RATANOV everything in the conflict and are inclined dependent existence for the Republic of to believe the demagogic pronouncements Djibouti. The People’s Independence [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. of Siad Barre. Movement does not exclude the possibility 95-9; translated by Bruce McDonald.] 2. Mengistu, who returned on 4 Sep- that in the future that party will be required tember from Jijiga, told about the battle out- to resort to armed methods of conflict Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. side that population center (“the most pow- against the present government, which is Ratanov, Memorandum of Meeting erful tank forces in Africa”). On Somalia’s persecuting it. with Mengistu, 10 September 1977 side, four motorized mechanical brigades (5, In the opinion of Mengistu, the Soviet 8, 9 and 10) took part in the fighting. After Union and other socialist countries could, the Somali attack on Jijiga, which was re- with the help of Ethiopia, if necessary, es- TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2 pelled, Ethiopian forces counter-attacked tablish contact with the People’s Indepen- From the journal 29” September 1977 and repelled the Somalis, completely de- dence Movement and render support to that RATANOV, A.P. Issue No. 350 stroying one tank battalion. The fighting in party. Toward this end the Soviet Commit- that region is continuing. It is possible, tee for Solidarity of the Countries of Asian RECORD OF CONVERSATION Mengistu noted in this connection, that Siad and Africa could dispatch a delegation to with the Chairman of the PMAC Barre counted on a victory outside of Jijiga Addis-Ababa or receive in Moscow a del- MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM for the purpose of forcing the Ethiopians into egation of that party. It would be worth- 10 September 1977 negotiations from a position of strength, and while to join forces for this purpose, in the event of a defeat, to “demonstrate Mengistu stated, in order to prevent the re- On September 10, together with the good will in the eyes of the Soviet Union.” turn of Djibouti to the imperialist bloc. heads of the diplomatic missions of Bul- 3. Responding to a question from the 4. In response to related representations garia, Hungary, the GDR, PDRY, Poland, Soviet Ambassador (a “good question”), of the Soviet Ambassador, Mengistu an- , Romania, PDRK [People’s Mengistu stated that up until recently the nounced his readiness to meet with the So- Democratic Republic of Korea; North Ko- government of the Republic of Djibouti had viet Chief Military Advisor and asked to be rea], Cuba, and Yugoslavia, I was invited to taken an unfriendly position toward Ethio- excused for the fact that, being occupied visit Mengistu Haile Mariam. From the pia in respect to the Somali-Ethiopian con- with the leadership of military operations, Ethiopian side, Atnafu Abate and Berhanu flict, by prohibiting the landing of Ethio- he had not been able to do this sooner. Bayeh, Deputy Chairman of the PMAC and pian aircraft in Djibouti, rendering medical 5. As concerns the All-Ethiopian So- member of its Permanent Committee, re- assistance to wounded Somali soldiers, and cialist Movement, Mengistu stated that the spectively, took part in the meeting, along so forth. Now, however, that the Republic movement had now split into two groups, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felleke of Djibouti is suffering a serious economic one of which was inclined toward coopera- Gedle-Giorgis. crisis as a result of Somali aggression and, tion with the PMAC. The PMAC will con- Mengistu said that the goal of this in particular, now that Somali saboteurs tinue its advocacy of the merger of all Marx- meeting was to inform the governments of stopped the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad ist-Leninist organizations and groups into a the socialist countries and the PDRY, from operating, its government has ex- single party and of the creation of a national through their representatives in Addis- pressed a readiness to enter into a trade re- front. Ababa, about the discovery by the PMAC lationship with Ethiopia. Mengistu is cer- 6. Responding to a question of the So- of an imperialist plot against the Ethiopian tain that this positive development in the viet Ambassador, Mengistu stated that the revolution, in which to some extent or an- policy of the Government of the Republic PMAC was preparing to reexamine the other are participating the USA (the initia- of Djibouti will gain strength. ranks of the All-Ethiopian Committee on tor of the plot), Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, In Djibouti, Mengistu continued, at the Peace, Friendship and Solidarity. Subse- Kenya, and Somalia. present time there are three groups of po- quently the PMAC will inform the Embassy According to the document, which fell litical forces: (1) the party of the People’s as to the manner in which it would be most into the hands of the PMAC “from trusted Independence Movement (Marxist- productive for the Soviet Committee on sources,” CIA official E. Kelly from the Leninist), advocating independence and cre- Solidarity of the Countries of Asia and Af- USA Embassy in Nairobi has worked out a ation of a progressive government; (2) the rica to render cooperation to that Commit- coordinated plan of action of domestic party of the National Union for Indepen- tee. In this connection, as relates to assis- Ethiopian counterrevolutionary forces and dence, advocating nationalist positions for tance which the Soviet Committee intends the countries which support them, which independence; and (3) the right-wing party to render to Ethiopia, it would be possible envisages a range of acts at the end of Sep- of the African People’s League, advocating, to direct this assistance to the address of the tember - beginning of October of this year, in the final analysis, if not annexation to Ethiopian Committee on Peace, Friendship which have as their goal the overthrow of Somalia, then at least the establishment of and Solidarity, simultaneously apprising the the PMAC and the creation of a pro-West- special relations with it. PMAC about this. ern, reactionary government. Terrorist acts COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 79 in Addis-Ababa against members of the 14 September 1977 Sudan in Eritrean affairs and has sent 40,000 PMAC leadership and the organization of a men to Sudan to exert influence on the combined attack of military formations pre- TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2 Sudanese leadership and to show its (Egyp- pared on the territories of Sudan and Kenya, From the journal of 29 September 1977 tian) support in the event of the activation and also a continuation of Somali aggres- Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 354 of the separatists in southern Sudan. This sion, are parts of the plan. has enabled Sudan to send 4,000 of its own In this regard Mengistu Haile Mariam Memorandum of Conversation with the soldiers to Eritrea. said that in the aforementioned document Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Ethiopia intends to activate its ties with there are listed various types of military sub- FELLEKE GEDLE GIORGIS the West European states, particularly with units and their specific tasks are set forth. 14 September 1977 the Scandinavian countries (, Fin- The attack would begin simultaneously from land, et al.), which haven’t always formed a the north-west, west, and south in the direc- On 14 September of this year, the So- bloc with the main imperialist powers and, tion of Addis-Ababa. In fact, as far as So- viet delegation taking part in the celebra- for example, took a position favorable to malia is concerned, its forces which are lo- tions of the occasion of the third anniver- Vietnam during the period of American ag- cated on the territory of Ethiopia, on 10 Sep- sary of the Ethiopian revolution (comrade gression. To this end, a mission to the afore- tember of this year again attacked Jijiga, in Yezhov, I.M.) had a meeting with Felleke mentioned states is contemplated. the event of the capture of which they are Gedle-Giorgis. About the USA—the USA and other planning an attack on the administrative During the course of a detailed con- imperialist states aim to overthrow the center of that region, Harar, and the great versation, after expressing his deep recog- Ethiopian regime (the minister claims that industrial center Diredawa. Battles for Jijiga nition to the Soviet Union for its compre- the USA has prepared a plot to do this). are continuing. hensive support and assistance to Ethiopia, Despite this, the minister said, Ethiopia aims Among the number of parties and or- the minister made the following statements: to use the contradictions among the West- ganizations which are participating in the Considering the extremely difficult erners in the interests of the Ethiopian revo- plot, Mengisu named the Eritrean separat- situation in Ethiopia, particularly in connec- lution, and also the fact that officially the ist organization, the Ethiopian Democratic tion with the military intervention by So- USA and other Western states have come Union, [and] the Movement for the Libera- malia, the Ethiopian government is taking out in support of the territorial integrity of tion of the Afars (detachments of this move- and will take measures which will aim to Ethiopia and [express] the desire to have ment would attack Assab). strengthen cooperation with states that sup- normal relations with it. In conclusion, having declared that the port Ethiopia, to receive support from con- At the same time, the diplomatic ac- PMAC is taking measures now to explode servative regimes, and even to divide those tivity of the PMAC will develop coopera- the schemes of the participants in the plot, states, including Arab states, which are tion with communist and socialist parties of Mengistu expressed the hope that the social- openly hostile to the Ethiopian revolution. the USA and Western Europe (to this end ist countries, whose assistance is decisive As a long-term goal, Ethiopia will even aim the PMAC invited representatives of the for Ethiopia, will provide it at this critical to restore contacts with Syria, , Sudan, communist parties of the USA, Italy, and moment the necessary political and military et al. Portugal to take part in the celebrations), and support. In this regard he noted that one of As a whole, the positions of the over- also with the international democratic, the most serious problems for Ethiopia may whelming majority of the member-states of labour, women’s and youth organizations be the problem of fuel, since the Arab coun- the OAU are favorable to Ethiopia as far as (World Peace Council, Movement of Afro- tries intend to apply an embargo on deliver- maintaining its territorial integrity is con- Asian Solidarity, etc..). ies of fuel to Ethiopa (which are realized cerned, although many African states are not The minister especially dwelled on the through the company Mobil). reconciled to the Ethiopian revolution and Chinese position on the Ethiopian revolu- The heads of the diplomatic missions its socialist orientation. The OAU and the tion. At the beginning of the revolution, the promised to bring the information which Committee created to provide good offices PRC provided economic assistance to Ethio- Mengistu had provided to the attention of for the resolution of the Somali-Ethiopian pia, and sent its economic experts. How- their governments. military conflict continue their efforts to end ever, as the Ethiopian revolution deepened, it and come out on the side of Ethiopia. the Chinese began to change their position, AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR However, Sudan blocks their activities. practically rendered comprehensive assis- IN SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA The position of Sudan is very duplici- tance to Somalia during the Somali-Ethio- /s/ A. RATANOV tous now: on the one hand, Sudan actively pian military conflict, and, it seems, intends supports Eritrean separatism, on the other to give it (Somalia) conventional battlefield [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. hand, it fears that in case of some form of weapons. 139-40; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] secession by Eritrea, this would create a Recognizing the great significance of dangerous precedent which could encour- the diplomatic activity of the Soviet Union Memorandum of Conversation between age separatism in southern Sudan. There- in support of Ethiopia, the minister ex- Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. fore Sudan appears to vacillate and Ethio- pressed the hope that the Soviet Union Ratanov and Ethiopian Foreign pia intends to use this. Under these condi- would continue it in the future, and, in par- Minister Felleke Gedle Giorgis, tions Egypt encourages intervention by ticular, would use its own friendly relations 80 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

with Algeria and influence in the Arab world by the code name “Fakel” [Torch], which Translated from English [into Russian] and with African states, and also with the was brought to the attention of the ambas- communist and progressive organizations in sadors of the Socialist Bloc Countries at a OPERATION “FAKEL” Western, African, and Arab countries. meeting with Haile Mariam Mengistu that Felleke Gedle-Giorgis expressed his took place on 10 September 1977. This Preparation of the creation of a para- gratitude for the clear position of the USSR document consists of a summary presenta- military unit for the execution of interven- in the Somali-Ethiopian military conflict. In tion of instructions and telegrams, sent dur- tion in Ethiopia and destabilization of cir- light of this, the minister emphasized that ing the period of 12 February through 4 June cumstances there shall commence on 14 Ethiopia does not aim to dismember Soma- of this year by the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi April 1977. According to information avail- lia and does not intend to interfere in its (under the signature of D. Wardner, and later able to us, all preparations, including the internal affairs. The minister also said that E. Kelly), to the American Embassies in delivery of materials necessary for military Ethiopia supports the improvement of co- Khartoum and Dar-es-Salam. operations, and training of a reserve contin- operation with Somalia. This being said, According to the document, the aim of gent, shall be completed by 16 September the Ethiopian government proceeds from the perpetrating “intervention and destabiliza- 1977. The operation, which shall commence fact that Somalia has progressive forces, tion of circumstances in Ethiopia” is to be on 1 October 1977, is designated by the code which are also striving for the restoration carried out by three groups: (1) Nuba (2) name “FAKEL.” of neighborly relations and peaceful coop- , to be carried out in the southwest- The forces to be implemented in the eration with Ethiopia. ern region of Ethiopia (in the territory of said operation shall consist of three sepa- For his part, comrade Yezhov, I.M. and the Sudan); and the third group consisting rate groups: the Soviet ambassador reaffirmed the posi- of “hostile elements in southeastern Ethio- Force No. 1 - Nuba group. tion of the Soviet Union on the problem of pia” (in Kenyan territory). The training and Force No. 2 - Anyanya group. the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and directed arming of these groups, primarily with Force No. 3 - Hostile elements from attention to the necessity of activating American weapons, is to be carried out by the southeastern region of Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s diplomatic efforts in various 16 September of this year. Commencement Forces No. 1 and 2 will operate in the countries. They reminded the minister of of operation “Fakel” is planned for 1 Octo- southeastern region of Ethiopia and, accord- the diplomatic steps taken by the Soviet ber 1977. ing to the plan, shall direct their attention Union in support of Ethiopia (demarches The starting point for all operations is toward adaptation to conditions in the given towards the leaders of Somalia, a range of to be the assassination, on 1 October of this location. Arab states, et al.). year, of the Chairman of the PMAC, as well In the preparatory period, Group No. as that of his Deputy, to be followed by an 3 will operate mainly in Kenya, but after AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR attack by Groups 1 and 2 from Sudanese the commencement of military operations, TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA territory. Two weeks thereafter, an attack responsibility for it shall be transferred to /s/ A. Ratanov by the third group from Kenyan territory is Somalia. planned. The establishment of a third front The above information constitutes the [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. of military operations, as contemplated by essence of telegrams and instructions of the 135-138; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.] the instigators of the plan, will lead to an U.S. Embassy in Nairobi to the American “automatic attack by Ethiopia on Sudan.” Embassador in Dar-es-Salaam during the Memorandum of Conversation with In the event of a retaliatory attack on Kenya, period between 12-26 February 1977, sent Ethiopian Foreign Secretary Dawit it is contemplated that the marines (the docu- by Dixon Werdner, an employee of the po- Wolde Giorgis, 17 September 1977, ment does not specify of what nationality) litical section of that embassy, who is be- with Attached Memorandum on and forces of “other moderate countries” lieved to be a CIA agent. Operation “Fakel” (Torch) will be used. Subsequent communications, sent Attachment: see four-page list ap- from the American Embassy in Nairobi to TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2 pended hereto. the U.S. Ambassador in Khartoum and Dar- From diary of 29 September 1977 es-Salaam under the signature of Major A. P. Ratanov Ser. No. 352 AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR Eddy Kelly, describe the make-up of the TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA staff, the preparation, and the objectives of Memorandum of Conversation with /s/ A. RATANOV the said operation. It is known that Major Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Eddy Kelly, who apparently has replaced Ministry DAWIT WOLDE GIORGIS cc: 3 AFO Dixon Werdner, leader of operation “Fakel,” 17 September 1977 Defense Ministry, CC CPSU is none other than Edmund Kelly, the third UOMP secretary of the political section of the U.S. We received a visit from Dawit at his UPVM Embassy in Nairobi. request. Pursuant to instructions from the 9/26/77 The first communication from Kelly, Chairman of the PMAC [Mengistu], he fur- [Stamp] dated 4 May 1977, indicates that military nished a document concerning an imperial- Attachment to Doc. No. 352 fortifications are located en route to ist conspiracy against Ethiopia designated dated 9/29/77 Mombasa (Kenya) and that the dispatch of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 81 materials to designated points shall be region of and Lyuan [sic], and, for the Nuba group (Force No. 1).In the event that implemented at night and by separate par- forces of No. 3, in a friendly country. the trip to the southwest is cancelled, the ties in order to prevent the leak of informa- Timetable for operation: Hour “X” and means must be found to send all groups to tion. Fortifications shall be delivered to the the signal for commencement of operations Addis Ababa for execution of the operation. northwestern region of Kenya, i.e., to the will be communicated later. In the event that the assassination of the head location of the prospective conflict, within The second telegram describes the con- of the government (Bomen) is unsuccess- 20-30 days from day “X”. duct of operations envisioned in the first ful, then his deputy is to be killed. N.B. - His second communication, dated 18 telegram: Kelly has repeatedly warned that all prepa- May 1977, indicates that the materials nec- - Assassination of the head of govern- rations must be completed by 16 Septem- essary for military operations were dis- ment will lead to chaos and disorder in ber 1977, that the date for execution of the patched from the northwestern region of Ethiopia. Following that the advancement operation - Day “X” - is set for 1 October Kenya to the designated point in the Sudan. of Forces 1 and 2 into the southwest will that it is necessary to maintain this timetable, Recognizing that fortifications of the prin- ensue. and that it is essential to do everything in cipal strike force are undergoing intensive - Establishment of this second front order to ensure the success of this opera- preparation, Kelly emphasizes the need for will prevent the Ethiopian forces from fo- tion. absolute secrecy and the paramount concen- cusing attention on the other front. This will At the end of all his telegrams, Kelly tration of attention on the principal objec- create a desirable opportunity for an attack also instructs those who receive them to di- tive (Ethiopia) and rapid preparations. from the southeast and will result in a two- rect their responses to the Division of Co- On 23 June 1977, Kelly dispatched a pronged conflict. vert Operations for Eastern and Central Af- telegram to the American Embassy in - Ethiopia will automatically attack the rica of the State Department. Khartoum, demanding the completion of the Sudan, and the intensification of activity in following four specific assignments: the southeast will, within two weeks, lead Transmitted by: /s/ V. Mishachev -assessment of the strength of enemy to a similar situation in Somalia. /s/ V. Mikhailov forces; - The center of the rear forces and ma- -determination of the actual disposition terial fortification in Mandera will provide [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. of military forces in conformance with for support to Forces 1 and 2. 129-134; translated by Bruce McDonald.] communist military doctrine, as well - If Kenya suffers an attack, then sub- as the quantity, methods and means for divisions of the marines and forces of other CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on the transfer of reinforcements; moderate governments will be deployed to 30-31 October 1977 Closed Visit of -confirmation of the receipt of materi- this region. Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow, als as soon as they are delivered; and On 4 July 1977, Kelly sent four tele- 8 November 1977 -completion of all preparations by 16 grams to Khartoum and Dar-es-Salaam. September 1977, in order to avoid any Two of these telegrams contain a de- Confidential alteration of the plan. tailed enumeration of the military fortifica- On 2 July 1977, Kelly sent two tele- tions which are already delivered or are lo- With regard to the request of the chair- grams to the U.S. Embassies in Khartoum cated en route from the USA and a “Coun- man of the Provisional Military Adminis- and Dar-es-Salaam. try of apple juice.” In sum, this includes trative Council (PMAC) of Ethiopia In the first telegram, the objective and 16,000 rifles, 559,000 rounds of ammuni- Mengistu Haile Mariam, he was received plan of action, projected for day “X”, are tion, as well as an undisclosed quantity of in Moscow on 30-31 October, this year, on set forth as follows: tear gas canisters, tracer bullets, bombs, a closed [zakritii] visit. On 31 October he Objective: Carry out the assassination mines, and propaganda materials. This had a conversation with L.I. Brezhnev, A.N. of the head of the Ethiopian government equipment will be stored for transport and Kosygin and A.A. Gromyko. with the aim of creating a panic situation in will be delivered to “Point One” by “friendly Mengistu informed in detail about the do- the country. Following that will be the co- hands.” Transportation will begin on 27 mestic political situation in Ethiopia, about ordination of an attack by forces hostile to August and the equipment will arrive at the grave situation on the northern, eastern Ethiopia, from the southwest and east. “Point One” on 30 August 1977. and southeastern fronts, where the battle is Plan of action: Forces No. 1 and 2 will Two other telegrams are addressed to raging against the Eritrean separatists, [and] commence operations on 1 October 1977. that portion of the operation which relates counterrevolutionary formations and regu- Force No. 3 will commence military action to elimination of the head of the government. lar units of the Somali army. The separat- two weeks thereafter. The assassin, as they refer to him, from the ists succeeded in seizing the main cities of Rear section and fortification: support Nuba group (Force No. 1), will liquidate the Eritrea, except for Asmara and the port of for the southwestern group shall be provided head of the government (Bomen) on 1 Oc- Massawa. Somali troops occupied in effect from “Point No. 1.” Force No. 3 will re- tober 1977, during his trip to southwestern the whole Ogaden, with exception of Harar ceive support from the side of a friendly Ethiopia, scheduled for September. The and Dire Dawa. country on the southeast of the country. second participant (referred to in the text as Mengistu spoke about the hostile activity A command and support group for the the “third”), to be selected for completion of Sudan and other reactionary Arab states forces of No. 1 and 2 will be located in the of this assignment, will be offered by the who plan in connection to the unification of 82 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the three separatist states in Eritrea to set up nite impression that in the existing situation German official with Soviet Ambassa- an Eritrean “government” and to proclaim in Ethiopia and around it, the PMAC ur- dor to Ethiopia Ratanov, Addis Ababa, “an independent state.” Mengistu confirmed gently needs further assistance of our fra- 6 December 1977 (dated 7 December) the aspiration of Ethiopia to settle Ethiopian- ternal countries through the mechanism of Somali relations in a peaceful way. He de- bilateral relations, as well as on the interna- Comrade Ratanov gave the following clared that Ethiopian armed forces set the tional arena. information: goal of the liberation of Ethiopian territory Militarily, the Eastern front is presently and do not intend to cross the frontiers of [Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202/583; obtained the most difficult problem for the Ethiopian their country. and translated from Russian by Vladislav side. Due to the correlation of forces the Mengistu pointed out that an inauspicious M. Zubok.] initiative is with the Somali side. The Ethio- situation on the battlefields and the threat pian troops are forced onto the defense. The of partition that [hangs over] the Ethiopian Conversation between East German Ethiopian side is making all-out efforts to state has wrought a negative influence on Socialist Unity Party (SED) official F. mobilize around 60,000 to 70,000 men. the economic and domestic political situa- Trappen and CPSU CC official K. About 20,000 men will already be available tion of the country, undermine faith in the Brutents, 7 November 1977 (excerpt) within the next few weeks. They will be victory of the Ethiopian revolution, [and] trained in short training courses. The Ethio- encourage activities of internal reactionary Memorandum of Conversation pian side will be able to go on the offensive forces. between Comrade Friedel Trappen and in about 1 1/2 to 2 months. Revolutionary Ethiopia, in Mengistu’s Comrade Karen Brutents, Deputy Head of The technical superiority of the Somali words, finds itself now in the enemy’s en- the International Relations Department of troops is most prominent in heavy artillery. circlement and aspires to support of first of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Although the Ethiopian side has - due to all the socialist states. By referring to the 7 November 1977 Soviet deliveries - at its disposal over 510 need to improve Ethiopia’s defense under heavy guns while Somalia only has 126, these circumstances, Mengistu made a re- [Names of other participants] there is a lack of soldiers who can handle quest to broaden Soviet military assistance. Comrade Brutents thanked [Trappen] the heavy artillery. The training is still tak- Expanding on all this, Menquistu spoke for the interesting information. The Soviet ing time. about his confidence in a final victory of comrades completely agree with our policy. 300 Cuban military experts (artillery, the revolution, stressing that the masses of The information they just received [from the tank drivers, pilots) are expected to arrive people firmly support the revolution and its SED] contains several new aspects. There soon. achievements that are being accomplished has been only little information on the de- The Ethiopian side currently has about in the interests of the people. velopments within the Eritrean Liberation 137 tanks on the Eastern front. The Somali On our side we confirmed the principled Movement, in particular concerning the side has about 140. line of the Soviet Union to give all-sided Marxist forces within this movement. It 40 Ethiopian tanks cannot be used in support to the Ethiopian revolution and to would be of extraordinary importance if battle due to minor repairs. Though these continue the further expansion of Soviet- these contacts would make possible contacts repairs would normally be done by the tank Ethiopian relations. Mengistu also received between the Eritrean movement and the drivers themselves, they are not capable of an agreement to supply during this year an Ethiopian leadership which could lead to an doing so. On the Somali side such repairs additional amount of Soviet armaments and armistice and pave the way for a peaceful are possible because the Soviet Union had military equipment. He also received the political solution. established the necessary repair station. principled assurances of the Soviet side to So far the Ethiopian leadership has not In recent days, the Ethiopian side has grant the PMAC assistance in working out exhausted all possibilities for such a solu- for the first time launched air attacks on plans of social-economic development of tion. It is necessary to support them in this, mobile objects using the MiG 21. The nega- Ethiopia, including the dispatch to Addis and in this sense the contacts facilitated by tive opinion about the MiGs has meanwhile Ababa of certain specialists. the SED are of great importance. improved (the [U.S.] F-5 is a much im- As a comradely advice, [the Soviet side] It now is important to utilize actively proved model with a wider operational shared with Mengistu ideas in favor of the these contacts for fruitful political work in range). accelerated creation in Ethiopia of a party favor of a peaceful and political solution. Comrade Ratanov gave the following based on the principles of Marxism- In the talks between the comrades of explanation of the Eritrean problem: Leninism, which would further the mobili- the CPSU and the Ethiopian delegation it If it were possible to give the Ethio- zation of masses to defend revolutionary was repeatedly emphasized that national pian side a breathing-spell in Eritrea, it could conquests and to promote the revolution. It problems cannot be solved militarily. focus its efforts on the Eastern front. A dia- was stressed to be important for the PMAC logue has to be initiated. This has not been to adopt practical measures to resolve the [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ done so far. In this regard, it would not be nationalities question in Ethiopia in order 126; obtained and translated by Christian advantageous to show all our cards right to ensure the support of the progressive re- F. Ostermann.] away. gime on the part of national minorities. It is of critical importance that the For the moment, we are left with the defi- Memorandum of Conversation, East Ethiopian side is not willing to grant the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 83

Eritrean population autonomy within the essary upon the establishment of the party tant from the people. bounds of its old territories. They assume to add to the leadership other capable forces On the national question: that other peoples still reside in Eritrea (e.g. from outside. There will be a fight about the One has to try — through political Tigre and Afars). This has to be taken into leadership positions within the central com- work and by a intelligent policy towards the consideration. Therefore they want to trim mittee of the party. If the forces around nationalities — to make all members of in- Eritrean territory. The area of the Afars Mengistu do not succeed in this fight, then dividual ethnic groups to feel as Ethiopians around the port of Assab as well as the Tigre the CC will not be an improvement in qual- first. Members of all ethnic groups should are to be separated. This would be almost ity over the present PMAC. The Ethiopian be represented in ministries and other insti- half of Eritrean territory. leadership has lately devoted much atten- tutions on an equal basis. The various indi- Should the Ethiopian leadership stick tion to the establishment of the party. There vidual nationalities have not even been rep- with this point of view, it will be difficult to still exists great confusion with respect to resented in the PMAC. Its composition came find a common ground for negotiations. ideological questions as well as strategy and about by accident. The popular mood is di- (Various peoples live, for example, in tactics. For example, they have only diffuse rected in particular against Amharen. There- Dagestan and Georgia. There are autono- ideas about the class basis. fore Mengistu was elected chairman. He mous territories within the individual repub- The workers, the peasants, the left wing evolved as the strongman. The Soviet mili- lics of the [Soviet] Union.) The most im- of the petit-bourgeoisie as well as anti-feu- tary experts have come to realize that no portant thing is to get both parties to the dal and anti-imperialist elements belong to decision is made without his agreement. negotiating table. the forces which support the Revolution. The first point of the 9-point program There is no talk about a national bourgeoi- [Source: SAPO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ on Eritrea states autonomy with respect to sie. From the start it has been perceived as 126; document obtained and translated by tribes/peoples but not with respect to terri- an enemy. There are also a great number of Christian F. Ostermann.] tories. Mengistu has stated in a previous honest people among the state apparatus and speech that Ethiopia would be willing to the officers corps. The minister for agricul- Memorandum of a Conversation grant more autonomy to Eritrea than it had ture has stated that they would probably between East German leader Erich had before. But he has not yet stated what some day appoint him ambassador in order Honecker and Siassi Aforki, General he meant by this. to get rid of him. Many people have gone Secretary of the Revolutionary Party of On the correlation of forces within the abroad out of fear. Not all of them were Eritrea, in Berlin, 31 January 1978 PMAC: counterrevolutionaries. (dated 3 February 1978) Mengistu has further consolidated his On the question of non-capitalist de- position since the elimination of [Co-chair- velopment with Socialist orientation: Within Honecker: [Welcoming remarks] man of the Coordinating Committee of the the leadership there is nobody who knows Aforki: We are very proud and very Armed forces (DERG) Lt. Col.] Atnafu what this state of development really means. happy about this meeting. It is a historical Abate. He has further gained stature as a It is presented as a Socialist revolution. For meeting. The first visit of our comrades in revolutionary statesman. One senses in example, the development of is re- the GDR already brought very positive re- speaking with him that he views things re- jected. 75% of the rural population is still sults. [...] We highly appreciate the good alistically. At the same time one has to involved in a produce-based economy. Who offices of your country and your party. What reckon with his complicated character. should develop agricultural production? we have achieved so far is already a turn- On the establishment of the Party: There are no social statistics on which the ing-point in our fight. The results of the One has to convince the Ethiopian side development of the Ethiopian village could meeting with the Ethiopians are still uncer- that it is an illusion to be able to create a be based. There are regulations for private tain, but in any case it will be a historic monolithic party from the start. The party investments but they are not propagated. The meeting. In the past 17 years a fierce battle can only be created in the fight against the bourgeoisie has money but is afraid to in- has been waged. Not one meeting took place various currents. It has to develop on the vest because it fears nationalization. One between Eritreans and Ethiopians. If some- basis of social conditions. [...] should follow the example of the USSR and thing developed from this first meeting, this There will be risks involved in the es- develop a NEP [New Economic Policy], will not only be good for our two countries tablishment of the party which have to be thus providing a prospect for all social but for the peoples of the entire world. The taken into consideration. During the estab- classes. only pre-condition for it is goodwill on the lishment of the party one has to deliberate Atnafu was criticized for problems Ethiopian and on our side. the question of co-option. which he rightfully brought up. He favored [Short review of the Eritrean-Ethiopian The PMAC presently has about 80 the development to a mixed society. It was conflict.] members. 30 of them are a burden. These another thing that he opposed socialism al- Comrade Erich Honecker: For the first members hardly have any education and can together. Now nobody dares to say anything dialogue with the Ethiopians it will be deci- easily become victims of the counter-revo- anymore. The mood of the workers and sive to consider in which direction one has lution. Mengistu intends to send them to the peasants is extremely leftist. It will take great to become active in the interest of the Revo- USSR, Cuba, and the GDR to turn them into persuasion to convince them of the neces- lution. We are deeply interested in the suc- revolutionaries. Only 25 to 20 men belong sity of a NEP. On the other hand there is the cess of the Ethiopian Revolution and in the to the active inner circle. It is therefore nec- danger that the PMAC will become too dis- objectives of the Eritrean People’s Libera- 84 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tion Movement. Both sides have the goal to als, a solution will not be possible. There is plained the attitude of the CPSU in this ques- repel the imperialist intervention and build no point in discussing the possibility of uni- tion: the CPSU is also of the opinion that a new humane social order. It is very pain- fying both revolutions. What we need are Ethiopia’s position in the Eritrean question ful that comrades who are ideologically guarantees that the fight against imperial- is different one from its relationship with close are involved in such a conflict. We ism and reaction will continue. Only one Somalia. Somalia is an aggressor who at- welcome the fact that Comrade Aforki has principal question is of importance. Every- tacked Ethiopia. The Soviet and Cuban com- the determination and mandate to come to thing depends on the capabilities and tac- rades have declared together with the Ethio- Berlin to find out together with the repre- tics of our organization. We won’t be picky pian leadership that no Somali territory will sentatives of the DERG how the problems in minor questions. It is totally clear to us be entered in the course of the Ethiopian can be solved. We have used our influence that in the case of an actual agreement its counter-offensive. This information was also as much as possible to make sure that you implementation is the important thing. Then given to the USA. will be heard. Now much depends on the we will check the details and implement In his talk with Comrade Ponomarev, dialogue which - after 17 years - can lead to them patiently. Eritrea has many enemies President Carter emphasized the situation on a turning-point. As I understand Comrade within and without. If they all find out about the Horn of Africa and pretended to be con- Aforki, he is moving in this direction. In his it, we will have many difficulties. But we cerned about Soviet arms deliveries to Ethio- conversation with Comrade Werner are preparing for it. It is true that we are not pia. In response Ponomarev pointed to the Lamberz, Comrade Mengistu indicated his the only organization. That, however, does much larger US arms deliveries to Iran, a readiness to grant the people of Eritrea full not worry us. Because of our great influ- country neighboring on the USSR. He re- autonomy within the Ethiopian state. What ence and military strength we can succeed. pudiated Carter’s insinuations that Cuban form this should take is a matter to be dealt The other two organizations in Eritrea have and Soviet troops were fighting in Ethio- with by both sides. The national question allied themselves with the imperialists and pia. The Soviet military were advisers who has immense importance for the whole the reaction in the Arabic region. had been sent at the request of the Ethio- Ethiopian Revolution. Its solution is also We have to expect that the imperialists pian government. Carter said he favored a hindered by Somalia’s aggression. Somalia will take advantage of the situation in case speedy settlement of the conflict. He ex- currently receives the support of all imperi- of a solution of the Eritrean problem and plained that the USA would neither now nor alist governments. Concerning the Eritrean escalate the situation and heighten the con- in the future deliver arms to Somalia. It was question, one has to see the opportunity flict. Therefore it is necessary that the So- pointed out to Carter and [U.S. Secretary of given by [the similarity of] the contents of cialist countries will guarantee a peaceful State Cyrus R.] Vance that the Soviet Union the Eritrean Liberation Movement and the solution. In the case of an agreement pru- had tried over a longer period of time to Ethiopian Revolution. I agree with Comrade dent tactics are necessary not to allow the convince Siad Barre, Samantar and other Aforki that a solution would be of great sig- reactionaries to exert their influence. In Somali leaders not to begin a war. Their ef- nificance not only for the peoples of Ethio- Ethiopia as well there are forces which are forts, however, proved to be in vain. pia and Africa but also for all peoples. We powerfully fighting against a just solution. With respect to the situation in Eritrea, accord great significance to the currently The current regime cannot proceed against Comrade Ponomarev mentioned the conver- arranged contact and the incipient dialogue. these forces by itself. This is an important sations between the Soviet leadership and We hope it will lead to agreement. The revo- question. Mengistu Haile Mariam in the course of lutionary streams belong together. Comrade Honecker: [Report on GDR domestic which it was recommended to Mengistu to Aforki has rightly stated that one can then and foreign policy] seek to a political solution to the problem proceed together against the imperialists. [Concluding remarks] and to grant autonomy to the Eritreans. Since From my point of view, the full autonomy then no new discussions between the So- within the Ethiopian state is the correct so- [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ viet side and the Ethiopians have taken lution in order to pursue together the com- 127; document obtained and translated by place. Mengistu has been silent. Up to now mon task of economic build-up and the cre- Christian F. Ostermann.] he has not done anything to follow our ad- ation of a progressive social order in Ethio- vice. The Cuban comrades have unequivo- pia and Eritrea. Your forthcoming meeting Memorandum of Conversation between cally told the Ethiopian leadership that Cuba can be successful. It is a historic meeting. I East German official Paul Markovski would not intervene in the Eritrean conflict, am interested in the question if you, Com- and CPSU CC International Depart- in a domestic Ethiopian conflict. The best rade Aforki, in the case one might come to ment head Boris N. Ponomarev in thing would be a peaceful solution. Both an agreement, will have the strength to Moscow, 10 February 1978 sides need to take the right attitude towards implement it. Besides you, there are two (dated 13 February 1978) the problem. Mengistu is, however, waver- other movements in Eritrea. In case of an ing according to the military situation. As agreement one would have to carefully plan [Markovski informs Ponomarev on the military pressure the rebels were exert- all steps. talks between PMAC (Ethiopia) and EPLF ing on Massawa and Asmara was increas- Comrade S. Aforki: The main problem (Eritrea)] ing, he was ready for a compromise. Now is in how far Ethiopia is willing to meet our Comrade B.N. Ponomarev thanked M. that this situation has become a bit more demands. It is clear from the start that if for the valuable information, said that they stable, he is silent or makes pungent state- Ethiopia is not bringing along new propos- appreciated the GDR initiative and ex- ments. We have to continue to work on him. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 85

Any solution has to be found within the Eritrean problem. It has to be expected that Willy] Brandt or [prominent SPD figure framework of the Ethiopian state although - as L. I. Brezhnev told Mengistu - the na- Herbert]Wehner. this is uncomfortable for the Eritrean move- tional question cannot be solved militarily. There has been no response to the re- ments. Comrade Ponomarev read a telegram Comrade Ponomarev agreed with the spective notes by Comrade Brezhnev to from Belgrade on an information [report] proposal communicated by Comrade Carter and other Western chiefs of state. by the head of the bureau of the PLO [Pal- Markovski to consult on the burning Afri- [Concluding remarks] estine Liberation Organization] in Baghdad, can questions among the six close friends Abu Nidal (he belongs to the left wing of at the forthcoming conference of the CC [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ the Fatah). Abu Nidal has traveled through Secretaries in Budapest. 127; document obtained and translated by Eritrea. According to his information, all Comrade Ponomarev reported on his Christian F. Ostermann.] regions except for Massawa and Asmara are recent visit to the USA as the head of a del- in the hands of the Eritreans. The coastal egation of parliament members. In his re- SED CC, Department of International area is controlled by EPLF under the lead- port to the politburo, he proposed to con- Relations, 16 February 1978, Report on ership of Aforki while Western Eritrea is un- tinue to work with the USA Congress. Con- Conversation with [Vice-president] der the control of the ELF (Mohammed gress nowadays has greater importance Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Member of Ahmed Nasser). The Eritreans want full since the prestige of the USA administra- the Politburo of the CP Cuba, in autonomy but are also willing to accept an tion is lower than ever before due to Havana, 13 February 1978 Ethiopian corridor to the sea. The majority Watergate and Vietnam and since Carter has of Aforki’s organizations consist of Marx- not shown enough stature [profil]. There are [Participants: Comrade Polanco, Deputy ist-Leninist elements. Abu Nidal was in- realistic forces in Congress, but also the Head of CC Department for International formed that Aforki was at a meeting in Ber- “hawks”, the obstinate defenders of the neu- Relations CP Cuba; Comrade Heinz Langer, lin. He was willing to meet with representa- tron bomb (Strand [sic; perhaps a reference Extraordinary Plenipotentiary and Ambas- tives of the CPSU. Abu Nidal emphasizes to conservative Democratic Sen. John C. sador in Cuba] that it would be necessary to quickly find a Stennis or Sen. Richard Stone], [Democratic solution since Saudi Arabia and other reac- Sen. Henry] Jackson et al.). He, Comrade [Welcoming remarks] tionary forces were exerting strong pressure Ponomarev, made a total of 25 speeches. Rodriguez: The initiative and the ef- upon the Eritrean movements. There were useful talks with Carter and forts of the SED merit the highest recogni- Comrade Ponomarev stated that the Vance. The visit showed that there are pos- tion. The [Ethiopian-Eritrean] meeting in CPSU did not think a meeting with Aforki sibilities for a dialogue. They have to be Berlin was of great historical importance. was necessary after a meeting between him utilized by the common efforts of the So- We fully agree with the strategy of the SED; and the SED had just taken place. The SED cialist countries. In this respect, Comrade this fully conforms with our common con- was to continue its conversations with the Ponomarev pointed to two problems: cept of efforts towards a peaceful solution Eritreans. 1. The forthcoming (May) UN Special of the Eritrean problem as agreed between Comrade Ponomarev informed me that Meeting of the UN Plenum should be used us. I would like to emphasize that there is the Ethiopian leadership recently ap- by the active appearance of all 9 friendly complete agreement among us and that the proached the CPSU with a request for sup- Socialist countries for the fight against the politburo of our party completely approves port in the build-up of the party. A group of neutron bomb and for effective disarmament of the strategy, the estimate, the arguments experienced comrades of the CPSU has been measures. The level of participation should and the conclusion in this matter. selected. Its head is a member of the CC. be cleared in time. In these questions one The leadership of our party has for Later, however, Mengistu requested to hold can count on the Non-Alignment Move- some time expected a declaration by off the sending of these comrades since mili- ment. At the same time it offers the possi- Mengistu on the Eritrean problem. This had tary questions were the top priority. Com- bility to effectively expose and isolate Chi- been agreed up between him and comrade rade Ponomarev favored close cooperation nese policy. Valdez Vivo in the 5-point program at the between the Soviet comrades, the Cuban 2. In Europe, especially in the FRG, end of last year. comrades, and the SED group in order to the fight against the neutron bomb needs Comrade Werner Lamberz had detailed assure maximum efficiency and coordinated further strengthening. In the Low Countries, this still more in his talk with Mengistu and strategy. Denmark, and Norway there already exist there was, as you know, the affirmation that Comrade Ponomarev expressed his broad movements whereas France has so far this declaration would still come in Decem- concern over the extremes in the Ethiopian kept out. If a broad movement which would ber. Obviously the Ethiopian comrades have Revolution. In talks with Mengistu, [Cuban] exert influence on the government could be not been sufficiently ready for it and still comrade Raul Valdes Vivo has already stated brought about in the FRG, this could be a have numerous reservations against a deci- that such events as the mass executions of great success. We all should contribute to sive step towards the solution of the Eritrean prisoners led by the “Red Terror,” which this, including the DKP [West German Com- problem. would not be advantageous to the Revolu- munist Party]. It is important to use all pos- We also completely agree with the tion, are incomprehensible. sibilities and to also work with personali- view that the Ethiopian leadership appar- Much now depends on what attitude ties like [former West German Chancellor ently does not have a clear concept, either Mengistu himself will take towards the and Social Democratic Party (SPD) official on a general solution of the national prob- 86 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

lem in Ethiopia nor on the specific prob- formity with a remark by Aforki which re- Therefore we continue to oppose a military lems in Eritrea. They have until now not lates to the generosity which they - the intervention in Eritrea. In coordination with really seriously believed in it and have not Eritreans - had expected from the Ethiopi- our Soviet comrades we have agreed to oc- seriously concerned themselves with it but ans. We would encourage this way of pro- cupy the entrance to the Mits’iwa Islands instead only considered the demand for a ceeding which would be in conformity with from where a certain degree of control can peaceful solution as [in itself] a kind of po- our views. On the other hand, however, a be exerted and from where in an extreme litical solution. worsening of the situation is possible. emergency a limited military intervention They probably still have the thought Based on the success at the eastern would be possible. in the back of their minds that a peaceful front and carried by the euphoria of victory In this connection it is very important solution of the Eritrean problem will mean and given the possibility to withdraw strong that we immediately think about Aforki’s a capitulation by the Eritrean movements, and experienced Ethiopian units, the Ethio- demand for a guarantee by the Socialist which means that the military solution pian leadership could aspire to a decisive countries. It might be necessary to work out would be the preparation for a further peace- and quick military solution in Eritrea. Un- a common basic view with the Soviet Union ful strategy. fortunately there are significant forces before the next meeting because it is to be One can certainly not neglect the mili- within the PMAC calling for such a solu- expected that Aforki will not only present tary measures in this matter, but the Ethio- tion. concrete proposals but will also expect from pian comrades still do not have the deep rec- Comrade Mengistu has now asked the the representatives of the Socialist countries ognition of the necessity of a political, i.e. leadership of the CP Cuba for the second a concrete response. Our view is based on peaceful solution of the Eritrean problem. time not only to give military support in the fact that we have and will take on a moral Thus just as much as one can certainly ar- Ogaden but also to deploy Cuban units in obligation towards the Eritreans when we gue that the leadership of the EPLF does Eritrea. urge upon them the political and peaceful not have an understanding of the historic Towards the end of last year he dra- solution according to the concept agreed importance of the Ethiopian Revolution, one matically called on us, arguing that Cuban among us. They could certainly then not can also argue that the awareness of the re- troops should immediately intervene in withhold the pressure of the enemy on their sponsibility for the Revolutionary develop- Eritrea since otherwise the final loss of this own. There is the danger here too that the ment in the entire region is not deeply rooted area was imminent and hence would have Ethiopian comrades may not pay attention in the Ethiopian leadership. incalculable consequences for the Ethiopian to the changed situation and are looking for [...]It is necessary that we continue our Revolution. In close consultation with the an easy success which would be costly for intense efforts on this common line in order Soviet comrades, Comrade Fidel Castro fa- us in political and moral terms with other to have all participants make a common ef- vored a massive intervention in the Ogaden countries. fort. In this respect the written agreement against the Somali invasion. He emphasized Comrade Rodriguez also informed us that was achieved is of enormous signifi- that this now was clearly a domestic Ethio- about some other questions: cance. The further strategy in the Ogaden pian matter and that we would have the - [Iraq] will be decisive and of utmost importance OAU, the African states, international laws - A few days ago, Comrade Nagere, for the question of how things will continue, and conventions, as well as the UN on our member of the politburo of the Meison probably also for the solution of the Eritrean side. Comrade Castro refused to intervene group [All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement, problem. Comrade Mengistu certainly did in Eritrea. We have promised every kind of defeated by Mengistu] (supposedly in the not want to make any concessions on this aid except for military units to our Ethio- second rank of this organization behind Prof. question as long as he seemed close to be- pian comrades. We have based this on the Haile Fidda) has asked the Cuban comrades ing defeated on all fronts. It will be impor- view that this was a justified national cause for consultation. The Cubans have consulted tant not to have a growing feeling of capitu- of the Eritrean people which could not be with Mengistu who did not oppose such a lation. From this point of view his reserva- solved militarily. Now, a few days ago, meeting but characterized Negere as a trai- tions and hesitation with the promised dec- Comrade Mengistu has asked again and tor. He will come in the next few days to laration are understandable. spoke of a dramatic and dangerous devel- Havana, and our Cuban comrades will in- Now we are rapidly approaching an- opment in the situation; again he demanded form us immediately about these talks via other situation which will lead to certain to have Cuban units deployed at the Eritrean our ambassador. decisions. There are two possibilities which front. - On the situation in the Ogaden, Com- might be expected after the success against Comrade Fidel Castro and all the mem- rade Rodriguez informed us that a large Somalia on the eastern front. On the one bers of our politburo are of the opinion that counter-offensive had been in preparation hand [there could be] a generous, calm, ob- we cannot afford to make any mistakes in since 25 December 1977. There have been jective, and thought-out approach to a peace- our handling of the Eritrean question. A two major campaigns in recent days which ful solution of the Eritrean problem, an ap- wrong move now could endanger our en- caused losses of more than 3000 men on the proach which is not caused by coercion, tire policy and important positions in Af- other side. It is a serious problem that the [but] which is based on the authority of vic- rica. We would be confronted by the major- Ethiopian comrades do not want to take pris- tory and which therefore can take advan- ity of African states, the Arabs, international oners of war and thus act very cruelly. These tage of a vastly new possibilities for a peace- organs, probably also the countries of the blows have caused the enemy large mate- ful solution. This would be a strategy in con- Non-Alignment Movement, and others. rial losses as well while our own have been COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 87 very small. In the last movement in the he also emphasized, however, that military to the conclusion that a long developmental Northeast there was a smaller loss of hu- encounters will intensify. Such factors as the stage will be necessary to solve the basic man life but the material losses have been general mobilization in Somalia and in- problems in favor of a Socialist Revolution very great. The Somalis have over 40 tanks, creased arms deliveries by the West will in Ethiopia. numerous medium-weight and heavy weap- have some effect. Also, one cannot forget 2. The international situation of the ons, flack artillery, armored cars and a great the fact that significant parts of the Ethio- conflict at the Horn of Africa is character- amount of weapons and munitions. In part, pian armed forces have to be kept in the ized by the efforts of the imperialist coun- they have left behind NATO war material North and are involved in fighting counter- tries to keep a crisis atmosphere on the Af- which was not even unwrapped. In the fights revolutionary groups in Eritrea. Another part rican continent in order to achieve their long- around Dire Dawa, the Somalis had to pull of the army is necessary to guarantee secu- term objectives. These plans are bound to back, leaving almost their entire armament. rity towards the Sudan. The Ethiopian army fail with the increasing progress towards a Up to now, there have been only pre- can still not be considered a homogeneous military solution of the conflict in favor of paratory blows. Most of the units marked unit. Large parts of the cadres, in particular Ethiopia. Western counter-efforts can clearly for action have not been deployed yet, and the officer corps, were taken over from the be recognized. Although the Barre regime the main blow has not even yet begun. The imperial government. Sabotage, insubordi- is embarrassing to the Western powers, they enemy is fleeing and giving up positions nation, even withdrawal without fighting are are using it as a tool in their attempt to pur- faster than had been expected. We are there- serious occurrences. Great attention is there- sue their interests. fore in a situation where we have to under- fore paid to the reorganization of the army They use the lie of alleged aggressive take a series of fast actions so that the en- and the concerted build-up of a popular mi- designs on Ethiopia’s part in order to con- emy will not have time to rebuild his forces. litia. The biggest problem here is once again ceal their direct activities in support of So- It is our plan to complete the main actions the cadres and their training. One should also malia. The declaration of Western powers by the end of February 1978. This means not underestimate the problems caused by that they would not make weapons avail- that by early March we can expect a great the change-over in the army from Western able to Somalia is refuted by arms deliver- victory at this front. This is, as is well to Socialist weapons systems which have to ies via third, in particular reactionary Arab known, the time for the next meeting. This be managed and deployed efficiently. countries and via “private” firms. Simulta- will have a great effect. As agreed upon with Finally, a number of problems with neously, the Western countries are increas- our Soviet comrades, in no case will we regard to the revolutionary development in ing their politico-diplomatic pressure for the transgress Somali borders. Ethiopia need to be solved. The situation in “independence” of the Ogaden to at least [Final remarks.] the countryside is characterized by a height- achieve a partial success which would im- ening of class warfare. In contrast to other prove the prospects for the realization of [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ developing countries with a Socialist orien- their long-term goals. 127; obtained and translated by Christian tation, there is a strong social differentia- From this point of view we have to F. Ostermann.] tion in Ethiopia and the implementation of understand the willingness of the Western class principle requires permanent relentless powers to attain an armistice without the Embassy of the GDR in the USSR, struggle. Although the necessity of an avant- withdrawal of Somali troops from Ethiopian Political Department, 17 February garde party has evolved, there are currently territory. It is their goal to give Somalia the 1978, Memorandum of Conversation no grounds for such a party. [...] Although opportunity to consolidate its position on with the Dep. Head of the MFA Third there have evolved political groups at a lo- Ethiopian territory and to achieve, through Department (Africa), Comrade S. J. cal level which in the future could lay the protracted negotiations, a situation like the Sinitsin, 16 February 1978 foundations for a party, there exist a num- one in the Middle East. Therefore the So- ber of sectarian groups which at times exert viet Union and the Socialist countries fully [...] Comrade Sinitsin gave his estimate large influence. support the basic Ethiopian position: armi- of the situation in Ethiopia and on the Horn Simultaneously with the problem of stice, withdrawal of Somali troops, and po- of Africa. building up a unified political organization litical negotiations. 1. The counteroffensive of the Ethio- with a broad popular basis, the question The direct and indirect [Western] sup- pian armed forces against the Somali troops arises with regard to a state apparatus which port for Somalia illustrates the demagogic in the Ogaden is considered positive. We are is loyal to the new leadership. Army and character of the declarations of the Western currently not dealing with a general offen- state apparatus - both taken over from im- governments, which shows itself in the com- sive but the recovery of important strategic perial times - still are divided in two camps. parison of Somalia with Ethiopia, the com- points which will then allow for the com- Many decisions taken by the revolutionary parison of an aggressor with its victim, and plete expulsion of Somali military from military leadership are already sabotaged the attempt to blame the Soviet Union and Ethiopian territory. So far, a 30 km to 70 within the government, even in the defense the Socialist countries for the heightening km deep zone has been recovered. The air and foreign ministry. The enemies of the of the conflict and thus to keep them from superiority of the Ethiopian forces has a people’s forces enjoy the full support of further supporting Ethiopia. The Ethiopian great impact. Comrade Sinitsin considered Western countries. Since there is a lack of leadership is carefully observing the attitude the prospect for a successful conclusion of trained progressive cadres, no radical solu- and actions of the imperialist states and dif- the fighting for the Ethiopians rather good; tion can be pursued. All these factors point ferentiates between them. In this respect one 88 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

has to view Mengistu’s declaration announc- tion by the Security Council since this would [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ ing to the United States, Great Britain, and promote the internationalization of the con- 127; obtained and translated by Christian the FRG that he would break diplomatic flict as intended by the Western countries. F. Ostermann.] relations if they continued their direct sup- One should also remember that a takeover port of Somalia. Hence he is clearly consid- by the Security Council would delay a reso- Memorandum of Conversation of SED ering with subtle difference states such as lution of the conflict - in a similar fashion Comrade Lamberz with Cuban Italy, which as a former colonial power is as the Middle East conflict - to an uncertain Ambassador to Ethiopia, Comrade currently taking on a flexible position in point in the future. Furthermore, a UN in- Pepe, Addis Ababa, 3 March 1978 Ethiopia, and France, which is above all in- volvement would lead to a great power con- (dated 4 March 1978) terested in the consolidation of its position frontation [and] would aggravate the situa- in Djibouti. tion within the UN which would have a (Based on notes of Comrade General 3. The conflict in the Horn of Africa negative effect upon the main problems now Major Jaenicke.) has led to a strong polarization and differ- confronting the UN. [Introductory remarks] entiation among the African and the Middle Although a treatment of the conflict has Comrade Pepe’s estimate of the situa- Eastern countries. The situation in Ethio- so far not been put before the Security Coun- tion. pia is made more difficult by the encircle- cil by the Western powers, it cannot be pre- There is a good development in the ment by reactionary regimes of states which cluded that such attempts will be under- East. There are still Somali troops in the depend upon them. While South Yemen is taken. One thing is clear, they would have area of Jijiga, Dire Dawa, and Harar have altogether taking a positive position on an anti-Soviet impetus. been liberated. Currently [there is] a con- Ethiopia, the other, even many progressive, With regard to Beijing’s attitude to- centration on the Ethiopian side against Arab nations, have considerable reservations wards the conflict between Somalia and Jijiga. about supporting Ethiopia. In particular, the Ethiopia, one can detect - as has been ex- Regular Somali troops are withdraw- Arab nations differ in their attitude towards posed in Soviet publications and mass me- ing to the border; [they] intend to leave guer- Eritrea which ranges from open solidarity dia - a clearly hostile attitude against the rilla fighters in Jijiga as a bridgehead. The to direct support of the separatists in Eritrea. Ethiopian leadership. Beijing supports, as problem of the Ethiopian troops not taking Reservations are also held against Libya and all over the world, reactionary regimes in- any prisoners was discussed with Mengistu; Algiers who do not even support the revo- asmuch as this serves anti-Sovietism. Al- it was Mengistu’s concept to take prisoners lutionary development in Ethiopia to a full though China openly shares Somalia’s point but it had not yet achieved complete aware- measure. Differences of opinion also exist of view, its direct material support is alto- ness among the troops. between Syria and Iraq on the one hand, and gether rather moderate. Besides direct arms A train route was opened in the East, Ethiopia on the other hand. deliveries, Beijing is supporting Somalia in inhabitants return [to their homes]. The Issar While the OAU has continued to de- the construction of roads and irrigation sys- and Afars were displaying good behavior; fend, in the framework of its own decisions tems and delivers medical aid. Issar in part fought on the side of the Ethio- and in full agreement with Ethiopia, the in- Existing pro-Maoist groups in Ethio- pians. tegrity of Ethiopian borders, one has to dif- pia exert very little influence and have no On the trip of the envoy [U.S. deputy ferentiate the attitude of individual African broad popular basis. national security advisor David Aaron] of countries toward the conflict. 4. With regard to the demand by So- USA President Carter to Addis Ababa: The The countries of Black Africa fully malia to recall its students in the USSR, American desire to keep the trip secret was support the Ethiopian position. But the Comrade Sinitsin informed us about the fol- not accepted. The USA was concerned that unanimous condemnation of Somalia as an lowing: Upon request of the Somali gov- Ethiopia would break off diplomatic rela- aggressor was not achieved. Thus, just as a ernment, the Somali embassy in Moscow tions. The USA would be ready to respect number of member states of the OAU repu- delivered a note to the MFA in Moscow the revolutionary development in Ethiopia diated the clear condemnation of the aggres- communicating the intention to recall all and grant aid to Ethiopia if its neutrality was sion against Angola, they also differ in their Somalis residing in the USSR. The Soviet guaranteed. They would perhaps be willing position in the evaluation of the situation Union was asked to help with the return of to deliver money and spare parts. on the Horn of Africa. One can also not over- the students which is to be carried out on Problems in the Ethiopia-USA relation- look such influences as that exerted by Ni- special planes. The MFA of the USSR re- ship were not the fault of the Carter Admin- geria which favors the independence of the sponded by arguing that the recall of stu- istration but of its predecessor (for example Ogaden. dents in ongoing training programs would non-compliance with weapons and material In general, the Soviet comrades ac- be a violation of existing agreements and deliveries). knowledge the positive fact that the OAU thus the financial burden had to be carried The United States’ main concern was will continue its activities for a settlement by Somalia. the Soviet and Cuban presence. The United of the conflict. This fact is also especially The students’ return aboard special States would not support Somalia as long important because some powers continue to planes itself was not refused. [...] as Ethiopia was operating on its own terri- pursue attempts for a settlement of the con- tory. flict by the UN Security Council. Like Ethio- [Signed: Vogel] Mengistu explained to the USA envoy: pia, the Soviet Union is against an interven- It was his right to ask for advisers to come COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 89 to Ethiopia, and they would stay as long as ternationalization of the conflict existed in colleagues in the leadership. Thus far that necessary. The Carter administration was to the North, in particular in Massawa. response has not been received. blame for the strained Ethiopian-USA rela- There are doubts about the Aforki’s Siad Barre’s reaction to the thoughts tionship (role of the CIA etc.). He empha- role. which we expressed to him in regarding his sized the neutrality of Ethiopia which would If Massawa finally falls, one could ex- request suggests that he, as in the past, is develop toward socialism. He would not be pect that USA ships would show up in the playing a dishonest game. He obviously ready to switch allies. port and Soviet ships would have to leave. would like to leave some part of the forces Mengistu’s response was so good that The enemy’s main blow can be ex- in the Ogaden disguised as “patriotic detach- the USA envoy immediately withdrew the pected in the North. Mengistu’s attitude ments” and not to accept as a starting point demand for the immediate removal of So- makes it easier for the enemy. Mengistu for negotiations the principle of mutual re- viet and Cuban advisers; he demanded the should not be confronted with the possibil- spect, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non- withdrawal of the Cubans after the end of ity of Eritrean independence. One has to pay violation of borders, and non-interference the Somali aggression; then the withdrawal attention to ensure that the Eritrean prob- in the internal affairs of one another. He would be necessary since otherwise this lem will not lead to a worsening of relations declares that these principles should be the would result in a threat to USA strategic in- with the Socialist countries. Comrade Raul subject of the subsequent negotiations. terests. Castro has made it clear to Mengistu that On the other hand, Siad Barre’s re- The United States attempts to get an the Cubans would not participate in the sponse in no way rejects the possibility of economic foothold in Ethiopia. Possibly fights in the North. organizing a Somali-Ethiopian meeting, if deliveries of arms, equipment etc. would Even in case of an internationalization Ethiopia will agree to it. Therefore, if follow to “further confuse the situation.” of the conflict Cuban troops could not in- Mengistu will give his consent to this meet- Comrade Pepe pointed to the fact that tervene, given the lack of any program. ing, then it seems expedient to continue our after the situation in the East would clear [Concluding remarks] work aimed at organizing it. Simulta- up some forces could try to perform an neously, it will of course be necessary to change of course in Ethiopia. (Something [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ confirm to Siad Barre our principled ap- similar to [pro-Soviet and anti-American 127; document obtained and translated by proach regarding the withdrawal from MPLA faction leader Nito] Alves in Christian F. Ostermann.] Ethiopia of all Somali sub-detachments and Angola.) about the principles of a settlement which At the request of the Cuban comrades, Minutes of CPSU CC Politburo are mentioned above. Mengistu spoke publicly about the presence Meeting, 9 March 1978 (excerpt) I believe that it is necessary for us to of Soviet and Cuban advisers. Nevertheless, continue working in this direction. the press continually claims that Ethiopia is Top Secret MFA USSR, the Committee of State still fighting by itself. The reason for this Only copy Security, the Ministry of Defense and the [is] unclear. Working Transcript International Department of the CC CPSU With respect to the “Red terror,” Com- are assigned to continue working in the di- rade Vivo mentioned this to Mengistu. Now MEETING OF THE CC rection of a settlement of the military con- there is a certain positive change. There is CPSU POLITBURO flict between Ethiopia and Somalia and to talk of “revolutionary legality.” 9 March 1978 submit possible proposals to the CC CPSU. [Mengistu and MEISON] With regard to Eritrea it was attempted Chaired by Com. BREZHNEV, L.I. [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 39, ll. 97, to convince Mengistu that a program for Attended by Coms. Grishin, V.V., Kirilenko, 114; translated by Mark Doctorff.] Eritrea had to be worked out. It would be A.P., Kosygin, A.N., Kulakov, F.D., necessary to create foundations and goals Mazurov, K.T., Pel’she, A.Ya., Demichev, SED Memorandum of a Conversation for which one could fight in Eritrea in order P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N., with Comrade [Soviet Ambassador to to be able to influence the lines of division Solomentsev, M.S., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, Ethiopia Anatoly P.] Ratanov in Addis among the various [Eritrean liberation] M.V., Riabov, Ia.P., Rusakov, K.V. Ababa, 13 March 1978 movements. Mengistu is not very convinced in this question. He fears other split-offs [. . .] 12. About Measures to Settle the Ethio- On 13 March 1978, [GDR diplomat] which would result in the destruction of the pia-Somalia military conflict met with the Soviet Ethiopian state. Ambassador to Ethiopia, Comrade Ratanov, Mengistu has little confidence in the BREZHNEV. All comrades, evidently, for an two-hour conversation. talks with the Eritreans. Cuban comrades have read the last telegrams from Ethiopia [Other participants; opening remarks] have doubts as well. Nevertheless the talks and Somalia in relation to Siad Barre’s re- On the attitude towards Somalia, Com- begun by the SED were very important. quest concerning our mediation. At first, rade Ratanov explained that they had in- Perhaps they would create pre-conditions for Mengistu’s reaction to the thoughts we ex- formed Mengistu on 7 March about Siad a necessary program. pressed about that issue was basically posi- Barre’s offer of negotiations. Mengistu Territorial integrity and central author- tive. But he has promised to give a final promised to have this immediately discussed ity had to be guaranteed. Danger of an in- response only after he will consult with his within the PMAC. He said that it would not 90 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

be bad if Somalia could be brought back into On the Eritrean question, Comrade entiation taking place among the Eritrean the Socialist camp regardless of the govern- Ratanov stated that the development in So- movements and forces are appearing which ment in that country. malia was not the only thing complicating are interested in a unification with the revo- One had to make efforts to tear Soma- the situation. There are people within the lutionary Ethiopian forces. lia away from the imperialists and certainly Ethiopian leadership who, based on differ- The Ethiopian troops in Eritrea are now there were positive forces influencing Siad ent positions, act in immature, arrogant, and tired of fighting, and even the victory of the Barre. Perhaps he has also acknowledged nationalistic ways. Ogaden has not changed much. Despite the some mistakes. In a conversation, Comrade Mengistu success, no significant units can be with- The discussion within the PMAC was indicated that the Socialist countries, to his drawn from there and a fast change in the apparently difficult, and there was no re- mind, did not really understand the Eritrean military situation in Eritrea is not to be ex- sponse the next day. On 9 March, the Cu- problem. It was not a national but a class pected. ban comrades approached Mengistu with a problem. He referred especially to an inter- On the development of the Party, message from Fidel Castro which contained view given by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a Mengistu has promised that a group of So- similar recommendations. On 13 March, member of the politburo of the CP Cuba, to viet advisers could arrive at any time. There Ratanov met again with Mengistu and then an English journalist on 12 February. In this have been a number of delays in this ques- received the written response of the Ethio- interview, Rodriguez indicated in response tion. Mengistu apparently has no concept pian leadership. (For a translation see ap- to a corresponding question that the Eritrean of the cooperation with the advisers. It is pendix [not printed--ed.]). Comrade problem had to be dealt with differently than necessary to convince him that the advisers Ratanov said, in the conversation in which the other questions in Ethiopia. It was con- could be a real help and relief. [...] [Maj.] Berhanu Bayeh [Chairman of the le- cluded that the Eritrean problem was a do- gal and administrative affairs committee and mestic Eritrean [sic-Ethiopian?--ed.] prob- [Source: SAPMO-BA, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ of the special commission on Eritea] par- lem. 127; document obtained and translated by ticipated, that it was right to demand guar- Mengistu thought that this statement Christian F. Ostermann.] antees from Somalia and that it had to re- had practically given the separatists a guar- frain from its territorial demands. At the antee. Soviet Foreign Ministry, Background same time it was necessary to employ the The Cuban comrades have declared Report on Soviet-Ethiopian Relations, correct political tactics. We lose nothing if that Comrade Rodriguez should not be in- 3 April 1978 we agree to negotiations. One cannot de- terpreted in this way. mand everything in advance. This would The movements in Eritrea which are Secret. Single copy practically mean to call for political suicide. directed against the Ethiopian Revolution orig. No. 167/3 ag After all Siad Barre wants to save his skin. are objectively counter-revolutionary. There 03.IV.78 Moreover, the Ethiopian positions could not are, however, national factors which have well be presented as logical before world to be acknowledged. The Arab countries are SOVIET-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS public opinion. At first Ethiopia declares that trying to separate Eritrea from Ethiopia and (Reference) it would be willing to negotiate if Somalia to make it a member of the Arab League. withdraws its troops. Now that they [the This would mean that Ethiopia would be cut Diplomatic relations between the Somalis] are willing to do so, the Ethiopi- off from the Red Sea. Mengistu has to un- USSR and Ethiopia were established on 21 ans are retreating from their position. This derstand that we fully understand this and April 1943. attitude could well be a gift for the imperi- also the dangers evolving from the nation- Soviet-Ethiopian political cooperation alists because Siad Barre can claim that alist and separatist Eritrean movements. One before the Ethiopian revolution in 1974 de- Ethiopia was not willing to negotiate and has to anticipate the plans of the imperial- veloped on the basis of the historical ties instead was preparing for new attacks in ists and the reaction. It is correct that the between the peoples of the USSR and Ethio- pursuit of its goals. After consultation with movements have lost much of their national pia, both countries’ participation in the Mengistu, the Soviet Union responded to character but there remain genuinely na- struggle against during World War Siad Barre in the following way: Ethiopia tional forces. It is correct that Eritrea is not Two, and also taking into account the posi- is willing to enter into negotiations with a nation but this also applies to other Afri- tive position that Ethiopia held in the Somalia with the Soviet Union participat- can countries. In proceeding towards a so- struggle against colonialism and racism, in ing. It will be expected from Somalia to lution in the Eritrean problem, we should the questions of strengthening global peace declare its readiness in the course of the distance ourselves from the separatists. and international security. negotiations to abandon its anti-Soviet, anti- Mengistu is so far not willing to call Former Emperor Haile Selassie I vis- Cuban, and anti-Ethiopian position. Soma- for progressive action in Eritrea and to work ited the Soviet Union in 1959, 1967, 1970, lia had to prove by its actions before do- together with the progressive forces. To him, and in 1973. mestic and world public opinion that it is Eritrea is exclusively an Ethiopian matter. The Provisional Military Administra- indeed assuming a really new position. Un- He favors a continuation of military actions tive Council (PMAC) announced its course der such conditions Ethiopia is willing to in order to bring under his control in par- for a Socialist orientation and its intention develop comprehensive cooperation be- ticular the centers and the road to Massawa. to develop comprehensive cooperation with tween both countries. Currently there is a process of differ- the USSR after it came to power on 12 Sep- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 91 tember 1974. vide comprehensive assistance and support of labor unions, women’s and youth move- The Ethiopian leadership emphasized for the Ethiopian revolution in the future. ments, solving nationality and other issues the fact that it saw the Soviet Union as the Comrades L.I. Brezhnev and Mengistu at the CC CPSU in the Soviet Union. In main source of their support internationally. Haile Mariam repeatedly exchanged per- 1977, 50 people were accepted to those The positions of the PMAC on the majority sonal letters, which also contributed to a courses. In March 1978, a group of four of major international problems coincide strengthening of bilateral relations. Soviet party officials went to Ethiopia to as- with or are close to those of the USSR. An Ethiopian delegation led by mem- sist the PMAC in creating a vanguard party In January 1975 the PMAC leadership ber of the Permanent Committee of the of the working class. raised in principle the question of develop- PMAC Berhanu Bayeh attended the celebra- Military Cooperation. In December ing Soviet-Ethiopian relations. It was an- tion of the 60th anniversary of the Great 1976 in Moscow Ethiopia and the Soviet nounced by our side that the Soviet Union October Socialist Revolution [in November Union signed an agreement on the transfer regarded sympathetically the measures 1977]. of some defensive weapons and military taken by the PMAC for building a new so- In the difficult situation which emerged equipment from the Soviet Union to Ethio- ciety on progressive principles, and that we around revolutionary Ethiopia and in the pia in 1977-1980. Upon request from the shared their opinion about the need to de- country itself the Soviet Union has provided Ethiopian side part of the weapons was de- velop comprehensive contacts between Ethiopia with constant political and diplo- livered immediately; and in February 1977 Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. matic support, for which the leadership of some rifles were supplied for the Ethiopian Political relations. On 6-11 July 1976 Ethiopia has repeatedly expressed its deep people’s militia in form of gratuitous assis- an Ethiopian state delegation led by former gratitude. tance. We also gave our consent to the gov- Chairman Mogus Wolde Michael of the Responding to the PMAC request to ernments of CzSSR [Czechoslovakia], VNR PMAC Committee of Ethiopia came to the provide support for the peaceful settlement [Hungary], PNR [Poland], and Cuba to sup- Soviet Union on an official visit. The So- of the Eritrean problem the Soviet Union ply Ethiopia with rifles produced under So- viet delegation at the negotiations was led addressed several leaders of Arab countries viet licenses, and to the government of the by Comrade A.A. Gromyko. Members of and of Somalia on that issue. The Soviet PDRY [People’s Democratic Republic of the Ethiopian delegation were received by Union has also made a presentation to the Yemen] to transfer Soviet-made tanks and Comrade A.N. Kosygin. Iraqi government concerning the small armored personnel vehicles to Ethiopia. On 4-8 May 1977 a state delegation of transfers of Soviet-made weapons to the Later, after a new request from Ethio- Ethiopia led by Chairman Lieutenant-Colo- Eritrean separatists from Iraq through pia, the Soviet side made a decision addi- nel Mengistu Haile Mariam of the PMAC Sudan. tionally to supply Ethiopia with weapons came to the Soviet Union on an official In the situation of the war unleashed and military equipment, and also with rifles friendly visit. Mengistu Haile Mariam was by Somalia against Ethiopia and the occu- for the People’s militia in 1977-1980. In received by Comrade Brezhnev. pation of a significant portion of its terri- addition, we supply Ethiopia with technol- Soviet-Ethiopian negotiations in which tory the Soviet Union took the position of ogy for general civilian use, and Ethiopian the sides considered the status and the pros- decisive support of Ethiopia, and provided servicemen have been accepted for study in pects for further development of Soviet- it with all kinds of assistance, including the the Soviet Union. Ethiopian relations, the situation in Africa, assistance in strengthening its capability to During the closed visit of Mengistu and other international problems of mutual defend itself. In our official statements and Haile Mariam to Moscow in October 1977, interest were held. addresses to a number of African and Arab the Soviet side agreed to provide urgently The sides adopted a Declaration of the countries, and also in our contacts with the additional supplies of weapons and military Basis for Friendly Relations and Coopera- Western countries, we consistently advo- equipment to strengthen the capability of tion between the USSR and Ethiopia in the cated the necessity of an immediate cessa- Ethiopia to defend itself in the situation of name of further strengthening of Soviet- tion of the conflict by, first and foremost, the Somali aggression. Ethiopian relations. A joint Soviet-Ethiopian an unconditional withdrawal of the Somali A group of Soviet military advisers and communique was published on the results troops from the territory of Ethiopia. specialists currently works in Ethiopia. of the visit of the state delegation of Ethio- In July-August 1977 the Soviet Union A state delegation led by Army Gen- pia to the USSR. During the visit the sides provided its good offices for the settlement eral V.I. Petrov has been staying in Ethiopia signed an Agreement on Cultural and Sci- of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. However, since November 1977 on a closed visit. The entific Cooperation, a Consular Convention, during separate meetings with the represen- tasks of the delegation include devising and the Protocol on Economic and Techno- tatives of both countries who came to Mos- measures jointly with the Ethiopian side to logical Cooperation of 6 May 1977. cow it became clear that the two sides held assist the PMAC in building the Ethiopian On 30-31 October 1977 Chairman uncompromising mutually exclusive posi- armed forces, for faster mastering of the Mengistu Haile Mariam of the PMAC of tions. In those circumstances both delega- Soviet military equipment by the Ethiopian Ethiopia came to the USSR on a closed visit. tions left for their countries, and the mis- army, and in the planning of military opera- During the conversation that Comrades L.I. sion of good offices was suspended. tions in the Ogaden and Eritrea. Brezhnev, A.N. Kosygin, and A.A. Party Contacts. At the request of the Gromyko had with him, it was emphasized PMAC, 120 active members of the PMAC [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, ll. that the USSR was going to continue to pro- took courses on party building, organization 24-32; translation by Svetlana Savran- 92 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

skaya.] Ethiopia with a call to normalize their rela- Confronted with the decisive refusal of tions and proposed a constructive program the Soviet Union and the other countries of Soviet Foreign Ministry and CPSU CC which would lead to a settlement, and indi- the socialist commonwealth to support the International Department, Background cated its readiness to make available its good territorial claims on Ethiopia, the Somali Report on the Somali-Ethiopian offices. In July-August 1977, in the course leadership on 13 November 1977 unilater- Conflict, 3 April 1978 of separate meetings with representative of ally announced the annulment of the 1974 Somalia and Ethiopia who were visiting Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and Secret, Copy No. 3 Moscow, it was found that the sides were Cooperation and demanded the recall from Issue 164/3afo occupying mutually-exclusive positions; Somalia of all Soviet military and civilian IV.03.78 moreover the Somalis were continuing to advisors. In Somalia an anti-Soviet cam- insist on wresting the Ogaden away from paign was unfolded. Diplomatic relations ABOUT THE SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA Ethiopia. with Cuba were cut off. CONFLICT Insofar as plans to obtain the Ogaden At the same time the Somali leader- (Information Sheet) without the application of force did not come ship began actively to search for support to fruition, the Somali leadership, in which from Muslim states, winning from them as- Since the time of the formation of an chauvinistic moods came to dominate, set sistance which included arms deliveries and independent Somalian state in 1960, there about the practical realization of its expan- the sending of forces for participation in has been tension in inter-state relations on sionist plans, counting on achieving success combat actions against Ethiopia under the the Horn of Africa. Its source is the aspira- in relation to the domestic political situa- banner of “Islamic Solidarity.” The visit of tion of the leadership of Somalia to unite tion in Ethiopia, which was aggravated at the President of Somalia, Said Barre, to Iran, the lands populated by Somali tribes in a that time. The Arab reaction also pushed Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Oman, and also Iraq single state and the claims it has made in them to this, and also imperialist states, in and Syria, at the end of December 1977- that regard to certain regions of Ethiopia particular the USA, which, according to beginning of January 1978, served just such (Ogaden), Kenya, and the territory of the Siad’s own admission, had promised to pro- goals. Republic of Djibouti. vide military assistance to Somalia. As the conflict went on, the Somali Relations are particularly sharp be- On 23 July 1977, Somalia unleashed leaders many times called out to the USA tween Somalia and Ethiopia. On multiple on the African Horn an armed conflict. and other Western powers with persistent occasions border incidents and military con- Under cover of the Front for the Liberation appeals to provide assistance to Somalia and flict have broken out between them. of Western Somalia (FLWS)—which had to interfere in events on the African Horn The revolution in Ethiopia in 1974 did been created by the Somali leadership it- aimed at a “peace” settlement to the con- not lead to an improvement in Somalia- self—it sent its own forces into the Ogaden, flict and the “defense” of Somalia from ag- Ethiopia relations. More to the point, Presi- and they occupied a significant part of the gression which allegedly was being pre- dent Siad and other Somali leaders, using Ethiopian provinces of Harar, Bale, and pared against it from the direction of Ethio- as a cover demagogic declarations about the Sidamo, and only through the bitter fights pia. right of nations to self-determination, right which unfolded in October-December 1977 Following the collapse of its adventure up to secession, have intensified their pres- were they stopped at the approaches to the in Ogaden, Somalia has not retracted its ter- sure on Ethiopia. The Somalis in essence important centers of Harar and Dire Dawa. ritorial claims against Ethiopia, and putting have demanded the partition of the multi- After appropriate preparation, the forth various conditions it continues to seek national Ethiopian state on the basis of Ethiopian armed forces went on the counter- these same goals by other means. The So- ethnicity. These demands were obviously attack in February of this year. In the be- mali leadership called on the great powers aimed against the interests of the Ethiopian ginning of March of this year the strategi- with an appeal to secure recognition and the revolution and poured grist on the mill of cally important city of Jijiga was liberated, realization of self-determination for the internal and external reaction. and a major grouping of Somali forces was population of the Ogaden. In this regard it In these conditions the USSR and other shattered. Cuban military personnel took called on the great powers to undertake ur- socialist states undertook efforts to normal- part in the military actions, while Soviet gent measure to settle the conflict through ize relations between Ethiopia and the military advisors participated in working out negotiations, and by securing the withdrawal Democratic Republic of Somalia (SDR). In the plan of military operations. To the of “all foreign forces” from the African March 1977, at the initiative of Fidel Castro present, the liberation of all territory has in Horn, having in mind the Cuban military with the participation of the chairman of the fact been completed, and Ethiopian troops personnel and Soviet military advisors Presidential Council of the PDRY S. Rubayi have reached the border with Somalia. which had been invited by the Ethiopian Ali, a meeting took place in Aden between When the Somalis were on the edge of a government as a means to strengthen the de- the Chairman of the PMAC Mengistu Haile military catastrophe, the leadership of the fense capability of the country. Somalia also Mariam and the President of the SDR Siad, SDR made the decision to withdraw its spoke out for sending “neutral forces” to the which due to the unconstructive position of forces from the Ogaden front. At the same Ogaden. the latter ended without result. time the representatives of the FLWS an- The Ethiopian leadership evaluated the The Soviet Union more than once ap- nounced that they would not stop military actions of Somalia as an act of armed ag- pealed to the leadership of Somalia and actions on the territory of the Ogaden. gression and in relation to this on 8 Sep- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 93 tember 1977 broke off diplomatic relations (under the chairmanship of Nigeria), which rican states, but [in fact] Kenya, which has with the SDR. met in session in Libreville [Gabon] in Au- tight contacts with the West, sharply con- During the armed conflict, the PMAC gust 1977, refused to accept the Front for demned them. expressed readiness to settle the conflict the Liberation of Western Somalia as a na- At the present time, from the side of peacefully within the framework of the tional-liberation movernment, [and] called the Westerners, particularly the USA, efforts OAU, putting forth as an absolute condition on the governments of both countries to stop are being undertaken to take into their own the beginning of negotiations with the So- hostile actions and to settle their disagree- hands the initiative for a settlement of the malis on the withdrawal of their forces from ments by peaceful means, on the basis of conflict in the interests of strengthening their Ethiopian territory. Simultaneously the the principle of the inviolability of the bor- own positions on the African Horn. Under Ethiopian leaders declared many times in ders of African countries. In a resolution conditions of the occupation of the Ogaden public speeches that Ethiopia did not intend, accepted by the the committee there was by Somali forces they put forth proposals after the liberation of the Ogaden territory, contained a call on everyone, particulary for a quick beginning to negotiations, so that to carry military actions beyond the limits non-African countries, to refrain from in- the Somali side could speak at them from a of their own borders. terference in the conflict. position of strength. Another of their ideas After the destruction of the Somali Efforts which have until now been un- which they put forth was to pass consider- troops, the Ethiopia MFA asserted in its dec- dertaken by several African countries and ation of the issue of the conflict to the UN laration on 12 March of this year the aspira- the OAU to mediate an end to the conflict Security Council, where the Westerners tion of the Ethiopian government to estab- have not led to any positive results in view counted on putting pressure on Ethiopia. lish peace and stability on the African Horn of the contradictory positions taken by the The decision of the SDR to withdraw in accord with the Charters and decisions sides. Somali forces from the Ogaden was quickly of the U.N. and the OAU, on the basis of Over the course of the conflict, the re- used by the USA leadership for a declara- observation of the principles of non-use of actionary Muslim regimes have taken a po- tion about the need for the quick withdrawal force as a means of solving international sition in support of Somalia. However, ac- from Ethiopia of Soviet and Cuban military arguments, and non-interference in the do- cording to information which we have, at personnel. The Western powers also spoke mestic affairs of other states. In the decla- the time of the conduct of military actions in favor of the idea of sending to the Ogaden ration it was further pointed out that the es- in the Ogaden, President Siad was not suc- foreign “neutral observers” to supervise the tablishment of peace on the African Horn is cessful in getting their agreement to send withdrawal of troops from that regions and possible only in the event of Somali retrac- their forces to that region, although Saudi to ensure the security of its population. tion of its claims for part of the territory of Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Egypt did co- The Chinese leadership has expressed Ethiopia and Kenya, and also Djibouti, [and] vertly send arms to Somalia. itself from an anti-Soviet position in rela- observation by it of international agree- On the other hand, such Arab countries tion to the conflict, trying to heap all the ments. In it are rejected the attempts of the as the PDRY, Algeria, and, to an extent, responsibility for the ongoing events on the USA government and its allies to tie the Libya, provided support to Ethiopia. In this Soviet Union. While not openly express- withdrawal of Somali forces to a resolution regard the PDRY sent weapons and military ing its attitude to the conflict, at the same of issues which fall under the sovereignty personnel to Ethiopia. time it has essentially supported the posi- of Ethiopia (the presence on its territory of Over the course of the conflict, Sudan’s tion of Somalia. There is information that foreign military personnel invited there by position underwent change. For a variety the PRC has delivered small arms to Soma- the Ethiopian government, the proposal to of reasons it refused to take an extreme anti- lia. send foreign observors to the Ogaden). Ethiopian course. The countries of the socialist common- Regarding Somalia’s demand that the Leading Western countries, while ver- wealth have in relation to the conflict taken population of the Ogaden be presented with bally supporting a political settlement to the a position of censuring the aggressive ac- the right of self-determination, the Ethio- Somalia-Ethiopia conflict and stressing their tions of Somalia and providing Ethiopia pian leadership declares that a resolution of own neutrality, in fact have tried to use the with internationalist assistance and support. that issue is a domestic affair of Ethiopia conflict to undermine the revolutionary re- Cuba acted particularly actively in this and that therefore it cannot be a condition gime in Ethiopia and to rout the progres- direction, sending, in response to a request for a settlement of the Somalia-Ethiopia sive forces in Somalia, and also to weaken from the government of Ethiopia and as of- conflict. The Ethiopian side also raises the the presence of the USSR in that region of ficially announced by F. Castro on 16 March issue of compensation from Somalia for the the world. In fact, the Westerners have con- of this year, its own tank operators, artillery losses caused by the military actions in the ducted a policy of veiled assistance to So- specialists, pilots, and also sub-units of Ogaden. malia. Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons mechanized infantry, to provide assistance Somalia’s position in the conflict with they have not set out to provide Somalia with to the armed forces of that country while Ethiopia does not meet, as a rule, with sup- direct military assistance. Primarily they did the Ogaden was under conditions of occu- port from the members of the OAU, who not want to decisively push Ethiopia away pation by Somali forces. During the Ethio- support the preservation of existing state from them, counting on reestablishing their pian counter-attack, Cuban solders were borders in Africa. positions here in the future. They also could used in the main lines of attack. The Soviet The special committee of the OAU for not but take into account that the actions of Union and Cuba are in constant contact settlement of Somalia-Ethiopia relations Somalia had not met with support from Af- aimed at coordination of their actions in 94 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

support of the Ethiopian revolution. pian regime. During the conflict, supple- their own country and world public opinion The attitude of the Soviet Union toward mentary, urgent measures were undertaken about Somalia’s new position. the Somali-Ethiopia conflict is determined to strengthen the defense capability of Ethio- So far the Somali leadership rejects by the fact that that conflict contradicts the pia, which had become a victim of aggres- these proposals and continues to insist on interests of progressive forces in that region, sion. We brought deliveries of combat ma- its own conditions. and creates a danger of turning the African teriel, weapons, and ammunition to Soma- The outcome of the war in the Ogaden Horn into a hotbed of serious international lia to a halt. After the Somali side under- essentially was reflected in the domestic tension. took unfriendly actions in November 1977, political situation of its participants. The After the outbreak of armed conflict on the Soviet Union stopped economic and situation in Somalia was sharply exacer- the African Horn, the Soviet Union came trade cooperation and ended military coop- bated. On the grounds of a worsening of out in favor of its quick cessation, for the eration with Somalia. the economic situation and a decline in the peaceful settlement of relations between So- In the beginning of March of this year standard of living, dissatisfaction with the malia and Ethiopia by means of negotiations President Said appealed to the Soviet Union current leadership grew among various on the basis of mutual respect by the sides with a request to provide mediatory services strata of the population, including the army. of sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviola- to settle the Somali-Ethiopia conflict and This dissatisfaction, which has assumed bility of borders and non-interference in expressed readiness to establish friendly open forms, is being suppressed by Said each other’s domestic affairs, noting that an relations between Somalia and the USSR. with the help of executions and repressions. absolute condition of such a settlement must From our side agreement was given to In Ethiopia the military victory facilitated, be a cessation of military actions and a quick implement mediatory efforts if the leader- on the one hand, the consolidation of the and unconditional withdrawal of Somali ship of Ethiopia would view that favorably patriotic, progressive forces, and the forces from the territory of Ethiopia, and that and in the event that Somalia took a realis- strengthening of the position of Mengistu otherwise a situation analagous to the one tic position on a settlement of the conflict. and his supporters, and, on the other hand, in the Middle East might arise on the Afri- In this regard Siad’s attention was drawn to enlivened nationalistic elements, including can Horn. the fact that the various preconditions put in the leadership of the country, which are Our principled line in relation to the forth by the Somali side (giving self-deter- putting forth the idea that the Somali threat situation on the Horn of Africa was precisely mination to the population of Ogaden) only should be “done away with” once and for expressed in the speeches of comrades L.I. delay the possibility of holding negotiations all. Brezhnev of 28 September 1977 on the oc- to bring an end to the conflict, insofar as Overall, the situation on the African casion of the visit to the USSR of the Presi- they cannot be acceptable to any sovereign Horn remains complex and tense. The ces- dent of the People’s Republic of Angola A. state and complicate the realization by us sation of military actions on the ground has Neto, and A.N. Kosygin of 12 January 1978 of mediatory efforts. not yet been ratified in any way, and the con- on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of As far as the establishment of friendly tinuing Somali claims to the Ogaden, and the President of the APDR [Algerian relations with Somalia is concerned, from [to] part of the territory of Kenya and the People’s Democratic Republic] H. our side there was expressed readiness for Republic of Djibouti, create a situation Boumedienne, and also in the TASS Decla- that in principle and under the clear under- fraught with the outbreak of a new armed ration of 18 January 1978. standing of the fact that Somalia will take confrontation. Such a situation creates an The Soviet Union spoke out against specific steps to establish a genuine peace opportunity for maneuvers of imperialist and efforts of the Western states to submit the on the African Horn. reactionary Arab circles in this region of issue of the situation on the African Horn In response to our information about Africa, and therefore the establishment there for consideration by the UN Security Coun- Siad’s proposal, the Ethiopian government, of peace and the achievement of an agree- cil, which they could use in particular to having expressed doubt about the sincerity ment between Somalia and Ethiopia on stop- unleash a hostile campaign against the of the intentions of the Somali leadership, ping the conflict corresponds to our inter- USSR and Cuba. At the same time the So- at the same time expressed readiness to be- ests. viet Union believes that the Organization of gin negotiations with Somalia in Moscow African Unity should continue its efforts to with the participation of the Soviet Union, Third African Department provide assistance on a settlement of the So- on the condition that the Somali represen- MFA USSR mali-Ethiopia conflict, insofar as it has not tatives are prepared to declare in due course exhaused its possibilities in this area. the rejection of their anti-Ethiopian, anti- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, ll. The position of the Soviet Union to- Soviet, and anti-Cuban positions; to declare 13-23; translated by Mark Doctoroff.] wards the Somali-Ethiopia conflict has respect for the territorial integrity of Ethio- many times been brought to the attention of pia and to give agreement to the demarca- SED Archives, Memorandum on Soviet the leadership of progressive African and tion of the Ethiopia-Somalia border on the Reaction to Libyan Proposal on Somali- Arab states, and also to a range of Western basis of existing international agreements; Ethiopian Conflict, 4 April 1978 powers. to stop their support of underground move- The Soviet Union consistently follows ments directed against the territorial integ- The Soviet Ambassador in Tripoli re- a firm line in providing the utmost assis- rity and unity of Ethiopia; and lastly, in some ceived instruction to communicate the fol- tance and support to the revolutionary Ethio- way or another to inform public opinion of lowing to [Libyan Prime Minister Abdul COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 95

Salam] Jalloud: Somalia for their designs. posals for a peaceful and political solution The proposals of the Libyan leadership With respect to the situation in Eritrea, although Comrade Werner Lamberz had on the settlement of the Somali-Ethiopian the Soviet Union has viewed and still views agreed with Mengistu Haile Mariam on conflict have been carefully examined in this in conformity with the UN and OAU working papers in December 1977. Moscow. We have communicated to the resolutions as an internal Ethiopian matter. The attitude of the representatives of Ethiopians the recent Libyan desire to re- We favor a political solution of this ques- the Eritrean Liberation Movement illus- ceive in Tripoli the chairman of the Provi- tion by negotiations between the central gov- trated, on the other hand that, under the pres- sional Military Administrative Council ernment and the Eritrean organizations. It sure by the leadership of the Sudan and the (PMAC), based on the fact that only the is our strong conviction that the current at- Arab reaction, there has been a strengthen- Ethiopian side itself can make a decisions titude of the Eritrean organizations which ing of nationalist, openly separatist forces in this respect. The Ethiopian side had pre- favor the separation of Eritrea from Ethio- within the Eritrean movements, especially viously communicated to us that Mengistu pia contradicts the interests of the Ethiopian by means of the coordination between the could not come to Libya at the end of Feb- Revolution and the progressive forces in this Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the ruary for negotiations with Siad Barre, for area and is only of advantage to the imperi- Eritrean Liberation Front (Revolutionary reasons which the PMAC chairman told you alists and the reaction. Council). personally. Libya and other progressive Arab states The leader of the Eritrean People’s Lib- The Libyan side is aware of the Soviet can use their authority and influence to con- eration Front, Aforki, presented the demand position with respect to the procedure for a vince the Eritrean organizations to terminate for a separate Eritrean state in even harsher political settlement in the area of the Horn the fighting and go the way of a peaceful terms. Only after long sharp discussion was of Africa. We have fully explained our point solution of the Eritrean problem in the he willing to agree to this second meeting of view during your recent visit to Moscow. framework of a unified Ethiopian state. and to the further examination of the pro- There is only one just basis for the settle- posals made by the SED. Thus it was pos- ment of the conflict - this is the mutual re- [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ sible to hold the second meeting. In the spect of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 127; document obtained and translated by course of the meeting, the representatives non-interference in domestic matters of the Christian F. Ostermann.] of the Ethiopian leadership and the EPLF other side. All attempts to achieve a politi- reiterated their known positions. They ac- cal settlement on any other basis were bound SED official Hermann Axen to E. cepted the SED proposal - this proposal was, to destabilize such a solution and burden it Honecker, 18 April 1978, enclosing as is well known, agreed to by the CC of with new difficulties. Draft Letter from Honecker to the CPSU - to put the following four points The withdrawal of Somali troops from Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks, before the Provisional Military Administra- the Ogaden is only a step in the right direc- 19 April 1978 tive Council and the Central Committee of tion, conditioned by the existing situation. the EPLF as recommendations for a settle- The conditions for a settlement as officially Enclosure: Honecker to Brezhnev, 19 ment: announced by the Somali leadership, in our April 1978 1. Both sides confirm their resolve to opinion, only served to postpone the start Esteemed Comrade Leonid Ilyich stop the bloodshed immediately and bring of negotiations. These conditions, as is Brezhnev! about a political solution. known, touch upon the sovereign rights of On 23 March 1978, the second meet- 2. The Provisional Military Adminis- Ethiopia and upon problems which lie in its ing between the representatives to the Pro- trative Council of Ethiopia will make a pub- domestic realm. The solution of the national visional Military Administrative Council of lic declaration expressing its concrete pro- question in the Ogaden belongs to this. Socialist Ethiopia and the Eritrean Libera- posals for the implementation of regional One cannot disregard the fact that the tion Front took place. Upon request by the autonomy for Eritrea in the framework of USA and other Western powers, which ver- Politburo of the CC of the SED, Comrade the Ethiopian state and under inclusion of bally favor a settlement of the conflict at Hermann Axen, member of the Politburo all willing positive forces in Eritrea. the Horn of Africa, in fact seek to make such and CC secretary, participated in the talks. The Central Committee of the EPLF a settlement more difficult in order to [Berhanu Bayeh and Aforki declared recognizes the achievements of the Ethio- strengthen their position in this area. again their desire to terminate the bloodshed pian Revolution and declares itself ready for In our opinion the main task now is to and to do everything to solve the Eritrean cooperation in the interest of implementa- put the settlement of the conflict at the Horn problem by peaceful means.] tion of regional autonomy. of Africa on the tracks of peaceful negotia- Despite this declaration made by both 3. Revolutionary Ethiopia’s secure ac- tions. The solution of this problem can not negotiators, the political negotiations cess to the Red Sea must be guaranteed by depend on whether Ethiopia and Somalia showed that the positions on both sides had its uninterrupted access lines and its con- can achieve agreement on all other problems become stiffer. trol over Asmara and the ports of Massawa in their relationship. It is now especially im- The representative of the Provisional and Assab. portant to influence the Somali leadership Military Administrative Council was in- 4. Both sides form a common commis- to assume a constructive position and to clined to favor a predominantly military sion for the purpose of implementing the avoid giving the imperialist and other reac- solution of the Eritrean problem. They did above points and all other steps for the se- tionary forces the opportunity to exploit not make any concrete or constructive pro- curity of the Revolution in Ethiopia and re- 96 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

gional autonomy in Eritrea. regional autonomy of Eritrea in the frame- The CPSU also works in this direction. It was agreed to inform the leadership work of the Ethiopian state in order to com- It agreed to receive an ELF-RC delegation organizations of Ethiopia and of the EPLF municate them at the appropriate time to the led by Ahmed Mohammed Nasser at the and have them communicate their positions Chairman of the Provisional Military Ad- level of the USSR Solidarity Committee on on the results of the second meeting and the ministrative Council, Mengistu Haile a confidential internal basis around 20 May proposals of the SED at a third meeting in Mariam. 1978. We will use these contacts in order to the GDR in mid-May. [Closing remarks] induce the representatives of the ELF-RC Thus the second meeting undermined to have direct contact with the Provisional all attempts by the representatives of the [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ Military Administrative Council. The objec- EPLF to break off all political contacts and 127; document obtained and translated by tive is to find an appropriate solution for negotiations with the Provisional Military Christian F. Ostermann.] Eritrea within the framework of the Ethio- Administrative Council of Ethiopia [as they pian state. We do not have the intention to had previously intended to do]. Memorandum of Conversation between hide from Ahmed Nasser our policy toward But the situation involves the acute [SED] Comrade Friedel Trappen and a unified Ethiopia. The policy of the CPSU danger that the fighting over Eritrea will Soviet Comrade R. A. Ulyanovsky in is aimed at the unity of Ethiopia. We will escalate and that the Arab reaction and the the CC of the CPSU, 11 May 1978 try to convince Ahmed Nasser that the fu- imperialists will intervene even further and ture development of the Eritrean people can attempt to internationalize the conflict. This [Other participants] only evolve in a unified Ethiopian state. In would severely endanger the revolutionary Ulyanovsky: the discussions we will continue to pursue developments in Ethiopia. As Comrade B.N. Ponomarev has al- the line of emphasizing the unity between The Politburo of the CC of the SED is ready pointed out in the last conversation the Marxist-Leninist forces and national- of the opinion that everything has to be done with the comrades of the SED, the CC of democratic forces in Ethiopia and Eritrea. to achieve a political solution of the Eritrean the CPSU considers the talks of the SED We would like to stress that we have question. The safeguarding of the revolu- with the Eritrean movements and the Ethio- to be extremely tactful in our relations with tionary process in Ethiopia and its territo- pian side very useful and positive. We can Mengistu Haile Mariam and the PMAC, in rial as well as political integrity is a neces- still say this today. On this basis one should particular with respect to the Eritrean ques- sary precondition for this. The Provisional approach the next meeting in June as well tion. Military Administrative Council must as other meetings. We consider the four Mengistu Haile Mariam does not have doubtless have reliable control over its free points agreed on at the last meeting as posi- an easy stand within the PMAC in this re- access to the Red Sea. This, however, must tive. If both sides really take the four points gard. In connection with the well-known Dr. be safeguarded by political and military as a starting point, this would be positive Negede [Gobeze] affair tensions have means. It is our impression following the for further development. We are of the opin- heightened within the PMAC and this has recent meeting that the Provisional Military ion that the following main points should not made Mengistu’s task any easier. Administrative Council is only oriented to- be emphasized: We would like to emphasize that all wards the military tasks in this matter and, a) The political solution of the prob- concrete initiatives on the Eritrean questions despite repeated verbal assurances, has not lem and an end to the bloodshed. have to originate from Ethiopia. This does made any concrete political steps in win- b) The granting of regional autonomy not mean that the Eritrean side is free of any ning over the Eritrean population for the for Eritrea, but, however, no separate na- initiatives. If we put the entire weight on implementation of regional autonomy. tional independence. the Mengistu Haile Mariam’s shoulders and We therefore think that the Provisional c) The unconditional use of Ethiopia’s free Ahmed Nasser or respectively Aforki Military Administrative Council should communications with the ports on the Red of any responsibility, this would be one- without further delay address an appeal to Sea. sided. The Ethiopian side is watching with all willing forces in Eritrea for the peaceful d) The increased unification of the pro- great jealousy the actions of the CPSU and political solution of the Eritrean problem. It gressive forces on both sides. the SED. Here as well one has to see the would have to render more precisely the This would be a deeply satisfying plat- connection between Mengistu Haile proposals it has made so far by concrete form which could be developed further. Mariam’s position and the people around suggestions on the implementation of the The points agreed upon in the March him. Mengistu Haile Mariam deserves to be right for self-determination of the different meeting are contained in these proposals and regarded by us as a man who represents in- nations within Ethiopia in order to speed up hence could be developed further at the June ternationalist positions. By contrast to him, the process of differentiation within the meeting. This would create a real founda- Berhanu Bayeh and Fikre Selassie as well Eritrean population and to isolate the reac- tion for the rapprochement of both sides. The as Legesse Asfaw and others, for example, tionary, separatist forces in Eritrea. main question is, how honestly, how genu- are marked by nationalism although they are Based on the results of the last meet- inely, and how deeply both sides will com- faithful to Mengistu Haile Mariam. ing, the Politburo of our Party proposes ply with these points. If one could say to- All steps and initiatives on the part of therefore that the Soviet comrades, in con- day that the four points are fulfilled by both the CPSU, the CP Cuba, and the SED must junction with representatives of our Party, sides or will soon be fulfilled, this would be be put forward extremely tactfully and care- work out internally possible solutions to the a great relief for us. fully not to cause any protests. Frankly, the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 97 problem lies to a certain degree in the fact great, and huge task to get the people of the Eritrean people will be achieved within that we all attempt to square the circle. The Eritrea on the side of the Ethiopian Revolu- the framework of a Ethiopian state. We re- one side of the problem is - and we are both tion. Preparations have been made but no ceived an information [report] in early May working on this - to solve the problem on concrete steps and measures. The Soviet according to which direct contacts had been an internationalist basis. On the other hand comrades have told Mengistu Haile Mariam established between the PMAC and the there are efforts to solve it on a nationalist and Legesse that it was now important to EPLF. We do not know anything about the basis. This is precisely why, I emphasize show the Eritrean people that the PMAC is substance of these contacts. With respect to again, we have to apply maximum caution, not identical with the regime of Emperor the concrete question whether it makes sense circumspection, and tactfulness towards Haile Selassi and the interests of the Ethio- to continue the negotiations or to await mili- Mengistu Haile Mariam so that the nation- pian Revolution are in harmony with the tary actions, Comrade Ulyanovsky stated alists will not grasp him by the throat. interests of the progressive forces in Eritrea. that both sides had to be induced to [take In our contacts and talks with Ahmed Unfortunately, forces in the PMAC and part in] further negotiations and that at the Nasser we intend to make it unmistakably Mengistu Haile Mariam himself have same time a certain limited military pres- clear to him that it is necessary that all revo- caused a slow-down of this necessary po- sure was quite useful, meaning that even lutionary forces join together and that the litical work towards the people of Eritrea. with the continuation of the negotiation ef- Eritrean problem is not only a national but Mengistu Haile Mariam is passive. forts certain military actions could not be above all a class problem which has to be We completely agree with the estimate precluded. solved by the common fight against the im- that military actions for the solution of the Concerning the question on the con- perialists and the Arab reaction. Eritrean question alone are pointless and, crete coordination between the CPSU, the Efforts to split up Ethiopia and create moreover, dangerous. They would widen the SED, and the Cuban CP, Comrade a separate Eritrean state, to refuse to give gap between the Eritrean people and the Ulyanovsky emphasized that all bilateral Ethiopia access to the ports on the Red Sea, Ethiopian Revolution and create new inten- contacts with the Cuban CP are excellent to drive the Soviet Union and the other So- sified hatred. This does not mean that the and that the same applied to the SED. There cialist countries out of this region, are not PMAC should completely abandon military has been no exchange of opinion with the simply a national problem but a problem of activities. We think that it is necessary to People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen on international class warfare, not to speak of exert military pressure on the Eritrean sepa- the part of the CPSU. They have, as is well the fact that such a separate state would be ratists forces. This especially since in regard known, pulled their troops out of Ethiopia. manipulated by the Sudan and Saudi Arabia to military matters the current situation in One has to take into consideration that the and their petrol dollars. Eritrea is not favorable for the PMAC. It is situation in the PDR Yemen is difficult. The We will therefore point out to Ahmed therefore necessary to talk but at the same PDR Yemen has to be protected. Nasser, who claims to be a Marxist, the na- time to act militarily on the part of the Comrade Ulyanovsky agreed to put the tional and international dimension of the PMAC. This applies in particular to the safe- proposal for the creation of a mechanism Eritrean problem. guarding of important military strategic po- for consultation and coordination before the Concerning the questions put forward sitions and especially of the communica- leadership of the CPSU. Concerning the by Comrade Trappen I would like to add tions with the ports of Massawa and Assab question of a possible later public announce- the following consideration: well as the capital Asmara, the cities ment of our parties on the Eritrean question The basic difficulty is the fact that sepa- Akordat, Keren, and Barentu. These mili- (in some form), it is expedient to examine ratist ideas have been rooted in Eritrea for a tary actions have to serve political measures. this in the light of the Moscow talks with long time. These ideas are very popular It was emphasized in the talk between Ahmed Nasser and the planned third meet- among the population, especially among the Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and Mengistu Haile ing of the Ethiopian and Eritrean sides with workers. This factor, the factor of the erring Mariam that it is necessary for the PMAC the SED. of the masses based on nationalism, is a to address itself to the Eritrean people. This With respect to the question of expert given one. The main difficulty therefore is political initiative is extremely acute today consultations on variants of a solution, it is that the mass of the Eritrean population does as never before. We deem it necessary that possible at any time for GDR scientists [spe- not understand the difference between the both the CPSU and the SED together exert cialists] to consult with Soviet comrades imperial regime of Haile Selassi and the influence on Mengistu Haile Mariam in this about concrete questions. Comrade policy of the PMAC. respect. We have to take into consideration Ulyanovsky thinks that at this point these The fight continues as in earlier times that the position of the Eritrean movements contacts should be limited to the level of under the imperial regime. This creates the has not become any less obstinate, because the International Relations Departments of great necessity for intensified political work they still demand the separation of Eritrea. the Central Committees. With respect to the by the PMAC and above all by Mengistu This shows that there are no honest efforts involvement of CPSU experts in the con- Haile Mariam towards the Eritrean popula- for a political solution on the part of the sultation and negotiations at the third meet- tion. It was particularly this point that Com- Eritrean representatives. Therefore it is cor- ing, Comrade Ulyanovsky stated that he rade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev discussed with rect to work for a change in the current po- would put this question before the party Mengistu Haile Mariam during his trip to sition of the Eritrean movements. It is espe- leadership for decision. Concerning the Moscow. cially necessary to receive from them a dec- guarantees called for by the Eritrean side, The PMAC is confronting a decisive, laration pledging that self-determination for one can only get more precise on this point 98 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

after concrete results have been achieved on character of the Ethiopian Revolution. 1978, Memorandum of a Conversation the question of what, who, and to whom in 2. It acknowledges the importance of between [SED] Comrade Grabowski some matter guarantees might be given. the Soviet-Cuban support. and the Head of the Third African Finally, Comrade Ulyanovsky pointed 3. It does not demand preconditions. Department of the [Soviet] MFA, out that the attempt to keep the Ethiopian 4. It is willing to negotiate. [CPSU] Comrade Sinitsin leadership from its military advance through 5. It favors the unification on a com- us was a very delicate matter. The PMAC mon democratic basis. On Mengistu’s speech of 14 June was predominantly of the opinion that even The Soviet comrades estimate that the The speech contains statements which a political solution of the Eritrean question attitude of the ELF appears to be slightly can hardly be read without concern. One still was not possible without a strengthening of more flexible as those of the other Eritrean has to assume that the military actions of Ethiopia’s military positions in Eritrea and movements but this is, however, only an ap- the separatists have to be energetically op- that the liberation of above-mentioned ports pearance. posed, that full and effective control by the and cities can only be achieved by military PMAC and the Ethiopian armed forces over means. The PMAC assumed that only then [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ the cities in the north of the country and their [would] actual and basic conditions exist for 127; obtained and translated by Christian access lines has to be assured. But obviously negotiations with the separatists.[...] F. Ostermann.] this was not everything that the speech meant to convey. Intentions for a complete [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ Winkelmann, SED CC Department of military solution of the Eritrean problem 127; document obtained and translated by International Relations, shine through. One cannot recognize any Christian F. Ostermann.] to Hermann Axen, 9 June 1978 new constructive or concrete suggestions on how to proceed politically. But this is ex- SED Department of International [Introductory remarks] actly what would be necessary in the cur- Relations, Information on talks of Comrade Ponomarev is sending cordial rent situation and in the context of corre- Ahmed Nasser (ELF-RC) in the USSR greetings to you. In his opinion, Mengistu’s sponding necessary military actions. Solidarity Committee, 7- 8 June 1978 recent speech does not allow for any [new] Obviously those forces within the conclusions with respect to the [Ethiopian- Ethiopian leadership which have always We received the following information Eritrean] talks in Berlin. Everything should favored a one-sided military solution have from the CC of the CPSU: be done as agreed upon. Even after this gained ground. It also seems important that The representatives of the Soviet Com- speech there is no reason for any nervous- there is heightened concern about the pos- mittee for Solidarity explained the USSR ness. sibility of a new delay of a solution of the position which is based on the assumption Comrade Ponomarev had a long talk problem contributing to a renewed destabi- that the solution of the Eritrean question has with Comrade Valdez Vivo on 9 June in lization of the revolutionary regime. to be achieved within the framework of a which he also had an exchange of views On Ethiopia’s international situation unified Ethiopian state by means of nego- about Mengistu’s recent speech. The speech The predominant majority of Arab tiations. is considered as mostly positive. It corre- states is increasingly moving against Ethio- In effect, the three talks which were sponds for the most part with the recom- pia. One should under no circumstances held with Ahmed Nasser proved that the mendations of the Soviet and Cuban com- underestimate the danger involved in the Eritrean friends are not yet willing to ap- rades with respect to the current situation clash between the positions of the reaction- proach the question by giving up the slogan and the necessary measures. It is in harmony ary and progressive Arab regimes in the of independence for Eritrea. Their argumen- with the agreements which have been made Eritrean question which is heightened by the tation is that neither side should coerce the with Mengistu. present policy of the Ethiopian leadership. other one into negotiations and a solution Mengistu’s speech, which contains the Basically, only the People’s Democratic could only be a result of unconditional ne- necessary elements for a peaceful solution Republic of Yemen is granting real support gotiations. of the problem, is the basis for the further for the Ethiopian Revolution. Algeria is act- In the first conversation on 7 June, A. work. Mengistu will travel in the next days ing in a very reserved way: while acknowl- Nasser indicated that the ELF-RC would to Asmara. It is planned to hold a meeting edging the achievements of the Ethiopian possibly consent to a federation. In the fol- with the population in which Mengistu will Revolution, it does hardly anything concrete lowing talks it was not mentioned again, and explain his program for a peaceful solu- in support. Syria and Iraq have clearly ex- by the time the third talk took place on 8 tion. His recent speech is the prelude to this pressed once more in recent days that they June, the position of the Eritrean friends had action. intend to give support to the [Eritrean] sepa- even hardened. [Concluding remarks.] ratists, including military supplies. The Iraqi Generally they were at pains to prove leadership is also interested in strengthen- that the ELF was the best, the [most] Marx- [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ ing in every way the pro-Baathistic elements ist-Leninist of the Eritrean movements. 127; document obtained and translated by in Eritrea. The Libyan position is quite un- They pointed out their advantages as fol- Christian F. Ostermann.] clear. Even though they rhetorically recog- lows: nize the achievements of the Ethiopian 1. The ELF recognizes the progressive GDR Embassy in Moscow, 19 June Revolution, they, however, less and less ex- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 99 plicitly oppose the separation of Eritrea. The gression was not condemned. constructive solutions.” It is remarkable that impression that the Libyan leadership basi- Nevertheless, an intervention by the Ahmed Nasser has pointed to this question cally favors the Arabization of Eritrea is not Arab countries in Eritrea should run into during his talks with the Soviet comrades far off. In no case does it want to see rela- considerable opposition within the OAU. in Moscow. The Soviet comrades, however, tions among the Arab states, especially This is in part the effect of the still deeply have no indication that these advances are among the countries of the rejection front, rooted traditional fear and resistance of the actually effective. One has to assume that be burdened by the Eritrean question. The African states against Arab expansionism. the USA would prefer a unified, reaction- pressure exerted by Saudi Arabia and Egypt At the same time, none of the African coun- ary Ethiopia to a divided Ethiopia. By us- can definitely be felt. It is difficult to say tries seriously wants to endanger its rela- ing the unity slogan, they are trying to acti- whether Arab countries will be willing to tions with the Arab states. This altogether vate those reactionary and nationalist forces, deploy troop contingents in Eritrea against very passive and inconsistent attitude of which no doubt still exist, against the revo- Ethiopia. They will undoubtedly take into many African countries and of the OAU was lutionary regime. consideration that the predominant major- not an unimportant factor which led the Considering all these aspects it is not ity of African countries would oppose such Ethiopian leadership to recognize that in surprising that the USA, Italy, and France a move. In their view, Eritrea is a part of practice only the Socialist countries are have officially opposed Eritrean separatism. Ethiopia. A separation of Eritrea would run Ethiopia’s real and principal allies. It is also symptomatic that the United States counter to their national interest as strong Among the imperialist countries, one is making obtrusive efforts to prove that it separatist movements exert de-stabilizing has to pay particular attention to the efforts was they who recommended to Siad Barre influence in many African countries. and activities of the USA, Italy, and France. to withdraw his troops from Ethiopia. The It is remarkable that similar consider- Their situation in Ethiopia and also with cautious handling of aid to Somalia also ations make even [Sudanese President Jafaar respect to the Eritrean question is quite deli- shows that the USA on no account intend to Al-] Numeiri waver. His attitude toward cate. All imperialist countries, of course, are keep their relations with Ethiopia - in the Ethiopia has become more careful, despite interested in the elimination of the Revolu- long run - strained. The USA and China are pressure from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Be- tionary achievements in Ethiopia and in the using Somalia and the provocative actions sides the Southern problem, several other establishment of a pro-Western regime. by Somalia against Ethiopia - which are questions (refugees from Eritrea, interest in They are putting all their efforts toward this above all intended to have a de-stabilizing the use of the Nile) impel him to keep up goal. The NATO countries, led by the USA, effect—more for anti-Soviet than anti- somewhat normal relations with Ethiopia. base their efforts on the sober assumption Ethiopian purposes. They understand that The African countries are in principle that a frontal attack would hardly help to support of the Eritrean separatists would also opposed to a change of borders. In this ques- achieve their goals, would only foster the be directed against the reactionary forces in tion the progressive [countries] and those basic anti-imperialist mood of the Ethiopian Ethiopia. countries which are largely dependent on the people and its leadership and drive Ethio- With respect to Somalis, the USA are West coincide in their views, though the lat- pia even closer into the hands of the Social- intent on establishing a foothold and bring- ter fear the revolutionary changes in Ethio- ist community of states. The USA in no case ing the leadership of the country under their pia. The common danger has even led to a wants to burn all its bridges to Ethiopia. To firm control. In this regard attention has to rapprochement between Ethiopia and the best of their abilities, they want to de- be paid to the fact that they also do not con- Kenya. Kenya appears more aggressive and stabilize the situation in Ethiopia and the sider Barre a solid partner. They assume that positive [in this question] than some pro- revolutionary regime, and undermine and he would deceive even the West. Neverthe- gressive African states. Tanzania’s attitude subvert the revolutionary development in less, it is to be expected that Barre will soon has a very positive effect as it consistently Ethiopia. The imperialists aspire to take ad- make a trip to the USA. He wants to gain and convincingly opposes the separation of vantage of ethnic conflicts, exploit the so- military support in the amount of $1 billion. Eritrea. Nigeria, which is under strong pres- cial instability of the leadership, and encour- There are indications that the USA is will- sure by the USA and in which the OAU has, age nationalist feelings in an effort to fur- ing to give $50 million. as is well known, much influence, already ther stiffen the Ethiopian attitude in the With respect to similar “military ab- showed itself to be wavering during the ag- Eritrean question and thereby aggravate the stention” by China, without doubt other gression by Somalia. Guinea, which has re- situation of the revolutionary regime. One motives play a role: the Chinese leadership cently repeatedly pointed out the war of na- also has to take quite seriously the skillful does obviously not consider it opportune to tional liberation by the Eritrean people, attempts, in particular by the USA, to launch display its military weakness in public - and gives Ethiopia more headaches than support. such arguments as “why should the solu- especially in such a burning spot of interna- In sum it can be said that the OAU does tion of the Eritrean problem be done only tional politics. Light arms are less reveal- not want to allow for a confrontation and is by way of cooperation with the Soviet Union ing, yet they will not allow Somalia to wage looking for ways to confirm the inviolabil- and the Socialist countries,” “a certain co- a large war against Ethiopia. In addition, ity of borders and the territorial integrity. operation with the USA and the West could China does not want to strain its relations How little consistent and passive the OAU certainly be useful,” “the USA after all have with Africa any further. is, is proved by the fact that Ethiopia has considerable possibilities in effectively in- With respect to the domestic situation received little support and that - due to the fluencing Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other in Somalia, one has to first emphasize that fear of a possible split - even Somalia’s ag- Arab countries,” “the West has to offer quite Barre is continuing to exploit nationalist slo- 100 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

gans and considerable tribal feuds to elimi- him. USSR of 11 July 1978 (attached). nate progressive elements from the state and ANDROPOV. It is in the same way 2. Affirm the draft of instructions to party apparatus and to replace them with important to show Mengistu that we are on the Soviet ambassador in Addis-Ababa (at- people faithful to him. This is facilitated by his side. tached) the fact that the party is without a broad so- PONOMAREV. Yesterday the Secre- 3. Assign USSR, Gossnab cial basis and in practice was organized by tary of the CC of the Communist Party of USSR, [Minzag] USSR, the Ministry of Barre from above. Barre is careful not to Cuba, Vivo Valdez visted me. He had been Foreign Trade, the KGB USSR, and the expound a pro-Western course. He has to in Ethiopia. In Cuba he received instruc- GKES to review the request of the Ethio- acknowledge that the progressive develop- tions. He is returning there. Vivo said that pian side and within three weeks in the pre- ment in the past cannot simply be crossed Cuba will not undertake to do anything in scribed manner to submit corresponding out. The country still has sufficiently pow- Ethiopia without the preliminary agreement proposals, including one about providing erful progressive forces which for now are with the Soviet Union. assistance to Ethiopia in relation to the silent. He thus prefers to leave many things In relation to the fact that our Ambas- drought and one about a delay in payment outwardly as they have been. Officially, the sador in Ethiopia Com. Ratanov has taken for the general civilian goods which were program and the organization of the party ill, and has been in Moscow for three months delivered for the Ethiopian army. are retained. The party organization is even already, it is apparently necessary to think Assign the appropriate agencies and being activated. about sending another comrade there. organizations to confirm the progress made [Signed] Grabowski. ANDROPOV. Ambassador to Ethio- in fulfilling the obligations of the Soviet side pia Com. Ratanov has already gotten bet- on agreements and contracts that were con- [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ ter, he can go. But overall it evidently makes cluded. Accelerate the realization of 127; document obtained and translated by sense for the MFA to think about a new achieved agreements with the government Christian F. Ostermann.] ambassador. of Ethiopian regarding the creation of So- KIRILENKO. I think that, you, Com. viet-Ethiopian commission on economic co- Minutes of Meeting of CPSU CC Mal’tsev, will take measures now to send operation. Politburo, 14 July 1978 (excerpt) there one of the comrades, say, an advisor, Assign the permanent Soviet represen- the most experienced, who could help Com. tative at the Council of Mutual Economic MEETING OF THE Ratanov. Assistance to present ideas regarding the CC CPSU POLITBURO The draft of the resolution is accepted. provision by the members of the CMEA of 14 July 1978 assistance to the economic development of [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 40, ll. 45, Ethiopia on a multilateral basis. Chaired by Com. KIRILENKO, A.P. 10-12; translated by Mark Doctoroff.] CC CPSU SECRETARY Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V., CPSU CC Politburo Decision, Kulakov, F.D., Mazurov, K.T., Demichev, 14 July 1978 [attachment] P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, Re: Point IX Prot. No. 112 B.N.,Solomentsev, M.S., Chernenko, K.Y., Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Riabov, Ia.P., CENTRAL COMMITTEE Secret Rusakov, K.V TOP SECRET CC CPSU [...] 9. About Measures for the Future According to the communication from Strengthening of Soviet-Ethiopian Relations No. P112/IX the Soviet Ambassador in Addis-Ababa, and To Comrades: Brezhnev, Kosygin, also according to the information from the KIRILENKO. Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Mazurov, Cuban friends, facts are taking place which Andropov, and Ponomarev have presented Suslov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Arkhipov, bear witness to manifestations of national- this issue. Katushev, Baibakov, Martynov, Zolotukhin, istic moods among certain parts of the Ethio- MAL’TSEV says that the Ethiopians Patolichev, Skachkov, Garbuzov, pian leadership following the victory over are behaving incorrectly in Eritrea. They Smirtiukov. Somalia in the Ogaden, which already is be- are campaigning against providing au- ginning to exert a negative influence on tonomy to Eritrea. They have begun mili- Extract from protocol No. 112 of the CC Ethiopia’s relations with several countries tary actions there. There are not conduct- CPSU Politburo session of 14 July 1978 of the Socialist community (spec. No. 695 ing an entirely correct policy in the Ogaden of 6\30\78). From the Ethiopian side, in either. Military actions are taking place About measures for the future strengthen- particular, a certain dissatisfaction is being somewhere there against Somalia. ing of Soviet-Ethiopian relations expressed regarding the progress of coop- KIRILENKO. Mengistu is still not eration with these countries above all in the sufficiently experienced, but at the same 1. Agree with the thoughts contained economic area, complaints connected with time he is a very sensitive person, therefore in the note of the MFA USSR, the Interna- the development of trade-economic rela- it is just necessary to educate him, to teach tional department, CC CPSU, and KGB tions, not always grounded in fact, are be- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 101 ing put forth. This type of mood in one way France). This determined the external poli- enterprises which were nationalized in Feb- or another shows up in the approach of the cies of the country, although formally Ethio- ruary 1975 (72 enterprises of the manufac- Ethiopian leadership to a resolution of the pia belonged to the nonaligned countries. turing industry), in which a foreign compo- Eritrean issue. The connection of Ethiopia’s economy nent was dominant, made up 41% of the The MFA USSR, the CC CPSU Inter- and trade as well as its defense to the capi- general sum of paid capital in this branch of national Department, and the KGB USSR talist governments was a key factor in the the national economy. In addition, the State consider it expedient to implement a range influence of the Western countries on Ethio- gained a controlling package of the stocks of steps from our side in order to neutralize pia. Until the revolution in 1974 developed of another 29 private companies. In ques- these types of moods in the Ethiopian lead- capitalist countries occupied the predomi- tions of defense, Ethiopia practically cut off ership. It would make sense to assign the nant position in the external trade activity relations with the capitalist countries and set Soviet ambassador in Addis-Ababa to have of Ethiopia. Thus, for example, in 1973, its course toward re-arming its army with a conversation with the chairman of the they represented approximately 70% of the Soviet weapons. PMAC, during which in an open and volume of external trade (by comparison At the same time, it would be incor- friendly way opinions would be exchanged with 3% for the group of socialist countries). rect to consider that Ethiopia was fully lib- about the future development of Soviet- Military supplies were completely de- erated from its dependence on Western Ethiopian relations, stressing the pendent on the United States. countries, particularly in the economic immutablity of the policy of the Soviet Meanwhile, the West took into consid- sphere. The state of Ethiopian debts to the Union of multi-sided support and assistance eration first and foremost the significant West in May 1978 comprised 351 million to the Ethiopian revolution. strategic position of Ethiopia in the region rubles. Meanwhile, Ethiopia, as a rule, pays Taking into account the conversation of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and Af- off its debts and credits in a timely fashion, with Mengistu it would be possible to re- rica as a whole in terms of a confrontation as well as the interest on them, and allots view the issue of conducting a comradely with the USSR, and likewise the visible situ- annually approximately 13 million rubles to exchange of opinions with the leadership of ation of the country on the continent in po- this end, which comprises approximately Cuba and the GDR about the current situa- litical terms. 5% of the annual export earnings and does tion in Ethiopia. At the same time, even during the im- not represent a burden for the country’s fi- Assign the corresponding Soviet agen- perial regime, between various Western nances. Such a policy makes it easier for cies to carefully review the requests of the countries and, first and foremost, between Ethiopia to receive new means for the de- Ethiopian side vis-a-vis economic issues, the USA and the “Common market,” there velopment of the country’s economy. Ethio- and to submit proposals aimed at improv- was a contradiction with regard to Ethiopia pia has an acute need for economic assis- ing Soviet-Ethiopian economic cooperation. in the area of the economy and, to a certain tance, particularly since the socialist coun- Please review. degree, in the area of policy. The countries tries have not taken the place of and do not of the “Common market” were dissatisfied intend fully to take the place of the economic A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov B. Ponomarev with the dominant position of the USA in assistance and technical collaboration with Ethiopia. From a certain point Japan also the Western countries. From the general 11 July 1978 entered the playing field as a competitor. volume of foreign economic assistance, the Until the revolution, the sum total of for- assistance of the Western countries and in- [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 91, d. 272, ll. 140- eign investments in the country’s economy ternational organizations which are under 143; translated by Mark Doctoroff.] comprised 504 million rubles. their control in the form of loans and cred- After 1974 the situation in the region its comprised 75% (status as of May 1978). Soviet Embassy in Ethiopia, back- concerning political and, particularly, ideo- It is precisely the economic factor that ground report on “Ethiopia’s Relations logical relations with the Western countries the Western countries are bearing in mind with Western Countries,” August 1978 changed in a fundamental way in connec- as they pursue a long-term struggle for tion with the fact that Ethiopia set its course Ethiopia. They will push Ethiopia toward USSR EMBASSY TO toward a socialist orientation and took on economic collaboration with the West, SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA as a ruling ideology Marxism-Leninism, and which would enable them to use this factor Re: no 275 likewise declared its intent to create a Marx- in pursuit also of political goals, to encour- 14 August 1978 ist-Leninist party. age the Ethiopian leadership, if not to sup- The external political course of the plant, then to cut back on the influence of ETHIOPIA’S RELATIONS WITH country also changed. Ethiopia began to the USSR. WESTERN COUNTRIES conduct an anti-imperialist policy, with the The other factor which the Western (Information) support of the countries of the socialist camp powers are counting on, is the inescapable, and, first and foremost, of the USSR. The in their minds, growth of bourgeois nation- Before the revolution, Ethiopia was position of foreign capital in Ethiopia was alism, or at the very least, of revolutionary primarily oriented toward the Western coun- seriously undermined in connection with the nationalism, which would be accompanied tries, first and foremost toward the USA and nationalization of the property of Western by a break with the socialist countries, an the countries of the “Common market” (Fed- firms in the country and its transfer to the erosion of Marxism-Leninism, and the con- eral Republic of Germany, Italy, England, State sector. The capital of the industrial duct of a policy of equal distance from the 102 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

East and the West. ceremony in honor of the graduates of the In order to preserve whatever remained The Westernizers are making use of the capital’s university, spoke about the impe- of their former position in Ethiopia, the USA fact that certain of the socialist countries are rialist plot headed by the USA in the pres- is trying to use all of the factors enumerated conducting themselves with restraint with ence of the new American ambassador. The above (economic pressure, Ethiopian na- regard to the development of economic col- People’s Republic of China acts as an ob- tionalism, ties which remain to the state ap- laboration with Ethiopia. These countries jective and actual ally of imperialism in the paratus). To a large extent the condition of include Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and also struggle against the countries of socialist Ethiopian finance depends, in particular, Romania, although this is for different rea- collaboration with Ethiopia. The Western- upon whether or not the United States buys sons. izers attempt as much as possible to use this coffee, the income from which made up in The leadership of the PMAC regards factor, and do not disdain even to use anti- 1977 approximately 75% of the general ex- resentfully and with a lack of understand- Soviet propagandistic slogans, which are port earnings of the country. The USA per- ing the fact that the Council for Mutual Eco- invented by the Chinese. sists in offering economic assistance to nomic Aid [], to which Ethiopia From the other side, in spite of the pres- Ethiopia, in particular in answer to the cir- appealed with a proposal for the develop- ervation of the anti-imperialist course, which culated appeal from the Ethiopian commis- ment of collaboration not only on a bilat- was manifest in the speeches of the Ethio- sion on assistance to the population of the eral, but on a multilateral basis in March pian delegation at the Session of the Coun- Ogaden and Wollo. At the same time, they 1977, has since that time not made any con- cil of Ministers and the Assembly of the underscore that America offers mainly hu- crete resolutions, but has rather confined it- heads of government of the Organization of manitarian aid, while the USSR is generous self to a declaration of the desire for such African States in Khartoum, and likewise only as regards military supplies. Mean- collaboration. at the conference of nonaligned countries while, in spite of the fact of the worsening The Western countries place serious in Belgrade, we cannot consider that the governmental relations, economic assistance hopes on the fact that the make-up of the struggle is over in the ruling circles of the from the USA to Ethiopia is growing. Thus, State apparatus, as well as a significant part country about questions of the external po- according to information of an American of the officer staff of the military forces of litical orientation and the essence of a policy Congressional commission, which visited Ethiopia, remains as before. Many of the of nonalignment. In this struggle a signifi- the countries of the Horn of Africa with the bureaucrats and officers received their edu- cant role is played by the petit-bourgeois in- aim of collecting information about the situ- cation in the West, and are subject to the fluence, which is still quite strong in the ation in the region, if in 1977 this assistance influence of bourgeois ideology, and as a officers’ circles. reached 11 million dollars, then in 1978 it consequence of this they regard unfavorably Before turning to the nature of Ethio- reached 15 million dollars. the course of the country toward a socialist pian relations with individual Western coun- In July of this year the USA announced orientation and the primary development of tries, it is worth noting that in the frame- the delivery in September and October of relations with socialist countries. The Ethio- work of the general anti-imperialist course, this year of assistance at a level of 12.5 thou- pian leadership, which understands this well, Ethiopia continues to distinguish between sand tons of food products, valued in sum is unable to replace the State apparatus due the USA and the countries of the Common at 7 million Ethiopian birr. In accordance to the lack of cadres which have received Market. with information from the American Em- the appropriate preparation. The regime The central flame of anti-imperialist bassy, philanthropic assistance from the remains transitional in the country, new or- propaganda is directed against the USA, USA to Ethiopia for the period from 1975 gans of authority have not yet been put into England, the Federal Republic of Germany, reached 75 million Ethiopian birr. place. The country’s leadership has only and, to a lesser degree, against France, Italy, The relations of Ethiopia with the begun the work of creating a basis for this. and the Scandinavian countries. countries of the Common Market is deter- Drawing a general conclusion, one can The relations of Ethiopia with the USA mined by their mutual interest in maintain- say with certainty that a long-term course have undergone the greatest changes. [The ing economic and commercial ties. Trying for the USA and the Western countries for Americans] have eliminated their military to keep Ethiopia in the sphere of their inter- the struggle for Ethiopia is being plotted. objects from the territory of the country, ests, the Western European countries have This is evident if only from the fact that, in their propaganda apparatus, their military regarded the revolution with patience. As spite of the Somali adventure, they do not mission; they have cut by one half the staff does the USA, they make declarations re- intend to exchange Ethiopia for Somalia. of the American embassy. The Ethiopian garding their support for the territorial in- While creating their position in Somalia, government delayed the agreement for the tegrity of Ethiopia, both in the event of So- they are setting their strategic sights on new American ambassador by three months mali aggression and with regard to Eritrea. Ethiopia. This can be seen both from the and gave it only after a serious discussion, The new French ambassador, upon convey- degree of patience with which the USA, in the course of which the Ethiopians warned ing his letters of credentials to the Head of England, and the Federal Republic of Ger- that if the anti-Ethiopian campaign in the the PMAC, Mengistu Haile Mariam, even many are regarding the sharp anti-imperial- USA, connected, in part, with human rights declared that France respects the path of de- ist attacks in the speeches of the Ethiopian issues, was not brought to an end, that they velopment chosen by Ethiopia in the frame- leaders and in the press. would seek to break off diplomatic relations. work of a policy of socialist orientation. The The head of the government, Mengistu After this the United States was forced to Federal Republic of Germany did not un Haile Mariam, in a speech he delivered at a reach a certain compromise. continued on page 422 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 103 U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980— New Russian & East German Documents

Editor’s Note: U.S.-Soviet relations following the inauguration of U.S. President in January 1977 misfired by March, when Secretary of State Vance carried the new president’s arms control initiative to Moscow, only to receive a harsh public lashing from the Soviet leadership. (For translations of Russian archival documents on this early period, including correspondence between Carter and Soviet leader L.I. Brezhnev, see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 140-154, 160.) But ties seemed to be mending by the late summer of that year—as reflected by progress on talks toward signing a SALT II arms treaty, quiet cooperation in heading off a South African nuclear test, and (on 1 October 1977) the issuance of an unprecedented joint statement calling on Israel and its Arab enemies to return to the Geneva Conference co-chaired by Washington and Moscow to seek a “comprehensive peace” in the Middle East. Yet, the fall of 1977 and the first half of 1978 witnessed another downturn in relations, caused by, among other disputes, the negation of the October 1 joint communique on the Middle East as Egyptian President startled the world by visiting Jerusalem in November 1977 and pursuing a separate peace with Israel; a massive Soviet-Cuban military airlift to Ethiopia that fall turned the tide of the Somali-Ethiopia conflict and irked Washington, which the following spring retaliated by accelerating ties with Beijing; talks on SALT II slowed to a crawl; Soviet human rights abuses (including the highly-publicized arrests and trials of well-known dissidents such as Anatoly Shcharansky and Yuri Orlov) fanned public anger in the United States; and within the Carter Administration, the faction (led by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) favoring a tougher line toward Moscow (including “linkage” of arms talks with other issues, such as Soviet behavior in Third World) began to get the upper hand in its incessant competition with those (such as Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance) adhering to a more conciliatory approach. By mid-1978, it seemed evident that U.S.-USSR relations had reached a new crisis point, dimming the hopes that had existed at the outset of the Carter Administration. Over the next year, the two sides managed to patch things up somewhat, agree on final terms for a SALT II treaty, and hold the long-delayed Carter-Brezhnev Summit in Vienna to sign it in June 1979. But valuable time had been lost, and a store of mutual mistrust had accumulated. Even that interlude of relative concord in Vienna turned out to be short-lived, for in the fall of 1979, at a time when Carter had hoped to be triumphantly signing a SALT II treaty after winning Senate ratification, U.S.-Soviet relations again went sour—and in December 1979 came an event that shelved the treaty indefinitely (and permanently, it turned out) and also officially rang the death knell of “detente”: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (see next section). To illuminate the evolution in ties between Washington and Moscow during this stretch, the Bulletin presents a selection of ten documents (or excerpts) from the Russian and East German archives, including: * the transcript of a contentious yet cautiously optimistic 30 September 1977 Oval Office meeting between Carter and visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, returning Vance’s ill-starred trip to Moscow (translated records of Gromyko’s discussions with Vance during this trip are also available, but not printed due to space limitations); * an extract from the minutes of a 27 April 1978 session of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (CPSU CC) Politburo in which Brezhnev recounts his handling of a meeting with Vance, specifically his upbraiding of Carter’s “inconsistent foreign policy line” and his “strong rebuff” of U.S. criticism of Soviet actions in Africa; * a testy encounter between Vance and Gromyko in New York on 31 May 1978, in which the Soviet Foreign Minister accused the Carter Administration of an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign that was on the verge of destroying detente and “bringing us back to the period of ‘cold war,’” and the two exchanged espionage accusations; * three excerpts from June 1978 CPSU CC Politburo sessions, including a general foreign policy survey by Brezhnev concluding that a “serious deterioration and exacerbation” of the international scene had taken place due to the Carter Administration’s “growing aggression,” and discussions of controversial dissidents (Andrei Sakharov and Anatoly Shcharansky); * a lengthy July 1978 “political letter” from Soviet Ambassador to the Washington Anatoly F. Dobrynin assessing the evolution of US-USSR relations in the first year-and-a-half of the Carter Administration, and recommending “expedient” policies for the future; * two excerpts from East German archival records of conversations between Brezhnev and German Democratic Republic leader Erich Honecker, one in July 1978 and another a year later, in which they analyzed the international situation and U.S.-Soviet relations; * and finally, little more than a month after the invasion of Afghanistan, a February 1980 Politburo-approved telegram to the USSR Ambassador to West Germany (in preparation for a meeting with former Chancellor and head of the Socialist International Willy Brandt) defending Moscow’s action and reviewing the downward spiral in U.S.-Soviet relations. Most of these translated documents were obtained by the “Carter-Brezhnev Project” undertaken by the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University in cooperation with the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and other scholarly and archival partners. To explore the reasons behind the collapse of superpower detente in the mid-1970s, the Project assembled veterans of the Carter and Brezhnev leaderships for a series of oral history conferences and promoted the declassification, 104 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

release, and translation of important new documents from the Russian archives, in particular from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives (known officially as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, or AVPRF), and the former CPSU CC archives (the Center for the Study of Contemporary Documentation, or TsKhSD); additional East-bloc sources were obtained from the East German archives by Christian Ostermann of the National Security Archive. In addition, the Project and the National Security Archive sought the declas- sification of U.S. documents through the Freedom of Information Act. All documents obtained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project and the CWIHP are available for research at the National Security Archive, which together with CWIHP has created (and houses) a Russian and East-bloc Archival Documents Database (READD) which is planned eventually to produce an internet-accessible listing of documents; in addition, beyond what is published in the Bulletin, CWIHP hopes to make additional translated materials available to scholars through the internet via the National Security Archive’s home page on the World Wide Web (http://www.nsarchive.com). For further information, contact the National Security Archive, Gelman Library, 7th fl., 2130 H St. NW 20037, tel.: (202) 994-7000; fax: (202) 994-7005; and [email protected] (e-mail).—James G. Hershberg

Document 1: Record of Conversation tably be competition between our countries. Soviet Union with the problem of the Jew- between Soviet Foreign Minister I do not think, however, that this is an ish emigration from the USSR. I would like Gromyko and President Carter, 23 unhealthy situation and I believe that we can with your assistance to achieve some September 1977 conduct this competition to our mutual ben- progress in overcoming of limitations estab- efit in the spirit of respect for each other. lished by the Congress in order to amelio- RECORD OF THE MAIN CONTENT Like the Soviet Union, our country will rate this source of tension and misunder- OF A.A. GROMYKO’S support its own defenses on the high level standing. CONVERSATION necessary to guarantee the preservation of Next month the question of human WITH USA PRESIDENT J. CARTER peace. I am sure that this will not prevent rights among others will be discussed at the us from developing our mutual relations. Conference [on Security and Cooperation 23 September 1977, Washington The USA has a highly developed tech- in Europe] in Belgrade. We approach this nology. We have powerful economic poten- Conference in a constructive way and we J. CARTER. I am very happy to greet tial, produce many food items, conduct large will maintain constant consultations in you here in the White House. It is an honor scale trade with other countries. Belgrade with the Soviet representative. We to meet you. The Soviet Union has its own strong already consulted on the questions related A.A. GROMYKO. I am very happy to qualities and it too has an ability to offer to the Conference with our allies and we do meet you, Mr. President, and to discuss the many benefits to the international commu- not want this Conference to be an obstacle questions which are of interest to both sides. nity. in our relations with the Soviet Union. But I want to use this opportunity to tell you that Both of our countries still do not use it is also true that it will be necessary to dis- L.I. Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership send in full the potential for the development of cuss all aspects of the Helsinki Agreement their greetings and best wishes to you. mutual trade, although we have some trade in Belgrade in order to verify how they are J. CARTER. Thank you and upon your links. We successfully cooperate in a num- being observed. In other words, my ap- return home please give my warmest and ber of science-technical areas such as en- proach to the Belgrade Conference is con- most sincere regards and best wishes to L.I. ergy industry. These links and cooperation structive and I do not want it to be conducted Brezhnev. should be developed further. in the spirit of controversy. At this meeting I would like to set forth We have different approaches to the The USA is actively involved in vari- in a general form my personal views on the question of human rights. And I know that ous international problems which we would questions of mutual relations between the some of our statements on this question pro- like to solve in the conditions of coopera- USA and the Soviet Union. Then, you, if voked L.I. Brezhnev’s displeasure. How- tion with the Soviet Union. We, in particu- you like, could respond to my general state- ever, adhering to our position on this ques- lar, are trying to resolve the South African ments, and after that we could discuss some tion, we do not want to interfere in the do- problems. We, like you, are very concerned concrete questions in more detail. mestic affairs of any state or to put you in about the situation that has developed there. A.A. GROMYKO. I agree with such a an awkward position. It is necessary, ap- We are worrying not only about the mani- procedure of our conversation. parently, to recognize that we see differently festation of racism in this part of the globe, J. CARTER. I would like to say right these problems and that the human rights but, like you, about the intention of the South away that as President I attach special sig- problem deeply troubles our people. Above African Republic to create its own nuclear nificance to good relations with the Soviet all, the human rights problem in our hemi- weapon. Union. I believe that friendly relations and sphere concerns us. But some facts in the We would like to resolve the problems close cooperation between the USA and the Soviet Union also give rise to our concern, of Namibia and Zimbabwe. Together with Soviet Union are of utmost importance and such as the imprisonment of some Soviet Great Britain we put forth a concrete plan I will do everything necessary in order to Jews, for instance [dissident Anatoly] of solving the problem of Rhodesia. I am guarantee the steady development of good Shcharansky. glad that in the UN the Soviet Union takes mutual relations between our two countries. You know, that our Congress, even a constructive position on this question. I Certainly, because of the differences before my coming to the White House, hope that in case of disagreement with our between our social systems there will inevi- linked the development of trade with the approach to the problems of the South of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 105

Africa we could privately discuss these cise the required restraint in order to pre- tracts, however, in the future we intend to problems via our ambassadors in Moscow vent unnecessary aggravation in this region. exercise more restraint in this regard. We or Washington so that we could have a com- A few words about relations between hope that the Western European countries mon approach in the public arena. We do the USA and China. We are striving to nor- and the Soviet Union will take the same not have any specific interest in that a spe- malize our relations with China not for the position as well. cific government would come to power in purpose of creating a kind of alliance with We would like to conclude a treaty on this region. This question should be decided it against the Soviet Union but for strength- a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. We by the people themselves. And we do not ening peace, developing trade and other re- would like to achieve a termination of all want to sell weapons to the countries of this lations with that country. We hope that the nuclear tests on the basis of signing, first, region. problem of mutual relations between the an agreement with the Soviet Union and Angola, with the presence of several PRC [People’s Republic of China] and Tai- England in the hope that it will impel France thousand Cuban troops there, creates a prob- wan will be resolved by peaceful means. and China to join such an agreement. We lem for us. I think it would have been use- But we do not want to abrogate our obliga- think it is important to include in such a ban ful if you, or we together, had convinced tion to guarantee the peaceful life of Tai- also so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, Cubans to withdraw their troops from wan. since it is difficult to make a distinction be- Angola, although I understand that we have In the past few years we witnessed the tween an explosion for military purposes a difference of opinions on this question. improvement of the Soviet Union’s relations and for peaceful ones. In any case, the abil- We also are interested in achieving a with some Western European countries ity to conduct peaceful explosions gives the settlement in the Middle East. Vance re- which are our allies. We too would like to countries who conduct them the ability to ported to me that judging from his conver- improve our relations with the Warsaw Pact use the nuclear energy also for military pur- sation with you, the Soviet position on this nations. Our alliance with our friends in poses. question is close to ours. In the past the Western Europe is solid, like your alliance Now a few words of a general charac- Soviet Union was close to the Arab states with your friends. And we hope that this ter in regard to a conclusion of the new and the USA was close, mainly, to Israel. situation will last. agreement on the limitation of strategic But even today we are interested in the pres- We conduct the negotiations with you arms. I think we are very close of reaching ervation of peace in the Middle East, in guar- on a number of questions of arms limita- an agreement. However, some new circum- anteeing the independence of Israel by tion. We would like to reach an agreement stances emerged which differ from the situ- peaceful methods. Over the last several on demilitarization of the Indian ocean in ation that existed during the meeting [be- years we won the respect and trust of a num- the future. We also are counting on an agree- tween Brezhnev and U.S. President Gerald ber of Arab countries. We are trying to con- ment on a ban on chemical weapons. We R. Ford in December 1974] in Vladivostok. duct a just and evenhanded policy in this would like to reach an agreement on advance For us, the measures taken by the Soviet region and we hope that together with you notification of missile launch tests in order Union regarding the equipping of heavy we will be able to further a peaceful settle- to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. missiles with MIRV [Multiple, Indepen- ment. Sometimes the Soviet Union’s ap- We hope that these and other negotiations dently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles--ed.] was proach to the problems of the Middle East, which we conduct with you will be success- unexpected and at the same time troubling. in our view, was not constructive enough. I ful. We did not expect that the Soviet heavy mis- only state the fact, however. I am not com- We hope to achieve an agreement on siles SS-18 would be equipped with MIRV plaining. banning hostile actions against artificial sat- at such a quick pace. But this strengthens We intend to keep you informed on the ellites. We know about the Soviet program the ability of the Soviet Union to launch a development of the situation in the Middle of the creation of the means intended for first strike and it threatens the survivability East, on the position of those countries with fighting the satellites of other countries. We of our missile silos. You, on the other hand, whom we have regular contact. And I hope also could develop such a program, but we express concern in regard to American that you too will keep us informed, in par- would like to ban such actions. Both of us cruise missiles which were not mentioned ticular about the PLO [Palestine Liberation take similar positions on the question of non- in Vladivostok. However, the cruise mis- Organization] position. proliferation of nuclear weapons and we siles are not capable of a first strike because Another region that worries us is Ko- together live through disappointments when of their small velocity and also because they rea. We hope that the South and North Ko- we witness attempts to violate this principle. can be easily identified during their flight. rea will live in peace with each other. The Both our countries speak in favor of stricter I talked with former President Ford and USA intends to withdraw its troops from the limitations in regard to proliferation of former Secretary of State [Henry A. South Korea in a 4-5 year period. How- nuclear weapons. Kissinger in detail and thoroughly studied ever, we have to do something so that South We worry about sales of arms to other the reports on the negotiations in Korea will be able to provide for its own countries. In the past the USA, unfortu- Vladivostok and I am convinced that the defence. nately, have been selling too much arms, like representatives of the USA were talking The introduction by North Korea of the the Soviet Union, by the way. there only about ballistic missiles, not the 50-mile zone of the sea borders concerns I hope that in the future we will not be cruise ones. us. We hope that the Soviet Union will be doing this. We still supply the arms to some I understand that L.I. Brezhnev does able to persuade the North Korea to exer- countries in accordance with our past con- not agree with such an interpretation of the 106 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Vladivostok negotiations. If so, one has to ness relations but precisely good friendly Brezhnev, that our policy is directed to main- recognize the disagreements between us on ones. I think, you, yourself, made such a taining good and, even more than that, - as this question, the disagreements in interpre- conclusion from L.I. Brezhnev’s speeches, we already mentioned - friendly relations tations. in particular after your speech in Charles- with the USA. Secretary of State Vance told me about ton. In your statement you touched upon your conversation with him on these mat- Incidentally, I would like to linger a bit some concrete problems. You pointed at the ters yesterday and I intend to give you an on some of your speeches, bearing in mind need to take into account the differences in account of our concrete proposals a little bit the importance of this question. You made social and economic systems of our coun- later. some statements where you touched upon tries. Actually, these differences exist, and So, I set forth my views on the ques- mutual relations with the Soviet Union. In they will exist. It is important, however, that tions of developing the relations with the some of these speeches you emphasized the despite the existing differences between us Soviet Union and I would like to empha- importance of mutual understanding and co- we should continue to develop our mutual size once again the great importance that I operation with the Soviet Union. In some relations. We again emphasize that it would attach to our mutual relations with the So- others you just mentioned the Soviet Union be in the interests of both our peoples and viet Union. I would like to assure you that without definite statements. And yet in some of the whole world. Precisely all that we personally as well as as President of the others you criticized the Soviet Union, in call the policy of peaceful co-existence, the USA that I will sincerely strive to overcome your own way, but I repeat, criticized it. policy of resolving controversial issues by all existing disagreements between us. I Sometimes you did it indirectly but it was peaceful means, regardless the differences hope that in the course of a few months we not difficult to guess to whom you addressed in economic and social systems and the dif- will be able to achieve such progress in our these criticisms, whom you had in mind. ferences in ideology. mutual relations, which would justify a And so we ponder which of these state- You correctly pointed out the impor- meeting between myself and L.I. Brezhnev. ments reflect your true policy as the Presi- tance of trade-economic relations. It is also I would very much like him to visit the USA dent of the USA, the policy of the USA as a true that they are essential for the develop- where we would be able to discuss with him state. We would like to think that it is those ment of political relations. It would be very for two-three days here, in Washington, or, statements, in which the need of coopera- good if all the obstacles on the path of the even better, in Camp David, all the ques- tion was emphasized, the necessity of main- development trade-economic relations be- tions which interest both of us. taining good relations with the Soviet Union tween our countries were removed. But it Before that, however, I would like us for the interests of both of our countries, for were not we who created these obstacles. together to have made such progress in solv- the interests of the whole world. They have been created on this side of the ing the problems of particular importance But this is our desire too[;] however, Atlantic ocean. All this is well known. to us, that would demonstrate to the whole only you can interpret your own statements. We, certainly, have noted some opti- world our mutual aspiration consistently to And that is why we would like you to do it mistic signals that appeared in the statements improve our relations. I spoke about it pub- now. I would like to bring to Moscow a of some American politicians that the situa- licly and I use this opportunity to express definite answer on the question of how you, tion can change for the better in the near my appreciation to L.I. Brezhnev for his yourself, imagine the prospects for devel- future. We would like for this to happen. public reaction to my speech in Charleston. opment of relations with the Soviet Union. We believe that it would be in the interests The American people sincerely strives There is hardly a need for a lengthy of both countries to establish normal trade- for cooperation and friendship with the So- discussion about the significance of these economic links, to remove all the obstacles viet Union. I hope that I, as the political relations for the peoples of our countries as on this path, especially because from the leader of our country, and L.I. Brezhnev, as well as for the whole world. It is self-evi- very beginning they were artificial. But in the political leader of the Soviet Union, will dent that these relations have a great sig- general, such relations are for our mutual not create obstacles on the path which our nificance. If there are good relations and benefits. We are convinced that it is both peoples so sincerely strive to follow. And I mutual understanding between us or, even countries that will benefit from trade and hope that our meeting today will be useful better, friendly relations, then there will be the development of economic links between and constructive in this respect. peace in the world, there won’t be another them. A.A. GROMYKO. I attentively lis- world war. If, however, these relations will You touched upon the issue of “human tened to your statement in which a whole go awry, if somebody will ruin these rela- rights.” We must say that when you or other specter of questions between our countries tions, then a world tragedy will occur. American politicians begin to talk about has been touched upon. On my part I would The basic thing in this matter is the “human rights,” we, in the Soviet Union, in like to express my opinion on the questions question of what will be the policy of the the Soviet leadership, have a kind of auto- you have touched upon and maybe on some USA government toward the Soviet Union matic conditional reflex: we expect that others. and, consequently, what will be the policy some shots will be made towards the Soviet First of all, I would like to emphasize of the Soviet Union toward the USA. For Union, of course without any grounds. Why that the entire Soviet leadership, L.I. ourselves, for the Soviet Union we have is it being done? We do not believe that one Brezhnev personally, and all our people sin- been giving and can give a clear answer right person in the world or even a group of cerely aspire to maintain good friendly re- now. I am authorized to declare on behalf people can claim the unique right to make lations with the USA, not just normal busi- of all our leadership, on behalf of L.I. judgments about “human rights.” Each state COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 107 has to decide these questions independently. hopes that other participants will do the course I am saying this not on behalf of Pal- And so it is being done. same. estinians. They did not authorize us to make If we would like to make a list of all Now, about the situation in the South any statements. But we are saying this on violations of human rights in the USA or, of Africa. Our policy for this region is the basis of knowing their position, and on say in England, Italy, the FRG, and in many simple. We do not have any military bases, the basis of our recent conversations with other countries, it would be a long and im- and no military personnel in this region. If [PLO chairman Yasser] Arafat in Moscow. pressive list. We are not doing it, however, one feels the influence of our ideology there So, is it really not possible to find a because we do not want to interfere in other then who in the world can build the barriers solution of the issue who must be the first people’s affairs. But we will never allow against the dissemination of any ideology? to take a step forward, Israel or the Pales- others to interfere in our affairs. The only thing we want there is that all the tinians? This is exactly what the diplomacy You mentioned someone called problems should be solved by the majority is for: to solve such problems. It is pos- Shcharansky. Nobody knows him at all ex- of population, by the peoples themselves. sible, for example, to find a solution under cept, maybe, doctors and some representa- The majority of population there are Blacks, which such a recognition of the Palestinian tives of authorities who oversee the order so the power belongs to them, not to the state by Israel and Israel by the Palestinians in our country. Such questions have an in- White racists. We are against any delays in would be declared by both sides simulta- finitesimal significance. Certainly, you, Mr. the transition of power. Such is, in short, our neously. President, have a right to act as you believe position in regard to Namibia, Zimbabwe, We share the opinion of Secretary is needed, but speaking impartially such South Africa. Incidentally, to the question Vance that peace in the Middle East should position of yours on this question can only of the SAR I will come back in connection mean not only an armistice but also the es- harm the climate of our relations. Besides, with the problem of non-proliferation of tablishment of normal relations between two we think that the gain you get, acting in a nuclear weapons. sides. such a way, is enormously disproportionate Now about Angola. We hailed the birth So let us together strive for the convo- to your political loss. of this new independent African state. Not cation of the Geneva Conference on the You touched upon the so-called Jew- so long ago we met A[gostinho]. Neto in Middle East already this year. An all Arab ish question. The Soviet Union during the Moscow, on the highest level, with the par- delegation could take part in this Confer- war saved millions of Jews. These are ticipation of L.I. Brezhnev. We did not find ence, if the Arabs themselves would agree known facts. This is an open book. Right that Angola took a hostile position in regard with that. But in any case the Palestinians, after the war we together, or to be more pre- to the USA. As for the Cuban troops in the PLO must be represented in Geneva. Let cise, at the same time as the USA we intro- Angola, it is the business of Angola and us try to do it. We are ready to make every duced in the UN the proposal on the cre- Cuba and I am not authorized to discuss this effort possible in this direction. ation of an independent Jewish state. Since question. It would be right, however, to ask Whether you want it or not, the lack of then we have always supported the right of in this regard: whose personnel supports the a settlement in the Middle East throws a Israel to independent state existence. We anti-Angolan movement, the troops that are shadow on our mutual relations. We think are trying to convince the Arabs, including based in Zaire and invade Angola? Whose that removing this shadow would serve the the most extremist groups, to recognize Is- foreign troops acted in Angola even before interests of both of us. rael as an independent state, i.e. to recog- the arrival there of the Cuban troops. The Maybe you supply arms to the Middle nize the reality. But at the same time we are answers to these questions are clear. East with happiness, we know to whom blamed that we act wrongly in regard to Jew- Now about the Middle East. This is a these arms go, and to many other countries. ish question. In general, the question of large topic. I do not think we should spend We do it without any particular joy. If a emigration from the Soviet Union of any a lot of time at your place discussing it. really stable peace would be established in nationality, whether the Russians, the Ukrai- More so since we already had an exchange the Middle East we would not supply the nians, the Armenians, the Georgians, the of opinions on this question with the Secre- arms there, if, of course, the others would Jews or others, is our domestic problem, tary Vance. And we have found out that not do it. It would be the ideal situation for which is to be resolved in accordance with there are some identical elements in our po- which one should strive. the laws of our country. If you use the facts sitions. We also handed over some infor- A few words about Korea. You said then you probably know that dozens of thou- mation to the American side which was not that you would be ready to cut the Ameri- sands of Jews have left the Soviet Union known to you. can troops deployed in the South Korea. But over the past several years. We are strongly convinced that if Is- as it is known the USA intends to keep its With satisfaction I have heard your rael had taken a more sober position and had bases there at the same time. I think you, words that you expect positive results from accepted the idea of a small state for the Pal- yourself, do not believe that we are going the Belgrade Conference, the results in the estinian Arabs, the PLO would have be to applaud such a decision, although, cer- spirit of the Helsinki agreement. It would ready to officially declare its recognition of tainly, such a step has some significance. be good if Belgrade would become a con- Israel as an independent sovereign state in All the same, this seat of tension would con- structive forum instead of a place of mutual the Middle East. In other words, it would tinue to exist among many others. accusations, some kind of a box of com- have recognized the reality. But this is ex- Now about China. From the point of plaints. The Soviet Union is ready to play actly what Israel is striving for. Now it has view of the international situation and also in Belgrade its own constructive role and more chances than ever to achieve it. Of of the broad interests of the USA and, of 108 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

course, the Soviet Union, we believe it is sentially identical. We both should expect a carriers of strategic nuclear arms in com- correct to emphasize that it would have been great danger if this problem will not be ef- parison to the total amount of them in the a great mistake if a dirty game had been fectively resolved. This is a fact that the SAR agreement that was reached in Vladivostok. played here, the open or secret collusion [South African Republic] step by step is Even earlier we agreed on the principle against the Soviet Union, against its inter- moving forward to the creation of its own of calculation of missiles equipped with ests. Because sooner or later it would have nuclear weapon. There are also other states MIRV, under which if the missile had been become known and the appropriate conse- who are close to the creation of nuclear tested even once with MIRV, then all the quences would follow, including those in the weapons. It would be good if the USA and missiles of this type should be included in area ofthe US-Soviet relations. We would the Soviet Union would work more vigor- the total amount of missiles equipped with like to hope that the USA does not intend to ously in the direction of reliable prevention MIRV. play the Chinese card against the Soviet of nuclear weapons proliferation. We are We accepted the USA proposal regard- Union. In the past under other American ready for it. ing the structure of the future agreement administrations we have been assured many You touched in general upon the ques- which would include an agreement or a times that the USA does not have such in- tion of arms sales to other countries. This treaty for the duration until 1985, the proto- tentions. We will see what the reality turn question is certainly connected to the gen- col to it, and the mutual declaration on ba- out to be. eral climate that exists in the world, to the sic directions of future negotiations. We also Presently relations between China and existence of hotbeds of tension. If the con- agreed that the protocol should be valid only the USA are normal and, possibly, even ditions for stopping the arms sales had been for three years rather than until 1985. friendly, whereas our relations with China created, we would have been ready to make All these were big concessions to the are tense. We do not object to the existence an appropriate agreement. We stated it many USA. But all of them, it goes without say- of normal relations between China and the times. But first the hotbeds should be re- ing, were made dependent upon the achieve- USA. But be on guard so that they do not moved. One of these hotbeds is the Middle ment of the general agreement on the whole pull you into games dirty and dangerous for East. complex of questions. In other words, we our both countries. We too once had good I think that it was not accidental that considered all the questions as a complex. relations with China. If the Chinese would you lingered on the question of stopping All these components are interrelated. One be able to embroil the USA with the Soviet nuclear tests. We would like to hope that the cannot seriously pocket any our concession Union they would gladly use it for their own Soviet-American agreement on some par- as self-evident, leaving, however, the rest advantage. Would this be good for the USA? tial steps in this sphere, which have been of questions unresolved. We do not have a crystal ball so that we concluded between us and which are being If the contentious questions that I men- could see the future, however, the history considered by the USA Congress, will be tioned would be resolved, then we could teaches historians a lot. It have taught us, ratified as soon as possible. And we hope conclude the agreement and sign it. I would in any case, and the USA, too, should have that the negotiations, that are being con- like you to see the situation from a more already learned. ducted between us on the broad treaty, will realistic perspective. You have mentioned the Indian Ocean. have also be successfully concluded. We understand that you get advice on Certainly it would have been very good if You also touched upon the problem of this question from many different people. an agreement would be reached between us problems, the signing of an agreement on I, on my part, was trying to picture the deci- on this question. Objectively, there are strategic arms limitation. I would like to sion which would have been the most cor- grounds for this. But it is strikingly evi- state our position on two major questions rect from our point of view. If we would be dent, however, that you stubbornly cling to which are still unresolved. First, on the able to resolve these two main questions, one rock in the Indian Ocean which is called cruise missiles of the class “air-land” (i.e. then the road to a new agreement would be Diego Garcia. In our view the USA has no ALCM [air-launched cruise missiles]) on the cleared up. real need for this, but at the same time this heavy bombers, and secondly, on the So- You said that there are two different is being done with the intention of stepping viet heavy missiles by which some people interpretations of the Vladivostok agreement on our toes. This is being done against the love to scare the American public. in regard to the cruise missiles. But, in fact, interests of our security. The American side I already stated our arguments to Sec- in Vladivostok there was not made any ex- should see this problem in a broader con- retary Vance which hardly need be repeated ception for any types of missiles. Some text. On our part we are ready to continue again. Apparently, you have been informed components of the proposed new agreement the exchange of opinions on this question about this. I shall emphasize only that in were absent in the acting temporary agree- that has already begun. regard to this questions “there is no land ment. Precisely, the aviation. The tempo- We conduct negotiations with the USA behind the Volga, there is no place to re- rary agreement speaks about two compo- on a range of other questions, including the treat,” as we used to say during the war. nents: intercontinental ballistic land-based arms limitations at the expert level, work- Just remember how many concessions missiles and the submarine-based ballistic ing groups. We are ready to continue these we have already made to the Americans. missiles. In the new agreement a third com- negotiations and would like to believe that Specifically, in May of this year in Geneva ponent was added, that is the aviation. they reach positive results. we agreed to cut back - bearing in mind the Now we again decided to meet the About the non-proliferation of nuclear significance you personally give to this USA half-way in order to reach the agree- weapons. Our interests in this issue are es- question - by 150 units the total number of ment. Secretary Vance, probably, has already COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 109 informed you. We are talking, in part, about USA, we think, should also be interested in Washington, I would like to meet him in the total number of land-based ICBM [in- this. In addition, a meeting would not be in order to discuss the practical steps which tercontinental ballistic misiles] equipped anyone’s interests if it were a meeting just could facilitate the settlement of the issue with MIRV. Yesterday during my conversa- for the sake of meeting, or if such a meeting of the trade-economic relations between our tion with Vance I announced that we would would push our relationship backwards. countries. be ready to limit the number of such mis- This seems to coincide with what you We do not believe that the Shcharansky siles to 820 units under the condition that in said. affair lacks significance. I did not blow it the agreement our proposed limitation J. CARTER: Let me briefly comment up. It concerns broad segments of the would be stipulated for the missiles [of] “air- on your statements. My attitude toward the American public. land” class. I would like to get a definite Soviet Union is consistent. On my part, I think that the concern that you ex- reaction of the American side to our pro- there were no words of criticism as such pressed about human rights in our country, posal before my departure from the USA. toward the Soviet Union or Brezhnev per- as well as our public concern over this ques- Now, there is another thing. We would sonally. At the same time, in the Soviet press tion in the Soviet Union, could lead to broad- like you, here, in the USA, to stop scaring there had been critical statements toward me ening of human rights in both countries. But the people by the statements about an abil- personally. Recently such criticism signifi- I hope that both sides will exert necessary ity of making a first strike at America by cantly subsided, which I appreciate. The restraint and that you will not allow openly the Soviet Union. Why is it being done? As point is that such criticism gives concern to expressed concern over these issues in the we understand it, it is being done only to our people. And I hope that in the future USA to spoil our relations. And, as I already excite the atmosphere so that one could eas- there will be no more. said, I hope that the Belgrade Conference ily build up the military budget of the USA. I would like to emphasize that I am will be conducted in an atmosphere of har- What first strike you are talking about? deeply devoted to maintaining constructive mony between our delegations. We are not going to make a first strike at friendly relations with the Soviet Union on About China. We will never allow that anybody. Moreover, together with the other the basis of solving all contentious questions our relations with China would become an states of the Warsaw Pact we proposed to in a peaceful atmosphere and without pub- obstacle for the development of USA rela- all countries signatory of the Final Act on lic polemics. I hope that in the future So- tions with the Soviet Union. We did not have Security and Cooperation in Europe to sign viet-American relations will constantly im- and we will not have any secret or open col- an agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear prove. I would suffer a complete political lusion with China directed against the So- weapon against each other. So stop scaring fiasco as a President if this does not hap- viet Union. I would rather stop my efforts the American people by this nonexistent pen. In other words, I would have betrayed to change for the better our relations with Soviet threat. The Soviet Union did not the confidence in me of my people. Now I China than to allow something like that to have, does not have, and will not have such enjoy the support of the majority of the happen. an intent. American people for my foreign policy. The As for Diego Garcia we have built there And now I would like to read what L.I. goal of constant improvement of relations a small airstrip, but we do not want at all to Brezhnev, whom I met before my departure with the Soviet Union is a matter of first use this island to damage the security of the to the USA, asked me to tell you in person. priority for me. There is no other more im- Soviet Union. Besides the greetings I extended to you in portant problem for me. About stopping all nuclear weapons the beginning of our conversation, he asked (It should be noted that in regard to this tests. A full cessation of all nuclear weap- me to tell you the following: “I and the important statement made by Carter, the ons tests, at least for some time in the be- whole Soviet people are struggling for peace President made it, apparently, bearing in ginning, would be a significant achievement. and struggling for it conscientiously. But I mind the fact that recent public opinion polls We can achieve it together. In our opinion am firmly convinced as well as all our lead- in the USA show that the majority of popu- such a ban should include also so-called ership that this issue must be resolved not lation critically responded to the way the re- peaceful explosions. We are ready to give arithmetically but politically. We do not have lations with the Soviet Union are handled you some information about the results of any other alternative. No calculations will by Carter.) our research on nuclear explosions for lead to anything good. I ask the President to I, continued J. Carter, am aware of the peaceful purposes. This research shows that think about it. Such an approach would only need to improve the Soviet-American trade. the application of nuclear explosions for elevate the authority of our states. And the I inherited the law, about which you know, building canals or changing the flows of riv- peoples of the world would take a sigh of which links the questions of trade with other ers is unadvisable. relief.” questions. I would like to see this problem Now on the problem of concluding a Now a few words about your meeting solved. I hope that together we will be able new agreement on strategic offensive weap- with L.I. Brezhnev, which you have men- to influence our common “friend,” Senator ons in more detail. We think - although we tioned. L.I. Brezhnev, personally, and the [Henry] Jackson, to annul the Soviet-Ameri- are aware that you do not accept this - the Soviet leadership are not at all against such can trade limitations that were adopted on Vladivostok agreement took place in a dif- a meeting, in general. We believe that such his initiative. I hope that you, as far as you ferent situation from the one that has devel- a meeting would be an important threshold can, will help me in this matter. oped today. And at that time we thought if it had been thoroughly prepared and con- When in the near future the Minister about a different perspective. As we under- cluded with a major political outcome. The of External Trade, Patolichev, will come to stand it the issue of cruise missiles was not 110 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

mentioned in Vladivostok. I certainly un- not see it as a concession to us. We would 90 units. This issue needs to be solved. derstand why the current different interpre- find ourselves in the same situation. It We agree to include into the protocol tations arose. We do not intend to use for would have been a mutual step leading to a for a three year term a resolution on non- our advantage the fact that the question of conclusion of a better agreement than the deployment of the land-based and subma- the cruise missiles was not discussed in one which we talked about earlier. And still rine-based cruise missiles with a range of Vladivostok. And we do not want to use we have the issue of the Soviet heavy mis- more than 600 km. our current technological superiority in this siles. In regard to the Soviet aircraft “Back- regard. And in general, we do not want any You said that you made concessions to fire.” The Soviet side, as I understand it, is advantages for ourselves in the area of stra- us on the question of counting ICBMs with ready to guarantee that its range will not tegic arms, since attempts to get such an MIRV but this too is not unilateral conces- exceed 2,200 km and that its current rate of advantage could upset the general balance sion, because otherwise it would be needed production will not increase. It would be and create disharmony. to check every single missile whether it is useful for us, however, to know what is its In our country, however, even a unani- equipped with a MIRV device or not. current rate of production. mous agreement of the whole government The consent of the Soviet Union in re- A.A. GROMYKO: American experts is not enough for securing the ratification gard to the structure of the future agreement have at their disposal the appropriate infor- by the Congress of any signed agreement. also is not just a concession since the mation. The Soviet side, apparently, does not achieved agreement does benefit both sides. J. CARTER: On the question of mo- give any significance to a question of its own There are two important question right bile inter-continental ballistic missiles we heavy missiles, which are three times more now, as you have said, which create many have some disagreements inside our own destructive than any of our missiles. In this difficulties. But before I touch on them I government whether we should develop respect I am very worried by your statement would like to mention those less significant them or reject its production altogether. We that “there is no land behind the Volga” for disagreements which exist on a number of are ready to ban its production and deploy- you, i.e. that you are against any further dis- other questions. ment for the period of the protocol term. The cussion and concessions on the questions One of these concerns the overall total Soviet side, as we understand, would like which interest us. I would like to hope that level of delivery vehicles of nuclear weap- this ban to be in effect until 1985. It also the Soviet side will display more flexibil- ons which under the original agreement proposes to ban testing of these missiles. I ity. must be equal to 2,400 units. You proposed think, our positions are close and the only The question of Soviet heavy missiles that in 5 years after the signing a new agree- thing is to find a mutually accepted word- is a subject of concern for us as a question ment this level would be cut back to 2,250 ing. of our cruise missiles is a subject of con- units. But we would like to lower the men- There are some disagreements on the cern for you. You said that you intend to tioned original number by 10 per cent, i.e. question of new types of the inter-continen- strive for the achievement of the mutually to 2,160 units which, in our opinion, would tal ballistic missiles. We would like agree acceptable agreement, however, my first im- fully satisfy the needs of each side. Thus, on a ban on testing and deployment of all pression is that the Soviet side does not dis- the difference between our positions is only new types of the ICBM. But you prefer to play enough flexibility. ban testing and deployment of only new CWIHP LAUNCHES We already put forward many propos- types of ICBM equipped with MIRV. I do STALIN PROJECT als directed to achieving an agreement, but not quite understand what is the essence of the Soviet Union turned them down. We The Cold War International History Project, this disagreement. are ready, however, to show further flexibil- in cooperation with U.S., European, and Russian A.A. GROMYKO: Speaking about our ity - although there are limits to it - in the partners, is launching a new international project concessions I had in mind concessions to hope that the Soviet side will act the same to obtain, assess, and disseminate new evidence the American side. There should not be any way. (particularly from newly opened East-bloc ar- misunderstanding here. This is related to In the end, I hope, we will be able to chives) on Josef Stalin and the Cold War. The the question of the methods of counting totally eliminate nuclear weapons. If in the project’s highest priority to gather and share new ICBMs equipped with MIRV which was course of the third round of negotiations on evidence—such as correspondence and tran- appreciated at the time by the USA govern- the limitation of strategic arms we would scripts, notes, or memoranda of conversations— ment. be able to cut back the upper limits on this that directly sheds light on Stalin’s personal role, Yesterday I informed Mr. Vance about types of weapons by 50 percent then we actions, views, policies, and behavior from the our consent to the establishment of a sepa- would be ready in the course of the follow- final stages of World War II through the early Cold rate level for ICBMs equipped with MIRV ing round to go even further, under the con- War years until his death in 1953. Project plans to the total of 820 units. This is almost the dition, of course, that China and France will include a workshop in Moscow in late 1997 de- same number as was proposed by the USA not start to build up their nuclear weapons voted to Russian evidence and scholarship on (800). on a large scale. Stalin, and a major conference in Washington the We agreed to cut back during the term You said that you made concessions to following year. Scholars interested in participat- of the agreement the overall level for the us when you agreed on some decrease of ing, particularly if conducting research in East- number of delivery vehicles of strategic the upper limit of the means of delivering bloc archives and able to contribute documents, nuclear weapons from 2,400 to 2,250. You the strategic nuclear weapons. But we do should contact CWIHP. mentioned the figure 2,160. What we have COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 111 proposed is a compromise figure leaning to- 1,200 units for ICBM and submarine-based tal USA or not. I certainly trust L.I. ward the American side. ballistic missiles with MIRV would be es- Brezhnev and you but we would like to have As for the land-based and submarine- tablished. more certainty. based cruise missiles for some reason you This combination almost fully accords A.A. GROMYKO: It is well known speak not about a full ban but actually about with the Soviet side’s position except for the that the distance between the Soviet Union permitting them to be tested on an air plat- sublevel of ICBMs and submarine-based and the USA is at least 5,500 km and that forms. It attracted my attention even yes- ballistic missiles with MIRV (1,200 units). was taken as a criterion for the definition of terday while listening to Mr. Vance’s state- Under such a settlement the difference the ICBM. ments. It is clear that if a cruise missile in- of 120 units between the total number of J. CARTER: But the range is not the tended for submarine or land basing is tested carriers with MIRV (1,320 units) and the only criterion. An aircraft could fly the on the air platform then it is possible to pro- number of ICBMs and submarine-based bal- maximum distance only in one direction. duce them by the hundreds and thousands, listic missiles with MIRV (1,200 units) could That is why I would prefer that its maxi- like pancakes. be used by both sides for heavy bombers mum range were precisely expressed in ki- There are also other questions to which equipped with “air-land” class cruise mis- lometers so to avoid any misunderstanding I can draw the attention of the USA Gov- siles. In the limits of the sublevel of 1,200 in the future, especially because your state- ernment. We will have another opportunity units both sides will have the freedom to ment which you were ready to make, in prin- to talk about them with the State Secretary. arrange the composition of the carriers with ciple, is a very good one. However, those two questions which I have MIRV taking into account, of course, the A.A. GROMYKO: This question has mentioned are the main obstacle to the sublevel of 820 units for the land-based already been discussed between us. Just agreement. These, I repeat, are the question ICBMs and MIRV. read more carefully our possible statement of our heavy missiles and the issue of cruise Then, the sublevel of 820 ICBMs with and you will see that it resolves all these missiles on heavy bombers. I would like to MIRV, as I understand, will have to include issues. hear your opinion about how we can settle the Soviet launchers, deployed in the area As for your last proposals, we, cer- these issues. of Derazhnia and Pervomaisk. tainly, will be ready to discuss them but (In order to exert pressure on Carter There are some other disagreements judging from our first impression they are we specifically emphasized that if the between us. For instance, you propose that aimed at giving one-sided advantages to the American side wishes to stick to their pre- the agreement on the maximum range of USA. And this is not the way of resolving vious unacceptable positions, then the con- 2,500 km for the “air-land” cruise missiles the problems we are facing. cessions in other issues made by us to the on heavy bombers remain valid for the term J. CARTER: But any agreed upon limi- USA become invalid.) of the basic agreement, until 1985. But we tation has an identical impact on the USA J. CARTER: I have spent many hours suggest to include this question into the pro- and the Soviet Union with the exception that studying the history of the negotiations be- tocol for the term of 3 years in order to dis- the Soviet Union gets a possibility to de- tween the Soviet Union and the USA on the cuss this question again. ploy 308 modern heavy missiles, which the question of strategic arms limitation, and I did not quite understand what you US cannot do. We are to agree on that since analyzing the fundamental interests of the said regarding the rate of production of the it was previously stipulated by the interim Soviet Union and the USA in this area. We “Backfire” aircraft. According to our infor- agreement. hope that you understand what and why is mation you produce 30 such aircraft a year. A.A. GROMYKO: The solution to this our concern. A.A. GROMYKO: I did not mention question was found in Vladivostok. Accord- On the basis of my understanding of any numbers and have no intention to do so ing to this solution the Soviet Union got the what the main concerns of the Soviet Union since you know the facts. Yesterday I read freedom to equip the heavy missiles with are, we now are ready to leave aside the a relevant text to Secretary Vance. Inciden- independently targetable warheads. The question of modern heavy Soviet ICBMs. tally, I want also to recall that part of this USA, in exchange, got the possibility not to In other words, their number could reach text which deals with the range of this air- stipulate in the agreement, that is now be- 308 units as it was stipulated by the interim craft. What we are saying is that the range ing developed, its concrete obligations for agreement. of this aircraft now is 2,200 km and we are dismantling their mobile ground-based sys- We also are ready to agree on the sub- not going to increase it to such an extent so tems. That was the meaning of the solution level of 820 ICBMs equipped with MIRV it could hit targets on USA territory. We are of these two difficult questions which had (which also includes our heavy missiles). not saying that the range of the “Backfire” long been an obstacle to an agreement. I We are ready to leave at the level es- will not exceed 2,200 km. This is what we did not talk about it before, believing that tablished in Vladivostok the total level of said to Vance yesterday. you knew it very well. Now, I thought I carriers with MIRV in the amount of 1,320 J. CARTER: We, certainly, would like should remind you how it had been done. units, including ICBMs with MIRV, subma- to have more clarity in this regard. If, for But since then nothing has changed in re- rine-based ballistic missiles with MIRV, and example, you intend to increase the range gard to the American mobile ground-based also heavy bombers equipped with cruise of this aircraft up to 2,400 - 2,500 km we systems. What has changed is only the USA missiles with a range exceeding 600 km. would like to get precise information about administration, but the situation with the We propose, however, that in the lim- it so that not only you but also we could mobile ground-based system is the same. So its of this level (1,320 units) a sublevel of judge if that aircraft can reach the continen- why anybody would ask us to change our 112 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

position on the heavy missiles? Director of the Arms Control and Disarma- this time had conducted in Moscow, and J. CARTER: Perhaps you did not un- ment Agency P. Warnke, an official of the from him receive confirmation of that un- derstand me correctly. We do not demand National Security Council W. Hyland, an derstanding. anymore that you change your position on interpreter Kramer. 2. To openly express to him our evalu- the heavy missiles. We accept your posi- ation of the contradictions of Carter’s in- tion. I only said that this is the only aspect Typed in 2 copies consistent foreign policy line, his constant where there is some inequality to the Soviet mb-05749/gs swings between assurance that he is for an Union’s advantage. In the rest the obliga- 12 October 1977 improvement of relations with the USSR tions of both sides are identical: what is per- and calls for a cranking up [nakruchivanie] mitted to the Soviet Union is permitted to [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian of of the ; to remind Vance (and us. And only in the question on heavy mis- Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; obtained through him, Carter) that there are things siles the Soviet Union has some advantages. and translated by Carter-Brezhnev Project.] which are more important than the foreign I hope, however, that you do not take me policy maneuvers of the moment, particu- for a fool who would put forward proposals Document 2: CPSU CC Politburo larly: issues of war and peace. damaging to the interests of the USA. Transcript, 27 April 1978 (excerpt) 3. To once again express our attitude The Soviet side wanted to preserve the about a possible meeting with Carter, about upper limit of carriers with MIRV to 1,320 Top Secret which he, as you know, continues to hint units. We agreed to it. Only copy through all possible channels. You proposed to include the heavy Working Transcript 4. To make known to the USA admin- bombers equipped with cruise missiles in istration in advance our steps in response to that upper limit. And we agreed. MEETING OF THE Carter’s decision to defer the production of However, this is not at all a sign of USA CC CPSU POLITBURO the neutron bomb. weakness. I think such solutions should 27 April 1978 5. To give a rebuff to several political satisfy your strategic and political needs and maneuvers which, as we assumed and as was that they are in accordance with the Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I. confirmed, Vance could take. We are talk- Vladivostok agreement reached by my pre- Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu. V., ing, primarily, about the attempt to put forth decessor President Ford and L.I. Brezhnev. Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, an accusation to the address of the USSR You will be able in the last part of the A.P., Kosygin, A.N., Kulakov, F.D., and Cuba in regard to events in Africa. day to continue the discussion of these ques- Mazurov, K.T., Pel’she, A. Ia., Suslov, M.A., I will not dwell in detail on the course tions with Vance. If further difficulties Ustinov, D.F., Demichev, P.N., Solomentsev, of the conversation. A transcript of it was should arise I will be ready directly or via M.S., Chernenko,K.Y., Kapitonov, I.V., just distributed. All the comrades, probably, Vance to make every effort possible to re- Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Riabov, Ia.P., have familiarized themselves with it. I will solve them. In general, I think that solu- Rusakov, K.V. say only that the mentioned program was tions proposed by us should satisfy all your entirely fulfilled. Vance agreed with our wishes as well as to satisfy modestly our I. About the results of the negotiations with evaluation of the negotiations on strategic special interests. the Secretary of State of the USA, C. Vance weapons. He accepted with due attention A.A. GROMYKO: We will be ready the criticism of the foreign policy zigzags to discuss in more detail all these questions BREZHNEV. My conversation with of the Carter government, and will, of with Vance. Vance took place after his two-day negotia- course, pass them on to the President. Let me thank you for this conversation. tions with Comrades Gromyko, Ogarkov, The attempt to deliver a reproach for I would like to emphasize once more that and others had concluded. He, evidently, Africa and African affairs which are linked the Soviet side would like to achieve, in the had picked out in advance several issues with the development of relations between end, the conclusion of a new agreement on which he had not brought up in the course the USA and the USSR, received such a limitation of strategic arms. This would be of the general negotiations. We can assume strong rebuff that Vance, excuse me, was not a great success, but it depends, of course, that he had an agreement with Carter on this. glad that he had raised that issue. He found on both sides. It is characteristic, that Vance did not take it necessary to take a defensive position, and The following people were present at any of the members of his delegation in to to justify himself. the meeting: On the Soviet side: A.F. the meeting with me. Only the ambassador Overall, I think, the conversation was Dobrynin, G.M. Kornienko, N.N. Detinov, came with him. But I, from my side, also useful. It will help Carter to see several V.G. Makarov, B.G. Komplektov, V.M. did not presume to broaden the circle of our things in a more realistic light. The tone of Sukhodrev; participants. Comrades Gromyko, Dobynin, the conversation was correct and friendly. On the American side: Vice-President and Aleksandrov participated in the conver- Vance behaved well, and even cordially. W. Mondale, Secretary of State C. Vance, sation. SUSLOV. Carter has a great desire to the Special assistant to the President for Na- Thinking over the plan of the conver- meet with Leonid Il’ich. tional Security Z. Brzezinski, the USA Am- sation, we set ourselves some tasks: Members of the Politburo, Candidate bassador in the USSR [M.] Toon, the deputy 1. Set forth our understanding of the members of the Politburo, and Secretaries assistant to the President [D.] Aaron, the main results of the negotiations which Vance of the CC say that they have read the tran- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 113 script of the conversation. The conversa- ing to their orientation. Yet we have always grams etc. I would like to point out three tion was very good, substantive, sharp in its tried to stress constructive aspects of those main areas, in which this concern reveals tone, as was appropriate. It has an aggres- declarations which were put forward by the itself. sive character. President, and by you and by other leading Very many people in the USA and in KOSYGIN. The conversation really American authorities who deal with foreign other countries, especially in the West, re- forced Vance to think over many issues, and policy. veal serious concern in connection with the he will of course pass all the content on to But most recently our attention has increase by the USSR of its military forces, Carter. been more and more attracted to the fact that, especially in Europe, and the fact that the USTINOV. Leonid Il’ich spoke very beginning with the President (and dimensions of this increase significantly well about offensive strategic weapons. Brzezinski has already surpassed himself in exceed the dimensions needed for defense. They should know our position on that is- this), American officials are constantly mak- Looking at the Soviet Union’s spending for sue. ing statements which are aimed, or so it conventional arms, people picture a dramati- SUSLOV. Leonid Il’ich did very well seems to us more and more, at nearly bring- cally rising curve, at the same time keeping in conducting the conversation with Vance. ing us back to the period of “cold war.” in mind the stable level (of spending) for KOSYGIN. The main thing is that they In Washington, D.C. the other day, I arms by the USA and other western coun- now know perfectly our position on all the could not but come to the conclusion that tries. issues. the orientation of President Carter’s state- The intentions of the Soviet Union sin- SUSLOV. We have to take a decision ments is to a great extent determined by the cerely concern many people. A natural ques- to approve Leonid Il’ich’s conversation with character of the false information which he tion arises: if the intentions of the USSR are Vance and the negotiations of Comrades receives. This can be illustrated by his dec- to preserve the existing military balance, Gromyko, Ogarkov, and others on issues larations on the situation in Africa, which why does it increase its military forces and related to the limitation of strategic weap- are obviously based on wrong, distorted in- weapons on such a scale[?] Doesn’t it mean ons. formation. that the Soviet Union, rather than trying to ALL. Correct. Now I see that the matter is even more reduce military rivalry in Europe by cutting serious. Evidently somebody in the United down the level of weapons and military [Source: Archive of the President of the States, some circles, consciously are creat- forces in the region, has more aggressive in- Russian Federation (APRF), f. 3, op. 120, ing myths, and are then referring to those tentions[?] d. 39, ll. 187-189; trans. by M. Doctoroff.] same myths, and dumping all this on the laps As for strategic weapons, we made of the President, the Secretary of State, and definite progress in the past: we concluded Document 3: Memorandum of Conver- other American leaders. the ABM Treaty, signed the Temporary sation between Soviet Foreign Minister So what is the real policy of the USA, Agreement on limitation of strategic offen- Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State and towards what is it directed: to the cre- sive weapons and have moved forward on Vance, 31 May 1978 (excerpts) ation of relations based on mutual respect, working out a new agreement on SALT. All on non-interference in internal affairs, and these can be considered positive elements Secret, Copy No. 1 on building relations; or towards aggravat- in the relations between our two countries. ing of tension in our relations[?] This is the On the other hand, the constant growth RECORD OF MAIN CONTENT OF question, which I would like you to answer. by the Soviet Union of its armed forces and CONVERSATION BETWEEN On returning to Moscow I will report modern conventional weapons by the USSR A.A. GROMYKO AND to L.I. Brezhnev and to the Politburo of the provokes serious concern in many people. U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE C. VANCE Central Committee of the Communist Party Another major issue which alarms us about the general political situation in the is Africa, which President Carter and I have 31 May 1978, New York United States today and about the USA’s already discussed with you in detail. I think policy towards the USSR. I presume that we all recognize that elements of rivalry will Our final meeting with the USA Secretary you, in turn, will inform the President about remain between us in the future. But at the of State C. Vance took place on May 31. this conversation. same time there will be areas, in which we First I met with Vance “eye to eye” (only C. Vance. I will certainly inform the will be able to achieve mutual understand- interpreters from both sides were present). President about our conversation. Actually ing and find a common language. If you you have just asked me two questions. First, look at the situation in Africa today, it seems A.A. Gromyko. Taking advantage of you asked me to explain the reasons for that that the areas of rivalry have developed be- this opportunity to talk to you in private, I which you have called an explosion of hos- yond the limits of normal competition and want to ask how the explosion of propa- tile propaganda toward the USSR in the led to military conflicts, fed by Soviet weap- ganda hostile to the USSR, which we have United States. Let me try to answer this ons and equipment and by armed combat observed in the USA for some time already, question with the utmost openness. detachments provided by Cuba. can be explained? Until now we have ob- There are several facts which provoke I am acquainted with your explanation served various declarations made by repre- concern in regard to the Soviet Union in the of the factors which stimulated certain mili- sentatives of the American administration, United States. These are reflected, naturally, tary actions in Africa, and I will not repeat and evaluated them in different ways accord- in newspaper articles, materials, TV pro- what was already said by both sides. How- 114 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

ever, in answering your question, I want to tual understanding of the character of de- preserve the security of the Soviet Union in set forth the evaluation of the actions of the tente, and about how to turn this process into the face of the constant—I repeat, con- Soviet Union in Africa which is being a two-way street. Fifth, to come to agree- stant—growth of NATO’s, and especially of formed in the USA and many other coun- ment on other steps which could be under- the USA’s, armed forces and weapons. tries (not only European). Many people now taken in order to provide broader exchanges If we had other intentions, why should presume that the Soviet Union sets fires in between our peoples in the spheres of cul- we, in the U.N. and in other forums, insist various regions of Africa instead of prevent- tural, scientific, and other activity, as well every year, every month, every day, on the ing those fires in a peaceful way. as in the area of commerce. necessity of disarmament, up to general and The third issue which provokes seri- In conclusion I must point out that, re- complete disarmament? Recall the propos- ous concern is connected with the question lating to the fact that detente should be a als which were put forward by L.I. Brezhnev of human rights, which has become particu- two-way street, and in the context of the situ- at the recent Komsomol Congress. They larly urgent recently because of actions like ation in Africa, we must determine how we were devoted to a total ban on the produc- [Soviet dissident Yuri] Orlov’s trial. should act so that all these questions do not tion of nuclear arms, and the subsequent These are the three main issues, which continue to be a constant source of confron- destruction of these weapons and the com- provoke what you call the explosion of emo- tation between us. plete switchover of nuclear energy to purely tions directed against the Soviet Union. I tried as I could to set forth more sim- peaceful uses. Remember the program, The second part of your question re- ply some fundamental problems and to ex- adopted at the 25th CPSU Congress, of ad- ferred to what the USA actually wants: to press my opinion about those steps which ditional actions in the sphere of the struggle build good relations with the Soviet Union could be undertaken in order to develop our for peace, which we try to bring to life liter- or to return to the “cold war” period, ac- relations in a correct direction and to im- ally every day, though you act in the oppo- companied by permanent confrontation and prove them. site direction. arguments between us. A.A. Gromyko. I will try to react to We would not have conducted such a I can answer that question quite sim- your statements as briefly as I can. Thus I policy if we had wanted to constantly in- ply and clearly. The United States does not will be able to avoid repeating what I al- crease our armaments. We carry out this want to return to the period of tension and ready said in Washington, D.C. policy of peace and detente firmly and con- confrontation between our two countries. I listened with positive feelings to your sistently, despite the ring of American mili- We want to return our relations to their cor- words to the effect that USA is trying to tary bases around the Soviet Union. We are rect path, we want to return to better, tighter, conduct its affairs so as to allow us to find ready to disarm, even radically, but at the closer relations between the Soviet Union solutions to the problems that confront us, same time, it goes without saying that we and the USA. We want to reduce tension in avoiding tension in Soviet-American rela- will never agree to unilateral disarmament. the military and other spheres, to find as tions and not returning to the period of the Do not expect this. An equal degree of se- many more grounds as we can for a com- “cold war.” I am sure that all my colleagues curity must be observed, there must be no mon language between us. in the Soviet leadership, including L.I. loss of security for any of the sides. This is There are several means by which it Brezhnev personally, will also react to your an immutable law which must be observed. would be possible to move forward in this words positively. This is my response to C. Vance. Neither of us is speaking direction and, maybe, the main way lies in the constructive part of your statements. It about unilateral disarmament. We believe making progress in the negotiations on limi- would have been good if the actions of the that both sides are pragmatic enough to un- tation of strategic weapons. Yet, besides this American government had corresponded derstand that unilateral disarmament is im- there is a lot more which we can do. Most with your words, but that is not the case now. possible. It can take place only within the importantly, we must come to a deep mu- You went on to say that one of the rea- mutual interests of the sides. The question, tual understanding of the fact that detente is sons for the explosion in the United States however, is whether we will manage to cre- a two-way street; we have to develop of propaganda hostile to the USSR was that ate a situation in which mutually advanta- broader links in commerce, cooperation, the Soviet Union lately had, apparently, geous arms control agreements, which will culture and other spheres. We made some greatly increased its military potential, and clearly show everyone that we are striving progress in these areas in the past, but un- that this fact worries the United States and for disarmament rather than for an increase fortunately we have lately backtracked sig- other Western countries. in arms, can be achieved. nificantly. I must categorically deny this state- A.A. Gromyko. I will respond to what I would like to mention some concrete ment. Moreover, it has already been repeat- you have just said later. Now I will con- steps, which in our opinion, could make it edly denied at the highest level by L.I. tinue to express ideas, which I started be- possible to achieve our aims. First, progress Brezhnev. It is not true. It is a myth, thought fore. I will touch on the issue of military during the negotiations on limitation of stra- up in the West with a definite goal in mind budgets. tegic weapons. Second, progress in the — to camouflage the Western program of Several times we have introduced pro- Vienna negotiations on reduction of armed arms increases. And the facts completely posals to reduce military budgets, naming forces and weapons in Central Europe. support this. in this regard concrete percentages, cor- Third, progress on a range of other arms Our military forces are certainly at their rected our proposal in accordance with control issues in the discussion of which we required level. But we do not want to spend counterproposals of other states. Yet, the and you participate. Fourth, a better mu- on defense any more than is necessary to USA and its allies never expressed any posi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 115 tive attitude to our proposals. They met them sulting declarations directed toward the So- are not responsible for somebody else’s sins with raised bayonets, every time rejecting viet Union, I would have been forced to use and do not intend to be. Those who sin are them at once. We proposed to freeze mili- not those, but sharper expressions. By the responsible. tary budgets at their present level, from way, those American officials who make Touching on the question of so-called which it might later have been possible to such declarations should study how to com- human rights, you raised a question of So- begin their reduction. But these proposals, municate with people, especially with rep- viet citizens, giving the concrete name too, were declined without consideration. resentatives of foreign states. Orlov, and noting that you could give some At the present special session of the Who should know better than the USA, other names. I will say only that we will United Nations General Assembly, devoted with its a far-reaching espionage network, not discuss questions like this, neither with to questions of disarmament, we decided to that the Soviet Union had absolutely noth- you, nor with anybody else, because these propose a new approach to the issue. Ear- ing to do with events in Zaire, Rhodesia, are questions in our internal competence, lier, when we had named a definite percent Namibia[?] As for the conflict between and only in our competence. by which to reduce military budgets, West- Ethiopia and Somalia, when Somalia And now I respond to your statement ern states had referred to various difficul- launched an attack against Ethiopia we, re- that there are other questions on which we ties related to the allegedly different struc- sponding to a request from the latter, helped do not agree, but which we should discuss tures of the military budgets of the Soviet out by sending to Ethiopia a certain amount in order to find mutually acceptable deci- Union and the countries of the West. We of weapons and a group of specialists to train sions. You are right: there are such ques- always acted from a belief that these com- them how to use the weapons. At the same tions. I want, however, to draw your atten- plexities had an artificial character and must time, as I already told you, we would at that tion to the fact that the USA and some of its not serve as a barrier on in the way time have welcomed any help of this kind allies do not, as a rule, want to discuss the ofreducing military spending. Now we de- from other countries, including the USA, if proposals which we put forward. It often cided to take another approach: to speak not any such assistance had been requested of happens that you decline our proposals on about percents, but about absolute figures. them. the basis only of some fragmentary reports These figures may not entirely coincide, al- But instead of this we face the fiction in the press, even before you have received though, it goes without saying that they must that Ethiopian troops acted under Soviet the official text. This was the case, for ex- be, as they say, in the same ballpark. There command, etc. Why is this done? Being re- ample, when the Warsaw Treaty states pro- must not be a situation when one great power alists, we started to look for reasons for such posed that all countries which signed the would reduce its military budget by 1 bln. absurd assertions. We came to the conclu- Helsinki Final Act should agree not to be dollars a year, and the other - by 1 mln. sion that it is necessary to search for those the first to use nuclear weapons against each Think over our new proposals. It seems to reasons in the attempts of some definite other. us that they could make it easier to achieve forces, particularly in the United States, to You turned this proposal down, but life an agreement. create a screen through which it would be itself did not reject it because of that. We Both previously and now, American more difficult for people to understand the suggested having a preparatory meeting, at representatives have tried and are trying now true situation, in order to justify [their] own which it would have been possible to con- to suggestthat their military budget is not actions in Africa, which appear as interfer- sider this proposal, if necessary to sharpen growing, although in fact USA military ence in the domestic affairs of the countries it, to ask each other different questions, etc. spending grows enormously every year. on that continent. You did not want to do this either. We also This truth is known to everyone. An illustration of this statement is the could follow this same approach, turning C. Vance. Spending is growing, but slaughter which took place in [the Shaba down at once any proposal of the Western not in real terms. Province of] Zaire not long ago. In fact nei- states at once. But is this how serious people A.A. Gromyko. We are speaking about ther the USSR nor Cuba had anything to do conduct their affairs[?] We would not like the real budget. with it. As you remember, I told President to conduct our affairs this way. C. Vance. From the point of view of Carter about this. We were indignant at this C. Vance. First of all I want to say that dollars our military budget is growing, but slaughter and at the insinuations to our ad- I fully agree that it is necessary to work out only because of inflation. dress. I have already said that there is not a some sort of a mechanism for the discus- A.A. Gromyko. I am afraid that now single Soviet person in Namibia or in Rho- sion of those or other proposals put forward you will start to throw blame at us for not desia, and in Zaire we have only official dip- by the sides, which would allow us to hear having inflation in our country. In fact the lomatic representatives. each other out and to seriously consider USA military budget is growing both in real Pass my words on to the President. Tell those or any other questions. The thing is and in material terms. You can not cover him that the assertions, which we confront that sometimes we are faced with divergent this with inflation. in connection with events in Africa, in par- interpretations of these or other problems, You spoke further on about the situa- ticular in Zaire, we can treat only as a pure the consideration of which could have tion in Africa. I must say that in this case a and deliberate fiction. helped to eliminate differences of opinion. total and crude distortion of the real situa- As it happened, some individuals and That is why it is very important to under- tion is taking place. If I, discussing this governments themselves threw an explosive stand how each side pictures the existing topic, behaved like some of your high rank- ball of lightening into the arena and now situation. Let us think of the best way to ing officials, who let loose with simply in- are saying: look, how terrible that looks. We conduct affairs which touch on relations 116 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

between the Soviet Union and the USA. You do not know his reasons, who he works case and am afraid that this matter will have Maybe it makes sense for the sides to meet for, do you? Many questions arise here. to take its normal course. more often both on our level and on the level C. Vance. Evidently it does not make As for reducing the amount of bail, of those who negotiate concrete questions, much sense to continue this argument. I [State Department official] M[arshall D]. in order to clarify the positions of both sides? mentioned these facts only to illustrate dif- Shulman has already told a representative Maybe it follows that we should think of ficulties in receiving trustworthy informa- of the USSR Embassy in the USA that the other methods? One thing is clear: some- tion. Probably it is one more argument in lawyers of the two mentioned people know thing must be done to change the tendency, support of the necessity of having more fre- how to solve this problem in accordance which has lately appeared in the relations quent meetings and exchange of opinions with American legislation. between our two countries. between us. A.A. Gromyko. I listened your answer A.A. Gromyko. This is a very impor- A.A.Gromyko. Perhaps. But if on the with the feeling of regret. What prospects tant question. basis of this type of information, known to do you see for solving this problem? C. Vance. Let me now respond to your be false, a broad campaign, hostile to us, is C. Vance. I think that a legal proceed- remarks regarding our information about the developed in the USA, then it is another ing will take place, and when it’s over we participation of Cubans in the events in kettle of fish. And if, on top of everything, will see what we can do. Zaire. According to our intelligence data, the government takes part in this process and A.A. Gromyko. I will not repeat what Cubans took part in planning and prepara- heats up this campaign, then what conclu- I have already said on this account, not to tion of the intrusion there. As for the sources sion should we draw? Really, this is not waste time. You are familiar with every- of our information, it was the Commander happening within the four walls of a work- thing I said about our attitude to such a de- of Katang armed forces, General Mbumba, ing study. It is taking place on a national velopment of events and about possible con- and Cuban sources in East Germany. We scale. sequences. considered these sources reliable. C. Vance. President Carter asked me I want to inform you that we found and A.A. Gromyko. Oh, then you are sim- to find out your opinion of the expediency confiscated more than 50 bugging devices ply victims of disinformation. If we were of carrying out exchange visits of some se- which were functioning in different Soviet not sure that our information was authentic, nior military officers from the Soviet Union institutions in the USA — in Washington, we would not have told you about it. We and the USA. I mean, for example, a meet- D.C., in New York, in San Francisco. I will take great responsibility for what we are ing between the Chairman of the Joint give you the materials connected with this saying. Chiefs of Staff and the Head of the General issue now. We, naturally, have at our dis- C. Vance. But how could we know that Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. As for posal many more photographs and, if we information provided to us by Mbumba and selecting questions for discussion, they can wanted, we could have released them long Cubans themselves does not correspond agree on them in advance. ago. But we have not done it yet, because with reality? When this information came A.A.Gromyko. We will discuss this we have a broader approach to Soviet- to us we assumed that it was based on solid question and inform you about our decision. American relations. We also took into ac- evidence. C. Vance. We start from a belief that count the requests of the American side not A.A.Gromyko. But who on Earth such exchanges could demonstrate to the to publish these materials. knows what kind of General this is? Who public our readiness to have contacts on all I can tell you, by the way, that many of does he serve? Is he really the only one to levels. This could even prove, in a way, that these devices were established under Presi- tell the truth, like Jesus Christ of the Bible we do not aim at confrontation. dent Carter’s Administration. I do not want legend? [sections omitted dealing with SALT II ne- to claim that this was sanctioned by him You have information from us — ac- gotiations and Cyprus situation—ed.] personally, but the fact is that they were put cept it. Your sources of information are bad During the final meeting with the USA into practice after he came to power. if they present lies as truth. You yourself Secretary of State Vance the issue of two C. Vance. I do not know anything know from experience that you must not Soviet citizens, staff members of the United about these devices and have absolutely no believe every report. Man was given his Nations Secretariat [Valdik] Enger and information whether they were installed brain in order to analyze information, think, [Rudolf] Cherniaev, who are being held in somewhere or not. I will consider materi- and make realistic conclusions. a prison in New York City, was discussed. als given by you but I do not want you to Unfortunately, there are officials in the The record of the main contents of this con- treat my silence as agreement with the fact USA who easily, to put it mildly, present lies versation, which took place in the presence that we did install such devices somewhere. for truth. But a serious policy cannot be of two interpreters only, is given below. A.A. Gromyko. It is necessary to say built on this. A.A. Gromyko. During this meeting that here, in New York, there took place C. Vance. I take into consideration you promised to answer the question we many approaches to our workers by staffers what you have said. Yet I want to say that raised about freeing the two Soviet citizens of American intelligence services who work we have to take as serious the information, kept in prison by American authorities. for the United Nations Secretariat. Accord- which we receive from people like the Com- C. Vance. I can do that. At the present ing to our estimate, at least 200 agents of mander of the Katang forces. time we can not undertake any definite ac- American intelligence work in this interna- A.A. Gromyko. But maybe the Gen- tions as far as these two people are con- tional Secretariat. eral you mentioned is only saving his skin? cerned. I specially got acquainted with the So we have at our disposal very many COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 117 quite interesting, and I would say, piquant THE CC CPSU CONCERNING photomaterials on this subject. They will The conversation was translated and re- SEVERAL ISSUES OF THE make a very interesting exhibition, though corded by V. Sukhodrev. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION a pretty big hall would be needed to accom- modate it. Correct: (signature) llegible] Comrades, it is apparent from what Andrei Our decision regarding these materi- 2 June 1978. Andreevich [Gromyko] has now told us, that als will to a great extend depend on the de- Original # 1351/GS Com. Gromyko has performed considerable velopment of this matter on the whole. You and useful work during his time in America have just said that after the trial you will [Source: AVPRF; trans. by M. Doctoroff.] both in terms of participation in the special see what you can do. We also will take a session of the General Assembly of the UN, look at what you do. Document 4: Speech by L.I. Brezhnev as well as in the course of his negotiations C. Vance. We do not start a war of in- to CPSU CC Politburo, 8 June 1978 with Carter and Vance, and also at the time telligence services with the Soviet Union. of bilateral meetings and discussions with Yet we are very much concerned by the case Proletariats of all countries, unite! representatives of many countries. I think of the two mentioned Soviet citizens, espe- Communist Party of the Soviet Union. that it is fitting to approve this work and to cially by the fact that they work for the CENTRALCOMMITTEE record this in our resolution. United Nations Secretariat. TOP SECRET But it would be, probably, incorrect to Besides, we are greatly concerned with limit ourselves only to this. From the re- the case, connected with our Embassy in No. P107/III port of com. Gromyko, and likewise from Moscow. The investigation on this matter To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin, the extensive information which has reached is still going on. But the fact that there is a Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kulakov, us recently through various channels, it is tunnel under the building of the USA Em- Kunaev, Mazurov, Pel’she, Romanov, completely clearly apparent that we are ex- bassy, more than 7 meters of which occupy Sluslov, Ustinov, Shcherbitskii, Aliev, periencing a very complicated period in the the territory of the building, which belongs Demichev, Kuznetsov, Masherov, development of international relations. A to the United States, disturbs us. We con- Ponomarev, Rashidov, Solomentsev, serious deterioration and exacerbation of the sider this as a rude intrusion into the build- Chernenko, Dolgikh, Zimianin, Kapitonov, situation has occurred. And the primary ing of our Embassy. Rusakov, Riabov, Zamiatin source of this deterioration is the growing As far as the issue of two Soviet citi- aggression of the foreign policy of the Carter zens arrested in the USA is concerned, I will Extract from protocol No. 107 of the government, the continually more sharply contact you again after the trial is over, and sessionof the Politburo of the CC CPSU of anti-Soviet character of the statements of the tell you which measures we could under- 8 June 1978 President himself and of his closest col- take. leagues—in the first instance those of A.A. Gromyko. We will be waiting for Several issues of the international situation Brzezinski. such a report. Judging from appearances, Carter is As for the incident with the USA Em- 1. To approve the proposal concerning not simply falling under the usual influence bassy in Moscow, according to the informa- this question, as stated in comrade of the most shameless anti-Soviet types and tion, which I received, the case is totally dif- L.I.Brezhnev’s speech at the Politburo ses- ringleaders of the military-industrial com- ferent. What your representatives describe sion of the CC (text of the speech affixed) . plex of the USA, but is intent upon strug- as an intrusion into the territory of the US 2. To charge the MFA [Ministry of For- gling for his election to a new term as Presi- Embassy, belongs, in fact, to the area of our eign Affairs] of the USSR, the KGB of the dent of the USA under the banner of anti- normal economic activity. The goals of USSR, the International Department of the Soviet policy and a return to the “cold war.” these measures actually had a purely pro- CC CPSU, the Department of Propaganda This line of the government of the USA tective character. In particular, there also for Foreign Affairs of the CC CPSU to pre- is putting its stamp on the policy of the were fire-prevention measures. pare the corresponding materials and Western powers both in the NATO bloc, and And in general it would have been projects of documents, with regard for the in Africa, and in relation to China. primitive to rely on some sort of tunnels in exchange of opinions, which took place at The question arises, how are we to re- our age of perfect technology. You and I do the Politburo session, and to submit them act to all of this? not live during the post-war period, when to the CC CPSU. I think, that passivity here is inadmis- in the middle of the 50s we discovered a sible. We must fight actively and persis- tunnel, several hundred meters long, which Politburo CC CPSU tently for peace and detente. We must do led from West to East Berlin. It was dug by all that is possible in order to hinder the Americans. [attachment] policy, which is fraught with the threat of a I will be expecting your reports about new world war. Here we need energetic our two citizens who are detained in the Re: item III protocol No. 107 steps, noticeable for the whole world. USA, and we will plan our activity accord- Concretely, if we are speaking of the ing to your decision. SPEECH OF Com. L.I. BREZHNEV immediate period, it would be possible, it C. Vance. Good. AT THE POLITBURO SESSION OF seems to me, to do the following. 118 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

First. We should come forward in our towards detente and towards the develop- the imperialist intentions with regard to the press (simultaneously in all of the main ment of good, mutually beneficial relations policy of the Soviet Union and other social- newspapers) with a large and serious decla- with the United States. ist countries in Africa, among them the re- ration, calling it, let’s say, “Concerning the Second. We should come forward with gion of the Horn of Africa, in Zaire, etc. policy of the Carter government.” We a collective declaration of governments— Briefly and in calm tones we should say how should publish this declaration without any participants in the Warsaw Pact regarding it is in reality. At the same time with all sort of signature—this will even attract more the results of the session of the Council of sharpness we should condemn the policy of attention to it. In it we should say directly, NATO. This document, taking into consid- armed intervention, subversive activity and that in the policy of the USA changes are eration the necessity of its approval, among other forms of interference in African af- taking place which are dangerous for the others by the Romanians, should be made fairs by the governments of NATO headed affairs of peace. Under the curtain of lies less sharp, with emphasis on the construc- by the USA. We should show how the con- and slander on the USSR and other social- tive elements of our policy. temporary colonizers, operating with the ist countries, concrete matters are being per- We should note with regret, that the hypocritical slogan, “African solidarity,” petrated, directed against peace and detente. work of the session of the Council of NATO enlist accomplices for themselves in Africa The course of negotiations with the Soviet and its resolutions do not serve detente or from the numbers of reactionary, anti-popu- Union on the limitations of strategic arms the consolidation of peace, but the exacer- lar regimes, for carrying out their own is intentionally being retarded. Attempts at bation of the international situation and the policy. We should express our conviction clumsy interference in our internal affairs intensification of military preparations, the that genuine African solidarity will take are being perpetrated, in fact, the ties be- arms race. Urgent calls for the increase of hold—the single will of independent coun- tween both countries are being curtailed. allotments, the agitation of the NATO rep- tries and the free peoples of Africa, their New extensive plans for the arms race are resentatives for neutron, chemical, bacterio- resoluteness to assert the independence of being made, and for decades in advance, at logical arms, the forcing through of long- their countries and the freedom of their in- the very time when the peoples hoped for term programs for the production of arms ternal development. disarmament. The current creators of of all types—this is the real meaning of this These are the three documents, it seems American policy, it seems, have already session and of that which follows after it. to me, that it would be possible to prepare found a common language with the aggres- The countries of the Warsaw Pact con- in the immediate future and come forth with sive anti-Soviet rulers of China, who, as it demn this policy and are certain that the them. Of course, this is not to be done in is known, declare peace and detente to be a peoples of other countries will condemn it. one day, but somehow intelligently distrib- fraud, and war to be the single realistic pros- There is an attempt to impose on us a con- uted over time. pect. tinually broader competition in arms. But Simultaneously it would be possible to The government of the USA has be- we decisively come forward for keeping in prepare instructions for our ambassadors in come the inspiration for a new colonialism check the arms race, for concrete agreements progressive and other more or less indepen- in Africa — the policy of armed interven- on these questions in all forums. The So- dent governments in Africa for carrying out tion and open interference in the affairs of viet Union is doing all that is dependent on the corresponding work with their guidance. African governments, the merciless suppres- it for the successful completion of negotia- In the spirit of the documents, about sion of revolutionary liberation processes. tions with the USA concerning SALT. The which I just spoke, it would be necessary, It is all of these current tendencies in socialist countries occupy a flexible posi- of course, to develop work through other the foreign policy of the Carter government tion and are developing concrete construc- channels as well—along the lines of con- which have lent the central color to the work tive initiatives at the Vienna talks. The coun- nections with fraternal parties, in the frame- of the last session of the Council of NATO tries of the Warsaw Pact are coming forward work of international social organizations, in Washington. Encouraging its adherents, for the strict observance of the principles of etc. dragging after itself those who waver and , against interference in As far as the work of the special ses- doubt, putting pressure on the dissenting the internal affairs of other countries — sion of the General Assembly of the UN for participants of this bloc, the USA is attempt- whether in the form of armed intervention disarmament is concerned, evidently, it is ing once again to push it onto the road of or subversive activities of another sort. necessary to continue to illuminate this the “cold war” and of active preparation for And we should conclude this document theme in our media of mass information a hot war. with a persistent call to return to the path of from the point of view of the proposal of So all of these dangerous sides of the detente, to the path of mutual respect and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, we should current policies of Carter should be [de- mutually beneficial cooperation, which is likewise support all that is healthy and con- scribed], without excessive dramatization, clearly indicated in the document of the structive, which has appeared and should but clearly shown in such a document. It is Helsinki Summit, in Soviet-American and appear in the work of the Assembly, and necessary to show both to other countries other bilateral documents, and in numerous should expose the maneuvers of the oppo- and to communities in the USA itself, just resolutions of the UN. nents to disarmament. how dangerous a game Carter, Brzezinski, Third. We should come forward with If the comrades are in agreement, then, and their likes are starting. a special Declaration of the Soviet govern- probably, we could charge the preparation We should conclude this text with a ment on African affairs. In this document of the material, to which I referred, to the calm and clear confirmation of our course we should categorically refute and expose MFA and to the corresponding departments COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 119 of the CC (International Department, De- Politburo Meeting, 22 June 1978 refuses to take a lawyer. He can refuse the partment of the CC and the Department of (excerpt) lawyer named by the court. If he names Propaganda for Foreign Affairs). another lawyer, and he has right to do it in Top secret the trial, then we will have to take a break [Source: Center for Storage of Contempo- only copy for 5 days. Besides, we meant to publish a rary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, Working paper short report about the beginning of fond 89, per. 34, dok. 1; obtained by D. Shcharansky’s trial. I believe it is not expe- Wolff; trans. M. Doctoroff.] SESSION OF THE POLITBURO OF dient to allow any correspondents into the THE CC CPSU trial. Document 5: Transcript of CPSU CC 22 June 1978 EVERYBODY. Right, don’t let them Politburo Meeting, 8 June 1978 in. (excerpt) Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I. ANDROPOV. What will In attendance: Comrades Andropov, Yu. V.; Shcharansky’s sentence be? Everything will Top secret Grishin, V.V.;Gromyko, A.A.; Kulakov, depend on how he will behave himself. For Only copy F.D.; Pelshe, A.Y.; Suslov, M.A.; Ustinov, example, Orlov was to be sentenced for Working draft D.F.; Demichev, P.N.; Kuznetsov, V.V.; three years according to the article of the Ponomarev, B.N.; Solomentsev, M.S.; Criminal Code, but he behaved in such a SESSION OF THE POLITBURO OF Chernenko,K.U.; Dolgikh, V.I.; Ryabov, rude way during the trial that the court was THE CC CPSU Y.P.; Rusakov, K.V. obliged to sentence him for seven more 8 June 1978 years with further exile for five years. [...] 2. Information of comrade Andropov, Shcharansky, of course, will not receive, say, Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I. Yu. V. on the Shcharansky matter the death sentence, but the court will give In attendance: Comrades Andropov Yu.V.; him a stern sentence of, say, 15 years. Grishin V.V.; Gromyko A.A.; Kulakov F.D.; BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov As our Ambassador comrade Dobrynin Pelshe A.Y.; Suslov M.A.; Ustinov D.F.; would like to inform the Politburo about the reports, Carter asked not to mention Demichev P.N.; Kuznetsov V.V.; Ponomarev Shcharansky matter. Let’s give him the Shcharansky’s connections with CIA. This, B. N.; Solomentsev M.S.; Chernenko K.Yu.; floor. of course, is up to the court; we must not Dolgikh V.I.; Ryabov Y.P.; Rusakov K.V. ANDROPOV. I want to inform the Po- conceal the materials, but maybe we can litburo that at the present time in the USSR give comrade Dobrynin certain directions [. . .]II. About Sakharov. 520 people are kept in prison, of these 110 to talk with Vance and express to him the people are held on charges that have politi- idea that the trial will be a closed one, but BREZHNEV. The other day comrade cal coloring. We will have to decide the the court possesses numerous materials Andropov Yu. V. informed me that question of Shcharansky’s trial, the prepa- about Shcharansky’s connections with the Sakharov has really let himself go and is ration of which is completed now. As is CIA. The Soviet court is very democratic, behaving like a mere hooligan. The situa- known, Carter made a speech to the effect but everything will depend on how the de- tion deteriorated to the point where he and that Shcharansky should not be brought to fendant will behave himself; that also his wife started a fight with a militiaman responsibility. But we can not satisfy such counts. near the court building while the Orlov case a request. Shcharansky committed crimes Comrade Andropov’s information was was being tried. and has to take full responsibility for them. taken into consideration. The reasons of our superpatient attitude He will be put on trial. But what is the best to Sakharov are familiar to you. But there time for the trial? Perhaps it should be [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 72; is a limit to everything. We must not leave started on July 10, this seems to be better. obtained by D. Wolff; trans. M. Doctoroff.] his escapades without reaction. The USSR Ambassador to the United States There was a suggestion to discuss comrade Dobrynin also recommends this Document 7: Political Letter of Soviet Sakharov’s behavior at the Presidium of the time. Ambassador to the United States Academy of Sciences. Perhaps, we should We discussed all questions of organi- Anatoly F. Dobrynin, 11 July 1978 do this. zation of Shcharansky’s trial together with The members of the Politburo, candi- comrades Rudenko and Smirnov. SECRET, Copy No. 2 dates members of the Politburo and secre- Shcharansky admits his guilt, we uncovered USSR Embassy in USA 11 July 1978 taries of the Central Committee support this his spy activity and can provide appropri- Washington Issue No. 667 proposal. ate materials. He is charged under two ar- ticles: under article 64 for espionage and TO THE USSR MINISTRY OF [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 71; under article 70 of the Criminal Code for FOREIGN AFFAIRS obtained by D. Wolff; trans. by M. betrayal of the Motherland. His trial will Doctoroff.] take place in the same courthouse as Orlov’s. To Com. GROMYKO, A.A. It is a good place, a club, a small audience Document 6: Transcript of CPSU CC will be appropriately prepared. Shcharansky I am sending a political letter, prepared by 120 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the Embassy, in which are reviewed the ba- it was decided to attempt a review of the concrete application by the White House is, sic elements of contemporary Soviet-Ameri- entire concept of the policy of detente, sub- as if, being partitioned. It is seen as impor- can relations. ordinating it to the needs of the Administra- tant and necessary—in support of the na- tion, not stopping even before publicly put- tional interests of the United States itself and Attachment: the letter mentioned above, ting under threat the chances of concluding the corresponding formation of public opin- Secret, on 8 pages, to the addressee and to a new agreement on the limitation of offen- ion—regarding problems associated with the file. sive strategic weapons (by artificially link- nuclear weapons, issues of war and peace ing it with other issues). (limitation of strategic weapons, a total ban USSR AMBASSADOR IN THE USA In the country, however, by the way on nuclear tests, certain other disarmament- /s/ A. DOBRYNIN pretty unexpectedly for Carter, this “harsh” related issues). As far as the majority of course, which had been firmly and clearly other questions is concerned, as in the past [attachment] rejected by the Soviet Union, caused a re- it is applied subject to the “behavior” of the action in which was evident a clear appre- Soviet Union in Africa, in the Middle East, USSR EMBASSY in the USA hension among broad strata of the Ameri- in relation to “human rights,” and so on. The Washington can population regarding the long-term con- reaction of the Administration to the re- SECRET, Copy No. 2 dition and fate of Soviet-American relations. cently-begun Shcharansky process is in this 11 July 1978 There was expressed the depth of the Ameri- regard sufficiently instructive. Attachment to Issue No. 667 can mood in support of the policy of detente, The Carter Administration variously which had developed in the course of the denies that it is supporting a return to the SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS last few years and which in the minds of the “Cold War.” It seems that it fears a decline IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA unsophisticated residents of this country is of relations with the Soviet Union to a level (Political Letter) associated with a simple thesis: detente miti- when the threat of a serious, to say nothing gates the threat of confrontation with the of a military, conflict with us would be in- Almost eighteen months ago—20 Soviet Union, and thus, of nuclear war with terpreted by the American people, and also January 1977—the new, 39th President of it. Characteristically, there were such ap- in other countries of the world, as something the USA, J. Carter, stepped across the prehensions even in the Congress, the rep- real. Carter, evidently has come to realize threshhold of the White House. Since that resentatives of which began to demand ex- that this would cause deep alarm among the time, a definite policy has been conducted planations of the Administration, where any- population of the country and would for him by his administration, the basic elements of way the matter of relations with the Soviet be a political loss, and maybe would repre- which are the subject of the review in the Union is heading and wasn’t the Adminis- sent a catastrophe in the 1980 presidential present political letter. tration trying to bring about some sort of elections. In this regard the choice—”co- I. As has already been noted by the big changes in these relations without the operation or confrontation”—which he tried Embassy, Soviet-American relations during consent of the Congress. to pose for us in his speech in Annapolis, the Carter Administration have been char- And so, Carter became convinced that seemed in its essence directed in the USA acterized by instability, major swings, which detente is not a “faucet” which he can turn itself to him personally; the heartland is ex- to a great extent are due to its calculations on and off whenever he feels so disposed. pecting from Carter himself an answer to of the state of affairs in both its internal and The Administration was obliged to quickly that choice, and he—thanks to the adher- external dimensions.In the middle of April make some adjustments in its position (par- ence to principle in our position—has turned of this year, Carter, as is well known, con- ticularly in light of the speech of L.I. out to have not quite as free a choice as he ducted in his country residence, Camp Brezhnev, and also our answer in Pravda to tried to present it. David, a meeting of the members of his cabi- Carter’s speech in Annapolis, which he had Overall, having moved to an obvious net and closest advisors, at which was teken found to be unexpectedly firm). The Presi- lowering of the level of relations with the a decision to carry out a regular reevalua- dent, having let Vance go out front, decided Soviet Union, the Carter Administration has tion of Soviet-American relations. The ini- to restrain Brzezinski a bit. Vance usually shown lately a desire to smooth them out a tiative for this affair came from Brzezinski stresses the positive accomplishments in little. This however, should so far be un- and several Presidential advisors on domes- Soviet-American relations without leaving derstood like this, that although it is not gen- tic affairs, who convinced Carter that he out, however, the negative things which are erally averse to improving them, the White would succeed in stopping the process of associated with Carter himself (for example, House at the same time does not want to worsening of his position in the country if the notorious policy of “defense of human sacrifice such irritants to our relations as he would openly initiate a harsher course rights” or “dissidents”). efforts to interfere in our internal affairs or vis a vis the Soviet Union. 2. Consequently, insofar as it is pos- actions like Carter’s planned visit to the Africa (events on the Horn of Africa, sible to judge on the basis of information “.” In a word, the Administra- and then in the Shaba Province of Zaire) was which the Embassy has at its disposal, the tion itself has imposed a definite barrier to chosen as the pretext around which the Ad- Carter Administration has come to its own the possible improvement in our relations ministration would begin earnestly to cre- variety of a selective, half-hearted concep- (which coincides with the tasks of strength- ate tension in Soviet-American relations. In tion of detente (of which Brzezinski him- ening NATO, the arms race, the game with fact, in connection to these African events self first accused us). Detente in its current China, and so forth). COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 121

A lot depends, of course, on how the President who caused a strategic arms agree- role in all of this. President himself will behave in the future. ment with the Soviet Union to fail, and who Our firm reaction to the recent blast of His views on Soviet-American relations, as led Soviet-American relations to the edge anti-Soviet rhetoric by the Carter Adminis- in the past, are inconsistent, they contain of Cold War. Under conditions of an ero- tration forced it to noticeably soften its tone. plenty of dribs of this and drabs of that. sion of Carter’s mass base in comparision We have to assert that this type of action Flirting with the conservative moods in the to his standing in 1976, the issue of rela- will be effective in the future too. How- country (the strength of which he at times tions with the Soviet Union really could be ever, it would not be in our interests to pass clearly overestimates), Carter frequently decisive for Carter in the next Presidential by specific positive aspects of Carter’s ap- resorts to anti-Soviet rhetoric in order to, as elections. proach to relations with the Soviet Union— they say, win cheap applause. The danger - Under conditions of the serious eco- in the first place his great personal interest is found in the fact that such rhetoric is nomic difficulties facing the USA, the pos- in a meeting with L.I. Brezhnev, his sup- picked up and amplified by the means of sibility of decreasing military spending by port in principle for a treaty on SALT, and mass communication, in Congress, and so limiting the arms race is proving more and others. Appropriate positive reactions from forth. Ultimately, as often happens in the more impressive to average American tax- our side, apart from anything else, would USA, the rhetoric is transformed, influences payers. For the population of the USA (and strengthen the positions of those individu- policy, and sometimes itself becomes policy. for Carter), inflation has become problem als and circles which are trying to to influ- It would be incorrect, however, to number 1. ence the President from the perspective of speak about some sort of hopelessness or Among Americans, as in the past, a the need for the development of Soviet- irreconcilability in our relations with the strong mood “not to allow another Viet- American relations over the long term. USA and, in particular, with the current Ad- nam,” particularly in Africa, continues to A.A. Gromyko’s meetings with Vance ministration, personally with Carter, al- hold. In the same way, the Administration’s and Carter, and also L.I. Brezhnev’s recep- though this issue is exteremely complex. interference in African affairs is causing tion of Vance, have great significance in this In the USA other things are also going growing suspiciousness among the Negro regard. on, which, together with the noted-above population of the country, which is feeling X X general attitudes in the country, require a sense of solidarity with the Africans in X Carter and the Administration to maintain their conflict with the racist regimes. For relations with the Soviet Union at a certain Carter, who defeated Ford with the support We consider the following approach to level, regardless of all the vacillation of the of a majority of Negro voters, the views to- be expedient along the most important lines current President. The following are in- wards him of this category of Americans of our relations with the Carter Administra- cluded among these things: subsequently may become critically impor- tion. - A general recognition in the USA of tant. Continue to energetically pursue the the primacy of Soviet-American relations (in 3. On a practical level, the Carter Ad- working out of agreements on SALT and a its early days, the Administration—this was ministration, based on everything, intends total ban on nuclear tests, having in mind to Brzezinski’s doing—tried to reduce their to continue the search for an agreement with create by these steps the political perquisites significance, but had to stop doing this when the Soviet Union on those issues which are for a Soviet-American summit meeting it collided with the realities of the interna- perceived by the public to touch directly on which could have decisive significance for tional situation.) the problem of the prevention of nuclear normalization and then for improvement of - The firm and principled line of the war. It goes without saying that it is neces- our relations. Soviet leadership on relations with the USA, sary to use this in our interest. On other Taking into account the importance of which is finding here a growing response. issues, so far no Administration desire to the European path for the deepening of the - In the ruling circles of the USA there review its position or to cease the anti-So- policy of detente and from the point of view is not by any means a united negative ap- viet rhetoric to which it resorts from time to of counteracting the opponents of that policy proach to relations with the Soviet Union. time is visible. This applies particularly to in the USA, it is very important to work even Influential political and business circles con- the “defense of human rights” in the Soviet more actively toward making progress on tinue to support a search for agreement with Union, NATO military preparations, oppo- the Vienna negotiations on the limitation on us in various areas, understanding from ex- sition to the Soviet Union in Africa, in the conventional forces and armaments in Cen- perience that the paths of confrontation with Middle East, and in other regions of the tral Europe on the basis of our last propos- us are hopeless. world. In this regard, special attention has als. It is necessary to maximally activate - The Administration cannot but take lately been assigned to the Administration’s this line, which was noted in the L.I. into account the fact that the main Western policy towards China, which according to Brezhnev’s recent speeches, particularly in partners of the USA—to say nothing of the all signs bears witness—if not formally, then Minsk. It would be extremely important to majority of developing countries—speak in essence—to its yearning for a plot with achieve via the Vienna negotiations such a more or less consistently in support of a China agains the interests of the Soviet psychological situation, when in the minds policy of detente. Union. The danger of this course to our in- of broad masses of American they would - Carter has to realize the vulnerability terests is self-evident. Brzezinski, whom become as real and as necessary to reach a of his position in the 1980 Presidential elec- Gus Hall named “the Carter regime’s decision as the current Soviet-American tions, if he goes into those elections as a Rasputin,” continues to play a significant SALT negotiations. Here is a significant area 122 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

for our propaganda in the USA. can relations, and it will be difficult to count - Regarding a Middle East settlement: on any sort of noticeable positive shifts. REPORT ON THE MEETING As the Americans try, with the assistance of More possibly, we can expect regular anti- BETWEEN SED GENERAL “artificial respiration,” to extend the life of Soviet outbursts about Shcharansky, SECRETARY E. HONECKER AND the Sadat “initiative,” it is expedient, along [Aleksandr] Ginsburg, and others. L. I. BREZHNEV IN THE CRIMEA, with the indisputable continuation of our Later, however, with the achievement 25 JULY 1978 principled course, which has demonstrated of a SALT agreement, which in itself will its correctness, to once again, at the proper be a significant event, and when the Admin- BREZHNEV: [Welcoming remarks; moment, publicly raise the issue of a re- istration will have to more actively try to report on domestic issues] sumption of preparations for the Geneva justify that agreement in Congress and be- The defense of the country is impor- Conference, and in the presence of the fore the public, it is possible to expect an tant. The strengthening of the country’s Americans as co-chairmen, of fulfilling the improvement in the political climate in our defensive capabilities still requires our con- joint Soviet-American communique of 1 relations. About that time an election cam- tinual attention. Unfortunately, it is not pos- October 1977. By doing this we will paign will be going on here, with its usual sible to reduce military expenses signifi- soundly throw a wrench into the outburst of chauvinistic demagoguery and cantly for now. NATO, especially the USA, Administration’s current game. We should anti-Soviet propaganda. is heating up the arms race. We must take continue to reveal the hypocrisy of the USA On this issue it is indicative that our care of our security and the security of our in trying to show that it is equally close to expression of firmness in relation to the allies. The production of modern weapons the interests of the Arabs and Israel. At the prosecution of renegades like Shcharansky is a heavy burden on the economy. But we same time we must more actively use the played its own role. The Carter Adminis- view the strengthening of our defenses as a contradiction between the American impe- tration, despite all its rhetoric, was forced national as well as an international duty. rialistic interests in the Middle East (oil, in- to retreat and to announce its intention to Allow me, L.I. Brezhnev said, two vestment in Saudi Arabia, etc.) and Israeli- continue the Soviet-American negotiations words on the trials against Shcharansky and Zionist interests (open territorial expansion on SALT aimed at the achievement of con- Ginzburg. As you know, in the West a true at the Arabs’ expense). crete results, and to declare that that agree- witch dance has been staged over these two - On the Chinese issue, we should con- ment meets the interests not only of the So- traitors whose hostile activities were in- tinue to actively, publicly advance to the viet Union, but also the national interests of spired by subversive imperialist centers. The USA our thesis, that the Carter the USA. “The Russians won this mini-con- matter went far beyond the importance of Administration’s formation of a bloc with frontation;” such is the conclusion of the the miserable roles which these people ac- Beijing on an anti-Soviet basis would pre- local political observers. tually played. Actually this was an attempt clude to it opportunities for cooperation with Finally, a Soviet-American summit of reactionary circles to test our strength, the Soviet Union in the matter of a decrease may become the most important landmark and we have vigorously demonstrated that in the threat of nuclear war and of arms limi- from the point of view of a turn in our rela- any attempts to intervene in our affairs, to tation, particularly as regards SALT. We tions with the USA, taking into account the blackmail us, and to drive the matter, under should support the growing feeling among great political charge which such meetings the pretext of protecting human rights, to Americans of anxiety regarding the possible carry. the point of creating a legal opposition consequences of the current course of the ____ against the Socialist order, are doomed to Administration vis a vis China. This be- fail. I think, he [Brezhnev] said, that this came, according to our observations, espe- Overall, it is important, as always, to should teach them once and for all. cially noticeable here after Com. L.I. consistently adhere to our principled line on As always, we have many concerns Brezhnev’s warning in Minsk, since it has the development of relations with the USA, with regard to international affairs. The situ- begun to occur to many Americans that the to the achievement of concrete decisions and ation in the world has not developed badly Administration’s playing of the “Chinese agreements wherever it concides with our in the last one to two years. On the one hand card” carries with it potentially dangerous interests, and at the same time to give a de- important results have been achieved under elements of confrontation with the Soviet cisive rebuff to unacceptable manifestations the conditions of detente, on the other hand Union which, which are detrimental to the in the policy of the Carter Administration. we are experiencing an open activation of USA, but in China’s interests. Without the imperialist forces in their attempts to roll constant support and nurturing among [A. DOBRYNIN] back the position of socialism in the vari- Americans of these feelings of anxiety and ous regions. preoccupation, as is now taking place in the [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 76, dok. 28, ll. Soviet-American relations illustrate USA in relation to SALT, the 1-9; document obtained by Carter-Brezhnev this. Speaking frankly, Leonid Ilyich said, Administration’s current covert move to- Project; translated by Mark Doctoroff.] the state [of U.S.-Soviet relations] leaves a ward a deal with China may assume an even lot to be desired. Although Carter has mod- more open and dangerous character. Document 8: Transcript, Meeting of erated his tone after the decisive rebuff we The immediate future, in any case the East German leader Erich Honecker gave him, for now there is no reason to as- next month or month and a half, will be an and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, sume that he is willing to eliminate the prin- extremely complex period in Soviet-Ameri- Crimea, USSR, 25 July 1978 (excerpt) cipal matter which has caused the turn for COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 123 the worse in our relations. I am speaking anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist basis. This coin- on the problem of treason. In one word: we, above all of the arms race heightened by cides with the efforts of the Chinese to use Erich, draw the conclusion that we have to Washington which is at the same time de- the “American card” in the fight against the stick together even more and coordinate laying the negotiations on arms control, and USSR and the other countries of the Social- even further in proceeding in the interna- the continuing campaign for the so-called ist community. tional arena. Our leadership is convinced, “human rights.” The other day we carefully analyzed Erich, that the new course of the CC of the At the center of attention at the meet- the policy of the Chinese leadership in the SED in international affairs, your actions in ing which recently took place between A. C[entral] C[ommittee] and arrived at the an effort to accomplish a common line of A. Gromyko and C. Vance were questions conclusion that it is increasingly reaction- the Socialist community, are being imple- relating to a new agreement on the limita- ary and aggressive in all directions. I am mented with continued vigor. tion of strategic arms, especially the ques- talking above all about the frank statements [Brezhnev then discussed questions tion of new types of ballistic missiles. by Beijing in support of the plans of the related to bilateral USSR-GDR relations] Should there be any [agreement on limita- revanchist circles in the FRG on the unity Honecker:[expressed agreement with tions] or not, and if so, to which [weapons] of Germany which de facto means the in- Brezhnev on state of international affairs, should they apply? The Americans tried this corporation of the GDR. bilateral relations] time again to handle the matter in a way that No less telling are the public contacts Initialed: E [rich]H[onecker] would assure them the possibility of devel- by both sides with [Franz Joseph] Strauss, oping missiles in which they have an inter- [Helmut] Kohl, and other rightist West Ger- [Source: Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien und est without regard for our interests. We, by man politicians. Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen contrast, were willing to renounce on a mu- Since it became an impediment to the DDR” im Bundesrachiv (SAPMO-BArch) tual basis the creation of new intercontinen- implementation of their great power ambi- Berlin, DY30 JIV 2/201/1495; document ob- tal ballistic missiles for the entire term of tions in Southeast Asia, Vietnam is now tained and translated by C.F. Ostermann the agreement. Since the Americans, how- under massive pressure by the Chinese lead- (CWIHP/National Security Archive), copy ever, still did not agree to this, they were ership. We are taking measures in order to on file at Natinal Security Archive.] asked directly whether they would agree to support energetically our Vietnamese mutually acceptable solutions on all other friends. These include various measures, Document 9: Transcript, Meeting of questions on the basis of our proposals if among them military ones. It is good, Erich, East German leader Erich Honecker we met them with regard to the question of he said, that during your visit to Hanoi the and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, new ballistic missiles. treaty of friendship and cooperation between Crimea, USSR, 27 July 1979 (excerpt) Vance could not respond immediately the GDR and the Socialist Republic of Viet- and promised to do this later. But he said nam [SRV] was signed. I can tell you confi- Minutes of the Meeting between SED our position with regard to the solution of dentially that [deleted] was recently with us, General Secretary E. Honecker and L. I. the remaining questions was indeed “very and besides other questions we also dealt Brezhnev in the Crimea, 27 July 1979 interesting.” Carter in his press conference with the possibility of a Soviet-Vietnamese (dated 28 July 1979) with [West German Chancellor Helmut] Treaty. Schmidt later characterized the meeting be- In one word: we cannot desert Vietnam. BREZHNEV: tween A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance as “con- It is our internationalist duty to strengthen structive and useful.” For now it is, of and express our solidarity with this Social- [Welcoming remarks; comments on course, difficult to say what the final Ameri- ist brother country and grant it comprehen- domestic situation, FRG-GDR relations] can response will be. But it is clear that in sive help, among other things via the any case we still are facing a battle. COMECON [Council on Mutual Economic And now on international questions. On the whole one can say that a settle- Assistance], an equal member of which the We have comprehensively informed ment in the relations between the USSR and SRV has just become. you on the results of the recent meeting with the USA is not to be expected anytime soon. One of the main methods developed by President Carter. I would like to emphasize Carter is wavering and apparently is listen- Washington as well as Beijing is the differ- that our politburo appreciates the support ing to the forces for which detente goes entiated approach to the Socialist countries which the GDR and the other brother coun- against the grain, although he seems to be as well as the attempts to drive a wedge be- tries have given to the results of Vienna. I aware that it is necessary to search for agree- tween them and to bring them into confron- would put it this way - at the meeting in ments with us on the cardinal question of tation with the Soviet Union. For this pur- Vienna we accomplished the reestablish- war and peace. pose they are actively taking advantage of ment of the direct dialogue between the Another tendency within the policy of the nationalistic deviations of such politi- USSR and the USA at the highest level. And the American administration has recently cians as [Romanian leader Nicolae] even more - we managed to give a positive beome more powerful. I am talking about Ceaucescu and make various promises. It is impulse to the entire complex of Soviet- their efforts to play the “Chinese card.” The difficult to say something about his behav- American relations. All this is, of course, question now is not simply a normalization ior. Basically he is a traitor. The devil knows very important. of relations between the USA and China, but what else he might possibly do. In this con- We did not have any illusions: there actually attempts at a rapprochement on an nection L. I. mentioned a saying by Stalin are quite a few dark moments in our rela- 124 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tions with the USA. The negotiations were, treaty on the non-first use of nuclear weap- for the presence of UN special forces on the frankly speaking, very difficult and this not ons as well as other kinds of arms is ac- Sinai Peninsula does not appear any more only because of their intensity. The largest cepted, it would, I must say, constitute a tre- on the agenda of the Security Council un- difficulties were connected with the nature mendous advantage for the cause of detente. doubtedly constitutes a success for our com- of the questions with which we dealt, with By the way, I have also talked about this mon line. Hence the attempts to bless Israel’s the differences, yes, even with direct con- with Carter. We have proposed to him a dec- separate agreement with Egypt directly with trasts between our views. laration to the effect that both sides would the authority of the UN failed. And that was As you know, it is not our habit to avoid forego the first use of either nuclear or con- exactly what Cairo, Tel Aviv and Washing- difficult questions. The Middle East, South- ventional arms against the other side or its ton persistently tried to achieve. But now east Asia, the situation in Southern Africa, allies. Initially Carter declared that he would the UN special troops have to be withdrawn. the relationship between the USA and China agree and said that one could try to arrange With respect to international questions, - on all these questions I explained our ba- for an agreeable formula. But later the Erich, I would like to briefly touch upon the sic point of view. With great determination Americans put on the reverse gear. But one situation in Africa. I conveyed to Carter our opinion on the has to understand that after all we wrestled Recently we have had quite active con- wrong theses of American propaganda with six years over the conclusion of SALT II. tacts with representatives of the progressive respect to the “Soviet threat” as well as with The Chinese problem still demands African states. To generalize these talks and respect to the “violation of human rights” greatest attention. the observations made by our comrades, and in the Socialist countries. Carter’s situation, The nature of Chinese foreign policy our CC comrades as well, the task of politi- as the recent rearrangement in Washington revealed itself in China’s aggression against cally strengthening the independent African proved, is not easy. A bitter battle over the Vietnam. The Chinese are now negotiating countries is still in the forefront. But the coming into force [ratification] of the SALT with the Vietnamese comrades but they are problem of our economic relations with II-Treaty is now being waged. If the treaty conducting the negotiations in a way that it these states is already posed in its fullest failed in the Senate, this would be, I think, a becomes obvious that they do not want a extent. It is important and valuable that we political catastrophe for Carter. But it would normalization of relations but Vietnam’s vigorously oppose colonialism and racism. also be an extremely severe blow to the in- capitulation. Moreover, there is a real dan- But the task which we have to meet together ternational prestige of the USA. ger of new Chinese provocations against has larger dimensions. It is necessary to in- You will of course understand that, by Vietnam. One has to take that seriously. This volve the African countries to a larger de- and large, the prospect of the failure of the obliges all of us, of course, not to weaken gree in cooperation with us in the economic treaty is not desirable for us. But even in in the slightest manner our support and our field. This will be of advantage to us as well such a case, we will probably not lose po- help for the Vietnamese people as well as as the Africans. Your trip through a number litically because then the entire world will for the peoples of Laos and Cambodia. There of African countries, Erich, proved very use- recognize who is consistently seeking dis- are more than enough problems and ex- ful. We highly appreciate your efforts in armament and who is working in the oppo- tremely difficult problems. Let’s take the support of the progressive forces in Africa. site direction. But we all should try - in the “refugee” matter. The enemies of Vietnam [concluding remarks] framework of our means - to make sure this have undertaken everything in order to make important matter will have a different end. use of this problem to create a bad image of Honecker: [report on domestic Issues] And now to the European matters. Here Vietnamese policy. To be sure, they did not obviously much depends on proceeding with manage to turn the Geneva conference into [Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 JIV 2/201/ our initiatives in the field of disarmament a trial of Vietnam. But obviously the matter 1313; document obtained and translated by which we have taken at the meeting of the cannot be put to rest. The Vietnamese friends C.F. Ostermann (CWIHP/National Security [Warsaw Pact] Political Consultative Com- are facing a great political and propagan- Archive); copy on file at the Archive.] mittee in Moscow and later at the meeting distic job. We all have to support them in of the Committee of Foreign Ministers in this task. Document 10: CPSU CC Politburo Budapest. Now briefly on our imminent negotia- Decision, 1 February 1980, with The reaction to our proposal has been tions with the Chinese about which you have telegrams to Soviet Ambassador to West a bit vague. The NATO countries seem to learned from the newspapers. One cannot Germany (for Willy Brandt) and have acknowledged the positive direction of expect quick progress in the Soviet-Chinese Finnish Social Democratic leader K. the efforts of the Warsaw Pact countries but dialogue. The negotiations with China will Sorsa (not printed) an audible “yes” was not to be heard. It is require great patience, circumspection, and good that currently the necessary link is exact calculation of each of our steps. Proletariats of all countries, unite! being established at the level of foreign min- That having been said, I think it is im- Communist Party of the Soviet Union. istries between the European conference on portant for all of us not to relent in our op- CENTRALCOMMITTEE military detente as proposed by us and the position against China’s policy which runs TOP SECRET European meeting [of the Conference on counter to the cause of peace and interna- No. P182/2 Security and Cooperation in Europe tional security. (CSCE)] in Madrid in 1980. A few words on the Middle East. The To Comrades Brezhnev, Suslov, Andropov, If our proposal on the conclusion of a fact that the question of prolonging the terms Gromyko, Kirilenko,Pel’she, Ponomarev, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 125

Zimianin, Zamiatin, Rusakov we shall proceed. necessary in order to whip up military fears We would like to communicate to you and further propagate the myth about a “So- Extract from protocol No. 182 of the our viewpoint on several concrete issues. viet threat,” to complicate the process for session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU The “.” The general as- ratification of SALT II and to justify new of 1 February 1980 sessment of it by the Soviet side is set forth military measures aimed at the reinforce- in the leading article of the newspaper ment of the hegemonic and imperialistic as- Re: Information for the Chairman of the “Pravda” dated January 29 of this year. In pirations of the USA. This was a distinc- Sotzintern [Socialist International] W. our view, the platform articulated in the tive rehearsal for that which is presently Brandt and the Chairman of the Social- American President’s speech, with which being perpetrated in connection with the Democratic Party of Finland, K. Sorsa. you are familiar, expresses in a concentrated events in Afghanistan. 1.Confirm the text of a telegram to the form the course of the present American Fact No. Four. In October and Novem- Soviet Ambassador to the FRG (Attachment administration, which was not just adopted ber of last year, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev put 1). today, in connection with the events in Af- forward a comprehensive program to ad- 2.Confirm the text of information for ghanistan. This course had already emerged vance the cause of military detente in Eu- transmittal to K. Sorsa (Attachment 2). a long time ago. rope, called for immediate negotiations, and Fact No. One. At the May 1978 spe- the Soviet Union also undertook unilateral SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL cial session of the General Assembly of the steps, with which you are familiar, aimed at COMMITTEE United Nations in New York, the urgent is- the lessening of military confrontation in Attachments to No. 300s sues relating to disarmament were dis- Europe. cussed, in connection with which the com- The USSR has adamantly called for the [attachment 1] prehensive program of actions proposed by institution of negotiations for the reduction the Soviet Union occupied the center of at- of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Re: Item 2, Protocol No.182 tention. Europe prior to the adoption of a decision However, during the very same period on new American missiles. SECRET of days, in Washington, a session of the And what was the response of the Attachment 1 NATO Council at the highest level adopted USA? The American administration liter- BONN a “long term program” of acceleration in ar- ally untied the hands of its confederates and TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR maments, calculated over a period of ten to set about in such a way that the December fifteen years. At the same time, President session of the NATO Council adopted a de- Meet personally with W. Brandt, tell Carter proclaimed a doctrine of global ac- cision to produce and deploy in Western Eu- him that you are authorized to communi- tions by NATO, expanding the “sphere of rope new nuclear missile armaments, rep- cate certain views on the international situ- responsibility” of that military bloc into resenting a substantial increase in the al- ation that has developed, and expound on widening regions, significantly exceeding ready existing American arms deployed at the following text. the framework stipulated in the agreement the frontline and aimed at the Soviet Union. Recently, especially in connection with that created the North Atlantic Bloc. In the Fact No. Five. Immediately following decisions of the December session of the application of this plan, NATO has appro- the NATO session and despite the voices NATO Council, events have transpired that priated to itself theright to interfere militar- resonating there about intentions to strive have sharply complicated the international ily, particularly in Africa (recalling the for a reduction in the level of military con- situation. events of Zaire). Finally, at the same time, frontation in Europe, President Carter is It is possible that we do not share the American official powers for the first time pushing through Congress a five year pro- same views on everything. One way or an- openly proclaimed a tie between their inter- gram of automatic (that is, irrespective of other, under present circumstances, precise ests, the interests of NATO, and the inter- any changes in the international situation) and first hand information about assess- ests of the Chinese Government, which, as build-up in the arms race. ments and intentions becomes especially is known, blatantly undermines the policy Fact No. Six. Already this year, citing necessary. The important thing is to find a of detente. the events in Afghanistan, President Carter common language on the issue that has al- Fact No. Two. A little more than half a is embarking upon full blown measures to ready been the topic of our mutual preoccu- year ago, Carter signed the SALT II Agree- curtail Soviet-American relations and even pation for many years - how to support the ment and spoke of its great significance for to apply so-called economic sanctions aim of strengthening international security. the cause of peace and security. However, against the Soviet Union. The SALT II Our general assessment of, and our po- in the last year, the American administra- Agreement has been withdrawn from con- sition on, the current international situation, tion has essentially ruined the chances for sideration and its ratification has been post- are known to you from the responses of ratification of the agreement. poned for an indefinite period. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to questions put for- Fact No. Three. In the autumn of this On the heels of this the “Carter Doc- ward by the newspaper “Pravda,” published year, the American government has under- trine” is proclaimed. on January 13 of this year. That document taken to organize a provoca- In it is a summary of the measures un- reflects the principled position of the Cen- tive outcry concerning “Soviet forces in dertaken by the American administration in tral Committee of the CPSU, from which Cuba.” This Cuban “mini-crisis” has been recent time to escalate the arms race and in- 126 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

flame international tensions. We are talk- territory of Afghanistan. Moreover, they do other government. We have never had and ing about efforts to resurrect the doctrines not conceal their aim - to liquidate the April do not have any expansionist plans in rela- from the days of the Cold War - “contain- revolution, to reinstate the previous anti- tion to Afghanistan, Iran, or Pakistan. We ment” and “rolling back” of Socialism, and popular order, to convert Afghanistan into a reject as a malicious lie any talk that our “.” staging ground for aggression against the goal is to expand into the “third world” or During meetings with the working USSR, with which that country has a 2,000 toward sources of oil. As soon as the rea- group of the Sotzintern [Socialist Interna- kilometer border. sons have dissipated which caused the Af- tional] in Moscow, the issue was discussed These plans were carried out by the ghan government to address us with a re- as to where the policy of President Carter is previous leader of Afghanistan, H. Amin, quest for the dispatch of Soviet forces, they leading. Now, that is fully apparent. We sustained, as the facts attest, in large part by will be withdrawn from Afghanistan. are literally talking about the destruction of the CIA. Having entered into a contract with At the present time, the military inter- that which was achieved in the last ten years, emigre leaders, he prepared a counter-revo- vention by Washington and Beijing in the accomplished by men of good will, includ- lutionary coup and carried out acts of re- affairs of Afghanistan has by no means come ing the Social Democrats. pression against genuine patriots on an un- to a halt. Washington is openly accelerat- Under these circumstances it is man- precedented scale. After seizing power, ing the delivery of arms to the so-called in- datory to reaffirm the policy of detente in Amin physically destroyed H. M. Taraki, surgents. As illustrated by the visit of the international tensions. Great significance president of the Democratic Republic of minister of foreign affairs for the PRC, adheres in pronouncements to the effect that Afghanistan, a veteran soldier against Af- Huang Hua, Beijing does not lag behind it is now important to “preserve cool heads ghan . The government of Af- Washington. Huang Hua assured the ring- and continue the process of negotiations,” ghanistan, led by B. Karmal, turned once leader of the mercenaries that China will that “hysteria must not substitute for ratio- again to the Soviet Union for help, as Taraki also henceforth render them assistance and nal policy,” and that “it is necessary to be- had done. support “without any limitations.” ware of ill-conceived and hypertrophied Responding to the request of the Af- Washington and Beijing are also at- [sic] reactions which do not conform to the ghan government for help in the struggle tempting to enlist several Arab states in their reality of events and which, in their entirety, against interventionist activity directed by aggressive actions against Afghanistan could lead to an even worse situation.” Washington and Beijing, we acted in accor- (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others). In this Our position is to seriously, responsi- dance with Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan fashion, Washington and Beijing are specifi- bly, and adamantly adhere to the principles Treaty on Friendship, Neighborly Relations cally following a course designed to create of peaceful co-existence, and to everything and Cooperation, concluded in 1978. Our a hotbed of international tension in the positive in the development of normalized, assistance is also fully in accord with Ar- Middle East. mutually advantageous relations between ticle 51 of the United Nations Charter, pro- At the same time a profusion of un- governments that was achieved in the pro- viding for the right of any government to mitigated nonsense is being voiced about cess of detente. collective self-defense, that is, the right to some kind of occupation by us in Afghani- Events in Afghanistan. We would re- appeal to any other country for help in de- stan or about a usurpation of that country’s quest you to examine them without the fending against aggression. And in the case sovereign rights by the Soviet Union. Ev- prejudice and hysteria characteristic of the of Afghanistan - and we want to emphasize ery one who is in Afghanistan these days, Carter Administration. this once more - there was and continues to including correspondents from the Western We think it would be useful to bring be external aggression, the form of which, information services, acknowledges that cir- the following information to your attention. as defined by the 29th Session of the U.N. cumstances are normalizing there. The new The facts establish that only a short General Assembly, consists of “the sending Afghan leadership, headed by Babrak time after the April revolution of 1978, an of armed bands, groups or regular forces or Karmal, is pursuing a rational and sober intense “undeclared war” was instigated mercenaries by a government or in the name policy, attempting to eliminate the remnants against Afghanistan. Bands of mercenar- of a government, which carry out acts in the of the policies of H. Amin, and to reinstate ies, financed with money from the CIA and application of military force against another democratic freedoms. All political detain- Beijing, have literally terrorized the civil- government.” ees, representatives of the intelligentsia and ian population of that country. Pakistan has In fulfillment of our treaty commit- the clergy have been released from prison. become the principal staging ground for this ments, we were obligated to defend the na- Relations are improving with the nomadic war. Here, more than twenty bases and fifty tional sovereignty of Afghanistan against ex- population, the Muslim clergy, although, support points have been created, at which ternal aggression. Moreover, we were un- speaking candidly, the situation in the south- terrorist and military detachments are able to stand by idly, in view of the fact that east and eastern provinces, where terrorists trained under the direction of American, the USA is attempting (with the assistance are operating, remains tense. Chinese, Pakistani and Egyptian instructors. of China) to create a new and dangerous The Afghan government has declared In just the period between July 1978 until military-strategic staging ground on our - and has confirmed by means of practical November 1979, the training of not less than southern border. measures - its firm intention to pursue a 15,000 individuals was carried out there. We would like to emphasize that our policy of international peace and friendship They are equipped with American and Chi- actions in no way affect the legitimate na- and a policy of non-alignment. It is under- nese weapons and then dispatched into the tional interests of the United States or any taking all measures toward the establishment COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 127 of normalized relations with neighboring ever possible. This policy is doomed to fail- EUROPE IN THE states based on principles of peaceful coex- ure, because it is impossible to intimidate istence and non-interference in the internal the USSR or to shake its determination. COLD WAR affairs of one another. Such is the truth about In this complicated situation, the lead- Afghanistan. ership of the CPSU does not intend to adopt Call for Contacts: from the European Our position on the decisions of the De- a policy of “fighting fire with fire.” We shall Project Group “Europe in the Cold War” cember session of the NATO Council. You henceforth exhibit a maximum degree of A group of European historians has re- are already aware of our principal assess- cool-headedness and reasonable judgment. cently taken an initiative in setting up a ment of its results. Here are several addi- We shall do everything possible to prevent project to reappraise the Cold War in Eu- tional observations. the Carter administration from drawing us rope from 1943-1989. As you are aware, the Soviet Union has into confrontation and undermining detente. We believe that, now that the archives in warned more than once, that if NATO in We shall not engage, as the American ad- Moscow and in several Eastern European December implements its decision, then it ministration is doing, in impulsive acts countries are increasingly being opened to will knock the ground out from underneath which can only intensify the situation and scholars, this is a timely and important op- negotiations and destroy their basis. Our play into the hands of the proponents of the portunity to examine the realities of the Cold agreement to negotiations in the face of the “Cold War.” War and its impact on the countries of West- ern and Eastern Europe. NATO decision would mean conducting The American side, forgetting the el- We have set up a long-term research them as to the reduction only of Soviet de- ementary principals of restraint and pru- project on the subject, which will involve at fensive capacity at the same time as the dence, is conducting a policy leading to the least seven Euro-international conferences. United States is carrying out, in full stride, destruction of all the inter-governmental ties It is hoped that the proceedings of each con- preparations for new nuclear missile sys- which were constructed with such difficulty ference will be edited and published as a tems. during the past years. Moreover, and this series of books. The first conference, on In the communique from the session can no longer be doubted, the Carter admin- “The Failure of Peace in Europe, 1943- of the NATO Council, the condition was laid istration is striving to spoil the relations of 1948,” took place in Florence in June 1996. down in the harshest of terms that negotia- the West European countries with the So- The second conference, on the period from the Berlin Crisis to the death of Stalin, is to tions shall be conducted only in regard to viet Union, and is demanding support from be held in Paris in the autumn of 1998. American and Soviet tactical nuclear inter- them for its dangerous line, i.e., that they We are interested in building our contacts mediate land based missile systems. Ex- subject themselves to that policy which with historians of the Cold War in Europe cluded from these proposed “negotiations,” Washington considers necessary. and especially those from Russia and East- and to be preserved inviolable, are all of the A great deal that is positive and con- ern Europe. Those with inquiries, sugges- other means of front line deployment be- structive could be achieved in connection tions, or contributions may contact any of longing to the USA, and the nuclear arse- with the meetings that have taken place in the following members of the Steering Com- nals of other Western European countries, Madrid by the conference on issues of Eu- mittee: that is to say, everything in respect to which ropean security and cooperation, as well as ITALY (Co-ordinating Centre): the Soviet intermediate range forces serve on the path to implementation of the pro- Prof. Ennio Di Nolfo/Prof. Antonio as a counterbalance. They are demanding posal of the Warsaw Pact countries concern- Varsori, Dipartmento Di Studi Sullo of the Soviet Union a sharp reduction in its ing the conduct of a conference on military Stato,Universita Degli Studio Di Firenze, existing defensive forces with a simulta- detente and disarmament. fax: 0039-55-2345486 neous preservation of the entire existing In a word, despite all the gravity of the BRITAIN: powerful NATO nuclear potential, aimed developing international situation, we be- Dr. Saki Dockrill/Dr. D.B.G. Heuser, De- against the USSR and its allies. lieve that there is a possibility of bringing partment of War Studies, King’s College, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his recent to a halt the dangerous development toward London, fax: 0044-171-873-2026. interview with the newspaper Pravda, stated which the present administration in Wash- FRANCE: Prof. Georges-Henri Soutou, Ecole that “the present position of the NATO coun- ington is pushing. Doctorale Mondes contemporaines, tries renders negotiations on this question The entirety of these circumstances de- Universite de Paris, IV-Sorbonne, fax: 0033- impossible.” At the same time, Comrade mands joint efforts from all who value the 1-404-62588. Brezhnev emphasized that “we are for ne- cause of peace and detente. GERMANY: gotiations, but honest and co-equal ones In Moscow, the meetings with you in Prof. Dr. Wilfried Loth, Kulturwissen- which conform to the principal of parity in the Soviet Union are fondly recalled, and it schaftliches Institut, Essen, fax: 0049-201- security.” is believed that they were useful. 460674 If Mr. Brandt should request a text, Prof. Dr. Klaus Schwabe, Historisches Our long term intentions deliver it to him, translated into German. Institut, RWTH, Aachen, fax: 0049-241- 8888357. [a similar telegram was approved to be sent USA: It is apparent that Carter and Brzezinski to Sorsa (not printed)—ed.] Prof. Vojtech Mastny, Woodrow Wilson In- are gambling on the prospect of intimidat- ternational Center for Scholars, Washington, ing the USSR, on the isolation of our coun- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 4; ob- D.C., fax: 001-49-357-4439 try, and on the creation of difficulties wher- tained by D. Wolff; trans. M. Doctoroff.] 128 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN Concerning the situation in “A”: New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

by Odd Arne Westad cies, the men at the second level spend both interventions consisted of two most of their time trying to second- separate plans—one political and one In the winter of 1994-95, as Rus- guess what their bosses really want in military—which, at the last moment, sian tanks and planes were pounding the terms of alternatives and conclusions. were merged to form one operation, Chechen capital of Groznyi into rubble, Add to this the paranoia and fear bred more substantial and therefore more I felt a painful, almost menacing, sense by an authoritarian political system, and difficult to manage. Since nobody in of déjà vu. I had just returned from the result is a distorted, dysfunctional Moscow could define exactly who the Moscow where I had been conducting decision-making process, in which es- enemy was, massive force became a interviews and collecting documents for sential commodities like time, informa- useful drug against the painful search a book on Soviet-era interventions, and tion, and trust are even scarcer than in for political and military precision. I was struck by how rhetorically and the West. In the fall of 1995, a group of schol- structurally similar the Chechen opera- The most immediate parallel to the ars and former Soviet and American tion was to the invasions of Hungary Chechen crisis was of course the inter- officials with special knowledge of the (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Af- vention in Afghanistan. In both cases, Afghanistan intervention and its effect ghanistan (1979). At the heart of all of the final decision to commit troops was on Soviet-American relations gathered these interventions was an inability made by an ailing and isolated leader; for a three-day meeting in the Norwe- within the Soviet (or Russian) leader- reports on conversations with Boris gian village of Lysebu, outside Oslo.1 ship to communicate effectively and to Yeltsin from late 1994 through late 1996 Among the participants on the Ameri- reach settlements once a conflict had sounded remarkably similar to conver- can side were Carter Administration reached a certain level. In terms of per- sations with Leonid Brezhnev during veterans Stansfield Turner, then Direc- sonalities, all of them were directed the period surrounding the decision to tor of Central Intelligence; William against former “allies”: , invade Afghanistan fifteen years earlier. Odom and Gary Sick, assistants to Na- Alexander Dubcek, Hafizullah Amin, Their political attention span and field tional Security Adviser Zbigniew and Dzhokar Dudaiev had little in com- of vision much reduced, both tended to Brzezinski on Soviet and Near Eastern mon beyond having spent most of their view decisions in strongly personalized affairs, respectively; and Marshall lives serving a Communist party. In all terms. To Brezhnev, Amin was the Shulman, then Secretary of State Cyrus four cases it seems like it was the bro- “dirty fellow” who usurped power by R. Vance’s main adviser on the Soviet ken trust, the sense of betrayal and in- killing President Nur Mohammed Union. On the Russian side sat several gratitude, which propelled the men in Taraki just days after the president had key survivors of the Brezhnev era, led the Kremlin past initial doubts and hesi- been embraced by Brezhnev in Mos- by former ambassador to the United tations up to the moment when some- cow. To Yeltsin, Dudaiev was a “scoun- States Anatolii F. Dobrynin and Gen. one said, “Go!” drel” who tried to blackmail him and Valentin Varennikov, then Commander From what we know, the Kremlin challenged his manly courage. Neither of Soviet ground forces. There were processes of decision-making on for- could be permitted to remain if the self- also some lesser known faces: Gen. eign policy crises have stayed remark- image of the ailing Kremlin leader was Leonid Shebarshin, former head of ably intact since the Bolshevik revolu- to stay intact. KGB foreign intelligence (and in the tion. Although the degree of absolute Around the sickly heads of state, late 1970s head of the KGB station in centralization on such issues has dif- factional politics flourished, with insti- Teheran), and Karen Brutents, former fered—from the one-man rule of Stalin, tutional rivalries particularly strong. Deputy Head of the International De- Gorbachev, and (when healthy, at least) During both crises the heads of the mili- partment of the Central Committee of Yeltsin to the small collectives of the tary and security institutions drove the Communist Party of the Soviet Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras—the events—in 1979 and 1994 it was the Union (CC CPSU). number of people actually involved in defense ministers, Dmitri Ustinov and The conference was the latest in a preparing and making essential foreign Pavel Grachev, who made the final push series of such gatherings of former So- policy decisions has remained ex- for intervention. Because of depart- viet and American officials to explore tremely limited. As in most bureaucra- mental jealousies, in operational terms the reasons behind the collapse of su- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 129 perpower detente in the mid-1970s, and sity)—were commissioned by CWIHP. coup in April 1978 (the “Saur [April] whether those events suggested any les- (CWIHP also expresses thanks to Revolution”). In spite of their misgiv- sons for current and future Russian- Raymond L. Garthoff and Selig ings about the lapses and limitations of American relations. They were orga- Harrison for providing copies of Rus- the Afghan Communist leaders, the nized as part of the “Carter-Brezhnev sian documents on Afghanistan.) Other members of the Soviet Politburo could Project,” spearheaded by Dr. James G. materials were gathered and translated not bring themselves to give up on the Blight of the Thomas J. Watson Insti- as a result of research by the present au- building of socialism in a neighboring tute for International Studies at Brown thor and for the Lysebu conference. In country. As the political and military University. Among the scholarly orga- addition to the documents published in predicament of the Kabul regime deep- nizations supporting the Project’s ef- this issue of the Bulletin, my summary ened, Soviet advisers came to substi- forts to obtain fresh evidence from of Soviet decision-making on Afghani- tute for the “revolutionary masses” and American, Russian, and other archives stan from early October to mid-Decem- the “Afghan Communists,” keeping the were the National Security Archive, a ber 1979 is based on the transcript of regime going while the “progressive non-governmental research institute the Nobel Symposium of Afghanistan strata” had time to develop. In the pro- and declassified documents repository and conversations with former senior cess, institutional and personal links based at George Washington Univer- Soviet officials at that meeting. were forged between Soviets and Af- sity; the Cold War International History The Lysebu meeting’s aim was to ghans, increasing the Kremlin’s sense Project, at the Woodrow Wilson Inter- retrace the final steps of Soviet deci- of commitment as well as the Kabul national Center for Scholars in Wash- sion-making on the Afghanistan inter- leadership’s ability to avail themselves ington; the Norwegian Nobel Institute; vention and to investigate the U.S. re- of Moscow’s resources.5 and the Institute for General History, sponse. The method is known as criti- As seen from Moscow, the devel- Russian Academy of Sciences. cal oral history: groups of former opments in Iran in the winter of 1978- Prior to the Afghanistan session, policymakers query each other on mo- 79 suddenly increased the importance which took place in Lysebu on 17-20 tives, issues, and actions, prodded by of the Afghan revolution. The rise of September 1995, the Carter-Brezhnev groups of scholars using newly declas- the Islamic radicals in Teheran took the Project had organized two other major sified documents. As in previous meet- Soviets by surprise and created politi- oral history conferences on the events ings of this kind—for instance the se- cal instability in the region, forcing the of the late 1970s: on SALT II and the ries of conferences held in 1987-1992 Kremlin to devote more attention to the growth of U.S.-Soviet distrust, held at on the Cuban Missile Crisis3—more situation along the USSR’s southern the Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons than history was up for discussion. borders. The overthrow of the Shah Island, Georgia, on 6-9 May 1994; and “Lessons” and relevance for today’s presented both opportunities and dan- on U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third leaders were on everybody’s mind and gers to the Soviet leadership: Many of World, held in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, the conversations were filled with those reporting to the Kremlin on Ira- on 23-26 March 1995. For each con- “presentisms.” In this conference, if nian and Afghan affairs expected the ference, a briefing book was prepared someone had suddenly replaced “Af- Iranian Communists to gradually by the National Security Archive with ghanistan” with “Chechnya” or some strengthen their position. But at the support from CWIHP and other Project possible site for future Russian inter- same time, Washington’s “loss” of Iran affiliates, containing declassified U.S. ventions, I do not think that the core alerted the Politburo for the first time documents and English translations of issues of the conversation would have to the possibility—however remote— documents obtained from Russian (and changed much. that the Americans would attempt to East German) archives, including those In retrospect, the Afghanistan in- replace their lost positions there with of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the tervention stands as an avoidable trag- fresh outposts in Afghanistan.6 former CC CPSU.2 Many of these edy, a tragedy in which the final script When the introduction of Soviet translations appear in this Bulletin. was ordained by perceptions, person- troops was first discussed in March In the case of the Afghanistan-re- alities, and ideology far more than “in- 1979, after a rebellion had broken out lated documents printed below, the terests” and “strategies.” Although sub- against the Communist regime in West- translations include, for the most part, stantial resistance to the invasion plans ern Afghanistan (and particularly in the materials declassified by Russian au- emerged within the Soviet hierarchy, the major city of Herat), the Kremlin lead- thorities as part of Fond 89, a collec- real story is how easily this opposition ers hesitantly concluded that “in no case tion prepared for the Russian Constitu- could be overcome by a tiny group of will we go forward with a deployment tional Court trial of the CPSU in 1992 people at the pinnacle of power.4 of troops in Afghanistan.” Politburo and now stored at the Center for the The documents published in this members Prime Minister Aleksei Storage of Contemporary Documenta- Bulletin show how the Soviet leaders Kosygin and CC Secretary Andrei tion (TsKhSD) in Moscow; translations gradually increased their commitment Kirilenko, who until the end opposed a of these documents—most of which to the Afghan Communist party (the Soviet invasion, argued that the Afghan were obtained and provided to CWIHP People’s Democratic Party of Afghani- Communists themselves were to blame by Mark Kramer (Harvard Univer- stan, or PDPA) after the Communist for the rebellion. “We gave [them] ev- 130 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

erything,” Kirilenko told the Politburo. since the summer to remove Amin from absolute minimum, to make sure that “And what has come of it? Nothing of the Afghan leadership, including two the decision was not delayed by the for- any value. After all, it was they who assassination attempts. None of these mal submission of reports from various executed innocent people for no reason efforts had succeeded, a fact which can- departments and ministries to the Po- and told us that we also executed people not have pleased the ambitious litburo. In this effort, they were assisted in Lenin’s time. You see what kind of Andropov and may have weakened his by ideology chief and Marxists we have found.”7 political position. In late November, Brezhnev’s chief adviser on foreign It was President Taraki’s murder by after Amin had demanded the replace- policy, Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov. his second-in-command Hafizullah ment of Soviet ambassador to Kabul Brutents, the deputy head of the CPSU Amin in October 1979—shortly after he A.M. Puzanov, Andropov and Ustinov CC International Department, told the had stopped off in Moscow for a cor- decided that the only way to resolve the Lysebu meeting that in early Decem- dial meeting with Brezhnev on his way Afghan issue was the combination of a ber 1979, as he was preparing a report back from a non-aligned summit meet- Soviet military intervention and the on the issue of a potential Soviet mili- ing in Havana—which set the Soviets physical elimination of Hafizullah tary intervention in Afghanistan, he got on the course to intervention. In light Amin. Amin’s persistent calls for in- a telephone call from Alexandrov- of past Soviet support for Taraki, the creased USSR military aid, including Agentov. “First, he asked me what I KGB suspected Amin of planning what Soviet troops, enboldened them and was doing. When I told him, he asked, Shebarshin called “doing a Sadat on made it easier for them to present their ‘And what exactly are you writing us”: a wholesale defection from the suggestions to the Politburo. there?’ When I told him that I was go- Soviet camp and an alignment with the The increasing strains in East-West ing to write a negative opinion, he said: United States—as Egyptian President relations—including in the essential ‘So, do you suggest that we should give Anwar Sadat had done earlier in the field of arms control—over the last Afghanistan to the Americans?’ And 1970s—which would allow the Ameri- months of 1979 may also have influ- he immediately ended the conversa- cans to place “their control and intelli- enced Andropov and Ustinov’s deci- tion.” Brutents’ report was not in the gence centers close to our most sensi- sion, and certainly made it easier for materials prepared for the Politburo tive borders.” The KGB closely moni- them to convince some of their col- members at the climactic meetings. tored Amin’s meetings with U.S. offi- leagues. The long-awaited Carter- The last obstacle on the path to in- cials in Kabul in late October, believ- Brezhnev summit in Vienna in June tervention was winning over, or at least ing that Washington was eying a re- 1979 had, despite the signing of a SALT neutralizing, those Politburo members, placement for its lost electronic intelli- II treaty, failed to generate much mo- such as Kosygin and Kirilenko, who gence collection posts in northern Iran.8 mentum toward an improvement in ties throughout the crisis had vocally op- Although no political orders had between Washington and Moscow. posed the idea of sending in Soviet yet been issued concerning a possible Moreover, the NATO decision that fall troops. Ustinov and Andropov realized intervention, the military chiefs of staff to deploy a new class of medium range that the only way to ensure that a pro- in late October 1979 began preparations nuclear missiles in Europe and the in- posal for intervention would carry the and some training for such a mission. creasing reluctance of the US Senate to day in the Politburo was to convince These orders reflected the increased ratify the SALT II pact removed the Brezhnev of the need to strike fast. The concern of Defense Minister Dmitri concerns of some Politburo-members party head—by nature cautious and cir- Ustinov over the Afghan issue, and his over the effects a Soviet intervention cumspect on international issues—was sense that proposing an intervention might have on detente. As one of the persuaded by arguments closely tied to might soon become politically accept- Soviet conference participants put it in his personal status on the world stage. able to his colleagues. In the not-too- Oslo, “by winter of 1979 detente was, Gen. Aleksandr Liakhovskii told the subtle game of who would succeed for most purposes, already dead.” The Lysebu meeting that after Amin’s coup, Brezhnev—which by late 1979 was in bleak outlooks on the diplomatic front “Brezhnev’s attitude to the entire issue full swing in the Politburo—a premium helped carry the day with Foreign Min- had changed. He could not forgive was being placed on both caution and ister Andrei Gromyko, who at the best Amin, because Brezhnev had person- enterprise: “Recklessness” or “being a of times was a somewhat pusillanimous ally assured Taraki that he would be able Napoleon” were potentially deadly epi- participant in Soviet high politics, op- to help him. And then they disregarded thets to hurl at a politically ambitious posing intervention in March only af- Brezhnev completely and murdered Defense Minister, while “forcefulness” ter being sure which way the wind was Taraki. Brezhnev used to say, ‘how and “looking after our interests” could blowing in the Politburo discussions. should the world be able to believe what be used as arguments in his favor. The KGB and Defense Ministry Brezhnev says, if his words do not count Ustinov’s colleague, collaborator, heads had two remaining obstacles to in Afghanistan?’” and sometime rival, KGB chief Yuri overcome in their determination to send Andropov’s remarkable personal Andropov, also started leaning toward Soviet troops to Afghanistan. First, they and handwritten letter to Brezhnev in military intervention in late 1979. The had to narrow the field of participants early December—read aloud by KGB had overseen several Soviet bids in the decision-making process to an Dobrynin to the Lysebu conference COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 131 from notes he had taken in the Russian deployment decision, states one in- sharp on Christmas Day: airborne Presidential Archives—summed up the formed Russian account, “Ustinov and troops from the 103rd and 105th air di- case for intervention. According to the Andropov cited dangers to the south- visions landed in Kabul and in Shindand KGB chief, Amin was conducting “be- ern borders of the Soviet Union and a in western Afghanistan, and units from hind-the-scenes activities which may possibility of American short-range the 5th and 108th motorized rifle divi- mean his political reorientation to the missiles being deployed in Afghanistan sions crossed the border at Kushka and West.” In addition, Andropov told the and aimed at strategic objects in at Termez. Just before nightfall on De- chronically ill and enfeebled leader, , Siberia, and elsewhere.”9 cember 27, Soviet paratroopers, assisted Amin “attacks Soviet policy and the Brezhnev accepted the outlined plan for by two KGB special units, attacked activities of our specialists.” But an intervention which the heads of the Amin’s residence at Duraleman Palace, Andropov dangled before Brezhnev a military and the KGB presented to him. and, after overcoming stiff resistance possible remedy for his Afghan Right after seeing Brezhnev, from the Palace Guards, summarily ex- troubles: A group of anti-Amin Afghan Ustinov and Andropov met with the ecuted the president and several of his Communists, mostly belonging to the head of the General Staff, Marshal N.V. closest aides. It was—we were told in minority Parcham faction, who had Ogarkov, in the Walnut Room, a small Lysebu by the men who devised it—a been living under KGB tutelage in ex- meeting room adjacent to the hall where well-organized and successful opera- ile, had, “without changing their plans the Politburo usually sat. The two in- tion, in which all the “strategic objec- for an uprising, appealed to us for as- formed Ogarkov of their conversation tives” were reached on time. sistance, including military assistance with Brezhnev. Ogarkov—who to- The intervention in Afghanistan if needed.” Although Andropov evi- gether with his deputies Gen. was the start of a war of almost unlim- dently still felt unwilling to ask Varennikov and Marshal Sergei ited destruction, leaving more than one Brezhnev directly and explicitly to sup- Akhromeyev had earlier warned million Afghans dead or wounded and port sending in Soviet troops, his letter Ustinov against an intervention—once almost four million driven into exile. made the case for such an intervention, again listed his reasons why Soviet For the Soviets the war became a death- the framework of which was already be- troops should not be sent in. Ustinov knell, signalling Moscow’s interna- ing discussed between the KGB head overruled him, and in the evening called tional isolation, its leadership’s incon- and the defense minister. a meeting of the senior staff of the De- stancy and fragmentation, and its Although agreeing with Andropov fense Ministry and told them to imple- public’s growing disbelief in the pur- concerning the political purpose of the ment preparations for the intervention. pose and direction of Soviet rule. By use of Soviet troops, Defense Minister The decision to send in troops was cer- the time its forces left in early 1989, the Ustinov was not willing to accept a lim- tain to come, Ustinov said. Soviet regime was crumbling; two years ited operation along the lines recom- On December 12, the Politburo met later it was gone. The Afghan War was mended by the KGB head. Varennikov, and formally ratified the proposal to not only the first war which the Soviet who headed operational planning in the intervene. Gromyko chaired the meet- Union lost: It was the last war it fought. General Staff, told the Lysebu meeting ing, after having co-signed the proposal The post-December 1979 docu- that Ustinov wanted 75,000 troops for together with Ustinov and Andropov. ments included in the Bulletin show the the operation for two main reasons: wrote out, by slow and painful road which the Soviet First, he wanted to make sure that the hand, a short protocol accepting the pro- leaders travelled toward realizing the toppling of Amin’s regime could be car- posal—entitled “Concerning the Situa- failure of their Afghan venture. Already ried out smoothly, even if some of the tion in ‘A’”—and had all Politburo after Andropov’s visit to Kabul in late Afghan army groups in Kabul decided members present sign their names di- January 1980, the Politburo understood to resist. Second, he believed that So- agonally across the text. Kosygin, who that the troops would have to stay in viet forces should be used to guard almost certainly would have opposed an Afghanistan for the indefinite future. Afghanistan’s borders with Pakistan intervention, was not present. Kirilenko Almost immediately, Moscow started to and Iran, thereby preventing outside signed after some hesitation. Brezhnev, seek a political settlement as an alter- support for the Afghan Islamic guerril- who entered the room after the brief native to war. Gromyko and Andropov las. On December 6, Andropov ac- discussion was finished, added his seem to have been at the forefront in cepted Ustinov’s plan. name, in quivering handwriting, at the this cautious and awkward examination Around noon on December 8, the bottom of the page.10 of the possibilities for getting the So- two met with Brezhnev and Gromyko Two days later, the General Staff viet troops out. in the general secretary’s office in the operative team, headed by Marshal As the documents show, the Polit- Kremlin. In addition to the concerns Akhromeyev, was in place in Termez, buro members just could not make up Andropov had raised with Brezhnev Uzbekistan (USSR), near the Afghan their minds as to what constituted So- earlier, he and Ustinov now added the border. A group from the operational viet minimum demands for a troop strategic situation. Meeting two days team arrived at Bagram airforce base withdrawal. Brezhnev’s letter to Fidel after West Germany had given its vital outside Kabul on December 18. Castro on Afghanistan in March 1980 support for NATO’s two-track missile- The main operation started at 3 pm demonstrates that Soviet expectations 132 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

as to what kind of political deal was pos- to be reached quickly. On the other the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, 2130 H St. sible became increasingly unrealistic as hand, Gorbachev believed that stepping NW, Washington, DC 20037. 3 See James G. Blight and David Welch, On the Western attitudes hardened and the Red up military pressure on the resistance Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Army failed to quell the Afghan Islamic and their Pakistani backers was the way Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd. ed. (New York: Noon- rebellion. In his address to a Central to achieve a deal within the timeframe day, 1990); and Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink: Committee plenum in June 1980, set by Moscow for a withdrawal. The Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Col- lapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993). Brezhnev put the Afghanistan conflict years 1985 and 1986 were therefore the 4 The best surveys of the Soviet intervention to into a standard Cold War context, im- worst years of the war, with massive appear in print so far are Diego Cordovez and plying that a settlement would not be Soviet attacks against the civilian popu- Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The In- possible before the overall Western ap- lation in areas held by the resistance. side Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Raymond L. proach to the Soviet Union changed. Considering the cards he had been Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American- In spite of his growing impatience dealt, Gorbachev did well in the Afghan Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. with the Afghan leaders, Andropov, af- endgame. He got the troops out on time (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 977-1075; ter taking over as General Secretary in spite of fierce opposition from his and Aleksandr Liakhovskii, Tragediia i doblest’ afgana [Afghan Tragedy and Valour] (Moscow: following Brezhnev’s death in Novem- own ranks and the constant political Iskona, 1995); see also Odd Arne Westad, ed., ber 1982, changed little of his maneuvering of the Reagan Adminis- The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations predecessor’s basic approach. Indeed, tration. The bickering among opposi- in the Carter Years (Oslo: Scandinavian Univer- the former KGB chief knew well that tion groups, the change of regime in sity Press, 1997). 5 See Odd Arne Westad, “Prelude to Invasion: his standing within the party was con- Pakistan (after the death of Mohammed The Soviet Union and the Afghan Communists, nected to the validity of the December Zia ul-Haq in a June 1988 plane crash), 1978-1979,” International History Review 16:1 1979 decision, in which he had been a and the massive Soviet supplies sent in (February 1994), 49-69, and “Nakanune vvoda prime mover.11 Like Brezhnev, in 1988 and early 1989, even gave the sovetskikh voisk v Afganistan,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 2 (1994), 19-35. Andropov sought a way out of Afghani- Najibullah regime in Kabul a real 6 KGB Gen. Leonid Shebarshin, author’s inter- stan, and was willing to accept a UN chance of survival, making the Soviet view, Moscow, 7 October 1993. Shebarshin was role in international mediation of the withdrawal seem less of a sell-out than the KGB rezident in Teheran in 1979. See also conflict. His message to the Politburo, it really was. In fact, the mistakes Shebarshin’s comments in Welch and Westad, eds., The Intervention in Afghanistan. however, was that the USSR must ne- Najibullah made after the Soviets bailed 7 See transcript of CPSU Politburo meeting, 18 gotiate from a position of strength: “We out in February 1989 probably had so March 1979, in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. are fighting against American imperi- much to do with his eventual downfall 8 [Ed. note: These stations were particularly im- alism which well understands that in that Gorbachev’s attempts to wash his portant because they were used to monitor So- viet missile tests and other military activities in this part of international politics it has hands over the fate of his one-time ally the USSR. According to various sources, rather lost its positions. That is why we can- have some basis in truth. than seeking replacements in Afghanistan the U.S. not back off.”12 ’s thinking on his instead moved to replace the lost electronic spy The Soviet approach to peacemak- Chechen imbroglio still seems far from posts in northern Iran by coming to an intelligence sharing arrangement with the People’s Republic ing in Afghanistan found no takers the 1986 mark, in terms of a compari- of China, allowing Washington to continue moni- among the Afghan Islamic guerrillas, son with Afghanistan. In spite of the toring Soviet missile tests from new electronic the military rulers of Pakistan, or in the differences between the two conflicts, intelligence joint U.S.-PRC stations in western Reagan Administration in Washington. the only way out for the Russian gov- China, with the Chinese also getting the data.] 9 Liakhovskii, Tragediia i doblest afgana, 109. Instead, starting in early 1984, Ameri- ernment was the path which Gorbachev 10 For an English translation and facsimile of this can military supplies to the Afghan re- followed from 1986 to 1989, and which document, see CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 76. sistance through Pakistan increased dra- Gen. Aleksandr Lebed undertook (with 11 Cordovez and Harrison find that Andropov’s matically. Reagan told the CIA in a Yeltsin’s grudging acquiescence) in the “objective was to minimize casualties and to scale down operations while seeking a negotiated settle- Presidential Directive that the aim of summer of 1996: a negotiated with- ment.” (Out of Afghanistan, p. 147.) While there U.S. involvement in Afghanistan had drawal of Russian troops. is little evidence for a scaling-down of military changed from increasing the costs to the operations in Afghanistan during Andropov’s USSR to trying to push the Soviets out. 1 The transcript of the Nobel Symposium at short time in power (November 1982-February 1984), at least he did not authorize the same sharp Moscow’s hapless handling of its Af- Lysebu will be published together with the tran- scripts of other Carter-Brezhnev Project confer- increase in military activities which took place ghan problem had led Reagan to aim ences. A preliminary version, David Welch and under his successor Konstantin Chernenko (Feb- for victory.13 Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Intervention in Af- ruary 1984-March 1985) and during Gorbachev’s , who took over ghanistan: Record of an Oral History Conference first year as CPSU general secretary (March 1985- (Nobel Symposium 95), is available from the Nor- March 1986). leadership of the CPSU in March 1985, 12 wegian Nobel Institute, Drammensvn. 19, 0255 CPSU CC Politburo transcript, 10 March at first had a dual approach to the Af- Oslo, Norway, fax: (+47) 22 43 01 68. 1983; excerpt printed below. 13 ghan war. On the one hand, he under- 2 Researchers interested in examining the photo- Former Director of Central Intelligence Rob- stood that the Politburo had to make a copied documents obtained by the Carter- ert Gates’ memoirs, From the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), provides the full- political decision to bring the troops Brezhnev Project should contact the National Se- curity Archive, where they are kept on file; the est overview we have so far of the CIA’s covert home and that any negotiated settlement Archive can be reached at (202) 994-7000 (tele- war in Afghanistan, especially pp. 319-321. connected to the withdrawal would have phone) or (202) 994-7005 (fax) and is located on COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 133 The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives

the contradictions between the Daoud regime The coming to power of the PDPA and Frequently used abbreviations: and its class supporters and the fundamental its actions “were met with approval by the interests of the working masses, the voice peoples’ masses.” At the same time the “in- APRF = Archive of the President, Russian of which is the PDPA.” ternal reaction, while so far not deciding on Federation Daoud’s order to arrest the PDPA fa- an open demonstration,” is activating “un- CC = Central Committee cilitated the fall of his regime. derground efforts” (propaganda, the drop- Com. = Comrade The Taraki government’s program (dec- ping in of weapons, and diversionary groups CPSU = Communist Party of the Soviet laration of 9 May 1978) is worked out on which are being prepared in Pakistan). Union the basis of the PDPA program of 1966. The The friction between the Khalq and DRA = Democratic Republic of Afghani- main task, is providing for the interests of Parcham factions is having a negative in- stan the working population on the basis of fun- fluence. GKEHS = State Committee for Economic damental of the social-economic The main point of disagreement is gov- Cooperations structures of society, and “the liquidation of ernment posts. The representatives of MFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs the influence of neocolonialism and imperi- Khalq, especially in the army, are dissatis- PDPA = People’s Democratic Party of Af- alism.” fied with the naming of Parcham represen- ghanistan In a conversation with the Soviet Am- tatives to a number of leadership posts. The SAPMO = Stiftung Archiv der Partaien und bassador on April 29, Taraki said that “Af- leader of Parcham, B[abrak]. Karmal, in his Massorganisationen der DDR im ghanistan, following Marxism-Leninism, turn, objected to the the widening of the Bundesarchiv (Berlin) will set off on the path of building socialism Revolutionary Council for the benefit of TsKhSD = Center for the Storage of Con- and will belong to the socialist camp,” but it military officers. The Ambassador and “ad- temporary Documentation, Moscow is necessary to conduct that line “carefully” visors on Party relations” in conversations and of his true goals the PDPA will inform with the new leadership stressed the neces- Political Letter from USSR Ambassador the people “later.” sity of “overcoming the tensions” and to Afghanistan A. Puzanov to Soviet In foreign policy the DRA is oriented “strengthening the unity” of the leadership Foreign Ministry, “About the Domestic toward the Non-Aligned movement, but it and the party. As a result, on 24 May 1978 Political Situation in the DRA,” will give its priority to cooperation with the the Politburo of the CC PDPA made a deci- 31 May 1978 (notes) USSR. sion to eliminate the names Khalq and About the reaction of the West: the Parcham and to affirm the unity of the It is noted that the “basic precondi- overthrow of Daoud was “a total surprise,” PDPA. tions” for the overthrow of [Mohammed] and in the press of the Western and “reac- The Afghans asked the USSR to send Daoud in April 1978 “flowed from the ob- tionary Moslem countries” a “campaign of a “large group of advisors and consultants” jective domestic political and economic de- falsehoods” was deployed against the new to work in the state apparat, and also to help velopment of the country after 1973.” government. in putting together a five year plan. The Daoud expressed the interests and class po- At the same time, “according to infor- USSR has “favorably” resolved these issues. sition of bourgeois landowners and rightist mation which we have” the embassies of the This will facilitate “the growth of sym- nationalist forces, and therefore was not ca- USA and other Western countries received pathy for the USSR, the further fortifying pable of carrying out a reformation “in the instructions to search out all means to hold and strengthening of our positions in Af- interests of the broad laboring masses,” pri- on in Afghanistan, including promises to pro- ghanistan.” marily agricultural reform. vide economic assistance. Conclusions: The situation in the coun- In conditions of a worsening economic The Afghan leadership “is not show- try “overall is stabilizing more and more,” situation in the country and Daoud’s depar- ing haste” in concluding economic agree- the government is controlling all its regions ture from the programmatic declaration of ments with the West, “proceeding from an and is taking measures “to cut off...the dem- 1973, which led to “a constant growth in intention to reorient its foreign economic onstrations of the domestic reaction.” the dissatisfaction of broad strata of the relations primarily towards the USSR and The most important factor for the fur- population,” Daoud huddled ever more the socialist camp.” ther strengthening of the new power will be closely with the “domestic reaction,” which The measures which have been under- the achievement of unity in the leadership was supported by the “reactionary Islamic taken by the new government in the month of the PDPA and the government. But “the regimes” and by “American imperialism,” it has been in power bear witness to its “firm tension so far has not totally been cleared and followed a course toward the “strength- intention” gradually to create the precondi- away.” The embassy jointly with a group ening . . . of a regime of personal power.” tions “for Afghanistan’s transition to the so- of Party advisors is undertaking measures This led to an “abrupt sharpening of cialist path of development.” to overcome the disagreements in the Af- 134 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

ghan leadership. Party or in the army to defend my thesis — unity “we will crush them as if with a steam- it is difficult to fulfill the May 24 resolution roller [proidemsia zheleznym katkom]. Such [Source: Based on notes taken by Odd Arne of the Party on unity and the directives of measures will only strengthen the Party.” Westad on materials at the Center for the the Politburo, they remain paper, nothing Storage of Contemporary Documentation more. Sent to Kozyrev, C.P., Ponomarev, B.N.... (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 5, opis (op.) 75, delo (d.) [. . .] Further, B. Karmal in a condition 1179, listy (ll.) 2-17.] of extreme excitement said the following. [Source: Notes of O.A. Westad, TsKhSD, f. In both the Party and in the govern- 5, op. 75, d. 1181, ll. 22-27.] Record of Conversation, Soviet ment I occupy the second post after N.M. Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, Taraki. Despite this, I do not know what is Record of Conversation between Soviet 18 June 1978 going on in the country — they have iso- Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. lated me, I am not engaged in either domes- Puzanov and Taraki, 18 July 1978 The meeting took place in connection tic or foreign policy issues, I live as if in a with the arrival in Kabul of a group of [So- gilded cage. For me, as a communist, this [The Ambassador] also said that the viet] Party advisors headed by V.I. is a heavy tragedy. In the presence of N.M. observations expressed by the leadership of Kharazov. Taraki, PDPA Politburo member H. Amin the DRA about the necessity for effective [The Ambassador] informed N.M. said that to provide unity it is necessary to defense of the airspace of the DRA had been Taraki about the arrival in Kabul on July 27 carry out extremely decisive measures. attentively studied in the General Staff of of the first group of Soviet advisors for work N.M. Taraki really wants unity. However, the USSR Armed Forces, and the necessary in the Afghan ministries and departments. for this to happen, thousands of honest com- measures had been worked out for use in [...] Further Taraki requested that only munists in Afghanistan will be subject to the event that there should appear a danger the Soviet Ambassador and V.I. Khazarov terror, persecutions, their names will be slan- to the DRA from the air. In addition, with remain and said that B. Karmal had arrived, dered. I myself live under the threat that this goal in mind the delivery of an addi- and wants to express a number of thoughts. they will subject me to persecution. In con- tional quantity of anti-aircraft installations Coming into the office, B. Karmal said clusion, B. Karmal declared that the matter for the present and future years had been the following. is moving towards a split in the Party, ev- reviewed. The deliveries of weapons will Recently more frequently it has been erything is moving into the hands of the be fixed in an agreement, for the signing of heard that there is no unity in the PDPA. government and army. which, according to the agreement, a del- This, without doubt, reflects negatively on N.M. Taraki declared decisively that all egation headed by Major-General V.E. the Party itself, on the state apparatus, the issues in the ruling organs of the PDPA are Kuznetsov is arriving today. army, the revolution, on the prestige of the decided on the basis of democratic central- Taraki informed the Ambassador about Soviet Union and might lead to difficult ism, and nobody threatens anyone. There the situation in the country and about his consequences. People are different, and this is no split in the Party, unity is being meeting on July 13-14 with the Deputy Sec- distinction might be used for provocative strengthened, although certain people are retary of State of the USA D[avid D]. goals. Unfortunately, our position (the demonstrating against it. If someone moves Newsom. Parchams) in the Party, state apparatus, and against the revolution and the unity of the In the conversation with me, said N.M. army is subject to a number of provocations. Party, then there will be a purge of the Party. Taraki, the Deputy Secretary of State spoke But insofar as I am sure that the Party, state There is no terror, however, if it will be reck- about the USA government’s concern about and army, under the leadership of N.M. oned that this or some other person presents the one-sided orientation in the foreign Taraki and [First Deputy Prime Minister] a danger for the revolution, then decisive policy of the DRA and the chill in Afghan- H[afizzulah]. Amin, with the great assis- measures of punishment may be applied to American relations. tance of the Soviet Union, are building so- him, right up to capital punishment. D. Newsom asked a provocative ques- cialism in Afghanistan, then, feeling a debt On this N.M. Taraki interrupted the tion — what actions will the government of to the revolution, I do not intend to create conversation and let it be known that he does the DRA take in the event of an attack by problems, so that neither a friend nor an not wish to continue the discussion with B. the Soviet Union. enemy can take advantage of my situation. Karmal. B. Karmal said good-bye and left. N.M. Taraki pointed out the inappro- Regarding the June 17 decision of the CC Remaining with N.M. Taraki, [the priateness of a question like that. PDPA Politburo to send a number of com- Ambassador and Khazarov] once again rades to foreign countries as ambassadors, I noted the necessity of taking into account [Source: Notes of O.A. Westad, TsKhSD, f. and N.A. Noor . . . also consider it useful to when making some or other appointments 5, op. 75, d. 1181, ll. 36-40.] go abroad as ambassadors or under the pre- the political resonance and consequences text of medical treatment, so as not to give which they might prompt. They stressed that Information from CC CPSU to GDR grounds for provocations against noble and enemies must not be given grounds for us- leader Erich Honecker, 13 October 1978 honest people. In such a way, N.M. Taraki ing similar issues for their own goals. and H. Amin may be able to fulfill the men- N.M. Taraki said that the Party is united Highly confidential tioned program. Unfortunately, said B. and its unity is becoming ever stronger, but Karmal, I have no possibility either in the as to those who will demonstrate against According to the instructions of CC COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 135

CPSU, candidate member of the Politburo among the populace, undermines the author- primary focus of the new government. CC CPSU secretary comr. B.N. Ponomarev ity of the revolutionary government and From our side it was continuously was in Kabul from 25 to 27 September of leads to the weakening of the new regime. stressed that right now the primary objec- this year, to meet with the leadership of the Our ideas were attentively heard out, tive should be to strengthen the people’s People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan but with visible tension. Without disputing democratic regime, adopting a measured and (PDPA) and the Democratic Republic of Af- them directly, the Afghan leaders tried to flexible policy to isolate the counter-revo- ghanistan (DRA) to discuss certain press- justify their policy by accusing Parchamists lution from the people, to deprive it of the ing questions concerning the unfolding po- (members of the “Parcham” faction who, opportunity to take advantage of the back- litical situation in that country and questions together with the “Khalq” faction, organized wardness of the masses. In the short time regarding Soviet-Afghan relations. Meet- the unification of the PDPA in 1977) of anti- since the establishment of the new govern- ings took place with the general secretary government activities. ment, large enterprises have already been of CC PDPA, chairman of the Revolution- Even before the revolution we did not set up to serve the interests of the people. ary Soviet, prime minister of DRA comr. trust “Parcham,” said N. Taraki, and the Along with this, enormous constructive op- Nur Taraki and member of the Politburo, union with the Parchamists was strictly a portunities opened up by the Afghan revo- secretary of CC PDPA, deputy prime min- formality. They took almost no part in the lution are still waiting to be discovered and ister and minister of foreign affairs of the armed uprising. But following the victory put to practical use. DRA comrade Hafizullah Amin. of the revolution the leader of the During the meetings, the Afghan rep- The main objective of the trip was to Parchamists B. Karmal demanded that the resentatives also touched on the question of put a stop to the mass repressions which top ministerial and departmental positions Afghan relations with imperialist countries. have taken on increasing proportions follow- be divided equally. He laid claim to play- Imperialism, said N. Taraki, places in front ing the revolution in Afghanistan, includ- ing the leading role in building the party, of us every kind of obstacle, including the ing repressions against the “Parcham” fac- declaring: “You have the army; give us the use of “soft” methods. Westerners and tion, which took part in the overthrow of party.” In addition, when their demands Americans are clearly trying to exploit aid the despotic regime. were not met, they threatened to start an in order to force us to steer away from the During the meetings special emphasis uprising. Under the given circumstances, chosen path. At the present time we are have was placed by our side on questions con- said N. Taraki and A. Amin, there was but no intention of spoiling our relations with cerning the unjustified repressions in the one choice: either them, or us. the West, though we understand that their DRA. In addition, it was pointed out that Besides, N. Taraki was trying to show, offers are not entirely unselfish. From our we are doing this out of our brotherly con- the measures being taken against the lead- side it was emphasized that in dealing with cern for the fate of the Afghan revolution, ing activists of “Parcham” did not exhibit the West one should not allow oneself to be especially since certain aspects of the un- any negative influence on people’s senti- lured into a trap. folding events in Afghanistan directly affect ments. The Afghan people support the new Concerning the China question, N. the Soviet Union and CPSU. regime and the Khalqist leadership of the Taraki unreservedly condemned the Maoist First to recognize the new state of PDPA. The PDPA leadership, Revolution- leadership and its actions, noting that the things in Afghanistan, the USSR demon- ary Council, and DRA government, said N. leaders of China have closed ranks with the strated its solidarity with Afghanistan in Taraki, understand completely the apprehen- enemies of communism. The PDPA has front of the whole world. This position was sions of the CC CPSU, but assure [it] that purged Maoist elements from the army and again authoritatively affirmed in L.I. the latest events in the country do not inter- the state apparatus. Brezhnev’s speech in Baku. It is widely fere with the advancement of the Afghan The meetings with N. Taraki and H. known that we are in every way assisting revolution and the strengthening of the Amin left the impression that the persecu- and supporting the new government. Un- people’s democratic regime. tion of Parchamists is primarily the result der these conditions, hostile propaganda Considerable attention was paid by our of factional infighting and personal hostili- within Afghanistan itself as well as outside side to questions of party expansion and ties. In addition, the Afghan leadership is its borders is currently being aimed at show- improvement of the ability of the People’s clearly underestimating the negative influ- ing that any events in Afghanistan - espe- Democratic Party of Afghanistan to govern ence that the repressions are having on the cially the negative aspects of these events - the nation and the populace. Emphasis was overall situation in the country and on sen- are connected to the direct or indirect par- also placed on the importance of creating timents within the army and the party. ticipation by the Soviet Union. and strengthening the party throughout all The discussions were marked by an air The attention of the Afghan leadership of the country’s territories, on the adoption of comradeship. All in all, [it was] a warm was focused on the fact that in recent times of prompt measures to normalize the activi- welcome by the Afghan leadership; their repressions have taken on mass proportions, ties of party organs from top to bottom, on attentive attitude towards the opinions of the are being carried out without regard to law, organizing agencies of the people’s govern- CC CPSU and readiness to discuss with us and are directed not only at class enemies ment, and on focusing increased attention the most delicate questions is an indication of the new regime (“Moslem Brothers,” sup- on economic problems. The people must of the importance they place on the friend- porters of the monarchy, etc.), but also at experience concrete results of the revolu- ship with Soviet Union and socialist coun- persons who could be used for revolution- tion in their own lives. That is why the im- tries. Taraki asked to relay to the CC CPSU ary interests; that brings out discontent provement of people’s lives should be the that “Afghanistan will always stand next to 136 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Soviet Union, aligned together with the Moscow, Kremlin the Afghan military. Special equipment and other socialist countries.” extra parts are shipped to the Democratic The CC CPSU submits that Afghani- 1. In connection with the request of Republic of Afghanistan at 25 percent of stan will heed our judgment in their contin- the Government of the Democratic Repub- cost on a 10-year loan with 2 percent yearly ued activities, although, it seems, this will lic of Afghanistan and with the partial interest. It should be noted that the Demo- only be demonstrated by their actions in the changes of instructions from the USSR cratic Republic of Afghanistan is in a more future. Incoming information indicates an Council of Ministers from 20 November favorable situation when compared to other abatement in repressions in the country and 1978, # 2473, give assent to the distribution friendly countries receiving aid. the beginning of the process of partial reha- of expenditures related to the dispatching Explain that according to our existing bilitation of party functionaries from the of Soviet specialists, at the expense of the rules, the shipment of general civilian equip- “Parcham” faction. Soviet side, for work in the armed forces of ment, including auto-transports, and civil- CC CPSU the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. ian airplanes and helicopters, is exclusively Instruct GKEhS to propose to the Af- a matter of the Ministry of Foreign Trade [Source: Stiftung Archiv der Partaien und ghan side that it provide, at its own expense, and conditions governing commercial trade, Massenorganisationen der DDR im for Soviet specialists and interpreters dis- irrespective of whether this equipment is Bundesarchiv (SAPMO), Berlin, J 2/202, A. patched to work in the armed forces of Af- used in the armed forces or other depart- 575; obtained by Vladislav M. Zubok (Na- ghanistan and furnish them with living quar- ments. tional Security Archive).] ters with necessary equipment, transport for Further, say that the Soviet government official purposes, and medical service. has made the decision to grant the Afghan CPSU CC Politburo Decision on 2. Expenditures related to the dispatch- request that the dispatching of all special- Afghanistan, 7 January 1979 ing of Soviet specialists to Afghanistan in ists for work in the armed forces of the accordance with present instructions must Democratic Republic of Afghanistan be Proletariat of all countries, unite! be made: in Soviet rubles from the account made at the expense of the Soviet side. Communist Party of the Soviet Union. appropriated by the state budget of the Telegraph the execution [of the orders]. CENTRAL COMMITTEE USSR for the rendering of free assistance to foreign governments, and in foreign cur- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, perechen (per.) 14, TOP SECRET rency from the account appropriated by the dokument (dok.) 24; document provided by SPECIAL FILE currency plan of GKEhS. Mark Kramer (Harvard University); trans- lation by Daniel Rozas.] To Comrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ustinov, Ponomarev, Ryabov, Skachkov, A.Kosygin Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Serbin,and Smirtyukov. 14-ri Discussions on Afghanistan, 17-19 March 1979 Extract from protocol # 137 of the CC CPSU [attached] to article 27 protocol # 137 Politburo session from 7 January 1979 TOP SECRET Top Secret ONLY COPY The question of the Ministry of defense and SPECIAL FILE WORKING TRANSCRIPT the State committee of the USSR on foreign KABUL economic ties. SOVIET AMBASSADOR MEETING OF THE POLITBURO 1. Approve a draft of orders from the OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE USSR Council of Ministers on this ques- Spec.# 978. Visit H. Amin or another indi- OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE tion (attached). vidual ordered to receive you, and, refer- SOVIET UNION 2. Ratify the attached draft of instruc- ring to the instructions, inform him that the tions for the soviet ambassador to the Demo- request of the Afghan side concerning the 17 March 1979 cratic Republic of Afghanistan. realization of deliveries of goods for the SECRETARY of CC general use of the armed forces, in accor- Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV, Presiding 13-af dance with the guidelines governing the In attendance: Y.V. ANDROPOV, A.A. [attached] to article 27 protocol # 137 shipment of special equipment through GROMYKO, A.N. KOSYGIN, A.Y. GKEhS, as well as the dispatching, at So- PELSHE, K.U. CHERNENKO, D.F. Top Secret viet expense, of specialists for work in the USTINOV, P.N. DEMICHEV, B.N. SPECIAL FILE armed forces of the Democratic Republic PONOMAREV, M.S. SOLOMENTZEV, N. Draft of Afghanistan, has been carefully exam- A.TIKHONOV, I.V. KAPITONOV, V.I. ined. DOLGIKH, M.V. ZIMYANIN, K.V. USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Say that the Government of the USSR, RUSAKOV, M.S. GORBACHEV INSTRUCTIONS based on the friendly relations between our countries, is rendering assistance, with very Re: Deterioration of Conditions in the from January 1979 favorable conditions, aimed at reinforcing DemocraticRepublic of Afghanistan and COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 137

Possible Responses From Our Side tion was not all that complicated, that the threats to the regime. In conclusion, he con- army was in control of everything, and so veyed his greetings to the members of the KIRILENKO. Leonid Ilych forth. In a word, he expressed the opinion Politburo, and personally to L.I. Brezhnev. [Brezhnev] has asked us to commence our that their position was under control. And thus was my discussion today with Politburo session today at this unseasonable KIRILENKO. In short, judging from Amin. hour, and he will then join us tomorrow, in the report of Amin, the leadership of Af- After a short time, approximately two order to discuss the circumstances that have ghanistan is not experiencing the slightest or three hours, we received news from our emerged in the Democratic Republic of Af- anxiety in connection with these events. comrades that chaos had erupted in Herat. ghanistan. The situation is urgent. Com- GROMYKO. Exactly. Amin even said One regiment, as I already indicated an ar- rades Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov to- that the situation in Afghanistan is just fine. tillery one, fired on its own troops, and part day have put together some proposals which He said that not a single incident of insub- of the second regiment went over to the in- have been completed and are now in front ordination by a governor had been reported, surgents. Consequently, only a portion of of you. Let us consider this matter closely that is, that all of the governors were on the the 17th division, which is guarding Herat, and determine what measures we ought to side of the lawful government. Whereas in remains loyal to the Government. Our com- take, what actions should be undertaken. reality, according to the reports of our com- rades also tell us that tomorrow and the next Perhaps we should hear first from Comrade rades, the situation in Herat and in a num- day, new masses of insurgents, trained on Gromyko. ber of other places is alarming, and the in- the territory of Pakistan and Iran, may in- GROMYKO. Judging by the most re- surgents are in control there. vade. cent communications that we have received As far as Kabul is concerned, the situ- About a half hour later, we again re- from Afghanistan in the form of encrypted ation there is basically calm. The borders ceived news from our comrades that Com- cables, as well as by telephone conferences of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran are rade Taraki had summoned the chief mili- with our chief military advisor Comrade closed, or more accurately, semi-closed. A tary advisor Comrade Gorelov and charge [Lt.-Gen. L.N.] Gorelov and temporary large number of Afghans, formerly work- d’affaires Alekseev. And what did they dis- charge d’affaires Comrade Alekseev, the ing in Iran, have been expelled from Iran cuss with Taraki? First of all, he appealed situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated and, naturally, they are highly dissatisfied, to the Soviet Union for help in the form of sharply, the center of the disturbance at this and many of them have also joined up with military equipment, ammunition, and ra- time being the town of Herat. There, as we the insurgents. tions, that which is envisioned in the docu- know from previous cables, the 17th divi- The measures that we have drawn out ments which we have presented for consid- sion of the Afghan army was stationed, and for the aid of Afghanistan are set forth in eration by the Politburo. As far as military had restored order, but now we have re- the proposals that you have in front of you. equipment is concerned, Taraki said, almost ceived news that this division has essentially I should add that we have appropriated an in passing, that perhaps ground and air sup- collapsed. An artillery regiment and one additional 10 million rubles to Afghanistan port would be required. This must be un- infantry regiment comprising that division in hard currency for the protection of the derstood to mean that the deployment of our have gone over to the side of the insurgents. border. forces is required, both land and air forces. Bands of saboteurs and terrorists, having in- Inasmuch as Pakistan, in essence, is In my opinion, we must proceed from filtrated from the territory of Pakistan, the principal place from which the terror- a fundamental proposition in considering the trained and armed not only with the partici- ists are infiltrating into Afghanistan, it would question of aid to Afghanistan, namely: un- pation of Pakistani forces but also of China, appear to follow that the leadership of Af- der no circumstances may we lose Afghani- the United States of America, and Iran, are ghanistan should send a letter of protest to stan. For 60 years now we have lived with committing atrocities in Herat. The insur- Pakistan or issue a declarations; in a word, Afghanistan in peace and friendship. And gents infiltrating into the territory of Herat to come out with some kind of written state- if we lose Afghanistan now and it turns Province from Pakistan and Iran have joined ment. However, the Afghan leadership has against the Soviet Union, this will result in forces with a domestic counter-revolution. not done that. To be sure, it looks very a sharp setback to our foreign policy. Of The latter is especially comprised by reli- strange. course, it is one thing to apply extreme mea- gious fanatics. The leaders of the reaction- I asked Amin, what kind of actions do sures if the Afghan army is on the side of ary masses are also linked in large part with you consider necessary from our side? I told the people, and an entirely different matter, the religious figures. him what kind of aid we might be able to if the army does not support the lawful gov- The number of insurgents is difficult render. But he had no other requests, he sim- ernment. And finally, third, if the army is to determine, but our comrades tell us that ply responded that he had a very optimistic against the government and, as a result, they are thousands, literally thousands. appraisal of the circumstances in Afghani- against our forces, then the matter will be Significantly, it should be noted that I stan, that the help you have given will stand complicated indeed. As we understand from had a conversation this morning at 11:00 us in good stead, and that all of the prov- Comrades Gorelov and Alekseev, the mood with Amin — Taraki’s deputy who is the inces are safely under the control of lawful among the leadership, including Comrade minister of foreign affairs — and he did not forces. I asked him, don’t you expect any Taraki, is not particularly out of sorts. express the slightest alarm about the situa- problems from neighboring governments or USTINOV. Comrade Gorelov, our tion in Afghanistan, and on the contrary, with a domestic counter-revolution, and so forth? chief military advisor, was with Taraki along Olympian tranquility, he said that the situa- Amin answered firmly that no, there are no with Comrade Alekseev, our charge 138 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

d’affaires in Afghanistan. I just spoke with in Herat, judging from everything, have scribed in the draft declaration in connec- Comrade Gorelov by telephone, and he said unfolded violently, because over a thousand tion with the supply of arms to Afghanistan, that the leadership of Afghanistan is wor- people have been killed. But even there the all of that is being done, shipments and de- ried about the state of affairs, and that mat- situation is unclear enough. liveries of this equipment are already tak- ters in the province of Herat are particularly ANDROPOV. Of course, the insur- ing place. Unfortunately, I do not know bad, as well as in the province of Pakti. The gents coming into the territory of Afghani- whether we will be able to supply every- bad part is that the division which is sup- stan will be joined first of all by those who thing before April; that is going to be very posed to be guarding Herat has turned out would rebel and solicit the Afghan people difficult. I would request that we adopt the to be ineffective, and the commander of the to their own side. decision in connection with the supply of division at this time is located on the air- KOSYGIN. In my view, the draft de- arms that is set forth here. As far as con- strip, more to the point, he is seeking refuge cision under consideration must be substan- cerns payment for the arms, I would delete there and, obviously, he is no longer com- tially amended. First of all, we must not that. manding the actions of any regiments re- delay the supply of armaments until April KOSYGIN. All the same, we must maining loyal to the government. Bear in but must give everything now, without de- dispatch everything, literally beginning to- mind that tomorrow (March 18), operational lay, in March. That is the first thing. morrow. groups will be deployed into Herat. Secondly, we must somehow give USTINOV. Fine, we are doing that, We advised Comrade Taraki to rede- moral support to the leadership of Afghani- and we will ensure that all of these things ploy several forces into the regions where stan, and I would suggest implementation are shipped by tomorrow. the insurgency has erupted. He, in turn, re- of the following measures: inform Taraki KIRILENKO. Let us authorize Com- sponded that this would be difficult inas- that we are raising the price of gas from 15 rade Kosygin to implement those amend- much as there is unrest in other places as to 25 rubles per thousand cubic meters. That ments to the draft of the decision of the well. In short, they are expecting a major will make it possible to cover the expenses Council of Ministers of the USSR. which response from the USSR, in the form of both that they will incur in connection with the we have before us, as relates to those points land and air forces. acquisition of arms and other materials by a which we have discussed. Tomorrow he will ANDROPOV. They are hoping that we rise in prices. It is necessary in my opinion present the document to us in final draft. will attack the insurgents. to give Afghanistan these arms free of KOSYGIN. Absolutely. I will come KIRILENKO. The question arises, charge and not require any 25 percent as- here tomorrow morning and do everything. whom will our troops be fighting against if sessment. KIRILENKO. We must undertake we send them there[?] Against the insur- ALL. Agreed. measures to ensure that all of the military gents? Or have they been joined by a large KOSYGIN. And third, we are slated supplies are sent in March. number of religious fundamentalists, that is, to supply 75 thousand tons of bread. I think KOSYGIN. And if, as Comrade Muslims, and among them large numbers we should reexamine that and supply Af- Ustinov has pointed out, it is impossible to of ordinary people? Thus, we will be re- ghanistan with 100 thousand tons. These ship everything completely in March, then quired to wage war in significant part against are the measures that it seems to me ought perhaps, a second portion can remain for the people. to be added to the draft of the decision and, April, but let that portion be insignificantly KOSYGIN. What is the army like in in that fashion, we would lend moral assis- small. Afghanistan—how many divisions are tance to the Afghan leadership. We must I also want to raise another question: there? put up a struggle for Afghanistan; after all, whatever you may say, Amin and Taraki USTINOV. The army in Afghanistan we have lived side by side for 60 years. Of alike are concealing from us the true state has 10 divisions, including more than 100 course, while there is a difficult struggle with of affairs. We still don’t know exactly what thousand soldiers. the Iranians, Pakistanis, and Chinese, nev- is happening in Afghanistan. What is their ANDROPOV. Our operational data ertheless Iran will lend assistance to Af- assessment of the situation? After all, they tells us that about three thousand insurgents ghanistan—it has the means to do so, all the continue to paint the picture in a cheerful are being directed into Afghanistan from more so since they are like-minded reli- light, whereas in reality, we can see what is Pakistan. These are, in main part, religious giously. This must be borne in mind. Paki- happening there. They are good people, that fanatics from among the people. stan will also take such measures. There is is apparent, but all the same they are con- KIRILENKO. If there is a popular nothing you can say about the Chinese. cealing a great deal from us. What is the uprising, then, besides those persons com- Consequently, I believe that we must adopt reason for this, that is hard to say. In my ing from Pakistan and Iran, who for the most the fraternal decision seriously to assist the view we must decide this question with the part consist of terrorists and insurgents, the Afghan leadership. I have already spoken ambassador, Andrey Andreevich masses against whom our troops are en- on the subject of payments, to talk more of [Gromyko], as soon as possible. Although gaged will include ordinary people of Af- that is unnecessary, and moreover, as here as a practical matter he is not authorized, ghanistan. Although it is true that they are written, in freely convertible hard currency. and he doesn’t do what is required of him. religious worshipers, followers of Islam. Whatever freely convertible currency they In addition, I would consider it neces- GROMYKO. The relationship be- may have, we are not going to receive any sary to send an additional number of quali- tween the supporters of the government and of it in any event. fied military specialists, and let them find the insurgents is still very unclear. Events USTINOV. Everything that is de- out what is happening with the army. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 139

Moreover, I would consider it neces- single day, deploy into Afghanistan the it. But I think it is best for Comrade Kosygin sary to adopt a more comprehensive politi- 105th airborne division and redeploy the to speak with Taraki. cal decision. Perhaps the draft of such a infantry-motorized regiment into Kabul; ALL. Agreed. It is better for Com- political decision can be prepared by our toward the border we would place the 68th rade Kosygin to speak with him. comrades in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, motorized division; and the 5th motor artil- ANDROPOV. We must finalize the the Ministry of Defense, or the Foreign De- lery division would be located at the bor- political statement, bearing in mind that we partment of the KGB. It is clear that Iran, der. Under this scenario, we would be ready will be labeled as an aggressor, but that in China, and Pakistan will come out against for the deployment of forces within three spite of that, under no circumstances can we Afghanistan, and do everything within their days. But we must adopt the political deci- lose Afghanistan. power and means to contravene the lawful sion that we have been talking about here. PONOMAREV. Unfortunately, there government and discredit its actions. It is KIRILENKO. Comrade Ustinov has is much that we do not know about Afghani- exactly here that our political support of correctly stated the issue; we must come out stan. It seems to me that, in the discussion Taraki and his government is necessary. And against the insurgents. And in the political with Taraki, all these questions must be of course, Carter will also come out against document this must be clearly and pointedly raised, and in particular, let him explain the the leadership of Afghanistan. stated. state of affairs with the army and in the coun- With whom will it be necessary for us In addition to that, we must bear upon try generally. After all, they have a 100,000- to fight in the event it becomes necessary to Taraki; if we are already talking about the man army and with the assistance of our ad- deploy troops - who will it be that rises deployment of forces, then the question must visors, there is much that the army can do. against the present leadership of Afghani- be considered thoroughly. We cannot de- Otherwise, 20 thousand insurgents are go- stan? They are all Mohammedans, people ploy troops without a request from the gov- ing to achieve a victory. Above all, it will of one belief, and their faith is sufficiently ernment of Afghanistan, and we must con- be necessary to accomplish everything that strong that they can close ranks on that ba- vey this to Comrade Taraki. And this must is necessary with the forces of the Afghan sis. It seems to me that we must speak to be directly stated in a conference between army, and only later, if and when the neces- Taraki and Amin about the mistakes that Comrade Kosygin and Taraki. In addition sity truly arises, to deploy our own forces. they have permitted to occur during this to this, Taraki must be instructed to change KOSYGIN. In my view it is neces- time. In reality, even up to the present time, his tactics. Executions, torture and so forth sary to send arms, but only if we are con- they have continued to execute people that cannot be applied on a massive scale. Reli- vinced that they will not fall into the hands do not agree with them; they have killed al- gious questions, the relationship with reli- of the insurgents. If their army collapses, most all of the leaders - not only the top lead- gious communities, with religion generally then it follows that those arms will be ers, but also those of the middle ranks - of and with religious leaders take on special claimed by the insurgents. Then the ques- the “Parcham” party. Of course, it will now meaning for them. This is a major policy tion will arise as to how we will respond in be difficult to formulate a political document issue. And here Taraki must ensure, with the view of world public opinion. All this - to do that our comrades will be required to all decisiveness, that no illicit measures will have to be justified, that is, if we are work, as I have already said, for a period of whatsoever are undertaken by them. really going to deploy our forces, then we three days. The documents must be prepared no must marshal all of the appropriate argu- USTINOV. That is all correct, what later than tomorrow. We will consult with ments and explain everything in detail. Per- Aleksey Nikolaevich [Kosygin] says, this Leonid Ilych as to how we can best accom- haps one of our responsible comrades should must be done as soon as possible. plish this. travel to Afghanistan in order to understand GROMYKO. The documents must be USTINOV. We have a second option the local conditions in greater detail. Per- prepared immediately. which has also been prepared. This one haps Comrade Ustinov or Comrade KOSYGIN. I don’t think that we deals with the deployment of two divisions Ogarkov. should pressure the Afghan government to into Afghanistan. USTINOV. The situation in Afghani- request a deployment of forces from us. Let ANDROPOV. We need to adopt the stan is worsening. We ought to speak now, them create their own special units, which draft of the decision which we have exam- it seems to me, about political measures that could be redeployed to the more difficult ined today, accounting for those changes and we have not yet undertaken. And, on the regions in order to quell the insurgents. amendments which have been discussed. As other hand, we must fully exploit the capa- USTINOV. In my view we must not, far as the political decision is concerned, that bility of the Afghan army. It seems to me under any circumstances, mix our forces also must be immediately prepared, because there is no point in me going to Afghani- with the Afghan forces, in the event that we bands are streaming in from Pakistan. stan; I have doubts about that. Perhaps some send them there. PONOMAREV. We should send member of the government should go. KOSYGIN. We must prepare our own around 500 persons into Afghanistan in the KOSYGIN. You must go there none- military forces, work up a statement relat- capacity as advisors and specialists. These theless, Dmitri Fedorovich [Ustinov]. The ing to them, and send it by special messen- comrades must all know what to do. point is that we are sending into Afghani- ger. ANDROPOV. Around Herat there are stan a large volume of armaments, and it is USTINOV. We have prepared two 20 thousand civilians who have taken part necessary that they remain in the hands of options in respect to military action. Under in the rebellion. As far as negotiations with the revolutionary masses. We have about the first one, we would, in the course of a Taraki are concerned, we must get on with 550 advisors in Afghanistan, and they must 140 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

be apprised of the state of affairs in the mili- cus on the political leadership of the coun- countries. tary. try and the army. And all the same, we have 8. Comrades Ponomarev and Zamyatin USTINOV. Even if one of us goes to to acknowledge that the Afghan leadership shall be authorized to prepare materials re- Afghanistan, still nobody is going to learn is concealing a great deal from us. For some lating to the intervention of Pakistan, the anything in just a couple of days. reason they do not want to be open with us. USA, Iran, China and other countries in GROMYKO. I think that negotiations This is very unfortunate. Afghanistan and to dispatch such material with Taraki should be undertaken by A.N. ANDROPOV. It seems to me that we to the press as it becomes available. Kosygin or D.F. Ustinov, and more likely, ought to inform the socialist countries of 9. We must think carefully about how in the end, by Comrade Kosygin. these measures. we will respond to the accusations that will KOSYGIN. Before speaking with KIRILENKO. We have spoken at be leveled against the USSR by other coun- Taraki, it will be necessary for me to get length, Comrades, and our opinions are tries, when we are charged with aggression approval from Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev]. I clear; let us come to a conclusion. and so forth. will speak with Leonid Ilych tomorrow and 1. Comrade Kosygin shall be autho- 10. The Ministry of Defense shall be then talk to Taraki. rized to clarify the document which has been permitted to deploy two divisions on the ANDROPOV. And the essence of our presented to us, to add to it the supply of border between the USSR and Afghanistan. decisions here today must be communicated 100 thousand tons of bread, an increase in And finally, as has been suggested here, to Leonid Ilych in detail. the price of gas from 15 to 25 rubles, and to it will be necessary for us to inform the so- GROMYKO. We have to discuss what remove the language about a percentage, and cialist countries of those measures which we we will do if the situation gets worse. To- hard currency, etc. have adopted. day, the situation in Afghanistan for now is 2. Comrade Kosygin shall be autho- Are there any other proposals, Com- unclear to many of us. Only one thing is rized to communicate with Comrade Taraki, rades? clear - we cannot surrender Afghanistan to to ascertain how they evaluate the situation ALL. It’s all been covered. the enemy. We have to think how to achieve in Afghanistan and what is necessary from KIRILENKO. I will now attempt to this. Maybe we won’t have to introduce us. In this discussion with Taraki, Comrade make contact with Comrade Chernenko and troops. Kosygin shall be guided by the exchange of communicate our proposals to him. KOSYGIN. All of us agree - we must opinion that has taken place here in the Po- ALL. Agreed. [Recess.] not surrender Afghanistan. From this point, litburo. KIRILENKO. I have just spoken with we have to work out first of all a political 3. The third point that we have dis- Comrade Chernenko. He believes that the document, to use all political means in or- cussed here consists of authorizing Com- proposals set forth here are correct, and he der to help the Afghan leadership to rades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and will attempt to inform Leonid Ilych about strengthen itself, to provide the support Ponomarev to prepare a political document them. which we’ve already planned, and to leave dealing with an exchange of opinions re- Let us adjourn this session for today. as a last resort the use of force. garding our policy in connection with Af- [Session adjourned.] GROMYKO. I want to emphasize ghanistan. again the main thing, which we must con- 4. We must appeal to Pakistan, through [March 18 Session:] sider thoroughly, and that is to come up with our channels in the Ministry of Foreign Af- an answer as to how we will react in the fairs, that the Pakistani government not al- KIRILENKO. Yesterday we agreed event of a critical situation. Taraki is al- low any interference in the internal affairs that Comrade A.N. Kosygin should commu- ready speaking of alarm, whereas Amin to of Afghanistan. nication with Comrade Taraki. Let us lis- date has expressed an optimistic attitude. In 5. I think that we should accede to the ten to Comrade A.N. Kosygin. a word, as you can see, the Afghan leader- proposal of Comrade Ustinov in connection KOSYGIN. As we agreed, yesterday ship, in my view, has incorrectly assessed with assistance to the Afghan army in over- I made contact with Comrade Taraki twice the state of affairs in the army and in the coming the difficulties that it has encoun- by telephone. [Ed. note: See transcript of country generally. tered by means of the forces of our military Kosygin-Taraki telephone conversation be- PONOMAREV. The Afghan army units. low.] He informed me that on the streets of achieved a revolutionary coup d’etat, and I 6. To send into Afghanistan our best Herat, the insurgent soldiers were fraterniz- would think that under skillful leadership military specialists, through our channels ing with those who support the government. from the government, it could hold to its with the Ministry of Defense, as well as The situation in that town is very complex. own position in defense of the country. through the KGB, for a detailed explication If, in the words of Comrade Taraki, the So- KIRILENKO. The problem is that of the circumstances prevailing in the Af- viet Union does not lend its assistance at many of the commanders in the army have ghan army and in Afghanistan generally. this time, we will not hold out. been imprisoned and executed. This has 7. Our draft of the decision must con- Further, Comrade Taraki said that Iran resulted in a major negative impact on the tain a provision for the preparation of mate- and Pakistan are supplying arms to the in- army. rials that expose the interference in the in- surgents, and that, at the time, Afghans were GROMYKO. One of our principal ternal affairs of Afghanistan on the part of returning from Iran, but it turned out that tasks is to strengthen the army; that is the Pakistan, Iran, the USA, and China, and for they were not Afghans but rather soldiers main link. Our entire orientation must fo- publication of those materials through third of the Iranian army dressed in Afghan cloth- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 141 ing. And they stirred up agitation and in- And the conversation again turned to Herat, there is support for the army. And again, surrection. Consequently, in a number of and he said that if Herat falls, then the revo- like Comrade Taraki, he appealed for assis- provinces of Afghanistan, and especially in lution is doomed. And on the contrary, if it tance. the town of Herat, events have unfolded that holds out, then survival of the revolution is KIRILENKO. It follows that they have bring with them a most serious danger. assured. In his opinion, the army is reli- no guarantee in respect to their own army. Comrade Taraki said further that the issue able, and they are depending on it. How- They are depending on only one outcome, could be resolved in a single day. If Herat ever, uprisings have emerged throughout the namely, on our tanks and armored cars. falls, then it is considered that the matter is entire country, and the army is too small to KOSYGIN. We must, obviously, in finished. be able to pacify the insurgents everywhere. adopting such a determination in respect to I then put the question to him: in Af- Your assistance is required, Comrade Taraki assistance, seriously think through the con- ghanistan there is a 100 thousand man army, again declared. sequences that will flow from this. The not all of which is situated in Herat; there is As far as Kabul is concerned, there, it matter is really very serious. only the one 17th division there. Could it is obvious from the telegrams we received ANDROPOV. Comrades, I have con- really be impossible to form several divi- today, the situation is basically the same as sidered all these issues in depth and arrived sions and deploy them to Herat in order to in Iran: manifestos are circulating, and at the conclusion that we must consider very, assist the supporters of the government? crowds of people are massing. Large num- very seriously, the question of whose cause Comrade Taraki responded that several di- bers of persons are flowing into Afghani- we will be supporting if we deploy forces visions were being formed, but that until stan from Pakistan and Iran, equipped with into Afghanistan. It’s completely clear to they were formed, there would be no garri- Iranian and Chinese armaments. us that Afghanistan is not ready at this time sons loyal to the government in Herat. KIRILENKO. In Herat the 17th divi- to resolve all of the issues it faces through In that connection they would like to sion numbers 9 thousand men. Can it re- socialism. The economy is backward, the receive reinforcements in the form of tanks ally be that they are all in a state of inaction Islamic religion predominates, and nearly and armored cars for the infantry. I then or have gone over to the side of the all of the rural population is illiterate. We asked him, will you be able to muster government’s opponents? know Lenin’s teaching about a revolution- enough tank crews to place the tanks into KOSYGIN. According to our data, the ary situation. Whatever situation we are action? He responded that they have no tank artillery and one infantry regiment have talking about in Afghanistan, it is not that crews, and therefore he requested that we gone over, although not entirely, and the rest type of situation. Therefore, I believe that dispatch Tajiks to serve as crews for tanks continue to support the government. we can suppress a revolution in Afghani- and armored cars, dressed in Afghan uni- USTINOV. As far as the Tajiks are stan only with the aid of our bayonets, and forms, and send them here. I then stated concerned, we don’t have separate [deleted] that is for us entirely inadmissible. We can- again, Comrade Taraki, there is no way you KOSYGIN. An antiaircraft battalion not take such a risk. will conceal the fact that our military per- located in Herat has also gone over to the KOSYGIN. Maybe we ought to in- sonnel are taking part in battle operations; side of the rebels. struct our ambassador, Comrade this fact will be immediately uncovered, and USTINOV. Amin, when I talked to Vinogradov, to go to Prime Minister of Iran press correspondents will broadcast to the him, also requested the deployment of forces [Mehdi] Bazargan and inform him that in- whole world that Soviet tanks are engaged to Herat to quell the insurgents. terference in the internal affairs of Afghani- in a military conflict in Afghanistan. KOSYGIN. Comrade Taraki reports stan cannot be tolerated. I also asked Comrade Taraki what was that half of the division located in Herat has GROMYKO. I completely support the population of Kabul. In response he told gone over to the side of the rebels. The re- Comrade Andropov’s proposal to rule out me that the population was 1 million 200 maining portion, he thinks, also will not such a measure as the deployment of our thousand. I then asked him, would it really support the government. troops into Afghanistan. The army there is be impossible for you to form part of a divi- USTINOV. The Afghan revolution has unreliable. Thus our army, when it arrives sion from the population of Kabul to assist encountered major difficulties along its way, in Afghanistan, will be the aggressor. the various provinces, to equip them and, in Amin said in his conversation with me, and Against whom will it fight? Against the like fashion, to arm them? To that he re- its survival now depends totally on the So- Afghan people first of all, and it will have sponded that there was nobody to train them. viet Union. to shoot at them. Comrade Andropov cor- I then said to him, how is it possible, given What is the problem? Why is this hap- rectly noted that indeed the situation in Af- how many people were trained in the mili- pening? The problem is that the leadership ghanistan is not ripe for a revolution. And tary academic academies in the Soviet of Afghanistan did not sufficiently appreci- all that we have done in recent years with Union, given how many of the old military ate the role of Islamic fundamentalists. It is such effort in terms of détente, arms reduc- cadres have come out on the side of the gov- under the banner of Islam that the soldiers tion, and much more - all that would be ernment, that there is now nobody to do the are turning against the government, and an thrown back. China, of course, would be training? How then, I asked him, can we absolute majority, perhaps only with rare given a nice present. All the nonaligned support you? Almost without realizing it, exceptions, are believers. There is your rea- countries will be against us. In a word, se- Comrade Taraki responded that almost no- son why they are asking us to help drive rious consequences are to be expected from body does support the government. In back the attacks of the insurgents in Herat. such an action. There will no longer be any Kabul we have no workers, only craftsmen. Amin said, albeit somewhat uncertainly, that question of a meeting of Leonid Ilych with 142 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Carter, and the visit of [French President] over to the adversary or is just sitting and ANDROPOV. We have to begin pub- Giscard d’Estang at the end of March will waiting it out, but against the people. There lishing articles about Pakistan and its sup- be placed in question. One must ask, and would be huge minuses for us. A whole con- port for the insurgents. what would we gain? Afghanistan with its tingent of countries would quickly come out USTINOV. I assume we will continue present government, with a backward against us. And there are no pluses for us at with the aid measures that we agreed on economy, with inconsequential weight in in- all. yesterday. ternational affairs. On the other side, we ANDROPOV. We should state directly ALL. Agreed. must keep in mind that from a legal point of to Comrade Taraki that we will support you USTINOV. The only thing is that we view too we would not be justified in send- with all measures and means except for the must rule out the possibility of deploying ing troops. According to the UN Charter a deployment of troops. troops. country can appeal for assistance, and we KOSYGIN. We should invite him here KOSYGIN. In short, we are not chang- could send troops, in case it is subject to and tell him that we will support you with ing anything in connection with aid to Af- external aggression. Afghanistan has not all means and measures but we will not de- ghanistan except the deployment of troops. been subject to any aggression. This is its ploy troops. They themselves will relate more responsi- internal affair, a revolutionary internal con- KIRILENKO. The government of Af- bly to the determination of questions con- flict, a battle of one group of the population ghanistan itself has done nothing to secure cerning the government’s management of against another. Incidentally, the Afghans the situation. And it has a 100 thousand man affairs. And if we do everything for them, haven’t officially addressed us on bringing army at that. What has it done? What good defend their revolution, then what remains in troops. has it accomplished? Essentially nothing. for them? Nothing. We have 24 advisors in In a word, we now find ourselves in a And after all, Comrades, we gave very, very Herat. We should pull them out. situation where the leadership of the coun- good support to Afghanistan. ZAMYATIN. As far as the supply of try, as a result of the serious mistakes it has ALL. Agreed. propaganda is concerned in connection with allowed to occur, has ended up not on the KIRILENKO. We gave it everything. this undertaking, we have articles prepared high ground, not in command of the neces- And what has come of it? It has come to about Afghanistan. We also have articles sary support from the people. nothing of any value. After all, it was they prepared about Pakistan and the assistance KIRILENKO. Yesterday in Afghani- who executed innocent people for no rea- rendered to the Afghan insurgents by China. stan the situation was different, and we were son and even spoke to us of their own justi- We must get these articles to press today. inclined toward the conclusion that we fication, as though we also executed people ALL. Agreed. ought, perhaps, to deploy some number of during the time of Lenin. So you see what CHERNENKO. Comrades, we must military detachments. Today the situation kind of Marxists we have found. decide who will invite Comrade Taraki. is different, and the discussion here quite The situation has changed since yes- KIRILENKO. This should be done by correctly has already taken a somewhat dif- terday. Yesterday, as I already said, we were Comrade A.N. Kosygin. Let him make the ferent course, namely, we are all adhering unanimous as to the rendering of military call and invite him to come to Moscow or to the position that there is no basis whatso- aid, but we carefully discussed the matter, Tashkent, whichever he prefers. ever for the deployment of forces. considered various options, searched for [With this the session of March 18 was ANDROPOV. Yesterday, when we different ways, other than the deployment adjourned.] discussed this issue, the Afghans were not of troops. I believe that we should present talking about the deployment of troops; to- our point of view of Leonid Ilych, invite [March 19 session:] day the situation there has changed. In Comrade Taraki to Moscow and tell him Herat, not just one regiment has gone over about everything that we have agreed on. BREZHNEV. Comrades, since the to the side of the rebellion but the whole Maybe it is true we should send spe- beginning of the events that have unfolded division. As we can see from yesterday’s cial declarations to [Ayatollah Ruhollah] in Afghanistan, I have been informed about discussion with Amin, the people do not Khomeini and Bazargan in Iran and Paki- them. I have been informed about the dis- support the government of Taraki. Would stan? cussions of Comrade A. A. Gromyko with our troops really help them here? In such a ANDROPOV. We should invite Com- Amin, of Comrade D. F. Ustinov also with situation, tanks and armored cars can’t save rade Taraki here. Amin, about the latest events that have taken anything. I think that we should say to KOSYGIN. I think we should consult place there in the course of yesterday, and Taraki bluntly that we support all their ac- with Leonid Ilych and send a plane to Kabul in that connection about the discussion of tions and will render the kind of support that today. Comrade A.N. Kosygin with Comrade we agreed upon yesterday and today, but that KIRILENKO. Comrade Kosygin Taraki. in no case will we go forward with a de- needs to speak with Comrade Taraki. If he I have signed documents authorizing ployment of troops into Afghanistan. wants to come to Moscow and not remain the delivery of additional supplies of spe- KOSYGIN. Maybe we should invite in Tashkent, then perhaps Leonid Ilych will cial materials, including military property him here and tell him that we will increase see him. and armaments, and also dealing with the our assistance to you, but we cannot deploy GROMYKO. I think it would be bet- issue of a number of measures having a po- troops, since they would be fighting not ter for us to prepare a political document litical and organizational character, and au- against the army, which in essence has gone after the discussion with Comrade Taraki. thorizing Comrade A.N. Kosygin to com- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 143 municate with Comrade Taraki, and to brief side of the insurgents, shooting broke out the Afghan army will behave. And if it does our press and other media outlets in con- and there were many casualties; more than not support our measures or remains neu- nection with the events in Afghanistan. In a thousand were killed. tral, then it will turn out that we have used a word, all of the measures that were set I discussed all aspects of the situation our forces to occupy Afghanistan. In doing forth in the draft decision of the Central in Afghanistan with the Deputy Premier and this we will create for ourselves an incred- Committee of the CPSU submitted on Sat- Minister of Foreign Affairs Amin. But I ibly difficult complication in our foreign urday, all of the measures that have been must say candidly that his assessment was policy. We would be largely throwing away adopted in the course of Saturday and Sun- somehow rather relaxed. We were under everything we achieved with such difficulty, day, in my view, are entirely correct. the impression conveyed by his assessment, particularly détente, the SALT-II negotia- The question was raised as to the im- and then suddenly the mood of Amin tions would fly by the wayside, there would mediate participation of our troops in the changed for the worse, and he himself be- be no signing of an agreement (and how- conflict that has arisen in Afghanistan. In gan to speak about the fact that the entire ever you look at it that is for us the greatest my view the Politburo has correctly deter- division located in Herat had gone over to political priority), there would be no meet- mined that the time is not right for us to be- the side of the insurgents. At the height of ing of Leonid Ilych with Carter, and it is come entangled in that war. the events in Herat, Dmitri Fedorovich very doubtful that Giscard d’Estang would We must explain to Comrade Taraki [Ustinov] spoke with Amin, who bluntly come to visit us, and our relations with West- and our other Afghan comrades, that we can expressed the view that the USSR should ern countries, particularly the FRG [Federal help them with everything that is necessary deploy troops in Herat. It begins to look Republic of Germany], would be spoiled. for the conduct of all activities in the coun- like a detective novel, how superciliously And so, despite the difficult situation try. But the involvement of our forces in the Afghan leadership posits such serious in Afghanistan, we cannot embark on such Afghanistan would harm not only us, but questions. an act as the deployment of troops (Paren- first of all them. Accordingly, it would ap- After that, Comrade A. N. Kosygin thetically, it is entirely incomprehensible to pear that we ought now to hear the report of spoke with Comrade Taraki, who told him us why Afghanistan has been so indulgent Comrades A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov, that the situation in Afghanistan was bad, with Pakistan, which is obviously engaged Y.V. Andropov and A.N. Kosygin, and with and he also requested a deployment of troops in intervention against Afghanistan. Yes- that conclude this phase of the adoption of to Herat. The border of Afghanistan, both terday the government of Afghanistan pub- measures which were necessary to imple- with Iran and Pakistan, is open. Our advi- lished a proclamation, but it was not suffi- ment in connection with the conflict in Af- sors promptly articulated a series of propos- ciently strident.) ghanistan. als, but they didn’t listen to them. We are rendering major aid to Afghani- GROMYKO. We must discuss today Today we have received reports indi- stan. How the government of Afghanistan the very acute question concerning the situ- cating that the situation in Herat is not all will conduct itself henceforth is difficult to ation in Afghanistan. We have closely fol- that bad: two regiments remain loyal to the predict; determining the situation there is lowed the developing events in that coun- government after all. Where lies the truth, I also problematic. However, there is no ba- try and have given instructions to our em- can’t say, but these are the reports we have sis whatsoever to conclude that all is lost bassy personnel, advisors and so forth. We gotten. there. I believe that if the Afghan govern- have systematically, I would say, very regu- We may assume with full justification ment can find in itself the strength to coor- larly, in the course of the day, received com- that all these events, not only in Afghani- dinate its actions properly, then matters prehensive information from our represen- stan but in the neighboring governments, might turn out there for the best. tatives in Afghanistan. including those in China, are being directed KOSYGIN. I had the opportunity to What do we have as of today? In an by the hand of the USA. China, Pakistan, speak with Comrade Taraki yesterday on array of provinces in Afghanistan, first and and Iran are playing a role here that is not at two occasions. He says that everything there foremost in Herat, there has been an upris- all far behind. is falling apart and that we must send troops, ing of insurgents. Where did they come There are several heartening notes in that the situation is the same in all of Af- from? They were dispatched from the ter- the fact that in Kabul, yesterday, a massive ghanistan as it is in Herat. He says that if ritory of Iran and Pakistan. These are all demonstration took place in support of the we lose Herat, then everything will fall. elements hostile to the government of Com- government. But all the same the govern- Pakistan, in his opinion, is sending a large rade Taraki. In order to conceal their de- ment position in Afghanistan is not in con- number of men, dressed in Afghan uniforms. ployment into Afghanistan, they were trol as it ought to be. According to his data, 4,000 such persons dressed in Afghan uniforms, and in num- Naturally, we cannot avoid the need to have been dispatched. There are 500 men bers amounting to several tens of thousands confront the questions relating to the situa- situated on the airfield in Herat at this time. they appeared in Herat, instigated this in- tion in Afghanistan. But I believe that we I asked him, who in Herat is on your side? surrection, and we unexpectedly began to will have to adhere to our line, our policy, Comrade Taraki responded that in essence receive reports about the events in Herat. and follow our course with a view to all of the entire population there has fallen under There is one government division located the peculiarities. If, for example, we take the influence of the religious fundamental- there, which was supposed to maintain pub- upon ourselves the risk of deploying troops, ists. He said that there are 200-250 persons lic order. But as a result of the fact that part we will obtain not as many pluses as mi- there who are organizing the entire thing. I of the government forces went over to the nuses. To this time we still don’t know how asked him, are there any workers there? He 144 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

said, that there are about two thousand work- Iran must be sent today. ANDROPOV. The first question that ers. I asked him what, in your opinion, are USTINOV. Amin spoke with me yes- must be decided concerns the difficulty of the prospects for Herat? He said to me terday morning. Having consulted before- the situation. In addition to that the situa- bluntly that Herat will fall tomorrow, but that hand with Leonid Ilych, I told him about tion is increasingly unreliable. Just what it is holding on for the time being. the massive aid that we are turning out and exactly is going on in Afghanistan? It has They are talking about forming new will continue to render. Amin said that the to do with the leadership. The leadership units and sending them to Herat. In the opin- Soviet Union is our closest and principal does not recognize the forces which support ion of Comrade Taraki, all who have gath- friend. He then started to lament about the it, and on which it could depend. Today, ered from the ranks of those dissatisfied with fact that Pakistan and Iran are sending large for example, a rather substantial demonstra- the new regime will then unite and set out numbers of saboteurs that are being trained tion took place in Kabul and Herat, but the for Kabul, and that will be the end of his on the territory of Pakistan by Chinese ad- leadership did not exploit these massive government. Again he requested assistance visors, being equipped with Chinese arms, measures to the necessary extent. Educa- from our troops. I said that I could not an- and are then being sent across the border tional efforts have been poorly managed not swer his request at this time. I said that we into Afghanistan. only in the army but among the population were intensively studying the question, and There is strong opposition in Afghani- generally. They execute their political op- that we would deliberate and then respond. stan on the part of the feudal lords. ponents. Nobody listens to the radio because As you can see, the discussion with He then turned the discussion to Herat transmissions are very weak. It will be nec- Comrade Taraki yielded no constructive re- and, just like Taraki, asked us to send tanks. essary for us to assist them with mobile tele- sults whatsoever. He spoke of the fall of I told him about the aid that we had deter- communications facilities. Herat and requested a deployment of our mined to give Afghanistan in the form of a Amin has essentially had all of the troops. I asked him what was required from supply of armaments. He said that such aid power in his hands, but only yesterday did our side in order to political mea- was helpful, but what they really need is for they ratify a new director of government sures with those of a military character. us to send tanks. security and a chief of state. This is the way Taraki then said to me, you should place BREZHNEV. Their army is falling to achieve some broadening of the political Afghan insignias on your planes and tanks, apart, and we are supposed to wage the war base among the leadership. and let them move on Herat from across the for them. On our part, we have advisors there border. I then said that this would be direct USTINOV. We have a large number under the direction of the chief advisor for aggression on the part of the USSR against of advisors in the Afghan army, as well as party policy Comrade Veselov. In my opin- Afghanistan. interpreters. I told Amin that we can send ion he is not up to the task and is coping I asked him, can you muster soldiers an additional number of interpreters. badly with the situation. It might be better and special drivers for tanks and armored Getting to the heart of the matter, in if we were to send there some comrade from cars from the ranks of the Afghans? He said Afghanistan there is basically no informa- the Central Committee apparatus. There are that this could be done, but only a very few. tion, no ties between Kabul and Herat. many advisors there. There are advisors in I told him of our decision to render There is a single small electric power sta- KGB channels, also in large numbers. comprehensive assistance to Afghanistan, to tion there, and consequently the insurgent I think that as far as the deployment of send an additional number of advisors and elements, having deserted the government, troops is concerned, it would not behoove specialists. are heading into the mountains. us to make such a determination. To de- Naturally, we must preserve Afghani- The situation in Herat today is some- ploy our troops would mean to wage war stan as an allied government. In addition, it what better. It is calm in the city. Technical against the people, to crush the people, to would appear that we must appeal to Paki- assistance, of course, will be necessary for shoot at the people. We will look like ag- stan with a warning that intervention against us to send. We will send a great deal of it. gressors, and we cannot permit that to oc- Afghanistan is intolerable. The same mea- We are forming two divisions in the cur. sure must be taken in respect to Iran. The Turkestan military district, and one division PONOMAREV. We have 460 Afghan message must be directed to Khomeini and in the Central Asian military district. We military personnel in the Soviet Union. to Bazargan. We must also come out with a have three regiments that could arrive in Af- These are all prepared officer cadres; they similar document in respect to Iran. ghanistan in literally three hours. But I am could be sent into Afghanistan. It would be good if the borders with saying this, of course, only to emphasize our OGARKOV. The Afghans have ap- Pakistan and Iran could be closed. state of readiness. Like the rest of my Com- pealed to us with a request to speed up the It seems to me that it would make sense rades, I do not support the idea of deploy- training of 160 officers. to take the further step of sending a good ing troops to Afghanistan. I would request USTINOV. We have to speak with ambassador to Afghanistan. From the dis- permission that we conduct tactical exer- Comrade Taraki about getting those people cussion with Comrade Taraki I learned that cises on the border with Afghanistan and to sent there and using them as officer cadres. he doesn’t even know to whom the govern- form regiments and divisions. KAPITONOV. As far as our chief ad- ment should turn. A great political task is I must say that the Afghan leadership visor on party policy Comrade Veselov is necessary there, and only in that event can is poorly handling very many matters, and concerned, he is a good man. He served as we save Afghanistan as an ally. that working under such conditions is very the Central Committee inspector with us, BREZHNEV. Letters to Pakistan and difficult for our advisors. and more recently worked as the INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 145 secretary to the Bashkirskii general party CPSU Politburo session of ence of the USA, Pakistan, Iran, China in committee. He is a young and energetic 18 March 1979 the internal affairs of the Democratic Re- comrade. public of Afghanistan. As soon as these ma- USTINOV. Our party advisors are not About certain measures of a political and terials are ready, send them to press. sufficiently qualified and there are very few organizational nature regarding the sharp- 4. Assign the MFA USSR and the CC of them, in all, it seems to me, five men, but ening of the situation in the Democratic CPSU International department to prepare the work has to be done very quickly. Republic of Afghanistan a draft of an appeal to the governments of KAPITONOV. That’s right, we really Iran and Pakistan about the inadmissability do have only five men there under the di- 1. Assign Com. Kosygin, A.N. to ne- of preparing diversionist and terroristic acts rection of Comrade Veselov. But we are gotiate by telephone with Com. N.M. Taraki on the territories of Iran and Pakistan, send- right now selecting a number of additional about the possibility of a meeting with him ing diversionist groups onto the territory of comrades and will send them there. in Moscow or Tashkent. Afghanistan, and intervention in the inter- BREZHNEV. I think that we should nal affairs of the DRA. approve the measures that have been worked CC SECRETARY 5. Assign the KGB USSR and the CC out in the course of these few days. 3-zm mk CPSU Department of foreign political pro- ALL. Agreed. paganda to prepare and send to third coun- BREZHNEV. It follows that the ap- [new document] tries materials about the interference in the propriate comrades should be authorized to internal affairs of Afghanistan by the USA, carry them out aggressively and if new ques- Proletariats of all countries, unite! Pakistan, Iran, China, and other countries. tions arise in connection with Afghanistan, Communist Party of the Soviet Union. to submit them to the Politburo. CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY CC ALL. Agreed. BREZHNEV. Accordingly, we are TOP SECRET [Source: Archive of the President, Russian adopting the decision: Federation (APRF), f. 3 op. 82, d. 137, ll. No.P147/II 121-123; obtained by Carter-Brezhnev To bring Comrade Taraki here tomor- Project; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] row, March 20. To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Discussions will be conducted by Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Ustinov, Transcript of Telephone Conversation Comrades A. N. Kosygin, A. A. Gromyko, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimianin, Zamiatin, Between Soviet Premier and D. F. Ustinov, and then I will see him. Smirtiukov. and Afghan Prime Minister Nur ALL. Very well. Mohammed Tarki, 17 or 18 March 1979 With this the session was adjourned. Extract from protocol No. 147 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 18 March 1979 Kosygin: Ask Comrade Taraki, perhaps [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25 dok.1, ll. 1, he will outline the situation in Afghanistan. 12-25; document provided by M. Kramer About certain measures of a political and Taraki: The situation is bad and get- (Harvard University); translation by Carter- organizational nature regarding the sharp- ting worse. Brezhnev Project.] ening of the situation in the Democratic Kosygin: Do you have support among Republic of Afghanistan the workers, city dwellers, the petty CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on bourgoisie, and the white collar workers in Afghanistan, 18 March 1979 1. Special file. Herat? Is there still anyone on your side? 2. In relation to the sharpening of the Taraki: There is no active support on Proletariats of all countries, unite! situation in the DRA, consider expedient the the part of the population. It is almost Subject to return within 3 days to the CC acceptance of a political document which wholly under the influence of Shiite slogans CPSU (General Department, 1st Sector) reveals the reasons for the sharpening of the - follow not the heathens, but follow us. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. situation in Afghanistan, and defines our propaganda is underpinned by this. CENTRAL COMMITTEE possible steps in providing assistance to the Kosygin: Are there many workers TOP SECRET leadership of the DRA in the stabilization there? SPECIAL FILE of the the situation in the country. Taraki: Very few—between 1,000 and Assign Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, 2,000 people in all. No.P147/II Ustinov, Ponomarev to prepare a draft reso- Kosygin: What are the prospects? lution on that issue, taking into account the Taraki: We are convinced that the en- To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, exchange of opinions which took place at emy will form new units and will develop Andropov, Gromyko,Kirilenko, Ustinov, the meeting the the CC Politburo. an offensive. Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimianin,Zamiatin, 3. Assign Coms. Ponomarev, Zimianin Kosygin: Do you not have the forces Smirtiukov. and Zamiatin to prepare materials for pub- to rout them? lication in the press, transmission by televi- Taraki: I wish it were the case. Extract from protocol No. 147 of the CC sion and radio, which unmasks the interfer- Kosygin: What, then, are your propos- 146 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

als on this issue? and a few workers. The working class in 14 July 1992, as translated in FBIS-SOV- Taraki: We ask that you extend practi- Afghanistan is very small, but it is a long 92-138 (17 July 1992), pp. 30-31.] cal and technical assistance, involving affair to train them. But we will take any people and arms. measures, if necessary. Meeting of Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, Kosygin: It is a very complex matter. Kosygin: We have decided to quickly and Ponomarev with Taraki in Moscow, Taraki: Iran and Pakistan are working deliver military equipment and property to 20 March 1979 against us, according to the same plan. you and to repair helicopters and aircraft. Hence, if you now launch a decisive attack All this is for free. We have also decided to Top Secret on Herat, it will be possible to save the revo- deliver to you 100,000 tons of grain and to SPECIAL FILE lution. raise gas prices from $21 per cubic meter to Kosygin: The whole world will imme- $37. RECORD OF MEETINGx diately get to know this. The rebels have Taraki: That is very good, but let us of A.N.KOSYGIN, A.A.GROMYKO, portable radio transmitters and will report talk of Herat. Why can’t the Soviet Union D.F.USTINOV and B.N.PONOMAREV it directly. send Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in ci- with N.M.TARAKI Taraki: I ask that you extend assistance. vilian clothing? No one will recognize them. Kosygin: We must hold consultations We want you to send them. They could drive 20 March 1979 on this issue. Do you not have connections tanks, because we have all these nationali- A.N.Kosygin. The Politburo has en- with Iran’s progressives? Can’t you tell ties in Afghanistan. Let them don Afghan trusted us with discussing with you all ques- them that it is currently the United States costume and wear Afghan badges and no tions which you think necessitate an ex- that is your and their chief enemy? The Ira- one will recognize them. It is very easy change of opinions. As I have already men- nians are very hostile toward the United work, in our view. If Iran’s and Pakistan’s tioned to you, your meeting with States and evidently this can be put to use experience is anything to go by, it is clear L.I.Brezhnev is scheduled for 18-18.30. as propaganda. What foreign policy activi- that it is easy to do this work, they have al- At first we proposed that the first word ties or statements would you like to see com- ready shown how it can be done. should be given to you, but since one im- ing from us? Do you have any ideas on this Kosygin: You are, of course, oversim- portant question from your side has already question, propaganda-wise? plifying the issue. It is a complex political been raised, I would like to first set forth Taraki: Propaganda help must be com- and international issue, but, irrespective of our opinion, and then we will attentively bined with practical assistance. I suggest this, we will hold consultations again and hear you out. that you place Afghan markings on your will get back to you. First of all, I would like to emphasize tanks and aircraft and no one will be any Taraki: Send us infantry fighting ve- that the friendship between Soviet Union the wiser. Your troops could advance from hicles by air. and the Democratic Republic of Afghani- the direction of Kushka and from the direc- Kosygin: Do you have anyone to drive stan is not conditional, dictated by some tion of Kabul. In our view, no one will be them? temporary viewpoints, but calculated for any the wiser. They will think these are Taraki: We will find drivers for be- ages. We have given and will continue to Government troops. tween 30 and 35 vehicles. give you assistance in the fight against all Kosygin: I do not want to disappoint Kosygin: Are they reliable? Won’t they enemies which act against you at the present you, but it will not be possible to conceal flee to the enemy, together with their ve- time and against those enemies with which this. Two hours later the whole world will hicles? After all, our drivers do not speak you may clash in the future. know about this. Everyone will begin to the language. We have carefully discussed the situa- shout that the Soviet Union’s intervention Taraki: Send vehicles together with tion which has developed in you country, in Afghanistan has begun. If we quickly drivers who speak our language—Tajiks and we looked for ways to assist you which airlift tanks, the necessary ammunition and Uzbeks. would best serve the interests of our friend- make mortars available to you, will you find Kosygin: I expected this kind of reply ship and your relations with other countries. specialists who can use these weapons? from you. We are comrades and are wag- There may be various ways of solving the Taraki: I am unable to answer this ques- ing a common struggle and that is why we problems which have developed in your tion. The Soviet advisers can answer that. should not stand on ceremony with each country, but the best way is that which would Kosygin: Hundreds of Afghan officers other. Everything must be subordinate to preserve the authority of your government were trained in the Soviet Union. Where this. in the eyes of the people, not spoil relations are they all now? between Afghanistan and neighboring coun- Taraki: Most of them are Moslem re- [The first page has a hand-written footnote: tries, and not injure the international pres- actionaries. We are unable to rely on them, At the Central Committee Politburo’s sit- tige of your country. We must not allow the we have no confidence in them. ting on 19 March, Comrade Kosygin read situation to seem as if you were not able to Kosygin: Can’t you recruit a further the transcript of these conversations in the deal with your own problems and invited 50,000 soldiers if we quickly airlift arms to presence of Central Committee secretaries.] foreign troops to assist you. I would like to you? How many people can you recruit? use the example of Vietnam. The Vietnam- Taraki: The core can only be formed [Source: Moscow Russian Television Net- ese people withstood a difficult war with the by older secondary school pupils, students, work in Russian, “Special File” program, USA and are now fighting against Chinese COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 147 aggression, but no one can accuse the Viet- tion and came to the conclusion that if our that the relations between our countries are namese of using foreign troops. The Viet- troops were introduced, the situation in your more than just routine diplomatic ex- namese are bravely defending by themselves country would not only not improve, but changes. They are based on a class founda- their homeland against aggressive encroach- would worsen. One cannot deny that our tion and on mutual ideology and politics. ments. We believe that there are enough troops would have to fight not only with In our country, as in yours, the government forces in your country to stand up to counter- foreign aggressors, but also with a certain belongs to the working class and to the peas- revolutionary raids. One only needs to unify number of your people. And people do not ants, who wrested it from the hands of the them and create new military formations. forgive such things. Besides, as soon as our aristocracy and the feudalists. Our revolu- During our telephone conversation with you troops cross the border, China and all other tion has provoked a malicious reaction from we spoke of the need to begin creating new aggressors will be vindicated. our class enemies. The revolutionary reor- military groups, keeping in mind that a cer- We have come to the conclusion that ganization undertaken by us - liberation of tain amount of time will be needed for their in the given period, the most effective sup- peasants from dependency to landlords and training and preparation. But even at this port that we could give you would be feudalists resulting from debt, redistribution time you have at your disposal a sufficient through methods of our political influence of land to landless peasants, and other mea- force in order to deal with the current situa- on neighboring countries and through the sures - have secured the authority of our gov- tion. One need only deal with it correctly. rendering of extensive and manifold assis- ernment among the people of Afghanistan, Let’s take the example of Herat. It seemed tance. This way would accomplish much and have had a positive response from the that all would fall apart, that the enemy had more than through the deployment of our people of Pakistan and Iran. This has driven firmly entrenched itself there, that the city troops. We are deeply convinced that we can fear into the reactionary forces of these had become a center of counter-revolution. overcome the enemy using the political countries, which have increased their sub- But when you really took charge of the mat- means being undertaken both by your side versive activities against our country, inten- ter, you were able to seize control of the situ- and by our side. We have already discussed sified slanderous propaganda, and begun to ation. We have just received word that to- with you that Afghanistan should work to- send terrorist gangs into our territory. They day, at 11 o’clock in the morning, the mili- wards good relations with Iran, Pakistan and began their propaganda against us by pro- tary town in Herat, the location of the muti- India by eliminating any pretexts they may claiming us apostates of Islam. Then they nous section of the 17th infantry division, have for meddling in your affairs. As for began to accuse us of all other mortal sins. has been taken by a battalion of paratroop- us, today we are sending two documents to The Pakistani propaganda perverted the ers supported by tanks from Kandahar, fol- the leaders of Iran and Pakistan, in which measures undertaken by us towards social lowing air-strikes. Troops loyal to the gov- we tell them with all seriousness not to liberation of women, whom we gave a dig- ernment are securing and further taking ad- meddle in the affairs of Afghanistan. We nified position in society. When we set to vantage of this success. are taking care of this matter ourselves, with- work on land reform, the ruling circles in In our opinion, our assignment for the out drawing you into it. These are, in es- Pakistan, seeing its revolutionary influence current time period is to defend you from sence, the thoughts which we wanted to on their people, crossed over to the politics various international complications. We will share with you openly, as comrades. of sabotage and subversive activities against give you assistance with all available means N.M.Taraki. I am very grateful to you us. The rulers of Pakistan were very fright- - ship weapons, ammunition, send people for the detailed account of the position of ened by the demonstrations that rolled across who can be useful to you in managing mili- the Soviet government on the question the country, protesting under banners “Long tary and domestic matters of the country, which I wanted to discuss. I also speak live the Democratic Republic of Afghani- specialists to train your military personnel forthrightly and openly, as your friend. We stan!” and “Long live Taraki!” Our country in the operation of the most modern types in Afghanistan also believe that emerging was not only being infiltrated by members of weapons and military machinery which problems should first be dealt with through of “the Moslem brotherhood” who had fled we are sending you. The deployment of our political means, and that military actions the country after the revolution, but also by forces in the territory of Afghanistan would must be auxiliary in nature. In the political entire subdivisions, dressed in Afghan mili- immediately arouse the international com- arena, we have taken a number of steps and tary uniforms, which are involved in sub- munity and would invite sharply unfavor- are convinced that the majority of the people versive activities and sabotage. After my able multipronged consequences. This, in remain on our side. Within a day after my visit to Soviet Union and the signing of a effect, would be a conflict not only with im- appearance on the radio where I explained very important Treaty between our coun- perialist countries, but also a conflict with the nature of events in Herat, throughout the tries, the American imperialists and other one’s own people. Our mutual enemies are country there took place 102 demonstra- reactionaries became strongly antagonistic just waiting for the moment when Soviet tions, the participants of which carried plac- against the Democratic Republic of Af- forces appear on Afghan territory. This ards condemning Khomeini and his min- ghanistan. They understood that Afghani- would give them an excuse to deploy on ions. This convinced us that our internal stan had been finally lost by the West. Afghan territory military formations hostile enemies are not so numerous. We were also Through their means of mass information to you. I would again like to underline that happy to hear the news that a segment of the USA, Pakistan, and Iran spread all sorts the question of deploying our forces has our armed forces, taking part in the mutiny, of slanderous material defaming us. It is in been examined by us from every direction; had put down their arms. the close friendship of Afghanistan and the we carefully studied all aspects of this ac- On my part, I also want to emphasize Soviet Union that one finds the main rea- 148 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

son for anti-Afghan activity of imperialists Cuba, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South ceive armored helicopters, an additional and reactionaries. Yemen. We are resisting these schemes, and number of armored transports and military Today we spoke with you concerning are doing everything to rule the country not infantry vehicles, as well as modern means the fact that Afghanistan should maintain by the force of arms, but by winning the of communication. Also, maintenance per- good ties with Pakistan, Iran, and India. This people’s respect through revolutionary- sonnel would be of great help to us. will be difficult to achieve, as Iran, and es- democratic reforms in the interest of the D.F. Ustinov. It seems that we are talk- pecially Pakistan, don’t want friendship with working people. For this we have already ing about MI-24 helicopters, which have us. spent 200 bln. afghani. The people can tell bullet-proof armor. We will give you 6 such A.N. Kosygin. A statement has just who is their friend and who is their enemy. helicopters during June-July and 6 more in been received from [Pakistani leader] Zia- Having seen that propaganda against our the fourth quarter of this year. Perhaps we ul-Haq, in which he notes that events in government has not found a broad response will be able to move up the timetable for Afghanistan are the internal matter of that from the Afghan people, the spiritual lead- deliveries. state and that Pakistan will not interfere in ers have changed tactics and have begun to N.M.Taraki. We have great need for them. This statement also notes that the shout that Afghanistan has become pro-So- these helicopters, and it would be good if government of Pakistan will only deliver viet, pro-communist, that there are now 10 they arrived together with pilots. humanitarian aid to the 35 thou. refugees thousand Soviet people in the country who A.N.Kosygin. We can send you main- from Afghanistan as long as their activities are bossing everyone around. tenance specialists, which would take care do not undermine relations between Paki- To sum up, I would like to say that we of these helicopters at the airport, but, of stan and Afghanistan. are worried by the possibility of infiltrators course, not battle crews. We have already N.M.Taraki. They only speak of hu- being sent across from Iran and Pakistan, spoken about the matter. manitarianism, but are themselves creating though, of course, your verbal confrontation D.F.Ustinov. You must prepare your camps to train commandos against us. with the leaders of Pakistan and Iran will be own pilots. We are training your officers, A.N.Kosygin. We are not so naive as very useful, and will have a sobering effect and we can expedite their release. to believe every word of Zia-ul-Haq, but on them. N.M.Taraki. Perhaps we can get heli- whatever the case may be, the statement has A.N.Kosygin. Some more news. The copter pilots from Hanoi or some other been made and it is binding. Iranian government has issued a directive country, for example, Cuba? B.N.Ponomarev. It seems that the state- ordering all foreign workers to leave the A.N.Kosygin. As I have already said ment of Zia-ul-Haq is Pakistan’s reaction to country by April 21 and for foreign special- earlier, we have helped and are helping Viet- the story in the newspaper “Pravda.” ists to leave by June 21. As for specialists nam a great deal, but they never asked us to A.N.Kosygin. Clearly Pakistan has deemed highly important for the Iranian send them our pilots. They only asked for become worried. They have felt the pres- economy, their cases will be dealt with on technical specialists. We are training 400 sure from not only your side, but also from an individual basis. Afghan officers. Choose the people you ours. N.M.Taraki. This remark most likely need, and we will expedite their training. N.M.Taraki. The article in “Pravda,” is directed towards the Americans. We have N.M.Taraki. We would very much like analyzing the schemes against the DRA, was information that the Iranian government has the delivery of helicopters to be expedited. published exactly at the right time. This already returned to the country American We have a great need for them. article has made a deep impression on our specialists who have been working there on A.N.Kosygin. We will further exam- neighbors. I, of course, agree with you that helicopter assembly. ine your request, and, if possible, will expe- it necessary to take active political steps, and A.N.Kosygin. Yes, we have heard dite the shipment of helicopters. that war is a very risky proposition. It would about it as well, but it is possible that we D.F. Ustinov. But, at the same time, be superfluous to delve into the question of may have more specialists in Iran than do you must worry about pilots for these heli- why the Pakistanis, the Iranians, the Ameri- the Americans. If there arises the question copters. cans, and the Chinese are undertaking such of our specialists leaving, then a large met- N.M.Taraki. Of course we will do that. active steps to undermine us. I would only allurgical factory as well as other important If we cannot find them in our country, then like to emphasize that we have been and will enterprises in Iran will be unable to func- we will look elsewhere. The world is big. continue to remain friends, and that we shall tion. And how many Afghans are working If you do not agree with that, then we will never be as close to anyone as we are with in Iran? search for pilots from among the Afghans you. We have learned and continue to learn N.M.Taraki. No less than 200 thou- studying in your country, but we need trust- from Lenin. We are well aware of Lenin’s sand people. They moved to Iran 5-6 years worthy people, and among the Afghan of- instructions on how to build relations with ago, during the regime of Daoud and even ficers whom we sent to study in the Soviet neighboring countries. We strive towards earlier. If they are going to be expelled, then Union earlier there are many “Muslim broth- good relations with neighbors, but we are under the guise of Afghan workers there will ers” and Chinese sympathizers. hindered by the Americans who are trying be guerillas coming as well, since it is very A.N.Kosygin. Of course, you need to to increase tensions by undermining pro- difficult to determine who is Iranian and sort this out with the people we are train- gressive governments. They have acted thus who is Afghan from one’s appearance. I ing. We can send the “Moslem brothers” against the young Soviet republic in the past, wanted to touch on the question of the needs back, and we can make early graduation of and are now continuing to act thus against of the Afghan army. We would like to re- those people whom you trust. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 149

D.F. Ustinov. This year 190 Afghan your transfer stations can only handle 15 A.N.Kosygin. We will study this ques- officers are finishing their training, among thousand tons of wheat per month. While tion, but, as far as I know, building a radio whom 16 are airplane pilots and 13 - heli- the 100 thou. tons are processed, we will station requires a considerable amount of copter pilots. We will send you, through think about what to do in the future. time. the chief military advisor in Afghanistan N.M.Taraki. Earlier, Pakistan prom- B.N.Ponomarev. We will send you a general Gorelov, the list of graduates, by ised to sell us 200 thou. tons, but then re- specialist in propaganda. You may relate to their specialization. canted on its promise. Turkey also declined him your ideas on how to secure a large pro- N.M.Taraki. Good. We will do that. to deliver 70 thou. tons. We need at least paganda support through socialist countries. However, the problem is that we don’t know another 300 thou. tons of wheat. D.F.Ustinov. Concerning additional the people belonging to counter-revolution- A.N.Kosygin. Since you were ready shipments of military machinery, a need will ary groups by name. We only know that, to pay for Pakistani wheat, you must have arise for additional military specialists and during Daoud’s regime, members of the money? We can buy wheat from the Ameri- advisors. “Muslim Brotherhood” and the pro-Chinese cans and transfer it to Afghanistan. For ex- N.M.Taraki. If you believe that such a “Shoal-i-Jawid” organizations were sent ample, 200 thou. tons of wheat would cost need exists, then, of course, we will accept over to the Soviet Union. We will try to 25 mln. rubles (40 mln. dollars). them. But won’t you allow us, after all, to work this out. N.M.Taraki. It will be difficult for us use pilots and tank operators from other so- A.N.Kosygin. You seem to raise ques- to find such a sum. cialist countries? tions about the deliveries of military machin- A.N.Kosygin. Find as much as you A.N.Kosygin. When referring to our ery with regard to the resolution which we can, and with that sum we will buy you military specialists, we mean mechanics made known in Kabul yesterday evening. wheat. who service military machinery. I cannot In this resolution we speak of large military N.M.Taraki. If we are unable to find understand why the question of pilots and deliveries, of the delivery of 100 thou. tons the means, then we will ask for your help tank operators keeps coming up. This is a of wheat, and of the price increase of Af- with wheat. We would also like to receive a completely unexpected question for us. And ghan natural gas from 24 to 37 dollars per deferment of payment on your loans and on I believe that it is unlikely that socialist 1000 m3. Are you familiar with this docu- their interest. Our military budget is planned countries will agree to this. The question ment? with the hope that such a deferment will be of sending people who would sit in your N.M.Taraki. No. It seems that they given. tanks and shoot at your people - this is a did not manage to brief me on it. A.N.Kosygin. With the free delivery very a pointed political question. A.N.Kosygin. Most likely this docu- of military technology we have already N.M.Taraki. We will see how we can ment arrived in Kabul before your depar- given you significant help for your military use those Afghan soldiers who were sent to ture to Moscow. Here are the decisions that budget. We will further think about that so study with you earlier. Perhaps we will ask the document contains: in March of this year as to provide you certain deferral of pay- you to accept for training those people who you will be sent additionally and without ments on the credits. We will review the is- we will select ourselves. charge 33 pcs. of BMP-1, 5 pcs. of MI-25, sue and will inform you of what can be done D.F.Ustinov. We will, of course, ac- 8 pcs. of MI-8T, as well as 50 pcs. of BTR- with regards to this question. cept them for training. 60pb, 25 pcs. of armored reconnaissance ve- N.M.Taraki. We also need a large ra- A.N.Kosygin. To sum up this conver- hicles, 50 pcs. of mobile anti-aircraft units, dio station, which would allow us to broad- sation, we can ascertain that there remains and an anti-aircraft unit “Strela” [Arrow]. cast propaganda throughout the world. Our the question of the construction of a power- On March 18 we already sent 4 MI-8 heli- radio station is weak. While any slander- ful radio station. There remains also the copters, and on March 21 you will receive ous declaration of some religious leader is question of expediting the deliveries of mili- 4 more helicopters. All of this is delivered spread throughout the world through foreign tary technology. You, as we understand, will to you without charge. organs of mass propaganda, the voice of our select helicopter pilots from the officers N.M.Taraki. Thank you for such great radio station remains almost unheard. training with us. If you have any other re- help. In Kabul I will acquaint myself in B.N.Ponomarev. We are taking ener- quests or desires, you may inform us through greater depth with this document. Right getic measures to spread propaganda about the Soviet ambassador and the chief mili- now I would like to say that 100 thou. tons the successes of the DRA. We already spoke tary advisor. We will carefully review them, of wheat is not enough for us. This fall we about the article in “Pravda.” Today’s edi- and will react accordingly. will not be able to reap the entire harvest tion contains your speech. It will be broad- We have also agreed to take political because the landlords whose land was con- cast by radio to Iran, Pakistan and other measures in defense of DRA from imperi- fiscated did not sow it, and in a few places countries. In this way we are helping com- alists and plots of the reactionaries. We will the crops were destroyed. pensate for the weakness of your radio sta- continue to exert political influence on them. A.N.Kosygin. You will receive 100 tion. Our press will also provide continuous sup- thousand tons of wheat at the rate that you N.M.Taraki. Your help with propa- port for the DRA. can transport it from the border to the coun- ganda is very valuable to us, but we would We think it important that within your try. It seems that you will have difficulties like for the world to hear our own voice. country you should work to widen the so- with the transport of wheat because, judg- That’s why we ask you to help us build a cial support of your regime, draw people ing from what transport specialists told us, 1000 [kilowatts] radio station. over to your side, insure that nothing will 150 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

alienate the people from the government. cause China is persistently pushing Pakistan Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo And finally, not as a matter of discussion against us. Session on Afghanistan, 22 March 1979 but as a wish, I would like to express my A.N.Kosygin. When aggression takes ideas on the importance of a very careful place, then a completely different situation Top Secret and cautious approach towards your staff. arises. The Chinese became convinced of Only copy One should take care of one’s staff and have this through the example of Vietnam and are Working transcript an individual approach towards it. Have a wringing their hands now, so to speak. As thorough and good understanding with each for Afghanistan, we have already taken SESSION OF POLITBURO OF person before hanging any labels on them. measures to guard it from aggression. I have CC CPSU N.M.Taraki. Are we talking about of- already said that we have sent correspond- 22 March 1979 ficers and generals? ing messages to the president of Pakistan, A.N. Kosygin. And about officers, and Khomeini, and the prime-minister of Iran. Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I. about generals, and about political figures. N.M.Taraki. The members of our Po- In attendance: Comrades Andropov, Iu.V.; But I repeat, I am saying this not for discus- litburo are aware of my visit to Moscow. Gromyko, A.A.; Kosygin, A.N.; Pelshe, sion, I am only expressing our wish. Upon arriving in Kabul I will have to in- A.Ia.; Ustinov, D.F.; Chernenko, K.U.; N.M. Taraki. We try to be solicitous of form them of the results of our meetings. Demichev, P.N.; Kuznetsov, V.V.; our cadres. However, the Herat events have Must I tell them that the Soviet Union will Ponomarev, B.N.; Solomentsev, M.S.; shown that “Moslem brothers” have pen- give the DRA only political support and Tikhonov, N.A.; Kapitonov, I.V.; Dolgikh, etrated into our midst, but we don’t hang other aid? V.I.; Zimianin, M.V.; Rusakov, K.V.; labels on those who are truly with us. A.N.Kosygin. Yes, both political sup- Gorbachev, M.S. A.N. Kosygin. We aren’t making any port and extensive assistance in the line of kind of claims about you. We are simply military and other shipments. This is the I. Regarding the issue of the situation in saying that mistakes in cadre policy are very decision of our Politburo. L.I. Brezhnev will Afghanistan expensive. We have experienced this our- tell you about this during the meeting with BREZHNEV. We reviewed the funda- selves. In Stalin’s time, many of our offic- you, which will start in 10 min. I think that mental issues about measures to assist Af- ers were put in jail. And when the war broke you will return to Afghanistan confident of ghanistan at the last meeting of the Polit- out, Stalin was forced to send them to the our support, confident of your own actions. buro on Monday, and the measures envis- front. These people showed themselves to N.M.Taraki. Expresses great [appre- aged by our decision are being realized in be true heroes. Many of them rose to high ciation] for the conversation that took place practice. rank. We are not interfering in your internal and thanks for the great assistance that is The situation in Afghanistan is pretty affairs, but we want to express our opinion being provided to Afghanistan during this complicated. Now the affair seems to have regarding the necessity of behaving solici- critical moment. improved. tously toward cadres. Interpreted by the graduate student of GROMYKO. But all the same the situ- N.M. Taraki. As far as I have under- the Diplomatic Academy of MFA USSR, ation continues to remain complicated. stood from this conversation, you are ren- comrade Kozin V.P., transcribed by the ad- BREZHNEV. We will continue to pro- dering and will render us assistance, but you viser of the Middle East Department of MFA ceed for our common position which we are not giving us a guarantee against aggres- USSR comrade Gavrilov S.P. determined at the last meeting of the Polit- sion. buro, and we will not change anything which A.N. Kosygin. We have not discussed ______we noted regarding assistance to Afghani- the question with you from this angle. We 21.III.79. stan. As we viewed it from the very begin- have been speaking about what are now the # AK-786ss ning, our actions in relation to the situation most effective means for the political de- 30 copies in Afghanistan were entirely correct. fense of your country. You should not un- 21.III.79. Comrade Taraki arrived in Moscow in derstand us as saying that we will leave you a somewhat excited condition, but during to the winds of fate. [x This record has not been seen by the par- the discussions he gradually cheered up and N.M. Taraki. There are three types of ticipants.] towards the end he behaved calmly and sen- support - political, economic, and military. sibly. Two kinds of assistance you are already giv- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 26; In my conversation with Comrade ing us, but how will you act if there is an provided by M. Kramer; translation by D. Taraki I said that the main thing now is po- attack on our territory from without[?] Rozas with assistance of K. Weathersby.] litical work among the masses and with par- A.N.Kosygin. If an armed invasion of ticular stress I repeated this. I said that the your country takes place, then it will be a [Ed. note: For a translation of the Russian Afghan leadership should pay its main at- completely different situation. But right transcript of the 20 March 1979 meeting in tention to the broadening of the base among now we are doing everything to insure that Moscow of Brezhnev with Taraki immedi- which it conducts revolutionary re-educa- such an invasion does not occur. And I think ately after the above meeting, see CWIHP tion. Here the activity of the People’s that we will be able to achieve this. Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 73-74.] Democratic Party and its ideo-political co- N.M.Taraki. I pose this question be- hesion has primary significance. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 151

Taking into account that the Afghan regarding an improvement in radio transmis- gression from Iran, Pakistan,” and other leadership has made not a few mistakes re- sions to Afghanistan, and in particular, asked countries, to speed up the delivery of weap- garding repressions, in the conversation at- for a more powerful transmitter. ons by air, postpone the expiration of cred- tention was paid to the fact that primarily CHERNENKO. Proposals about that its, present 100,000 tons of grain to the political and economic means should play have been received. DRA, and raise the price of Afghan natural the main role in attracting broad strata of KOSYGIN. I said that were are review- gas bought by the USSR. Taraki gives the population to support the current regime. ing that issue attentively. thanks for the USSR declaration to Iran and I directly said to Comrade Taraki that re- ZAMIATIN. Yesterday that issue was Pakistan with the condemnation of interfer- pressions are a sharp weapon and it must be reviewed by the Ministry of Communica- ence in the domestic affairs of the DRA. applied extremely and extremely cautiously, tions and Gosteleradio [State Television and and only in the case when there are serious Radio]. Comrades Talyzin and Lapin sub- [Source: Notes by O.A. Westad in TsKhSD, legal grounds for it. mitted proposals which are entirely accept- f. 5, op. 76, d. 1044, ll. 29-30.] Comrade Taraki was told about the able. The issue is how to redirect a booster decisions which we made in support of Af- transmitter with a strength of 1000 kilowatts [Ed. note: For a translation of a report to ghanistan both in the international plane and which is located close to Dushanbe near the the CPSU CC Politburo on the Afghan situ- in the area of bilateral cooperation. At the border with Afghanistan. This transmitter ation by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and same time it was directly declared that we is sufficient for the entire territory of Af- Ponomarev, dated 1 April 1979 and ap- consider the introduction of Soviet military ghanistan. proved by the Politburo on 12 April 1979, detachments inexpedient, insofar as in the KOSYGIN. Herat for all intents and see CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 67-69.] current situation this would only play into purposes is now in the hands of the govern- the hands of our common enemy. ment. Report of the chief of the Soviet Comrade Taraki thanked us for receiv- ZAMIATIN, CHERNENKO say that military advisory group in Afghanistan, ing him in Moscow and accepted the in Herat the situation is more normal now. Lt. Gen. L.N. Gorelov, with H. Amin, 14 thoughts which had been expressed to him ZAMIATIN. The radio transmissions April 1979 (excerpt) with understanding. He assured me that the will be conducted, of course, in the Afghan Afghan leadership is doing everything so as language. Moscow to continue the development of the country BREZHNEV. In conclusion, Comrade Urgent. Secret along a revolutionary path. Taraki thanked us for the reception which Overall I believe that the conversations was shown him and for the solutions to the ...I was invited to see Com. Amin, who, were useful. Demonstrating solidarity with issues which we announced to him. I think at the behest of N.M. Taraki, requested that the Afghan revolution and our faith in the that it would be possible to: we send to Kabul some 15-20 combat heli- Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation, 1. Approve the conversations which we copters with ammunition and Soviet crews we at the same time warned the Afghan had with Comrade Taraki. so that, if the situation in the outlying and ledership about the danger of extremism and 2. Agree with the proposals of Com- central regions deteriorates, they can be used the underestimation of mass political work, rades Lapin and Talyzin regarding the or- against bands of rebels and terrorists who and oriented him towards conducting a more ganization of the radio relay to Afghanistan, are being infiltrated from Pakistan. well-considered and thought-out course. and also to make a corresponding notation In this regard, assurance was provided As was reported to me, Comrade Taraki in the nature of an instruction regarding the that the arrival in Kabul and the use of So- remained very satisfied with the discussions creation of a more powerful transmitter. viet crews will be kept secret.... in Moscow and left in a good mood. ANDROPOV. That is a very good mea- L. Gorelov Perhaps, the participants in the discus- sure. 14 April 1979 sion will add something to what was said The proposal is accepted. above? INSTRUCTIONS: This should not be KOSYGIN. I accompanied Comrade [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25, dok. 2; done.[Marshal and Chief of Staff] N. V. Taraki to the airfield. He thanked the Polit- document provided by M. Kramer; transla- Ogarkov buro [and] Leonid Il’ich for the nice recep- tion by Carter-Brezhnev Project.] tion and for the favorable attitude towards [Source: B. V. Gromov, Ogranichennyi Afghanistan. The new year, by the way, has Record of Conversation between Soviet kontingent (Moscow: Progress/Kultura, begun by their calendar. They celebrated it Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. 1994), p. 78; translated by Mark Kramer.] here. Comrade Taraki said that he had not Puzanov and Taraki, 22 March 1979 expected that over such a short time it would [Ed. note: For a translation of a CPSU CC be possible to decide so many questions, to Taraki informs [Puzanov] about his Politburo decison dated 21 April 1979 re- conduct such a broad consideration of all conversations on high-frequency radio with jecting the above-mentioned request from the problems which so greatly interest the Brezhnev, Kosygin, Ustinov, Gromyko, and Amin that Moscow send Soviet helicopter Afghan leadership. Ponomarev. The Soviet leadership has made crews to participate in the fighting, see About equipment, Comrade Taraki ex- a decision “to provide political and military CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 74-75.] pressed a request that measures be accepted assistance to the DRA in the event of ag- 152 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

CPSU CC Politburo Decision and strong desire to provide further internation- written agreement on a ban on Afghan refu- Instruction to Soviet Ambassador in alist assistance in order to stabilize the situ- gees engaging in political activities, and the Afghanistan, 24 May 1979 ation in the Democratic Republic of Af- ceasing of propaganda among the Pushtu ghanistan, has taken a decision to deliver to tribes and an end to the sending of armed Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Afghanistan in the period 1979-1981, free- groups into Afghanistan. CENTRAL COMMITTEE of-charge, special property in the sum of 53 TOP SECRET million rubles, including 140 guns and mor- [Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD,, tars, 90 armored personnel carriers (of which f. 5, op. 76, d. 1044, ll. 47-51.] No.P152/159 50 will represent an expedited delivery), 48 thousand machine guns, around 1000 gre- Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov- To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andro- nade throwers, 680 aviation bombs, and also Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC on the pov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, to send in the form of an expedited delivery Situation in Afghanistan, 28 June 1979 Baibakov, Patolichev, Skachkov, Serbin, in June-July 1979 medicines and medical Smirtiukov equipment in the sum of 50 thousand rubles. Top Secret In terms of immediate assistance in May of Special File Extract from protocol No. 152 of the CC this year, 100 incendiary tanks and 160 CPSU Politburo session of 24 May 1979 single-use bomb cassettes. The delivery of To the CC CPSU gas bombs with a non-toxic poison gas is About Providing Supplementary Military not considered possible. . . . Difficulties in the coming-into-be- Assistance to the Democratic Republic of As far as the request of the Afghan side ing of the DRA have a primarily objective Afghanistan for the dispatch to the DRA of helicopters character. They are related to the economic and transport planes with Soviet crews and backwardness, the small size of the work- 1. Approve the draft instruction of the a possible landing of our parachute troops ing class, the weakness of the People’s USSR Council of Ministers on this issue in Kabul is concerned, the question of us- Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). (attached). ing Soviet military units was considered in These difficulties are becoming more in- 2. Assign Gosplan USSR and the Min- much detail and from all points of view dur- tense, however, as the result of subjective istry of Foreign Trade to review within ing Comrade M. Taraki’s visit to Moscow reasons: In the Party and the government a weeks the request for the delivery to the in March of this year. Such actions, we are collegial leadership is lacking, all power in Democratic Republic of Afghanistan of deeply convinced, are fraught with great fact is concentrated in the hands of N.M. 1500 automobiles and to submit a proposal complexities not only in the domestic po- Taraki and H. Amin, who none too rarely on this issue. litical, but also in the foreign policy sphere, make mistakes and commit violations of 3. Affirm the text of the instruction to which no doubt would be used by hostile legality. . . . the Soviet Ambassador in the Democratic forces first of all to the detriment of the in- The main support of the Afghan gov- Republic of Afghanistan on this issue (at- terests of the DRA and the consolidation of ernment in the struggle with counter-revo- tached) the victory of the April revolution. lution continues to be the army. Recently, Telegraph upon execution. security forces, border troops, and newly- CC SECRETARY created self defense forces have begun to [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 30, ll. take a more active part in this struggle. [attachment:] 1-3; provided by M. Kramer; translation by However, broad strata of the population are Re: Point 159 Prot. No. 152 Carter-Brezhnev Project.] involved in the struggle with reaction only Top Secret insufficiently, the consequence of which is SPECIAL FILE Record of Conversation Between Soviet that the measures which the DRA govern- Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, ment has taken to stabilize the situation have To KABUL 9 June 1979 been not very effective . . . . TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR Regarding this information, the MFA Puzanov reports the USSR’s demarche USSR, KGB USSR, Ministry of Defense Visit N.M. Taraki and, referring to the to Islamabad about the inadmissability of and International Department of the CC instruction, inform him that the Afghan anti-Afghan activity from the territory of CPSU consider it expedient to: leadership’s request about the provision of Pakistan, and about Zia-ul-Haq’s response . . . 3. To assist the main military advi- supplementary military assistance to the about the Pakistanis’ readiness to clear away sor, send to Afghanistan an experienced gen- Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have the tension and to meet with Taraki at any eral and a group of officers to work directly been attentively reviewed. time. among the troops (in the divisions and regi- Say that in Moscow they share the con- Puzanov puts forth his observations, ments). . . . cern of the Afghan leadership in relation to that during such a meeting, in exchange for 4. To provide security and defense for the activation of counter-revolutionary ac- the DRA’s obligation to support Pakistan the Soviet air squadrons at the Bagram air- tivity by the reactionary forces in Afghani- upon its entry into the Non-Aligned Move- field, send to the DRA, with the agreement stan. The Soviet leadership, guided by a ment, it might be possible to get from it a of the Afghan side, a parachute battalion COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 153 disguised in the uniform (overalls) of an [Source: notes by O. A. Westad of document that as the Soviet leaders had said repeat- aviation-technical maintanence team. in TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d.1044, ll. 47-51.] edly, and as B.N. Ponomarev had stressed For the defense of the Soviet Embassy, during the most recent meetings in Kabul, send to Kabul a special detachment of the Boris Ponomarev, Reports from Kabul, the Soviet side cannot embark on the par- KGB USSR (125-150 men), disguised as 19-20 July 1979 (excerpts) ticipation of Soviet personnel in combat Embassy service personnel. At the begin- operations. ning of August, after preparations have been Report From Kabul (Secret. Urgent) Later on Amin provided information completed, send to the DRA (to the Bagram about the situation in the country. He la- airfield) a special detachment of the GRU . . . Taraki, and Amin as well, repeat- mented that he does not have the authority of the General Staff to be used in the event edly returned to the issue of the widening to run military affairs, and that Taraki, who of a sharp aggravation of the situation for of the Soviet military presence in the coun- is concentrating the leadership in his own the security and defense of particularly im- try. They put forth the issue of introducing hands, cannot to a sufficient extent control portant government installations. approximately two [Soviet] divisions to the the execution of commands. The Soviet DRA in the event of emergency circum- Ambassador responded that per the experi- A. Gromyko, Iu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, stances “at the request of the legal govern- ence of the Great Patriotic War it would be B. Ponomarev ment of Afghanistan.” possible to create for operational leadership In regard to this pronouncement of the an extraordinary group of 5-6 people, in- [Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, The Tragedy and Afghan leadership it was declared that the cluding Amin, the Minister of Defense, the Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI Soviet Union cannot do that. Chief of the General Staff, the Minister of “Iskon”, 1995), p. 76. Liakhovskii notes that Internal Affairs, Chiefs of the Sarandoy and this the recommendations made in this docu- Ponomarev State Security. It is necessary to find a form ment were approved during the CC CPSU which, on the one hand, preserves Taraki’s Politburo meeting of 28 June 1979, in Reso- 7.19.1979 authority, and from the other, facilitates an lution No. P, 156/XI.] improvement in operational leadership. * * * * * Amin agreed. Record of Conversation Between Soviet A ciphered telegram containing the Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, Report From Kabul (Secret. Urgent) contents of the conversation was sent to 10 July 1979 Ustinov and Ponomarev. On July 19 a second meeting with N.M. The conversation is about the negotia- Taraki took place . . . Taraki once again re- [Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, tions with Pakistan. Puzanov “spoke ap- turned to the issue of the strengthening of f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045, ll. 94-97.] provingly” about the steps the Afghans had military support from the side of the Soviet taken to open a dialogue with Pakistan. The Union, saying in that regard that in the event Conversation of the chief of the Soviet Ambassador noted that “the Pakistanis must of the outbreak of an emergency situation military advisory group in Afghanistan, not be given grounds for breaking the dia- the landing of a parachute division could Lt. Gen. Gorelov, with H. Amin, logue.” play a decisive role in crushing the mani- 11 August 1979 Taraki warned that Pakistan “is lead- festation of counter-revolutionary forces. ing things toward a break in the negotia- In response, our position was put forth On August 11 a conversation with tions”... once again, emphasizing that the Soviet Amin took place at his request. During the Puzanov: “in any case the Afghan side Union cannot take such measures. meeting special attention was paid to the must demonstrate reasonable restraint; if the Ponomarev request for the arrival of Soviet sub-units in Pakistanis set out to break off the negotia- the DRA. tions, let the blame for that fall entirely on 7.20.1979 H. Amin convincingly asked me to in- them.” form the Soviet leadership about the neces- About Iran: It is impossible to evalu- [Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, The Tragedy and sity of quickly dispatching Soviet sub-units ate the situation in that country Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI to Kabul. He repeated several times that unidimensionally, “in the country leftist “Iskon”, 1995), p. 87.] “the arrival of Soviet troops will signifi- forces are operating.” He advises that a cantly raise our moral spirit, will inspire friendly step should be taken in relation to Record of Conversation between Soviet even greater confidence and calm.” Iran, analogous to the one made in relation Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Further he said, “It is possible that the to Pakistan. Puzanov and H. Amin, 21 July 1979 Soviet leaders worry that their adversaries Taraki “expressed satisfaction over the in the world will view that as interference arrival and deployment in Bagram of the Amin transmitted a request to send to in the domestic affairs of the DRA. But I Soviet special group.” He would like also Afghanistan 8-10 helicopters with Soviet assure you that we are a sovereign and in- to confer with the Soviet comrades about crews in connection with the decommission- dependent state and solve all our problems measures to strengthen the border defenses. ing of the MI-24s which they have. independently. Your troops will not partici- [The Soviet Ambassador] told H. Amin pate in combat actions. They will be used 154 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

only in moments that are critical for us. I vey to him the same message. leadership of Afghanistan, events in recent think that we will need the Soviet sub-units Second. Guide yourself by the fact that days have developed along the following until spring.” we cannot take it upon ourselves to arrest lines. Amin with our own battalion force, since Upon returning from Havana, Taraki 08.12.79 Gorelov this would be a direct interference in the was given an ultimatum by Amin demand- internal affairs of Afghanistan and would ing that the officials closest to Taraki—the [Source: As cited in Znamya, no. 4, 1991, have far-reaching consequences. Indeed, minister of internal affairs, [Aslam] from the Archives of the General Staff of the this is practically unfeasible. Watanjar, the minister of communications, USSR Armed Forces.] (Note: the second part of the telegram, [Syed] Gulabzoy, the minister of border af- in addition to ambassador [A.M.] Puzanov, fairs, [Sherjan] Mazdooryar, and the chief Report from Soviet Deputy Defense Min- was also sent to [Ivan] Pavlovski, [B.S.] of the security organs, [Asadullah] ister Army Gen. Ivan Pavlovskii, during Ivanov, and [L.N.] Gorelov.) Sarwari—be dismissed and punished on the visit to Afghanistan, 25 August 1979 pretext that these officials were involved in [Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. an “imperialist conspiracy” against Amin. On August 25, together with the main Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Taraki’s attempts to persuade Amin to military advisor [Gorelov], I met with Amin. Institute; provided to CWIHP by Odd Arne drop his demands and normalize the situa- Amin once again raised the issue of the Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute; trans- tion in the leadership were of no avail. All introduction of our forces into Kabul, which, lation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.] evidence indicates that Amin used Taraki’s in his opinion, would free one of the two absence to lay the groundwork for ensuring divisions of the Kabul garrison for the CPSU CC Politburo Decision, that all real power, including supervision of struggle with the rebels. 15 September 1979, with report by the army and state security organs, was con- I responded to Amin that the introduc- Gromyko, Ustinov, and Tsvigun centrated in Amin’s own hands. tion of our troops might lead to the compli- Having discerned this turn of events, cation of the military-political situation and Communist Party of the Soviet Union Taraki evidently was about to remove Amin the strengthening of American assistance to Central Committee from the leadership, but he displayed inde- the rebels. Top Secret cisiveness and hesitation, and it is possible Pavlovskii No. P168/5 that he lacked sufficient forces to carry out 08.25.79 his intention. To: Coms. Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin, The CPSU CC Politburo’s appeal call- Resolution of USSR Minister of Defense Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kunaev, ing on Taraki and Amin to join forces in the D.F. Ustinov: “Submit to the CC CPSU.” Pel’she, Romanov, Suslov, Ustinov, Cher- name of the revolution and to present an out- nenko, Shcherbitskii, Aliev, Demichev, Kuz- wardly unified position was received posi- [Source: As cited in Znamya, no. 4, 1991, netsov, Masherov, Ponomarev, Rashidov, tively by them and others, but even so, Amin from the Archives of the General Staff of the Solomentsev, Tikhonov, Shevardnadze, continued actively preparing to achieve his USSR Armed Forces.] Gorbachev, Dolgikh, Zimyanin, Kapitonov, aims and Taraki, as before, was indecisive Rusakov and was clearly unable to put an end to CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Amin’s activities. As a result, all the levers Afghanistan, 13 September 1979 Extract from Protocol No. 168 of the of real power by now are essentially in (excerpts) CPSU CC Politburo Session Amin’s hands. He controls the leadership on 15 September 1979 of the armed forces, the state security or- CPSU CC Politburo meeting of gans, and the internal affairs organs. 13 September 1979 On the Situation in Afghanistan In the process, Amin has completely isolated Taraki through the use of force; Ratified the following directive to the Agree with the recommendations ex- there is no access to him at all, even for our ambassador in Kabul: pressed in the note from Coms. A. A. representatives. First. The ambassador has been com- Gromyko, D. F. Ustinov, and S. K. Tsvigun By having seized, in particular, on the missioned to meet with Taraki and Amin and on 15 September 1979, No. 793/gs (at- episode involving an exchange of gunfire urgently express the hope that they will both tached). in Taraki’s residence, which killed two demonstrate a sense of responsibility to the people, including Amin’s bodyguard, Amin revolution. In the name of saving the revo- CC Secretary has explicitly demanded that Taraki relin- lution, they must come together and act in quish all his posts. concord from a position of unanimity. A Re: Point 6 of Prot. No. 168 According to recent information, rift in the leadership would be fatal to the Top Secret which was picked up by our representatives revolutionary cause and the Afghan people. CPSU CC during a conversation with Amin, a plenum If Amin does not consent to a joint of the PDPA CC is supposed to be convened meeting with Taraki, then, with Taraki’s According to information coming in on 16 September. Taraki will be advised to agreement, visit Amin separately and con- from all channels about the situation in the give up all his posts voluntarily on the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 155 grounds of ill health, and even if he does 75; translated by Mark Kramer; first publi- and government leadership in Afghanistan, not agree, a decision to this effect will be cation in Russian in Novaya i Noveishaya in connection with Amin’s effort to remove adopted. Istoriia 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (docu- all persons close to Taraki by concentrating Amin has ignored the repeated appeals ment on 95-97), intro. G.N. Sevastionov.] in his hands all real power, including the of our comrades warning him that such a command of the army. step might have dire consequences both for Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister In the last few days the situation among the party and for the country. Gromyko to Soviet Representatives in the leadership of Afghanistan has been In these circumstances, our position at Kabul, 15 September 1979 sharply exacerbated and the conflict has this stage should be along the following taken on an open and highly charged char- lines. To Soviet Representatives in Kabul acter. Amin, alleging that during Taraki’s First. Considering the real state of af- trip to the conference in Havana a number fairs as it has now developed, we must not 1. It is acknowledged to be expedient, of individuals in the Afghan leadership at- refuse to deal with Amin and the leadership considering the real state of affairs as it is tempted to discredit him, Amin, demanded headed by him. At the same time, we must developing in Afghanistan, not to refuse to their dismissal and punishment. do everything we can to restrain him from deal with H. Amin and the leadership which Taraki’s efforts to convince Amin to carrying out repressions against Taraki’s he heads. In this regard it is necessary to withdraw his demands and normalize the supporters. We should use our contacts with use all means to restrain H. Amin from re- situation obviously were not successful. Amin to get a definitive clarification of his pressions of supporters of N. Taraki and Amin, though he did verbally voice his sup- political outlook and intentions. other people who are not pleasing to him, port for Taraki, took a number of steps to Second. Our military advisers assigned who are not enemies of the revolution. At isolate Taraki almost by use of force. to the Afghan forces, and also our advisers the same time it is necessary to use contacts In connection with the latest events, a to the state security organs and internal af- with H. Amin for further discerning his po- few days ago we urgently appealed to Taraki fairs ministry, should remain in place, car- litical personnel and intentions. and Amin, in the name of the CC CPSU rying out their direct functions connected 2. It is also acknowledged to be expe- Politburo and L.I. Brezhnev personally, with with the preparation and conduct of combat dient for our military advisors who are at- an urgent call to unite and in the name of operations against rebel formations, but tached to the Afghan forces, and also the saving the revolution act in concord and with without taking any part, of course, in repres- advisors in the organs of security and inter- unity. We warned them directly that a split sive measures against people who have nal affairs, to remain at their posts. They in the leadership would be disastrous and fallen into Amin’s disfavor in the event that should fulfill their immediate functions con- that it would be immediately taken advan- army units are ordered to carry out such nected with the preparation and conduct of tage of by internal counter-revolution and measures. military actions agains rebel formations and foreign enemies of Afghanistan. We called Third. Shipments of Soviet weapons other counter-revolutionary forces. They, on the leaders of Afghanistan to demonstrate and military equipment to Afghanistan it goes with saying, should not play any part a high degree of responsibility to the revo- should be curtailed somewhat, being lim- in repressive measures against people who lution. ited mainly to supplies of spare parts and are not pleasing to H. Amin in the event that Both Taraki and Amin at the time wel- ammunition needed for combat operations detachments and sub-units to which our ad- comed positively our appeal. However, in against the rebels. visors are attached are involved in these actuality, judging by incoming intelligence, Fourth. We should appeal to Amin and actions. Amin continued his activities to realize his express our view that if Taraki is removed A. Gromyko plans, while Taraki demonstrated a high from his posts, there is no need to exact re- 09.15.1979 degree of indecisiveness in suppressing pressive measures against him or to carry these activities. You know today’s results. out any sort of trial. [Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, The Tragedy and The near removal of Taraki from govern- Fifth. On the matter of how the Soviet Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI ment is unlikely to have relieved tension, press organs should treat the ongoing events “Iskon”, 1995), p. 98.] given that he continues to enjoy the support in Kabul, it would be advisable to limit cov- of a certain segment of members of the erage in coming days to purely factual ma- Information from CC CPSU to GDR People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. terial, reporting it calmly without express- leader E. Honecker, 16 September 1979 All in all, the situation continues to be highly ing any kind of assessments of the situation tense, and right now it is difficult to say in or commentaries. Highly Confidential which direction events will lead. We, on our We request consideration. 16.9.79 part, continue to follow the situation care- fully. A. Gromyko D. Ustinov S. Tsvigun In connection with the well-known events in Afghanistan, we would like to in- [Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J 2/202, A. 575 15 September 1979 form our friends on several aspects of the provided by V. Zubok (National Security No. 793/gs development of events in that country. Archive); translated from Russian by Already for some time now, there has Carter-Brezhnev Project.] [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 173, ll. 72- been conflict and disagreement in the party 156 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Excerpt from transcript, CPSU CC to confront for a long time to come. Af- Politburo meeting, 20 September 1979 Highly Confidential ghanistan will continue as before to be in- terested in receiving economic and other Brezhnev reported on the situation in As we have informed you earlier, al- types of material assistance from the USSR Afghanistan: “Events developed so swiftly ready for some time now there have been and other socialist countries. that essentially there was little opportunity conflicts and disagreements in the party and We think that work will have to be done for us, here in Moscow, to somehow inter- government leadership in Afghanistan. with Amin, and that this work will be sub- fere in them... Right now our mission is to These were not disagreements over major stantial, rather difficult and delicate. As you determine our further actions, so as to pre- issues - the question is essentially in the ri- know, we sent Amin a congratulatory tele- serve our positions in Afghanistan and to valry and the struggle for power between gram (though without unnecessary praises secure our influence there. supporters of Taraki and Amin. and overtures). In the future we will con- “We should assume that the Soviet-Af- After Taraki’s return from his visit to tinue to examine positively requests from ghan relations will not sustain some sort of Havana and Moscow, the situation if the the Afghan government to render them this major changes, and, it seems, will continue Afghan government became even more dif- or that concrete assistance in developing the in their previous course. Amin will be ficult. Amin sharply increased his activi- country and in its fight against counter-revo- pushed toward this by the current situation ties, trying to dismiss Taraki and those close lution. At the same time, our representa- and by the difficulties which the Afghan to him and concentrate all real power in his tives on location will continue to try to in- government will face for a long time to hands, including the control of the army. fluence Amin, in order to avert repressions come. Afghanistan will continue to be in- Despite our persistent calls for both sides to against Taraki and his circle and in general terested in receiving from the USSR mili- act in concord, in the interests of defending to prevent various excesses on the part of tary, economic and other aid, and possibly and strengthening the revolution’s achieve- Amin. even in increased amounts. ments and not to exacerbate the situation, We will continue to follow carefully “Evidently, Amin will continue to fol- neither side took any appropriate measures Amin’s activities, observing whether he is low at least outwardly the recommendations to reinstate unity. keeping his promises and will act as events we gave earlier (under Taraki)... But [our] Taking advantage of Taraki’s indeci- dictate. job will be difficult and delicate.” siveness and his inability to take any swift and effective measures, Amin in the end dis- [Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J IV 2/202, A. 575; [Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. missed him from government, replaced the obtained by V. Zubok; translation from Rus- Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel chief administrators of the security and in- sian by Carter-Brezhnev Project.] Institute; provided to CWIHP by O.A. ternal affairs organs, and commenced to Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute; trans- purge the top ranks of the army. Of course, Transcript of Brezhnev-Honecker lation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.] one cannot be uncritical of many of Amin’s summit in East Berlin, 4 October 1979 methods and activities, in particular his ex- (excerpt on Iran and Afghanistan) Excerpt from transcript, Meeting of treme lust for power, ruthlessness in his re- Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and lations with former colleagues, forming BREZHNEV: [...] Afghan Foreign Minister Shah-Valih, opinions and making decisions Now briefly on the situation in Iran and New York, 27 September 1979 (excerpt) singlehandedly. However, it is impossible Afghanistan. - Tendencies of a not particu- to ignore the currently existing situation, and larly positive character have lately surfaced A.A.Gromyko: What is the USA re- we must deal with the new leadership in Af- in Iran. The Islamic leaders have begun to action to the latest developments in Afghani- ghanistan. persecute the progressive forces. They ruth- stan? We are under the impression that the Following his rise to power, Amin lessly suppress the activities of national Americans are still wavering and cannot made a number of statements from which it minorities. In addition, they try to blame us come to a definite conclusion. Apparently, follows that he intends to continue the for the instigation of activities. they have not worked out any specific evalu- course of expanding the revolution, on Our initiatives with regard to the de- ations. In our discussions with them— I al- strengthening cooperation with the Soviet velopment of good neighborly relations with ready met once with Secretary of State Union and socialist collaboration. Around Iran are currently not gaining any practical [Cyrus R.] Vance—they have not touched him there are a number of honest people, results in Tehran. We know all that. upon this question. real revolutionaries who support the tenets But we also understand something else: of Marxism-Leninism and are favorably in- The has undercut the [Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. clined towards Soviet Union, having re- military alliance between Iran and the USA. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel ceived their education in our country. We With respect to a number of international Institute; provided to CWIHP by O.A. believe that Soviet-Afghan relations, just as problems, particularly with respect to the Westad, Nobel Institute; translation for Afghanistan’s relations with other socialist Middle East, Iran is now taking anti-impe- CWIHP by D. Rozas.] countries, will not undergo some sort of rialist positions. Imperialism tries to regain momentous change. Amin will be pushed its influence in the region. We are trying to Information from the CC CPSU to towards this by the current situation and dif- counter these efforts. We are patiently work- GDR leader Honecker, 1 October 1979 ficulties which the Afghan regime will have ing with the current Iranian leadership and COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 157 moving them to develop cooperation on an 1342; obtained and translated from Ger- equal and mutually beneficial basis. man by C. Ostermann.] [Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, We have recently briefed you on the f. 5, op. 76, d. 1355, ll. 17-20.] latest events in Afghanistan. Supplement- Information of KGB USSR to CC ing this, I would like to say the following: CPSU International Department, Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov- We have given Afghanistan more than a little 10 October 1979 Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC, economic support. We have sent our advis- 29 October 1979 ers there, civilian as well as military, and The Leadership of Iran on the External Top Secret have supplied them with significant amounts Security of the Country Special File of weapons and military equipment. The situation in the country has im- According to KGB information, in To the CC CPSU proved. In some provinces, however, mili- August in Teheran a secret meeting was held tary encounters continue with the hordes of with the participation of representatives of The situation in Afghanistan following rebels who receive direct and indirect sup- the Prime Minister, the Ministries of For- the events of September 13-16 of this year, port from Pakistan and direct support from eign and Internal Affairs, the Intelligence as the result of which Taraki was removed Iran, from the USA, and from China. In ad- and Operational Administrations of the Gen- from power and then physically destroyed, dition, there are tensions within the Afghani eral Staff, Gendarme and Police Adminis- remains extremely complicated. leadership. Our efforts were directed to con- trations of the General Staff and the Staff of In the effors to strengthen Amin in tribute to the unity of the Afghani leader- the “Corps of Defenders of the Revolution,” power, along with such superficial gestures ship and not allow for divisions to happen. with the goal of studying issues which touch like the beginning of the reworking of the But Amin has taken advantage of Taraki’s on the security of Iran. It was noted that the draft of the constitution and the liberation indecisiveness and, as you know, eliminated USSR and the USA, which have their own of some of the people who had been arrested him; he has achieved the leadership. Amin interests in this region, are worried about earlier, in fact the scale of repressions in the did this even though he was held as Taraki’s the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Party, army, state apparat and civic organi- friend. You know that Taraki had a stopover It is presumed that the USA might resort to zations has widened. . . . in Moscow on his way from Havana where a direct military threat and realization of a According to information which we the Conference of the Non-Alignment blockade. But in the event that Iran will not have, at the present time the execution of a Movement took place. I met him and ad- take sharp steps which hurt the USA, and group of Politburo members (Zeray, Misak, vised him to take measures to stabilize the will obstruct the penetration of the Soviets, Pandzhshiri) who are subject to fictitious ac- situation in his country and among other this will ease the position of the USA. cusations of “anti-Party and counter-revo- things begin with the work on a constitu- Evaluating the policy of the USSR in lutionary activity,” is planned. At the ple- tion and to keep up revolutionary lawful- relation to the Iranian regime, the partici- num of the CC PDPA which took place re- ness, etc. We now see that Amin is imple- pants in the meeting came to the conclusion cently, Amin introduced into the ruling or- menting what I told Taraki. that insofar as strengthening the Islamic re- gans of the Party people who are more de- Frankly, we are not pleased by all of public will lead to a weakening of the posi- voted to him, including a number of his rela- Amin’s methods and actions. He is very tion of the regime in Afghanistan, exert a tives. . . . power-driven. In the past he repeatedly re- certain influence on the Moslem republics Recently there have been noted signs vealed disproportionate harshness. But with in the USSR and will be “a brake in the path of the fact that the new leadership of Af- regard to his basic political platform, he has of penetration of Communism in the re- ghanistan intends to conduct a more “bal- decidedly confirmed to the course of fur- gion,” the Soviet Union “will not turn away anced policy” in relation to the Western ther development of the Revolution, of fur- from the ideological struggle and efforts to powers. It is known, in particular, that rep- thering cooperation with the Soviet Union put into power in Iran a leftist government.” resentatives of the USA, on the basis of their and other countries of the Socialist commu- It was stressed that with the aim of weaken- contacts with the Afghans, are coming to a nity. ing the Islamic regime the USSR might or- conclusion about the possibility of a change It is a fact that many of Amin’s follow- ganize “provocational” activity among Irani in the political line of Afghanistan in a di- ers and partisans are honorable people who Kurds, Azeris, Turkmen, Baluchis, support rection which is pleasing to Washington. are faithful to the ideas of Marxism- leftist forces, create economic difficulties, Taking account of this and starting Leninism and take a good attitude towards resort to a military threat on the basis of the from the necessity of doing everything pos- us. [Soviet-Iranian] agreement of 1921. sible not to allow the victory of counter- By taking into consideration the actual It was noted that Afghanistan is not in revolution in Afghanistan or the political re- situation, we will continue to support Af- any condition to undertake military actions orientation of H. Amin towards the West, it ghanistan and give it a variety of support against Iran. However, border conflicts are is considered expedient to hew to the fol- and help it in its fight against foreign ag- not excluded. In addition, Afghanistan is in lowing line: gression and the domestic counterrevolu- need of economic assistance from Iran, 1. Continue to work actively with tion. [. . .] which might soften its position. Amin and overall with the current leader- The positions of Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, ship of the the PDPA and the DRA, not giv- [Source: SAPMO (Berlin), DY30 JIV 2/201/ and Saudi Arabia were also analyzed. ing Amin grounds to believe that we don’t 158 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

trust him and don’t wish to deal with him. October with the aim of [1] reviewing the tives. Taking account of the combat opera- Use the contacts with Amin to assert appro- state of the People’s Armed Forces of Af- tions, drafts were also prepared of docu- priate influence and simultaneously to fur- ghanistan and the organization and meth- ments providing basic guidelines for the or- ther expose his true intentions.... ods of their combat operations against the ganization of combat and operational prepa- Upon the availability of facts bearing rebels, [2] providing on-site assistance to the rations. witness to the beginning of a turn by H. Afghan commanders in dealing with these Despite these efforts to increase the Amin in an anti-Soviet direction, introduce questions; and [3] preparing recommenda- combat capability of the People’s Armed supplemental proposals about measures tions for the further strengthening of the Forces of Afghanistan, a number of ques- from our side. combat capabilities of the People’s Armed tions are still unresolved. Forces of Afghanistan. Military regulations that were codified A. Gromyko, Iu. Andropov, The work of Com. I. G. Pavlovskii’s with help from Soviet advisers have not been D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev group in providing assistance to the Afghan instilled in the People’s Armed Forces, and military command was carried out in strict they have no impact on the practical life of 29 October 1979 accordance with the CPSU CC’s decision the troops. The commanders, staffs, politi- and with instructions issued by the USSR cal organs, and party organizations do not [Source: As cited in A.A. Liakhovskii, The minister of defense, taking account of the always coordinate their work in resolving Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Mos- military-political situation in the country and tasks among the troops. Staffs at all levels, cow: GPI “Iskon”, 1995), p. 102.] also the political and organizational mea- including the General Staff, have still not sures implemented within the Afghan army become a central, directing organ in the daily Record of Conversation Between Soviet by the DRA leadership. life of large and small units and in the troops’ Ambassador Puzanov and Amin, On all matters that they studied, rec- combat activity. 3 November 1979 ommendations were devised and transmit- Political work in the Afghan army, es- ted personally by Com. I. G. Pavlovskii to pecially with the officer corps, is still not The Soviet Ambassador reported the H. Amin, offering them as proposals for the conducted concretely or effectively enough. readiness of the Soviet leadership to receive further strengthening of the Afghan armed The combat morale and fighting elan of the Amin. He also informed [Amin] of forces. troops, the state of military discipline, and Moscow’s satisfaction about the measures The provision of comprehensive prac- the army’s willingness to act are still low. of the Afghan leadership in the area of Party tical assistance by our side to the People’s During the final conversation with H. and State building. Further, Amin spoke Armed Forces of Afghanistan enabled them Amin, M. Yakub, and M. Ekbal, Com. I. G. about the situation in the country. The So- to make a transition between August and Pavlovskii once again directed their atten- viet Ambassador in his turn informed October. Rather than continuing to rely on tion to the unresolved problems and our rec- [Amin] of the agreement of the Soviet lead- a passive defense and faltering operations ommendations for solving them. At the end ership to send a Soviet specialist to Herat to by small units against the rebels, they were of the discussion, H. Amin said: “We are take down the drilling installation. able to launch coordinated and active op- taking all measures to ensure that your rec- erations by larger groupings. This allowed ommendations are fulfilled, and we will al- [Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, them to gain the initiative in combat and to ways work in coordination with Soviet ad- f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045.] destroy the most dangerous forces of coun- visers and specialists. Our friendship is un- terrevolution in the provinces of Paktia, wavering.” Then he expressed the hope that Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, Report Ghazni, Parvan, Bamian, and several other Soviet military advisers would be assigned to CPSU CC on Mission to Afghanistan areas. to every battalion of the Afghan armed of Deputy Defense Minister Army-Gen. To prepare the troops for these actions, forces. In conclusion, H. Amin thanked the I. G. Pavlovskii, 5 November 1979 tactical exercises with live fire were held, delegation for providing help and requested and combat operations were conducted to that they transmit warm greetings and per- Top Secret resolve specific tasks. Soviet generals and sonal thanks to Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, and CPSU CC officers provided direct assistance in work- also to Comrades A.N. Kosygin, D.F. ing out the plans for operations and in car- Ustinov, Yu.V. Andropov, and A.A. On the Results of the Mission of the rying them out. This experience in prepar- Gromyko, as well as all the other leaders of USSR Deputy Defense Minister, Army- ing and conducting operations taught the the CPSU and the Soviet government. General I. G. Pavlovskii, in the Afghan commanders, staffs, and political Overall, the group of generals and of- Democratic Republic of Afghanistan organs the methods and means of organiza- ficers headed by the USSR deputy defense tion for undertaking active combat opera- minister, Army-General I.G. Pavlovskii, In accordance with the CPSU CC’s tions in mountainous regions. Help was pro- fufilled the tasks assigned to them. Decree No. P163/62 of 15 August 1979, the vided to the Main Political Directorate in Reported for informational purposes. USSR deputy defense minister, Army-Gen- organizing party-political work among the eral I. G. Pavlovskii, and a group of gener- troops according to the different categories D. Ustinov als and officers were in the Democratic Re- of servicemen, so that they could be mobi- public of Afghanistan from 17 August to 22 lized for the active pursuit of combat objec- 5 November 1979 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 159

No. 318/3/00945 Council, General Secretary of the CC PDPA, quarters in Kabul, etc. The diplomatic and Prime Minister of the DRA H. Amin circles in Kabul are widely talking of [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 149, ll. 120- recently has insistently been raising the is- Amin’s differences with Moscow and his 122; translated by Mark Kramer; first pub- sue of the necessity of sending to Kabul of a possible anti-Soviet steps. lication in Russian in Novaya i Noveishaya motorized rifle batallion for defense of his All this has created, on the one hand, Istoriia 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (docu- residence. the danger of losing the gains made by the ment on 97-98), intro. by G.N. Sevastionov.] Taking account of the situation as it has April [1978] revolution (the scale of insur- developed and the request, H. Amin consid- gent attacks will increase by spring) within Record of Conversation between Soviet ers it expedient to sent to Afghanistan the the country, while on the other hand - the Ambassador to Afghanistan F.A. detachment of the GRU of the General Staff threat to our positions in Afghanistan (right Tabeev and H. Amin, 6 December 1979 which has been prepared for these goals, now there is no guarantee that Amin, in or- with a complement of about 500 men, in a der to protect his personal power, will not The conversation concerned Amin’s uniform which does not reveal its belong- shift to the West). [There has been] a growth journey to Moscow. Amin made reference ing to the the Armed Forces of the USSR. of anti-Soviet sentiments within the popu- to the agreement of the Soviet leaders, trans- The possibility of sending this detachment lation. mitted by Puzanov, and expressed concern to the DRA was envisioned by the decision 2. Recently we were contacted by that he not be late. Further he spoke about of the CC CPSU Politburo of 06.29.79 No. group of Afghan communists abroad. In the necessity of thinking about the agree- P 156/IX. the course of our contact with Babrak ment on issues of inter-Party cooperation for Regarding the fact that issues related [Karmal] and [Asadullah] Sarwari, it be- the upcoming 2-3 years in relation to the to the sending of the detachment to Kabul came clear (and they informed us of this) end of the term of action for the plan of in- have been agreed with the Afghan side, we that they have worked out a plan for oppos- ter-Party relations between the PDPA and propose that it is possible to drop it in on ing Amin and creating new party and state the CPSU for 1979. airplanes of military transport aviation dur- organs. But Amin, as a preventive measure, ing the first half of December of this year. has begun mass arrests of “suspect persons” [Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, Com. Ustinov, D.F. is in agreement. (300 people have been shot). f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045.] In these conditions, Babrak and Iu. Andropov, N. Ogarkov Sarwari, without changing their plans of Extract from CPSU CC Politburo opposition, have raised the question of pos- Decision, 6 December 1979 No. 312/2/0073 sible assistance, in case of need, including 4 December 1979 military. Top Secret We have two battalions stationed in Special File [Source: As cited in A.A. Liakhovskii, The Kabul and there is the capability of render- Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Mos- ing such assistance. It appears that this is To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, cow: GPI “Iskon”, 1995), p. 107.] entirely sufficient for a successful operation. Gromyko, Suslov, Ustonov But, as a precautionary measure in the event Personal memorandum, Andropov to of unforeseen complications, it would be Extract From Protocol No. 176 of Brezhnev, n.d. [early December 1979] wise to have a military group close to the the Meeting of the CC CPSU Politburo of border. In case of the deployment of mili- 6 December 1979 1. After the coup and the murder of tary forces we could at the same time de- Taraki in September of this year, the situa- cide various questions pertaining to the liq- About the dispatch of a special detachment tion in Afghanistan began to undertake an uidation of gangs. to Afghanistan undesirable turn for us. The situation in the The implementation of the given op- Agree with the proposal on this issue set party, the army and the government appara- eration would allow us to decide the ques- forth in the note of the KGB USSR and the tus has become more acute, as they were tion of defending the gains of the April revo- Ministry of Defense of 4 December 1979. essentially destroyed as a result of the mass lution, establishing Leninist principals in the No. 312/2/0073 (attached). repressions carried out by Amin. party and state leadership of Afghanistan, At the same time, alarming informa- and securing our positions in this country. CC SECRETARY L. BREZHNEV tion started to arrive about Amin’s secret activities, forewarning of a possible politi- [Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. F. [attachment] cal shift to the West. [These included:] Con- Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel tacts with an American agent about issues Institute; provided to CWIHP by Odd Arne Top Secret which are kept secret from us. Promises to Westad, Director of Research, Nobel Insti- Special File tribal leaders to shift away from USSR and tute; trans. for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.] to adopt a “policy of neutrality.” Closed To the CC CPSU meetings in which attacks were made against [Ed. note: For a translation and facsimile Soviet policy and the activities of our spe- of the handwritten document (12 Decem- The Chairman of the Revolutionary cialists. The practical removal of our head- ber 1979) entitled “On the Situation in ‘A’,” 160 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

recording the Soviet decision to approve the tions for the operation of the American cul- forces, including Taraki supporters from the military intervention in Afghanistan, see tural center; under H. Amin’s directive, the former “Khalq” group. CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), p. 76.] DRA special services have ceased opera- All earlier disagreements were elimi- tions against the American embassy. nated and the previously existing schism in Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov- H. Amin attempted to buttress his po- the PDPA has been liquidated. Khalqists Ponomarev Report on Events in sition by reaching a compromise with lead- (represented by Sarwari) and Parchamists Afghanistan on 27-28 December 1979, ers of internal counter-revolution. Through (represented by Babrak) have announced the dated 31 December 1979 trusted persons he engaged in contact with final unification of the party. Babrak was leaders of the Moslem fundamentalist op- elected leader of the new party center, and Top Secret position. Sarwari - his deputy. CC CPSU The scale of political repression was In this extremely difficult situation, taking on increasingly mass proportions. which has threatened the gains of the April Regarding events in Afghanistan Just during the period following the events revolution and the interests of maintaining during 27-28 December 1979 of September, more than 600 members of our national security, it has become neces- the PDPA, military personnel and other per- sary to render additional military assistance After a coup-d’etat and the murder of sons suspected of anti-Amin sentiments to Afghanistan, especially since such re- the CC PDPA General Secretary and Chair- were executed without trial or investigation. quests had been made by the previous ad- man of the Revolutionary Council of Af- In effect, the objective was to liquidate the ministration in DRA. In accordance with ghanistan N.M. Taraki, committed by Amin party. the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty in September of this year, the situation in All this, in conjunction with objective of 1978, a decision has been made to send Afghanistan has been sharply exacerbated difficulties and conditions specific to Af- the necessary contingent of the Soviet Army and taken on crisis proportions. ghanistan, put the progress of the revolu- to Afghanistan. H. Amin has established a regime of tionary process in extremely difficult cir- Riding the wave of patriotic sentiments personal dictatorship in the country, effec- cumstances and energized the counter-revo- that have engaged fairly large numbers of tively reducing the CC PDPA and the Revo- lutionary forces which have effectively es- the Afghan population in connection with lutionary Council to the status of entirely tablished their control in many of the the deployment of Soviet forces which was nominal organs. The top leadership posi- country’s provinces. Using external support, carried out in strict accordance with the pro- tions within the party and the state were which has taken on increasingly far-reach- visions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978, filled with appointees bearing family ties or ing proportions under Amin, they strived to the forces opposing H. Amin organized an maintaining personal loyalties to H. Amin. bring about radical change in the country’s armed operation which resulted in the over- Many members from the ranks of the CC military-political situation and liquidate the throw of H. Amin’s regime. This operation PDPA, the Revolutionary Council and the revolutionary gains. has received broad support from the work- Afghan government were expelled and ar- Dictatorial methods of running the ing masses, the intelligentsia, significant rested. Repression and physical annihila- country, repressions, mass executions, and sections of the Afghan army, and the state tion were for the most part directed towards disregard for legal norms have produced apparatus, all of which welcomed the for- active participants in the April revolution, widespread discontent in the country. In the mation of a new administration of the DRA persons openly sympathetic to the USSR, capital numerous leaflets began to appear, and the PDPA. those defending the Leninist norms of in- exposing the anti-people nature of the cur- The new government and Revolution- tra-party life. H. Amin deceived the party rent regime and containing calls for unity ary Council have been formed on a broad and the people with his announcements that in the struggle with “H. Amin’s clique.” Dis- and representative basis, with the inclusion the Soviet Union had supposedly approved content also spread to the army. A signifi- of representatives from former “Parcham” of Taraki’s expulsion from party and gov- cant number of officers have expressed dis- and “Khalq” factions, military representa- ernment. may at the domination of H. Amin’s incom- tives, and non-party members. By direct order of H. Amin, fabricated petent henchmen. In essence, a broad anti- In its program agenda announcements, rumors were deliberately spread throughout Amin front was formed in the country. the new leadership vowed to fight for the the DRA, smearing the Soviet Union and Expressing alarm over the fate of the complete victory of the national-democratic, casting a shadow on the activities of Soviet revolution and the independence of the anti-feudalistic, anti-imperialistic revolu- personnel in Afghanistan, who had been re- country, and reacting keenly to the rise of tion, and to defend Afghan independence stricted in their efforts to maintain contact anti-Amin sentiments in Afghanistan, and sovereignty. In matters of foreign with Afghan representatives. Karmal Babrak and Asadulla Sarwari, both policy, they pledged to strengthen in every At the same time, efforts were made to living abroad as emigres, have undertaken possible way the friendship and cooperation mend relations with America as a part of to unite all anti-Amin groups in the country with the USSR. Taking into account the the “more balanced foreign policy strategy” and abroad, in order to save the motherland mistakes of the previous regime, the new adopted by H. Amin. H. Amin held a series and the revolution. In addition, the currently leadership, in the practical application of its of confidential meetings with the American underground group “Parcham,” under the policies, is intent on giving serious consid- charge d’affaires in Kabul. The DRA gov- leadership of an illegal CC, has carried out eration to broad of social ernment began to create favorable condi- significant work to rally all progressive life and ensuring a law-abiding society, wid- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 161 ening the social base and strengthening the Gromyko and Afghan Foreign Minister A.A.Gromyko. I would like to share a state throughout the country, and maintain- Shad Mohammad Dost, 4 January 1980 few thoughts about the current situation in ing a flexible policy with regards to religion, the Security Council as well as the charac- tribes and ethnic minorities. No. P27 ter of your appearance at the upcoming ses- One of the first steps that has captured Top Secret sion. the attention of Afghan society was the re- SUMMARY You, comrade minister, have every rea- lease of a large number of political prison- son to appear as the accuser - not as the ac- ers, which include prominent political and RECORD OF MAIN CONTENTS OF cused. It seems there are enough facts for military activists. Many of them (Kadyr, THE MEETING OF A.A.GROMYKO this. Keshtmand, Rafi, and others) have actively WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN It is necessary to emphasize that the and enthusiastically joined in the work of AFFAIRS OF THE DRA, Sh.M.DOST deployment of a limited military contingent the new Revolutionary Council and the gov- 4 January 1980 in Afghanistan has been undertaken by the ernment. Soviet Union as a response to repeated ap- Broad masses of people met the an- A.A.Gromyko welcomed Sh.M.Dost peals by the DRA to the government of nouncement of the overthrow of H. Amin’s as a representative of the new Afghanistan; USSR. These requests had been voiced ear- regime with unconcealed joy and express informed him of the latest reports from the lier by Taraki during his visit to Moscow their eagerness to support the new USSR representative at the UN, O.A. and by Amin. administration’s program. The commanders Troyanovsky. It would also be useful to remind the of all key formations and units of the Af- Sh.M.Dost. The situation in Afghani- participants at the Security Council of Ar- ghan army have already announced their stan remains difficult. The rebels were able ticle 51 of the UN Charter. support of the new leadership of the party to capture a number of the country’s prov- The change in the leadership of Af- and the government. Relations with Soviet inces, for example, Kunduz, Tokhar, ghanistan is solely the internal matter of Af- soldiers and specialists continue to remain Samangan, and Badakhshan. However, with ghanistan. The representatives of Western friendly overall. The situation in the coun- the help of the Soviet Union, the armed countries, Thatcher in particular, are trying try is normalizing. forces of DRA were able to push the counter- to draw a correlation between the change in In Kabul’s political circles it is noted revolutionaries out from the mentioned the Afghan leadership and the deployment that the Babrak government, evidently, must provinces. In the northern part of the coun- of the Soviet military contingent in Afghani- overcome significant difficulties, inherited try they continue to hold only the adminis- stan. However, one should emphasize that by him from the previous regime, in estab- trative center of Badakhshan-Faizabad. there is no relationship here. This is purely lishing order in domestic politics and During meetings of the CC PDPA Po- coincidental. economy; however, they express hope that litburo, the Revolutionary Council and the I can confidentially inform you that we PDPA, with USSR’s help, will be able to government of DRA, , con- have evidence that Saudi Arabia intends to solve these problems. Babrak can be de- tinually stresses the necessity to carefully get six countries bordering it to break off scribed as one of the more theoretically pay attention to the friendly and timely ad- diplomatic ties with the DRA. equipped leaders of PDPA, who soberly and vice and wishes coming from the Soviet As you have requested, we have pre- objectively evaluates the situation in Af- leaders. pared for you a number of materials, in par- ghanistan; he was always distinguished by Of great importance are Soviet recom- ticular concerning American military bases. his sincere sympathies for the Soviet Union, mendations concerning the expediency of These materials will be sent to New and commanded respect within party masses sending messages in the name of Babrak York along with V.S. Safronchyuk who is and the country at large. In this regard, the Karmal to Khomeini and Zia-ul-Haq (they going there to assist you as you have re- conviction can be expressed that the new are being prepared right now), as well as quested earlier. leadership of DRA will find effective ways the organization of meetings between the When you are assaulted [with ques- to stabilize completely the country’s situa- chairman of the Revolutionary Council and tions] concerning the deployment of a So- tion. ambassadors from Iraq, India, and other viet military contingent in Afghanistan, you nonaligned countries with the aim of ex- can parry this by exposing the aggressive [signature] [signature] plaining the meaning of events that took politics of the USA. In Cuba, the USA, de- Yu. Andropov A. Gromyko place in Afghanistan and to actively influ- spite the constant demands of the Cuban [signature] [signature] ence them to take a positive attitude towards government and people, continues to main- D. Ustinov B. Ponomarev Afghan affairs. tain its military base in Guantanamo. This There was also a press conference by is an example of open and rude interference 31 December 1979 B. Karmal for foreign journalists which took in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. No. 2519-A place on the evening of January 3. Concerning contacts with Safronchyuk The conference was successful, and the and your conversations with him, it is de- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 10; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRA has sirable to use discretion and certain caution provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.] ordered all ambassadors in foreign countries during conversations in New York, espe- to give out visas to any foreign journalists cially inside premises. Meetings and ex- Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister interested in visiting Afghanistan. changes of opinion can be realized in turn 162 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

on the premises of the Soviet representatives Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I. other countries — did not follow the Ameri- to the U.N. or in the buildings of the Soviet cans, are not in agreement with the sanc- consulate-general. It is desirable not to ad- Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V., tions which the USA is applying. vertise that Safronchyuk arrived in New Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, The General Assembly session ended. York to render you assistance. Officially, A.P., Pel’she, A. Ia., Suslov, M.A., Many delegates spoke over the three days. he is going in the capacity of a member of Tikhonov, N.A., Ustinov, D.F., Chernenko, But it is necessary to say, that of the 104 the Soviet delegation to the session of the K.Y., Gorbachev, M.S., Demichev, P.N., delegations which voted for the resolution, GA [General A of the UN, which, as is Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N., many voted without soul, 48 countries ab- known, is still carrying on its work. Solomentsev, M.S., Kapitonov, I.V., stained and voted against. That is a full one Sh.M.Dost. Should I say something Dolgikh, V.I. third. In such a way, the Americans man- regarding China, and, if so, in what capac- aged to lump together the reactionary re- ity? 8. Re: The Issue of the Situation in gimes and to force them to vote for the reso- A.A.Gromyko. In the case that rude Afghanistan lution. accusations and various kinds of insinua- I think that there will be some kind of tions are leveled in the direction of Afghani- BREZHNEV. You remember, Com- momentum in the American press, and in stan, it will be necessary to respond with a rades, that several months ago in relation to the press of other countries. But at the same decisive rebuff. However, in the course of events in Afghanistan we assigned a Com- time, countries like Argentina and Brazil do the Security Council session it is hardly nec- mission made up of Comrades Andropov, not agree with the the Americans, for ex- essary to dwell on China, as in such an event Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to in- ample, on the sale of grain to the Soviet the Chinese representative would be happy form the Politburo, and if necessary, to pre- Union. Canada too. to hear it. Do not create an advertisement pare corresponding documents and submit BREZHNEV. Vance came out against for the Chinese, but certainly do give a re- them to the Politburo. the participation of the USA in the Olympic buff. I will say that that Commission did its Games. Sh.M.Dost. Concerning the propa- work well. Most recently a whole range of GROMYKO. Yes, Vance, it’s true, did ganda campaigns carried on by the USA and resolutions were accepted and correspond- express such a thought unofficially. But on other Western countries on “human rights,” ing measures were implemented. all types of measures the English are very shouldn’t I speak at length about the fact It seems to me that the situation in Af- complacent. Giscard d’Estaing sent a mes- that after the 27th of December in Afghani- ghanistan is still far from the time when it sage. It is better. An Islamic conference is stan, the new leadership of DRA has freed will not require daily observation and the meeting in Islamabad. K. Babrak appealed all political prisoners, regardless of class, acceptance of corresponding operational to us for advice, whether he should go to religion, language, tribe or ethnicity, or po- measures. Therefore, it seems to me that it the conference. We advised him that it is litical views[?] We can, right now, invite to is not necessary to create any sort of new best not to go outside the borders of the Afghanistan representatives from any coun- commission; instead, we will assign the very country. try and show them that our jails are empty. same Commission to continue its work in ANDROPOV. In the last ten days in A.A.Gromyko. This is a very wise and the same spirit as it conducted it up until Afghanistan all the organs of party and state important measure on the part of the gov- now. leadership were created; even a procurator ernment of DRA. You should certainly Will there be any objections to that pro- was named. The Afghan leaders have started speak about it in detail. posal? No. more bravely to [missing one or more lines. ______Then we will consider that the Polit- —trans]. There is one great difficulty in their 7.I.80. buro Commission will act, with its former work — there are many various groups. # 020/gs membership. Despite it all, the difference between the GROMYKO. In the leadership of Af- Parcham and the Khalq is still noticeable. [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 36; ghanistan, a consolidation of forces is go- Of course, it is necessary to carefully fol- provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.] ing on. The often appeal to us for advice. low the state of affairs in the party and We give it. They make proclamations. achieve, in accord with our recommenda- CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 17 There are no essential changes in the mili- tion, unity. They considered the letter of the January 1980 (excerpt) tary situation. But it also has not worsened. CC CPSU in the Politburo and at the CC This is a very important element. The Army PDPA plenum, and they prepared corre- [handwritten] P179 supports the leadership of Afghanistan. sponding directives for the primary party or- Top Secret The international situation around Af- ganizations. Only copy ghanistan has taken a turn for the worse. The tribes play a big role there. It is Working Transcript The ruckus, which has unfolded particulary very important to win them over to the broadly in the USA, has also assumed a party’s side. Three very imposing tribes MEETING OF CC somewhat weakened form. In NATO there annnounced their support for the Babrak CPSU POLIT BURO is no unity regarding measures toward the regime. Babrak is doing great work regard- 17 January 1980 Soviet Union. In any case the Western coun- ing the strengthening of unity. In particu- tries — in particular, FRG, Italy, Turkey, and lar, there are definite shifts in relation to COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 163 work with religious officials. Y.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov, and B.N. The provision by the USSR of many- USTINOV reports in detail the mili- Ponomarev with continuing their work on sided, including military, assistance to Af- tary situation in various areas of Afghan ter- analyzing and preparing materials related to ghanistan and the coming to power of the ritory; he says: overall, the military situa- the situation in Afghanistan. government of Babrak Karmal created the tion is basically satisfactory, there are now All questions that need to be consid- necessary conditions for the stabilization of significantly fewer hotbeds of resistance by ered should be submitted to the Politburo the situation in the DRA and put an end to the rebels. of the Central Committee. certain tendencies in the development of the PONOMAREV speaks about the type situation in the Middle East which are dan- of measures which have been taken regard- Secretary of the CC gerous for us. ing the creation of the party and the strength- Along with this the development of ening of unity. He reports that yesterday a [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 174, l. 117.] events bears witness to the fact that the USA, group of our advisers consisting of 16 its allies, and the PRC have set themselves people, with Com. Grekov, L.I. at the head CPSU CC Politburo Decision, the goal of using to the maximum extent the of it, was sent to Afghanistan. Babrak 28 January 1980, with Report by events in Afghanistan to intensify the atmo- Karmal listens very attentively to the advice Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov- sphere of anti-Sovietism and to justify long- of our comrades. The leadership of the party Ponomarev, 27 January 1980 term foreign policy acts which are hostile now has a backbone. to the Soviet Union and directed at chang- BREZHNEV. There is a proposal to TOP SECRET ing the balance of power in their favor. Pro- accept for consideration the information of No.P181/34 viding increasing assistance to the Afghan Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, counter-revolution, the West and the PRC Ponomarev on this issue. Gromyko, Suslov,Ustinov, Ponomarev, are counting on the fact that they will suc- Assign Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Rusakov. ceed in inspiring an extended conflict in Ustinov, and Ponomarev to continue their Afghanistan, as the result of which, they work on the review and preparation of ma- Extract from protocol No. 181 of the CC believe, the Soviet Union will get tied up in terials connected with the situation in CPSU Politburo session of that country, which will negatively reflect Afghanistance. Submit to the Politburo is- 28 January 1980 on the international prestige and influence sues which require a decision. of the USSR. ALL. Agreed. About further measures to provide for the In the future as well, the necessity of national interests of the USSR in relation to providing for the broad foreign policy in- [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 44, ll. 31, the events in Afghanistan terests and the security of the USSR will 42-44; trans. by M. Doctoroff.] demand the preservation of the offensive Agree on the whole with the consider- nature of the measures which we undertake CPSU CC Politburo decision, ations which are put forth in the attached in relation to the Afghan events. In work- 17 January 1980 note of Comrades Gromyko, A.A., ing out and conducting them, we would sug- Andropov, Iu.V., Ustinov, D.F., Ponomarev, gest that it is expedient to be guided by the COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET B.N. following. UNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE The MFA USSR, the Ministry of De- - Henceforth, in relations with the fense, the KGB USSR, and the International USA, to maintain a firm line in international Top Secret Department of the CC CPSU are to be affairs in opposition to the Carter guided by these considerations in working Administration’s provocative steps. Despite #P179/USh out and implementing practical measures on the fact that Washington will in the future Afghanistan. continue to initiate an anti-Soviet campaign To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, and will strive to impart a coordinated char- Andropov, Gromyko,Suslov, Ustinov, CC SECRETARY acter to the actions of its allies, to realise Ponomarev. [attachment] our countermeasures proceeding from the inexpedience of complicating the entire Excerpt from Protocol #179 of the Re: Point 34 Protocol No. 181 complex of multi-level relations between the Politburo CC CPSU session of Soviet Union and the USA. 17 January 1980 Top Secret - To intensify our influence on the po- Special File sitions of various NATO allies of the USA, On the situation in Afghanistan. particularly on France and the FRG, to the To the CC CPSU greatest possible extent using in our inter- 1. To take into consideration the infor- ests the differences which have been re- mation presented by Comrades A.A. About further measures to provide for the vealed between them and the USA in the Gromyko, Y.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov, and national interests of the USSR in relation approach to the choice of measures in re- B.N. Ponomarev on this question. to the events in Afghanistan sponse to the actions of the Soviet Union in 2. To entrust Comrades A.A. Gromyko, Afghanistan. 164 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

- Keeping in mind that the events in Khomeini regime to inspire anti-government summed up as follows: Afghanistan are being used by the USA and uprisings on Moslem grounds in Afghani- - The consistent implementation in the PRC as a convenient pretext for a fur- stan. Party life and Party constuction of the line ther rapprochement on an anti-Soviet basis, - Taking into account that the possibili- about the unity of the Party which has been to plan long-term measures to complicate ties of the West and China to achieve their recommended to the Afghan comrades in the relations between Washington and Beijing strategic goals in Afghanistan are weakened appeals of the CC CPSU to the leadership in the context of the development of rela- by the absence of a well-organized and in- of the PDPA. The identification and isola- tions within the bounds of the so-called triple fluential political opposition to the people’s tion, both in the center and in local regions, alliance of the USA, PRC, and Japan. power, direct serious attention to conduct- of people who may oppose that line, so that - To consider with the leadership of ing measures, including those of a special they will not be able to exert a demoraliz- Communist and working class parties of nature, to demoralize organizations of Af- ing influence in the Party. capitalist and developing countries the is- ghan immigrants and discredit their leaders. - The utilization of the experience of a sue of the deployment of a broad campaign - In relation to the U.N. General range of socialist countries (Czechoslova- in support of the Afghan revolution and Assembly’s consideration of the so-called kia, Bulgaria, and others) in the resolution brotherly assistance to the DRA from the “Afghan question,” to activate work on un- of the issue of the creation of a genuinely Soviet Union. In addition, through unoffi- masking the anti-Soviet and anti-Afghan representative broad front of left and demo- cial means to undertake measures to attract machinations of the USA, its allies, and cratic organizations headed by the PDPA. to this campaign other mass organizations, China, and also on the neutralization of the The strengthening of the influence of the organs of the press, etc. consequences of those actions which are Party on Afghan youth, especially among - In the Non-Aligned movement, us- unfavorable to the USSR and the DRA. the student body, the creation, in assistance ing the resources of Cuba and the Socialist - While conducting foreign policy and to the Komsomol, of a range of sport, cul- Republic of Vietnam, and also the countries propagandistic measures, to use even more tural, and other organizations. belonging to the progressive wing of the widely the thesis that the Soviet Union’s - The utmost consolidation and devel- Non-Aligned Movement, to inspire state- provision of military assistance to Afghani- opment of the DRA’s progressive socio-po- ments of support for the Afghan government stan cannot be viewed in isolation from the litical foundations, the acceleration in the and to avert possible attempts by the West USA’s provocative efforts, which have al- working out and acceptance of a new con- and China to provoke the Movement to con- ready been undertaken over the course of a stitution, the creation of opportunities for demn the actions of the Soviet Union, to iso- long time, to achieve unilateral military ad- representatives of tribes and national minori- late Afghanistan and to use the developing vantages in regions which are strategically ties to participate with full rights in the work situation to weaken the progressive wing in important to the USSR. of the Dzhirgs and local councils. the Non-Aligned movement. - The establishment of contacts and the - To concentrate the main efforts in In relation to the difficult domestic conducting of negotiations with the leaders opposition to the hostile activity of the USA political and economic situation in the DRA, and elders of the most warlike tribes in the and its allies regarding the Islamic countries along with the intensification of anti-Soviet DRA and the search for ways to achieve the of the Middle and Near East, particularly moods which are taking place among part quickest compromise on conditions for their Pakistan and Iran, and also such influential of the Afghan population as the result of the ceasing the anti-government struggle. Re- countries of Asia as India. To actively op- criminal activity of H. Amin and his circle, alization of a line on a gradual attack on the pose Washington’s policy of knocking to- a certain period of time evidently will be position of the tribal reaction, the showing gether a united front of the West and certain required for the normalization of the situa- of flexibility and a differentiated approach Moslem countries, and of reorienting Is- tion in Afghanistan itself. to various tribes and socio-economic strata. lamic fanaticism on an anti-Soviet course. The consolidation of people’s power in - The working out of a long-term plan Proceeding from the fact that the USA the country during the coming years and the of work with the Moslem clergy which en- and China are most actively trying to use stabilization of the domestic political and visions attracting moderate Moslem leaders Pakistan and that the most important bases economic situation in Afghanistan will to a to cooperate with the authorities, the isola- of the Afghan bandit formations are located great extent depend on the extent to which tion of representatives of reactionary cleri- on the territory of that country, constantly there will manage to be provided true unity cal circles, the establishment of contacts exert a restraining influence on the regime in the ranks of the Party and the unification with the Shiite clergy, the inadmissability of Zia ul-Haq, including via special chan- of all progressive and national patriotic of any form (including economic) of dis- nels, and to push him to accept measures to forces in the framework of a united front. crimination against Shiites. limit the actions of the rebels from Pakistani Taking this into account, provide help - The setting up of normal economic territory. and all-around support to the leadership of life in the country, and, in particular, the - Bring into life measures directed at PDPA in the realization of the goals of the improvement of the material basis for work- the preservation of the anti-imperialist, pri- April [1978] revolution and in the fulfill- ers in the city and village. The provision of marily anti-American, elements in the for- ment of our recommendations on the key a balanced, mutually beneficial cooperation eign policy of Iran, insofar as the continua- issues of Party and state construction and between the state and private sectors. The tion of the crisis in Iran-American relations the development of the economy, the fun- presentation of broader possibilities in the limits the potential possibilities of the damental proposals of which may be area of domestic and foreign trade, and also COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 165 in the production sphere for the middle and In accordance with the assignment Y.V. Andropov especially the petit bourgeoisie while main- (#Pl80/XP), I held discussions with General taining state control. Secretary of the Central Committee of 5 February 1980 Besides this, from our side: PDPA, Chairman of the Revolutionary #271-A - To work with the leadership of the Council of the DRA B. Karmal, and also PDPA to realize its foreign policy program with Member of the Politburo of the Cen- [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 175, ll. 3-4; and to work out further steps to consolidate tral Committee of PDPA, Deputy Chairman appendices not printed.] the foreign policy position of Afghanistan. of the Revolutionary Council A. Sawari, - To provide all-around practical assis- with Minister of the Interior S.M. CC CPSU Politburo transcript, tance in military construction, keeping in Gulyabzoy, Minister of Communications 7 February 1980 (excerpt) mind the quickest creation of a militarily M.A. Vatandjar, Member of the Politburo prepared, organized and equipped people’s of the Central Committee of PDPA, Secre- Top Secret army. Facilitate the consolidation of the tary of the Central Committee of PDPA N.A. Only copy PDPA’s position among the command staff, Nur, member of the Politburo of the Cen- Working Transcript and also the intensification of training of the tral Committee of PDPA S.M. Zeray, and army in the spirit of devotion to the people’s Member of the Presidium of the Revolution- MEETING OF CC power of Afghanistan. ary Council of the DRA Major-General A. CPSU POLITBURO -Keeping in mind the complex tasks Kadyr in Kabul on January 31-February 1 which the special services of Afghanistan (notes on the conversations are attached). 7 February 1980 must resolve, speed up fulfillment of the During our conversation B. Karmal Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I. program to provide assistance via all chan- handed me, for deliverance to the Central Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V., Grish- nels of work of the organs of state security, Committee of the CPSU, the text of the let- in, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, A.P., internal affairs, and people’s militias, both ter of the Central Committee of PDPA to Suslov, M.A., Tikhonov, N.A., Ustinov, in the center and in the local regions. party organizations concerning the issues of D.F., Gorbachev, M.S., Demichev, P.N., -Taking into account that in the spring party unity (attached). Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N., Kapi- of 1980 in Afghanistan a further activation During my stay in Kabul I had conver- tonov, I.V., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., of the insurgent movement may take place, sations with Soviet Ambassador to DRA Rusakov, K.V. and also having in mind the well-known Comrade F.A. Tabeev, and with the head of historic and national particularities of the the group of our party advisers Comrade L.I. 3. About Com. Andropov’s conversations Afghans, conduct consultations with the Grekov, who raised several questions con- with the Afghan leaders about certain issues Ministry of Defense and the government of cerning our economic and party cooperation of Soviet-Afghan cooperation the DRA and conclude appropriate agree- with Afghanistan. The questions are re- ments which define the status and legal po- flected in the appendices. BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov, sition of the Soviet military contingents for First Secretary of the Central Commit- Iu.V. traveled to Afghanistan in accord with the whole period of their presence in Af- tee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan the Politburo’s decision. Let us listen to ghanistan. Comrade [Sharif] Rashidov, with whom I Com. Andropov. We request consideration. had a conversation during my stop in ANDROPOV. I distributed a detailed Tashkent on my way to Kabul, believes that description of the conversations which I had A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov considering the increase in the amounts of with the Afghan leaders, therefore I think D. Ustinov B. Ponomarev cargo shipped between the Soviet Union and that there is no need to make a detailed re- Afghanistan it is necessary for the central port. But all the same I would like to make 27 January 1980 ministries to take measures to put an end to special note of several issues. falling behind the schedule in the construc- First of all it is necessary to note di- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 3; pro- tion of the joint bridge crossing on Amu rectly that the situation in Afghanistan is vided by M. Kramer.] Darya river in the region of Termez-Hairaton stabilizing now. This is evident from all the (memo attached) and also to speed up the data. In the conversation which I had with Andropov Report to CPSU CC on Talks process of consideration of his proposal on Com. Karmal, he cited in great detail what with Afghan Leaders, 5 February 1980 organizing an independent branch of the has been done in the month since the re- Central Asian Railroad in Termez that he moval of Amin from power. Although the Top Secret presented to the Ministry of Transportation. situation in the country does continue to be Special folder It would be advisable to request that complex, and demands the most urgent and concerned departments of the Central Com- pressing measures aimed at its stabilization, CC CPSU mittee of the CPSU and other bureaus ex- the main thing is that now the leadership of amine the questions raised by Comrades Sh. Afghanistan understands its fundamental Concerning the discussions with the Afghan R. Rashidov, F.A. Tabeev, and L.I. Grekov tasks and is doing everything possible so that leaders. and submit their proposals in this regard in the situation really does stabilize. the general order. In my conversation, I particularly 166 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

stressed the necessity of establishing genu- mistakes which had been tolerated earlier. Afghanistan somewhat. ine party unity, heightening of the military I stressed the necessity of more fully using GROMYKO. It seems to me that we readiness of the army, strengthening rela- the breathing space which they have in or- need to look ahead a little. Within some tions of the party and government with the der to liquidate the contradictions which had time, it goes without saying that forces will masses, instituting normal economic life in arisen inside the party and in the country. I be withdrawn from Afghanistan, insofar as the country and activizing the foreign policy particularly pointed to the correct distribu- they now are introduced at the request of activities of Afghanistan in accordance with tion of responsibilities among the members the Afghan leadership and in accordance the demands of the situation. So, I concen- of the Politburo, and the conscientious ful- with the agreement. Let’s say that hostile trated on these basis tasks, about which there fillment of his responsibilities by every com- propaganda from China, Pakistan, etc. will is plenty of material in the transcript of the rade. stop. Can we in this event speak about a conversations. Therefore, it seems to me, In the conversations much attention full withdrawal of forces without getting there is no need to develop it in detail. was paid to strengthening the army and anything in return[?] It seems to me that it Further, I had conversations with A. teaching it attack maneuvers, and its mas- would make sense to think about the kind Sarwari, S. Gulabzoi, and M. Vatandzhar. tering of the technology which has been of agreed obligations to set between the Sarwari, as you know is the deputy chair- delivered in sufficient quantity. In the CC sides when it will happen that it will be pos- man of the Revolutionary Council and Politburo a guidance for action for all mili- sible to withdraw the forces. We will not Deputy Prime Minister of the DRA, tary and civilian members of the PDPA was have a full guarantee, I think, that some sort Gulabzoi is minister of internal affairs, and accepted. I have to say that it is a good guid- of hostile forces will not further attack Af- Vatandzhar is Minister of Communications. ance; it without doubt will help in strength- ghanistan. Therefore we have to provide All these comrades play major roles in the ening the unity of the party and raising the for the full security of Afghanistan. leadership of Afghanistan. Therefore, it was level of its defense preparedness. BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov’s very important to me to find out how these Our ambassador and other representa- visit to Afghanistan was taken at the request comrades imagine the affairs to themselves, tives in the DRA presented several issues of Babrak Karmal. The conversations and especially in view of the fact that several of of assistance to Afghanistan, including most consultations which Iurii Vladimirovich had them belong to a different group (as is well prominently the construction of an oil re- were very useful and substantive. I think known, in the PDPA there are two groups, finery. Regarding this, there is an agree- that it makes sense to approve the conver- the Khalq and the Parcham). The task is to ment made in 1972. Its capability was set sations conducted by Com. Andropov, and liquidate this rift so that they and others feel to be 100 thousand tons per year. Now the to accept the draft of the resolution which themselves members of one unified party. I Afghans request that its capability be in- he presented. told them directly that by using their influ- creased to 500 thousand tons. ALL. Correct. ence they could make a heavy contribution The second issue concerned the devel- It is accepted. to the unification of the party. opment of power engineering on the basis I also spoke with them in detail about of a common scheme of power generation [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 44, ll. 73, all the other questions. In particular, I paid and supply for the northern regions of Af- 77-80; trans. by M. Doctoroff.] attention to strengthening the organs of state ghanistan. Then they posed the issue of con- power, and the army, and particularly to con- struction of a mining and ore-concentrating CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on ducting major work among the tribes so as combine at the base of the Ainak copper Afghanistan, 7 February 1980 to attract the people to the side of the party deposit. They also posed such issues as the and to strengthen the unity of the people with construction of a transit bridge across the COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET the party, so that the people would believe river Amdaryu and complex of installations UNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE in the party’s ideals. A great deal was said on the Afghan [river] bank, and the recon- about all these issues, and I should note that struction of the Kabul house building com- Top Secret all these comrades correctly understand the bine. These are essentially the issues about tasks in this regard. which I wanted to speak. #Pl 82/S h. Then I had a conversation with the USTINOV. Iurii Vladimirovich has member of the Politburo of the CC PDPA, made a very thorough report about his jour- To: Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, and secretary of the CC PDPA, chairman of ney to Afghanistan. But I want to say that Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, the organizational commission of the CC, we must speak very carefully regarding a Rashidov—full text; Baibakov, Sosnov, Nur Ahmed Nur, member of the Politburo withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. I Skachkov—#3, 4 ; Pavlovski—#5. CC PDPA S. Zeray, and member of the Pre- think about a year will be needed, maybe sidium of the Revolutionary Council of the even a year and a half, [before] which the Excerpt from Protocol #182 of the Politburo PDPA, General Kadyr. With them, besides situation in Afghanistan has not stabilized, CC CPSU session of 7 February 1980 all the issue I raised in the previous conver- and before that we can not even think about sations, such as strengthening the party and a withdrawal of troops, otherwise we may On Comrade Y.V. Andropov’s discussions consolidation of the unity of Afghan com- incur much unpleasantness. with the leaders of Afghanistan concerning munists, I stressed as well the necessity of a BREZHNEV. I believe that we even some aspects of Soviet-Afghani coopera- quick correction of all the shortcomings and need to increase the contingent of forces in tion. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 167

taking into account the further development between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it seems 1. To approve the discussions that of the situation in Afghanistan and around to be necessary to take into account the fol- Member of the Politburo CC CPSU, Chair- it. lowing points. man of the KGB USSR Comrade Y.V. Secretary of the CC The situation in Afghanistan and Andropov held with the leaders of the around it continues to remain complicated. Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 175, ll. 1-2.] Although the new measures which have some aspects of Soviet-Afghan cooperation. been undertaken by the Afghan leadership 2. To ask the International Department CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Soviet inside the country and in the international of the Central Committee of the CPSU to Policy on Afghanistan, 10 March 1980, arena are facilitating the stabilization of the submit proposals on the issues of party co- with report on Proposal by Fidel Castro situation in the country and the consolida- operation mentioned in the discussions with to Mediate between Afghanistan and tion of the international position of the DRA, Comrade B. Karmal and with other Afghani Pakistan, and approved letter from L.I. this process is going slowly. The combat leaders, and also relating to the issues raised Brezhnev to Fidel Castro readiness of the Afghan forces for the time by the head of the group of the party advis- being remains low. The actions of the for- ers of the CC CPSU, Comrade L.I. Grekov, TOP SECRET eign and domestic counter-revolution are to the Central Committee of the CPSU. No.P187/33 continuing, dependent on the material, mili- 3. To entrust the State Committee on tary, and political support from the USA, Economic Cooperation (SCEC) and the To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, China, Pakistan, and from a range of other Ministry of Transport Construction to ex- Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Moslem countries with reactionary regimes amine the proposals of the Central Commit- Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamiatin. as well. tee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Judging by everything, a successful (Comrade Rashidov) on speeding up the Extract from protocol No. 187 of the CC resolution of the internal problems and the construction work on the joint bridge cross- CPSU Politburo session of 10 March 1980 consolidation of the new structure in Af- ing on the Amu Darya river in the region of ghanistan will demand not a small amount Termez-Hairaton, and to take necessary About our further foreign policy line in re- of effort and time, for the length of which measures to increase the speed of work of lation to Afghanistan and about a response the Soviet forces there will remain the ba- the Soviet construction organizations. Also, to F. Castro’s appeal sic stabilizing factor standing in opposition to submit in the regular order proposals on to the further expansion of the activity of construction of the structure on the Afghan 1. Approve the considerations con- domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary bank (a transfer base) on the conditions of tained in the note of Comrades Gromyko, forces. the general contract. Andropov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rakhmanin Along with this, in the interests of cre- 4. To entrust the Gosplan of the USSR of 10 March 1980 (attached). ating more favorable conditions for the sta- and the SCEC with participation of relevant 2. Affirm the draft instruction to the bilization of the situation in Afghanistan, it ministries and bureaus to examine the con- Soviet Ambassador in Havana (attachment might also make sense to use the apparent siderations presented by the Soviet Embassy 1). interest in efforts to find a political solution in Kabul on speeding up the construction of 3. Affirm the draft instruction to the to that issue which has begun to appear in the oil-processing plant, power stations and Soviet Ambassador in Kabul (attachment 2). Western and in Non-Aligned countries un- electric power lines according to the “Plan der the influence of our firmness on the Af- of the electricity supply to the Northern re- CC SECRETARY ghan issue. It is important, however, to di- gions of Afghanistan,” of the mining and rect the conduct of those searches in an ap- processing group of enterprises on the cop- [attachment] propriate way, to fill it with contents that per deposits site in Aynak, and of the recon- are advantageous to us, in counterweight to struction of the housing construction groups Re: Point 33, Protocol No. 187 the efforts of the Western countries, dis- of enterprises in Kabul. Top Secret guised as [seeking] a political settlement, 5. The Ministry of Transportation to achieve simply a rapid withdrawal of So- should speed up the consideration of the To the CC CPSU viet troops from Afghanistan so as to change proposals of the Central Committee of the the regime which exists there now. Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Comrade In accord with the instruction of 28 In this regard, the thought expressed Rashidov) on setting up an independent February of this year (P185/I) and in con- by F. Castro, that Cuba, in its capacity as branch of the Central Asian Railroad with nection with F. Castro to L.I. Brezhnev (tele- Chairman of the Non-Aligned movement, the terminal in Termez. gram from Havana No. 167), we report the would propose an initiative to make its good 6. To entrust the Commission of the following considerations. offices available in the matter of organizing Politburo CC CPSU on Afghanistan to think Upon the determination of our further negotiations between Afghanistan and Pa- out the question of the new relations be- foreign policy steps on issues which con- kistan, might turn out to be useful. tween the Soviet Union and Afghanistan cern Afghanistan, including taking account Accordingly, in L.I. Brezhnev’s re- under the treaty, having in mind the realiza- of F. Castro’s proposal that Cuba provide sponse to F. Castro it will be expedient to tion of this idea at corresponding time, and its good offices to organize negotiations express our favorable attitude to his idea 168 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

about the provision by Cuba of its good of- relations on the basis of principles of good sion of good offices, but not in the replace- fices in setting up negotiations between Af- neighborliness and non-interference in each ment of the direct negotiations between Af- ghanistan and its neighbors and in working others’ internal affairs, obligations should ghanistan and its neighbors. out corresponding guarantees of non-inter- be fixed about the cessation of armed and Agreements which are achieved in the ference in the internal affairs of the DRA. any other hostile activity from the territory course of these negotiations would be In this regard it is necessary, of course, to of those countries against each other, and backed by appropriate guarantees, in the first arrange with F. Castro that he from his side also about the problem of refugees from place from the USSR and the USA, but also and we from our own should talk over this Afghanistan. In particular, a ban on the en- from certain other countries from among idea with B. Karmal. It is also necessary to listment and the use of refugees in under- those which would be acceptable both to explain to F. Castro our approach to a pos- ground activity against the DRA and the liq- Afghanistan and to the other side. Posing sible political settlement and in this regard uidation of refugee camps located directly the issue in this way would allow Afghani- the complexity of the Afghan events, so that on the border with Afghanistan, the repa- stan to deflect, say, the candidacy of China. Castro realistically evaluates the situation triation of refugees to Afghanistan, and the Now it would be premature to deter- and does not feed on illusions of a simple resettlement of those of them who do not mine the detailed content of the guarantees and quick achievement of a settlement. wish to return in remote regions of Pakistan and the exact make-up of the participants, Keeping in mind the task of providing and Iran could be discussed. In the final insofar as this will depend both on the con- favorable conditions for the stabilization of stage of the realization of such measures on tents of the agreements themselves and on the situation inside Afghanistan and the ne- the territory of Pakistan and possibly of Iran the development of the situation. The main cessity for the world to get used to the new too, it would be possible to envision some point of the guarantees should be that the situation in that country and the Soviet form of verification with the participation countries which provide the guarantees will Union’s role there, our approach to a politi- of Afghanistan. respect them and by their own authority will cal settlement of the Afghan situation could In the process of working out such bi- fortify the bilateral agreements of Afghani- harmonize both the initial and more long- lateral agreements, evidently, there will arise stan with Pakistan and Iran. The USA must range tasks. In this regard, the transition to the issue of mutual respect for the current accept as well the obligation not to conduct a final resolution of the more long-term tasks borders between the participating states in any sort of underground activities, includ- would depend on the resolution of the ini- the agreement, keeping in mind that Paki- ing those from the territory of third coun- tial tasks, so it is possible to constantly bring stan will strive to secure Afghanistan’s rec- tries, against Afghanistan and its govern- influence to bear on that process. ognition of the Durand Line. Historically, ment. In its general appearance the outline of this issue is a complicated one for Iran. Its In the context of considering the guar- a political settlement could consist of a com- final settlement is directly connected to the antees it might be possible to pose as well plex of bilateral agreements between Af- development of the situation in Afghanistan the issue of the growth of the USA’s mili- ghanistan and its neighbors, above all Paki- itself and around it. Correspondingly, it tary presence in the region of the Indian stan, and systems of corresponding guaran- would be inexpedient for the government Ocean both in terms of the threat to the se- tees from the USSR, USA, and certain other of the DRA to prematurely—even before the curity of the Soviet Union which that would states, each of which should be acceptable true position of Pakistan will become create, and also from the point of view of both to Afghanistan and to the opposing side. clear—commit itself with a declaration the incompatibility of such actions with the The first task should become the start about its readiness to recognize the Durand task of stabilizing the situation in the Middle of consultations between Afghanistan and Line. According to tactical considerations, East. its neighbors aimed at a normalization of it is more advantageous for the Afghans to During the consideration of both the their relations. In this regard, continue to use this issue to receive from Pakistan maxi- guarantees and the overall problem of a po- try to ensure that the neighbor-countries of mal concessions on questions in which it litical settlement, it makes sense to conduct Afghanistan, and also the United States and holds an interest. the matter so that the governments of the other countries involved in anti-Afghan ac- The negotiations aimed at the working participating states clearly understand that tivities, from the very beginning of the po- out of concrete agreements should be con- issues which touch on the system which litical settlement process, undertake practi- ducted directly between Afghanistan and exists in Afghanistan must not in any way cal measures which would bear witness to Pakistan, and also between Afghanistan and be the subject of negotiations. In the same the cessation of their interference, includ- Iran. This, on the one hand, would way it must be clear that issues which con- ing military, in the internal affairs of Af- strengthen the position of the government cern Afghanistan must not be considered and ghanistan. Directly link this demand with a of the DRA, and on the other would exclude decided beyond the government of the DRA possibility of the positive development of the “internationalization” of a political reso- or without its participation. the process of political settlement. lution of the Afghan issue, which is unde- Drafts of L.I. Brezhnev’s response to As far as the concrete content of the sirable for us. The role of Cuba in its ca- F. Castro and our appeal in this regard to B. agreements which could be worked out be- pacity as chairman of the Non-Aligned Karmal have been prepared taking into ac- tween Afghanistan and its neighbors is con- movement would consist of getting the bi- count the considerations which have been cerned, in them, besides the consolidation lateral negotiations started with the agree- put forth above. of the general principals concerning respect ment of the participants and in a certain in- We request consideration. for the sovereignty and readiness to develop fluence on their conduct through its provi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 169

A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov D. Ustinov forces in the Non-Aligned Movement. With order in Afghanistan, [and to] the composi- B. Ponomarev O. Rakhmanin regret one has to state that many among the tion of its government, cannot by in any way non-aligned countries have recently fallen a subject of negotiations. Equally must it 10 March 1980 under the influence of a campaign that is be clear that the issues concerning Afghani- inimical to the cause of social progress. stan cannot be discussed and decided on [attachment 1] We fully understand the present pre- behalf of [i.e., without-trans.] the govern- dicament of Cuba in the Non-Aligned ment of the DRA. We understand that there To the clause 33 of the Protocol No. 187 Movement in the status of its chairman and is a unity of opinions with you on this issue, we value even higher [Cuban] efforts to pre- and that precisely these motives dictated Top Secret vent the misuse of this Movement’s author- your initiative regarding Cuba’s assistance Supplement I ity against the interests of socialism. in starting up talks between Afghanistan and ABSOLUTE PRIORITY [Vne ocheredi] I believe, Fidel, you should know in Pakistan. detail the situation inside Afghanistan. I It is known that the government of the HAVANA must tell you straightforwardly that it re- DRA stated very clearly its intention to SOVIET AMBASSADOR mains complicated and tense. Domestic and maintain relations of peace and friendship Copy:KABUL - SOV[iet]AMBASSADOR external counterrevolution, supported by with its neighbors, particularly Pakistan. (for orientation) material, military, and political aid from the Cuban assistance in the form of goodwill USA, China, Pakistan and a number of other service in establishing this kind of relations Pay a visit to F. Castro and transmit Muslim countries ruled by reactionary re- between Afghanistan and its neighbors him the following letter from L.I. Brezhnev: gimes, have intensified their subversive ac- could, in our view, be useful. By the way, tivities. A realistic estimate of the situation in our opinion the term “goodwill services” “TO FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CC tells that some time will pass before the Af- is more applicable here than “mediation.” OF THE COM[MUNIST] PARTY OF ghan revolution becomes irreversible and its Of course, we will need a thorough CUBA, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE political and social gains become firm. It is coordination, first of all with the Afghan STATE COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL therefore not a coincidence that the imperi- leadership, on the course of actions. It is OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC alists and their fellow-travellers important to prevent a substitution of some OF CUBA [pripeshniki] persist in attempting, one way kind of international actions for direct ne- Comrade Fidel CASTRO RUZ or another, to compel the immediate and gotiations between the existing government complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is the Dear comrade Fidel, Afghanistan. goal of the authors of various plans that are Regarding your letter, I would like to However, when some people in the being nurtured today in the West, who do report that we agree in general with its esti- West became convinced of our firmness, not want to deal with the existing Afghan mate of the existing situation in the world they began to take an interest in the search leadership. It seems inadvisable to us to have and [with] your assessment that the Afghan for political solutions of the problem con- any degree of involvement on the part the issue is being artificially blown up by im- nected with Afghanistan. However, behind General Secretary of the U.N in these af- perialist forces to cover their encroachments this lies visibly the same quest, achievement fairs. This, among other aspects, would against detente, peace, sovereignty, and in- by political means of the same goals - a unavoidably be linked to the well-known dependent development of peoples. Events change of the existing regime in the DRA. anti-Afghan resolution of the General As- in Afghanistan, beyond any doubt, do not Western countries blatantly ignore the gov- sembly of the United Nations. As to the provide the real cause of the present-day ernment of B. Karmal and attempt to con- question about a possibility of assisting aggravation of the international situation. duct affairs concrning Afghanistan behind Cuba in its goodwill services on the part of Without these events, imperialism would the back of the government of the DRA and some other countries, members of the Non- find some other pretext to aggravate the situ- without its participation. This approach to Aligned Movement, this could probably be ation in the world. To this testify the steps political settlement, of course, should be tackled later with a view to the developing taken by the United States even before the categorically rejected. situation; now this question should rather recent events in Afghanistan and out of any On our side, we stand for a political be left aside. relation to them. settlement, but for a real settlement, aimed It seems to us that, in starting talks with We are convinced, however, that a co- first and foremost at the liquidation of the Afghanistan and Pakistan, and then, prob- ordinated and firm policy of the Soviet causes that brought about the existing situ- ably, also with Iran, we should from the very Union, Cuba, and other fraternal countries ation, i.e. at effective and guaranteed termi- beginning keep our eyes on the goal of de- is a guarantee that socialism, in the final nation of aggression and all other forms of veloping a complex of agreements among analysis, will prevail in the interest of peace interference into the affairs of Afghanistan; [those countries], agreements that, in addi- and of defusing the present situation, which [we also stand] for a settlement that ensures tion to general principles of respect of sov- was created by the actions of the most ag- the sovereignty [and] independence of Af- ereignty, development of good-neighborly gressive circles of imperialism. ghanistan and further a consolidation of the relations, and non-involvement into the in- We and our Cuban friends hold a unani- gains of the Afghan revolution. It is obvi- ternal affairs of each other, would also con- mous opinion on the present correlation of ous that the questions related to the existing tain clear and specific committments to a 170 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

cessation of hostilities and any other hos- est regards and best wishes from myself and [attachment:] tile activity conducted from the territory of from all our comrades. these countries against each other and to the With comradely welcome, To #IV of Protocol #191 settlement of the issue of refugees from Af- ghanistan. In particular, we should demand L. BREZHNEV Top Secret a ban on recruitment and use of refugees CC CPSU for subversive activity against the DRA and 10 March 1980". [demand the] liquidation of refugee camps We are presenting some considerations in the immediate vicinity of the frontiers Inform upon delivery by telegraph concerning our further steps in relation to with Afghanistan, the repatriation of refu- the situation in Afghanistan and around it. gees to Afghanistan and resettlement of [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 5; those among them who would not wish to documents provided by M. Kramer and Situation in Afghanistan and the role of the return, to central areas of Pakistan and Iran. Raymond L. Garthoff; translations by Soviet troops. Bilateral agreements that might be Carter-Brezhnev Project (report) and achieved in the course of such negotiations Vladislav M. Zubok (Brezhnev to Castro).] 1. The development of the situation in between Afghanistan and its neighbors Afghanistan after the introduction of the lim- could be supported by appropriate guaran- CPSU CC Politburo Decision on ited contingent of the Soviet troops in De- tees from, first of all, the USSR and the Afghanistan, 10 April 1980, with report cember 1979 confirms our assessment that United States, and other states, each of by Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov- it was a timely and a correct action. It un- whom would be acceptable for Afghanistan Zagladin, 7 April 1980 dermined the plans to overthrow the revo- as well as for the opposite side. lutionary regime in DRA and prevented the Such is in general terms a scheme of Top Secret emergence of a new hotbed of military threat political settlement as we see it. Obviously, #P191/IV on the Southern borders of the Soviet Union. its realisation will demand considerable ef- It put an end to Amin’s adventuristic policy fort and time, considering that the imperial- To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, line, which led to the goals and objectives ist and other reactionary circles will put Andropov, Gromyko,Kirilenko, Suslov, of the April [1978] revolution being discred- obstacles in the way. Therefore we have no Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimyanin, ited, to abandoning cooperation with the So- illusions as to a possibility of fast movement Arkhipov, Zamyatin. viet Union, and to establishing close ties towards this solution. with the West. The cadres of the People’s So much for the considerations that we Excerpt from Protocol #191 of the Politburo Democratic party, the army, and the admin- wanted to share with you, dear Fidel, in re- CC CPSU session of 10 April 1980 istrative apparatus loyal to the revolution sponse to your letter. As a practical matter, had been saved from physical execution. we stand on the point that your idea [about Concerning our further policy on issues re- Gradually the conditions for active partici- the mediation initiative] must be discussed lated to Afghanistan pation in the revolutionary movement of in advance with B. Karmal. On our side we both the former groups “Parcham” and also will approach him on this subject and, To approve the considerations on this “Khalq,” along with other representatives judging what his reaction could be, we ex- issue submitted by the Politburo CC CPSU of patriotic and national-democratic forces, pect to continue to discuss with you the is- Commission on Afghanistan (memo at- are being created. sues concerning realisation of your initia- tached). The new leadership of the DRA headed tive. We also expect to hear your opinion The Commission should continue by B. Karmal with comprehensive assis- concerning the considerations that we have monitoring the development of the situation tance from the Soviet Union in general cor- laid out. in Afghanistan and around it closely, and rectly outlined the tasks related to internal You are right, Fidel, in pointing that in solve the emerging problems as they arise normalization, the organization of military the existing situation Cuba has a chance to according to the considerations stated in the resistance to the internal and external coun- move to a more active policy within the memo, submitting relevant proposals to the terrevolution, for overcoming the harmful framework of the Non-Aligned Movement Central Committee of the CPSU as neces- consequences of the Amin regime, and for in defense of peace and international secu- sary. achieving a relationship of trust with the rity. This is all the more important, since the The Departments of the Central Com- tribes and other strata of the population, and imperialist forces are striving to see in Af- mittee upon consulting the Commission began to work on practical solutions to those ghanistan the only cause of aggravation of should carry out a coordinated propaganda problems. international tension, to divert attention from policy on the basis of the considerations 2. At the same time the situation in their dangerous activities aimed at the sub- stated in the memo, and guide the central Afghanistan remains complicated and tense. version of detente, to weaken the struggle organs of the press, radio, and television The class struggle, represented in armed of people for their rights. accordingly. counterrevolutionary insurrections, encour- In conclusion I would like to send you aged and actively supported from abroad, and the members of the leadership of the Secretary of the CC is occurring in the circumstances where a CC of the Communist Party of Cuba warm- genuine unity of the PDPA is still absent, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 171 where the state and party apparatus is weak improving the combat readiness of the army, positions of sharp condemnation of the So- in terms of organization and ideology, which the state security forces, and the people’s viet actions in Afghanistan by some of the is reflected in the practical non-existence of militia, for solving the primary economic countries that held such positions before is local government organs, where financial tasks, and for improving the work with tribal emerging among the members of the Non- and economic difficulties are mounting, and leaders, assumes the primary importance. Aligned Movement. Their positions are where the combat readiness of the Afghan 5. Meanwhile our troops in Afghani- changing toward searching for such a settle- armed forces and the people’s militia is still stan will have to continue to carry out their ment that would allow Afghanistan to main- insufficient. The efforts that had been un- tasks of defending the revolutionary regime tain its status as a nonaligned country. This dertaken notwithstanding, such important in the DRA, defending the country from ex- is the line taken by India, which is concerned political problems as establishing relations ternal threats, including sealing off the bor- about a possibility of Pakistan’s rearmament with Muslim clergy, tribal leaders, and ders of the country together with the Afghan with the assistance of the USA and China, middle and petit bourgeoisie have not yet forces, ensuring the safety of the major cen- and about the buildup of the USA military been solved. The agrarian reform has not ters and communications, and also building presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Per- been completed, especially in the Eastern up and strengthening the combat readiness sian Gulf. and Southern regions of the country. of the Afghan armed forces. Only when the The government of Pakistan has re- 3. The Soviet troops stationed in Af- situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, and the cently been showing some signs of unwill- ghanistan provide decisive assistance in es- situation around the country improves, and ingness to follow the USA policy on the Af- tablishing control over the situation in the only upon a request of the DRA leadership, ghan question blindly. One such sign was country. Together with the Afghan armed may we consider the question of the even- the willingness to receive the Cuban For- forces they have successfully carried out tual withdrawal of our troops from the DRA. eign Minister as a representative of the state operations for elimination of armed rebel chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement in formations in several provinces of the coun- Situation around Afghanistan and the Islamabad. Although the Cuban initiative try. As a result of those operations, the or- relevant objectives. of offering good offices for bilateral nego- ganized armed forces of the counterrevolu- The development of the situation tiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan tion have suffered substantial losses, and around Afghanistan has recently been char- with the goal of normalization of their rela- thus the military threat to the existence of acterized by a certain stratification of the tions so far did not produce any concrete the new regime has been significantly re- forces hostile to the Democratic Republic results, such steps would be expedient in the duced. of Afghanistan and to the Soviet Union. future, and this is exactly what the Cubans These are all reasons to believe that 1. The United States and China con- are going to do, using their contacts with after the military operations planned for the tinue to hold to a hard line aimed at chang- many nonaligned countries. immediate future are completed, there will ing the political regime in Afghanistan and 3. At the same time, it would be advis- be a relatively long period during which, at the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet able for us to maintain our contacts with the even with support from abroad, the coun- troops. Other countries exhibit a certain countries that express interest in searching terrevolutionary forces would probably be readiness to search for compromise solu- for a political settlement of the Afghan situ- unable to carry out any large-scale military tions for a political settlement in the exist- ation. During such meetings we should con- actions. Such a prognosis is supported by ing situation, even though those solutions, tinue to consistently develop the idea that the fact that already now the counterrevo- as a rule, are unacceptable. the basis of any political settlement should lutionaries have had to change their tactics; Thus, in contradiction to the USA po- be a complete and guaranteed cessation of they are mostly engaging in terrorist acts and sition, the majority of the Western European all aggressive actions and all forms of sub- small group actions. At the same time they countries do not demand the withdrawal of versive activities and interference in the in- are putting their stakes on economic sabo- the Soviet troops as a preliminary condition ternal affairs of Afghanistan. tage, disruption of transportation and food for any settlement, but consider it a part of During our meetings with representa- supplies, arousing religious, nationalist, and the process of such a settlement. Gradually tives of Western European and other coun- anti-Soviet feelings, [and] animosity toward the understanding emerges that there could tries it is important, as always, to point out the government and its undertakings. How- not be any resolution of the Afghan ques- that the questions concerning the current ever, one should not exclude the possibility tion without accepting the fact that Afghani- regime in Afghanistan, the composition of of the counterrevolution making an effort stan, being the Soviet Union’s immediate the government and the like, could under to organize massive uprisings in certain neighbor, is a part of the zone of Soviet spe- no conditions be a subject of negotiations; provinces of the country. cial interests. Our decisively negative re- and that any questions whatsoever concern- 4. In these circumstances the need for action to the absolutely hopeless plan of ing Afghanistan could not be discussed or carrying out consistent and purposeful mea- “neutralization” of Afghanistan proposed by resolved without the DRA government, sures for achieving a genuine ideological, the British, and aimed at the change of the without its current leadership. political, and organizational unity in the Afghan political regime by removing its cur- 4. Concerning the possible set of is- ranks of the PDPA, and for strengthening rent leadership, definitely encouraged this sues for discussion in connection with the its influence in the country, for unifying all evolution in the positions of the Western Afghan settlement, besides the question of national-patriotic forces, for creating an ef- European countries. real guarantees of non-renewal of armed and fective apparatus of local government, for 2. A tendency to abandon the initial foreign interference in the internal affairs 172 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

of Afghanistan, we should raise such ques- aligned movement regardless of the exist- concerning Afghanistan. tions as the reduction of the USA military ence of the American-Pakistani agreement presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Per- of 1959, according to which the USA con- 1. To agree with the considerations on sian Gulf, the creation of a zone of peace in siders it to be “vitally important for national this issue laid out in the memorandum of the Indian Ocean, and the liquidation of for- goals and for general peace to preserve the the Commission of the Politburo CC CPSU eign military bases there—all this against independence and the territorial integrity of on Afghanistan on 6 May 1980 (attached) the USA efforts to limit the discussion to Pakistan,” and pledges to take “necessary 2. To approve the draft instructions to Afghanistan itself. Raising those questions measures including the use of armed forces” the Soviet ambassador in Kabul (attachment would allow us to put pressure on the Ameri- in a situation of aggression against Pakistan 1) and the Soviet ambassador in Havana cans and to influence the negotiating pro- and upon the request of the Pakistani gov- (attachment 2) [not printed--ed.] cess for our benefit. Besides, it would per- ernment. mit us to increase the number of countries In relation to this, it would be expedi- SECRETARY OF CC that view our position on Afghanistan fa- ent for Afghanistan not only to maintain, but vorably, or at least with understanding. also to strengthen its role in the Non-aligned [attachment] 5. It is advisable to work on the ques- Movement, using it for building up its con- To the point XYII of the Protocol no. 195 tion of encouraging other countries of the tacts with other non-aligned countries. socialist commonwealth to take a more ac- 8. It is assumed that realization of the Secret tive part in providing Afghanistan with as- considerations mentioned above will require sistance in political, economic, and other a close and constant coordination of actions CC CPSU spheres. This question needs special con- between the Soviet Union and the DRA In accordance to the decision of 10 sideration. leadership on all aspects. Our rich experi- March 1980 (Pyongyang 187/33) a common 6. Therefore, our policy in the ques- ence of relations with new Afghanistan will line has been worked out with the leader- tions of an Afghan settlement should be help ensure such coordination. ship of the DRA on the issue of a political aimed at, first, helping decrease the tension We are requesting your consideration. settlement of the situation around Afghani- which was created by the West in connec- stan. It was assumed in doing this, that later, tion with the introduction of the Soviet A. Gromyko Y. Andropov D. Ustinov particularly taking into account the imple- troops into Afghanistan; secondly, at creat- V. Zagladin mentation of the Cuban initiative of good- ing more favorable external conditions for will services and the overall development internal consolidation of the revolution in 7 April 1980 of the situation around Afghanistan, it will the DRA, and for making the revolutionary #0304/gs be possible to return to a more specific defi- changes irreversible; and thirdly, at creat- nition of a foundation where one could start ing conditions for the future eventual with- [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 176, ll. 9-17; in bringing about a political settlement. drawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, translation by Svetlana Savranskaya.] At the present time it is advisable to when it would be justified by the political recommend to the Afghan leadership to step and military situation in the country and in CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 8 May forward with an across-the-board program the region in general. 1980, with Politburo Commission of political settlement stemming from the 7. We should begin with the assump- Report, 6 May 1980, and Approved scheme of principles which has been agreed tion that at certain point in time we could Cable to Soviet Ambassador in Kabul upon ealier. Such a step would make it easier sign a new treaty of friendship, cooperation, to influence the developing situation around and mutual assistance between the Soviet Proletarians of the world, unite! Afghanistan in a direction favorable for Af- Union and Afghanistan, which would make Communist Party of the Soviet Union. ghanistan and the USSR. It would also pro- it clear for everyone that we are ready to CENTRAL COMMITTEE mote the international stature of the govern- ensure the defense of the Democratic Re- ment of B. Karmal. public of Afghanistan, of its socio-economic Top Secret It is advisable to inform F. Castro of and political regime from all forms of ex- our recommendations to B. Karmal concern- ternal aggression. This question could be No. P[olitburo session] 195/[Issue] XYIII ing the promotion of such a program, since discussed in the future taking into account the Cuban comrades need to take these rec- the development of the situation, but it needs For comrades Brezhnev, Kossygin, ommendations into account while imple- to be solved positively. Those who inspire Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, menting their initiaitve of setting up talks the aggression against Afghanistan will not Ustinov, Ponomarev, Russakov, Zamyatin, between Afghanistan and Pakistan. have reasons for objections against a defen- Smirtyukov Submitting for consideration, sively-oriented treaty of the kind that the USA has with dozens of countries. Excerpt from the Protocol no. 195 of A. Gromyko Yu. Andropov D. Ustinov Such a treaty will not mean that Af- the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU B. Ponomarev ghanistan loses its status of a nonaligned from 8 May 1980. country. One just needs to be reminded that 6 May 1980 Pakistan has been accepted into the non- On the proposals for political settlement no. 391/gs COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 173

idea of a political settlement, to fill it with To underline, that the people of Af- [attachment 1] content corresponding with our joint inter- ghanistan is full of determination to defend ests. These interests, as we believe, will be the freedom and independence of its Moth- Concerning point XVII of the well served if the Afghan government would erland, its right to define for itself a social- Protocol no. 195 promote an across-the-board program of political order under which it would like to political settlement, which would become a live. Secret logical follow-up and specific development Then one could formulate the follow- Attachment 1 of the repeated declarations of the DRA ing specific postulates of the program of KABUL about its readiness to normalize relations political settlement itself. SOVIET AMBASSADOR with Pakistan and Iran. Affirming that in accordance to the It is absolutely clear that realization of basic principles of the Democratic Repub- Pay a visit to B. Karmal and, referring bilateral agreements between Afghanistan lic of Afghanistan the international affairs to the order, give him the following infor- and Pakistan, [and] between Afghanistan of the DRA are based on the principles of mation. and Iran, constitute an obligatory key ele- peaceful coexistence and on the policy of As has become known, it has been ment of a political settlement. It is no coin- positive and active non-alignment, the gov- agreed in the course of the exchange of opin- cidence, that this principled position is con- ernment of the DRA declares its intention ions with the Afghan leadership regarding sciously ignored in all kinds of Western to achieve a political settlement to ensure the mission of goodwill services by Cuba plans, based on the intention to internation- complete and guaranteed cessation of ag- to continue joint coordination on the issues alize the Afghan issue and to resolve it with- gressive actions against Afghanistan, sub- concerning the promotion of the idea of out the participation of the government of versive acts and any other forms of inter- political settlement. the DRA and against the interests of Afghan ference from outside into its internal affairs, The analysis of the situation reveals people. to liquidate the existing tension in the area that at the present moment there is an ongo- The advancement of an across-the- and to overcome the differences through ing divergence of approaches of various board program of settlement by the Afghan peaceful means, by means of negotiations. countries towards Afghanistan and what government would be, in our opinion, very To this end: happens around it. timely today also from in view of exercis- 1) The government of the DRA pro- On one side, the USA, China, and a ing appropriate influence on the position of poses to the governments of Pakistan and number of other states continue their hos- the countires, participants of the next ses- Iran to hold Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan- tile subversive activity against Afghanistan, sion of the Ministers of foreign affairs of Iranian negotiations, having in mind the actively strive to counteract consolidation the Islamic states, forthcoming in May of development of bilateral agreements about of positions of the government of the DRA this year. normalization of relations. Such agreements inside the ecountry and on the international If our Afghan friends share this opin- might contain commonly accepted articles arena. It is no coincidence, therefore, that ion, [they] could publish in the immediate concerning mutual respect for sovereignty, Cuba’s intiative to set up a dialogue between future a Declaration of the government of readiness to develop relations on the basis Afghanistan and Pakistan evoked a sharp the DRA, where, in the introductory part of principles of good neighborliness and negative reaction in those countries. they would formulate in a comprehensive non-interference into internal affairs, and On the other side, the reaction of some program some specific proposals concern- might include specific committments to sup- other countries, particularly Arab states of ing a political settlement. press military and any other hostile activity the Steadfastness Front [against Israel-ed.], The introductory part of the Declara- from their territory against each other. to the declaration of the government of the tion may point out that Afghan people, by 2) The government of the DRA appeals DRA in favor of a political settlement, to proclaiming in April 1978 a national demo- again to the Afghans who temporarily stay, the clarifications made by the Minister of cratic revolution, made its final choice and for different reasons, on the territory of Pa- Foreign Affairs Sh.M. Dost during his re- set itself upon the path of construction of a kistan and Iran, to return to the Motherland. cent trip, and also to the useful efforts un- new society in the country, based on prin- It confirms that they would be respected and dertaken by Cuba concernining the mission ciples of equality and fairness, while pre- their liberties and personal protection would of goodwill services, all this definitely in- serving its Islamic character and respecting be guaranteed, and they would be able to dicates the emergence of more realistic historic and national tradition, the society choose freely their place of residence and trends. By the way, the mission of goodwill that excludes exploitation of man by man. type of occupation. The government of the services of Cuba turned out to be undoubt- [The Afghan people] would like to build a DRA appeals to the authorities in Pakistan edly useful for at least one reason: it became new life for itself under peaceful conditions, and Iran to assist the free return of the afore- clear today who really stands for a political developing friendly and cooperative rela- mentioned persons to Afghanistan. How- settlement and who would prefer to limit tions with all its neighbors, with Muslim ever, if any part of those Afghanis prefers oneself to talks on this subject in order to countries [and] all other states. However, it to stay [abroad], then the questions concern- mask the continuing interference into the af- confronted brutal interference, including by ing their presence must also be discussed fairs of Afghanistan. military force, into its internal affairs, on the during bilateral negotiations with a view to All this testifies to the necessity of fur- part of the imperialist and other reactionary achieving appropriate agreements. ther and more intense efforts to promote the forces. 3) Upon achieving mutually satisfac- 174 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tory solutions to the problems indicated in eral agreements of Afghanistan with Paki- No. P200/Vi points 1 and 2, and upon normalization on stan and Iran. this basis of relations between Afghanistan 7) The government of the DRA favors To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin, and its neighbors, the government of the taking into account, in the process of politi- Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kunaev, DRA would be ready to examine other is- cal settlement, military-political activity in Pelshe, Romanov, Suslov, Tikhonov, sues of bilateral relations, including those the area of the Indian Ocean and Persian Ustinov, Chernenko, Shcherbitskii, Aliev, that had long been a bone of contention. Gulf by the states that do not belong to this Gorbachev, Demichev, Kuznetsov, Mash- 4) Proposing to hold bilateral negotia- region. While sharing the concern of other erov, Ponomarev, Rashidov, Solomentsev, tions with Pakistan and Iran without any states regarding the build-up of the military Shevardnadze, Dolgikh, Zimyanin, preliminary conditions, the government of presence of the USA in the Indian Ocean Kapitonov, Rusakov, Savinkin, Smirtyukov. the DRA firmly stands on the view that these and Persian Gulf, the government of the negotiations are incompatible with the con- DRA supports a proposal to turn this area Extract from protocol No. 200 of the tinuation of hostile activity against Afghani- into a zone of peace, to liquidate foreign session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU stan. Correspondingly, from the very begin- military bases there, and to carry out other of 19 June 1980 ning of the process of political settlement, measures to reduce tension and increase se- one should pass practical measures convinc- curity. Measures on Afghanistan. ingly testifying to the effecting of a cessa- While putting forward proposals on a tion of military and any other kind of inter- political settlement, the government of the 1. To approve Comrade Brezhnev’s ference into the affairs of Afghanistan on DRA once again with all determination de- proposals on the immediate measures on Af- the part of all states involved in such inter- clares, that the questions bearing on the in- ghanistan. ference. terests of Afghanistan cannot be discussed To proceed with the assumption that 5) The government of the DRA con- much less resolved without the participation the Soviet Union will continue to provide siders that, besides a complex of bilateral of the government of the DRA and along- political, military, and economic assistance agreements between Afghanistan and Paki- side it. At the same time the Afghan gov- to Afghanistan in order to help ensure the stan, [and] Afghanistan and Iran, another ernment considers as helpful the efforts of national independence and territorial integ- constituent part of political settlement must other states that favor a start of negotiations. rity of Afghanistan, to strengthen the be appropriate political guarantees of some In this regard it welcomes and supports the people’s democratic regime and the leading other states that would be acceptable both initiative taken by the Republic of Cuba in role of the People’s Democratic Party. for Afghanistan, and for all other partici- its capacity of chairman of the Non-Aligned 2. To consider expedient to withdraw pants of bilateral agreements. Among those, Movement, to offer its goodwill services. several military units whose presence in Af- in the DRA’s opinion, should be the Soviet The government of the DRA expects, ghanistan now is not necessary. Union and the United States. The chief that the specific program of political settle- To charge the Ministry of Defense of meaning of the guarantees must reside in ment that it offers will meet adequate un- the USSR to make a decision on the num- the fact that the countries-guarantors will derstanding, first of all, on the part of Paki- ber and composition of the troops to be with- respect themselves and by their authority stan and Iran, and will allow [them] to move drawn and on the time frame and the order will support bilateral agreements of Af- in practical way to such a settlement through of their withdrawal from Afghanistan. ghanistan with Pakistan and Iran. As to the negotiations. To charge Comrade Iu.V. Andropov to guarantees on the part of the USA, they must In the end tell B. Karmal that simulta- coordinate the issues concerning the with- include a clearly stated pledge not to con- neously with the proposal of the program drawal of some Soviet military units from duct any kind of subversive activity against of political settlement it would be good to Afghanistan with B. Karmal. Afghanistan, including from the territory of take measures for its broad dissemination 3. To use the withdrawal of some So- third countries. using the channels of media, as well as viet military units from Afghanistan as le- 6) The government of the DRA de- through Afghan embassies abroad and for- verage for demanding that Pakistan and Iran clares that the issue of the withdrawal of eign missions in Kabul. cease their hostile actions against the DRA Soviet limited military contingent from the On our side, we will give to this initia- and to stop sending interventions from their territory of Afghanistan should be resolved tive of Afghanistan the required political, territory into Afghanistan. in the context of a political settlement. The diplomatic, and propagandist support. cessation and the guaranteed non-resump- Report upon delivery by telegraph Politburo CC CPSU tion of military incursions and any other forms of interference into internal affairs of [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 8; [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 176, ll. 101- Afghanistan would remove the causes that provided by M. Kramer; translation by 102; translation by Sveta Savranskaya.] made Afghanistan turn to the USSR with Vladislav M. Zubok.] the request to introduce the aforementioned Information from the CC CPSU to contingent into its territory. Specifically, the CPSU CC Politburo decisions, Erich Honecker, 21 June 1980 issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops 19 June 1980 from Afghanistan will depend on resolution 21.06.80 of the issue of effective guarantees to bilat- TOP SECRET Confidential COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 175

indivisible. From all corners they announce Following the traditions established in CC CPSU Plenum, 23 June 1980 that the Soviet Union has supposedly the relationship between our parties, we (excerpt) changed its policy and by its own actions would like confidentially to inform you of threatens the West and its interests. In ev- the following. PLENUM OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE ery way they exaggerate in this regard the At one time we sent you information OF THE CPSU Afghan events, they cast it in a false light. on the deployment of a limited Soviet mili- 23 JUNE 1980 In pursuit of these goals they break all their tary contingent in the territory of the Demo- former records of trickery, lies, and evil cratic Republic of Afghanistan. At the time Sverdlovsk Hall, 11:00 a.m. puffery. we informed you that this action was taken Acting on the true course of events, the as a result of numerous requests by the Af- [. . .]Brezhnev: Not a day goes by Soviet Union directly casts back in the face ghan government in connection with a sharp when Washington has not tried to revive the of the officials of the imperialist states facts increase in imperialist aggression, primarily spirit of the “Cold War,” to heat up milita- like the acceptance by the USA and NATO, by the USA, as well as by China, using for- rist passions. Any grounds are used for this, in demonstrative form, of the decision to mations of Afghan counterrevolutionary real or imagined. increase sharply their military budgets, to bandits who are entrenched in Pakistan and One example of this is Afghanistan. abruptly whip up the arms race, to deploy Iran. The ruling circles of the USA, and of China new American intermediate range weapons Given the current situation the CC as well, stop at nothing, including armed in Western Europe, to make ready the strike CPSU, taking into account the fact that the aggression, in trying to keep the Afghanis [“rapid development”-ed.] force in the In- interventionists have been dealt a serious from building a new life in accord with the dian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. blow and that with respect to this there is ideals of the revolution of liberation of April To all this, to all of our well-founded no longer a need for the presence of the en- 1978. And when we helped our neighbor accusations against the NATO bloc, they can tire initial military contingent deployed in Afghanistan, at the request of its govern- raise no objection. And how can they ob- Afghanistan, has deemed it expedient to ment, to give a rebuff to aggression, to beat ject, if all this happened when the so-called withdraw several military units, the presence back the attacks of bandit formations which Afghan issue was not even mentioned. of which is not critical at this time. This operate primarily from the territory of Pa- . . . Comrades, for our actions in Af- measure is being carried out with the com- kistan, then Washington and Beijing raised ghanistan, for the fact that we fulfilled our plete agreement of the Afghan government. an unprecedented racket. Of what did they obligation to international solidarity in re- Of course, if the intervention directed accuse the Soviet Union[?]: of a yearning lations to revolutionary Afghanistan, for the against the progressive achievements of the to break out to warm waters, and an inten- fact that the aggressor already has received Afghan people, against independence and tion to make a grab for foreign oil. And the a solid rebuff, the Soviet Union does not in- the territorial integrity of DRA continues, whole thing was that their plans to draw tend to make any excuses to anyone, and or worse still, increases, then all necessary Afganistan into the orbit of imperialist the inspirers of aggression against the Af- measures will be taken not only to policy and to create a threat to our country ghan state are beginning to feel that. Those strengthen the Afghan armed forces, but also from the south crashed to the ground. should ask for pardon who organized and our military contingent in Afghanistan. In the Soviet act of assistance to Af- stand behind the aggression against Afghani- The withdrawal of several Soviet mili- ghanistan there is not a grain of avarice. We stan, who concocted the criminal plans in tary units from Afghanistan rests on the fact had no choice other than the sending of relation to that country, the independent ex- that Soviet Union will continue to render troops. And the events confirmed that it was istence and security of which have a direct political, military and economic support to the only correct choice. (Continued ap- relation to the security of the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, with the aim of maintaining plause). We accuse the organizers of the aggression the national independence and territorial against Afghanistan and demand that that integrity of Afghanistan, buttressing the [. . .]Gromyko: [. . .] Given all that was aggression be stopped. (Applause). people’s democratic regime and the funda- achieved by the fraternal countries in the in- Of course, it would be premature to mental role of the People’s Democratic ternational arena, especially in the 1970s, believe that the complexity in relation to Party. in the struggle for detente and peace, we note Afghanistan is already behind us. The ex- We intend to use the withdrawal of sev- something else: the general situation in the ternal enemies of Afghanistan and the do- eral Soviet military units from Afghanistan world has grown more complicated, tension mestic reactionary forces will still make in order to secure from Pakistan and Iran has grown, above all in our relations with themselves known. But the matter is now the cessation of hostile activities against the the United States. The question arises: what on the correct path. Afghanistan will not DRA and the smuggling of interventionists is the reason for this? return to the past. Our Party and our people into Afghanistan from their territories. We The opponents of detente do not can be sure of that. (Applause). reckon that our friends will follow the same trouble themselves even with a minimal For us now, as Leonid Il’ich an- course. dose of objectivity in explaining the reasons nounced, there is no need to have in Af- for such a situation. They are building their ghanistan a military contingent even of the [Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J IV 2/202, A. 575; policy on deception of the peoples. Imperi- size which it was when it was introduced. obtained by V. Zubok.] alist policy and deception of the peoples are But if the situation demands it, we at any 176 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

time will be able to strengthen our contin- The other day, the President of Paki- Interference” in Afghanistan, gent, so as to reliably work together to pro- stan Zia-ul-Haq addressed us with a pro- 2 October 1980 vide for the independence and territorial in- posal on holding talks with Afghanistan, Pa- tegrity of Afghanistan. kistan and Iran under the mediation of the Secret The possibility of reaching at an ap- Soviet Union. The goal of these talks should propriate time a Treaty of mutual assistance be, in his words, the normalization of bilat- CPSU CC between the Soviet Union and the Demo- eral relations, the preservation of cratic Republic of Afghanistan, which would Afghanistan’s status as independent and On Foreign Interference in the Internal clearly demonstrate the resolve of both friendly to the Soviet Union and the assur- Affairs of the Democratic countries not to allow any encroachment ance of a guarantee not to interfere in its Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) from without on the independence and in- internal affairs. tegrity of the Afghan state, deserves serious In the opinion of Zia-ul-Haq, such a Following the victory of the revolution attention. meeting could take place in Moscow dur- in Afghanistan, the USA and its allies in . . .We have proposed and propose that ing the second half of August of this year, NATO, as well as China, Pakistan, Iran, and Washington be led in our mutual relations first on the level of Foreign Ministers, and several reactionary Arab countries, launched by the principles of equality, equal security, then on the level of national and govern- subversive actions against the DRA, and mutual advantage, non-interference in each ment leaders. The President of Pakistan these actions were greatly stepped up once other’s domestic affairs. In a single word, announced that so far he has not discussed Soviet troops were sent into Afghanistan. we have built and are ready in the future to this idea of his with the government of Iran, The USA and its allies are training, build our relations with the USA on the prin- but he expressed confidence that Iran will equipping, and sending into DRA territory ciples of peaceful coexistence. lend its support. armed formations of the Afghan counter- Declaring our readiness to maintain From the very beginning we were not revolution, the activity of which, thanks to normal relations with the USA, we proceed sure of the seriousness of Zia-ul-Haq’s in- help from outside, has become the main fac- from the fact that hostility between the two tentions. Nevertheless, after consulting with tor destabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. powers is not only unwise, but also danger- the government of the Democratic Repub- The most serious actions against the DRA ous. At the same time we more than once lic of Afghanistan, we decided to express, are being launched from the territory of Pa- have warned the Americans, that they should in principle, a positive regard to his proposal. kistan, where armed detachments of Afghan take into account the lawful interests of the However, following this, as we sus- reactionaries are being trained at 42 sites. Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union will pected, Pakistan essentially went back on In total, over 60,000 rebels, including more not permit anyone to trample on those in- their word. Under the guise of additional than 50,000 who have been infiltrated into terests. Many of you, evidently, have in “explanations” of their proposal their started DRA territory, have been trained in Paki- your memory how during the terms of of- to put forth completely unacceptable pre- stan in 1980 with help from American, Chi- fice of various Presidents throughout the conditions for these talks. nese, Pakistani, and Egyptian instructors. post-war period, American policy rocked First of all, Pakistan directly and rudely The Iranian leadership is openly sup- from side to side. It cost the Soviet Union declares the “unacceptability” of Babrak porting the Afghan reactionaries. There are considerable effort to lead the USA to an Karmal as the head of the Afghan govern- 13 training camps on Iranian territory for acknowledgement of the single reliable ba- ment and that he must be replaced by some- the Afghan rebels. Some 5,000 people have sis of our relations—a policy of peaceful one else. Secondly, Pakistan declares that been trained at these sites, including nearly coexistence. it will continue to act on the basis of 3,000 who have been sent into Afghanistan. Now the American administration has Pakistan’s obligations stemming from the American instructors are taking an ac- once again begun to veer wildly. The un- decisions made by the Conference of Islamic tive part in the training of rebels on the ter- derlying cause of the current break in So- Nations. Thirdly, despite Zia-ul-Haq’s ear- ritory of Pakistan. These instructors have viet-American relations is Washington’s at- lier conviction that Iran will support his pro- come mainly from the Washington-based tempt to do whatever it takes to achieve posal for direct talks with Afghanistan, Pa- “International Police Academy” and the military superiority over us. kistan is distancing itself from that as well. Texas-based school of subversion. In March Obviously we have no intention to con- and April of this year alone, the USA sent [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 40; tinue the dialogue with Pakistan on the ba- 100 instructors through Karachi into the re- provided by M. Kramer.] sis of their current position, which consti- gions of Pakistan bordering on the DRA. tutes a particularly rude interference in the Some of these instructors directly organized Information from the CC CPSU to internal affairs of the Democratic Republic the operations of rebel units on the territory Erich Honecker, 18 July 1980 of Afghanistan. of Afghanistan. The USA is providing shipments of 18/7/80 [Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J IV 2/202, A. 575; weapons to the Afghan rebels mainly Confidential document provided by V. M. Zubok.] through third countries (Egypt and Saudi Arabia). The direct supply of weapons to DISPATCH Report by Soviet Defense Minister the Afghan rebels in Pakistan is carried out Ustinov to CPSU CC on “Foreign via transport assets of the Pakistani ground COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 177 and border forces, and also through the na- (excerpt), 10 March 1983 reached the countryside: [they] rarely in- tional transport corporation. teract with the masses, about one third of The Carter administration is seeking to SESSION OF THE CC the districts is not under the control of the unite the Afghan counterrevolution, prom- CPSU POLITBURO central authority, and one can feel the fra- ising its leaders that if they unite, they will 10 March 1983 gility of the state government. receive unlimited help in the form of weap- In closing, I would like to say that evi- ons and money. The USA chief of mission Chairman: comr. ANDROPOV Yu.V. dently we need to take the steps which are in Pakistan, B. King, said this during a meet- Present: comrs. Aliev G.A., Gorbachev outlined in the recommendations given to ing this past March with the secretary of M.S., Gromyko A.A., Pel’she A. Ya., you for examination. It seems that it will Pakistan’s defense ministry, Lieutenant- Tikhonov N.A., Chernenko K.U., Demichev be necessary to hold a meeting with Karmal General D. Khan. The USA consulates in P.N., Dolgikh V.I., Kuznetsov V.V., and a group of leading officials of the Peshawar and Karachi are working to unite Solomentsev M.S., Kapitonov I.V., and People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan the scattered groups of the Afghan counter- Ryzhkov N.I. sometime in April. It seems that it would revolution. An “Afghan section” that has also be expedient for Yu. V. Andropov to been created in the USA consulate in [...] 6. On the situation in Afghanistan and meet personally with Babrak Karmal. Karachi is supervising rebel operations and additional measures towards its improve- TIKHONOV. When speaking of 300 providing them with weapons and equip- ment. mln. rubles, this refers to free assistance. ment. ANDROPOV. You remember how ar- The American authorities are also in- GROMYKO. In accordance with the duously and cautiously we decided the ques- stigating actions by anti-Afghan emigre resolution of the Politburo, a group of high- tion of deploying troops in Afghanistan. L.I. groups in the United States itself. With the ranking party, soviet, military and produc- Brezhnev insisted on a roll call vote by the direct participation of the CIA, the “Asso- tion management officials traveled to Af- members of the Politburo. The question was ciation of American Aid to Afghan Refu- ghanistan. This group put in some good examined in the CC Plenum. gees,” the “National Liberation Front of work there. They put together a set of pro- In deciding the Afghan problem we Afghanistan,” the “Unity Council,” and the posals for the further stabilization of the situ- must proceed from existing realities. What “Committee for Solidarity in Organizing the ation in Afghanistan. We examined these do you want? This is a feudal country where Liberation of Afghanistan” have been set up proposals during meetings of the CC Polit- tribes have always been in charge of their in the USA. These organizations have been buro Commission on Afghanistan. These territories, and the central authority was far given the task of coordinating the actions proposals contain problems that must be from always able to reach each Kishlak [an of anti-Afghan forces abroad and of provid- decided in the immediate future by both the Afghan district]. The problem is not in ing financial aid to armed detachments of Afghan and the Soviet sides. Financially Pakistan’s position. We are fighting against the Afghan counterrevolution. speaking, this will cost approximately 300 American imperialism which well under- The American CIA has devised special mln. rubles in the course of three years. This stands that in this part of international poli- recommendations “for the use of religious is a large, yet minimum sum, and it seems tics it has lost its positions. That is why we movements and groups in the struggle that we should make this expenditure. cannot back off. against the spread of Communist influence.” On the whole, the situation in Afghani- Miracles don’t happen. Sometimes we In accordance with these recommendations, stan is, as you know, difficult. Lately, cer- are angry at the Afghans because they act agents from the American special services tain elements of consolidation have been illogically and work slowly. But let us re- in Pakistan are carrying out vigorous work examined, but the process of consolidation member our fight with basmatchism [ban- among the Pushtun and Beluga tribes, pro- is moving slowly. The number of gangs ditry]. Why, back then, almost the entire voking them to carry out anti-government [rebel groups] is not decreasing. The en- Red Army was concentrated in Central Asia, acts in Afghanistan. emy is not laying down its weapons. The yet the fight with basmatchi continued up Foreign interference in the DRA’s in- negotiations with Pakistan in Geneva are until the mid-1930’s. And so in our rela- ternal affairs, above all by the USA, is moving slowly and with difficulty. This is tions with Afghanistan there must be both thwarting efforts to normalize the situation why we must do everything to find a mutu- demands and understanding. in Afghanitan. ally acceptable political settlement. In ad- As concerns the recommendations of Reported for informational purposes. vance, it can already be said that this pro- the Commission, are they not a little impos- D. Ustinov cess will be a lengthy one. There are ques- ing with exact instructions as to what should 2 October 1980 tions which must be discussed separately. be done by the Afghan side and by ours? One should only keep in mind that for now GROMYKO. Of course we will work [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 177, ll. 84- we cannot give Pakistan consent on concrete to complete the recommendations. 86; translated by Mark Kramer; first publi- time periods for the withdrawal of our troops ANDROPOV. Yes, so that it should cation in Russian in Novaya i Noveishaya from the country. We must exercise cau- be a political document. It must be much Istoriia 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (docu- tion here. Yes, the situation is stabilizing. more flexible. ment on 98-99), intro. by G.N. Sevastionov.] It is good that the Afghan army has grown PONOMAREV. We will complete to 140 thousand. But the main trouble is these materials. CPSU CC Politburo transcript that the central authorities have not yet ANDROPOV. Evidently we do need 178 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

these talks with Karmal. It will probably Also present: comrs. Vorotnikov V.I., be advantageous to hold them in two rounds; GORBACHEV: Before we start dis- Gromyko A.A., Zaikov L.N., Ryzhkov N.I., moreover, my discussion with Karmal cussing the issues on the agenda, I would Solomentsev M.S., Chebrikov V.M., should be organized last. like to inform you on some questions. Shevardnadze Eh.A., Demichev P.N., KUZNETSOV, TIKHONOV, GOR- A troubling cable has arrived from Dolgikh V.I.,Yeltsin B.N., Talyzin N.V., BACHEV. That’s right. Aden. They want to shoot 50 people there. I Biryukova A.P., Dobrynin A.F., Zimyanin ANDROPOV. Then, perhaps we will think we should issue an appeal, pointing M.V., Medvedev V.A., Nikonov V.P., make the following decision: To agree with out that the main thing today is unity. And Razumovskii G.P., Kapitonov I.V. the findings reported by the Politburo Com- the actions of this kind can aggravate inter- mission on Afghanistan and accept the ex- nal strife. [...] 11. On [former Afghan king] Zakhir pediency of holding discussions with B. GROMYKO: Right Shah. Karmal and a group of other leading offi- GORBACHEV: Let Yegor Kuzmich cials of the People’s Democratic Party of [Ligachev], Viktor Mikhailovich GORBACHEV. Have all comrades Afghanistan in March-April of this year. At [Chebrikov] and the MFA prepare the nec- familiarized themselves with the memoran- the same time we can ratify the draft reso- essary instruction. dum from comrs. Chebrikov V.M., lution of the USSR Council of Ministers on LIGACHEV: The Bulgarians refused Shevardnadze Eh. A., Sokolov S.L., and giving additional economic assistance to the to receive Muhammed. Dobrynin A.F.? Afghan Republic. GORBACHEV: We should not drama- POLITBURO MEMBERS. Yes, we The resolution is approved. tize it. They have to face certain difficul- have. ties, too, regarding this question. GORBACHEV. Then let us exchange 7. On the Afghan-Pakistan negotiations on According to information from confi- opinions. I have an intuition that we should the questions of political settlement dential channels, [East German leader Erich] not waste time. Najib needs our support. Honecker let himself speak in a way that He objectively evaluates the situation and ANDROPOV. It seems that the ques- testifies to his misunderstanding of our point understands the difficulty of the existing tion is clear. of view about Socialist self-government of problems. He believes that the activisation GROMYKO. The Afghans, of course, people, that socialism itself is a self-gov- of measures directed towards national rec- must be given materials which would give ernment. onciliation, strengthening of the union with them the ability to prepare well for the ne- [pages missing-ed.] the peasantry, and consolidation of politi- gotiations. GORBACHEV (reads a memorandum cal leadership of the party and the country PONOMAREV. They very much need on Afghanistan). This is a strict party docu- is a pressing task. these materials. ment. The situation is quite dramatic. B. Karmal is stalling. [translator’s note: ANDROPOV. Then let us approve the Karmal is very much down in terms of Gorbachev here uses an idiomatic Russian resolution. health and in terms of psychological dispo- expression—“Karmal vydelyvnet Kren- The resolution is approved. sition. He began to pit leaders against each delya”—which literally means, “Karmel is other. walking like a pretzel.” The expression, [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89 per. 42, dok. 51; pro- SOLOMENTSEV: A correct position. derived from a term for the weaving and vided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.] CHEBRIKOV: Karmal tells himself unsteady gait of a drunkard, in this case sig- that he cannot cope with his functions (he nifies Gorbachev’s assertion that Karmal is CPSU CC Politburo Transcript reads a cable). not behaving in a straightforward manner.] (excerpt), 20 March 1986 GROMYKO: One could instruct We have been fighting in Afghanistan Mikhail Sergeevich to speak with him. for already six years. If the approach is not Top Secret changed, we will continue to fight for an- Only copy [Source: f. 89, per. 36, d. 18; provided by other 20-30 years. This would cast a shadow (Draft) M. Kramer; trans. by V.M. Zubok.] on our abilities to affect the evolution of the situation. Our military should be told that SESSION OF CC CPSU POLITBURO CPSU CC Politburo transcript they are learning badly from this war. What, 20 March 1986 (excerpt), 13 November 1986 can it be that there is no room for our Gen- eral Staff to maneuver? In general, we have Chairing: com. GORBACHEV M.S. Top Secret not selected the keys to resolving this prob- Only Copy lem. What, are we going to fight endlessly, Attending: com Aliev G.A., Gromyko A.A., Working Draft as a testimony that our troops are not able Zaikov L.N.,Ligachev E.K., Ryzhkov N.I, to deal with the situation? We need to fin- Solomentsev M.S., Chebrikov, V.M., MEETING OF CC CPSU POLITBURO ish this process as soon as possible. Dolgikh V.I., Eltsin B.N., Yeltsin B.N., 13 November 1986 GROMYKO. It is necessary to estab- Sokolov S.L., Talyzin N.B., Biryukova A.P., lish a strategic target. Too long ago we Zimianin M.V., Medvedev V.A., Nikonov Chaired by comr. GORBACHEV M.S. spoke on the fact that it is necessary to close V.P., Razumovskii G.P., Yakovlev A.N. off the border of Afghanistan with Pakistan COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 179 and Iran. Experience has shown that we lay in the resolution of these problems does GORBACHEV. Who is preventing were unable to do this in view of the diffi- not increase our opportunities for settlement. him from solving the cadre questions? cult terrain of the area and the existence of Right now the situation is worse than half a CHEBRIKOV. Well, each of us, a little hundreds of passes in the mountains. To- year ago. In one word, it is necessary to bit. Such was the case with Dost, with the day it is necessary to precisely say that the more actively pursue a political settlement. minister of defense, with supplementing the strategic assignment concludes with the car- Our people will breathe a deep sigh if we membership of the CC PDPA Politburo. rying of the problem towards ending the war. undertake steps in that direction. GORBACHEV. I thought that we gave GORBACHEV. It is necessary to in- Our strategic goal is to make Afghani- Dost agreement on deciding these questions. clude in the resolution the importance of stan neutral, not to allow it to go over to the CHEBRIKOV. Then why is nothing ending the war in the course of one year - at enemy camp. Of course it is important to being decided? We speak less about Af- maximum two years. also preserve that which is possible in the ghanistan than we do about where will Dost GROMYKO. It should be concluded social arena. But most important - to stop work and where will the minister of defense so Afghanistan becomes a neutral country. the war. be sent. Then it is necessary to give instruc- Apparently, on our part there was an under- I would agree that it is necessary to tions to comr. Kryuchkov who is now in estimation of difficulties, when we agreed limit this to a period of one-two years. Kabul, not to avoid these questions in meet- with the Afghan government to give them SOLOMENTSEV. It would be good ings with Najib, but to tell him directly that our military support. The social conditions to complete a political settlement for the he must decide them as he finds necessary. in Afghanistan made the resolution of the 70th anniversary of [the 1917] October SHEVARDNADZE. Right now we are problem in a short amount of time impos- [Revolution]. reaping the fruit of un-thought-out decisions sible. We did not receive domestic support GROMYKO. It is difficult to talk of the past. Recently, much has been done there. In the Afghan army the number of about such a period of time. to settle the situation in Afghanistan and conscripts equals the number of deserters. CHEBRIKOV. On this question many around it. Najib has taken up leadership. From the point of view of evaluating decisions have been made. Much energy has He needs practical support, otherwise we the domestic situation in Afghanistan, we been put in. But, unfortunately, the situa- will bear the political costs. It is necessary can sign under practically everything that tion, both in Afghanistan and around it, con- to state precisely the period of withdrawal Najib suggests. But we should not sharply tinues to remain difficult. I support the pro- of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. You, cut off Karmal, as he serves as a symbol to posal of Mikhail Serge’evich [Gorbachev] Mikhail Serge’evich, said it correctly - two his people. A meeting of our representa- that it is necessary to liven up and push the years. But neither our, nor Afghan comrades tives with him should be held. It is also problem towards a logical conclusion. In- have mastered the questions of the function- necessary to try keep him on the general deed, we posed the question of closing the ing of the government without our troops. track; to cut him off would not be the best border. Andrei Andre’evich [Gromyko] is After the trip to India, it would be ex- scenario. It is more expedient to preserve partly right, speaking about the difficulties pedient to invite Najib to Moscow. We must [his relations] with us. of such a closing, due to the geographic and regard Afghanistan as an independent coun- Najib recommends a rather wide spec- other conditions. But partly the failure in try and entrust Najib to make decisions in- trum of steps. They deserve attention. One the closing is also tied to the fact that not dependently. He wants to create a headquar- path is to draw in the peasant masses on the everything was done that could have been. ters for the military command. Why should way of supporting the government power; Right now the enemy is changing its tac- we hinder him? another - negotiations with Islamic parties tics. He is going underground. It is neces- I expressed hesitation concerning the and organizations inside Afghanistan and sary to look for the means to a political so- replacement of Dost, as he is an experienced beyond its borders, which are ready to com- lution of the problem. The military path for diplomat and has a wide cultural horizon. promise; third path - relations with the the past six years has not given us a solu- But nevertheless, if the first secretary of the former king. I think that we should not spurn tion. PDPA believes that it is necessary to replace them. This should be done possibly in a What should have been done? First of him, then we must give him the liberty to combination other than proposed by Najib. all, it was necessary to receive Najib in make the decision. Right now a more concrete stage of discus- Moscow. He has never visited us. It is pos- Arguments are being made as to who sion with him concerning these questions is sible that Karmal’s conduct can be in some must accomplish the closing off of the bor- needed. A certain plan of actions is neces- way explained by the fact that as of now we ders - the army or state security organs? And sary. Here, it seems, our participation is have yet to invite Najib to come here. There this question must be decided by Najib, not needed, in particular, through the course of have been telephone conversations with him by us. our contacts with Pakistan. through intermediaries, but that’s not Bearing in mind the prospects for fu- Concerning the Americans, they are not [enough]. A direct conversation is neces- ture development in relations with Afghani- interested in the settlement of the situation sary. It could clear up a great deal. It is stan, it is important to put stress on economic in Afghanistan. On the contrary, it is to their important not to put off such a conversa- cooperation. Without this, our foundations advantage for the war to drag out. tion; a day or two should be found for the there will be difficult in the future. GORBACHEV. That’s right. purpose. I support the proposition of Victor GROMYKO. It should be considered Another important question - the ques- Mikhailovich [Chebrikov] on the impor- how to link India into the settlement. A de- tion of cadres. tance of meeting with Najib. 180 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

GORBACHEV. We can give corre- territory we cannot establish authority. We and agriculture, comr. Zeray, “because of sponding instructions to comr. Kryuchkov. have lost the battle for the Afghan people. various reasons, the status of peasants in the SHEVARDNADZE. Both comr. The government is supported by a minority government zone is in certain ways worse Kryuchkov and comr. Vorontsov are good of the population. Our army has fought for than in regions of counter-revolutionary people, but their discussions cannot replace five years. It is now in a position to main- activity.” To the question of how this can meeting with the General Secretary. tain the situation on the level that it exists be explained, comr. Zeray told me that “the GORBACHEV. Here, probably, now. But under such conditions the war will regions under the control of the counter- Akhrome’ev S.F. hears about the organiza- continue for a long time. revolution are better supplied with goods of tion of a headquarters for the military com- 50 thousand Soviet soldiers are sta- first necessity (these goods are shipped there mand of DRA and smiles. Would these tioned to close off the border, but they are by contraband from Pakistan). A similar headquarters really command our troops? not in the position to close off all passages situation exists in Khost, Uruzgan, and other DOBRYNIN. We must give liberty to where cargo is transferred across the bor- border regions. Sometimes a paradoxical Najib. Two questions arise here. First— der. I repeat that we can maintain the situa- situation arises when the peasants in regions the idea of national reconciliation, and sec- tion at the current level, but we need to look under our control, said comr. Zeray, receive ond—the political settlement of the situa- for a way out and resolve the question, as goods not from us, but from zones of gang- tion around Afghanistan. Andrei Adre’evich [Gromyko] has said. We formation.” Urgent measures are needed in Karmal must be removed. But we must must go to Pakistan. this most important question - the improve- remember that through national reconcilia- GORBACHEV. Why do you hinder ment of the situation of peasants in the gov- tion, not a single member of the CC PDPA Najib? ernment zone. Politburo supports Najib. There is no con- AKHROME’EV. He should not be Many members of PDPA leadership are cept of such reconciliation. building headquarters, but a state commit- without initiative, and have gotten used to GORBACHEV. The concept of settle- tee on defense. We allow him to make cadre waiting for recommendations from our ad- ment exists—we have established that—but changes. visors and have become sort of armless. It in practice the problem is being resolved. VORONTSOV. A few words to con- seems that our advisors in the beginning fre- Sergei Fedorovich, perhaps you will solve tinue the thought, just expressed by comr. quently “struck them on the arms.” it? Akhrome’ev S.F. Afghanistan is a peasant Such is not comr. Najib. He creates AKHROME’EV [USSR dep. minister country (80 percent of the population are the impression of a talented and decisive per- of defense]. No, it will not be possible to peasants). But it is exactly they who have son. He must be given the opportunity to solve it. least benefitted from the revolution. Over make decisions himself, only looking to DOBRYNIN. The question of the con- eight years of the revolution agricultural pro- make sure that because of his [inexperience] cept has not become the most important for duction has increased by only 7 percent, and he does not amuse himself with secondary the Afghan government. I come out in fa- the standard of living of peasants remains details. And he must have the opportunity vor of receiving Najib in Moscow. Right at pre-revolutionary levels. to himself create his own “command” [or now a message could be given to comr. By the acknowledgment of comr. Najib team]. Kryuchkov about the meeting with Najib. himself and a member of Politburo, comr. GORBACHEV. In October of last year Let him tell Najib that he himself should Zeray, in a conversation with me, the party [1985] in a Politburo meeting we determined make the decision concerning Dost, Karmal, “has still not reached the peasantry,” land- upon a course of settling the Afghan ques- but that this must be done without stirring water reform has turned out unsuccessful tion. The goal which we raised was to ex- up factionalism. and has not been realized (now comr. Najib pedite the withdrawal of our forces from AKHROME’EV. Military actions in has already taken up to review from a more Afghanistan and simultaneously ensure a Afghanistan will soon be seven years old. stability-of-life oriented perspective), the friendly Afghanistan for us. It was projected There is no single piece of land in this coun- peasant has not received significant mate- that this should be realized through a com- try which has not been occupied by a So- rial benefit from the revolution. Even right bination of military and political measures. viet soldier. Nevertheless, the majority of now, in the words of comr. Zeray, when there But there is no movement in either of these the territory remains in the hands of rebels. are only 5 mln. people out of a population directions. The strengthening of the mili- The government of Afghanistan has at its of 18 mln. under the control of the govern- tary position of the Afghan government has disposal a significant military force: 160 ment (moreover, 3 mln. of them live in the not taken place. National consolidation has thousand people in the army, 115 thousand cities and only 2 mln. in the country - this is not been ensured mainly because comr. - in Tsarando and 20 thousand - in state se- no more the 300-400 thou. families), the Karmal continued to hope to sit in Kabul curity organs. There is no single military party and the government have not inher- under our assistance. It was also said that problem that has arisen and that has not been ited from the previous government precise we fettered the actions of the Afghan gov- solved, and yet there is still no result. The plans on how to quickly raise the standard ernment. whole problem is in the fact that military of living of these 300-400 thousand peas- All in all, up until now the projected results are not followed up by political [ac- ant households which are under the sphere concept has been badly realized. But the tions]. At the center there is authority; in of influence of the government. problem is not in the concept itself, but in the provinces there is not. We control Kabul By the declaration of the member of its realization. We must operate more ac- and the provincial centers, but on occupied the Politburo responsible for the economy tively, and with this guide ourselves with COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 181 two questions. First of all, in the course of It should be emphasized that the Af- two years effect the withdrawal of our troops Excerpt from Protocol No. 146 of the ghan comrades are seriously worried as to from Afghanistan. In 1987 withdraw 50 per- meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU how the situation will turn out. In general, cent of our troops, and in the following of 24 January 1989 their resolve to resist the enemy is strength- [year] - another 50 percent. Second of all, ening; they are taking a number of emer- we must pursue a widening of the social base Question of the Ministry of the Foreign gency measures and trying to arrange more of the regime, taking into account the real- Affairs USSR, Ministry of Defense rationally the forces that are available. To a istic arrangement of political forces. In con- USSR, Committee of State Security USSR certain extent, the Afghan comrades are nection with this, it is necessary to meet with counting on the continuation of their con- comr. Najib, and, possibly, even with other To agree with the understandings set forth tacts with a fairly significant number of members of the CC PDPA Politburo. in the note of Comrades Shevardnadze E.A., commanding officers within armed detach- We must start talks with Pakistan. Yazov D.T., and Kryuchkov V.A. of 23 Janu- ments of the enemy, on the strong disagree- Most importantly, [we must make sure] that ary 1989 (attached) ments which continue to exist within the the Americans don’t get into Afghanistan. opposition, and on the incompatibility of But I think that Americans will not go into Secretary CC some of its leading political groups, in par- Afghanistan militarily. ticular the “Islamic Association of Afghani- AKHROME’EV. They are not going [attached] to article VI protocol #146 stan” ([Burhanuddin] Rabbani) and the “Is- to go into Afghanistan with armed forces. Top Secret lamic Party of Afghanistan” ([Gulbuddin] DOBRYNIN. One can agree with SPECIAL FILE Hekmatyar). Armed clashes between de- USA on this question. tachments of these and other opposition GORBACHEV. We must give instruc- CC CPSU groups are not just continuing, but are tak- tions to comr. Kryuchkov to meet with Najib ing on wider proportions as well. and give him an invitation to visit the So- On the measures pertaining to the The president is even closely examin- viet Union on an official visit in December impending withdrawal of Soviet forces ing such a possibility as declaring martial 1986. from Afghanistan law or taking other extraordinary measures It is necessary to also tell comr. Najib in the country, thinking that this may facili- that he should make key decisions himself. In the difficult situation characterizing tate the adoption and execution of difficult Entrust comrs. Shevardnadze Eh.A. the state of affairs in Afghanistan, one can decisions in the critical period ahead. At first (roll-call), Chebrikov V.M., Sokolov S.L., increasingly feel the inner tension stemming he was leaning towards implementing mar- Dobrynin A.F., Talyzin N.V., and from the impending withdrawal of the re- tial law in our presence, but in the course of Murakhovsky V.S., taking into account the maining units of Soviet troops. The atten- the discussions with him that have taken discussion which took place in Politburo tion of the regime and the forces of the op- place, he arrived at the conclusion that this meetings, to coordinate, make operative position is totally focused on 15 February, would best be done after the Soviet forces decisions, and make necessary proposals on when, in accordance with the Geneva ac- have left Afghanistan. solving the Afghan question and settling the cords, the term of stay of our military con- The Afghan comrades express their situation around Afghanistan. tingent must end. In addition, the given understanding of the decision to withdraw POLITBURO MEMBERS. We agree. timetable for Kabul is even more constrain- Soviet forces and affirm it once again, but, ing, as the last Soviet military units must in conjunction with this, having soberly as- The resolution is passed. leave the Afghan capital in the beginning of sessed the situation, point out that they can- February. not manage completely without our military [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 16; Practically throughout the entire coun- assistance. Such assistance, in their opin- provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.] try, military engagements between the gov- ion, could be rendered in forms different ernment forces and the opposition continue from today’s and on a limited scale, but, nev- CPSU CC Politburo Decision of to take place, in the course of which the ertheless, would be a serious support both 24 January 1989, with attached report government has essentially been able to practically and psychologically. The Afghan of 23 January 1989 maintain its positions, although with the help comrades believe that if, after the with- of Soviet aviation. The enemy has thus been drawal of Soviet forces, the opposition is Communist Party of the Soviet Union. unable to capture Jalalabad, Kunduz, and unable to capture the principal centers in a Central Committee Kandahar. However, everyone understands swoop, then the Peshawar “alliance of that the main battle is still ahead. Currently seven” and the Teheran “union of eight” will Top Secret the opposition has even decreased its mili- have to enter into negotiations with Kabul Special File tary activity somewhat, saving up its forces to work out the future government arrange- No. P146 for the coming period. Comr. Najibullah ment in Afghanistan, which they steadfastly believes that it is intent on expanding its refuse to do at this time. The most impor- To Comrades Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, activities simultaneously in several key di- tant thing, emphasize the Afghan friends, is Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, rections after the withdrawal of Soviet to hold out for at least the first three-four Iazov, Murakhovsky, Kriuchkov forces. months after the departure of the Soviet 182 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

forces, after which the situation may gradu- tinued also in the future, including in the assistance it is necessary, during the remain- ally begin to shift to their advantage. Such UN Security Council as well as in contacts ing time, to intensify through all channels an opinion is borne out by some remarks with the Pakistani government itself. the condemnation of the actions of the op- made by representatives of the opposition, 1. The chief question on which de- position, which is obstructing the delivery in the course of contacts with Soviet repre- pends the continuing evolution of the situa- of foodstuffs to Kabul and other large Af- sentatives in Islamabad. By these remarks tion boils down to this: will the government ghan cities; moreover, one should lay stress it was implied that if the government of be able to maintain Kabul and other large not on the fate of the present government, Najibullah holds out, they will re-examine cities in the country, though above all the but on the situation of the population of these their current position of not recognizing it capital? The situation in Kabul is difficult; cities, which is seriously suffering as a re- in the capacity of a negotiating partner. indeed, the main problems are not even mili- sult of such barbarous actions. In the given situation there arise for us tary, but economic. It is very clear that the In principle, it is possible to consider a number of difficult elements. On the one opposition plans to organize an economic the following scenarios: hand, our departure from decisions, which blockade of Kabul, close off its supply of First scenario. Citing the difficult situ- have been made and announced, to complete foodstuffs and petroleum products, and pro- ation of the civilian population, leave one the withdrawal of our forces on 15 Febru- voke discontent and even direct insurgence division, i.e. approximately 12 thou. people, ary may cause us extremely undesirable of the populace. Already, such a blockade on the Hairaton-Kabul highway. The given complications in the international arena. On is virtually being carried out by the forces scenario is hardly desirable, as a question the other hand, there is no assurance that of the opposition in the form of highway may arise at the UN that we did not com- shortly after our departure there will not robberies and intimidation and bribery of pletely withdraw our forces. Despite the fact arise a very serious danger to the regime that, drivers of Afghan ground-based freight ve- that Pakistan is not fulfilling its obligations throughout the world, is associated with us. hicles destined towards Kabul. It should be under the Geneva accords, one may assume Especially since the opposition, during the pointed out that the present complications that the majority of countries in the UN decisive period, may well manage to coor- with flour and foodstuffs in general in Kabul would not support us because, for many, the dinate its actions for a given time, which is are to a significant degree related to the fact question of the military is at the crux of the what the American and Pakistani military that the directive to inflict defeat on Ahmad problem. circles have been persistently urging them Shah, whose detachments present the great- Second scenario. Citing the threat of to do. Certain apprehensions also arise due est threat to the road between Kabul and starvation in Kabul and other cities, appeal to the fact that there is still no real unity Hairaton, was not carried out when the time to the UN to urgently provide a shipment of within the PDPA, and factional, tribal, and was ripe. foodstuffs and petroleum products to the other disagreements remain. Impulsiveness At the present time, just the monthly cities and send the UN troops to maintain and memories of past “injustices” are trans- requirement of flour in Kabul is around 15 the highway in operation. Until the arrival parent in the thinking of some Afghan lead- thou. tons. Recently, several thousand tons of the UN forces, leave our military subdi- ers. Feeble, to say the least, are the actions of flour were delivered by Soviet motor and visions in these positions to carry out strictly of prime minister M.H. Sharq and many air transport. However, it is imperative to humanitarian functions - provide the popu- ministers in his cabinet. have stored provisions for at least 2-3 lation with foodstuffs and petroleum prod- A most serious factor remains the fact months, which would be controlled by the ucts. In conjunction with this, affirm that that violations of the Geneva accords by President and which would give the Afghan the withdrawal of the Soviet military con- Islamabad have acquired not just an open, friends the possibility of feeling secure in tingent has taken place. Announce that, af- but a flagrant character. Pakistani this matter. ter the arrival of the UN forces, our subdi- borderguards are directly participating in Since such large stores can be created visions will immediately return to the So- military operations on Afghan territory. only with the help of motor transport, we viet Union. Bombardments of bordering regions of Af- are talking about getting flour and other However, this scenario is practically ghanistan are taking place, arms flow con- foodstuffs through the Hairaton-Kabul high- unfeasible, since the deployment of UN tinuously, and armed bands are crossing over way. In the words of comr. Najibullah, if forces requires a decision of the Security from Pakistan. As before, the headquarters the road remains functionally secured until Council, on which we cannot depend. of the Afghan opposition parties, their train- May, the survival of the regime is guaran- Third scenario. Withdraw all troops ing centers and bases continue to function teed. Evidently, the Afghan friends will not by 15 February, as planned; affirm this in unimpeded in Peshawar and other cities. All be able to secure the normal functioning of the international arena with pronouncements of this is done by inertia [concerning poli- the road without our help. We must pro- by the governments of USSR and the Re- cies] established under Zia-ul-Haq. It is un- ceed from the fact that a break in the func- public of Afghanistan. Then, under the re- likely that B[enazir]. Bhutto is in a position tioning of the Hairaton-Kabul highway can- quest of the Afghan government with which to change the situation in the near future. not be allowed. In addition, special atten- it will appeal to the countries of the world, Both we and Afghanistan have been tion will have to be paid to the most vulner- begin the escort of convoys of civilian cargo continuously, in a decisive manner, and cit- able section of the highway, which is the with the apportionment of Soviet military ing concrete facts, condemning and continue Salang pass with its more than three kilo- units for their defense. The escort of such to condemn such actions of the Pakistani meter-long tunnel. convoys could start within approximately government. Such a line is meant to be con- In preparation for the delivery of such two weeks after the withdrawal of Soviet COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 183 troops. Prior to this time, create a wide- In all of the four enumerated scenarios RA [Republic of Afghanistan] army. The R- spread general opinion with condemnations it is intended that at least an insignificant 300 rocket batteries, which are currently of the actions of the opposition, which is number of Soviet troops is to be left behind with the Soviet military contingent, may also sentencing the population of Afghan cities after 15 February 1989. be transferred to the Afghan Side after modi- to death from starvation. With the backdrop There still remains to be examined yet fying them to an export model and after the of such general opinion the escort of con- another, fifth, scenario - Soviet forces are preparation of Afghan personnel for use and voys by our units would appear to be a natu- withdrawn completely before 15 February, maintenance of these units, which should rally humanitarian step. In addition, under but we give the Afghan Side additional as- be quickly carried out on our territory. this scenario, a number of sections of the sistance, including financial, in the organi- 4. It would be expedient to positively road would have to be surmounted with a zation of the defense of the Hairaton-Kabul decide the question concerning the use of fight each time. highway using their own forces, up to the the USSR border force capacities in the Af- Fourth scenario. Withdraw almost all point of completely providing for these Af- ghan border zone, keeping in mind, how- Soviet troops by February 15. Officially af- ghan units for a determined time-period, ever that the Soviet mobile border groups firm the withdrawal of the Soviet military though, undoubtedly, this would be tied to currently stationed there will not remain. contingent in a corresponding statement. considerable difficulties, especially in en- 5. Lately, we have been doing quite a But, under the pretext of transferring some suring a dependable convoy escort. bit to give the Afghan friends economic as- posts on the Afghan Side of the Hairaton- As for the Kabul airport, keeping in sistance in accordance with exactly those Kabul highway, leave Soviet units in some mind its importance, it is expedient to have difficulties that Afghanistan is in. This as- of the more important points, including in there, with the conclusion of corresponding sistance, despite all kinds of difficulties with the Salang pass. Avoid creating much noise, agreements with the Afghan Side, our own which both we and the Afghans met during on our part, about this action; note only that control tower staff, numbering up to 100 its shipment and distribution, has without a this is but a small number of Soviet military people. doubt averted numerous undesirable turns personnel who were slightly delayed by the 2. From the side of the Afghan gov- in the situation’s development. fact that the Afghan side has not yet taken ernment a question has been raised concern- Nevertheless, in view of the difficulty over from them the stated posts. After some ing the continuation of air assaults and bom- of the Afghan situation, we must once again time, as in the third scenario, begin escort- bardments of the armed opposition forces very carefully re-examine the current eco- ing convoys to Kabul under our military carried out by Soviet aviation from our ter- nomic processes which are of the utmost protection. ritory after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. importance to its internal political situation. Under all these scenarios we can be- The difficulty of this question is being ex- We must determine what can be done addi- gin with the fact that these operations would plained to the Afghan comrades; they are tionally to improve the Afghan economy be undertaken by our regular units, but they being advised to think about how to make which is in a critical state and, in effect, on must be formed on a volunteer basis, pri- better use of the capabilities of their own the brink of ruin; we must give operational marily from among military personnel who aviation under the new circumstances. On assistance to solve the acute problems which are serving out their duties in Afghanistan the whole, our explanations have been re- are arising, in particular through the ship- or those that have served their term and are ceived with understanding, but, at the same ments if foodstuffs and goods of first ne- now in Soviet Union. In conjunction with time, they say that in some of the more criti- cessity to Kabul and various provinces of this, offer a salary of 800-1000 rubles per cal situations, the use of Soviet aviation may the country, including Badakhshan. month, partially in Afghan currency, for the be simply indispensable. It appears that this 6. In conjunction with all these mea- rank-and-file and significantly increase the question cannot be examined without tak- sures, it is necessary, as before, to continue officers’ salaries as well. ing into account all the internal and exter- giving the Afghan Side assistance in iron- Give international observers the right nal factors. ing out relations with the opposition in Pa- - and announce this widely - to verify 3. The Afghan Side assigns serious kistan, Iran, and Western Europe. We must whether we are actually escorting civilian significance to having at its disposal such pay attention to every nuance of the goods. In the nearest future, talks should powerful types of weapons as the R-300 opposition’s mood to catch the more suit- be held with the UN Special coordinator of rockets and batteries of “Hurricane” multi- able moments when we can use the neces- humanitarian and economic assistance pro- rocket launchers. These questions evidently sary influence to split it, separating the grams Aga Khan with the aim of using these require a differentiated approach to this or “moderates” from the extremists. In par- programs and the mechanism of the Spe- another type of weapon, but the general line ticular, right now it is important to support cial coordinator in order to counteract the should be directed, inasmuch as is possible, the mission of the representative of the Sec- extremists’ plans to stifle Kabul and other towards a more complete satisfaction of retary-General of the UN B. Sevan who has large Afghan cities with an economic block- Afghan requests. It should be kept in mind agreed to work towards the creation of a ade. that the very fact of possessing such types consulting panel for resolving the future In the talks with Aga Khan it should of weapons would strongly reinforce our government structure of Afghanistan. be suggested that UN convoys of foodstuffs, friends psychologically and give them con- Through our diplomatic channels, it petroleum products, and medical supplies fidence in their forces. Taking this into ac- will be necessary to take continuing steps go not only through Pakistan, but, to a sig- count, batteries of “Hurricane” have already in our work with all countries which are in nificant extent,through Soviet Union. been set up in the Special Guards and the one way or another connected to the con- 184 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

flict in Afghanistan. the memorandum. armament like R-17 missiles, air-defense Special attention should be paid to- 3. For the State commission of the equipment, and others. wards supporting contacts with the Pakistani Council of Ministers of the USSR on the 2. The question about conducting Side, using the upcoming talks involving the military-industrial questions, the Ministry of bombing raids by Soviet aviation from the USSR minister of foreign affairs in Defense of the USSR together with corre- territory of the USSR requires additional Islamabad. sponding ministries and agencies to decide study. 8. It is essential to carry on even more urgently on the possibility of an increase of 3. We should continue demonstrative goal-oriented propaganda work concerning delivery of R-17 missiles and their combat relocations of our aircraft from Soviet air- Afghanistan, for which all scenarios of de- divisions to Afghanistan [in the amount of] fields near the border with Afghanistan, hav- velopments in the Afghan situation must be up to 10-12 units per day and to take ap- ing in mind that these relocations should be thoroughly analyzed ahead of time. Of par- propriate measures for that. done without any camouflage so that they ticular importance will be the securing of could be observed by the Pakistanis and the propaganda concerning the decision to in- SECRETARY OF CC opposition. [We should] continue further the troduce martial law in Afghanistan, if such flights of the Soviet military reconnaissance is taken by President Najibullah. To point 6 of Protocol no. 158 aircraft over Afghanistan, particularly in the areas of Jalalabad and Khost, possibly at E.Shevardnadze V. Chebrikov Top Secret lower altitudes, with the aim of obtaining A.Yakovlev D.Yazov V. Murakhovskii aero-photografic data about military concen- V. Kryuchkov CC CPSU trations of the enemy. 4. With regard to the idea of Najibullah 23 January 1989 On additional measures to influence about sending foreign volunteers to Afghani- #65/OS the Afghan situation stan to render assistance to the government 20 copies of the Republic in the repulsing of aggres- During the almost three months since sion, there is nothing to object to, if the Af- [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 4; pro- the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Af- ghan friends do this kind of work with a vided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.] ghanistan, the armed forces of the Republic number of countries, particularly Muslim manage to oppose the opposition supported ones. CPSU CC Politburo Decision, by Pakistan, the USA, and Saudi Arabia. 5. It is decided that we will continue a 13 May 1989, with report by Zaikov- However, the enemy, who realises that its constant political-diplomatic campaign with Shevardnadze-Yazov-Kryuchkov plans to overthrow the government of the aim of influencing [public opinion] on Najibullah may be in danger, does every- the Afghan issue in the United States, Paki- Proletarians of the World, Unite! thing to increase its military pressure. It fo- stan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and also insofar as Communist Party of the Soviet Union cuses on the seizure of Jalalabad in order to one can use the capabilities of India, the CENTRAL COMMITTEE set up its “transitional government” and to Non-Aligned Movement. In particular, the lay seige to Kabul. Afghan theme will continue to be a focus in No P158/6 In view of preparations for a new mas- Soviet-American contacts. It is advisable to sive assault on Jalalabad with a large in- accept the proposal of Saudi Arabia to play To com. Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Zaikov, volvement of the Pakistanis, all the way to a mediator’s role between us and the Afghan Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Yazov, the sending of Army formations camou- opposition. We have in mind to take into Baklanov, Belousov, Kryuchkov, Belyakov, flaged as “Malishi,” we published a Decla- account the anti-Afghan line of Pakistan in Pavlov A., Falin ration of the MFA USSR and undertook developing bilateral ties with this country. other measures of a preventive nature, in- Excerpt from the protocol no. 158 of the cluding ones in covert channels. L. Zaikov E. Shevardnadze D. Yazov session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU Taking into account this development, V. Kryuchkov on 13 May 1989 it would be advisable to carry out a number of measures to bolster the government of 12 May 1989 On additional measures to influence the the Republic of Afghanistan and to exert a no. 390/os Afghan situation constraining influence on the Afghan oppo- 1. To agree wtih considerations of com. sition and Pakistan. [Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 35; Zaikov L.N., Shevardnadze Ed. Y., Yazov 1. Of special importance in the cur- trans. by Vladislav M. Zubok.] D.T., Kryuchkov V.A., reported in the rent situation is a constant display of pow- memorandum of 12 May 1989 (attached) erful impact on the enemy by combat fire, 2. For the Ministry of Defense of the its further intensification, the use of the most USSR, the Committee on State Security effective types of weaponry. In this regard, [KGB] of the USSR, the Ministry of For- we should search for additional reserves to eign Affairs of the USSR to take necessary accelerate delivery of armaments and am- measures for realization of the proposals in munitions into Afghanistan, particularly the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 185

US-Cuban Relations and the Cold War, 1976-81: New Evidence from Communist Archives

Editor’s Note: The Cold War be- of 1976-1981, thus constitute a source * a record of a June 1979 conver- tween the United States and the Soviet of potentially valuable insights both for sation between the Soviet ambassador Union ended years ago, but it thrives historians and for analysts of current to Cuba and Fidel Castro regarding the in two places: on the Korean peninsula, and future interactions between Wash- recently-held Vienna summit between where communist North confronts capi- ington and Havana. Although schol- Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev; talist South across the 38th parallel in ars (with few exceptions) still lack ac- * documents on the September a tense armed standoff; and between the cess to Cuban archives which might al- 1979 “Cuban brigade” controversy, in United States and Cuba, where Fidel low a more accurate and perceptive re- which a political furor erupted in the Castro remains in charge almost four construction of Cuban decisions, poli- United States over reports that a Soviet decades after the revolution he led came cies, and motives, the opening of other military brigade was stationed in Cuba; to power in 1959—still passionately archives in the former communist world although the flap died down after it be- committed to socialism and still the offer new opportunities to probe what came evident that the Soviet force was nemesis of Washington, which refuses was happening on “the other side” of a residual presence dating from the af- to recognize and regularly lambasts his the U.S.-Cuban impasse, and of Cold termath of the Cuban Missile Crisis government. Even as such Cold War War events in which Cuba played a part. rather than a newly-deployed “combat” landmarks as the Bay of Pigs and Cu- Elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP force (as some alleged), the episode ban Missile Crisis recede into history, Bulletin, for example, appear transla- side-tracked Congressional consider- relations remain as problematic as ever, tions of Russian on the 1962 Cuban ation of ratification of the just-signed and as likely to become entangled in Missile Crisis and Russian and East SALT II treaty and exacerbated Soviet U.S. domestic politics. Presidents from German documents on the 1977-78 mistrust of the Carter administration; Kennedy to Clinton have maintained an Horn of Africa events (as well as a rare * a December 1979 analysis of economic embargo on and refused to instance of Cuban archival documents current trends in U.S.-Cuban relations establish diplomatic relations with the that have emerged, in this case relat- privately presented to the Soviet ambas- Castro regime, and given at least rhe- ing to Havana’s policies in Africa ob- sador in Havana by the head of the re- torical support to a Cuban emigre com- tained by Prof. Piero Gleijeses). sponsible department of the Cuban munity in the United States that openly All but one of the documents that Communist Party Central Committee; calls for its overthrow. Havana, in turn, follow were obtained from the Russian * the transcript (provided by the has regularly denounced Washington as archives in connection with the Cubans to the Soviet Embassy in Ha- an imperialist bully seeking to strangle, “Carter-Brezhnev Project,” a series of vana) of a secret November 1981 meet- subvert, and topple the Cuban revolu- oral history conferences on U.S.-Soviet ing in Mexico City between U.S. Secre- tion. relations and the collapse of detente in tary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and The past year (1996) provided the mid-1970s organized by the Center Cuban Vice President Carlos R. ample evidence that Cold War-era ac- for Foreign Policy Development at Rodriguez. rimony continues to flourish across the Brown University in cooperation with Of the Russian documents printed narrow straits separating Cuba and the National Security Archive, the Cold here, perhaps the Haig-Rodriguez tran- Florida, as exemplified by the enact- War International History Project, and script is the most surprising given the ment in the United States of the “Helms- other academic and archival partner in- Reagan Administration’s combative Burton Amendment” (a controversial stitutions. These documents, obtained public stance toward Cuba at the time law, sharply criticized in Europe, de- from the Center for the Storage of Con- (when Haig, hinting at military action, signed to punish firms or individuals temporary Documention (TsKhSD) (the said Washington should “go to the doing business with Cuba); the fatal archival repository for records of the source” to stop Cuban support of left- shooting-down by a Cuban air force former Central Committee of the Com- ist insurrections in Latin America). In fighter of a plane piloted by a U.S.- munist Party of the Soviet Union from their meeting, kept secret at the time, based anti-Castro Cuban emigre group; 1952-1991) and the Archive of the Haig and Rodriguez discussed current and fervent anti-Castro declarations by President of the Russian Federation tensions in bilateral relations and also both major presidential candidates in (APRF), both in Moscow, include: reviewed past disputes, such as the Cu- their election campaigns. * a background report on Cuban- ban interventions in the Angola and The translated East-bloc docu- American relations, 1976-1979, pre- Ethiopia crises examined elsewhere in ments below, dealing with U.S.-Cuban pared by the Soviet Embassy in Havana this Bulletin. The Haig-Rodriguez en- relations during the Cold War period in the spring of 1979; counter constituted a rare discussion 186 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

between senior officials of the two coun- Make a World Safe for Revolution: History Project as Associate Director. tries, and is all the more remarkable in Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Harvard Uni- Ostermann plans to analyze and present that it occurred precisely at a moment versity Press, 1979). additional translated selections from of acute tension between them. Alas, In addition to the Russian docu- the Honecker-Castro conversations in the accuracy of this Russian transcript ments, the translated materials include a future CWIHP publication. and other details concerning the meet- an excerpt from the East German tran- Both the Russian and East German ing are difficult to ascertain at the mo- script of a May 1980 summit meeting documents were obtained and trans- ment, since records on this meeting ap- in Havana between Castro and the lated via the collective efforts of the parently remain secret in both the U.S. leader of the Socialist Unity Party of CFPD, the National Security Archive, and Cuban archives. Germany (SED), Erich Honecker, in and CWIHP. They and other declassi- Presenting commentaries on the which Castro presents his version of the fied U.S. and East-bloc documents ob- Russian documents noted above are two “brigade” controversy of the previous tained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project scholars who have authored numerous autumn and other aspects of East-West are available for research at the Na- works on U.S.-Cuban relations: Peter relations. This excerpt, as well as a tional Security Archive, Gelman Li- Kornbluh, Senior Analyst and Direc- Castro-Honecker conversation in East brary, 7th floor, 2130 H St. NW, Wash- tor of the Cuba Documentation Project Berlin in April 1977 also excerpted in ington, D.C. 20037; e-mail: at the National Security Archive, a non- this issue of the Bulletin, are from a [email protected]; tel. governmental research institute and de- larger collection of records of (202) 994-7000; fax: (202) 994-7005. classified documents repository located Honecker-Castro conversations be- The collection is part of the Russian and at George Washington University in tween 1972 and 1989 obtained from the East-bloc Archival Documents Data- Washington, DC; and Jorge I. SED archives in Berlin by Christian F. base (READD), maintained by the Dominguez, Dillon Professor of Inter- Ostermann, a doctoral candidate at Archive and CWIHP. READD hopes to national Affairs and Director of the Hamburg University currently based at include Cuban documents if and when Center for International Affairs at the National Security Archive, who has the archives in Havana become acces- Harvard University and author of To also joined the Cold War International sible to scholars.—James G. Hershberg

USSR Embassy in Cuba, “Informa- influential group of individuals in his close the readiness of Cuba in principle to improve tional Letter on Contemporary Cuban- circle ([U.S. Ambassador to the United Na- relations with the United States, and as a American Relations,” 26 April 1979 tions] A. Young, [Democratic Senator from mandatory condition has put forward the South Dakota] G. McGovern and others), demand for an end to the economic block- EMBASSY OF THE USSR who believe that the normalization of rela- ade. TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA tions represents greater opportunities for the In early 1977, both countries undertook TOP SECRET United States to neutralize the policies of practical steps toward the goal of improv- Copy No. 4 Cuba toward Africa and Latin America. ing relations. In March, at the initiative of Ser. No. 223 As part of the new approach, the the Americans, the first direct negotiations 26 April 1979 Americans have come out with official pro- at the level of deputy foreign ministers since nouncements about their readiness to com- the interruption of diplomatic relations took INFORMATIONAL LETTER mence discussions with Cuba on the prob- place in New York. In April, in Havana, ON CONTEMPORARYCUBAN- lems existing between the two countries agreements were signed concerning fishing AMERICAN RELATIONS “without preliminary conditions.” The rights within the 200-mile zone along with Carter administration has also taken practi- preliminary agreements on delimitation of Havana cal steps to reduce tensions in relations. the maritime economic zone. At the initia- 1979 Flights over Cuban territory by reconnais- tive of the Americans, interest sections have sance aircraft have been terminated; several been opened in the embassy of Switzerland The process of relaxation in Cuban- measures have been undertaken to bring a in Havana and the Republic of Czechoslo- American relations, which was abruptly in- halt to terrorist activity of - vakia in Washington. American citizens terrupted in 1976, commenced anew with aries on USA territory; and the prohibition with families living in Cuba have been the election of Jimmy Carter as president of of travel to Cuba has been relaxed. USA granted the right for their families to visit the USA. The new American administration, authorities have begun to warn the Cubans the United States. by all appearances, is counting on the re- about hostile activities being planned by In late 1977, the policy of Cuba in Af- sults of normalization in relations and ex- Cuban emigres, and a number of their par- rica, in particular its international assistance pansion of trade with Cuba to restore cer- ticipants have been arrested and prosecuted to Ethiopia, put the brakes on the process of tain positions in the economy and turn the in the American courts. normalizing relations with the USA. How- country’s difficulties to its own advantage. The Cuban government has adopted a ever, in spite of threatening pronouncements In this regard the question continues to sur- wait-and-see attitude, although in general it in the press and from an array of congress- face regarding the possibilities inhering in has reacted positively to these USA gestures. men concerning the Cuban military presence a prospective “break” between Cuba and the In a series of public statements, and also in in Ethiopia, the USA administration re- USSR. the course of meetings with American sena- frained from exerting serious pressure on A large influence in the change of tors and congressmen arriving in Havana Havana and attempted to preserve the con- Carter’s policies has been contributed by an during this period, Fidel Castro has indicated ditions for dialogue. In December 1977, at COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 187 the behest of Carter, Representatives F. was struck that conclusively strengthened question of lifting the ban on the sale of Richmond and R. Nolan visited Cuba and the maritime boundaries between the two medicine and certain types of equipment for expressed to Castro the president’s concern countries. In January 1978, an agreement the nickel industry. They pointed out that in connection with the “growing Cuban in- was reached between the coast guards of the the presence of Cuban forces in Africa and tervention” in Ethiopia. In February 1978, two countries calling for the rendering of the possibility of their intervention in Zim- the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs assistance to vessels in distress in the Straits babwe and Namibia was causing anxiety in S[antiago]. Roel Garcia, secretly visited here of Florida, common efforts against the traf- the USA and preventing the president from at the instructions of President L[opez]. ficking of narcotics, and a halt to terrorist reaching a decision in respect to the eco- Portillo and conveyed to Castro an oral activity by Cuban counterrevolutionaries on nomic blockade. The Americans attempted message from [U.S.] Vice President [Walter] USA territory. to attain assurances that Cuba would not Mondale expressing the concern of the The Cubans were permitted to open intervene militarily in Zimbabwe and American government about the presence accounts in American banks, which was Namibia, and exhorted Cuba to support of Cuban troops in Ethiopia. Through the necessary, in part, for normal operation of Western plans for a “peaceful settlement” intercession of Portillo, the position of prin- the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, of those problems. ciple held by Cuba on this question was which was also granted the right to transmit In response to the Americans it was communicated to Carter. It was represented consular payments to Havana. Cuban emi- firmly declared that Cuba would not impose that, in the case of necessity, the Cuban mili- gres, living on USA territory, were permit- any preliminary conditions on the normal- tary specialists located in Ethiopia would ted to send their relatives in Cuba up to 500 ization of relations with the USA but would take part in military operations only on the dollars every three months. American tour- not back down on questions of principle re- territory of that country. ists visiting Cuba received the right to bring lating to its foreign policy. It was further In May 1978, during the course of the back into the United States goods having a emphasized that the solidarity of Cuba with well-known events in the Zairian province value of up to $100 per person. African and other countries, and the inter- of Shaba, which the Americans attributed In response to these “gestures” from nationalist assistance rendered by it to to the Cuban presence in Africa, Fidel Castro the Carter administration, the Cuban gov- Angola and Ethiopia, could not be the sub- met with the head of the American Interests ernment freed three Americans who were ject for negotiations with the USA. “We will Section in Havana, L[yle]. Lane, and serving sentences for espionage activity (out withdraw our forces from there,” Castro through him transmitted to Carter an oral of eight). Readiness was declared to favor- stated in discussions with the Americans, message in which he emphasized that Cuba ably examine the question concerning the “when conditions of peace and security are “has no ties whatsoever” to the events in remaining Americans being detained under achieved there. And this will be done on Shaba. the condition that the USA, for its part, the basis of agreement with the governments The USA government attempted to di- would release the Puerto Rican freedom of those countries, and not as the result of minish the tensions arising in relations be- fighters Lolita Lebron and her three com- pressure exerted by the USA.” tween the two countries during late 1978 in rades [imprisoned for involvement in a No- It was indicated further that Cuba did connection with the propaganda campaign vember 1950 assassination attempt against not oppose a peaceful political settlement in the USA centering around the issue over President Harry Truman]. American citizens to the problems of Zimbabwe and Namibia, the supply of Soviet MiG-23 fighters to with families located here were returning to but that it refused to bind itself in connec- Cuba. In Havana, during a closed meeting the United States (in all about 250 individu- tion with its future policy in that region, between Fidel Castro and representatives of als); and persons having dual citizenship considering that the racist regimes might the Carter administration, the latter at- were permitted to leave. undertake such provocations and aggressive tempted to justify the resumption of flights A policy of dialogue continued be- actions against Angola as would “demand a over Cuba by USA reconnaissance aircraft tween the parties. Exchanges of opinions response.” At the same time it was empha- on the grounds that the appearance of the on a wide variety of issues concerning bi- sized that Cuba adhered to a constructive MiG-23’s had provoked significant anxiety lateral relations took place among contacts position and consistently therewith was in in the United States and that the president at various levels, including those during favor of a peaceful settlement to conflicts, had been forced to adopt a “position which closed meetings in Atlanta (USA) in August including those arising among African coun- would permit him to assure the American and in Cuernavaca (Mexico) in October tries. As an example, they pointed to the people that everything was being done to 1978. In this connection the Americans em- efforts previously undertaken by the Cubans ensure the security of the country.” The phasized that the principal impediment to to attain a peaceful resolution to the con- Americans also declared that the training of full normalization of relations was the Cu- flict between Somalia and Ethiopia, and the naval forces taking place off the Cuban ban military presence in Africa. From their assistance rendered by them in support of coast was being carried out in the traditional part they undertook efforts to exert pressure an improvement in relations between region and was not being directed against on Cuba in this regard, and to obtain at least Angola and Zaire. Cuba. The Cuban side took this explana- a partial withdrawal of Cuban forces from In the course of meetings with official tion under advisement. Angola and Ethiopia. In this connection, representatives of the Carter administration, Notwithstanding the developments official representatives of the American ad- Castro emphasized that the principal impedi- outlined above, a certain amount of progress ministration declared in closed meetings that ment to the normalization of relations was continued in connection with several spe- if Cuba sincerely desired an improvement the economic blockade and the presence of cific questions regarding bilateral relations. in relations, then it must make “positive the American base at Guantanamo. He In late 1977, in connection with the expira- steps” in the areas of “vital interest” to the stressed that Cuba regarded as highly im- tion of the temporary agreement on the de- USA located in Africa and Puerto Rico. For moral the policy of utilizing a blockade as limitation of the maritime economic zone, example, to begin with, the withdrawal of an “instrument of pressure and imposition the Americans proposed to conduct new forces from Angola and Ethiopia would lead of demands.” It was stated to the Americans negotiations. In December an agreement to a readiness by the USA to examine the that the problems of Africa and Puerto Rico 188 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

were not related to the economic blockade ade continues to be maintained essentially not be granted most favored nation trading and that Cuba would not conduct negotia- in its entirety. The prohibition on exports status, nor will it be eligible for credits from tions on those questions in exchange for its of American goods, imports of Cuban prod- the Export-Import Bank or the USA Com- lifting. “Cuba,” Castro emphasized, “is not ucts, issuance of commercial and financial mercial Credit Corporation. Without such China and is not Egypt. It has nothing in credits to Cuba by governments and private status, products for Cuban export will be common with those countries which can be financial institutions, and activity by banks subject to high customs tariffs (for example, pressured or bought.” of the USA and other countries containing cigars at $4.50 per pound plus 25% of their All the same, in the course of these American capital, accounts and dollars, con- value). contacts with the Cuban side an obvious tinues in force. The USA has attempted to apply the degree of flexibility was demonstrated. A At the same time, the USA has been provisions of the embargo to imports of readiness was declared to include, in the forced to implement modifications in those Cuban nickel by Japan, Italy, and France. general discussion of normalizing relations, aspects of its policy which had related to These governments have been informed that as a condition to the lifting of the economic trade with Cuba by foreign countries. The the USA will not permit the import of spe- blockade, the issue of compensation for the ministries of finance, trade and state depart- cial steels using Cuban nickel. At the same nationalized property of Americans, claims ment have been permitted to issue licenses time, in the course of Cuban-American con- for which were calculated at 1.8 billion dol- for transactions concluded with Cuba by tacts in 1977-78, according to data provided lars (considering interest at 6% for 18 years, companies of those countries which are con- by “Business International Cooperation,” that sum will almost double). The Ameri- trolled by American monopolies. They are five leading USA nickel companies an- cans were apprised that Cuba, in turn, has able to export nonstrategic materials and nounced their interest in cooperation with counterclaims for losses resulting from the import Cuban products. Exports to Cuba Cuba after the lifting of the economic block- economic blockade, and that only on this of goods from third countries containing up ade in the sphere of nickel production and basis could negotiations on that theme be to 20% in components of American manu- trade. conducted. facture are also permitted. A new and recent significant step in The Cuban leadership has stimulated On the other hand, subsidiaries of Cuban-American relations is the decision of interest on the part of certain business circles American monopolies located in third coun- the Cuban government to release more than in the USA in studying the possibilities of tries are not permitted to maintain accounts three thousand political detainees (not less future trade and economic ties. The organi- with Cuba in American dollars, to issue it than 400 persons per month) on the condi- zation “Business International” conducted credit for a period of more than one year, or tion that they go to the United States; and to a seminar in Havana with the participation to transfer technology. permit the departure of Cubans wishing to of leaders of major corporations from the In sum, according to data of the USA reunite with their families abroad and visits USA, Japan, and several West European Interests Section in Havana, from October by Cuban emigres to their relatives. This countries. It was made particularly appar- 1975 through January 1979 the USA Com- decision, adopted on the basis of a compre- ent that the participants wielded broad in- merce Department has issued licenses to hensive analysis of the domestic situation fluence in USA political circles and were in subsidiaries of American firms in third coun- regarding emigration, marks a fundamental a position to exert pressure on Congress tries for the export of nonstrategic materi- reexamination of the previous policy on that necessary from Cuba’s perspective. als in the amount of 450 million dollars, al- question. At the negotiations which took In late 1977, Cuban Minister of For- though not all applications for export li- place in Havana in November and Decem- eign Trade M[anuel]. Fernandez visited the censes have been realized, and the share of ber of 1978 with representatives of the Cu- USA at the invitation of the Council on East- goods directly produced in the USA is not ban emigre community, Castro confirmed West Trade. He attended a conference in greater than 5-6%. this decision and emphasized that up to 500 Washington in which the leaders of more Licenses have been granted for such political detainees will be released each than 80 USA trade and industrial firms and products as electric motors, industrial scales, month. However, implementation will de- representatives of the Commerce Depart- tractors, light and heavy automotive equip- pend in the final analysis on a decision by ment and State Department participated. ment, equipment for the paper industry, the USA to admit them into the country. The minister announced that in the event the pharmaceuticals, florescent lamps, herbi- In a closed meeting with representa- economic blockade were lifted, Cuban- cides, locomotives, textile machines, boil- tives of the American administration in late American trade could reach several hundred ers, etc. Exports of navigational systems, 1978, Castro stated that the “primary fac- million dollars per year. Cuba would be computers, communications, electrical dis- tor” making possible the adoption of these interested in acquiring USA grain, feedstock tribution equipment, construction machin- decisions was the policy of the Carter ad- resources, medicines, chemical products, ery, electronic experimental equipment and ministration, which had “ceased to encour- light and heavy metals, construction mate- so forth, are prohibited. Up to 50% of ap- age terrorist and subversive activity and in- rials, turnkey factories, miscellaneous plications for the issuance of licenses have tervention in the internal affairs of Cuba.” equipment and other goods. been granted to subsidiaries of American This, in his words, had created a new envi- Groups of American business leaders companies located in Canada and Argentina. ronment, making possible a new approach and businessmen from the states of New It should be bome in mind that a lift- to the emigration issue. York, California, and elsewhere, have vis- ing of the economic blockade would not The United States turned out to be to- ited Havana. The Cubans believe that there automatically result in the development of tally unprepared for Cuba’s proposal, which are American companies who are seriously trade between the two countries. Cuba scored a serious moral and political victory interested in the conduct of business in would first of all have to comply with the - the American administration was deprived Cuba. These companies are even prepared provisions of the USA Trade Act of 1974 of its trump card consisting of the supposed to waive their claims for compensation of requiring it to guarantee the right to emi- violation of human rights. The USA was their nationalized property. grate from the country and to conclude bi- confronted by the need for a response to the Notwithstanding, the economic block- lateral trade agreements. Failing this it will Cuban initiative. Moreover, the American COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 189 administration was subjected to strong pres- composer-performers A. Brouver, S. in studying the application of solar energy sure from representatives of the Cuban emi- Rodriguez, P. Milyanez, and the singers T. for the cooling of industrial and residential gre community. Under the circumstances, Martinez, E. Burke and others. buildings. the USA officially announced that it would American artists and choreographers Last March, at the invitation of the accept all of the political detainees (up to participated in the Sixth International Bal- Minister of Public Health H. G. Mundis, the 3,500 individuals), to be released at the rate let Festival in Havana. Last March, in the USA Assistant Secretary of Health, Educa- of 400 persons per month, together with their large concert hall here named after Karl tion and Welfare, USA Surgeon General H. families. In order to examine this problem, Marx, three joint concerts by American and Richmond, was here. At a press conference special commissions from the USA Justice Cuban musicians and singers were held. he announced that he was favorably im- Department came to Havana. In October They were attended by members of the Po- pressed by the development of public health 1978, the first group of political detainees litburo of the Central Committee of the in Cuba, especially the low rate of infant and their families departed for the USA. This Communist Party of Cuba C. R. Rodriguez mortality and the degree of attention directed March, the Americans introduced a new and A. Hart, and by member of the Secre- to health care among the adolescent popu- simplified procedure for the issuance of vi- tariat of the Central Committee of the party lation. During the course of negotiations, sas to political detainees in order to facili- A. Peres Effera. the Cuban side sounded out the possibility tate the conditions for the admission into the Cuban Minister of Culture A. Hart had of purchasing pharmaceutical supplies in the USA of up to 400 persons every month. discussions in Havana with the vice presi- USA. H. Richmond was received by Fidel In the beginning of this year, Cuban dent of the firm “Columbia Broadcasting Castro. Under the auspices of UNESCO, emigres began to arrive on visits to their Systems” about the possibility of releasing several Cuban medics are receiving on-the- relatives. According to accounts of friends, a recording of Cuban music in the USA. job training in the USA. the number of such persons in 1979 will In 1978, 35 film critics were invited An exchange of literature is taking exceed 100,000 individuals. During the first from the USA. Based on their examination place between Casa de las Americas in Ha- three months of this year around 20,000 of Cuban films and meetings with col- vana and New York, nongovernmental or- Cuban emigres have arrived. leagues, they published a series of positive ganizations involved in cultural ties with The Cuban leadership understands the materials in the American press about Cu- Latin American countries. This year, the need to intensify its ideological work in the ban cinematography. This ensured the suc- Vice President of the Cuban Institute of country relating to the new policy in con- cess of the Cuban Film Week, organized in People’s Friendship (ICAP) J. Gayardo vis- nection with emigration. This question oc- Washington, New York, San Francisco, ited the USA for negotiations with Casa de cupied an important role in presentations by Chicago, and Los Angeles, which was at- las Americas in New York over the organi- Castro at the recent Seventh Plenum of the tended by a delegation of cinematographers zation of informational work at the local Central Committee of the party and at a na- under the leadership of the director S. community level relating to real life circum- tional conference of party leaders last Feb- Alvarez. It met with leading representatives stances in Cuba. ruary. In accordance with conclusions of the American cinema, as well as univer- In April of this year, at the invitation reached by the Division of Revolutionary sity students and professors. of ICAP, for the eleventh time, 130 progres- Orientation of the Central Committee of the An American rental company is now sive young Americans visited Cuba as mem- party, measures have been worked out to acquiring Cuban films for display in cinema bers of the “Venceremos” brigade, to be- neutralize the negative influence from a houses and on television. The journal “Cu- come acquainted with the country and to massive arrival of emigres for meetings with ban Cinema” will be re-published in English participate in the sugar harvest. their relatives. Party organizations at all in the United States. In 1978, 16 American Traditional annual Cuban-American levels have been authorized to explain to the films were purchased through an interme- boxing matches have been started up. This workers the basis for the present policy in diary firm in Italy. year American athletes participated in in- relation to the Cuban emigre community. The first high school contacts have ternational meets in Havana in classical and Cuban-American contacts have been established. Late last year, a delega- free form competitions. It is expected that achieved a definite development in the tion headed by Minister of Higher Educa- they will participate in the Brothers spheres of culture, science, and sport. The tion F. Vecino visited the United States. It Barientos international light athletic tourna- improvement of these contacts is serving as visited eight universities and met with their ment. one of the methods for achieving a mutual deans, the Assistant Secretary of Health, An examination of the development in understanding between the two countries, Education and Welfare, and a number of Cuban-American contacts permits the con- as well as an additional source for the re- senators. At the invitation of F. Vecino, clusion that the Cuban leadership is main- ceipt of hard currency. Thus, on the com- teachers from the Universities of Pittsburgh, taining a firm position on the issue of nor- mercial front, the National Ballet of Cuba Massachusetts and Minnesota this year vis- malizing relations with the USA, decisively completed an extended tour of the USA in ited Havana University and Central Univer- rejecting attempts by the Americans to ex- 1978. Its performances in Washington and sity, as well as polytechnic and agricultural ert pressure on Cuba, and that Cuba will not New York were attended by around 100,000 institutes. An exchange of small groups of yield on matters of principle relating to its spectators. The director of the ballet, A. students for training in agricultural special- domestic and foreign policy as a form of Alonso, was elected as an honorary foreign ties has been proposed. The son of Senator “payment” for the normalization of rela- member of the John F. Kennedy Center for McGovern is currently enrolled at the Uni- tions. the Performing Arts. Her essay on Cuban versity of Havana. The Cuban leadership understands as ballet was published in the USA. Several contacts between scientific in- well the negative consequences in the do- Last year and again this year, the mu- stitutions are being worked out. Thus, the mestic ideological realm and the interna- sical groups “Iraqueres,” “Moncada,” National Center for Scientific Studies is now tional arena that would be brought about by “Manguardi,” “Los Papines,” and “Aragon” receiving informational materials. The a full normalization of relations with the toured in the United States, along with the American side is offering Cuba assistance United States. 190 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

In this connection it may be assumed Jimmy Carter. ternational Relations, an experienced, tested that contacts with the USA on a variety of 1. Having listened closely to me, comrade, a serious, disciplined, thoughtful levels, particularly in the spheres of cultural, Castro expressed his gratitude for the infor- and, at the same time, personable indi- scientific, and athletic ties, will continue and mation “which,” he said, “is extremely im- vidual,” Castro explained. expand. Both sides are expressing interest portant and interesting, and represents a syn- From my part, in accordance with in- in preserving the level of contacts already thesis of the Soviet Union’s appraisal of the structions previously conveyed, I once again attained and in making further progress. points of the Vienna conference which, judg- assured him that, in Moscow, the activities Considering the importance of the is- ing from its achievements, was a convinc- of the Cuban government in Africa are re- sue of Cuban-American relations in the con- ing success of Soviet foreign policy and per- garded with complete confidence and that, text of the present and future interests of the sonally for Comrade L.I Brezhnev. I will in connection with the Rhodesian question Soviet Union and the countries of the so- send a congratulatory telegram to Comrade and other issues, it is considered that the cialist bloc, and the desirability and neces- Brezhnev, the text of which will also be USSR and Cuba are acting in conformity sity of receiving information about it from published in the national press,” Castro and with a unity of purpose. the Cubans, it would appear appropriate and stated. 3. At the conclusion of the discussion, fitting to continue an exchange of opinions As the discussion continued, Castro Castro informed me that the sugar harvest with our Cuban friends on this problem, uti- touched upon the events taking place in was almost complete but that, apparently, lizing for this purpose joint visits and meet- Nicaragua and the results of the latest con- as a result of heavy rains, they would not ings of governmental and party leaders as ference of the OAS [Organization of Ameri- succeed in reaping in this harvest the well as responsible employees of the For- can States] in Washington, which he de- planned eight million tons of sugar. “There eign Ministries of the USSR and Cuba. scribed as the latest in a serious of crippling will be somewhere around 7.9 million tons It is evident that special attention defeats suffered by American imperialism or slightly more,” he noted. Touching on should be directed to an analysis of the con- in the Western hemisphere. In his words, the matter of the supply of Cuban sugar to ditions being put forward by the American that meeting of the OAS demonstrated with the USSR and the delay already allowed for administration for the normalization of re- complete clarity that today ever more Latin in that connection, Castro said, “I have dis- lations with Cuba. American countries are exhibiting “disobe- cussed this matter with C.R. Rodriguez (who dience” to the demands of the United States. informed me about the letter from Comrade AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR He pointed out further that these issues will I.B. Arkhipov and your conversation with TO CUBA be the subject of discussion tomorrow dur- him), and with other Cuban comrades, and /s/ V.VOROTNIKOV ing his meeting in Havana with the presi- I am aware of your difficulty with the sup- dent of Venezuela [Luis Herrera Campins]. ply of sugar. We are doing everything we [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 828, ll. 1- “I am certain,” Castro declared, “that the can,” he said, “to stop the interruption and 13; translation by the Carter-Brezhnev Americans will not dare to intervene uni- cure the shortfall in the July sugar supply, Project; copy on file at National Security laterally in the affairs of Nicaragua, and that perhaps to some extent in August, but most Archive.] Somoza will eventually be required to likely a portion of the supplies (approxi- leave.” mately 80 thousand tons) will be delayed Soviet Ambassador to Cuba V.I. 2. At his own initiative, Castro raised until December.” In this connection Castro Vorotnikov, Memorandum of Conversa- the issue of a member of the Secretariat of emphasized several times that they will not tion with Fidel Castro, 25 June 1979 the Central Committee of the Communist permit a similar situation to recur. Party of Cuba, Comrade R. Valdes Vivo, From diary of V.I. Vorotnikov recently removed from his duties, who had AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TOP SECRET failed to discharge the functions entrusted TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA Copy No. 4 to him and was unable to correctly and pre- /s/ V. VOROTNIKOV Ser. No. 326 cisely fulfill his assigned task in a recent 4 July 1979 trip to a number of African countries. [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 833, ll. 40- “We assigned him a single and essen- 42.] Record of Conference tial task - to inform several African leaders with First Secretary of the Central that we would be unable to render military Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Vorotnikov, Committee of the Communist Party of assistance to them, and instead Valdes be- Memorandum of Conversation with Cuba and Chairman of the State Council came distracted in the disposition of other Raul Castro, 1 September 1979 and Council of Ministers problems which he did not have the author- of the Republic of Cuba, ity to discuss. And this resulted in damage From the journal of TOP SECRET Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz to our activities, and raised a host of doubts Vorotnikov, V.I. Copy No. 3 and false rumors not only among our So- Original No. 393 25 June 1979 viet friends, but among the Africans as 13 September 1979 well,” said Castro. “We discussed the per- We received a visit today from F. formance of Vivo extensively and acknowl- MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION Castro at my request. Pursuant to instruc- edged all of his past services, but we were with the second secretary of the CC CP of tions, I reported to him the results of the unable to excuse his lack of discipline and Cuba, deputy chairman of the State meeting and negotiations in Vienna between disobedience in the execution of such im- Council and Council of Ministers, Secretary General of the Central Commit- portant and sensitive assignments. This was minister of FAR [Revolutionary Armed tee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Pre- the only correct decision. We have now ap- Forces] of the Republic of Cuba sidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR pointed Jesus Montane Ordonez to the post Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, and USA President of Manager of the General Division of In- Raul Castro COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 191

1 September 1979 tionary Armed Forces] to use and maintain stated that he did not allow anti-Soviet books new military equipment, has indeed been lo- to be published in Yugoslavia, assuming he On September 1 Raul Castro visited the cated in Cuba.” R. Castro emphasized that knew of their content in advance. embassy. He anxiously described the ex- they proposed this version out of principled R. Castro also said that J. Tito’s entou- tensive Western, primarily American, anti- convictions and experience with previous rage, particularly, [Yugoslav Foreign Min- Cuban media campaign, timed to coincide confrontations with Americans regarding the ister Milos] Minic, was noticeably more with the VIth conference of the heads of Soviet military presence on the island, and “cocky” in his approach to Cuba and the states and governments of non-aligned consider that we should not camouflage the USSR, than he (Tito) himself. During the countries. The theme of the increased So- real state of affairs but, at the same time, negotiations Minic tried to outdo Tito and viet military presence in Cuba and the sta- should not make a concession to the Ameri- give his own answer or make his own at- tioning there of ground troops was particu- cans, who could easily interpret attempts to tempt to interpret Tito’s words. Thus, for larly exaggerated. What is being referred negate the presence of a training center on example, Tito agreed to publish a joint to specifically is an infantry brigade num- Cuba as a repudiation by Cuba and the Yugoslav-Cuban communique in the press, bering 3,000 soldiers. In recent days Ameri- USSR of their right to create such a center but then Minic started saying that this would can officials have supported this campaign. and send necessary military personnel there. be difficult to accomplish, and as a result it R. Castro noted the statement by the State R. Castro added that the Americans have was never drafted. Department spokesman Hodding Carter in known about this brigade for a long time J. Tito also meet with [Ethiopian which he dwelled on the supposedly “recent and that he was struck by the cynicism with leader] H. Mengistu. The latter openly discovery of Soviet combat units in Cuba,” which they affirm that it was “recently” de- posed a whole series of questions about and demands by Senators Stone and Church tected. He also noted that they had no doubts Yugoslavia’s policy towards the NAM; how- to conduct an investigation into the ques- that the VI conference of the NAM in Ha- ever, Tito evaded direct answers to them and tion of the Soviet military presence on the vana was one of the domestic and foreign talked his way around them with general island. Furthermore, R. Castro recounted policy reasons for the outbreak of the anti- arguments and appeals to maintain the unity that on September 1 Wayne Smith, the new Cuban campaign. of the Movement. head of the USA Interest Section in Havana He further described the proceedings It still remains undecided whether or visited the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Af- of the meeting of the foreign affairs minis- not J.B. Tito will speak at the opening cer- fairs. In his conversation with the deputy ters of the countries of the NAM. On Sep- emony of the Conference of heads of states minister of foreign affairs of Cuba, tember 1, by the end of the session, the and governments or during the working ses- P[elegrin]. Torras, he stated that he was au- agenda for the Conference of heads of states sion. Yugoslavia claims that, since he is the thorized to convey the American and governments was practically approved. only founder of the Movement who is still government’s “concern” about the “evi- The inclusion on the agenda of the problem living, he should speak at the opening of the dence” of the presence in Cuba of a brigade of Western Sahara was the only point on Conference. However, irrespective of how of Soviet troops. P. Torras replied that the which there was serious discussion. The this will be decided, J. Tito will speak in Cuban side would not accept this line of representative from Morocco spoke against any case, in all likelihood after F. Castro. questioning and that American diplomats are the inclusion of this topic on the agenda During the visit of the Minister of De- fully aware - although the USA fails to un- because he contended that this was a colo- fense of Nicaragua to the USSR, R. Castro derstand it - that Cuba is a sovereign state nial issue, which had been decided under emphasized again that improving military and should be addressed as such, or else it the auspices of the UN a long time ago, and cooperation is not an issue, and that they will be impossible to achieve mutual under- in consequence of which an agreement with only intend to influence Bernardino standing between the two countries. W. Spain et al. had been signed. Some coun- L[arios]. Montiel on political and educa- Smith hastened to explain that he received tries supported him, however, they were in tional issues. R. Castro related that at one instructions only to communicate “concern” the minority; of the 31 delegations speak- time F. Castro had advised the Sandinistas and did not require an answer to his state- ing out on this topic, only four urged that to appoint one of the former Somoza offic- ment. He added that the State Department Western Sahara not be included on the ers who went over to the revolutionary side considered it inappropriate to react to the agenda for the summit conference. as minister of defense. The front’s leader- statements by Senators Stone and [Idaho R. Castro considered the dinner given ship selected B.L. Montiel who gives the Dem. Frank] Church through bilateral dip- by F. Castro in honor of [Yugoslav leader] impression of an honest and candid indi- lomatic channels, without recourse to pub- J.B. Tito on August 30 to be strictly a for- vidual, but who does not have any fixed lic debate. The American diplomat also ex- mality. The negotiations which took place political positions. He is mostly “for show”; pressed his regret that his first meeting with between F. Castro and J.B. Tito on the next the army is being built without his knowl- P. Torras took place on this unpleasant oc- day, however, were useful in his view. The edge and all real power in this area belongs casion. Non-Aligned Movement was unable to to the commander-in-chief of the people’s In connection with these actions by the achieve mutual understanding on many is- Sandinista army, Humberto Ortega. B.L. USA and considering that this question sues, and on the issue of Kampuchea each Montiel senses this and tried to send in his could emerge at any moment at the Confer- leader merely stated his point of view. At resignation. To prevent his resignation and ence of the NAM [non-aligned movement], the same time J.B. Tito’s effort to avoid open give him the appearance of authority, the F. Castro authorized R. Castro to come to confrontation with Cuba and other socialist leaders of the FSLN (Sandinista National an agreement with the Soviet side on a pos- countries was noticeable and the general Liberation Front) organized a trip to Cuba sible reply. The Cuban leaders proposed the tenor of the discussion was rather calm. In for the minister and asked for the coopera- following reply: “For the past 17 years a a private conversation with F. Castro, the tion of the Cubans in the organization of trips symbolic Soviet combat unit, created as a Yugoslav leader tried to convince him that for B.L. Montiel to other countries. The first training center where Soviet military spe- Yugoslavia’s policies could not be consid- reaction of the Cuban friends was that it cialists train officers of the FAR [Revolu- ered anti-Soviet at all, and, in particular, would not be appropriate for him to travel 192 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

either to the GDR or to the USSR. They the USA regarding the issue of the Soviet 339-40; translation by Mark Doctoroff.] said this to H. Ortega. He answered that he military personnel in Cuba shares their fears, but explained Montiel cur- CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 27 rent situation and said that he was already BREZHNEV. Last night Carter once September 1979, with Brezhnev-Carter promised trips to Cuba, Arab states, and again appealed to us via the hot line regard- Hotline Correspondence Europe, and once again affirmed that what ing the issue of the story they have dreamed was proposed was only an unofficial, pri- up about the presence of our military bri- Proletariats of all countries, unite! vate, exclusively “informational” visit. Af- gade in Cuba. There is nothing new in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. ter this second request by H. Ortega, con- message. We informed Com. Gromyko, CENTRAL COMMITTEE sidering that they themselves suggested to who is conducting negotiations with Vance, TOP SECRET the Sandinistas that they make the former about that. Somoza officer defense minister, the Cuban Today com. Gromyko sent a rough No.P169/V leaders decided to turn to the Soviet side on draft of a response to that telegram. this matter. I think that we must assign the same To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, R. Castro also commented that the commission to urgently and attentively re- Andropov, Gromyko,Suslov, Ustinov, Nicaraguan foreign minister, Miguel view, and if necessary, rework this draft, Ponomarev, Rusakov. D’Escoto, who was also in Cuba, was a after which, as Com. Gromyko suggests, former Jesuit priest, but apparently one of a having agreed with Fidel, we will send our Extract from protocol No. 169 of CC CPSU small number of “red priests” in Latin response to Washington, to Carter. Politburo session of 27 September 1979 America. He is educated and has a grasp of The comrades are familiar, evidently, many issues, but his political views cannot with the draft. The telegram was distrib- be called clear and well-founded. However, uted. About a response to the President of the he has conducted himself very well at the KOSYGIN. I agree with the draft re- USA regarding the issue of the Soviet mili- session of the OAS on Nicaragua and now sponse, but with a minor editorial correc- tary personnel in Cuba at the conference of ministers of foreign af- tion. I would strike three [sic—trans.] fairs of the NAM in Havana. His appoint- words: “...and to be ruled by cold reason.” 1. Approve the draft of Com. ment to the position of minister of foreign BREZHNEV. Comrades Aleksandrov, Brezhnev, L.I.’s response to the President affairs of the FSLN also followed the ad- A.M. and Ponomarev, B.N. also have cor- of the USA J. Carter on the given issue (at- vice of F. Castro to include several priests rections. tachment 1). Send this response after coor- in the government. The minister of culture ALEKSANDROV. I would like to dinating it with Com. F. Castro. Transmit is a second priest in the government. suggest beginning the text of the letter with the response via the direct line Moscow- I thanked R. Castro for the informa- the following: “First of all, I must openly Washington. tion he conveyed. tell you, Mr. President, that we are extremely 2. Affirm the draft instructions to the surprised by the openly hostile to the So- Soviet Ambassador in Havana (attachment AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR viet Union campaign which has been 2). TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA launched in the USA with the active par- 3. Assign the MFA USSR and the (V. Vorotnikov) ticipation of the Administration, for which [General] Department CC CPSU to prepare the United States has absolutely no real rea- a draft of information for the leadership of [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 77, d. 833, ll. 63- sons and no legal basis. It seems to us that the fraternal parties of the Socialist coun- 67; trans. by Elizabeth Wishnick.] the only result of the swelling of this artifi- tries (except Romania) taking into account cially created campaign can be a real loss to Com. Gromyko’s conversations with C. Minutes of CPSU CC Politburo the relations between our countries and to Vance in New York and in accord with the Meeting, 27 September 1979 (excerpt) the stability of the peace, the importance of exchange of opinions which has taken place which we discussed in Vienna.” in the Politburo, and submit it to the CC Top Secret BREZHNEV. Com. Ponomarev, B.N. CPSU. Only copy also supports this proposal. Working Transcript If the comrades have no other remarks, CC CPSU SECRETARY then let us approve the text of this letter tak- 15-ke MEETING OF THE CC ing into account the proposed corrections ob CPSU POLITBURO and send it for agreement with Com. Castro. And if no remarks arrive from Com. Castro, [attachment 1] 27 September 1979 then it follows that we should send the let- ter to Carter via the hot line. Re: Point V, Prot. No. 169 Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I. RUSAKOV. Perhaps it is necessary to Top Secret Attended by Coms. Grishin, V.V., Kosygin, assign the MFA to prepare a text of infor- A.N., Suslov,M.A., Ustinov, D.F., mation on this issue for the leadership of Attachment 1 Chernenko, K.Y., Demichev, P.N., the brother parties of the socialist countries, Ponomarev, B.N., Solomentsev, M.S., with the exception of Romania. Dear Mr. President, Tikhonov, N.A.,Gorbachev, M.S., Dolgikh, BREZHNEV. If there are no more re- V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Kapitonov, I.V., marks, let us accept such a resolution. My colleagues and I have familiarized Rusakov, K.V. ALL. We are agreed. ourselves with your appeal. First of all, I must openly tell you, Mr. [. . .] 5. About a response to the President of [Source: APRF, f. 3. op. 120, d. 42, ll. 335, President, that we are extremely surprised COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 193 by the openly hostile to the Soviet Union correspond to our mutual interests. TRANSLATION campaign which has been launched in the Copy of Issue No. 93/2 of No 1 USA with the active participation of the With respect. 25 September 1979 Administration, for which the United States L. BREZHNEV has absolutely no real reasons and no legal ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT basis. It seems to us that the only result of 27 September 1979 COMMUNICATIONS TRANSLATED the swelling of this artificially created cam- Pages paign can turn out to be a real loss to the [attachment 2] Special Center for Lines of Direct Commu- relations between our countries and to the nication in the Kremlin stability of the peace, the importance of Top Secret 6:25 P.M.2 which we discussed in Vienna. We are sorry Telephone numbers: PATS 44-82 that despite it all you maintain the made up HIGH STATE MATTER TRANSLATOR [illegible] version of the Soviet military unit which is supposedly located in Cuba. 01 [Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 89, d. 69, ll. 128-30 My advice to you: drop this version. USSR/USA 134-45; translation by M. Doctoroff.] We have a military training center in Cuba, 251448E which has existed there for more than 17 -P.1- Conversation between Soviet Ambassa- years. It carries out its training functions in dor to Cuba A.S. Seletskii and Jose accord with an agreement with the Cuban Dear Mr. President, Antonio Arbesu, Head of the USA government. It does nothing more and can sector of the Cuban Communist Party do nothing more. You can be entirely calm I am sending this message, sincerely Central Committee, 27 December 1979 about that. In a conversation with A.A. hoping that you and your colleagues will Gromyko, Secretary of State C. Vance, him- favorably regard the constructive proposals FROM THE JOURNAL SECRET self, also remarked that the Soviet Union had aimed at resolving the new problem which OF SELETSKII A.S. Copy No. 3 done nothing which contradicts the 1962 has arisen in the relations between us, which Issue No. 2 agreement, and the Soviet military person- Secretary Vance made to Minister Gromyko. “03” January 1980 nel which is stationed on Cuba does not The presence in Cuba of a brigade of Soviet present any sort of threat to the United troops, which we consider to be combat RECORD OF CONVERSATION States. troops, causes deep and serious concern an with the head of the U.S. sector (I repeat, there is a military training the part of the American government and of the Americas Department of the CC of center in Cuba; it will exist. We do not have American society. This concern was not the Communist Party of Cuba Jose any intention of changing its status as such caused artificially. The quickest possible Antonio Arbesu a center. We are informing you of this in resolution of this problem by mutual agree- order to show good will, since this entire ment will prevent the unfavorable develop- 27 December 1979 issue relates entirely and exclusively to the ment of our mutual relations and will allow competence of two sovereign states — the both our countries to continue the course to- In the conversation at the CC of the Soviet Union and Cuba.) ward which we are striving—to broaden the Communist Party of Cuba J.A. Arbesu pre- [Along the margins of the above para- bounds of American-Soviet cooperation. sented some considerations concerning cur- graph the following is written: “Conditional, Mr. President, both you and I have rent Cuban-American relations. taking into account the possible opinions of worked intensively— you longer than I— The USA policy in the question of nor- F. Castro.”] to achieve an agreement on SALT-2. It malization of relations with Cuba is deter- But if that which is going on now in would be a tragedy for our countries if this mined by two main factors: their military- the United States around this issue is an at- work for peace would be today threatened strategic interests, and the domestic situa- tempt which is motivated by some other as a result of the fact that both our govern- tion, said Arbesu. At the same time, from considerations, then we can only express our ments could not resolve the problem which the military-strategic point of view, there are regret about that. has caused on one side a feeling of deep two policy lines in the USA leadership now: It seems to us that any sort of other concern. the line of the National Security Council, thoughts should recede before the signifi- On parting in Vienna, we agreed to and the line of the State Department. Thus, cance of the Soviet-American relations, in openly inform each other when necessary, Brzezinski thinks that Cuba, “as a result of which now the important place is occupied and I am writing to you specifically in the its economic dependence on the Soviet the Treaty on Limitation of Strategic Arms spirit of that openness and our common ad- Union,” does not have its own foreign (SALT-2). herence to the establishment of more stable policy, that it is a “Soviet satellite”, and that Let us, Mr. President, proceed from the mutual relations. therefore, there is no sense in talking to results of the exchange of opinions on the Sincerely, Cuba. All the questions concerning, for ex- key issues of Soviet-American relations and Jimmy Carter ample, the Cuban actions in Africa or in problems of world politics which we had in Central America should be discussed with Vienna and which I value highly. His Excellency James E. Carter the Soviet Union so that it would “put the In general, Mr. President, I wanted to President of the United States of America needed pressure on Cuba.” tell you one thing: it makes sense to remove The White House, Washington The USA State Department takes a dif- this artificially contrived issue without spoil- ferent approach in relation to Cuba. They ing the atmosphere, showing restraint and LINES OF DIRECT COMMUNICATION, believe that in spite of all those things, the consideration. KREMLIN COMMITTEE of STATE SE- questions concerning Cuba should be dis- I think that such an approach would CURITY OF THE USSR cussed with Cuba itself, not with the USSR. 194 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

In the last several months Brzezinski the principled issues of our policy in Africa proving relations with Cuba, not to speak line took over in the American leadership, and in other regions of the globe, especially about it publicly. Senator G. McGovern has said Arbesu; and that had a negative effect in the circumstances when the economic to exercise caution now because the state in not only on USA-Cuban relations but also blockade of Cuba is being maintained in its which he will run for reelection [South Da- on their policy to Latin America in general. fullest form. However, Arbesu mentioned, kota] is well known for its conservative elec- The USA instigated the well-known the Americans show some interest in a dia- torate. The same could be said about Sena- “microcrisis” concerning the presence of the logue with our Interest Section in Washing- tor Church [of Idaho]. Other “young Sena- Soviet military training center in Cuba, re- ton, though it has a certain situational char- tors [Representatives],” like, for example, newed reconnaissance flights over our ter- acter. For example, when the “microcrisis” F. Richmond, and R. Nolan, even though ritory, conducted provocative maneuvers on concerning the presence of the Soviet mili- they are not up for re-election this time, pre- their base at Guantanamo and naval exer- tary specialists in Cuba came up, they dis- fer not to mention the question of normal- cises near our coasts. All this led to the situ- cussed it with our representatives at the In- ization of relations with Cuba now. ation where now we have reached “the low- terest Section. In regards to who the winner will be, est point in our relations with the USA since The American side also tried to put said Arbesu, in our opinion it is still too early Carter became President in 1977,” men- pressure on us in the question of Nicaragua, to make predictions. For example, we do not tioned Arbesu. said Arbesu. However, they did not make exclude the possibility of J. Carter winning At the same time the State Department any official statements in that regard. Be- the election. At the same time, E. Kennedy does not want to close the door completely, sides, it is not in Carter’s interest to raise would be able to ensure more governorships and has shown an interest in maintaining our this issue because his political opponents and seats in Congress for Democrats. We contacts. American congressmen, business- could exploit it. If Carter claims that Cuba should not discount the possibility of the men, university professors continue to visit interferes in Nicaraguan affairs, it would victory of the former CIA Director G. Bush Cuba, though in smaller numbers, and our give a reason for his opponents to blame him either. cultural and sports contacts continue. The for not giving the necessary support to Regarding the Republicans, mentioned State Department, mentioned my interlocu- Somoza; and this is not in his interest. Arbesu, governor Reagan has more chances tor, agreed to conclude an agreement be- Arbesu said that the question of lifting for success than [John] Connally. tween the coast guards of our two countries, the American economic blockage of Cuba In a nutshell, said Arbesu in conclu- and allowed our aircraft to fly to the USA, remains frozen, and is not on the agenda sion, we believe that until the elections and mostly to transport members of the Cuban now. He mentioned that it might be reason- a new President is in the White House, even community for visits with their relatives in able to expect that when the USA Congress if that is J. Carter again, we should not ex- Cuba. The Americans were supposed to gathers in session, it would make a decision pect any significant steps for improving re- ratify the agreement on fishing before the granting us licenses for purchase of some lations with Cuba from the American ad- end of this year. However, since the USA pharmaceutical products and drugs in the ministration. After the elections a lot will Congress is currently in recess, the agree- USA. Therefore, now we can speak about depend on the evolution of the international ment would probably be approved by the only a partial lifting of the economic block- situation in general. For example, on how USA government with the subsequent rati- ade, emphasized my interlocutor. the events unfold in Iran and in Central fication by the Senate. Arbesu said that as far as he knew, the America. For the USA now Iran represents The “gestures” made by the American Americans did not in any form raise the one of the main problems. side toward Cuba earlier remain in force, question of Cuba joining the Treaty of said Arbesu. Thus, our Interest Section in Tlatelolco [in which Latin American coun- ADVISER AT THE EMBASSY OF THE Washington was allowed to have accounts tries agreed to make the region a nuclear- USSR IN THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA in American banks, which is necessary for free zone], or the Non-proliferation Treaty. /s/ A. SELETSKII its normal functioning, and to transfer the Besides, he said, the USA is well informed consular fees to Havana. Cuban citizens re- about our position in those questions. [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 77, d. 642, ll. 18- siding in the United States still have a right No doubt, said Arbesu, the beginning 21; translation by Svetlana Savranskaya.] to transfer $500 to their relatives in Cuba electoral campaign in the USA will have every three months. American tourists are more and more influence on their policy Transcript of Conversation between allowed to bring Cuban goods valued up to toward us. The recent “microcrisis” could Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and East $250 into the United States. We consider all be explained by Carter’s desire to show him- German leader Erich Honecker, this, reiterated Arbesu, as a sign of the State self as a “strongman,” who can be “tough” Havana, 25 May 1980 (excerpt) Department’s desire to maintain a certain, when USA interests are at stake. He wanted although minimal, level of relations as a to remove the accusations presented by his (uncorrected) basis for their future improvement when the opponents who blame him for his “weak- circumstances become more favorable. ness.” Arbesu pointed out that since Decem- Besides, mentioned Arbesu, we believe Minutes of ber 1978 the American side no longer that the so-called “expansionism” will be the official talks between the Secretary showed the initiative to conduct “closed one of the themes of this electoral campaign General of the SED Central Committee meetings” with the Cubans, during which in the USA. It will mean primarily the So- and chairman of the State Council, in the past they exchanged opinions on a viet Union, and its actions in Africa, for ex- Comrade Erich Honecker and the First broad spectrum of international, especially ample, and it will certainly touch upon us Secretary of the Central Committee of the African and Latin American, problems. It as well. Cuban Communist Party, the chairman of is apparent, said Arbesu, that the Carter ad- The electoral campaign which has be- the State Council and the Council of ministration is now more than convinced gun in the USA also led many Senators and Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, Fidel that we would not make any concessions in Congressmen, who always stood for im- Castro Ruz at the Palace of Revolution in COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 195

Havana relinquish that right. If we call this a study before May 1. Once they had said that, I center for moral reasons, then we relinquish thought they were ready to suspend the ex- Wednesday, 28 May 1980 the right to have a brigade. At the May 1 ercise. I told my comrades they might ex- (Beginning: 9:45 a.m.) demonstrations, I said that we have got study plain that we were going to respond on May center no. 12, but that we would like to have 1 or 2. Yet on April 30, at night, during the Fidel Castro: Dear Comrade Erich numbers 13, 14, 15. But the malicious cam- first hours of May 1, before the mass rally Honecker! Dear German comrades! paign started with that brigade. All USA we organized against the military exercise, Your visit, dear Comrade Honecker, presidents knew that we have a brigade here. at this point they proclaimed the suspension has long been on our agenda, long before it One can hide a pen, but not an entire bri- of the exercise. The very same day! This is came to the problems of the recent past, long gade with tanks, guns, with 2,000 to 3,000 the first time that they set up something like before the military maneuvers [scheduled by men. Everyone knows this. The CIA tries this on such a big scale, and they have sus- the U.S. at its Guantanamo Bay naval base to find out whether the soldiers have a bride pended it without any conditions. The planes for May, but cancelled--ed.]. But now it has or not. They want to know everything. They haven’t been flying over our country for a special meaning that your visit is taking knew about the presence of this brigade, and several weeks. Mariel and the issue of the place right now, at a time of increased ac- for 15 years, they treated this as a secret, USA interests section here is giving them a tivity of the USA and the other enemies of the issue has never been discussed. big headache now. There are 380 counter- our revolution. When the October Crisis started they revolutionaries. This is the situation. They Hostility and aggression, of course, did were not bothered by the fact that we had a want to negotiate. But what they are inter- not come all of a sudden, but there are rea- brigade here. No president has raised this ested in is to resolve these two issues. sons for this: the liberty of Ethiopia, events issue, neither Kennedy nor Johnson, neither We are saying that this has to be dis- in Nicaragua, the situation in Central Nixon nor Ford. But now, the current presi- cussed globally. And just at that time Com- America; then there was the conference of dent does. rade Honecker’s visit takes place, and there- the nonaligned countries [in Havana in Sep- The Americans themselves believe that fore it is of great importance for us. tember 1979], and agression gradually in- the president has made a mistake to discuss The Mexican government, too, has creases in this whole situation. During the this question just at the same time when the adopted a friendly attitude towards us. Re- conference of the nonaligned countries, they Senate was supposed to discuss SALT II and cently, the Mexican president announced were very angry and started a malicious the conference of the nonaligned countries that he would visit Cuba, too. [Jose] Lopez- campaign. At that time, they discussed the was taking place, with the intention, of Portillo is going to visit our country on July issue of the Soviet brigade, exactly at the course, of bringing Cuba into a difficult le- 28. He announced the visit almost three time of the conference of the nonaligned gal situation, to portray it as a country with months in advance, in the midst of this tense countries. We corresponded with the Soviet a Soviet military base, because they took up situation. Clearly, this has political impli- comrades regarding this issue. We took the the issue and produced a big scandal, a very cations. view that this should be called a brigade. big scandal. This caused damage to SALT The Mexican press also behaved well. But when we explained all that to the So- II and led to a tense climate, the pretext to And Mexico’s attitude in general was a posi- viet Union, it was called a study center. Of create an operational military command near tive one. When Lopez-Portillo visits us, we course, the Soviet comrades did not want to Cuba. In reality, it is an intervention force will give him a great reception. We will aggravate the international situation any that they have created just after this prob- choose roughly the same route that you have further, and since SALT II still had to be lem. It is also possible that Carter thought taken. Usually, we don’t take choose a long discussed in the Senate, there was no other that, under such strong pressure, the Soviet route but a much shorter one. It is an ex- option than calling it a “study center.” Thus, comrades would be forced to withdraw these ception that we chose such a long route. I the brigade was called study center no. 12. troops. That’s what they thought. Perhaps think the last visit for which we organized Once this had been said, we had to stick to Carter hoped to achieve a political success. such a big trip was [Algerian leader Houari] that term. The Soviet comrades made it clear Boumediene’s; we also did it for Brezhnev. I have expressed this in a special way right from the beginning that they are not Moreover, the state security is very on the USA-TV and in the USA-press: what willing to discuss the issue, that these troops worried during such big visits. Lots of you call a brigade and we call a study cen- would not be withdrawn. In the end, it was people have to be deployed because there is ter is something that we have had for 17 a disaster for Carter. But this was part of the always a potential risk. I suppose this is the years now. escalation of threats. same in the GDR as it is here in Cuba. We This unit came here after the October Then, there were the spy planes over are located in immediate proximity to the [1962] Crisis. Actually, we strongly resisted Cuban territory. The most recent event was USA, and it is always possible that some- a total withdrawal of troops. Finally, we the organization of a naval exercise, includ- one will infiltrate. Hence, such a trip is al- managed to have one brigade stay with us, ing a landing in Guantanamo military base. ways potentially dangerous. and for 17 years, this brigade has been here. Actually, they have taken a step back be- This is the time at which you have ar- These troops were not included in the agree- cause of the great mobilization of the rived, Comrade Honecker, this is why this ments following the October Crisis. The Oc- masses. We announced to organize mass visit is of special importance for us, and we tober Crisis affected the missiles, the bomb- rallies all over the country. The issue of feel very honored. I am convinced that this ers, and the nuclear weapons, but not the Mariel existed before. We already had or- visit will contribute to the future develop- troops. When the brigade stayed with us, no ganized the April 19 mass rallies and after ment of the relations of the two countries. agreements were concluded. that, they took a step back. They canceled The people are very excited about this visit In any event, we always would have the landing exercise in the military base, and and there is great satisfaction with it. liked to see these troops called a brigade for even signaled that they were ready to nego- one reason: we must not relinquish our right tiate a suspension of the Mariel exercise. Erich Honecker: to have Soviet brigades here. We did not That was on April 29, about 48 hours Comrade Fidel, please let me convey 196 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the warmest salutes [die herzlichen The situation in the Caribbean has to that they can’t ignore the power of the So- Kampfesgruesse] from the CC of the Ger- be seen in this context. The USA, albeit very viet Union and its allies. For the first time man Socialist Unity Party, the State Coun- reluctantly, would have tolerated Cuba, ever, war would be carried to directly to the cil, the Council of Ministers, and the people since they understand that because of the USA. In the past, the USA has always sent of the German Democratic Republic to you, then-concluded agreement, the Soviet Union merely an expeditionary corps across the the members of your delegation, and the stands behind Cuba. They know that the Ocean when the war was almost over. Now party and state leadership. whole socialist community stands behind they must reckon that a war with nuclear We are very pleased to have the op- Cuba, that behind the slogan “Hands off weapons also affects the USA. portunity to visit revolutionary Cuba, the Cuba!” stands the power of socialism. The big fuss they make about Afghani- American island of liberty, at the present Through the powerful manifestation of stan is of the same nature as the invention time because we know - as you have already revolutionary Cuba within the last couple of the Soviet brigade in Cuba just at the time pointed out - that this visit has special im- of weeks, the mobilization of the Cuban of the conference of the nonaligned coun- portance. First, this visit takes place at a time people, they felt that the revolutionary re- tries [and] the ratification of SALT II. For a when the USA apparently is trying to in- gime and the government of Cuba led by long time, the most aggressive circles within crease tensions at the international level. In Fidel Castro are very solid. the USA have been preparing their strike this context, it goes without saying that the I completely agree with Fidel Castro: against the policy of detente, against peace, measures the USA has taken against Cuba they feel that Cuba is not alone, that it is because they want to tip the global balance in the Caribbean are of particular impor- virtually the lighthouse of socialism in of power in their favor. They want to coun- tance. It is obvious that this USA exercise America, that it provides a stimulus for the teract the further strengthening of Real So- has been drawn up according to a long-term anti-imperialist revolution in Latin America. cialism, the development of national libera- plan. It has become clear that detente, which They had to swallow the fact that Cuba is tion movements in Africa and Latin has its primary basis in Europe, does the revolutionary, but Nicaragua came as a great America, the development of communist imperialist circles no good. surprise to them. As we all know, events in and workers’ parties within the capitalist In the meantime, the Americans not Nicaragua did not fall out of the blue, and countries, and their mass impact in the only have been kicked out of Vietnam, but they felt that the Nicaraguan revolutionar- struggle against the attempts of the bour- the Vietnamese also managed to counter ies had the moral and material support of geoisie to pass on the burden of crisis to the China’s aggression. In addition, the Ameri- Cuba. Add to this the events in El Salvador. working people. cans had to leave Iran because of the Ira- The USA imperialists have a strong In fact, this can be discerned directly nian people’s revolution. Of course, this an interest that all is quiet in their “backyard.” from recent political events. They are known uncomfortable matter for the USA’s politi- But there is a new revolutionary wave in to Comrade Fidel and the other comrades. cal elites; since the stake is not only the oil, Latin America. As Comrade Fidel rightly Recently, at the session of the Political Ad- which does not belong to the American im- pointed out: Kennedy kept quiet about the visory Commitee of the Warsaw Pact coun- perialists, but also an outpost at the south- so-called Soviet brigade, as did Johnson, tries in the Polish capital, we have exam- ern border of the Soviet Union. Nixon, and Ford. In the beginning, Carter ined this situation. On the basis of Comrade Moreover, there were the events we did not feel like broadcasting it. However, Brezhnev’s fundamental speech, his assess- could witness on our trips through Africa, we have seen that there are powerful ele- ment of the present and future international such as Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, ments within USA imperialism that don’t situation, the declaration drew concrete con- Ethiopia, South Yemen. We had meetings like detente at all. They reached the conclu- clusions. You know that declaration. In my with the South African national liberation sion that cooperation with the Soviet Union speech in Warsaw, I have pointed out that movement, with SWAPO [the Southwest benefits the socialist movement in Europe the current attempt to further heighten in- African People’s Organization], with the and Asia and the national liberation move- ternational tensions results from the mount- ANC [African National Congress], and also ments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. ing crisis within the capitalist countries, with the Organization for African Unity in For a long time, they have been preparing a which leads some imperialist elements to re- Addis Ababa. The OAU Secretary General, blow against the policy of detente, in order gard war as their last resort. Whether the [Edem] Kodjo - in presence of all African to go over to a policy of confrontation countries of Real Socialism and the masses ambassadors - presented me a copy of the It is not yet clear whether they will take all over the world are going to allow for this, OAU charter and gave a speech of anti-im- the crucial step, that is, the step from con- however, is a different question. perialist, anti-colonialist, and anti-racist frontation to war; because a military attack We have to note the fact that the character. He expressed strong solidarity on Cuba means world war, as does a mili- Vladivostok agreements [of December 1974 with the socialist German Democratic Re- tary attack on the GDR. They know that the between Brezhnev and Ford regarding a public and thanked us. It became clear that Soviet Union, after the forced American framework for SALT II] were not kept by Africa - and not only the socialist countries withdrawal from Iran, did not permit them Carter. Comrade Fidel already mentioned - is heading off for new shores, which are to compensate through the occupation of Af- that despite prolonged negotiations and the not those of imperialism. ghanistan or the strengthening of USA in- signatures of Vienna, SALT II has not been The scheme of Camp David, which fluence there. Thus a situation was created ratified by the U.S. Congress and Senate. basically did not solve any problem concern- that is reflected by various actions and in Furthermore, we must note that, against ing the Middle East, was declared doomed the development that Comrade Fidel Castro the will of world public opinion and that of to failure. Except for Egypt, all countries - has pointed out. many NATO member states, the 1978 including Saudi Arabia - are against the The US-Americans aim at increasing NATO Council Meeting in Washington has Camp David agreement. The resolution of tensions on the international level. Certain adopted the NATO long-term program, the Near East conflict is dashed by Israel’s elements have an interest to dramatize the which envisions yearly increases in military imperialist stance, which is strongly backed situation, to make it seem as if the outbreak expenditures until 1990. At a time when by USA monopolies. of World War III is imminent. We have seen what matters is adding a military dimension, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 197 i.e. disarmament, to detente, they have banner that is waved by the Cuban people dates. adopted the long-term defense program, in under the leadership of its communist party In Berlin, we organized a big rally of spite of opposing resolutions passed by the and that of Fidel Castro. the GDR’s youth. 700,000 FDJ [Free Ger- UN. Likewise, our struggle, too, the GDR’s man Youth] members marched up. This left NATO’s [December] 1979 Brussels and the CSFR’s [Czechoslovak Socialist even the Western correspondents flabber- missile deployment decisions [to deploy Federal Republic’s] struggle, is a banner for gasted. After all, there are only 1.2 million medium and intermediate range missiles in all peace-loving people in the world, since people living in the capital. 700,000 FDJ West Germany and elsewhere in Western we don’t allow imperialism to take any step members marched into Berlin and domi- Europe] are a provocative step. At the same against our borders. I am mentioning the nated the city at the time. time when disarmament is on the global CSFR because, together with us, it is fight- (Fidel Castro: From all over the coun- agenda and Carter, at the signing of SALT ing in the front line. try?) II in Vienna, talks about the existence of a In the aftermath of [the 1975 East-West Yes, from all over the country. rough balance of military power on the glo- accords at] Helsinki, the West German im- (Fidel Castro: How were they bal level, they raise an outcry over an al- perialists have attempted to build up a fifth accomodated?) leged Soviet threat and pass this defense column in the German Democratic Repub- In tents, in schools, in apartments, or program in Brussels. lic. To this end, they adressed not only coun- in other peoples’ homes. This was a big cam- Basically, the production of new terrevolutionary elements, which, of course, paign. They didn’t have much time to sleep, American intermediate nuclear forces and still exist in our country, too, but also the but they all had a place to stay. Some fami- their deployment in Western Europe is an reactionary, the unsteady, and the uncertain. lies hosted up to 7 teenagers. The family attempt to undermine the results of SALT All this took place under the slogan of hu- slept in the kitchen, so that the FDJ mem- II. They want to offset the fact that Soviet man rights. bers could sleep in the bed and living-rooms. missiles can reach the USA. This is sup- They placed their hopes in the Protes- There was huge attendance. We never had posed to be achieved through the tant and the Catholic Church, which have had something like this before. depolyment of American intermediate-range 8.5 and 2.5 million members, respectively. During these four days, the Western (nuclear) missiles having a range beyond These churches and their bishops were sup- journalists were not subjected to any restric- Moscow up to the Urals. While it takes 20 posed to act in our country as guerillas of tions in their interviews. Moreover, some to 30 minutes for the missiles that are de- the West. With the help of the 6,000 West- 200,000 people from the Federal Republic ployed in the USA to reach the Soviet Union, ern citizens, who, as a result of the interna- and came to the capital to dis- they only need 5 minutes when deployed in tional recognition of the GDR and the en- cuss with the FDJ members. In any case, the Federal Republic, Belgium, and Great suing establishment of Western embassies, none of them managed to report something Britain, except for the so-called wing mis- came to our country, they undertook sub- negative. They were surprised that this youth siles [Fluegelraketen], which would also versive activities. The American, the Fed- is different from what they thought. violate the neutrality of such states as Swe- eral German, and other embassies estab- Along a wide front, we prepared for den. lished contacts with our artistic intelligen- the 30th anniversary of the GDR [in Octo- Hence, this a large scale, long-term at- tsia in particular. One million copies of a ber 1979]. 250,000 young people marched tempt to tip in favor of American imperial- so-called manifesto against the GDR party in Berlin. Comrades Brezhnev, [Polish ism the rough balance of military power that and state leadership have been published, leader Edward] Gierek, [Czechoslovak currently exists in the world. This is sup- allegedly written by leading SED function- leader Gustav] Husak, [Bulgarian leader posed to put pressure on the Soviet Union aries. Under the slogan of human rights, it Todor] Zhivkov, [Hungarian leader Janos and the socialist countries, including Cuba, has been tried to set up committees for the Kadar], [Mongolian leader J.] Zedenbal, and on countries like Nicaragua, and others, and “protection of human rights” and the “pro- others were there. In any case, we gave our on the national liberation movement. They tection of workers’ rights.” adversary such a thrashing that he last all want to foster anything that leads to an alli- Various elements have been given the his interest in continuing his shameless pro- ance of the USA, Japan, China, and, if pos- opportunity to use the FRG’s TV and radio paganda against the GDR with the same fe- sible, the FRG, too, against Real Socialism to influence the GDR. All around the clock, rocity as before. and the national liberation movement. For 24 hours a day, 35 FRG radio stations are At this time, the Chancellor of the us, a very interesting aspect is that China broadcasting political commentaries. The FRG, Helmut Schmidt, requested a meet- supports the so-called reunification of Ger- three Western TV channels were also used ing. This means that while adhering to their many, i.e. the elimination of the GDR. for interviews with certain authors and other revanchist attitude towards the GDR, they It is necessary to recognize this situa- GDR people, which were conducted “on be- were forced to accept that socialism has a tion. On the other hand, the situation cer- half of the SED against the SED leadership.” solid basis in our country. tainly is not like the reactionary imperialist On behalf of socialism in the GDR, they Then, at the transition from 1979 to circles would have it. Of course, Real So- spoke out against the SED’s alleged dog- 1980, there was the heightening of interna- cialism is strong enough to defy the USA. matism. They disguised themselves as so- tional tensions. It is perfectly possible to shatter the USA cialists, but all their efforts were in vain. (Fidel Castro: One question before we imperialism’s attempt to conduct a large- In May of last year, our republic held continue. In which month did this march- scale offensive against the socialist coun- municipal elections. There were mass ral- ing up of the 700,000 young people take tries and the national liberation movement. lies all over the country, where all issues place?) In this context, we regard socialist were discussed. More than 99 percent of the This was in May 1979, and in Octo- Cuba, the American island of liberty, as play- citizens voted for the candidates of the na- ber, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary, ing a very important role. Our country’s citi- tional front, despite the fact that the West- there were 250,000. The demonstration in zens, the citizens of the Soviet Union, and ern media had asked the people either not May, at Whitsun, was the big response to those of all socialist countries, see it as a to vote at all or to vote against these candi- our adversary’s campaign which claimed 198 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

that the GDR youth does not support the me. Of course, the first meeting I had was we going to meet in the GDR? I answered: regime. Since then, they keep quiet or say with Comrade Brezhnev, who, after his First, go to Moscow to Comrade Brezhnev, that it has to be admitted that the enthusi- health cure is back on the world stage in full then we can meet in the GDR. asm was not organized. health. Old comrades-in-arms and friends That’s how we parted, and we both Then, dear Comrade Fidel Castro and sat together the night and talked about cur- found that this was a useful meeting. Cer- dear Cuban Comrades, there was the appar- rent issues. I had meetings with [Indian tainly, this meeting has a certain impact on ent heightening of international tensions in leader] Indira Gandhi and various other per- the situation in Europe, because the Federal late 1979 / early 1980. We have reacted with sonalities, which I don’t want to go into at Republic has some influence on its west- great level-headedness to this situation. On this moment, and with Helmut Schmidt, too. ern, northern, and southern allies. Of course, January 9 we had a reception for the diplo- Two issues were central. The first is- we don’t believe that we are the center of matic corps. There, I expressed the GDR’s sue was that, because of our commitment to the world, the normalization of GDR-FRG hope that it would be possible to reduce in- never again let a war start from German soil, relations, however, certainly is of great im- ternational tensions because there is no al- one has to resist the Carter course of con- portance for detente in Europe. It helps to ternative to the policy of peaceful coexist- frontation. We thus discussed the necessity restrain the belligerence of the USA. After ence. Only the American ambassador did to supplement the political dimension of all, the Federal Republic of Germany is the not attend the reception since our politburo detente with detente in the military field, not second strongest power within NATO. and the Council of Ministers had made a to support, but to counteract the unpredict- The events in the Caribbean, and es- statement in support of the entry of a lim- able policy of Carter. pecially the anti-Cuban campaign of the ited contingent of Soviet troops into Af- The second issue was the boycott of USA and the Western media are related to ghanistan following the Afghan the Olympics. I said that it is an insult to the heightening of international tensions. In government’s request. A couple of days later the Soviet Union and to Comrade Brezhnev this context, our visit, which had been we had a hare-hunt for the diplomats. personally, if the athletes of the Federal planned for a long time, indeed carries great We have continued our policy of so- Republic are prevented from participating international importance. This view has cialist buildup with great popular support, at the Olympic Games in Moscow. Schmidt been expressed yesterday by the “Pravda” and I expressed to Chancellor Helmut told me that he is under heavy pressure from and this morning by the “Neues Schmidt my readiness to meet him for a talk the USA. Moreover, he said that this was Deutschland.” They wrote that, especially in 1980. the “mildest reaction” to the “invasion,” the in the present situation, the solidarity with They all were surprised that the GDR, “intervention” of the Soviet Union in Af- revolutionary Cuba shown by the Soviet together with the Soviet Union and the other ghanistan as he put it. Union and its allies, including the GDR, is socialist countries, reacted so calmly to I said: Mr. Schmidt, what you call an of great importance. In the GDR, we have Carter’s confrontational course. Indeed, the “intervention” in Afghanistan is no interven- started a big solidarity campaign under the citizens of our republic stand firmly behind tion at all. On this issue, we apparently have slogan: “Hands off Cuba! - Stop the Amerian the policy of the party and the government, differing points of view. You used to be economic embargo against Cuba! - Stop the which is directed against Carter’s confron- defense minister and you know exactly that espionage flights! - Give up the USA mili- tational course and stands up for peaceful after the Americans got kicked out of Iran, tary base in Guantanamo!” I was pleased to coexistence and international cooperation. they now try to gain a foothold in Afghani- hear that the espionage flights are currently We have activated our ministerial exchange stan—through external aggression, as a being suspended. with the FRG, but also with Belgium, the compensation for the weakening of their Under these conditions, Comrade Fi- Netherlands, France, and Austria. While one position in Iran, so to speak. Hence, the del Castro, we renew the fraternal solidar- has to proceed from the assumption that the Soviet Union simply had to respond to the ity and our comradeship in arms between Western governments, particularly with re- requests that Afghanistan already had voiced the GDR and revolutionary Cuba. We are spect to the boycott of the Olympic Games several times before by sending a limited aware that we are fighting in the front line, [in Moscow in summer 1980], will show a contingent of troops to that country. As soon but we know there are strong reserves in certain class solidarity with the USA, they as Afghanistan’s neighbors ensure non-in- behind. On this basis, we look with opti- still hesitate to identify entirely with the terference in Afghan domestic affairs and mism into the future and will develop our hardened policy of the USA administration. the stopping of the external aggression, guar- bilateral relationship further. Thus, it came to the meeting [on May anteed by the USA, the Soviet Union, per- I apologize for having talked so exten- 19 in Warsaw] between Leonid Brezhnev haps France as well, as soon as the Afghan sively about the international situation, but and Giscard d’Estaing, about which you are government declares that the Soviet troop I was prompted by your statements on these probably informed. Finally, there was the contingents can be withdrawn or reduced, issues. long delayed meeting [on May 16 in Vienna] the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan between the new Secretary of State in the will begin. I pointed out that Fidel Castro, Fidel Castro: Carter administration, [Edward S.] Muskie, as chairman of the nonaligned movement, What Comrade Honecker has told us and [Soviet Foreign Minister] Comrade has made a similar proposal. is very interesting. We have listened with [Andrei] Gromyko. Today, the GDR news- Schmidt did not want to see it this way. great attention. The international situation papers report that on June 30 and July 1 the He told me: Mr. Honecker, have you seen is of vital importance for us; because its Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Ger- the maps of the Soviet invasion? I said: I aggravation means increasing dangers for many, Helmut Schmidt, is going to meet also have maps, but this is irrelevant; stop- Cuba. with Comrade Brezhnev in Moscow. ping the external aggression is the crucial As I have already pointed before, the During my stay in Belgrade, on the issue. Yankees have been very angry with us for occasion of Tito’s funeral [8 May 1980], I Then I had to go to the meeting with some time and they toy with the idea of how had talks with several statesmen. Comrade [Zambian President Kenneth] to get back at us, especially after events in Many expressed the desire to talk to Kaunda, and Schmidt asked me: When are Angola and Ethiopia. In our contacts, they COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 199 insisted on a troop withdrawal from Angola which part of the globe it happens. It will existence of a divided Germany as an im- and Ethiopia. We always replied that we are affect us. This is why the failure of detente portant element of the European balance of not on any account going to discuss this is- is of special importance to us, of very spe- power. With respect to the issue of Afghani- sue with them. We refused to talk about it. cial importance. First, because detente elimi- stan, France wants a political, but not a mili- This was one of their most pressing de- nates the possibility of a global conflict, but tary solution, and this goes for Afghanistan mands. at the same time eliminates the possibility as well as for Iran. By and large, this is a Another demand relates to our solidar- of local conflicts and also the opportunities useful element, since it limits the chances ity with Puerto Rico’s independence; and it for repression and attacks on the liberation of the USA to revive the Cold War with all is virtually a tradition of the revolution to movement. its ferocity. show solidarity, to give support, if there is a Of course, detente has numerous ad- In this context, the conversation that struggle for the liberation and independence vantages, particularly if it involves disarma- the new American Secretary of State, of Puerto Rico. ment and a lowering of military spending. Muskie, had with Comrade Gromyko is in- This was before the revolution in This is virtually the only way to give the teresting, too. Muskie presented himself as Grenada, a small country. This has impor- Third World more resources for their devel- the man who wants to be the number one in tant implications in the Caribbean, where opment. This is why the policy of the Cold U.S. foreign policy. He did not mention there is instability after the success of revo- War, of arms races, is a catastrophe for all Brzezinski’s name, but he said: I am inde- lution in Nicaragua [words unintelligible- countries, but particularly for our country, pendent from the President’s entourage. Mr. ed.] the difficulties in Central America. given its geographic position. However [it Gromyko, let us discuss the issue of Af- For some time they have been hoping is a catastrophe for Cuba], not only because ghanistan and sort it out. that we would make a mistake, so that they of this position, but also as a developing Comrade Gromyko replied: We sent can teach us a lesson, as they put it. Thus country, and it is not only political and mili- our limited contingent of troops to Afghani- we must act with great caution on all these tary effects, but also economic ones in Latin stan only after there was interference in issues. America. The Cold War can trigger a spe- Afghanistan’s domestic affairs, when there It is not our fault that there are revolu- cial effect. This allows the USA to better was the danger that you would get a foot- tions. We are [not] responsible for what hap- control certain wavering governments and hold in Afghanistan after you got kicked out pens in El Salvador. This is a phenomenon to conduct a policy towards the whole lib- of Iran. Comrade Gromyko added, as dis- that has developed over time. Except for the eration movement that suits them. This hurts cussed in Moscow, that Afghanistan is noth- example that Cuba gives, and to give an the revolutionary movement all over the ing but a pretext for the USA to heighten example is always best, because solidarity, world, but especially in Latin America; be- international tensions. This means, this was too, plays a big role. These political phe- cause the Yankees believe that Latin a result of long-planned steps taken by the nomena, however, arise virtually as natural America is their back yard. The USA has USA. events, because the people no longer accept an interest in what happens in Asia, what Comrade Gromyko went on saying: such a situation. When such a revolution- happens in Europe, in Portugal, and so on, Give up the boycott, so that your athletes ary situation emerges in these countries, then but they have a much stronger interest in can come to the Olympic Games. It is a sym- inevitably this leads to tensions. Thus, with what happens in Latin America, in the revo- bol of your attempts to stir up the Cold War. the revolution, of course, there are tensions. lutionary changes in Latin America. Particu- Also, this contradicts your statement, Mr. In Afghanistan, too, with the revolution, larly in a Cold War situation, an interven- Muskie, that you want a healthy interna- there were tensions, and the new situation tion becomes more likely. This is why, for tional climate. Muskie said this could not in Iran, the revolution, has produced tensions us, the issue of changing the current course be changed, the President has taken his de- in that region. We take an interest in what and of finding the way back to detente, if cision. Thereupon, Comrade Gromyko ex- happens in the Caribbean, but also what possible, is of tremendous importance. plained that the President already has happens in all other areas of the globe, what changed his mind so many times, perhaps happens in Afghanistan. Erich Honecker: he could do it again in this case. Muskie re- Some Yankees, some groups of forces There are some new aspects. We got plied that this would not be possible. within the intelligentsia, are developing the information about the meeting between In concluding, Muskie said that he argument, the strategy, that, when a crisis Comrade Brezhnev and Giscard d’Estaing. would inform his President. Comrade unfolds in one part of the globe, in Iran or This meeting came as a complete surprise Gromyko could proceed from the assump- Afghanistan, in the Indian Ocean or any- to the USA. tion that he, Muskie, has been Secretary of where else in the world, then the USA has Even if one takes into account the ex- State for 20 days while Gromyko has been to respond [against] Cuba. They have said istence of a certain class solidarity between in office for 20 years. However, he would that quite frankly. If they have some clash France and USA imperialism, this talk be- like to say that the USA wants a normaliza- with the Soviet Union in a part of the globe tween Comrade Brezhnev and Giscard tion of the situation between the USA and where the balance of power is unfavorable d’Estaing still suggests that France intends the Soviet Union. for the USA, then they should respond in a to pursue a policy independent from the No one knows whether this was only place where the balance of power is favor- USA and is not willing to support the hard- diplomatic maneuvering or not. The ratifi- able for the USA. Because one should not ened, Cold War, course of the USA. Giscard cation of SALT II played an important role think that only a global conflict is possible. d’Estaing explained that France will not in the conversation. According to Muskie, A world conflict is the most severe. The support the USA’s economic sanctions it is not impossible that, after the elections, decisions are of tremendous importance and against the Soviet Union, that its athletes the situation might change. The conversa- they are dramatic ones. However, the real will go to Moscow, and that France does not tion has demonstrated that the USA does prospects for a conflict, not a general con- want the FRG to become the leading power well understand the implications of the ag- flict, but a local one, are much greater. in Western Europe. France, Giscard gravation of the international situation. In this sense, it doesn’t matter to us in d’Estaing said, has an interest in the further Fidel Castro has pointed out that the 200 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

international situation leads to Cold War, countries, and we are very happy about that. Of course, the situation has aggravated, also leads to an increased danger of local Among the socialist countries in Eastern for several months already, and also already conflicts, including the Caribbean. On the Europe the GDR is the country that pays before events in Afghanistan. The events in other hand, the peoples’ revolutionary move- greatest attention to Africa. When I talk Afghanistan basically are a pretext for car- ments have examples in the form of other about the socialist countries in Eastern Eu- rying through the boycott and all these mea- countries, as Cuba here in Latin America; rope, I would like to exclude the Soviet sures. This started after the confirmation of but they are objectively determined. If a sub- Union. Because for a long time it has made SALT. jective factor is added to that, then such a lot of efforts in this area. I am convinced You mentioned Carter’s words in welcome events as in Nicaragua take place. that the African countries greatly appreci- Vienna; however, when Carter came back Of course, the USA now endeavors to pre- ate the cooperation of the Soviet Union and to the USA, he gave a speech before Con- vent a second Nicaragua in El Salvador, and the GDR. This is important; because if the gress and used quite sharp words with re- their actions in South Korea also demon- GDR does not go there, others will go, who spect to Cuba. In this speech he explained strate their determination to defend the sta- have different intentions, who want to cul- to the public that he had told Brezhnev that tus quo. On the other hand, there are such tivate relations in order to moderate devel- Cuban adventurism in the Caribbean con- events as those mentioned by Comrade Fi- opments. I am thinking of the Yugoslavs. stituted an obstacle to detente and peace. He del Castro, e.g. Grenada in the Caribbean. They want to exert influence in a sense expressed fairly wicked intentions toward As far as the African region is con- which is not the most positive. This is why us, and basically accused us of constituting cerned, you are under heavy pressure of the the GDR’s presence helps us a lot to main- an obstacle to detente, an obstacle for the USA because of your military operations in tain the most radical positions. relations between the USA and the Soviet Angola and Ethiopia. But we are sitting in Erich Honecker: The speech you gave Union. the same boat, even though we don’t have before our State Council [in April 1977] is He basically asked the Soviet Union any troops there. We only have technical still ringing in our ears. This was after your to control us. Just at this time, we wanted to experts there. The USA is very curious about trip to Africa. Since then we have increased have some contact, because the revolution what the GDR does in Africa, be it in Angola our engagement there. in Nicaragua had reached its final phase, and or Ethiopia, in Zambia or Mozambique, Fidel Castro: This is very important for they wanted to talk to us. We refused to talk Namibia or South Africa. We have a lot of all of us, for the whole revolutionary move- to them and, after Carter’s speech before cadres there who are active in various fields, ment. The Ethiopian comrades are very Congress, we cancelled a meeting they had and we train cadres for them. This is why happy that you want to supply a cement fac- scheduled. the USA is currently tightening its policy tory. We have promised to help them to put The worst in all of this was the policy towards the GDR. Above all, they bring their up the cement factory. But the contribution of preparing certain armaments. The deci- influence to bear on the banks in order to to sustaining the radical spirit in these coun- sion to deploy 570 missiles is a very serious hurt us, in order to create economic prob- tries, in Ethiopia, in Angola and Zambia, in issue. I agree with you that this deployment lems in the GDR. Madagascar has to be added to that, and is upsets the balance of power. If Europe de- However, our economy is sound, we very beneficial for us within the framework ploys an additional number of missiles have enough allies. In addition to the So- of the nonaligned movement. against the Soviet Union, then this is a viet Union and the other socialist countries, The great success of the VIth summit change in the correlation of forces. There there are also imperialist monoplies that conference [of nonaligned countries in Ha- are no missiles close to the USA. We can want to trade with us. For example, we are vana in September 1979] nonwithstanding, understand this situation very well, because expanding our economic relations with the radical countries are in the minority, but we experienced the October Crisis. When France, Italy, Scandinavia, and Belgium. we were able to win them over on the most the missiles were deployed here, the Yan- After this visit, Comrade Mittag will go to important issues, and thereby to isolate the kees disagreed, and they almost provoked a Mexico. This year or next, President Portillo countries with reactionary positions; be- world war precisely because the missiles that plans to visit the GDR. cause there actually were very significant were deployed in Cuba could have reached We have met the Cuban comrades in disagreements at the nonaligned conference. the USA within a couple of minutes. This Angola and Ethiopia. I would like to thank The situation in Afghanistan has caused would have annulled the entire warning sys- you, Comrade Castro and the other com- a lot of problems for us, particularly with tem and all time calculations. The Yankees rades for the extensive security measures regard to the Third World. We remained in didn’t agree at all with the installation of that you have provided; a whole Cuban the absolute minority. The imperialists ex- such missiles. We had 52 missiles here, but batallion in Luanda. ploited this issue. At that time, we were they are talking about 570 intermediate Fidel Castro: Yes, I remember. We fighting for the Security Council, and we range missiles against the Soviet Union, and asked our comrades there to provide com- gained some 90 votes. Colombia was a ma- the Soviet Union’s long range missiles do prehensive support for Comrade Honecker’s jor obstacle for us, they got 50 votes then. not have that range, the USA’s intermediate trip. We would not have backed off but would range missiles in Europe, however, can Erich Honecker: We felt this support have continued the elections, however, be- reach the Soviet Union; this is a traumatic everywhere, and I would like to thank you cause of the events in Afghanistan, we had situation. on behalf of our delegation and of our re- to talk to the Mexicans and to give up the Erich Honecker: Helmut Schmidt told public as a whole. idea. It would have been nonsense, many me at our meeting: Mr. Honecker, we are Fidel Castro: I believe it was a very votes would have been lost, and this did a afraid, this is why we agreed with that mis- good initiative of the GDR’s party and gov- lot of harm to the nonaligned movement, sile decision; because the Soviet Union got ernment to send such a delegation to Africa. because the number of progressive, radical these SS-20 missiles, as you call them, and It supports the liberation movement and is countries still is very limited. There is a they are aimed at us, the Federal Republic. very beneficial for us. It is very important middle group, though, which can be won I replied: Mr. Schmidt, if you are afraid of to develop the GDR’s cooperation with these over on some issues. the missiles, then you should have been COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 201 afraid before the decision, because the mis- the missiles to submarines, to ships. It is church, together with and on suggestion of siles that can reach you in the Federal Re- known that exactly at the peak, if you can the GDR’s church, has issued a statement public are not at issue here at all. The group say so, of the USA’s plans against Cuba, the against the Carter policy. of the Soviet armed forces has got them, and Soviet Union has pointed to this agreement. Fidel Castro; Is it correct, that you have the NPA [National People’s Army of East Comrade Gromyko did the same when so many Protestants in your country? Are Germany] has got them, too. We can de- talked to Muskie. This is how all this is in- they indeed religious? stroy Bonn with missiles at any time, or even tertwined with each other. Erich Honecker: They are church the whole Federal Republic. The missiles, Fidel Castro: I believe Brussels is the members, and of course they are religious, however, that you want to deploy, they are most serious step they have taken. otherwise they were not members. I had con- supposed to reach up to the Urals. The USA What you said with regard to Muskie, versations with the bishops. This was the thereby achieves superiority over the Soviet we think that he has certain ideas. Some first time ever in the history of the GDR. Union in terms of missiles. These are the political circles in the USA take the view They said: We don’t want to be partisans of issues at stake and not the Federal Repub- that to chose Muskie for that function was a the West. We are GDR citizens. The mem- lic. smart move; because what one got to know bers of our congregation work for social- The USA wants to turn Western Eu- about Muskie was that he is a liberal, not an ism. We conceive of ourselves as a church rope into an anti-Soviet missile carrier, and aggressive man. He has no bad reputation. within socialism. I couldn’t say anything they want to shift the risk to Western Eu- There is no doubt that he has been appointed against that. The vast majority of the people rope. Thereby, they shift the military bal- Secretary of State just at a point when Carter feel attached to their state, to socialism, and ance, and we will not allow that to happen. feels weak. I think he has made some de- the leaders of the church are smart, they take This means that now we must have defense mands. Among other things, he said that he that fact into account. They exert an influ- systems against missiles that can reach us is independent, and that he will not be ence on the churches in the Federal Repub- within 5 minutes. This necessitates great Brzezinski’s tool but a true Secretary of lic and in the USA. At the World Council of armaments efforts. State. There have always been disagree- Churches, they have introduced a resolution At the VIth conference of the non- ments between Vance and Brzezinski. Ev- calling for the continuation of detente and aligned countries, you said that armaments ery time they sent a contact group to us or disarmament. It has been presented to the should be reduced and that a $500 million to Panama, or to Costa Rica, this group con- governments of all countries. The Protes- fund should be created. However, if now, sisted of two men. The first belonged to the tant churches of the GDR and the USA have following the Brussels decision, these mis- State Department, the other to the National issued a common statement calling for the siles are built, there will be no detente in Security Council. At any rate, I am of the continuation of detente. Hence, certain the military field. Then we have to muster opinion that Muskie will pursue a policy of changes become apparent here. all means in order to increase our defense defending his positions against Brzezinski, Of course, the church does not want to efforts. We will not allow a military imbal- and he will claim authority. join together with us completely. This is ance to the disadvantage of the socialist Erich Honecker: This is why he said evident, they can’t do that. However, it is countries. Your comparison is a very good he is responsible for foreign policy. still better to have a church that is loyal to one. The USA has made a big fuss about 50 Fidel Castro: He can exert a positive the socialist state than one that works against missiles at the time of the October crisis. influence. Vance has exerted a positive in- it. Now they want to want to deploy 570 mis- fluence. The policy of missile buildup is In the USA, too, there are quite a lot of siles right on the Soviet Union’s doorstep. Brzezinski’s. The policy of allying with people who oppose the policy of confronta- After the elimination of their Iranian bases China against the Soviet Union is tion, otherwise Vance would not have had and facilities, they now try the same in Af- Brzezinski’s. He traveled to China, he had to go. He was against the military adven- ghanistan. Moreover, there are their activi- pictures taken of himself at the border. ture in Iran. What you said about Muskie ties in Turkey. Erich Honecker: He had a picture taken confirms our information that Muskie in- The aggravation of the international of himself at the [Pakistani] border with deed wants to act more independently. We situation thus is intertwined with the height- Afghanistan, with a machine gun in his have to exploit that. ened crisis in the Caribbean, the USA’s back- hand. Fidel Castro: I believe that a lot of yard, so to speak. But the USA is not going Fidel Castro: Yes, he is a cunning devil. people understand that the third world war to succeed. Erich Honecker: This policy is danger- would also be the last. Fidel Castro: I would like to add the ous, but he won’t succeed. However, it can Concerning the boycott of the Olym- following story. In the resolution of the Oc- cost us a lot. pic Games, a many people believe that the tober crisis, the USA has pledged to with- One has to say that resistance against USA’s non-participation increases the oth- draw the missiles from Turkey and Italy. this policy is beginning to show in Western ers’ chances at the Games a lot. They have done that. In a certain sense, their Europe. It’s true, they bow before the USA Erich Honecker: With respect to the plans [to deploy missiles in Western Europe] and they have seriously supported the mis- chances of preventing a third world war, we are illegitimate and violate the October cri- sile decision, e.g. the FRG. However, we are optimistic, even though you never know sis agreements. This has not been publicized, had conversations in the Netherlands, in what some lunatics will get up to. but [former Soviet leader Nikita S.] Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and France. Regarding the Olympic Games, there Khruschev has shown me the letters, the let- The leading politicians of these countries are some people in our country who think ters related to the agreements. This was a don’t want a Third World war. that the USA does not send its athletes to tacit pledge to withdraw the missiles there. We are in contact with the folks of big Moscow because it is afraid that they would They were of a different kind than today’s; FRG companies, the chemical industry, again lose against the GDR’s athletes as was however, they, too, could reach the Soviet Mannesmann, and others. They all oppose the case in Montreal [in 1976]. Union. the boycott, too. It is very interesting that Erich Honecker: Then they relocated even the Federal Republic’s protestant (12:25 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.: Lunch Break) 202 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

a bishop, Bishop Mitzenheim, responsible regarding political issues in general. Erich Honecker: As for the movie for Thuringia. He was awarded the National I suppose there is not much I need to we’ve just seen, I have already asked if we Medal of Honor in gold for his contribution tell you about our own problems; during our can get it for our TV. to the building up of our republic. We thus conversations we return to that topic time Fidel Castro: In less than four weeks approach the issue of cooperation between and again. Yesterday I have already talked we have organized three big rallies, the last Christians and Marxists in the same man- a little bit about our difficulties. And there of them being the one for your arrival yes- ner. are shortcomings, too. But we fight against terday. Fidel Castro:The archbishop of Salva- these shortcomings to get rid of them. Erich Honecker: This huge manifesta- dor [Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, With regard to the implementation of tion has already been covered by our TV assassinated on 24 March 1980] was an the planning and management system for the yesterday, as will be today’s negotiations; apostle of the poor, of the revolution. The economy we have made some progress. We everything in color. Millions of GDR citi- CIA killed him. He exercised strong resis- have been working on that for years, and zens are watching this. 80 percent of the tance and cried out against repression. The currently we do a lot to improve efficiency. people have a TV-set. church in Salvador has a very revolution- We had some difficulties in meeting the Fidel Castro: Hence, there are much ary attitude, and this is of great importance goals of the five-year plan. The five-year more viewers than there are Catholics and for Latin America as a whole. In Jamaica, I plan will not be fulfilled, but we will never- Protestants. met with church representatives, as I did in theless make significant progress. The ce- Erich Honecker: These are loyal citi- Chile in 1972. I talked a lot about the alli- ment factory we are going to open tomor- zens as well. ance between Christians and Marxists. This row is one example. With this five-year plan, Fidel Castro: If we said that we have is no tactical alliance, but a strategic one. we face problems in the world market. Un- Catholics, then we could talk about millions I mentioned Jamaica. Jamaica cur- fortunately, our economy is highly depen- of Catholics who are baptized. Yet actu- rently faces a very difficult situation, above dent on international trade, on trade with the ally, nobody becomes involved with the all for economic reasons, particularly be- Western countries. We have to buy some church. Our relations with the church are cause of the oil price. They produce baux- products from the Western countries, par- not that bad. In the early days of the revo- ite. The oil price has increased 15 times, ticularly food, e.g. milk. We do a lot in or- lution it was necessary to make some priests the price of bauxite only two times. [Ja- der not to be dependent on the West. We leave the country, to expel them; because maican leader Michael] Manley is a very have agreements with the GDR concerning Catholicism was the faith of the rich. 60% able man, but he has got some problems. the production of powdered milk. As a re- of the people were farmers, and on the coun- The opposition party is influenced by sult, we will no longer depend on Canada, tryside there was not a single church. In the CIA, and they do all that they can in France, and other Western countries, at least other Latin American countries they do ex- order to destabilize and overthrow the gov- not to such a high degree, the dependence ist. Once a year, priests visit the villages to ernment. Now we have to see how these will be reduced. baptize the people, but they lack a religious problems can be solved. It is a very dramatic There are also many chemicals, e.g. education, they were only educated in the situation that shows certain similarities to pesticides, herbicides, where we are depen- big landowners’ private schools. Therefore, the situation in Chile at the time. We give dent on Switzerland and the FRG, because religion did not exert a particularly strong them any kind of support they request. Yet the socialist countries have not yet devel- hold on the people. Nevertheless, we are sometimes they act like the Chileans at the oped such chemicals. Unfortunately, there very careful in our relations with the church, time. is no hope that the GDR will develop such especially given the situation in Latin Erich Honecker: Every people has to products in the foreseeable future. We also America, not to admit that the revolution is learn by experience. must buy a lot of equipment from the West- opposed to the church. In addition, we have Fidel Castro: They simply are too ern countries. It will be the same for you. talked a lot about the Christians’ closeness democratic—Comrade Honecker, the floor Above all, the issue is raw materials, many to the Marxists, and said that Jesus was is yours now. sorts of raw materials, and spare parts. In Christian. Erich Honecker: I’ve already taken up sum, a significant part of our trade depends Erich Honecker: The Sermon on the a lot of time. on relations with the West. Mount says something along these lines, too. Fidel Castro: You have much more to In addition, the prices of sugar and Fidel Castro: There are many priests tell than I do. To sum up, I would like to nickel were low for some years. This year, with a revolutionary attitude in Latin say the following: the price of sugar has increased. The world America. We think this is of great impor- It is our party’s belief that our relations price of sugar will probably very good next tance. with the GDR are very good ones. We are year, and this helps us a lot in dealing with Erich Honecker: We also integrated a very satisfied with how this relationship has these difficulties. lot of them into the National Front. At the developed, and we are very grateful to the However, there are other problems as elections, they call upon the people to vote GDR. You are virtually the first country with well. We had some obscure plagues recently. for the candidates of the National Front. which we have concluded the coordination We believe that these plagues were caused I come from a miners’ town. The ma- of the five-year plan. In our view, all issues by sabotage. jority of the people was Catholic. There was have been settled to our satisfaction, and this First, there was a fungal disease in our a street where 80% of the people living there helps us a lot. Our discussions with the oth- tobacco plantations. This year, 90% of our voted for the KPD [the Communist Party of ers have not yet been concluded. tobacco production were destroyed, and we Germany]. As for the political issues, we fully had to import tobacco. Fortunately, there are After 1945, we had Priest Kleinschmidt agree. I believe that there still are a lot of chemicals that are well-suited for fighting in the GDR, who was responsible for all of possibilities to develop our cooperation in this sort of fungus. We have made a strong Mecklenburg, and we had priests on the the economic and political field. But things effort and we got the necessary amount for National Front’s National Council. We had are going well. This is what I wanted to say next year. Therefore, we believe that we will COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 203 have solved the problem by next year; be- and we are at pains to calm the people down. There are two very interesting phenom- cause this plague has brought us into a very If 150 children had died, then we would have ena. They all believe what the revolution- difficult situation. Other countries were hurt, witnessed serious acts of revenge. And ap- ary government says, and second, they have too. In Jamaica, the whole tobacco produc- parently this was the intention. the methods of the revolution, a revolution- tion has been destroyed, in Canada, too, and Three days ago a special school was ary style. perhaps the USA will be affected as well. set on fire, a dangerous incident, too. This is strange. The Yankees concen- It’s blue mould [Blauschimmel]. Yesterday a small rum factory was set trate them in bases, and there they organize On our sugar plantations we also had a alight. Hence, there is sabotage, and this ei- the revolt. They don’t obey any orders. With very serious plague, but it affected only one ther could have been planned by the CIA or these rogues they have imported rogues with type. 30% of our sugar plantations have been instigated by the radio stations of the USA a revolutionary style. In comparison, the planted with this type of sugar. This led to a and the venomous pirate radio stations. Al- other emigrants in the USA are calm, but loss of some 1 million tons of sugar. We fight together, these acts are typical of the CIA’s the Cuban people raise all sorts of outcries. against this plague by replacing this type of war of nerves. Therefore, we will have to Hence, this is the situation. The West sugar with another one, a new type, which take more drastic measures and send some does not really understand this. 90 % of the is resistant against this disease. people before the firing squad. These are ter- people are steadfast and agree with the revo- Then there is the African swine fever, rible things. Our main concern is that they lution, 10 % are against the revolution, but which we are fighting successfully. This use bacteriological means against the the latter are militant. The West does not swine fever is practically under control. It economy. really understand this phenomenon. This is strange, though, three plagues all at the Our problem is that we are heavily de- will remain the same for 30 or 40 years, as same time. pendent on agriculture. Our exports depend long as we have the USA on our doorstep. A couple of days ago a plane overflew on agriculture. Agriculture suffers from There will always be a small minority. I am our country and dropped a gelatin-like, liq- natural plagues, such as droughts. However, totally convinced of that, we must not have uid substance containing a fungus; quite there are also these artificial plagues, and any illusions about it. clever, in microscopically small capsules. now we struggle with this kind of difficul- Therefore, every country where there Currently, we are conducting research on the ties. is a regime change means increased secu- issue. These things were dropped in a width Nevertheless, the morale is good. We rity for our revolution. Each additional revo- of 25 kilometers. We haven’t publicized any- have practically formulated the next five- lution makes us stronger because we gain thing yet, because we are still in the process year plan already. It is not a very ambitious allies. For 20 years, we have been isolated, of conducting research. We have asked the one, but a modest, a realistic plan, that has on our own, now there are already three of Soviet comrades for help. But we still need been calculated cautiously, on the basis of us in the region: Grenada, Nicaragua, and more facts. low world prices. If the situation improves, Cuba. Moreover, there are friendly states, This is very disquieting, however, since we will try to fulfill the plan. such as Panama and Jamaica, for example; these could be symptoms of bacteriological We now coordinate the plans with the some countries that have developed a posi- warfare. These chemicals are highly devel- other socialist countries. We are preparing tive attitude towards us compared to the time oped. The material that has been used does for the II Party congress. It will be charac- of our isolation, when not a single country not come from a small group of counterrevo- terized by a fighting spirit. had a friendly attitude towards us. Mexico lutionaries, it belongs to a highly developed The party has grown, perhaps a little only entertained formal relations with us, industry. Now we don’t know who has done bit more than we desired, because we im- but no relations of a friendly nature. This this. We know for sure that we are dealing proved very restrictive criteria, always in situation has changed a lot. with fungi, a type of fungus that could dam- search for excellence. Recently we tried to Mexico’s position is a very interesting age the sugar. We are doing the relevant tests increase the number of workers in the party. one; since after the discovery of the huge before we publicize something. The drop- Our comrades also work in services, intelli- (crude) oil resources, its economic situation ping took place 12 to 14 days ago. But we gence, the ministry of the interior, the mili- has changed, its power has grown. The de- don’t have all elements available yet. Per- tary. We also had a special campaign aimed pendence on the USA has been decreased. haps this is psychological warfare? at increasing the percentage of workers. However, at the same time, this engen- Furthermore, there are various signs of Currently the party has 400,000 members ders a danger, because the USA demand that sabotage. A couple of weeks ago a very se- and candidates. At the time of the I. Party Mexico supplies them with 4,000 barrels of rious act of sabotage occurred. A day-nurs- congress, there were 150,000 members and (crude) oil every day in order to solve their ery in a high-rise was set on fire. This fire candidates. The youth organization has energy problems. The Mexicans are afraid was very dangerous, because there were 570 450,000 members, and it has a restrictive of the USA. They don’t want to follow the children in the nursery at this point. By a character, too. We will stick to this policy USA’s oil policy, but maintain a limited po- miracle, all children were saved. because we look not so much for quantity sition that corresponds to the country’s de- A few days later, the same thing hap- but for quality. The party is very unified, velopment needs in order to simultaneously pened to a old people’s home in Jamaica. the people are very unified. All the people expand the markets. But Mexico plays an 150 old women died. Image what would who are sitting here are comrades, all revo- important role in this area of the globe, a have happened here if 100 children had died! lutionaries are comrades, and even the rogue very important role, since it has got the eco- Maybe the people would have killed the is ready to fight. The people who are now nomic power because of the oil. Hence, at- rogue. The people might have killed some leaving our country and go to the USA, who tention should be paid to Mexico. Lopez 10,000 of these guys, but then the problem are no revolutionaries at all, have a revolu- Portillo, the Mexican president, has a good would have gotten out of hands; because we tionary mentality. They are rebels. They attitude, a brave position, he is open-minded, have to run a visible campaign with the party refuse to obey orders. They will give the and this should be taken into account. and the mass organizations in order to keep USA a big headache, although they are en- Argentina and Brazil are in a different the people calm. They want to strike back, emies of the revolution. situation. These countries are much more 204 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

dependent on the USA. Brazil seeks to in- has been prepared. All questions have been lated to the continuing carrying through of crease its independence. Without any doubt, settled, and we have expressed our opinions the GDR’s foreign policy. this is a very reasonable government, but on international issues. As far as foreign policy is concerned, the situation is different from that in Mexico. We consider the conclusion of the the problems are quite obvious. The coop- Mexico can be seen more as an ally, as a treaty on friendship and cooperation very eration with the Soviet Union is the corner- friend. important. stone of our foreign policy. We coordinate The Yankees have asked the Mexicans (Fidel Castro: This is our first treaty.) our foreign policy with the socialist brother to do them some service here, in order to The people of the German Democratic nations. Concerning foreign policy, there solve their problems with us. We told the Republic will be delighted when they learn is agreement as to the basic issues, the issue Mexicans that we would agree, if the goal about it, and it is certain that this will re- of the further consolidation of the unity and is to solve all problems at the same time, ceive great attention; just as our stay here indivisibility of the community of socialist not only those that are of interest to the USA. already receives great international atten- countries, the issue of defending the They Mexicans said that they agree with tion. The conclusion of this treaty will out- achievements of detente, its supplementing that. line all that what we, even more so than be- with arms reductions, and active support for When the Mexicans, the Yankees, and fore, will have to live up to in our mutual national liberation movements. In this pro- we sit at a table, the relation will be two to cooperation. cess, we pay great attention to the develop- one on some issues. The Mexicans have Despite all agreement with regard to ment of the nonaligned countries about invited representatives from Panama, and economic and other issues, there will be a which Comrade Fidel Castro has informed we have said that it is better to have more whole string of additional possibilities to us in the context of the Havana conference Latin Americans. Maybe it is better for us develop the cooperation of two countries and the subsequent events. if the Mexicans participate in these talks. that are so much joined together in friend- Although all these issues concerning Therefore we agreed. We don’t know what ship as are the German Democratic Repub- the future development of our foreign policy is going to happen and where it is going to lic and the Republic of Cuba. are understood, the citizens of the GDR cer- happen because the Yankees are quite con- We in the GDR follow with great plea- tainly face a lot of problems. World events strained in their actions because of the cam- sure with how much energy you implement are highly complex, so that the Party has to paign. Before the elections, Carter must the decisions taken at the Ist Party congress be very active in this area; this all the more make no concessions at all. Therefore, the of the Communist Party. We follow with so since the enemy seeks to deceive the situation is not going to change before the deep sympathy your efforts concerning the people through the mass media and to dis- elections. On no account, can we help Carter preparation of the IInd Party congress, about guise its aggressive policies, particularly that solve his own problems. What guarantees which you have just informed us. of the USA. We have created a solid basis is Carter going to give us? And what if he The remarks you made in the context regarding these issues. The comrades now loses the elections? They don’t talk about of the Party congress regarding the effec- are increasingly capable of thinking for Angola and Ethiopia any more, now they tiveness and quality of your work are very themselves and clarifying these issues in talk about solving the problem in the USA’s familiar concerns for us. We, too, devote dialogue with the people. interests section which is full of counter- increasing attention to these issues given the In January of this year we held big talks revolutionaries, and in Iran, they demand conditions of our development. Moreover, with our party’s first district secretaries (1. their hostages. They were afraid that our in our activities we proceed from the as- Kreissekretaere) under consultation of the people would attack the consulate. Before sumption that revolutionary Cuba com- local government secretaries (Sekretaere der our demonstration, they were very con- mands great authority and conducts a very Bezirksleitungen). cerned, and Mariel is the second issue that active, principled foreign policy in full ac- Fidel Castro: How many districts are they are very concerned about. cordance with the Soviet Union and the there in your country? There, we are the ones who issue the countries of the socialist community while Erich Honecker:There are 136 districts exit visas. They are afraid of Latin America, certainly taking into consideration your (Kreise), but also a whole string of indus- of the people from Haiti, Mexico, and the country’s specific situation. trial districts. Altogether there were 600 next problem is the hijacked plane. They It is obvious that in the preparation of comrades present there. At this meeting, we are interested in agreements and they are your IInd Party congress you are concerned assessed the class struggle between social- concerned about that. with a whole string of issues that we also ism and imperialism and its implications for However, they always find something have to deal with in preparing for our Xth the work of our party. One can note the dif- new. At the time, they talked about subver- Party congress. Recently our Central Com- ferences between the various imperialist sion in Latin America, now there are new mittee held its 12th conference. Supple- countries, but the basic conflict still is the issues. In this pre-election period, it is very menting the Politburo’s report on the orga- one between socialism and imperialism. difficult for them to make concessions. nization of our Xth Party congress, I held a The imperialists are quite united in their Hence, we remain at the present point as speech there. The Xth Party congress has struggle against socialism, they only dis- long as the elections have not taken place. been scheduled for 11-16 April 1981. We agree with regard to method. This was a broad outline of the current publicized the agenda and at the same time We also evaluated the development of situation. We will provide further informa- we announced that motions to be consid- the national liberation movement and the tion about Cuba, but these were the main ered by the Party congress have to be pro- role of the Communist and workers’ move- issues. posed before the end of March. In the con- ments in the developed capitalist countries. Erich Honecker: Comrade Fidel text of the summoning of our Xth Party con- It was a broad range of international issues, Castro, thank you for your explanations. It gress the entire country will engage in a which are mainly ideological issues, and is quite obvious that there are no issues be- great debate about the future shaping of the issues concerning the future shaping of the tween us that need further discussion. German Democratic Republic’s developed developed socialist society. For example, As far as we know, the communique socialist society. Of course, this will be re- we discussed the question how to continue COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 205 our dynamic economic policy under of 18,000 megawatts, on the basis of brown going to last? changed international economic conditions coal in fact. Erich Honecker: Until the year 2000 in combination with the execution of our Fidel Castro: This is eight to nine times and beyond. Supplies for the next 30 years socio-political program. These questions are as much energy as we produce. So, 60 mil- are ascertained. We don’t have to worry certainly not only of theoretical importance; lion tons of brown coal produce the same as about that. Our greatest worries concern the above all they concern the masses and hence 15 nilllion tons of oil. This is more than raw materials that we don’t have such as oil the Party. what Romania produces. and gas, gold, silver, nickel, wood, etc. We believe that we can compensate for Erich Honecker: I have picked this ex- Fidel Castro: Why do you need gold? the changed international economic condi- ample because, under the changed interna- Erich Honecker: For microelectronics, tions, which find expression in increasing tional economic circumstances, for us as a for example. Of course the processing of prices, in inflationary tendencies, through country lacking in raw materials it is cer- these raw materials is pace-setting, but es- higher labor productivity. You know our de- tainly more effective to use brown coal for pecially the development of microelectron- velopment, therefore I don’t have to go into carbochemistry, for coke, town gas. This is ics. At this year’s Leipzig spring fair, the detail. The main problem we face is to com- a crucial component of the GDR’s economic visitors were very surprised by the triumph bine the advantages of the socialist social power. of microelectronics in a several of the order with the scientific-technical revolu- Fidel Castro: But 300 million tons of GDR’s industries, e.g. in machine tool en- tion. This means, among other things, es- coal are the same as 75 million tons of oil. gineering, where it plays a very important pecially a more efficient management of Erich Honecker: At any rate, we don’t role in the context of automating entire pro- natural resources. We have great supplies have the oil, but we have the brown coal. duction processes, in the car industry, of brown coal in our country. Within the We import 20 million tons of oil per year, through the use of industrial robots, in the framework of the plan, we are currently which we use primarily for chemical pro- rolling mill industry, certainly in measure- making it our task to extract 300 million tons cesses. In addition, we import 4 billion cu- ment technology, in the gadget industry, in of brown coal a year instead of the 240 mil- bic meters of natural gas, and we produce 8 ship and crane building. In our republic, lion tons we have produced in the past. Of billion cubic meters ourselves. However, almost every industry witnesses the trium- course this is a huge task, since it involves our domestically produced gas has a low phant march of microelectronics. This is the opening of new coal mines. calorie content - ca. 2,000. We use this kind necessary since 95 to 99 percent of the in- Fidel Castro: How many kilocalories of gas mainly for process energy because it crease in industrial production is supposed does coal have? is less well suited for chemical processes. to be achieved through increasing labor pro- Erich Honecker: 2,000 to 3,000, it var- Hence, the first principle is to use our ductivity. ies. However, given the increase in world own raw materials more efficiently for the Fidel Castro: Microelectronics and prices, this is a very important natural re- development of our economy. These are, higher productivity will make up for the source. as mentioned before, brown coal; moreover, workers that you are lacking. Fidel Castro: How many tons of brown the earths for the porcelain industry, which Erich Honecker: Indeed, we are sav- coal are necessary to substitute 1 ton of oil? experiences a rapid development, both china ing 300 million man-hours per year because I am talking about the type of brown coal and porcelain for technical use actually. We of technological improvements and the sci- that you produce. have the earths for developing the glass in- entific management techniques. In one year Erich Honecker: Practically, we use dustry - we were presented the thermopanes we saved 167,000 workers simply by in- brown coal for our carbochemical industry. in the Palast, but glass is mainly used for creasing labor productivity. Despite the cri- Relatedly, it is the source material for vari- house building. We have great deposits of sis of the capitalist world market, despite ous raw materials, plastics, rubber (elas- potash. We produce around 3.2 million tons the price increases national income on av- tomers?), for the production of gas. We just annually, part of it gets exported. In recent erage grew by 4% annually within the have opened a new factory near Buna. Near years we have increased production by 1 COMECON, industrial production by 5 to Leuna we then saw the old plant, which million tons. We also have supplies of ura- 5.5%. Overall net income grew by 4%, works in the field of carbochemistry. The nium, and it is known that uranium-mining those of workers and employees by 4.7%. new one works on the basis of oil. Initially, is strongly developed. The uranium is mined Retail sales are up by 4% on average. This we intended to abandon carbochemistry by a German-Soviet company. Uranium can could only be achieved because of the divi- because at that time oil was cheaper than be used for peaceful and for non-peaceful sion of labor within the COMECON, espe- brown coal. We wanted to switch com- purposes. cially with the Soviet Union, and the strong pletely to petrochemistry. But now we are This is already it as far as our own sup- increase in the productivity of the working developing a stronger carbochemical indus- plies are concerned. We have to import oil, people of the GDR. try, and the new plant produces 100,000 tons gas, ore for our metallurgy, various metals, Now I’d like to tell you how we man- of PVC per year on the basis of brown coal, precious metals for the metallurgy, sheet aged to achieve such an increase in labor rock salt, and lime. This leads me already steel, etc. All these questions of improving productivity. This is possible because we to the answer to your question. 4 tons of efficiency and quality, with which the party have a standardized socialist system of edu- brown coal are neccessary to substitute one is concerned in its entire work, played a role cation; almost every child of our people goes ton of oil. However, this is not the crucial in the discussions with the first district sec- to kindergarten, all attend the 10-class poly- issue. Crucial is the fact that we have brown retaries, not only regarding better exploita- technic secondary school. This not only coal, but not oil. This is why we now sup- tion of these raw materials, but, relatedly, leads to a higher level of general education, port brown coal and develop the for a more efficient development of certain but creates a better basis for professional carbochemical industry to produce plastics pace-setting industries. The production and training as well. The best get sent to the uni- and rubber. The second way of exploiting processing of brown coal are certainly pace- versities and technical colleges. brown coal consists of using it as a source setting for the development of our economy. Since the German Democratic Repub- of energy. Currently our grid has a capacity Fidel Castro: How long are the supplies lic came into existence 1.4 million skilled 206 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

workers have graduated from the universi- Fidel Castro: Where do you get the great improvement concerning qualitative ties and technical colleges. Without the high wood for the furniture from? economic indicators, especially with regard level of education among workers, without Erich Honecker: We fell 7 million cu- to the increase in labor productivity. This the good professional training for everyone, bic meters of solid timber per year ourselves, leads me to our Xth Party congress. We have without the fact that under the worker and the forestry ministry wants to increase the discussed political-ideological issues, we peasant power 1.4 million people attended output to 8 million. The rest of the wood have explained openly the basic economic universities and technical colleges such an are imports, particularly from the Soviet issues that have to be mastered. We have economic and hence social development of Union. But we do not only use wood. For decided that what matters is to consolidate the GDR would not have been possible. the furniture, we increasingly use plastics, and gradually expand our social achieve- This is the reason why the GDR belongs to rubber, etc. We make chipboards from wood ments. Now it is up to the Party and the the ten most powerful industrial countries. shavings and import chipboards. Sometimes people to fulfill these tasks. Stalin’s slogan: “The cadres take all deci- the furniture looks as if it was made from Because of the results we already have sions.” still holds true. This is the only way oak or birch or walnut, or even from Afri- in hand we are very optimistic. My speech to develop the various branches of our can walnut, from precious woods. Yet ac- before the first district secretaries was read economy: electrical engineering/electronics, tually it is film produced in our factories that out to 150,000 party activists, and then these metallurgy, scientific equipment-building, gives that impression. Our Party printeries issues were discussed within the entire Party. the shipyard industry, mechanical engineer- produce film, and this wood has proven to Each basic organization has an action plan ing, the chemical and the optical industry, be of higher quality than natural wood. for realizing the political-ideological, eco- etc., of course the ceramics industry as well. Various corrosives have been used for test- nomic, and cultural goals. When you are planning your IInd Party ing. The material lasts. In the economic field the working congress—and you mentioned that the ce- The housing program is the centerpiece people of more than 120 combines have ment factory with an output of 1.6 million of our social policy. Moreover, we are in made it their task to bring an additional 2 to tons of cement per year will play an impor- the process of introducing gradually the 40- 3 daily productions to the plan, with the tant role, it is the biggest cement factory in hour workweek while retaining the 5-day same amount of raw materials and other in- Latin America, and many new factories have workweek. We have increased minimum puts if possible. been built in Cuba—our experience has vacation from 15 and 18 to 21 days, we have We have 16.9 million citizens in our been, and this is all I can speak of, that one taken special measures concerning the pro- republic. Following the principle of indi- has to educate the cadres and rely on them. tection and support for mother and child and vidual selection, which says that the best The issue is not only discipline at work and the family. We have increased the paid leave should belong to the Party, we have 2.1 mil- making full use of working hours, but also for mothers for the first child to six months, lion members and candidates. 56% of them to achieve a balance between the scientific- it used to be six weeks, and to one year for are workers. For the first time in the Party’s technical cadres and the cadres with good the second child. history 20% belong to the scientific-techni- professional training, who know their trade, Fidel Castro: This country will become cal intelligentsia. This means more than who are loyal politically and skilled work- a real anthill. 450,000 scientists, technicians, graduates of ers as well. This is the secret that allows Erich Honecker: See, Fidel, you must the universities and technical colleges are the GDR to defend the position that it has proceed from the conditions in your coun- Party members. This enables the Party to gained. try, we from those in ours. We are building fulfill the tasks explained before. Accord- We discussed all these issues at the socialism under different conditions. I ing to a decision taken at the 12th session meeting with the district secretaries and wouldn’t mention this at all if the develop- of the Central Committee, for every 800 explained that only through the further dy- ment of our peace-oriented foreign policy members there will be an elected delegate. namic development of the GDR’s economy and anti-imperialist solidarity weren’t We are deeply convinced that in con- we can ensure our social policy and the com- closely related to the issue of the further nection with the open discussion within the prehensive strengthening of the GDR shaping of the developed socialist society Party surrounding the Party congress, with against attacks by our imperialist enemies. and intellectual-cultural life. the help of the dialogue between the Party This is the case simply because here people At the same time we have to set aside members and the entire citizenry, in the year have the tendency to compare. For them, considerable resources not only for interna- 1980 the conditions for formulating at the socialism has to be more attractive than capi- tional solidarity with the peoples of Africa, Party congress another program for the de- talism. Since you can get three of the FRG’s Asia, and Latin America, etc., but also for velopment of the GDR until the year 1985 TV channels here, but only two of the GDR, our defense, the development of the National will be created. Here we envision an aver- the actual situation is decisive. People’s Army, the army, the air force, and age annual increase in labor productivity of The last ten years have witnessed the the navy. It is known that our army is hardly 4% for the years 1981 to 1985, and of 5% biggest housing program ever in the history small, and it is equipped with the whole per year in industrial production. The fig- of our country. Between 1971 and 1976 we range of state-of-the-art weaponry with ures for income, net income, retail sales, for have built or modernized 603,000 apart- which the Soviet troops in the GDR are investment, housing, and other social pro- ments. This is the final year of the 1976- equipped, too. grams will correspond to that. 1980 five-year plan, and in compliance with We explained all these tasks openly We thus fight for the realization of our the decision of the IXth Party congress we before the Party and at the same time said: Party program, adopted at the IXth Party will have built or modernized 750,000 apart- if we fulfill them we will be able to keep congress, by setting ourselves the goal of ments, 510,000 of them with the help of the prices for basic consumption goods, further shaping the developed socialist so- apartment factories; of course this is a huge rents, and services stable. All this is worked ciety and creating the conditions for a housing program since, for every new through by the Party, discussed with the gradual transition to communism. household, the equipment, i.e. floor cover- people. I apologize if my explanations have ing, drapes, furniture, etc. has to be added. I can say that this year we are noting a been too extensive. There were some ques- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 207 tions, which perhaps can be answered later cause of the cold. But thousands of Cubans Dresden, I had a chance to see the marks in more detail. These questions concern are in the South of Angola, in the trenches, left by the war. I was told, however, that problems in the development of the GDR. for months. Why shouldn’t they be able to everything has been removed. I think that Just like the comradeship between the Cu- work in Siberia? I am convinced that they this was a mistake. One should have left ban Communist Party and the German So- can work there, and we are having discus- one devastated district as it was. cialist Unity Party is the centerpiece of our sions along these lines with Comrade I am pleased to accept your invitation friendship, the Party is the decisive force in Baibakov and various personalities in the to visit the GDR. your country. It couldn’t be otherwise. We Soviet Union. However, they doubt that we thus create the basis for the further devel- can stand the cold. (End of the official talks: 6:35 p.m.) opment of the relations between the Ger- Erich Honecker: If we can stand the man Democratic Republic and socialist heat, why shouldn’t you be able to stand the [Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Cuba. cold? Massorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR Fidel Castro: We have a Communist Fidel Castro: There are remote areas, im Bundesarchiv” (Berlin), DY 30 J IV 2/ Party, but haven’t built socialism yet; you where they kept prisoners, but that doesn’t 201/1365; obtained by C.F. Ostermann; have a Socialist Unity Party and are already matter. translation for CWIHP by Ostermann and building Communism. Erich Honecker: There are vast areas, Holger Schmidt.] Erich Honecker: This is the dialectic. and we got such an offer, too. We couldn’t Moreover, this is always connected with accept it for the reasons mentioned before. Transcript of Meeting between U.S. what you have said before. There are dif- Therefore we have a well-developed forestry Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, ferent ways to Communism. The important [sector]. Unfortunately, you don’t, for ob- Jr., and Cuban Vice Premier Carlos thing is to actually pursue these paths. Then jective reasons, and what we can’t get, we Rafael Rodriguez, Mexico City, it is no longer decisive how the party calls have to substitute through chemistry. Yet 23 November 1981 itself. All of us who are sitting here come what it does not produce are the silicon chips from the German Communist Party (KPD), for microelectronics, the microprocessors. Embassy of USSR TOP SECRET from the Communist youth organization. Fidel Castro: We have silicon. to Republic of Cuba Copy No.__ Through the unification of Social Democrats Erich Honecker: We have silicon en Ser. No. 544 and Communists we became the German masse. We control the whole silicon chain 8 December 1981 Socialist Unity Party. Now we have already with the help of our scientists. We have pro- developed so far that we think of Commu- duced the multispectrum camera at Zeiss. CC CPSU nism. You first thought of Communism and When Comrade [Gunter] Mittag met called your party Communist Party. Schmidt [on 17 April 1980 in Bonn], he Attached please find a stenographic Fidel Castro: It’s Karl Marx’s fault. I claimed that our camera was better than the record received by the Soviet Ambassador have listened carefully to your explanations American one. We are not modest as far as from C. R. Rodriguez of his conference with because we can still benefit more from the our productive capabilities are concerned. U.S. Secretary of State Alexander A. Haig GDR’s experience. That’s what I was think- However, apart from that, what is actually which took place in Mexico City on 23 No- ing of when you talked about the system of crucial are the cadres. vember of this year. education. With respect to some things the Fidel Castro: Where do you produce conditions in your country are different from that camera? Attachment: original in Spanish, 38 those in ours. There are some issues where Erich Honecker: In Jena. But in pages, and translation consisting of 26 we can use your experience. We have to Dresden, the industry is very powerful, and pages; this address only. make an effort in that regard. the institute for microelectronics is located In the realm of professional training there. AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR there is still a lot of room for improvement. I have yet to fulfill an honorable task. TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA Our situation, though, is very different On behalf of our Party’s Central Commit- /s/ V. VOROTNIKOV from yours. Let us compare just a few fig- tee, the Council of State, and the Council of ures. You produce nine times as much elec- Ministers, I would like to invite a party and [attachment] tricity as we do, and you consume 16 times government delegation of the Republic of as much wood. These are only two ex- Cuba under the leadership of Comrade Fi- Translated from Spanish amples. We face severe constraints concern- del Castro to visit the German Democratic ing raw materials and have no energy Republic. Our people would be pleased if CONFERENCE OF DEPUTY CHAIR- sources, neither gas nor oil. We don’t even Fidel visited the GDR. MAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF have wood. We are asking the Soviet com- Fidel Castro: The next time, I will be THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA CARLOS rades to establish a Cuban colony in Siberia more experienced and thus able to make RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ WITH U.S. for the production of wood. better use of my stay with all what I have SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER Erich Honecker: You can get it. The learned now about microelectronics. I won’t HAIG, IN MEXICO, Bulgarians are there. We also got an invita- go hunting wild pigs, won’t go to Rostock, 23 NOVEMBER 1981 tion, but we are lacking workers. but visit the factories instead. Halle is a very “YEAR OF THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY Fidel Castro: You should transfer this nice area, it has young cities, sports facili- OF VICTORY AT PLAYA GIRON” invitation to us. ties, a new swimming bath, a very good wine Erich Honecker: Agreed. tavern, and a very big enterprise, Leuna. (Stenographic record, State Council) Fidel Castro: Then we make the deal There I saw the militia branches, this is a together. In the Soviet Union, people think very interesting spot for visitors. I always Carlos R. Rodriguez. [Mexican For- that the Cubans can’t work in Siberia be- think of Halle. It was very nice there. In eign Minister] Jorge [Castaneda], why don’t 208 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

you stay with us a while? I’d like to make other and the rights of each. in 1975 under my former colleagues Ford some introductory remarks. Alexander Haig. I applaud you for and Kissinger, and also the domestic situa- Jorge Castaneda. Okay. your outstanding introduction. For the past tion in the United States created under the Carlos R. Rodriguez. Just one more some time I have been following your pre- influence of Vietnam and the Watergate minute (spoken in English). Can you sit eminent career. scandal - that it was these, and not only or- with us for a little while? I also am very grateful to President dinary geopolitical reasons, that formed the Jorge Castaneda. Of course. Lopez Portillo for the invitation, which he basis for a process of continual worsening Carlos R. Rodriguez. Just a second made several months ago to President in relations and growing repercussions, (spoken in English). Reagan, to function as a party assisting in which I regard as very dangerous factors in It seems to me necessary and fitting these negotiations. the cause of international peace. that we express the thanks of the Cuban Jorge Castaneda. As a messenger. At that time, I was located abroad, but government to the government of Mexico Alexander Haig. We don’t have an ad- nevertheless discussed the question in de- for the kind intentions it has displayed in equate expression for “assisting party” and tail with Kissinger and Ford. At that time making the conduct of this meeting possible. therefore, if you prefer, one may say “mes- they were not in a position to achieve a gen- When the government of Mexico com- senger” or “bridge.” eral consensus in the United States with re- municated this suggestion to us, we imme- (Jorge Castaneda leaves the room). gard to support of a policy that they consid- diately expressed our agreement. Indeed, In Washington, we consider that this is ered correct at that moment. Subsequently, this was a difficult moment, inasmuch as, a very fitting occasion for our meeting, be- the Ford presidency dialectically reflected in the entire period of our revolution, we cause, indeed, we are going through a criti- the spiritual condition of the American have never encountered such a torrent of cal moment in the history of these twenty- people after the and Watergate. accusations and threats against our country, odd difficult years. The only course open All that has changed now. Now any and besides that we knew that our counter- to us leads to the requirement that we make disposition of forces gives rise to a counter- part would be the Secretary of State, one of a choice. In any event, we believe that it is measure. That is what has happened in this the very most active exponents of this trend, essential to conduct negotiations between case. These days our national spirit has sig- Mr. Haig himself. Notwithstanding, we con- the two governments prior to proceeding fur- nificantly strengthened, allowing the attain- sider that this meeting comports with the ther. ment of unprecedented levels of military ex- principles to which we have adhered since Prior to the commencement of this penditures, and simultaneously creating a the moment of victory of the Cuban Revo- meeting, I already expressed to Jorge our readiness to come to terms with limitations lution and its ascendance to power. appreciation for this constructive initiative, in the social and economic sphere. That We have never refused to engage in which has made it possible to discuss our spirit is developing into an ever greater dialogue. We have always considered that circumstances and, beginning with this, our growth of the desire to come to a solution dialogue must take place in conditions of first meeting, to forge ahead in an examina- of international conflicts which the Ameri- equality and mutual respect, and, for our tion of the questions which are a cause of can people regard as a threat to peace. part, we approach dialogue in the light of concern to both countries. In that which concerns the United respect for principles which, from our point I’m very grateful that you have come States and Cuba, it seems to me, in essence, of view, are not subject to debate. from a long distance to this unofficial, se- that we never had any tensions as a result of We have had contacts with the Ameri- cret meeting. From our side, we intend to ethnic or spiritual conflicts. To the contrary. can government over the course of these hold it secret. Historically, Americans and Cubans were years: contact with the Ford administration, Carlos R. Rodriguez. That is consis- very close and had good relations, relations and the Carter administration, on parallel tent with our wishes. We have decided to based on mutual respect. However, due to levels. There were moments of rapproche- do the same. objective reality - founded or unfounded - ment. And then circumstances arose which Alexander Haig. I have been involved the people of the United States regard the cut short that rapprochement. with these problems for a greater portion of chain of events as a challenge to their vital In our message to the government of my time that you might suppose. In the be- national interests, as intervention. This situ- Mexico, we wanted to say that, from our ginning, I started working in Washington ation has come about during an extended side, we are in complete accord with the under President John Kennedy. After the course of time, beginning in 1975 and con- ideas expressed yesterday by President so-called missile crisis I was an assistant to tinuing right up to this day. First Angola, Lopez-Portillo, who called for an end to the Cyrus Vance and well remember those dif- then Ethiopia, South Yemen, the threat to verbal terrorism which has been widely uti- ficult days which followed upon that crisis, , and in all of this Cuba has lized by both sides in the recent past, and and the actions taken by each side against played a role. for a beginning to the process of detente. the other which, in the final analysis, brought Beginning in 1978, we have seen a re- From our standpoint, within the frame- to you, instead of potentially dangerous con- newal in our hemisphere of actions charac- work of these principles to which we ad- sequences, a period of relative tranquility. teristic of the beginning of the 1960s. These here, we consider that this is possible, and Then, beginning in 1975-76, for various rea- have been regarded by the people as an un- with these intentions we have come to this sons, matters began to go very poorly and acceptable intervention from the point of meeting, which has not been easy, at which have continued to deteriorate. And now we view of the interests of the United States. discussion will take place over the resolu- have come to a crossroads which, by all in- That is what it was like in the 1960s. In the tion of problems that have deteriorated to dications, even by a most modest appraisal, beginning of the 1970s there came a period the brink of confrontation, but which, in our may be described as dangerous. of calm. Then an increase in tensions be- opinion, can find a solution that is accept- Looking at our relations in all of their gan anew. In our subjective assessment, all able not only for bilateral relations, but for manifestations during the course of the past this does not differ so significantly from relations in all of this region, provided that twenty years makes it evident to me that the relations with the Soviet Union and Soviet both sides will demonstrate respect for each difficulties, the beginning to which occurred actions. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 209

After the missile crisis, we went clear in the widening of activity in Africa, You are aware, Mr. Minister, that in the through a long period of tensions. The situ- Southeast Asia, and in Northwest and West- developing countries of the so-called “Third ation improved at the end of 1969, even in ern Asia. In this manner, there exists a ten- World,” there are many leaders who today spite of the conflict in Vietnam and the role dency - correct or mistaken - to believe that are turning away from the Soviet Union’s of the Soviet Union in that conflict, which an agreement exists between Moscow and arms, its technical assistance, and trade with was major, candidly speaking, major. I was Havana in connection with various interna- it, from participation in economic relations, located there at that time and believe that tional activities, at least a tacit one, if not where the reward is measured on a scale of Americans came to the conclusion that mat- explicit. All this has created a mood in the sacrifice. You yourselves suffer from this ters in that situation were handled improp- United States which brought Mr. Reagan to reality and have a right to participate in in- erly. That was an attempt to resolve a prob- power. ternational trade, including trade with the lem arising exclusively out of conceptions We are closely following public opin- United States. I know that President Reagan of a struggle for so-called social justice be- ion polls, and I can assure you that the mood considers trade with Cuba a possibility. We tween two parts of Vietnam, at the same time of the people in the United States is defi- must discuss this in the atmosphere of mu- as it was necessary to approach the prob- nitely militating toward a change in our re- tual respect to which you referred, which lem from the point of view of relations be- lations with Cuba, a change that is not posi- must be the goal of an independent peace, tween the superpowers who, in essence, tive for Cuba, but which regards Cuba as a and to do this it is necessary to account for made the war possible. Americans drew threat. I assume that there is room here for geopolitical reality. from this the conclusion that domestic [in- some subjective misstatement, but this is the Carlos R. Rodriguez. Thank you very ternal? indiginous?--ed.] forces should cre- fact of the matter. much. ate the conditions - either by peaceful means I suppose that any leader comes to I have listed with great interest to the or through the shedding of blood - to pro- power having certain fixed opinions about exposition of principals laid forth by the vide for their future. Just operating exclu- things, and President Reagan is no excep- esteemed Secretary of State. At the outset I sively on their own resources - well-founded tion. Maybe he will turn out to be an ex- will speak to two points. First of all, to your or otherwise - they can express their con- ception, if you consider the recent past, and words about the position of Reagan on the cerns and the state of mutual relations his understanding of how to fulfill his mis- question of bilateral relations with Cuba and among the people. I can say that the United sion. But I can assure you, that he is a man its common position on the problem of peace States adheres to exactly this position in re- of peace, a man who wants to relieve the and problems confronting humanity today. lation to Central America. people from the burden of armaments, a man We have keenly felt the danger of the I do not believe that President Reagan who does not oppose social transformations. approach to this problem by Reagan and his has some kind of preconceived notion re- His approach to the conflicts at the Cancun group of leaders from an ideological point garding the social system in Cuba. This Conference, and his initiative in connection of view. Speaking candidly, in the public must be determined by the people of Cuba. with the basic direction of developments in pronouncements, first and foremost of Our capability for coexistence, not- the Caribbean Basin, should serve as a ref- Reagan, we perceive a great ideological withstanding ideological conflicts, is mani- erence point. Pursuant to his instructions, I content. And we have been greatly surprised fested most graphically in relations with have met with the leaders of Eastern Eu- by its manifestation in the declarations of other Communist regimes: China, Yugosla- rope and representatives of the Angolan re- the Secretary of State as well. And we have via and the growing number of countries in gime. In my opinion, all of this attests to been surprised more than once because, Eastern Europe. Notwithstanding all of the the fact that we are talking not about ideol- judging from information received from Soviet rhetoric to the contrary, the problem ogy, but about a geopolitical problem. And prominent European leaders, we had gained is not here. In other words, in their judg- specifically, due to this understanding, he is a different impression about the positions ment about everything, they ascribe our dif- ready to pursue matters to the most danger- of Mr. Haig on international questions, ficulties with you to ideological dissatisfac- ous line. In recent months he has been oc- which we had considered to be more prag- tion on the part of the United States in rela- cupied with an examination of this problem. matic. That does not mean that they are not tion to the political system in Cuba. We are thoroughly familiar with the reality based on principle, only that they are more Carlos R. Rodriguez. It is good that of Cuba in the area of security, economics pragmatic, not so much determined by the we are here together (spoken in English). and defense. We understand well the vul- influence of ideology. Alexander Haig. I was saying that we nerability of Cuba. We have discussed this What we have heard gives us cause for are looking at the relationship between the problem with the Soviet Union for a long reflection. global activity of the Soviet Union and the time. They understand perfectly well the The second element that I consider to local activity of Cuba. meaning of these discussions and are aware be important inheres in the treatment of the We are capable of arithmetic and know of the limitations on activities, transgression mutual feelings of the people of the United that one third of your resources are provided of which could lead to confrontation be- States and Cuba. I am fully in accord with by the Soviet Union: everything that relates tween the superpowers, for which we are that. to transportation, equipment, materials, all prepared. Despite 22 years of continuous sharp of the assets and means necessary for suste- At the same time, we have analyzed exchanges, there is no anti-American senti- nance of the Cuban economy. with great care the needs of Cuba, in the ment in Cuba. It does not exist among the On the other hand, in 1975 we were sense of its hopes for the future. It seems to people, and we, the leaders, similarly do not witnesses to a situation which subjectively us that the Cuban people have suffered a rule with anti-American sentiments. We can led us to conclude that the Soviet leader- great deal from sacrifices imposed from say this absolutely categorically. This is ship assessed the changes which took place abroad. We believe that the possibility still seen in the course of any meetings of Ameri- in our country as changes of a geopolitical exists for a normalization of its relations not cans with our people, irrespective of their character - I am talking about Watergate and only with the United States, but with all of posts and positions. the war in Vietnam. This was abundantly this hemisphere. I am satisfied with the opportunity - 210 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

after the words just spoken by the Secretary viet Union regarding the activity of the ing in Aden. That meeting was attended by of State - to attribute the current intensifi- forces, inasmuch as the Soviet Union al- Mengistu and his assistants, Siad Barre and cation of our conflicts to geopolitical rea- ready had an obligation to Angola to supply his assistants, Ali Rubayi, who at that time sons. And I would hope to possess all of arms and it became necessary to speed up was the president of [South] Yemen, Fattah the necessary eloquence, within the short its implementation. As a result, we reached Ismail and Ali Nasir, who is now the presi- time available to us, in order to attempt to an agreement, and we don’t deny this, un- dent of South Yemen, and Cuba was repre- prove that the geopolitical reality is not what der which the Soviet Union proceeded to sented by Fidel Castro and myself. Fidel it is made out to be in this case. dispatch certain types of weapons, and we worked - and when I say Fidel, it is because I am aware that the Secretary of State sent people who were capable of using them. he was at the center of that meeting - from is a great lover of philosophy. Thus, even in And thus it was. When we became in- 10:00 p.m. to 7:00 in the morning, trying to the seventeenth century, since the time of volved in the events in Angola, we had ab- achieve a consensus among the parties. Hume, it has been considered proven that solutely no concept of the geopolitical con- However, this proved impossible to attain, the factual appearance of “B” following the ceptions about the importance of Angola in because Siad Barre unequivocally rejected appearance of “A” does not signify that “A” light of the interests of the Soviet Union. all of the suggestions presented at the meet- necessarily is the cause of the appearance We saw in Angola a friendly country, a group ing. While the meeting did not lead to an of “B.” I will attempt, in the briefest of fash- of revolutionaries struggling against colo- agreement, nevertheless Siad Barre prom- ion, in order to avoid tiring you, to describe nialism, against South Africa, and embarked ised not to attack Ethiopia. And then, when our interpretation of events, beginning in on all of this. Siad Barre attacked Ethiopia, we considered 1975. And then Ethipia stepped to the front ourselves obligated to Mengistu, whom we We became involved in Angola with- of the line. How did all of this happen there? had persuaded to attend the peace confer- out the slightest wish to establish our mili- We established relations with Ethiopia ence which had taken place in Aden. tary presence there. Speaking of military at the request of Somalia. We had main- One fine day, all of this will come to presence, I have in mind the presence of tained no diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, and light. You can believe me or not, but some regular troops. In sending the first 150 we harbored serious doubts in relation to the day this will be common knowledge. people to Angola, we had absolutely no con- process that was taking place in that coun- The outward geopolitical character of ception of what would become of the events try. At the time, the leader of the revolution these events is completely at odds with the in that country. This I can state to you un- was not Mengistu. Power was in the hands essence of the true facts. I had the privilege equivocally. of Teferi Bante. And I was personally as- to accompany Fidel Castro at the time of We had long maintained our ties with signed to establish contact in Colombo [Sri his meetings with the leadership of the So- the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Lib- Lanka], where I headed the Cuban delega- viet Union. These were attended by eration of Angola] in its struggle against tion at a conference of the heads of state and Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, who had just Portuguese colonialism. President governments of the non-aligned countries returned from Africa, Gromyko, and [Agostinho] Neto requested our assistance [in August 1976], to establish contact with Rusakov. And it was we who insistently in the preparation of groups which led to Teferi Bante and Ali Bukarom, at that time urged the need to render military assistance organization of the Angolan army. With this Vice President of Somalia, for the purpose to Ethiopia. This was the situation, to be aim we dispatched 150 persons in three of attempting to reconcile them among distinguished from that in Angola, because schools: one located in the south, the other themselves, which turned out to be impos- in this case preliminary negotiations were in the northeast, and the third around sible because of the refusal of Teferi Bante. taking place. But in these negotiations it was Luanda. The subsequent development of Subsequently, Vice President [of So- Fidel Castro himself who first advocated events ensued as follows: suddenly we re- malia Gen. Mohamed Ali] Samantar, simul- military assistance. History will bring all ceived news from Neto that they had been taneously occupying the post of Minister of of this to light. attacked by forces from Zaire and troops of Defense of Somalia, came to Cuba. I was I did not understand what was said Holden Roberto from the north, and by in charge of the preliminary negotiations about Yemen, because our forces have never South Africa from the south. with him. In their course he addressed him- been there. Subsequently we spoke about I can assure you unequivocally, inas- self with a request for military assistance Nicaragua, where the same is occurring. much as I played a direct role in this matter, from Cuba for an attack on Ethiopia, claim- In [South] Yemen, with the assistance that when the decision to dispatch Cuban ing that that country represented the great- of a small number of specialists, we helped forces into Angola was made, we commu- est danger to socialism in North Africa. At to organize the militia. In this connection I nicated nothing about it to the Soviet Union. that moment we had no idea that our troops can assure you that if the war, which Yemen We were not even aware of its point of view would ever end up in Ethiopia. We had a began, did not turn into an extended war on that account. And we had absolutely no group in Somalia, which was rendering as- between the North and the South, this was idea of the number of troops that it would sistance in the creation of a militia, and the mainly owing to the position of Cuba, which be necessary to send. In this manner, the Soviet Union had armed forces in Somalia not only played no role in it, but which cat- first group was dispatched when the forces and was utilizing the Somali port of Berbera egorically and completely opposed the war, in the southern theater advanced more than as a base for its navy. This is how the close and the current position of the command- 400, almost 500 kilometers from the cooperation with Somalia came about. ing army of Yemen, which surrendered all Namibian border, approaching Lobito and Samantar had a discussion with Fidel of its positions . . . was in large part con- Benguela, and the forces of Zaire were lo- and Raul Castro, who counseled in favor of nected with these events. [ellipsis in origi- cated 30 kilometers from Luanda. In this restraint and the conduct of negotiations. nal--ed.] situation we sent at first not regular troops, During his visit to Africa [in March In this fashion, it would be desirable, but rather groups of commandos. 1977], Fidel Castro met first with Siad Barre that in connection with this everything It is true that subsequently an agree- and then in Ethiopia with Mengistu, and should be entirely clear - I am interested first ment was reached between Cuba and the So- agreed with them to conduct a historic meet- and foremost in the logic of the develop- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 211 ment of events, namely, the logic. subversive activity; even such moderate advisors of various categories, rendering Let us turn now to Latin America, government leaders as Lopez-Portillo are assistance in the organization of the armed where, as you say, beginning in 1975, there completely open in their adherence to this forces and training of the Nicaraguan army. has been a return to events characteristic of view. I believe that he knows [Venezuelan That is all that we have there. the 1960’s. President] Carlos Andres Perez. I believe When we hear the repeated pronounce- As you indicate, there was a tranquil that Carlos Andres Perez is a right-wing ments of the esteemed Secretary of State period in relations between the United States Social Democrat and holds to the same as- about our dispatch of 500-600 soldiers to and Cuba. I would say, as you did, that this sessment. All who, during the course of Nicaragua, and the statements of other lead- tranquil period was interrupted by the events many years, have engaged in analysis of the ers in the United States to the effect that we in Angola. I believe that this was connected circumstances in Central America, all who, have there 3,000 military instructors, all of to the pride of Secretary of State Kissinger, during the course of many years have stud- this seems truly absurd to us, inasmuch as, who had his own plan for a solution for ied it, have come to the opinion that this situ- it seems to me, we are in a position to know Angola, which did not include the govern- ation is inflammable, naturally inflammable. what we have there. We are prepared to ment of Agostinho Neto[:] this is aptly de- The circumstances of the struggle publish a list of those 500 persons, who went scribed by [ex-CIA officer John] Stockwell against Somoza gave rise to these events. there on the day when [U.S. columnists in his book [In Search of Enemies], which We helped the Sandinista front in every way Roland] Evans and [Robert] Novak wrote nobody could deny and Kissinger, having that we could, with all of the means that we that in the course of two days, 500 Cubans maintained ties with us, from that moment were able to deploy. But we were not the arrived; we can state their names, the place became our most sworn enemy. only ones who helped them. You know that where they lived in Cuba, and the place The administration of Carter came to there were several governments in Latin where they were teaching in Cuba. We can power and brought to life a prolonged and America who helped them substantially tell you the places, where they are teaching difficult process. We believe that the prin- more than we did. Thus, this was a situa- now. We can publish the names and places cipal actors in the Carter administration un- tion, which was regarded by Latin America of employment of the 2,700 Cubans located derstood the gist of events in Angola, but as a fatal tumor which it was necessary to in Nicaragua. And this will be easy to verify. that, unfortunately, the information of the remove. It is true that we have there 2,759 persons. CIA about Shaba was completely mistaken. We are close friends with the This is true. But it can be easily and univer- On the very day [25 May 1978] when Sandinistas. [But] It would be a serious sally verified, that there are no [Cuban] sol- I was to meet, and did meet with Cyrus mistake to believe that the Sandinistas rely diers in Nicaragua. Vance in New York, one hour beforehand on the advice that we give them. On the It surprises us to hear talk that Cuba President Carter delivered a speech in Chi- contrary, they have a very clear concept of has sent arms, which Nicaragua has received cago, in which he laid on us the responsi- that which they are required to do. for its defense, and that such arms are fun- bility for the events in Shaba, in relation to We believe that the Sandinistas are in- neled through Cuba. I have even heard dec- which we had not the slightest connection clined to preserve in Nicaragua a pluralistic larations from Mr. Haig himself on this and in respect to which we even conducted system. It is known that several of the score. If the intelligence services of the serious discussions with our Angolan Sandinistas want to carry out a revolution United States speak of this, then they speak friends, warning them about the danger of that is deeper than that which exists at the of what they do not know, for it would be placing the forces of the Shaba gendarme at moment. This is a fact. And we always easy for them to verify whence these arma- the border. That ruined everything. speak the truth as we understand it. I be- ments came, how they were delivered, on And then came Nicaragua. lieve that they understand perfectly well that what they arrived, in what manner they were I suggest to you, Mr. Secretary of State, it will be difficult and undesirable to hasten followed, and not one of them came through that you would be committing a serious er- the process of intensifying the revolution. I Cuba. ror in allowing a geopolitical mirage to im- believe it is correct what you said yesterday Naturally, we are not inclined to dis- pel you toward a mistaken interpretation. I before your departure from Washington, to close the source from which they came and wanted to note, for example, that the mis- the effect that the possibility of negotiations how they arrived, but we know that the CIA take in Shaba had a most negative result. with the Sandinistas is not to be excluded, knows how they arrived, in what manner, Beginning in 1976, quietly, saying nothing although I am disturbed by your pronounce- from where, and how many. So why do they to anybody, and without any pressure on us, ment, which bore the resemblance of a threat say that it came from Cuba; why do they we began to pull our people out of Angola, directed at Nicaragua, that time is running insist that Cuba is involved in this[?] Cuba inasmuch as we considered that more of short. I distinctly regret your making that is in agreement with the concept that Nica- them were located there than was necessary statement, and we can exchange our opin- ragua should be armed. Nicaragua has made to ensure minimal security for that country ions on that score. it completely clear to us, and we share their during the period in which we were orga- We are rendering and will continue to opinion, that they are arming themselves not nizing their armed forces. The events in render to Nicaragua our solidarity and sup- because they are next to Honduras, not be- Shaba forced Neto to address us with a des- port, inasmuch as we consider this our obli- cause they may suffer an attack from El perate request, not only to refrain from re- gation and our right. We have no intention, Salvador, and not because Guatemala might moving personnel, but to return a portion regardless of the consequences, to refuse the participate in an attack against them, but for of those personnel that we had already re- solidarity which we consider to be right. I a combination of these factors, in addition moved. For this reason, we now have more believe that Cuba is not in the slightest de- to the threat from the United States. This people in Angola than were there in 1976. gree interfering in Nicaragua. We have there much is clear. You tell me. I know, that As for Central America. It is not only 2,759 people, of which 2,045 are teachers, [State Department official Thomas] Enders we who say that it would be a mistake to 240 are technicians, 159 are doctors, and 66 has stated to the Nicaraguans, that it is ab- conceive of that which has happening now are nurses. We have no forces in Nicara- surd for them to arm themselves, inasmuch in Central America as a result of external gua. We have there several dozen military as the United States can destroy all of it in 212 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the course of a very short period of time. to involve itself. I am acquainted with col- cated in a letter to [Canadian Prime Minis- This is true, this is true, it is for sure. How- leagues who are noted there. These col- ter Pierre Elliot] Trudeau during the course ever, not one self-respecting small country leagues exist and are carrying out their ob- of an exchange of correspondence with him. will reconcile to a demand that it admit to ligations. But these colleagues have no In this I repeat that for which we are pre- its own destruction without putting up a power, they are not authorized to bestow the pared. fight. I think it is necessary to understand name of the Soviet Union, not one iota. It You touched upon our difficulties and this. I think that it should be understood. is clearly visible, that the Soviet Union in our vulnerability. This is true. We are vul- El Salvador. no way wants to be entangled in anything nerable, and our people has suffered a great We do not have there, Mr. Haig, we do which is seen to be a revolutionary process deal from the American blockade. You call not have there any troops, nor any military in which it does not desire to participate. this an embargo. We consider ourselves to advisors, and we say this to you with the I would like to tell you something in be blockaded by the United States. We have same clarity with which we have spoken to addition to this. Certain American leaders suffered physically. Our hospitals at times other leaders from different parts of the are always expressing the opinion that the have been without medicine. We have suf- world. We have declared this and are ready Soviet Union acted as a hostile influence fered economically. Three days ago I re- to prove it. We would request to be shown between the United States and Cuba, that it ceived a communication from London, in even one instance of an appearance there of fermented in Cuba hostile feelings towards which it was indicated that several compa- these fabled Cuban troops. In those places the United States. I could tell you that the nies, due to pressure from the Americans, where Cuban troops are located, they are opposite is true. Many of the conflicts that had difficulty obtaining nickel. The Japa- universally recognized, and in El Salvador we have had with the Soviet Union were nese have repeatedly stated to us, that ow- they are nowhere to be found, inasmuch as occasioned by the acts, words, and positions ing to American pressure, they cannot de- there are no Cuban troops, and no Cuban of Cuba, which did not correspond with the velop economic relations with us to the ex- military advisors there. intentions of the Soviet Union in this por- tent that they would like to achieve. We are explaining all of this out of a tion of the world. I believe that nothing We well understand, and Fidel Castro desire to prevent a dramatic confrontation worries the Soviet Union more than the has spoken about this, that if we could im- under circumstances in which it is possible course of developments in the situation in prove relations with the United States, then to attain a mutual understanding by means Central America and the Caribbean Basin, our conditions would be better. The very of negotiations. When we say that we are which could become a new element in the fact of having the United States as a poten- not supplying armed forces to this or an- conflict between the United States and the tial market, located several miles from us, other part of the world, we say this not be- Soviet Union. I believe that when Mr. Haig would ease our problems. We would have cause it would be a violation of the moral and Mr. Reagan have the opportunity to con- access to technology that is currently inac- principles of Cuba or somehow unlawful. sult with Fidel Castro, he will tell them about cessible to us, we would have access to fi- There is one confirmed fact: the United this in greater detail than I can, because, al- nancing which we do not have, and we be- States has troops in various parts of the though I have attended many meetings, nev- lieve that this is desirable and possible. But world. President Reagan has admitted that ertheless, no one could speak about this I would like for you to understand our point the USA is rendering support to Afghan problem more than he. of view, that we do not intend, for the pur- counter-revolutionaries located in Pakistan. Such are the facts. pose of achieving that, to sacrifice that He has publicly declared this. And what about our position in rela- which we considerto be our primary prin- Not long ago the administration forced tion to the events in El Salvador? At the ciples. Of course, you have not told me, Congress to repeal the “Clark Amendment” present time we are in favor of a political that we must sacrifice them. But I would on the grounds that it wanted a free hand solution. A political solution which, natu- like to discuss this question as it arises from for the purpose of rendering assistance to rally, we understand to be more or less en- the concepts of the current administration [UNITA leader Jonas] Savimbi and other compassed in the plan which was announced of the United States. As we understand this forces operating against the government of yesterday by President Lopez-Portillo: the matter, we are not being requested to be an Angola. Frankly speaking, we do not un- possibility of convening a Founding Assem- ally of the United States or to conform with derstand why the United States, merely be- bly, but with the participation of all the the social system that exists there. We do cause it happens to be, at the present time, forces involved in the conflict, including the not like the social system in the United one of the most powerful states, can have a Revolutionary-Democratic Front and the States. But, naturally, that is the social sys- right which we, being a small country, do Front for the National Liberation of tem of the United States, and the American not have. I believe that it is irrational to hold Farabundo Marti. Such is the position of people are entitled to decide what they must such a position. That is our principal point Cuba. do. In view of all these realities, it follows [iskhodnaia tochka], to which we will ad- We are prepared for any compromise that we should examine the following prin- here. in this direction, a compromise in which, as ciples: Thus, I have attempted with consider- we understand it, the other parties will also First, the sovereignty of Cuba - the in- able specificity to prove the absence of geo- be committed, including the United States. alienable right, being understood to include political reasons. We could say the follow- We must all take these obligations upon territorial sovereignty, including the base at ing: What does the “White Book” say? The ourselves. We can discuss the extent of our Guantanamo; we have the right to trade with “White Book” contains certain truths, and participation in all of this. In this connec- the entire world, including the United States. certain lies, as well as certain data about the tion our intentions were communicated by Second: we have a right to solidarity supposed ties between the revolutionaries Comrade Fidel Castro to President Lopez with the countries of the “Third World,” and who are struggling in El Salvador against Portillo, to the Deputy Chairman of the So- in particular, with the countries of Latin the right-wing junta, and the Soviet Union. cialist International Vishnevsky, to the chair- America. And what is evident from this: the fact that man of the Liberal Democratic Party of Third: our friendship with the Soviet the Soviet Union has absolutely no desire Canada [Edward] Broadbent, communi- Union. We are friends of the Soviet Union, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 213 close friends. We reject any suggestion that countries. I could furnish you with infor- Alexander Haig. I can assure you that we are an agent of the Soviet Union in any mation about these things which, perhaps, the benign picture that you have painted part of the world. I have explained to you are taking place without the knowledge of does not conform to reality. I’m not saying the nature of our position on this issue. We some members of the government. That can that you don’t have a significant number of not only have real feelings for the Soviet happen. It has happened at times even in teachers there, but they are teaching your Union, cemented in a common ideology, but our country, not very often, but in certain philosophy to Nicaraguan children, just as also we have received significant assistance instances. they tried to do in Chile. However, we do from the Soviet Union for our own eco- We believe that the presence of Cuba not agree that you have the right to do that. nomic development. Naturally, with that in Nicaragua constitutes a threat to the con- The Nicaraguans have the right to teach their assistance alone we cannot develop our tinent, and in addition, we believe that the people what they believe in. You are deeply country as quickly as necessary and as we activity of Nicaragua in El Salvador like- involved in the Sandinista revolutionary would like to. However, we do not believe wise constitutes a serious threat. I can as- movement, and we suggest that this creates that such assistance is incompatible with the sure you categorically that we are in pos- a great risk for us all: for the Cubans, for establishment of normalized relations be- session of comprehensive proof of such in- the hemisphere, and for Nicaragua. We be- tween the United States and Cuba. volvement. There isn’t the slightest bit of lieve that Cuba should reexamine this. No- Alexander Haig. Mr. Rodriguez, I be- doubt about it. It’s a fact. We have photo- body is asking Cuba to humiliate itself; we lieve this has been a very fruitful exchange. graphs, documents, minutes of interroga- are not talking about that. We are talking I am certain that you will forgive me, if I do tions and “confirmations” by those interro- about the conditions of ever increasing not agree with all of this logic. Several gated. For this reason, I cannot agree with bloodshed in Central America. months ago our intervention prevented a that which you are telling me. I am not say- We believe that the only solution for serious clash between your forces located ing that you have no right to say it. You El Salvador is to allow the Salvadoran in Angola and the South Africans. But the have every right to say what you want to, people themselves to decide their own fate, next time it is possible that we will not have but we also have a right to draw our own that is, by means of the electoral process, in such success in stopping their movement conclusions from the events as we see them. which all sides should participate. A Legis- with the assistance of our influence. We have proof, and we are telling you about lative Assembly would be created, in which Carlos R. Rodriguez. But I would say it. the political process would conform com- that our forces are located far away from Unfortunately, the time has come, pletely with the will of the people. But we them, and that it was not merely your inter- when the rhetorical debate between the cannot consent to Nicaragua’s intervening vention, but our restraint. United States and Cuba will not solve the in El Salvador under the mask of solidarity Alexander Haig. I know that. I am problem, and, on the contrary, there is an or any other revolutionary ruse, as it has aware of that. But they would have ad- array of areas in which the sovereignty of been doing for quite some time. And your vanced further to your bases, and we stopped Cuba is not in the slightest bit implicated. presence there, your assistance, facilitates it. We knew nothing about their operations However, Cuba is exporting revolution and this. Just as day follows night, this is the or about when they would commence. But bloodshed on the continent. objective reality. the fact that they appeared served as a source We know what you write, we know I have no doubts about the facts which of information for them concerning the op- what you defend, we know what you are you have marshalled with respect to Shaba erations of SWAPO [the Southwest African talking about, and we believe that it consti- or the situation in Ethiopia. However, the People’s Organization]. They even captured tutes a threat to peace and stability, and we question arises, on what basis do Cuban a Soviet prisoner, who has not stopped talk- cannot see it in any other light, inasmuch as forces continue to be located in Angola, per- ing to this moment about how he was cap- we are talking about objective reality. forming various functions, and in Ethio- tured, about the scale of activity and coor- You complained about the embargo. pia[?] Why do the regimes want this? I am dination of activities in Angola. He did not We have not had an effective embargo, but addressing a serious question to you, not in exclude anything from his observations. we can impose one on sugar, on the produc- respect to Ethiopia, but about the situation Carlos R. Rodriguez. But that was not tion of all the products which you use to in Angola. a Cuban prisoner. Correct? obtain hard currency. However, we don’t You say that you are not involved in Alexander Haig. Correct. We knew want to do that, we don’t want to have any South Yemen, but I can tell you, that we have where the Cuban armed forces were located, other complications. I must inform you of counted large and small aircraft, which have and we also know, that it would be highly this. You speak of solidarity with the flown from Ethiopia to South Yemen, and desirable, if Cuba would pull out of Angola. Sandinistas. I believe that you would ren- we have heard radio broadcasts... This would help Angola, it would help Cuba, der to them the greatest form of solidarity, Carlos R. Rodriguez. And did you see and it would assist in the resolution of the if you would bring the Cubans home, and Cubans as well? issue over the independence of Namibia and say to the Sandinistas that they should es- Alexander Haig. We have intercepted normalization of conditions. This is some- tablish an order that does not violate the radio broadcasts in the Spanish language. I thing that I have discussed with the Sovi- rights... have read them every day. And if it wasn’t ets, the Angolans, and the governments of Carlos R. Rodriguez. Return doctors? you, then it was Ethiopians that speak Span- the “Front Line,” and there is an ever grow- Teachers? Return three thousand Cubans ish remarkably well. And for this reason, I ing opinion, that this is the very thing which who... am telling you, that all of this activity, be it you must do. Alexander Haig. We have a very good within the framework of geopolitics or oth- And moreover, as concerns the events account of the doctors, teachers, Angolan erwise, has convinced the Americans that it which you described, and the activity of the veterans and military advisers, their titles, has a geopolitical connection. CIA, I can assure you, that they are in pos- names and past activity. Consequently, we must find a solution, session of information about military aircraft Carlos R. Rodriguez. It would be in- if we are interested in peace and stability in which has been supplied by you to other teresting to take a look at it. the immediate future, we must find a solu- 214 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tion to these problems. Otherwise, we will that is not the case, then we are on a path Alexander Haig. Fine, as countries be required to pursue a different course, toward confrontation, and soon. I know that they have the right to do this, but if they which, I believe, after my discussions with this sounds like rhetoric, but believe me, I choose this course, then they must pay the you here, would not be desirable for you. I have examined and reexamined many docu- price for that choice. And this gives rise to know that the United States also does not ments, detailed reconnaissance data, the anxiety in all of the countries in the region, want this, but it is prepared, after many years content of negotiations conducted in all parts and they are bound to oppose it. This con- of not being in a position to take any mea- of the word; much of may be inexact, and I stitutes a danger. Wherein lies the neces- sures, is ready to take them very quickly. am certain that there is inexactness in the sity for this? I have no information to sug- Therefore, I am speaking to you of the need “White Book,” and it could not be other- gest that any country wants to invade Nica- to immediately find a solution. I can assure wise. It has to do with reconnaissance and ragua. If you have in mind a handful of you, that these solutions would not impinge intercepted documents which, for the most Somoza supporters, who are engaged in the honor, sovereignty, or integrity of Cuba part, we have examined in Colombia, where smuggling in Honduras and who do not even or the Cuban people. Nobody wants that. the involvement of the Cubans was signifi- have arms, the government of Honduras has That would be foolish. And it is an objec- cant, and we did not raise the question about announced that it is attempting to relocate tive fact, that it would be much easier to Colombia... them to another place in order to avoid any achieve this by force, but that is not our in- Carlos R. Rodriguez. Let’s talk about pretext for an invasion. And that effort has tention. However, frankly speaking, we that as well... already been underway for a period of sev- believe that time is slipping away. Alexander Haig. Your involvement eral months. I say to you in complete can- We have not disclosed to the Ameri- was significant... dor, that time is slipping away from us. can public our data or the information that Carlos R. Rodriguez. Not as signifi- For this very reason, as you are aware, is available to us. You have seen the “White cant as it was said to be. the Mexicans proposed this approach. I Book,” but we have another fifty of them. Alexander Haig. ...but significant have studied all of the negotiations that took We have volumes, records of radio broad- enough to raise problems. And this is oc- place during the time of the Carter adminis- casts, data from technical reconnaissance, curring also in Guatemala... tration, and they were nothing but a series we have photographs. Carlos R. Rodriguez. If you will per- of delaying tactics, in order to prevent any Carlos R. Rodriguez. A good factory mit me, I will address that later. progress. And nothing was achieved by that, for “White Books.” Alexander Haig. ...fine, what I am say- not a thing. We do not want to establish Alexander Haig. It’s just the first chap- ing is, that we must find a solution and that kind of a dialogue, you don’t want that, ter. quickly. and we don’t want it. If you are prepared to Carlos R. Rodriguez. But I understand Carlos R. Rodriguez. What solution? speak seriously, we are also prepared. But that you have a good factory for “White Alexander Haig. There must be a so- we are in need of a prepared context for dis- Books.” lution, because nobody gave Cuba the di- cussions and some kind of sign from your Alexander Haig. Notwithstanding, the vine right to interfere in the internal affairs side that results will be achieved. President does not want to do this, although of the countries in this hemisphere, regard- Carlos R. Rodriguez. Inasmuch as we he is prepared to do it and very soon. This less of what arguments may be advanced to have little time, I will try to be brief, laconic, would incite great enmity, and would stir justify it. You know that today we have 34 and objective. up emotions even more. I insist that you military advisors in El Salvador. And how First, you have insisted upon the need take seriously what I have told you, and on many does Cuba have in Nicaragua? for a solution and have expressed the inter- an assessment that any sound-minded Carlos R. Rodriguez. We have there est of the United States in a solution in which American will be compelled to make in the not many more advisors, not many more. there would be no humiliation of Cuba or face of the events I have described. This Alexander Haig. We are in possession threat to the sovereignty of Cuba. We are does not mean that your involvement has of intelligence, and you are correct when you prepared to search for a solution, and we not been exactly as you have described it; say that there are many independent forces must come to an agreement at another time however, we regard this as a serious threat in Nicaragua. And they tell us every day about what steps to take, because this in- to our vital interests and the interests of what is happening there every day. And volves not only the United States and Cuba, peace and stability in the hemisphere. what is happening is unacceptable. Regard- but also the other countries of the region, If you share my opinion that stability less of the manner in which you describe it, and the revolutionary forces with their own and peace are desirable in the hemisphere, regardless of what seems to you subjectively criteria and points of view. We believe that then you can work out a solution that does as moderation, it cannot be accepted. Anxi- Mexico could be a uniting link in this mat- not compromise your dignity. How could ety exists in the countries of this hemisphere. ter. We could conduct an even more direct this be accomplished so that nobody even There was a time when Cuba held very exchange of opinions. asked you about that? I have already said sound positions in the non-aligned world. Alexander Haig. Let’s maintain con- that it would be necessary to extol the firm- However, issues have now arisen concern- tact directly, without intermediaries, as we ness of Cuba and its spirit of self-sacrifice. ing its involvement. It is essential that we have done in the past. We could send our However, the basic problem in this matter come to a mutual understanding, otherwise ambassador with special authority, General remains the same, about which we are en- the results may be very serious. And we are [Vernon] Walters, to Havana. We can meet, gaged today in the whole world: peaceful not talking about the intervention of Ameri- in turn, in Havana and New York, because, changes in the framework of acceptable le- can forces against Nicaragua, we are not in my view, we must commence a dialogue gality, and not through bloodshed, arms, and going to do that. However, we can find no immediately. not by the means of instigating terrorism and explanation for an army of 50,000 men and Carlos R. Rodriguez. I believe that this revolution. a militia of 200,000 men. There is no justi- is important, and we are ready to do it. In And so, if the Cuban Revolution has fication for that. addition to this I would like to introduce sev- matured to this point, then that is fine. If Carlos R. Rodriguez. Why not? eral clarifications, because certain misun- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 215 derstandings can arise. which, as you say, are also consistent with weapons, and who organized them. I can I do not want at this time to commence the interpretations of the President of the assure you that Fidel Castro exerted efforts a discussion about the facts, although at United States, cause me great anxiety. For to prevent this adventurism, not for the sake some point we can also discuss whether example, I do not believe that the United of the government of Turbay, but for the sake there or not there is falsification. When States has any right to interfere in matters of the fate of those young people that we General Walters comes to Cuba, I think that related to the presence of Cuban teachers in knew would be killed. This was an ill-con- it is important for him to bring with him as Nicaragua. This, and what they are teach- ceived adventure. much data as possible in order to examine it ing, is a question for the Nicaraguan gov- However, as to why Cuba trained the for the purpose of interpreting these facts. ernment to decide. I can assure you, that men of M-19. At our initiative, an agree- I remember that the “Bay of Pigs” was these are elementary school teachers who ment was reached with [Colombian] Presi- brought about by information from people can hardly teach Marxist-Leninism. I don’t dent Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, when he located in Cuba that led the CIA to a mis- know whether you have ever attempted to came to power, when he again recognized taken conclusion. As regards your reference read any books about Marxist-Leninism, but Cuba: we agreed not to help, in any way, to aircraft, I can tell you, that everybody it would be very difficult for our 2,700 teach- any one partisan group, and we fulfilled that knows what is taking place in Cuba. We ers to teach Marxist-Leninism to little Indi- agreement. You can ask Alfonso Lopez have no factions in the government. We ans. However, we believe that only the gov- about this. And we adhered to this under have a division of labor. However, the mem- ernment of Nicaragua, and no other, must the government of Turbay. And only after bers of the Politburo know everything that decide whether or not they need our teach- the government of Turbay assumed a hos- the military is doing. And I can assure you ers. I am convinced of this, because I have tile position in the United Nations, which that you are telling me things with which I had enough discussions with the Nicaraguan we, in a geopolitical sense, interpreted as a cannot in the slightest bit agree, frankly leadership and I have also spoken with Fi- provocation directed by the United States, speaking, not in the slightest degree. About del, and I know from other discussions, at only then did we consider ourselves dis- Angola, about Ethiopia. They ask, why are which I have been present, that the Nicara- charged from that agreement. we still located there[?] Because they want guans do not have the slightest desire or in- There is no obligation that we have us there, and the same in Angola. If, as a terest to intrude in Honduras. They under- taken upon ourselves with any country, result of what is happening there now (we stand perfectly well that this would lead group or government, that we have failed to already know about the results of the meet- them into a confrontation with the United honor. This should be clear to the United ing of the contact group, about the decision States, and there would be nothing worse States. of the foreign ministers of Africa, we see for Nicaragua, than to be pulled into a con- that there is an opportunity to achieve a con- frontation with the United States. [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 84, d. 584, ll. 1- sensus on Namibia, and that there are vis- We can and must continue our discus- 27; translation by Bruce McDonald; docu- ible signs of progress), if as a result of a sion about all these things. You say that time ment obtained by Carter-Brezhnev Project solution to the Namibia issue the Angolans is slipping away from us. Let us use it to and on file at National Security Archive.] allow us to withdraw our forces, then we the maximum extent. I want to say one are ready to leave there. There is no doubt thing: Cuba never lies, and Fidel never lies. about this whatsoever. But I am concerned That which we say, we can prove. I have by the fact that we have in Angola not only stated to you what we are prepared to do, RESEARCH IN MOSCOW several thousand soldiers, several tens of where we can achieve a consensus, and thousands of soldiers, but also several thou- where we cannot achieve a consensus. Scholars needing research performed sand construction workers and civilians. When we say “We are obligated to do it,” in the Russian archives may contract And the information that you are we are obligated. with scholars at the Russian Center “Ar- spreading about Nicaragua is a complete You spoke of Colombia. You do not chival Conversation at the Historical falsification. We can discuss all of this with know how these members of M-19 ended Archives Institute (HAI) of the Russian General Walters in detail in the course of up in Cuba. [Colombian] President [Julio- State University for the Humanities in several days. We can discuss this, and we Cesar] Turbay [Ayala] had a telephone con- Moscow. For further information can give you all of the details that are of versation with me in which he requested me interest to you, because we do not want a - requested me! - that we accept in Cuba please direct inquiries to: confrontation to arise because of a mistake. members of M-19, inasmuch as they had Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov; We are also prepared for a confronta- seized a group of ambassadors in the em- Historical Archives Institute (HAI); tion. We know that such a confrontation will bassy of the Dominican Republic. As a re- Russian State University for the Hu- be traumatic for our people. We have no sult, they came to Cuba. They were in Cuba, manities; Moscow, Russian Federation; doubt about this. But neither are we afraid they underwent preparation, just as thou- fax: (7-095) 432-2506 or (7-095) 964- of a confrontation. What we fear is an un- sands of others who come to Cuba. Any 3534; tel.: (7-095) 921-4169 or (7-095) necessary confrontation, in which, as a re- Latin American who comes to Cuba - mem- 925-5019 sult of errors by both sides, as a result of an ber of the intelligentsia, poet, military per- Scholars may also address inquiries absence of contacts, thousands of Americans son - wants us to teach him to use firearms. and hundreds of thousands of Cubans will And we have taught thousands. That is true. regarding possible collaboration for re- perish. This worries us. And I am worried And we never conceal the truth, but we have search in Russian archives to: by other elements of interpretation which, I had nothing in common with the training of Prof. Alexander O. Chubarian; Di- believe, we must discuss. If necessary, I can the group that infiltrated Colombia, and had rector, Institute of Universal History; on any day leave for New York and orga- nothing to do with its arming. The coun- Leninsky prospekt 32a; 117334 Mos- nize a different, more detailed meeting. But tries who have spoken about this are fully cow, Russian Federation; fax: (7-095) several of your personal interpretations aware of who trained them, who gave them 938-2288; tel: (7-095) 938-1009 216 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

COMMENTARIES and its concessional foreign aid pro- viet combat unit, created as a training grams have ended. The Soviet Union center where Soviet military specialists CUBA AS SUPERPOWER: no longer exists, and the Russian Fed- train officers of the [Cuban armed HAVANA AND MOSCOW, 1979 eration is unable and unwilling to pro- forces] to use and maintain new mili- vide Cuba with the funding and other tary equipment, has indeed been located by Jorge I. Dominquez support that permitted the latter to be- in Cuba.” He recalled Cuba’s “experi- have as if it were a superpower. ence with previous confrontations with In 1979, Cuba behaved as if it were The declassified documents from Americans regarding the Soviet military a superpower. Tens of thousands of Cu- the Soviet archives, which this note ac- presence on the island” and emphasized ban troops were stationed in Angola and companies, are drawn mainly from the that “we should not camouflage the real Ethiopia, and hundreds of other Cuban year 1979; even the document that dates state of affairs.” Certainly, he empha- military advisers, trainers, and addi- from 1981 focuses principally on events sized, there should be no attempt “to tional troops were posted to other coun- that had taken place at the end of the negate the presence of a training center tries across the seas. Cuba had interna- 1970s. None of the documents breaks on Cuba” because that would be inter- 1 tional programs assisting about three major new ground; the basic issues preted “as a repudiation by Cuba and dozen countries in Africa, Latin these documents discuss have been part the USSR of their right to create such a America, the Middle East, and South- of the public record for some time. But center and send the necessary military east Asia; many of these programs re- the documents do shed interesting light personnel” to Cuba. quired the overseas deployment of Cu- on a variety of questions, the most im- In fact, as the subsequent docu- ban personnel, while others provided portant of which is the nature of the So- ments indicate, the Soviets chose to training in Cuba itself for over 20,000 viet–Cuban relationship at what turned camouflage. Their response to the foreigners. In part for these reasons (and out to be the apex of their joint influ- United States acknowledged the pres- notwithstanding Havana’s tight alliance ence in world affairs. ence of a “military training center” but with the Soviet Union), Cuba had been In the summer of 1979, the United did not acknowledge that it was a “com- elected chairman of the Nonaligned States (re-)discovered the presence of bat unit,” contrary to Cuba’s preference. Movement—at the time a significant or- a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. That In 1979, the Cuban leadership behaved ganization of African, Asian, Latin brigade had been left in Cuba since the as good believers in democratic central- American, and Caribbean countries— 1962 missile crisis consistent with the ism. Fidel Castro’s own reassurances to and it hosted its sixth summit in Ha- same “trip-wire” concept that had led the United States emphasized that it was vana in September 1979. the United States to keep troops in Eu- a military training center, with no ref- Cuba was also the Soviet Union’s rope. In each case, the forward forces erence to a “combat unit”—echoing the 2 only truly reliable military ally in the posted by the respective superpower Soviet position exactly. Only in Sep- Cold War, and the Cuban armed forces were deemed insufficient to stop an all- tember 1991, when the Russian Federa- proved to be the only communist army out invasion by the other superpower, tion government announced its decision capable of fighting effectively in dis- but the presence of those forward forces to withdraw the combat brigade from tant locales for objectives at best remote had deterrent value: if an invasion were Cuba, did Havana publicly vent its an- from the “cause” of the defense of the to occur, both superpowers would be ger that the Soviets had rejected Cuba’s homeland. From the mid–1970s to the immediately and automatically locked advice in 1979. end of the 1980s, over 300,000 Cuban in war. As it turned out, some time in Cuba believed that the Soviet po- troops served abroad. In any given year, the late 1960s the U.S. government lost sition in 1979 retreated from the prin- relative to its population, Cuba had track of the Soviet brigade in Cuba; it ciple that both governments had the more troops posted overseas every year was found only as a result of intensi- right to agree to station a Soviet com- than the United States had posted in fied intelligence monitoring of Cuba in bat unit in Cuba. Cuba was closer to the Vietnam at the peak of its engagement the late 1970s. mark. The settlement of the 1979 crisis in that war. In the 1970s and 1980s, the The attached documents for Sep- in fact modified the series of under- Cuban armed forces were able to ac- tember 1979 discuss the Soviet and Cu- standings begun in 1962 that had complish three times on African soil (in ban response to the new U.S. challenge. evolved over time. For the first time Angola in 1976 and 1988, and in Ethio- The issue for the two governments was those mutual understandings extended pia in 1978) what the United States to decide how honest they should be in to conventional forces. Also for the first could not do in Vietnam and what the their response to the United States. With time, the Soviets accepted a limitation Soviet Union could not do in Afghani- authorization from President Fidel on the presence of their military person- stan: Cuban troops won the wars they Castro, on September 1 Armed Forces nel in Cuba, pledging (27 September went to fight. Minister General Raúl Castro sought an 1979 document) that “We do not have Nearly two decades later, this ac- agreement with the Soviet Union on the any intention of changing its status as count reads like a fantasy, for Cuba’s content and style of the reply. General [a military training] center.” In effect, government today is struggling to sur- Castro’s preferred formulation was: this minicrisis was settled through a uni- vive, all its troops have been repatriated, “For the past 17 years a symbolic So- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 217 lateral Soviet concession to the United These three statements are quite ban government officials, and has re- States. consistent with everything that had been peatedly produced nefarious results. Other important areas of disagree- known about the nature of Cuban-So- The 4 July 1979 document cites Fidel ment between the Soviets and the Cu- viet relations in general, and specifically Castro’s judgment that Valdés Vivó bans become evident in the minutes of on these issues. The only exception is “failed to discharge the functions en- the 23 November 1981 meeting be- that Rodríguez claims a larger role for trusted to him and was unable correctly tween Cuban Vice-President Carlos Cuban initiative in making the decision and precisely to fulfill his assigned task Rafael Rodríguez and U.S. Secretary of to enter the Ethiopian-Somali war on in a recent trip to a number of African State Alexander Haig.3 The text makes Ethiopia’s side, whereas scholars had countries.” Valdés Vivó “raised a host it clear that the talks were not success- believed that the Soviets had had a con- of doubts and false rumors not only ful. Nonetheless, the minutes show a siderably greater impact in making that among our Soviet friends, but among perhaps surprisingly accommodating original decision. The key point that the Africans as well.” In 1996, Valdés opening gambit from Haig, followed by Haig, and others, missed is that the Vivó, then heading the School of Po- his lack of understanding of one key USSR. had a restraining effect on Cuba litical Science at the University of Ha- point that Rodríguez was communicat- in the late 1970s, and that serious dif- vana, took the lead in launching an as- ing. Haig’s principal concern was the ferences occurred between the Soviet sault on the highest-quality semi–au- close connection between Cuba and the Union and Cuba because the latter was tonomous Cuban research think-tanks, Soviet Union in backing Cuban over- much more militant. To be sure, Cuba intolerantly and dogmatically criticiz- seas operations. Rodríguez kept telling could not have conducted such a far– ing their research on Cuba.4 Haig, in effect, that it was fine for the ranging foreign policy were it not for The documents conclude with a United States to blame Cuba but, please, the massive Soviet political, economic, timeless statement about Cuba’s ap- do not blame the USSR.! and military backing, and on this cen- proach to international affairs. Though Rodríguez first asserts: “I can as- tral issue Haig was right to challenge not always honored, it remains an im- sure you unequivocally, inasmuch as I Rodríguez. portant signpost for governments that played a direct role in this matter, that The attached documents also fea- must still deal with Fidel Castro’s gov- when the decision to dispatch Cuban ture other interesting aspects of Soviet– ernment: “There is no obligation that forces into Angola was made [in 1975], Cuban relations. For one, they demon- we have taken upon ourselves with any we communicated nothing about it to strate a thorough and competent knowl- country, group, or government that we the Soviet Union. We were not even edge of Cuban affairs and policies by have failed to honor.” aware of its point of view on that ac- Soviet embassy officials. They show a count.” Next, Rodríguez discusses the very close communication between the 1 I have written about these issues in Jorge I. Ethiopian war (1977–78): “I had the two governments on large and small is- Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolu- privilege to accompany Fidel Castro at sues that concern them. The minutes of tion: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard the time of his meetings with the lead- the Soviet Politburo meetings under- University Press, 1979). ership of the Soviet Union. . . . And it score the importance Soviet leaders ac- 2 Castro’s remarks in Granma Weekly Review, 7 was we who insistently urged the need corded to securing Fidel Castro’s agree- October 1979, 2. to render military assistance to Ethio- ment on the proposed joint course— 3 For Haig’s account, see his Caveat: Realism, pia. This was the situation, to be distin- even if Castro’s views did not prevail Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: guished from that in Angola, because in the end. Macmillan, 1984), 130–137. in this case preliminary negotiations The documents also shed light on 4 For an example of his writings on general Cu- were taking place. But in these nego- the role of several key Cuban officials, ban affairs in recent times, see Raúl Valdés Vivó, tiations it was Fidel Castro himself who some of whom remain important play- “¿Sociedad civil o gato por liebre,” Granma, 4 first advocated military assistance.” Fi- ers in contemporary Cuba. Rodríguez January 1996, 2. nally, Rodríguez turned to the troubles was long a thoughtful and cosmopoli- in Central America: “Certain American tan influence at the peak of the Cuban ****** leaders are always expressing the opin- government, and his encounter with ion that the Soviet Union acted as a Haig—though ultimately unsuccess- A “Moment of Rapprochement”: hostile influence between the United ful—confirms his reputation for states- The Haig-Rodriguez Secret Talks States and Cuba, that it fermented in manship. José Antonio Arbesú has been Cuba hostile feelings toward the United for many years a senior Cuban govern- by Peter Kornbluh States. I could tell you that the opposite ment and communist party decision is true. Many of the conflicts that we maker and analyst with broad respon- The United States “will go to the have had with the Soviet Union were sibilities for U.S.–Cuban relations; the source” to stop Havana’s alleged export occasioned by the acts, words, and po- 27 December 1979 document illustrates of revolution in Central America, Sec- sitions of Cuba, which did not corre- his broad competence in analyzing U.S. retary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. spond with the intentions of the Soviet affairs. Raúl Valdés Vivó has repeatedly dramatically warned Fidel Castro’s Union in this portion of the world.” been given high responsibility by Cu- Cuba shortly after took 218 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

office. On 23 November 1981, Haig insights into the style and personalities maneuvers in the Caribbean. “There did just that, sitting down for a secret of the two diplomats involved. could be no talk about normalization, meeting with Cuban Vice-President The Mexican government was si- no relief of the pressure, no conversa- Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in Mexico multaneously intermediary, mediator, tions on any subject except the return City to discuss the issues that divided and catalyst for the Haig-Rodriguez to Havana of the Cuban criminals [from the United States and Cuba. meeting. Alarmed by the Cold War the Mariel boatlift] and the termination Of all the American presidential ad- rhetoric emating from the Reagan Ad- of Cuba’s interventionism,” Haig wrote ministrations that have dealt with Fidel ministration—much of it from Haig in his memoirs.6 Castro since 1959, Reagan’s seemed the himself—in 1981 the government of During the limousine ride to the air- least likely to engage in a dialogue with President Jose Lopez-Portillo sought to port with Reagan after the Cancun sum- Cuba’s communist government; and of mitigate the growing potential for U.S. mit, however, Lopez-Portillo and all the hardline officials in the Reagan intervention in Central America and the Castaneda put their appeal directly to Administration, Alexander Haig Caribbean by urging dialogue instead the president of the United States. Ac- seemed the most unlikely choice for of what the Cubans described as “ver- cording to one Mexican official, Lopez- such a mission. “I want to go after bal terrorism.” In an effort to preempt Portillo essentially called in his chips: Cuba,” Haig told his then deputy Rob- future hostilities, Mexican Foreign Min- he asked Reagan to return Mexico’s fa- ert McFarlane in early 1981 as he de- ister Jorge Castaneda called for “a vor of disinviting Castro to Cancun by manded a plan for U.S. military pres- ceasefire of silence.” “Mexico,” he of- authorizing a U.S. emissary to meet se- sure against Castro. As McFarlane re- fered, “is prepared to serve as a bridge, cretly with Cuba’s vice president later ported in his memoirs, “it was as though as a communicator, between its friends in the year. Reagan readily agreed, and Haig had come into office thinking, and neighbors.”4 subsequently directed Haig to undertake ‘Where can we make a quick win?’ and Lopez-Portillo’s major opportunity this mission when the opportunity arose judged that place to be Cuba.”1 to promote an agenda of negotiations in November. For that reason, the Haig- came at the North-South Summit held The meeting took place in the spa- Rodriguez talks stand as an extraordi- at the Mexican resort of Cancun in Oc- cious home of foreign minister nary episode of U.S.-Cuban diplomacy tober 1981. Cuba had been involved in Castaneda, located in a suburb of at the height of the Cold War in the the preparatory meetings for the sum- Mexico City. According to a member Western Hemisphere. mit, and Mexican officials hoped the of Castaneda’s family, the Mexican for- Extreme secrecy surrounded prepa- gathering of world leaders might pro- eign minister introduced the two pro- rations for the talks: Reagan and Haig vide an opportunity for a “discreet” tagonists to each other in his library, and kept most of the U.S. government out meeting between Castro and Reagan. then left them to talk privately, aided of the loop; an unmarked car was used But, according to one of the conference only by a Cuban translator. to ferry Haig from the U.S. Embassy to organizers, Andres Rozental (now The house, according to family the private home of Mexican Foreign Mexican ambassador to Great Britain), members, had no secret taping system. Minister Jorge Castaneda; and Haig and U.S. officials balked when they learned Yet, the Top Secret 38-page transcript Rodriguez agreed this would be an “un- Castro was scheduled to attend. “If Fi- of the discussion, which Vice President official, secret meeting.” Yet it quickly del came, Reagan wouldn’t,” Rozental Rodriguez provided in Spanish to the leaked to the Spanish magazine El Pais, recalls being told. Although Mexico Soviet ambassador to Havana in De- and then to the Mexican and U.S. press. had long resisted U.S. pressure to iso- cember 1981, suggests that the meet- In a televised interview with CBS News late Cuba, Lopez-Portillo was forced to ing may in fact have been recorded— in January 1982, Reagan admitted that call Castro and essentially disinvite him. perhaps by the Cuban interpreter. In any such a meeting had, in fact, occurred.2 “Castro understood immediately,” event, the existence of an apparently Moreover, since the 1984 publica- Rozental remembers, “and graciously verbatim record allows historians to tion of Haig’s memoirs,3 historians agreed not to make it an issue.”5 chart the issues, diplomatic positions, have had a U.S. version of the Mexico Instead of the summit, Lopez- and tenor of the discussion. meeting. Haig’s rendition of events, and Portillo invited the Cuban leader to a The central issue on Haig’s agenda his summary of the substance of the private meeting on the island of was Cuba’s alleged role in supporting talks, generally comports to the Cuban Cozumel in July. The two talked about the Sandinista government in Nicara- version printed in this issue of the Bul- a potential U.S.-Cuban dialogue. gua and funneling aid to the El Salva- letin (although it omits discussion of Through Mexico, Castro passed the doran guerrillas. Drawing on what he how the secret meeting came to occur message that he was willing to discuss called “volumes, records of radio broad- in the first place). This Cuban tran- all outstanding issues with Washington. casts, data from technical reconnais- script—originally in Spanish, translated Haig and other administration sance ... photographs,” Haig charged into Russian, obtained by scholars from hardliners, however, forcefully opposed that Cuba, in “tacit agreement” with the the Russian archives and now translated talks with Cuba as anathema to a strat- Soviets, was fueling revolution in Cen- into English—provides new details, as egy of raising Castro’s level of anxiety tral America. “We regard this as a seri- well as the flavor of the discussion and through verbal threats and U.S. military ous threat to our vital interests and the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 219

of continuing talks, and that conduct- the Central America conflict escalated interests of peace and stability in the ing “an even more direct exchange of dramatically in the months and years hemisphere,” he stated. opinions” would be desirable. Haig, at that followed, and for most of the de- In response, Rodriguez spent con- his own initiative, suggested that spe- cade, Nicaragua and El Salvador were siderable time and detail attempting to cial U.S. envoy General Vernon Walters wracked with the violence and blood- refute the U.S. “evidence” of Cuban in- visit Havana for additional talks. “We shed that Mexico had hoped could be volvement in revolutionary movements can meet, in turn, in Havana and New avoided if the Reagan Administration from Central America to Africa. “I am York, because, in my view, we must and Castro’s government could achieve aware that the Secretary of State is a commence a dialogue immediately,” a modus vivendi. great lover of philosophy,” he said to Haig is recorded as saying at the close Yet, the fact that the Haig- Haig, noting that of the meeting. “I believe that this is Rodriguez talks occurred at all may well Since the time of Hume, it has been important, and we are ready to do it,” have mitigated against the further de- considered proven that the factual replied Rodriguez. velopment of the even more overtly bel- appearance of ‘B’ following the ap- In the immediate aftermath of this licose U.S. policy toward Cuba that pearance of ‘A’ does not signify meeting, both the Mexican interlocutors Haig, among others, initially sought. that ‘A’ necessarily is the cause of and the Cubans believed that a positive The talks also set the stage for negotia- the appearance of ‘B’. step had been taken toward dialogue tions between Washington and Havana The U.S. had a “mistaken interpre- between Washington and Havana. “We over immigration that took place in tation” of Cuba’s role in Nicaragua and had accomplished what we wanted— 1984. At the very least, the U.S.-Cuba El Salvador, Rodriguez asserted, which to get them together,” recalled Andres meeting in Mexico demonstrated that a he blamed on CIA distortion of intelli- Rozental. Face-to-face, the Cubans “moment of rapprochement”—a civil, gence. In response, Haig reasserted that found Haig to be far more level-headed, rational high-level dialogue— was pos- the U.S. possessed “proof” that Cuba respectful, and reasonable than his vit- sible, even at a peak of acrimony in bi- was “exporting revolution and blood- riolic Cold War rhetoric had led them lateral relations. shed on the continent.” Dismissing to expect. In Rodriguez’s opinion, Rodriguez’s lengthy version of world shared later with Mexican officials, 1 McFarlane recalled that Haig wanted to “close events since 1975, Haig declared: “I can Haig was “neither crazy nor stupid, but Castro down,” and directed McFarlane to “get ev- eryone together and give me a plan for doing it.” assure you that the benign picture that a reasonably intelligent, experienced you have painted does not conform to McFarlane writes that when he came up with an person with whom conversation was options paper that pointed out the practical draw- reality.” possible.” Rodriguez was said to be im- backs of blockading Cuba or other types of un- Notwithstanding the acrimonious pressed that Haig was willing to send provoked hostility, Secretary Haig harshly repri- manded him. “Six weeks ago I asked you to get disagreement on the nature of Cuba’s Walters—an official of “great author- role abroad, the Haig-Rodriguez discus- busy and find a way to go to the source in Cuba. ity, close to President Reagan”—as an What you’ve given me is bureaucratic pap. . . . sions did produce a surprising commit- envoy to continue the talks, and that the Give me something I can take to the President so ment toward coexistence. Unlike the Secretary of State had emphasized the that he can show a substantial gain during his first year in office. I want something solid, not some Democratic Clinton Administration— need to make a supreme effort to settle which a decade later would demand that cookie-pushing piece of junk.” Eventually, issues through “la via pacifica”—the McFarlane reports, calmer heads prevailed and Cuba democratize as a prerequisite for peaceful road. the Reagan Administration decided to stick to the normalizing relations—Haig made it Haig, on the other hand, appears to agreements on Cuba worked out with the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis. See Robert clear that Washington took a have interpreted the meeting as evi- position on Cuba’s internal political set- McFarlane, Special Trust (New York: Cadell & dence that U.S. pressure on Castro was Davies, 1991), 177-181. up. “I do not believe that President working. “Clearly the Cubans were 2 See “Reagan Says Haig Met Key Cuban,” New Reagan has some kind of preconceived very anxious. They had read the signs York Times, 28 January 1982. State Department officials, according to the story, “described them- notion regarding the social system in of a new American policy.”7 Haig re- Cuba,” Haig stated. “This must be de- selves as ‘quite surprised’ that the President had turned to Washington to push, again, for said what he did. They still insisted they knew of termined by the people of Cuba.” Later a blockade. Walters did make a secret no such meeting.” 3 in the conversation Haig noted that trip to Havana in March 1982—Mexi- Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: “President Reagan considers trade with can officials contributed once again to Cuba a possibility.” While dismissing Macmillan, 1984), 133-136. the arrangements—and spent five hours 4 Quoted in Morris J. Blachman, William M. past “moments of rapprochement” as “a conferring with Castro and Rodriguez Leogrande, and Kenneth E. Sharpe, eds, Con- series of delaying tactics” on the part on Central America. But nothing con- fronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America (New York: Pantheon, 1986), of the Cubans, Haig stated that “if you crete came of the talks. are prepared to talk seriously, we are 276. In the end, as Ambassador Rozental 5 Author’s telephone interview with Rozental, also prepared.” puts it, the Mexican initiative was a October 1996. 6 According to the transcript, “failure in getting anything going” be- Haig, Caveat, 133. 7 Haig, Caveat, 136. Rodriguez and Haig agreed that Mexico tween the United States and Cuba. “could be a uniting link in this matter” Moreover, U.S. military involvement in 220 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN More New Evidence On THE COLD WAR IN ASIA

Editor’s Note: “New Evidence on History Department (particularly Prof. Zhang Shuguang (University of Mary- the Cold War in Asia” was not only the Priscilla Roberts and Prof. Thomas land/College Park) played a vital liai- theme of the previous issue of the Cold Stanley) during a visit by CWIHP’s di- son role between CWIHP and the Chi- War International History Project Bul- rector to Hong Kong and to Beijing, nese scholars. The grueling regime of letin (Issue 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, 294 where the Institute of American Studies panel discussions and debates (see pro- pages), but of a major international (IAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social gram below) was eased by an evening conference organized by CWIHP and Sciences (CASS) agreed to help coor- boat trip to the island of Lantau for a hosted by the History Department of dinate the participation of Chinese seafood dinner; and a reception hosted Hong Kong University (HKU) on 9-12 scholars (also joining the CWIHP del- by HKU at which CWIHP donated to January 1996. Both the Bulletin and egation were Prof. David Wolff, then of the University a complete set of the the conference presented and analyzed Princeton University, and Dr. Odd Arne roughly 1500 pages of documents on the newly available archival materials and Westad, Director of Research, Norwe- Korean War it had obtained (with the other primary sources from Russia, gian Nobel Institute). Materials for the help of the Center for Korean Research China, Eastern Europe and other loca- Bulletin and papers for the conference at Columbia University) from the Rus- tions in the former communist bloc on were concurrently sought and gathered sian Presidential Archives. such topics as the Korean and Vietnam/ over the subsequent year-and-a-half, Following the Hong Kong confer- Indochina Wars; the Sino-Soviet Alli- climaxing at the very end of December ence, CWIHP brought a delegation of ance and Split; Sino-American Rela- 1995 and beginning of January 1996 U.S., Russian, Chinese, and European tions and Crises; the Role of Key Fig- (in the midst of U.S. shutdown of the scholars to Hanoi to meet with Vietnam- ures such as Mao Zedong, , federal government and the worst bliz- ese colleagues and to discuss possible , and Nikita Khrushchev; zard to strike Washington, D.C. and the future activities to research and reas- the Sino-Indian Conflict; and more. The East Coast of the United States in many sess the international history of the new information presented via both ac- years) with the production of the Indochina and Vietnam conflicts with tivities attracted considerable media double-issue and the holding of the con- the aid of archival and other primary attention, including articles or citations ference, after some final fusillades of sources on all sides; the visit was hosted in , Washington e-mails and faxes between the Wilson by the Institute for International Rela- Post, Time Magazine, Pravda, The Center in Washington (CWIHP’s direc- tions (IIR) of the Vietnamese Foreign Guardian, and Newsweek, as well as a tor as well as Michele Carus-Christian Ministry. Contacts between CWIHP report on the Cable News Network of the Division of International Studies and IIR and other Vietnamese scholars (CNN); garnering particular notice in and Li Zhao of the Asia Program) and continue on how best to organize ac- both popular and scholarly circles were Priscilla Roberts at HKU. tivities to exchange and open new his- the first publication of conversations Despite last-minute obstacles torical sources; these are likely to in- between Stalin and Mao during the posed by weather and bureaucrats (i.e., clude the publication of a special Bul- latter’s trip to Moscow in Dec. 1949- visa troubles), more than 50 Chinese, letin devoted to new evidence on the Feb. 1950, Russian versions of corre- American, Russian, European, and conflicts in Southeast Asia, and, in co- spondence between Stalin and Mao sur- other scholars gathered in Hong Kong ordination with other partners (such as rounding China’s decision to enter the for four days of discussions and de- the National Security Archive, Brown Korean War in the fall of 1950; and bates. CWIHP provided primary orga- University, and the Norwegian Nobel translations and analyses of Chinese- nizational support for putting the pro- Institute), the holding of a series of con- language sources on the 1958 Taiwan gram together and financial backing to ferences at which new evidence would Straits Crisis, particularly in light of the bring the participants to Hong Kong be disseminated and debated. resurgence of tension in that region (in- (with the aid of the National Security To follow up these activities, cluding Chinese military exercises) in Archive and the University of Toronto), CWIHP plans to publish a volume of the period leading up to the March 1996 while HKU provided the venue and cov- papers from the Hong Kong Conference Taiwanese elections. ered on-site expenses, with the help of (and related materials); this volume, in The Hong Kong Conference, as generous support from the Louis Cha turn, will complement another book well as the double-issue of the Bulle- Foundation. In addition, as noted containing several papers presented at tin, culminated many months of prepa- above, the IAS, CASS in Beijing helped Hong Kong: Odd Arne Westad, ed., rations. The basic agreement to orga- coordinate Chinese scholars’ participa- Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of nize the conference was reached in May tion; and Profs. Chen Jian (Southern the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1953, 1994 between CWIHP and the HKU Illinois University/Carbondale) and scheduled for publication in 1997. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 221

In addition, this section of the “Mao, Stalin, and the Struggle in Man- Revolution in Asia, 1949-58” present Bulletin presents more informa- churia, 1945-46: Nationalism or Inter- tion on several topics addressed both nationalism?”; Yang Kuisong (Inst. of Panel III: New Evidence on Sino- at Hong Kong and in the previous Bul- Modern History, Chinese Academy of American Relations in the Early Cold letin: Social Sciences [CASS], Beijing), “On War * Russian and Chinese documents the Causes of the Changes in Mao’s on the Mao-Stalin summit in Moscow view of the Soviet Union”; Niu Jun Chair: W. Cohen (Univ. of Maryland/ that help flesh out the conversations (Inst. of American Studies [IAS], Baltimore); Papers: Zhang Bai-Jia (Inst. between the two leaders published in CASS), “The Origins of the Sino-So- of Modern History, CASS), “The Lim- the previous Bulletin; viet Alliance, 1945-50”; Brian Murray its of Confrontation: Looking at the * an analysis by William Taubman (Columbia Univ.), “Stalin, the Division Sino-American Relations during the (first prepared for Hong Kong) of the of China, and Cold War Origins”; Com- Cold War Years from the Chinese Per- personal conflict between Khrushchev mentators: James Tang (Hong Kong spective”; O.A. Westad (Norwegian and Mao and its role in the Sino-Soviet Univ.), O.A. Westad (Norwegian Nobel Nobel Inst.), “The Sino-Soviet Alliance split, as well as contemporaneous Rus- Inst.) and the United States: Wars, Policies, sian documents (from both Moscow and and Perceptions, 1950-1961”; Tao East Berlin archives); Panel II: New Evidence on the Korean Wenzhao (IAS, CASS), “From Relax- * another paper prepared for Hong War ation to Tension in China-US Relations, Kong, by M.Y. Prozumenschikov, on the 1954-58”; Xiao-bing Li (Univ. of Cen- significance of the Sino-Indian and Chair: Jim Hershberg (CWIHP): tral Oklahoma), “The Making of Mao’s Cuban Missile Crises of October 1962 Cold War: The 1958 Taiwan Straits Cri- for the open rupture between Moscow Session 1: The North Korean Dimen- sis Revised”; Yongping Zheng (IAS, and Beijing, along with supplementary sion CASS), “Formulating China’s Policy on Russian and East German archival the Taiwan Straits Crisis, 1958"; Com- materials; Papers: Alexandre Mansourov (Colum- ment: Nancy Bernkopf Tucker * and, perhaps most intriguingly, bia Univ.), “Did Conventional Deter- (Georgetown Univ.); Gordon Chang a Chinese response to a controversy rence Work? (Why the Korean War did (Stanford Univ.); He Di (IAS, CASS) opened in the previous Bulletin about not erupt in the Summer of 1949)”; the discrepancy between Russian archi- Hakjoon Kim (Dankook Univ., Seoul), Panel IV: Chinese Policy Beyond the val documents and published Chinese “North Korean Leaders and the Origins Superpowers: Engaging India and the documents regarding communications of the Korean War”; David Tsui (Chi- “Nationalist States” between Mao and Stalin on Beijing’s nese Univ. of Hong Kong), “Did the entry into the Korean War in October DPRK and the PRC Sign a Mutual Se- Chair: Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Wilson Cen- 1950 (along with new evidence on a key curity Pact in 1949?” ter); Papers: Ren Donglai (Nanjing omission from a Russian document in Univ.), “From the `Two Camp’ Theory the last Bulletin). Session 2: The Course of the War to the `Five Principles of Peaceful Co- Additional materials are slated for existence’: A Transition of China’s Per- publication in CWIHP Working Papers, Papers: Shen Zhihua (Ctr. for Oriental ception of and Policy Toward the Na- future Bulletins, and via the Internet on History Research, Beijing), “China Had tionalist States, 1949-1954"; Roderick the CWIHP site on the National Secu- to Send Its Troops to Korea: Policy- MacFarquhar (Harvard Univ.), “War in rity Archive’s home page on the World Making Processes and Reasons”; the Himalayas, Crisis in the Caribbean: Wide Web: http://www.nsarchive.com Kathryn Weathersby (Florida State the Sino-Indian Conflict and the Cuban Following is the program of the Univ.), “Stalin and a Negotiated Settle- Missile Crisis, October 1962”; M.Y. Hong Kong Confernce: ment in Korea, 1950-53”; Chen Jian Prozumenschikov (TsKhSD, Moscow), (Southern Illinois Univ./Carbondale), “The Influence of the Sino-Indian Bor- Cold War International History Project “China’s Strategy to End the Korean der Conflict and the Caribbean Crisis Conference on New Evidence on the War”; Fernando Orlandi (Univ. of on the Development of Sino-Soviet Re- Cold War in Asia Trento, Italy), “The Alliance: Beijing, lations” [presented in absentia by J. University of Hong Kong, Moscow, the Korean War and Its End” Hershberg (CWIHP)]; Comment: 9-12 January 1996 Norman Owen (Hong Kong Univ.) Comment: Allen S. Whiting (Univ. of Panel I: New Evidence on the Origins Arizona), Warren I. Cohen (Univ. of Panel V: From Alliance to Schism: New of the Sino-Soviet Alliance Maryland/Baltimore) Evidence on The Sino-Soviet Split

Chair: Odd Arne Westad (Norwegian Dinner Talk: John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio Chair: Zi Zhongyun (IAS, CASS); Pa- Nobel Inst.); Papers: Michael M. Sheng Univ./Athens), “The Division of Labor: pers: Dayong Niu (Beijing Univ.), (Southwest Missouri State Univ.), Sino-Soviet Relations and Prospects for “From Cold War to Cultural Revolu- 222 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tion: Mao Zedong’s Response to “On the Borders of the Sino-Soviet chival documents)”; Vladislav M. Khrushchev’s Destalinization and Conflict: New Approaches to the Cold Zubok (National Security Archive), Dulles’ Strategy of Peaceful Evolution”; War in Asia”; Christian Ostermann “Stalin’s Goals in the Far East: From Deborah Kaple (Princeton Univ.), “So- (Hamburg Univ./National Security Yalta to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of viet Assistance and Civilian Coopera- Archive), “The Sino-Soviet Border 1950"; Li Hai Wen (CPC CC), “[Zhou tion in China”; Zhang Shuguang (Univ. Clashes of 1969: New Evidence from en-Lai’s Role in] Restoring Peace in of Maryland/College Park), “The Col- the SED Archives”; Commentator: Tho- Indochina at the Geneva Conference”; lapse of Sino-Soviet Economic Coop- mas W. Robinson (American Asian Re- William Taubman (Amherst College), eration, 1950-60: A Cultural Explana- search Enterprises) “Khrushchev versus Mao: A Prelimi- tion”; Sergei Goncharenko (IMEMO, nary Sketch of the Role of Personality Moscow), “The Military Dimension of Session 2: The Warsaw Pact and the in the Sino-Soviet Dispute” [presented the Sino-Soviet Split”; Mark Kramer Sino-Soviet Split in absentia by M. Kramer (Harvard (Harvard Univ.), “The Soviet Foreign Univ.)]; He Di (IAS, CASS), “Paper or Ministry’s Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Re- Papers: L.W. Gluchowski (Univ. of Real Tiger? U.S. Nuclear Weapons and lations on the Eve of the Split”; Com- Toronto), “The Struggle Against `Great Mao Zedong’s Response”; Comment: ment: Chen Jian (Southern Illinois Power Chauvinism’: CPSU-PUWP David Shambaugh (Univ. of London); Univ./Carbondale); Zheng Yu (Inst. of Relations and the Roots of the Sino- Vojtech Mastny (independent) East European, Russian, and Central Polish Initiative of September-October Asian Studies, CASS) 1956"; Werner Meissner (Hong Kong Panel VIII: New Evidence on the Baptist Univ.), “The Relations between Indochina/Vietnam Conflicts and the Panel VI: Aspects of the Sino-Soviet the German Democratic Republic and Cold War in Asia Schism the People’s Republic of China, 1956- 1963, and the Sino-Soviet Split”; Com- Chair: A.S. Whiting (Univ. of Arizona); Chair: Robert Hutchings (Wilson Cen- mentator: M. Kramer (Harvard Univ.) Papers: Mark Bradley (Univ. of Wis- ter): consin at Milwaukee), “Constructing an Panel VII: New Evidence on Chinese Indigenous Regional Political Order in Session 1: Border Disputes: and Soviet Leaders and the Cold War Southeast Asia: Vietnam and the Diplo- in Asia macy of Revolutionary Nationalism, Papers: Tamara G. Troyakova (Inst. of 1946-49”; Mari Olsen (Univ. of Oslo), History, Far Eastern Branch, Russian Chair: J.L. Gaddis (Ohio Univ./Athens); “Forging a New Relationship: The So- Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok), Papers: Haruki Wada (Inst. of Social viet Union and Vietnam, 1955”; Ilia “The Soviet Far East and Soviet-Chi- Sciences, Univ. of Tokyo), “Stalin and Gaiduk (Inst. of Universal History, nese Relations in the Khrushchev the Japanese Communist Party, 1945- Moscow) “Soviet Policy Toward U.S. Years”; David Wolff (Princeton Univ.), 1953 (in the light of new Russian ar- Participation in the Vietnam War” [pre- sented in absentia by J. Hershberg CONFERENCE ON REGIONAL CHINESE ARCHIVES HELD (CWIHP)]; Zhai Qiang (Auburn Univ.), In August 1996, the US-China Archival cently-Declassified U.S. Government Docu- “Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, Exchange Program of the University of ments on American Policy Toward the De- 1964-65”; Robert K. Brigham (Vassar Maryland (College Park) and the Chinese velopment of Atomic Weapons by the College), “Vietnamese-American Peace Central Archives Bureau held a conference People’s Republic of China, 1961-1965.” Negotiations: The Failed 1965 Initia- on “Regional Chinese Archives,” with ses- Assembled by then-CWIHP Director Jim tives”; Igor Bukharkin (Russian Foreign sions and activities in Beijing and other Hershberg with the help of the National Ministry Archives), “Moscow and Ho northern Chinese cities (Jinan, Qingdao, Security Archive and the Lyndon B. Johnson Chi Minh, 1945-1969”; Comment: R. Yantai, Tianjin). Participants included both Presidential Library, the documents included Chinese and American scholars and archi- White House, State Department, and CIA MacFarquhar (Harvard Univ.) val authorities from regional, urban, na- materials on the events surrounding China’s tional, and Communist Party archives. first detonation of an atomic explosion on Closing Roundtable on the New Evi- On behalf of the Cold War International 16 October 1964. dence, Present and Future Prospects and History Project and the National Security The gathering, coming nine months after Research Agenda: Archive (a non-governmental research in- the CWIHP Hong Kong Conference, also stitute and declassified documents reposi- offered an opportunity to continue the Participants: Niu Jun (IAS, CASS), tory located at George Washington Univer- Project’s ongoing contacts with Chinese O.A. Westad (Norwegian Nobel Inst.), sity), Prof. David Wolff, now CWIHP’s Di- colleagues. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois Univ./ rector, gave a presentation on declassifica- For further information on the conference tion procedures in the United States and op- and the US-China Archival Exchange Pro- Carbondale), W. Cohen (Univ. of Mary- portunities for using the Freedom of Infor- gram, contact Prof. Shu Guang Zhang, His- land/Baltimore), R. MacFarquhar mation Act to conduct research on issues of tory Dept., 2115 Francis Scott Key Hall, (Harvard Univ.), K. Weathersby interest to China. As an illustration, Wolff College Park, MD 20742-7315, tel.: (301) (Florida State Univ.) presented a compilation of “Selected Re- 405-4265; fax: (301) 314-9399. --J.H. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 223

MORE ON MAO IN MOSCOW, Dec. 1949-Feb. 1950

Editor’s Note: The previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (no. 6-7, Winter 1995/96, pp. 4-9) con- tained translations of the Russian transcripts of two conversations (16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950) between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong during the latter’s visit to Moscow in December 1949-February 1950. Mao’s trip to the USSR, shortly after the victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution and the establishment in October 1949 of the People’s Republic of China, marked the only personal encounter between these two giants of 20th-century history, and led to the signing on 14 February 1950 of a Sino-Soviet treaty formally establishing an alliance between the two communist powers—a landmark in the history of the Cold War. To provide further examples of the newly-available East-bloc evidence on this crucial event, the Bulletin presents below a selection of translated additional materials from Russian and Chinese sources. They include three records of conversations between Mao and senior Soviet officials, on 1, 6, and 17 January 1950, located in the archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, formally known as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), and provided to the Bulletin by Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute (Oslo), author of Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the , 1944-1946 (NY: Columbia University Press, 1993); Westad’s commentary precedes the documents. In addition to immediate considerations relating to Mao’s activities in Moscow, the conversations cover a range of subjects concern- ing Sino-Soviet ties—political, diplomatic, economic, and military. Especially notable for Cold War historians concentrating on interna- tional relations are the exchanges on joint strategy in the United Nations to unseat the Guomindang () representative (fore- shadowing a Soviet boycott that would enable the Security Council to approve U.N. participation in the Korean War) and a discussion of U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s National Press Club speech of 12 January 1950—particularly his efforts to foment discord between the USSR and China. These conversations, of course, should be read in the context of the two previously mentioned Stalin-Mao conversations, which bracket them (other talks are believed to have taken place, but no additional transcripts have emerged). In contrast to the Russian documents, which were found by outside scholars working in the archives, the Chinese materials were published since the late 1980s in “neibu” or “internal” editions which have gradually made their way outside China, where they have been extensively used by scholars.1 Most of these collections were assembled by teams working for or with authorities of the Chinese state or the Central Committee of the (CCP), with outside scholars receiving little or no access to high-level archives for the post-1949 period, and thus unable to inspect the originals (let alone the surrounding documentation) of the materials contained in these publications. Nonetheless, albeit with due caution, scholars’ use of such publications over the past decade has trans- formed the study of CCP and PRC foreign policy (at least through the 1950s), as well as the actions and motivations of senior figures such as Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai). To make these Chinese-language materials accessible to an English-reading audience, two U.S.-based Chinese scholars have under- taken to translate, edit, and annotate a multi-volume collection of materials on PRC/ CCP foreign policy since World War II, culled from PRC sources. The two are Prof. Shuguang Zhang (University of Maryland/ College Park), author of Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), and Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995); and Prof. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale; during 1996-1997 visiting fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC), author of China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994). The first volume was published in November 1996 by Imprint Publications (Chicago): Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950.2 The translations of Chinese materials below, mostly communications from Mao in Moscow back to other members of the PRC leadership left behind in Beijing, are among more than 200 translated texts included in that volume, the vast majority of which are either reports of the CC CCP or of Mao himself. Introduced by Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland/Baltimore), the volume also includes extensive annotations, a glossary, and a chronology; subsequent planned volumes include two volumes covering the 1950s. All the footnotes for the Chinese documents, as well as the translations themselves, are taken from Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950. All but one of the Chinese documents originally appeared in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s manuscripts since the founding of the People’s Republic], vol. 1 (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987), the first in a series of compendia of collected Mao documents that has now appeared in more than ten volumes reaching into the early 1960s. Although they have made extensive efforts to ascertain the authenticity of the documents by consulting with officials and scholars who have had access to the archives, both editors stress the need for caution and critical analysis of these source materials and the importance of encouraging the fastest and fullest possible opening of PRC and CCP archives as a far preferable and more accurate method of exploring China’s recent past.3—James G. Hershberg. 1 For an analysis of the opportunities and pitfalls of this source, see Chen Jian, “CCP Leaders’ Selected Works and the Historiography of the Chinese Communist Revolution,” CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 131, 144-146. 2 Cloth: ISBN 1-879176-20-3 ($55.00): Imprint Publications, Inc., 520 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 840, Chicago, IL 60611; tel.: (312) 595-0668; fax: (312) 595-0666; e-mail: [email protected] 3 Comments made at seminar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 4 December 1996. 224 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950

by Odd Arne Westad Kremlinologists of yore used to Soviet relations since the Moscow sum- Beijing, N.V. Roshchin, to get Stalin’s liken analyzing political conflict in the mit. OK. When Mao’s train finally left Politburo to watching a dog-fight tak- Part of the reason why so little has Beijing on December 6, the two sides ing place under a rug. One could hear been regarded as “known” about these had still not agreed on a framework for sounds of fighting, groans from those meetings is the mythology which grew what should be discussed in Moscow. badly bitten, and see the rug moving as up around the physical encounter be- Mao had three matters at the fore- positions changed. But it was not until tween the Stalin and Mao figures. Es- front of his mind as his train wound its the rug was removed that it was pos- pecially for Mao, these meetings were way toward the Soviet capital. He sible to determine who had come out an integral part of the story of his rise wanted security against a potential on top and what damage had been done to power, and, no less importantly, the American attack. He wanted Soviet as- to those who lost. growth of his unique knowledge and sistance in the construction of social- Until very recently, analyzing the understanding. Mao loved to talk about ism. And he wanted to remove the events of the Sino-Soviet summit meet- his “humiliation” at Stalin’s hands in stigma which, in his view, had been in- ing in Moscow in late 1949-early 1950 Moscow, and about how the Korean flicted on Chinese-Soviet relations by has been a bit like watching the War had proven him (Mao) correct, and Stalin’s signing in 1945 (at the close of Kremlinologists’ dogs.1 We have not how the Soviet leader, once again, had World War II) of a Sino-Soviet Treaty known much, except to register a gen- come to realize his mistakes toward the with Mao’s bitter rival, the Nationalist eral sense of unease on both sides when end of his life. Until 1956, Mao told Government headed by Jiang Jieshi they alluded to these meetings over the this story repeatedly to members of his [Chiang Kai-shek]. The best way to subsequent decades. Until 1995—when inner circle, and after 1956—when open achieve all of these aims, Mao con- the Cold War International History criticism of Stalin became acceptable cluded, was to sign a new treaty be- Project obtained and published records following Khrushchev’s secret speech tween the two countries, based on Com- of two conversations between Joseph at the 20th Congress of the Communist munist solidarity, discarding the 1945 Stalin and Mao Zedong during the sum- Party of the Soviet Union—the Chinese pact. But the Chinese leader was in no mit2—no transcripts from the many leader told it to visitors of all sorts who way certain that Stalin would accept conversations held during the summit came to call on him at Zhongnanhai, the such a proposal, and he was prepared were publicly available. The only docu- compound for the Chinese leadership to act with great care, so that his wish ments which Western scholars could use in Beijing. For Mao and for all mem- for a new treaty did not stand in the way were the published treaties, which on bers of the Chinese Communist Party of the two other aims, both of which most issues were as uninformative as (CCP), the Chairman’s encounter with could prove more obtainable.6 all other Soviet friendship, cooperation, Stalin became a central part of revolu- Stalin, on his side, wanted to test and mutual assistance agreements.3 tionary discourse.4 Mao, his commitment to “proletarian This constituted a strangely limited What do we then “know” almost internationalism,” and his style of be- harvest for what undoubtedly was fifty years after the event, as the cover havior in Moscow. With unflinchable among the most important political is slowly sliding away? faith in his own ability to separate summit meetings of the 20th century. The Moscow summit had a long friends from enemies, Stalin agreed to Not only were these the first and only and unhappy pre-history. Mao had re- a meeting with the new Chinese leader face-to-face meetings between the two quested a meeting with Stalin on at least in order to see how Mao would hold up great Communist . They pro- three occasions since early 1947, but the under scrutiny. Stalin had not yet de- vided the fundamental shape for the Kremlin boss—the vozhd—had turned cided whether or not to sign a new Sino-Soviet alliance, a compact which him down each time, with excuses rang- treaty, nor had he made up his mind formed the political direction of both ing from the military situation in China, about any major agreements with the states and which Western leaders for to international diplomacy, to the So- new Chinese regime, prior to Mao’s many years during the most intense viet grain harvest. Even after Stalin arrival in Moscow. Based on what we phase of the Cold War regarded as a promised senior CCP emissary Liu know of his behavior in other contexts, deadly threat to the capitalist world sys- Shaoqi in July 1949 that Mao would be it is likely that Stalin sought material tem. The meetings also formed impres- invited to Moscow as soon as the for his conclusions primarily from the sions and images among leaders on both People’s Republic was set up,5 the Chi- Chinese attitude to the post-World War sides, shades of which have been vis- nese in October and November had to II territorial arrangements in East Asia ible at all important junctures in Sino- pressure the Soviet ambassador in and from Mao’s attitude toward the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 225 vozhd personally. Lewis, and Xue Litai surmise that it was portant it was to the Soviets for him to What happened between the two rumors among the foreign press corps appear willing fully to coordinate his sides in Moscow from December 17 to in Moscow that Mao was being spurned policies toward the United States with January 2 remains shrouded in mystery. or even put under house arrest by his Moscow. The effect of Molotov’s and Stalin obviously wanted to impress the Soviet hosts which compelled Stalin Vyshinskii’s alerting the Chinese to Chinese, to show them Soviet power by agree to let TASS publish an interview Acheson’s speech (and particularly his arranging visits to memorials and sym- with the Chinese leader on January 2. claim that the Soviets were out to sub- bols of the achievements of Commu- In that interview, Mao referred to the jugate China) was to give Mao a chance nism. It is also obvious that he did not 1945 treaty and trade issues as items to demonstrate his loyalty to the boss. want anyone to engage in any further being under consideration by the two (At the same time in Beijing, Mao’s in- discussions of the main political issues sides. telligence chief, Li Kenong, told the beyond what had been said at the meet- Just what happened in the Kremlin Soviets that a peaceful liberation of ing between Mao and himself on De- during the day of January 2 we do not Taiwan might be possible after all.8) cember 16. know. Oral history sources indicate that Zhou Enlai had prepared well on Beyond that, everything is still con- Molotov and Mikoyan together ap- his long train trip across Siberia. From jecture. Mao may have feigned illness proached the boss and suggested hold- his arrival in Moscow on January 20, to avoid accepting the Soviet agenda for ing talks with the Chinese at some point the Chinese Prime Minister was the “sightseeing” and to insist on an imme- over the coming two weeks. Stalin dynamic force in the negotiations, diate continuation of the political talks. agreed, and entrusted the two with seek- which soon took the form of Chinese The Soviets then used Mao’s “illness” ing out Mao and informing him.7 After proposals and Soviet counter-propos- to explain why substantive meetings seeing Molotov and Mikoyan, Mao als.9 On almost all issues concerning with Stalin, or any Soviet leader, were fired off a jubilant telegram to Beijing, the alliance treaty, bilateral assistance, impossible, thereby trying to force Mao telling of “an important breakthrough” trade, and credits and loans, the Chi- to come up with suggestions for a spe- in his work: The Soviets had agreed to nese drove their agenda forward, while cific agenda. Mao may indeed have signing a new treaty and would receive the Soviets argued over details. The been ill. We know that he was not in Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in Moscow Chinese got less, and some times much good health in October, and the strenu- to negotiate it. less, than what they bargained for, but ous journey to Moscow could hardly Based on what we now know, Mao they got some form of agreement on all have helped. was almost certainly overstating his areas which were important to them.10 Even more important is why Stalin case. As the Chairman’s conversation While the economic negotiations decided to let his guest kill time over with Molotov on January 6 shows, showed the Chinese that Stalin’s lieu- the New Year holidays holed up in a Stalin had in no way green-lighted a tenants could drive a hard bargain, what government dacha near Moscow. The new treaty, and was still holding open really hurt the CCP leaders in a way that most likely explanation is that the So- the possibility of merely amending the none of them ever forgot was the So- viet leader just could not make up his 1945 text. In spite of the several meet- viet propensity for introducing territo- mind on what the outcome of the Chi- ings between Mao and Soviet officials rial issues into their negotiating tactics. nese visit would be, and as long as the over the following weeks, to which The Soviet negotiators made Mao feel boss did not act, his subordinates could Goncharev, Lewis, and Xue allude, like he was forced to part with pieces not take any initiatives on their own. there is no evidence from archival of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, The exertions of his own 70th birthday sources of when the Soviet leader gave Xinjiang, and Mongolia to get the So- celebrations (on 21 December 1949) his go-ahead for a new treaty to be ne- viet assistance which he needed. Espe- and the ensuing New Year functions gotiated. It was not until meeting with cially when the Soviets introduced the may also have taken their toll on the Mao and Zhou on January 22 and de- issues of excluding all non-Soviet for- vozhd and made it inopportune for him claring “to hell with” the Yalta accords eigners from Manchuria and Xinjiang to seek out difficult negotiations just at that Stalin made clear to the Chinese and establishing joint Sino-Soviet com- that time. that he was ready to scrap the 1945 text. panies in Xinjiang, Mao must have felt We know that Stalin did meet with A contributing factor to Stalin’s that he paid a heavy price. Mao on at least three occasions during change of mind may have been the con- As we see clearly from the Chinese this period, but existing sources indi- versations on U.S. foreign policy which record, Stalin’s tactics, driven by sus- cate that those meetings were brief and were held in Moscow and Beijing in the picion and rancor, were unnecessary for dealt exclusively with specific practi- interim. As shown by the record of the preventing Sino-American rapproche- cal issues, such as sending Soviet teach- January 17 meeting—where the topic ment and most unhelpful for establish- ers to China and Soviet assistance in for discussion was Secretary of State ing a lasting Sino-Soviet relationship. repairing the Xiaofengman hydroelec- Dean G. Acheson’s speech on develop- Stalin kept his railway and naval con- tric station. In their book Uncertain ments in Asia before the National Press cessions in Manchuria (although the Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean Club in Washington on January 12— leasing period was shortened), and se- War, Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Mao was very much aware of how im- cured phrasing in the secret additional 226 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

protocols on Xinjiang and Manchuria Stalin, on the other hand, often made 8 Record of conversation, Shibaev-Li Kenong, which gave him a sense of strategic hasty decisions based on little or no in- 16 January 1950, Archive of Foreign Policy of control of these areas. But Stalin and formation or consultation. And since the Russian Federation (AVPRF), f. 0100, o. 43, his associates paid a price for their con- there was, at least in this case, little p. 302, d. 10, ll. 38-44. cessions which was considerably higher room for initiatives by any of Stalin’s 9 See Vyshinskii to Stalin, 2 February 1950, and than the price Mao paid for signing the subordinates, the result was a disjointed attached draft agreements, AVPRF, f. 07, o 23a, agreements which provided him with policy-making process, through which p. 18, d. 234. On ll. 29-34 Vyshinskii summa- protection, legitimacy, and aid. By his the Soviets won a pyrrhic victory—ex- rized his conversation with Zhou earlier that day. actions, Stalin undermined Chinese acting Chinese concessions, but losing 10 See Roshchin’s and Mikoian’s conversations faith in the commonality of ideological the opportunity to forge a lasting alli- with Zhou on February 12, summarized in principles between the two sides. ance. AVPRF, f. 07, o 23a, p. 18, d. 234, ll. 71-74 and The “lessons” of Soviet perfidy in 64-68. For a very interesting summary of pros- 1949-50 poisoned China’s relationship 1 By far the best survey of the summit available pects for trade, see Kosiachenko et al. to Molotov to Moscow through the 1950s and be- is in Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and et al., “O torgovle s Kitaiskoi Narodnoi yond. Almost twenty years after the Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and Respublikoi” [“On trade with the People’s Re- signing of the treaty, as Zhou Enlai ad- the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer- public of China”], 12 February 1950, AVPRF, f. vised Vietnam’s Communists on the sity Press, 1993), 84-129. Although very little 07, o. 23a, p. 18, d. 237, ll. 1-249. diplomatic aspects of liberating their has been published in China in terms of docu- 11 Transcript of talks between Vietnamese and country, he recalled his and Mao’s ex- ments (except the items which are included in the Chinese party delegations, Beijing, 11 April 1967. periences with the Soviets in the late present collection), there are a number of mem- 12 CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 143. 1940s. “The closer to victory your oirs dealing with the summit. The most impor- struggle is, the fiercer your struggle with tant is Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian [Along- TRANSLATED RUSSIAN AND the Soviet Union will be.... The closer side giants in history] (Beijing: Zhongyang CHINESE DOCUMENTS ON MAO your war comes to victory, the more wenxian, 1991). Shi was Mao’s interpreter in ZEDONG’S VISIT TO MOSCOW, obstructive and treacherous the revi- Moscow. DECEMBER 1949-FEBRUARY 1950 sionist Soviets—who cannot compare 2 The Mao-Stalin conversations of 16 December even to Stalin— will be. I refer to [our] 1949 and 22 January 1950 were published in Document 1: Telegram, Mao Zedong to past experiences in order to make you CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 5-9, Liu Shaoqi, 18 December 19491 vigilant.”11 with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, As the evidence now stands, it is Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok. (1) [I] arrived in Moscow on the 16th hard to see it corroborating Goncharev, 3 For an overview of what was known up to the and met with Stalin for two hours at 10 p.m. Lewis, and Xue’s view of Stalin and mid-1980s, see Peter Jones and Sin Kevill, (Beijing time). His attitude was really sin- Mao as, in Michael Hunt’s phrase, comps., China and the Soviet Union 1949-84 cere. The questions involved included the “shrewd nationalists and resolute (London: Longman, 1985). For a comparative possiblity of peace, the treaty, loan, Taiwan, realpolitikers engaged in an intricate view, see Margot Light, ed., Troubled Friend- and the publication of my selected works. game of international chess.”12 Where ships: Moscow’s Third World Ventures (London: (2) Stalin said that the Americans are afraid they see a well-considered plan, at least British Academic Press, 1993). of war. The Amerians ask other countries to on Stalin’s part, the documents suggest 4 See, e.g., Mao’s March 1956 conversation with fight the war [for them], but other countries a good deal of improvisation and inde- Soviet ambassador Pavel Yudin, CWIHP Bulle- are also afraid to fight a war. According to cision on the part of the Soviet leader- tin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 164-167. him, it is unlikely that a war will break out, ship. If one adds to this the multiple and 5 Soviet records on Liu Shaoqi’s trip to Moscow and we agree with his opinions. (3) With often unintended consequences of cul- in the summer of 1949 have recently been released regard to the queston of the treaty, Stalin tural misperceptions and quirky person- from the Archive of the President of the Russian said that because of the Yalta agreement, it alities so clearly brought out in the Federation (APRF) and published in the journal is improper for us to overturn the legitimacy memoirs, the picture which emerges is Problemi Dalnego Vostok [Problems of the Far of the old Sino-Soviet treaty. If we abolish rather of two “giants of history” strug- East] introduced by former Soviet ambassador to the old treaty and sign a new one, the status gling, and ultimately failing, to con- Mongolia Andrei Ledovsky. For an English trans- of the Kurile Islands will be changed and struct a purpose to their bilateral rela- lation, see Andrei Ledovsky, “The Moscow Visit the United States will have an excuse to take tionship beyond the treaty text. of a Delegation of the Communist Party of China them away. Therefore, on the question of The Chinese side, if anything, in June to August 1949,” Far Eastern Affairs 4 the Soviet Union’s thirty-year lease of came out better than the Soviets as far (1996), 64-86. Lushun [Port Arthur], we should not change as a “realist,” interest-oriented agenda 6 See Odd Arne Westad, “Brothers: Visions of an it in format; however, in reality, the Soviet is concerned. Mao’s decision-making Alliance,” in Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Union will withdraw its troops from Lushun was, in 1950, still oriented toward con- Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, forth- and will let Chinese troops occupy it. I ex- sensus within his party and relied coming. pressed that too early a withdrawal [of the heavily on trusted advisers whose judg- 7 Former Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister Mikhail Soviet troop from Lushun] will create un- ments influenced his own thinking. Kapitsa, author’s interview, 7 September 1992. favorable conditions for us. He replied that COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 227 the Soviet withdrawal of troops [from dure of discussion, and we should act in the Lushun] does not mean that the Soviet same way toward all capitalist countries. If FROM THE DIARY OF Secret Union will stand by with folded arms [in a a certain capitalist country openly an- ROSHCHIN N.V. Copy No.2 crisis]; rather, it is possible to find ways nounces the desire to establish diplomatic through which China will not become the relations with us, our side should telegraph MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION first to bear the brunt. His opinon is that we that country and request that it dispatch its WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE may sign a statement, which will solve the representative to China for discussions about PEOPLE’S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT Lushun problem in accordance with the establishing diplomatic relations, and at the OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF above-mentioned ideas, and that by doing same time, we may openly publish the main CHINA, COMRADE MAO ZEDONG so, China will also gain political capital contents of the telegram. By doing so, we 1 JANUARY 1950 [zhengzhi ziben]. I said that it is necessary will be able to control the initiative.2 for us to maintain the legitimacy of the Yalta Following the orders of the USSR Sec- agreement. However, public opinion in [Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao retary of Foreign Affairs, comrade [Andrei] China believes that since the old treaty was [Mao Zedong’s manuscripts since the found- Vyshinskiy, on January 1 [I] visited the signed by the GMD [Guomindang; ing of the People’s Republic; hereafter Chairman of the People’s Central Govern- Kuomintang, KMT], it has lost its ground JGYLMZDWG], vol. 1 (Beijing: Central ment of the People’s Republic of China, with the GMD’s downfall. He replied that Press of Historical Documents, 1987), 193; comrade Mao Zedong. the old treaty needs to be revised and that translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian After an exchange of New Year greet- the revision is necessarily substantial, but it Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign ings and other formalities, a friendly and will not come until two years from now. (4) Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 129.] warm conversation took place, during which Stalin said that it is unnecessary for the For- comrade Mao Zedong related the following. eign Minister [Zhou Enlai; Chou En-Lai] to Document 3: Telegram, Mao Zedong to During the past few days he received a fly here just for signing a statement. I told CCP CC, 22 December 1949 report from Beijing that the governments of him that I will consider it. I hope that the Burma and India expressed their readiness commercial, loan, and aviation agreements Central Committee: to recognize the government of the People’s will be signed at the same time, and the Pre- (1) According to [Wang] Jiaxiang, Po- Republic of China. The position of the Chi- mier [Zhou Enlai] should come. It is hoped land, Czechoslovakia, and Germany all want nese government on this matter is as fol- that the Politburo will discuss how to solve to do business with us. If this is true, we are lows: to inform the governments of Burma the treaty problem and offer its opinions. going to have trade relations with three more and India that if they are sincere in their countries besides the Soviet Union. In ad- wishes to mend diplomatic relations with the [Source: Pei Jianzhang et al., Zhonghua dition, we have done business or are going People’s Republic of China, first they must renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi [A Diplomatic to do business with Britain, Japan, the completely break all ties with Jiang Jieshi, History of the People’s Republic of China] United States, India and other countries. unconditionally refuse any kind of support (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1994), 17-8; Therefore, in preparing the trade agreement and assistance to this regime, making it into translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian with the Soviet Union, you should have a an official declaration. Under the condition Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign comprehensive perspective. While we that the governments of these countries ac- Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Docu- should naturally give top priority to the So- cept the aforementioned proposals of the mentary Evidence, 1944-1950 (Chicago: viet Union, we should at the same time pre- Chinese government, the Indian and Bur- Imprint Publications, 1996), 128.] pare to do business with Poland, Czecho- mese governments may send their represen- , Germany, Britain, Japan, the tatives to Beijing for negotiations. Document 2: Telegram, Mao Zedong to United States, and other countries, and you Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, need to have a general evaluation of its scope there is also information, which states that 19 December 1949 (excerpt) and volume. (2) The telegram of the 21st in the very near future England and other has been received. We have arranged with countries of the British Commonwealth will (1) As to the question of the Burmese Stalin to have a discussion on the 23rd or evidently take steps toward recognizing the government’s request to establish diplomatic 24th. After that discussion, we will be able People’s Republic of China. relations with us, you should ask it in a re- to determine the guideline, which we will Touching upon the military situation in turn telegram if it is willing to cut off its inform you by telegraph. China, comrade Mao Zedong pointed out diplomatic relations with the Guomindang, that as of now all of the main Guomindang and at the same time invite that government [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:197; transla- forces on the mainland of China have been to dispatch a responsible representative to tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, crushed. In the Szechuan and Xinjiang Beijing for discussions about establishing eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy [Sinkiang] provinces approximately 400 diplomatic relations between China and and the Cold War in Asia, 129.] thousand Guomindang troops were taken Burma. Whether the diplomatic relations prisoner and switched to the side of the will be established or not will be determined Document 4: Memorandum, 1 January People’s Liberation army. For the remain- by the result of the discussions. It is neces- 1950 Conversation of Mao and USSR der of the Khutszunan cluster, numbering sary that we should go through this proce- Ambassador to China N.V. Roshchin 30-40 thousand persons, all the routes for 228 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

retreating to Tibet and to the south have been stay in the USSR for three months, how- The conversation was translated by Shi cut off. They will be destroyed in the very ever, presently the circumstances of [his] Zhe (Karskiy). near future. In Yunnan there are also up to work in China are forcing him to reduce the After parting with comrade Mao another 30 thousand persons scattered to the length of his stay to two months. Keeping Zedong, I remained to wait for the car with south-west from Kunming in separate in mind the eleven-day [train] travel to Karskiy. The latter informed me that com- groups of Guomindang followers, but their Beijing, he intends to leave Moscow at the rade Mao Zedong has been feeling much fate has been decided. end of January, counting on being in Beijing better for three days already. He sleeps fine, Mao Zedong requested to transmit the on February 6. without taking medication, jokes, is cheer- following information concerning his health After listening to all of comrade Mao ful and talkative with everyone, but, the condition and his plans for further stay in Zedong’s announcements, I stated that I will same as before, cannot be out in the fresh Moscow to the leaders of the Soviet gov- report all of his wishes to the government air for long. He still gets spells of dizziness. ernment: the very next day. Comrade Mao Zedong firmly decided to rest “My health condition — says Mao Further I asked comrade Mao Zedong another week and not travel anywhere. On Zedong, — has improved after a two-year if he is aware of the proposal made by the January 2 a conference of doctors will take resting period. For the last four days I have Soviet government in November [1949], to place. been sleeping 8 hours a day with no prob- hand over a few hundred Japanese army lems, without taking special sleeping medi- officers to the Chinese government, in or- USSR AMBASSADOR IN CHINA cation. I feel much more energetic, but when der to bring them to justice for crimes and /s/ (Roshchin) going for a walk, I cannot remain out in the atrocities which they committed while sta- fresh air for more than a quarter of an hour tioned in China. [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian - I get dizzy. With regard to this, I intend to Comrade Mao Zedong stated that he Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, f. 0100, op. rest one more week in total peace and com- was aware of this even prior to his depar- 43, d. 10, papka 302, ll. 1-4; document pro- pletely restore a normal sleeping pattern.” ture from Beijing, but because they were vided by O.A. Westad; translation for Further he pointed out that following busy with preparations for the trip to Mos- CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.] the week-long rest period he would like to cow, the Chinese government was not able visit comrades Shvernik, Molotov, to look into this matter seriously. His point Document 5: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Voroshilov, Beria, Malenkov, Vasilevskiy, of view on this matter is as follows: as a CCP CC, 2 January 19503 and Vyshinskiy. These visits will have to matter of principle, the Chinese government take the nature of ordinary conversations. will take these criminals and will put them Central Committee: He will not talk about any specific topics on trial for all their deeds. However, taking (1) Our work here has achieved an nor discuss any business matters. There must into consideration that presently the atten- important breakthrough in the past two days. be one visit per day, they must not be very tion of the Chinese people is concentrated Comrade Stalin has finally agreed to invite lengthy, and he thinks that the best time for on the events surrounding the elimination Comrade Zhou Enlai to Moscow and sign a them would be after 5-6 pm. of the final remnants of the Guomindang and new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and During the same time period he would that the Chinese court system has not yet Alliance and other agreements on credit, like to meet with I.V. Stalin to discuss busi- been ironed out, the Chinese government trade, and civil aviation. Yesterday, on 1 ness matters. cannot begin the trial process without pre- January, a decision was made to publish my After completing the discussion con- paring the population for it, because it will interview with the Tass correspondent, and cerning business matters, during the remain- not have a proper political effect. Besides, it is in the newspapers today (2 January), der of the stay he intends to place a wreath the Chinese government must at the same which you might have already received. At at Lenin’s mausoleum, see the subway sys- time prepare the trials against the 8:00 p.m. today, Comrade Molotov and tem, visit a few collective farms, attend the- Guomindang military criminals. Comrade Mikoyan came to my quarters to aters, and with that finish his stay in Mos- Taking into consideration all of this — have a talk, asking about my opinions on cow. says Mao Zedong, — I suppose that we will the Sino-Soviet treaty and other matters. I Comrade Mao Zedong emphasized that be able to take the military criminals from immediately gave them a detailed descrip- he refrains from visiting factories, meetings Soviet territory after six months. I ask the tion of three options: (a) To sign a new Sino- with large audiences, and giving public Soviet government to keep these criminals Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. speeches, because it is tiring to his health for the first six months of 1950 on its terri- By taking this action, we will gain enormous and may, once again, disturb his sleeping tory and, if possible, to collect more infor- advantages. Sino-Soviet relations will be pattern and provoke a relapse of spells of mation on them for the trial. In the begin- solidified on the basis of the new treaty; in dizziness. Previously he intended to visit ning of the second half of the year we will China, workers, peasants, intellectuals, and different places in the Soviet Union, but take them and will put them on trial. the left wing of the national bourgeoisie will presently, due to his health condition, he On this the business discussion was be greatly inspired, while the right wing of refrains from traveling around the Soviet concluded. Following the discussion com- the national bourgeoisie will be isolated; and Union, because there is a long trip home rade Mao Zedong invited me to the table to internationally, we may acquire more po- ahead of him. have dinner together with him. I accepted litical capital to deal with the imperialist Upon leaving Beijing he intended to the invitation. countries and to examine all the treaties COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 229 signed between China and each of the im- news should not be publicized until Zhou People’s Republic in a more advantageous perialist countries in the past. (b) To pub- has arrived in Moscow. position in the world. It will press the capi- lish through the news agencies of the two (3) Are the above-stated arrangements talist countries to come to our terms; it will countries a brief communique stating that feasible? Will five days be enough for you be favorable for China to be recognized un- the authorities of the two countries have to finish the preparations? Does [Zhou] need conditionally by various countries, and for exchanged opinions on the old Sino-Soviet one or two more days for preparation? Is it the old treaties to be abolished and new trea- treaty and other issues, and have achieved a necessary for Comrade Li Fuchun or other ties to be signed; and it will deter the capi- consensus, without mentioning any of the comrades to come to offer assistance? Please talist countries from taking reckless actions. details. In fact, by doing so we mean to put consider them and report to me in a return off the solution of the problem to the fu- telegram. [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:213; transla- ture, until a few years later. Accordingly, tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, China’s foreign minister Zhou Enlai does [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:211-2; transla- eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy not need to come here. (c) To sign a state- tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, and the Cold War in Asia, 132-3.] ment, not a treaty, that will summarize the eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy key points in the two countries’ relations. If and the Cold War in Asia, 131-2.] Document 7: Telegram, Mao Zedong to this is the option, Zhou Enlai will not have CCP CC, 6 a.m., 5 January 1950 to come either. After I have analyzed in de- Document 6: Telegram, Mao Zedong to tail the advantages and disadvantages of CCP CC, 4 a.m., 3 January 1950 [Your] telegram of 7:30 p.m., 4 Janu- these three options, Comrade Molotov said ary has been received. (1) We have already promptly that option (a) was good and that Central Committee: arranged [with the Soviet leaders] for Zhou Zhou should come. I then asked: “Do you My telegram of 11:00 p.m. yesterday to come here with approximately seventeen mean that the old treaty will be replaced by must have reached you. Comrade [Zhou] aides. He can come. There should be no a new one?” Comrade Molotov replied: Enlai’s trip to the Soviet Union must be of- problem. We have also informed the authori- “Yes.” After that we calculated how long it ficially approved at a meeting of the Gov- ties here that the train will leave Beijing on would take for Zhou to come here and to ernment Administration Council. The Coun- the night of 9 January. (2). It is better if sign the treaty. I said that my telegram would cil should also be informed that the main Bao Erhan, Deng Liqun and the head of the reach Beijing on 3 January, and that [Zhou] purposes of Zhou’s trip are as follows: to trade department of the Yili [Ili] region could Enlai would need five days for preparations negotiate and sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty arrive in Moscow on 21 or 22 January, two and could depart from Beijing on 9 Janu- of Friendship and Alliance (in comparison or three days after [Zhou] Enlai’s arrival; ary. It would take him eleven days by train to the old treaty, there will be some changes but it is fine if they come on 19 January, the [to travel to Moscow], so he could arrive in concerning the status of Lushun [Port same day Enlai arrives. Please inform me Moscow on 19 January. The negotiation and Arthur] and Dalian, although the details still immediately about your decision [on this the signing of the treaty would need about have to be negotiated; however, the defense matter]. Please also decide and report to me ten days, from 20 January to the end of the against possible aggression of Japan and its what kind of transportation Bao Erhan and month. Zhou and I would return home in allies and the recognition of Outer Deng Liqun will need for getting here. Do early February. Meanwhile we also dis- Mongolia’s independence will continue to we need to dispatch a plane from here, or is cussed the plans for my sightseeing outside constitute the basic spirit of the new treaty); it possible for the air transportation regiment [my quarters and Moscow], and we decided to negotiate and sign a credit agreement (we now stationed in Xinjiang assign a plane for that I would visit Lenin’s tomb, travel to have proposed the sum of $300 million, them? Please inform me of your decision Leningrad, Gorky, and other places, and which will be provided over a few years; immediately by telegraph. (3) Concerning make tours of such places as an ordnance the reason why we have not requested more the key points of the negotiation and the factory, the subway (Molotov and Mikoyan is that [we believe] it better for us to bor- preparatory work [for the negotiation], all recommended these two items) and a col- row less than to borrow more at present and the points you have put forward should be lective farm. We also discussed the prob- for several years); and to negotiate and sign carefully considered, and preparations lem of my meeting with various Soviet lead- a civil aviation agreement (it will benefit the should be made accordingly. Since we are ers (so far I have not left my quarters to pay development of our own aviation industry) going to engage in negotiations, we should an individual visit to any of them). and a trade agreement (by defining the scope present our views extensively, and should (2) Please finish all the preparations of the barter trade with the Soviet Union, make our points clear. After Enlai’s depar- [for Zhou’s departure] in five days after you we will be in a more favorable position to ture, the Central Committee may continue receive this telegram. I hope that [Zhou] determine the orientation of our own pro- to study these issues, and inform us of its Enlai, together with the minister of trade4 duction, as well as to conclude trade agree- opinions by telegraph at any time. As far as and other necessary aides, and with the nec- ments with other countries). In addition, you the materials on trade are concerned, if you essary documents and materials, will depart should gather all the members of the Gov- are unable to have them ready in five days, from Beijing for Moscow by train (not by ernment Council now in Beijing for a brief- you may continue working on them after air) on 9 January. Comrade Dong Biwu will ing. At both meetings, you should point out Enlai’s departure, and report to us by tele- assume the post of acting premier of the that this move [the signing of an alliance graph at any time. Government Administration Council. The treaty with the Soviet Union] will place the 230 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:215; transla- erating station and draft the necessary mea- Security Council to expel the representative tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, sures for putting an end to the disastrous of the Guomindang group from the Coun- eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy condition of the Jilin [Xiao-fengman] hy- cil. In the event that the Guomindang repre- and the Cold War in Asia, 133.] dro-electric power station. sentative remains in the Security Council, Mao Zedong voiced his gratitude to the the Soviet representative will declare that Document 8: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Soviet Government for rendering the nec- he will not participate in the work done by CCP Central Committee, 5 January essary assistance by answering that the help the aforementioned Council so long as the 1950 rendered by the Soviet Union in this matter Guomindang representative will be partici- is of great significance to China’s entire pating in it. Please pay attention to two matters: (1) national economy. Mao Zedong said that he agrees with When the question of replacing the [old] 2. I informed Mao Zedong that, with this course a hundred percent and thinks that Sino-Soviet treaty with a new treaty has regard to Liu Shaoqi’s telegram concerning copies of such a declaration from the been reviewed by the Government Admin- fuel supplies from the Soviet Union for the People’s Republic of China to the Security istrative Council and the [Central People’s] use of pilot training, [we] intend to answer Council can be directed to the members of Government Council, please urge all the that, according to calculations made by our the Security Council simultaneously. participants to maintain secrecy. (2) Before experts, it has been determined that the need I noted that after coordinating this mat- Zhou [Enlai] departs with his more than ten for fuel for the aforementioned purpose is ter from the Chinese side, I will have to [assistants], or on their way [travelling to determined by the standards of the Soviet present the proposal to the Soviet Govern- Moscow], it is necessary for him to assemble Army in the following amounts: 13,400 tons ment for consideration. all those people to declare discipline to them, of high-octane gasoline, 5,270 tons of low- 4. Mao Zedong said that, in regard to telling them that undisciplined words and octane gasoline, 1,315 tons of aviation oil, the message of the Soviet Government to actions are prohibited, and that they must and 26 tons of product P-9. the People’s Government of China concern- obey orders on every occasion. The Soviet Government will give an ing the Japanese military criminals /971 order to direct the aforementioned amount persons/, he would like to report the follow- [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:217; transla- of fuel to China in the course of the first ing: tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, half of the year, starting with January. As 1. In general, there is no doubt that the eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy far as the methods and conditions of pay- Japanese military criminals must be trans- and the Cold War in Asia, 134.] ment by China for the delivered fuel are ferred to China to stand trial. concerned, they can be determined during 2. However, the Chinese Government Document 9: Conversation between the negotiations concerning the commodity intends to put the Japanese military crimi- A. Vyshinsky and Mao Zedong, circulation for the year 1950. nals on trial at the same time as the Moscow, 6 January 1950 Mao Zedong voiced his agreement Guomindang military criminals. The orga- with the telegram and asked to express grati- nization of such a trial process is planned to FROM THE DIARY OF SECRET tude to the Soviet Government for this as- take place approximately during the first or A.Y. VYSHINSKY sistance. As far as the amount of fuel goes, second half of 1951. Therefore, it would be he said that “our people would like to ac- desirable for the Soviet Government to agree MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION quire more” and they have to be under strict temporarily to keep the aforementioned WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE control. He is grateful to the Soviet Gov- Japanese military criminals in the Soviet PEOPLE’S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ernment for reviewing the calculations in Union, roughly until the second half of 1950. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF this situation, an action with which he com- I noted that, since the Soviet Union is CHINA, MAO ZEDONG pletely agrees. Mao Zedong added that the bound by corresponding obligations — to 6 January 1950 matter of fuel expenditure has to be dealt repatriate all Japanese military prisoners by with in a strict manner, because it will be in January of 1950, perhaps it would be more On 6 January of the current year, I vis- the interests of China itself, which must be expedient to agree on formally considering ited Mao Zedong. After a brief exchange of more frugal in using the articles of outside the Japanese military criminals as having greetings and formalities conversation of the assistance. Mao Zedong asked [me] to leave been transferred to China, but in fact to tem- following content took place. him the text of the telegram. porarily leave them on the Soviet territory. 1. I informed Mao Zedong that with 3. I asked Mao Zedong whether he Mao said that this is the exact formula regard to the request of the People’s Cen- thinks it would be more expedient for the he considers to be the most expedient. tral Government of the People’s Republic People’s Republic of China to address the 5. Mao stated that he is increasingly of China for assistance with the disastrous Security Council of the United Nations with coming to the conclusion that the People’s condition of the Jilin [Xiaofengman] hydro- a declaration that the remaining of the Republic of China and the Soviet Union electric power station, the Soviet govern- Guomindang representative in the Security need to draft a new treaty of friendship and ment has made a decision—to send, within Council is unlawful and that he must be ex- alliance between the two nations. The draft- a period of five days, four Soviet experts to pelled from the Council. As for itself, the ing of a new treaty between us, he said, China for a month, who must write a report Soviet Union intends to support this kind of stems from the completely new relations, on the condition of the hydro-electric gen- declaration and, in its turn, to demand the which have evolved between the People’s COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 231

Republic of China and the Soviet Union fol- ies and volume of exports to and imports cil and the United Nations’ general secre- lowing the victory of the People’s Revolu- from such countries as the Soviet Union, tary, if it was necessary, at the same time, to tion. A review of the existing treaty is espe- Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and send the telegram to the Soviet Union, Great cially necessary, since two important com- Hungary, as well as Great Britain, France, Britain, the United States, and France as per- ponents of the treaty, Japan and the the Netherlands, Belgium, India, Burma, manent members of the Security Council. Guomindang, have suffered major changes: Vietnam, Thailand, Australia, Japan, He said yes. He said that the Soviet Union Japan has ceased to exist as an armed force Canada, and the United States, for the whole would take due action in accordance with and the Guomindang has been broken up. of 1950. Otherwise, we may find ourselves China’s telegram. He made it clear that he Besides, as is well known, a certain group in a disadvantageous position. It is hoped asked my opinion in the capacity of [So- of the Chinese people is expressing dissat- that, after [Zhou] Enlai’s departure from viet] foreign minister, and I made it clear isfaction with the existing treaty between Beijing, [Liu] Shaoqi, Chen Yun, and [Bo] that my agreement was official. After receiv- China and the Soviet Union. Thus, the draft- Yibo will pay attention to this matter. ing this telegram, please move forward im- ing of a new treaty of friendship and alli- mediately, so that the telegram with this ance between China and the USSR would [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:218; transla- statement could be sent out before [Zhou] be in the best interests of both sides. tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, Enlai’s departure [for Moscow] on 9 Janu- While answering Mao Zedong, I said eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy ary. In addition to sending the telegram to that the question of a new treaty, in my eyes, and the Cold War in Asia, 134.] the United Nations’ secretary general and seems to be a complicated matter, since the the Security Council, the foreign ministries signing of a new treaty or reviewing of the Document 11: Telegram, Mao Zedong of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the existing treaty and introduction of any kind to Zhou Enlai and CCP CC, 6 a.m., United States, and France should also be of corrections may be used as an excuse by 7 January 1950 notified by telegram, with the text of the the Americans and the English for review- telegram to the United Nations attached. ing and altering parts of the treaty, chang- [Zhou] Enlai and the Central Commit- Please let me know of the arrangement on ing which may cause damage to Soviet and tee: this matter, as well as if you would be able Chinese interests. This is not desirable and At 1:00 a.m. today (the 7th), Vyshinskii to send out the telegram on 9 January. must not be allowed to occur. came to my quarters to talk about three mat- Mao noted that, without a doubt, this ters: (1) [The Soviet Union] is in a position [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:219-20; trans- circumstance must be taken into consider- to satisfy our request of purchasing airplane lation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, ation when creating a formula for solving fuel. (2) [The Soviet Union] is in a position eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy the given problem. to satisfy our request of offering assistance and the Cold War in Asia, 134-5.] Persons present during the conversa- in repairing the dam of the Xiaofengman tion: comrades Kovalev I.V., Fedorenko waterpower station. A letter with formal re- Document 12: Telegram, Mao Zedong N.T., and also Wang Jiaxiang and Shi Zhe / sponse to these two issues will be passed to to Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, 12 p.m., Karskiy/. me tomorrow (the 8th). (3) [He] proposed 7 January 1950 The conversation lasted approximately that our foreign ministry should issue a state- 45 minutes. ment to the United Nations Security Coun- [Liu] Shaoqi, [Zhou] Enlai: cil, denying that Jiang Tingfu, the represen- Here is a draft of the statement5 that A. Vyshinsky tative of the former Guomindang govern- Zhou is to telegraph to the president of the ment, had the legitimate right to hold United Nations General Assembly, the [Source: AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 43, d. 43, China’s seat at the Security Council. United Nations secretary general, and the papka 302, ll. 1-5; provided by O.A. Westad; Vyshinskii made it clear that if China issued governments of the ten member states of the translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.] such a statement, the Soviet Union was United Nations Security Council (do not ready to do one thing: if Jiang Tingfu re- send it to Yugoslavia). Please dispatch the Document 10: Telegram, Mao Zedong mained at the Security Council as China’s telegram per this draft. to Zhou Enlai and CCP CC, 6 a.m., representative (and it was said that he would 7 January 1950 even become the president of the Security [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:221; transla- Council this year), the Soviet Union would tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, [Zhou] Enlai and the Central Commit- refuse to attend the Security Council’s meet- eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy tee: ings. Vyshinskii asked my opinion. I imme- and the Cold War in Asia, 135.] We have received the two telegrams on diately stated that China’s foreign ministry the management of the question of estab- could issue a statement like this. I also said Document 13: Telegram, Mao Zedong lishing diplomatic relations with Great Brit- that my telegram would reach Beijing on 7 to CCP CC and CCP Northwest ain and India and the telegram on export- January, and that a statement signed by Bureau, 10 January 1950 (Excerpt) import trade, dated 8:00, 5 January. In re- China’s foreign minister Zhou Enlai could gard with the question of export-import be issued on 8 January or 9 January. I asked The Central Committee, and pass on trade, you must pay special attention to him that, in addition to sending the state- to Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], He making an overall plan on the total variet- ment to the United Nations Security Coun- [Long] and the Northwest Bureau: 232 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

(1) I fully agree to the plan to dispatch ters and talked with me this evening. He pro- takes.9 troops into Xizang [Tibet] contained in Liu posed that our government should send a [Bocheng]’s and Deng [Xiaoping]’s tele- telegram to the United Nations, addressing [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:237; transla- gram of 7 January.6 Now Britain, India, and the question of sending our representative tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, Pakistan have all recognized us, which is to the United Nations to replace the eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy favorable to [our] dispatching troops into Guomindang’s representative, since a very and the Cold War in Asia, 137.] Xizang. serious struggle is now under way in the (2) According to Comrade Peng Security Council over the legitimacy of the Document 17: Conversation, V.M. Dehuai, the four months needed for dis- GMD’s representative. While the Soviet Molotov and A.Y Vyshinsky with Mao patching troops [to Xizang] will start in mid- Union supports our government’s statement Zedong, Moscow, 17 January 1950 May (in the previous telegram I mistakenly about expelling the GMD’s representative, wrote “three months”).7 the United States, Great Britain, and the majority of the member states oppose the FROM THE DIARY OF TOP SECRET [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:226-7; transla- expulsion. Therefore, it is necessary for V.M. MOLOTOV tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, China to make a further statement. The tele- eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy gram can be sent out a week from now. I MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION and the Cold War in Asia, 136.] have agreed to his proposal. The Central OF V.M. MOLOTOV AND A.Y. Committee may need to consider a nomi- VYSHINSKY WITH THE CHAIRMAN Document 14: Telegram, Mao Zedong nee for our head representative and report OF THE PEOPLE’S CENTRAL to Liu Shaoqi, 13 January 1950 to me by telegraph, and the final decision GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S will be made after [Zhou] Enlai gets here. REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MAO Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi: (5) I will leave for Leningrad tomorrow (the ZEDONG, 17 JANUARY 1950 (1) I will depart for Leningrad today 14th), at 10:00 p.m., not today. I will stay in (the 13th) in the evening and will be back Leningrad for one day, the 15th, and will After an exchange of greetings and a to Moscow in two days. (2) I have arranged return on the 16th. [Wang] Jiaxiang, [Chen] brief dialogue on general topics, a conver- for Liu Yalou, Soviet advisor Kotov and two Boda, Shi Zhe, Wang Dongxing will accom- sation ofthe following content took place. other men to come here. Please inform Nie pany me. Ye Zilong and the technical staff 1. I told Mao Zedong, that on 12 Janu- Rongzhen of this matter. (3) Xiao Jinguang will stay to work in my quarters here. The ary [1950] the USA Secretary of State can now be appointed as commander of the Central Committee may send its telegrams Acheson gave a speech at the National Press navy; please also inform Nie Rongzhen to me as usual. Club, which touched on certain international about this appointment. matters, in particular, matters concerning [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:235-6; transla- China, USSR and their mutual relations. [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:234; transla- tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, Acheson’s statements concerning these mat- tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy ters are a clear slander against the Soviet eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136-7.] Union and were designed to deceive directly and the Cold War in Asia, 136.] public opinion. The United States went Document 16: Telegram, Mao Zedong bankrupt with its policy in China, and now Document 15: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Hu Qiaomu, 14 January 1950 Acheson is trying to justify himself, with- to Liu Shaoqi, 13 January 1950 out shying away from deceitful means in the Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu: process. An example of the extent of (1) I agree with your telegram dated I shall leave for Leningrad today at Acheson’s fabrications can be seen in the 13 January about implementing the order to 9:00 p.m. and will not be back for three days. following segment of his speech: requisition foreign military barracks and I have not yet received the draft of the “The following is taking place in preparing to force the United States to Renmin ribao [“People’s Daily”] editorial China: the Soviet Union, armed with evacuate all the former U.S. consulates from and the resolution of the Japanese Commu- these new means, is partitioning north- China.8 (2) I agree that the Shanghai Mili- nist Party’s Politburo. If you prefer to let ern regions of China from China and tary Control Commission should confiscate me read them, I will not be able to give you incorporating them into the Soviet or requisition immediately all the property my response until the 17th. You may prefer Union. This process has been com- left by the U.S. Economic Cooperation Ad- to publish the editorial after Comrade [Liu] pleted in Outer Mongolia. It has been ministration there. (3) As far as the problem Shaoqi has read them. Out Party should ex- almost completed in Manchuria, and I of taking over the property left by the pup- press its opinion by supporting the am sure that Soviet agents are sending pet regime in Hong Kong is concerned, Cominform bulletin’s criticism of Nosaka very favorable reports from Inner please make a decision after the Foreign and addressing our disappointment over the Mongolia and Sinkiang [Xinjiang]. Ministry and the Central Finance and Eco- Japanese Communist Party Politburo’s fail- This is what is happening. This is a nomics Commission have provided their ure to accept the criticism. It is hoped that partition of entire regions, vast regions, suggestions. I have no specific opinion on the Japanese Communist Party will take ap- inhabited by Chinese, a partition of this matter. (4) Vyshinskii came to my quar- propriate steps to correct Nosaka’s mis- these regions from China, and their in- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 233

corporation into the Soviet Union. doubts. At the same time, however, he in- to do so this very evening and immediately I want to announce this, and maybe quired if it would not be better for Xinhua made arrangements with comrade I will sin against my doctrine of repu- [Chinese News Agency] to make this kind Vyshinsky. diating dogmatism. But, in any case, I of declaration. Afterwards Mao Zedong said that dur- want to say that the fact that the Soviet I answered that since the matter con- ing the past few days the Americans have Union is taking over four northern re- cerns a speech by the Minister of Foreign mobilized the activities of their [diplomatic, gions of China, is the most important Affairs of the USA on an important matter, intelligence and information] networks and and the most significant factor in any the declaration should not be made by the are testing the ground for negotiations with great power’s relations with Asia. telegraph agency, but rather by the Minis- the People’s Government of China. Thus, a What does this signify to us? This try of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Re- few days ago, the head of the American tele- signifies something very, very impor- public of China. graph agency in Paris addressed Mao tant.” Mao Zedong said that he shares the Zedong with a question on how he would I advised Mao Zedong to familiarize same opinion and, after familiarizing him- react to the famous American expert on far- himself with Acheson’s entire speech and self with Acheson’s speech, tomorrow he eastern affairs [State Department official left him a full text of this speech (as reported will prepare the text for the declaration [to Philip C.] Jessup’s trip to Beijing for nego- by TASS). be made by] the Ministry of Foreign Af- tiations. Almost simultaneously, information Mao Zedong said that until now, as is fairs of the People’s Republic of China, sub- was received from Shanghai stating that known, these kinds of fabrications were the mit it to us for suggestions and corrections, steps are being taken by the American con- job of all kinds of scoundrels, represented and then telegraph it to Beijing, so that the sulate in Shanghai, through representatives by American journalists and correspondents. Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pres- of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, to ob- And now this dirty work has been taken up ently performing the duties of the Secretary tain agreement from the People’s Govern- by the Secretary of State of the USA. As of Foreign Affairs, can publish this declara- ment of China to send their representative they say, the Americans are making tion. At the same time Mao Zedong pointed to Hong Kong for negotiations with Jessup. progress! out that in this declaration he will expose However, we are paying no attention to this I responded that, with regard to Acheson’s slanderous fabrications against American ground testing, said Mao Zedong. Acheson’s speech, we think the Soviet the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Mao Zedong said that, as Union and the People’s Republic of China Mao Zedong asked what, in our opin- he already informed comrade Vyshinsky should respond accordingly. At the same ion, is the actual purpose of Acheson’s slan- earlier, the People’s Government of China time, I pointed out that according to a TASS derous declaration and could it, this decla- is taking certain measures toward forcing announcement from Washington, on 14 ration, be a kind of smokescreen, using the American consular representatives out uary, the former consul general in Mukden, which, the American imperialists will at- of China. We need to win time, emphasized [Angus] Ward, while responding to ques- tempt to occupy the island of Formosa? Mao Zedong, to put the country in order, tions from the press, stated the very oppo- I said that, after going bankrupt with which is why we are trying to postpone the site of what Acheson said in his speech on their policy in China, the Americans are try- hour of recognition by the USA. The later 12 January. In addition, I quoted the appro- ing, with the help of slander and deception, the Americans receive legal rights in China, priate portion of Ward’s declaration, which to create misunderstandings in the relations the better it is for the People’s Republic of stated that he did not see any signs which between the Soviet Union and the People’s China. On 14 January of this year, the local would point to the Soviet Union’s control Republic of China. I also said it is impos- government in Beijing informed the former over the administration of Manchuria or its sible to disagree that they are using the dis- American consul of their intention to appro- attempt to incorporate Manchuria into the semination of slander as a kind of a priate for their own use the barracks for- USSR, even though the Soviet Union is ex- smokescreen, in order to carry out their plans merly used by foreign armies, rights for ercising its treaty rights concerning the joint of occupation. In addition, I noted that, in which were acquired by foreigners through administration of KChZhD [Chinese our opinion, the declaration of the People’s inequitable treaties. Occupation of the afore- Changchun Railroad]. Government of China regarding Acheson’s mentioned buildings essentially means that I said that we intend to react to speech could point out that the fabrications the American consul will be deprived of the Acheson’s aforementioned speech with a of the USA Secretary of State are an insult house he is inhabiting and will force him to declaration from the Ministry of Foreign to China, that the Chinese people did not leave Beijing. In response, the American Affairs of the USSR. However, we would lead a struggle, so that someone else could consul in Beijing started threatening the prefer for the Chinese government to be the rule or establish control over one or another Chinese government that USA, as a sign of first to make a statement on this matter, and part of China, and that the Chinese people protest, will be forced to recall all of their afterwards, following the publication in our reject Acheson’s declaration. consular representatives from Beijing, press of the declaration of the People’s Gov- Mao Zedong said that he agrees with Tientsin, Shanghai, and Nanking. This way, ernment of China and Ward’s statement, the this and will immediately start drafting the said Mao Zedong in a half-joking manner, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs would declaration. At the same time he asked for the Americans are threatening us with ex- make an appropriate statement. the text of Acheson’s speech and Ward’s actly that which we are trying to accomplish. Mao Zedong said that he agrees with declaration to the press to be transferred to I noted that this policy of the Central this, and there is no place here for any Beijing for the Xinhua agency. I promised People’s Government of China is designed, 234 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

first and foremost, to reinforce the country’s of view it would be more expedient to act and the Cold War in Asia, 138.] internal situation, which is sufficiently clear through the Secretary of the Guomindang and understandable to us. delegation in the Union Council for Japan Document 19: Telegram, Mao Zedong 2. Furthermore, I said that the declara- Chen Tin-Cho, who not long ago sent a let- to Liu Shaoqi, 18 January 1950 tion by the People’s Republic of China, ter through General Derevyanko concern- which states that maintaining the ing the work he is performing with regard Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi: Guomindang representative in the Security to the switch of the aforementioned delega- The telegram of 17 January has been Council is unlawful and that Jiang Tingfu tion in Tokyo to the side of the People’s received. (1) That the United States is evacu- must be removed from it, as well as simul- Republic of China. We, noted Mao Zedong, ating all its official personnel from China is taneous actions by the Soviet representative need to exert influence on Zhu Shi-Min and extremely favorable for us. However, those in the Security Council, caused a commo- convince him to switch to our side. This democratic figures who have suffered from tion and, to a certain extent, confused our would allow us to reach a smoother solu- the fear of the United States may have some enemies’ camp. However, in order to bring tion to the question of our representative’s disagreement with such actions as the req- the struggle begun in the UN to a conclu- appointment to the Union Council for Ja- uisition of foreign military barracks. Please sion, we would consider it expedient for the pan. pay attention to making explanations to People’s Republic of China to appoint its Mao Zedong said that he will prepare them. (2) When the British charge d’affairs own representative to the Security Council. a response to Chen Tin-Cho’s letter and will [John C.] Hutchinson arrives in Beijing, And it would be preferable for this appoint- send it to us for delivery to the addressee in what questions should we raise in discus- ment to take place as soon as possible. Tokyo. sions with him? The Central Committee Mao Zedong responded that he had a I said that this proposal is acceptable should draft a written document on the ba- conversation with comrade Vyshinsky con- and we will be able to deliver comrade Mao sis of a discussion with members of the for- cerning this matter and completely agrees Zedong’s answer to Chen Tin-Cho through eign ministry, which should define the with such a proposal. However, for us, em- General Derevyanko. guidelines, approach that we are to adopt phasized Mao Zedong, this matter presents The conversation lasted 1 hour 20 min- and the concrete issues that we are to ad- a technical problem - selection of the can- utes. dress. The document should be reported to didate. The only suitable candidate is the Persons present during the conversa- me in advance. present deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs tion: comrade N.T. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe comrade Zhang Hanfu, even though he is (Karsky). [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:241; transla- somewhat weak for the purpose. I would like tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, to coordinate the question of appointing V. MOLOTOV [signature] eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy Zhang Hanfu with comrade Zhou Enlai 18.1.50 and the Cold War in Asia, 138.] upon his arrival in Moscow. I said that if that is the only problem, [Source: AVP RF, f. 07, op. 23a, d. 234, pap. Document 20: Telegram, Mao Zedong he can talk to Zhou Enlai over the phone 18, ll. 1-7; provided by O.A. Westad; trans- to Liu Shaoqi, 5:30 p.m., 18 January (VCh [a high frequency link] ), while he is lation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.] 1950 en route. Mao Zedong willingly agreed to com- Document 18: Telegram, Mao Zedong Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi: municate with Zhou Enlai over VCh and to to Liu Shaoqi, 17 January 1950 (1) This afternoon, at 4:30, I had a tele- coordinate this question immediately. phone conversation with [Zhou] Enlai (he 3. After this I said that according to our Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi: has arrived in Sverdlovsk and will, probably, information the head of the Guomindang (1) In response to the Vietnamese arrive in Moscow on 20 January, at 5:00 delegation in the Union Council for Japan, Government’s request to establish diplo- p.m.), and we felt that as Zhang Hanfu does General Zhu Shi-Min, wants to break with matic relations [with us], we should consent not have the necessary prestige and qualifi- the Guomindang and switch to the side of to it and give it our reply immediately. I have cation, he should be assigned as a deputy. It the People’s Republic of China. However, drafted a reply. Please broadcast it tomor- is more appropriate to let Luo Fu become we have no confidence that this informa- row (the 18th), while at the same time tele- China’s chief representative to the United tion is sufficiently reliable and, in addition, graphing it to by internal ra- Nations. A telegram to the United Nations we do not know Zhu Shi-Min well and it is dio transmitter.10 (2) Our foreign ministry has been drafted, and if the Central Com- difficult for us to arrive at any definite con- should pass the Vietnamese Government’s mittee agrees, please dispatch it and pub- clusion about him. For this reason we would statement requesting establishing diplomatic lish it tomorrow, on the 19th. (2) According like to discuss the matter with Mao Zedong relations with foreign countries to the So- to [Zhou] Enlai, both Gao Gang and [Li] and find out whether we should wait until viet Union and the other new democratic Fuchun agree that Luo Fu is qualified to be Zhu Shi-Min announces his switch or, with- countries.11 [China’s] diplomatic representative. But Luo out waiting for it, demand the removal of Fu himself is yet to be informed. When you the Guomindang representative from the [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:238; transla- publish the telegram [to the United Nations], Union Council for Japan. tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, please send a telegram to Luo Fu at the same Mao Zedong said that from his point eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy time, explaining that as we did not have COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 235 enough time, we were unable to get his con- ers arrived here on 20 [January]. On 21 and the Cold War in Asia, 141.] sent in advance, and that we thus ask for his [January], the twelve of us participated in a understanding. He will be notified in a sepa- meeting in commemoration of Lenin. On 22 Document 24: Telegram, Mao Zedong rate telegram for the time of his departure [January], six of us, including Shi Zhe, had and Zhou Enlai to Liu Shaoqi, 1 for the United Nations. (3) The completion a discussion with Comrade Stalin and oth- February 1950 of the procedure on his nomination can be ers, in order to settle the questions concern- waited until the convening of the sixth ses- ing principles and the working procedures. Comrade Liu Shaoqi: sion of the Government Council. If you feel On 23 [January], Zhou [Enlai], Wang Please convey our greetings to Com- necessary, you may summon the vice-chair- [Jiaxiang] and Li [Fuchun] had a discussion rade Ho Chi Minh.15 He has played the role persons of the government and the leading with Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, and Roshchin as the leader and organizer in the heroic members of the major parties for a discus- about several concrete issues. On 24 [Janu- struggle for Vietnam’s national indepen- sion tomorrow, the 19th. (4) Since [Zhou] ary], we handed to Vyshinskii a draft of the dence and the establishment of a people’s Enlai will soon come to Moscow, the state- Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, democratic government in Vietnam. China ment can be issued in Li Kenong’s name. and Mutual Assistance worked out by us.14 and Vietnam have recognized each other, (5) As what you did the last time, after the We are now drafting a second document, that and will soon establish diplomatic relations. telegram is dispatched, copies of it should is, the agreement on Lushun, Dalian, and The Soviet Union has already recognized be sent to the diplomats of the Soviet Union, the Chinese Chanchun Railway, and, prob- Vietnam, and it is hoped that the other new Czechoslovakia, Poland, Great Britain, ably, the drafting can be finished today. We people’s democratic countries will all give France, the Netherlands, and other countries have also decided that we will make a third their recognition (our embassy in the So- in Beijing. (6) When the Xinhua News document, the Sino-Soviet barter agreement, viet Union has delivered Vietnam’s memo- Agency publishes the news, it must be in- ready in three days. All in all, our work is randum asking for foreign recognition and troduced that Zhang Wentian is a member proceeding quite smoothly. (2) Attached establishing diplomatic relations to the em- of the CCP Central Committee, that he par- here is the draft of the Sino-Soviet Treaty bassies of all new democratic countries in ticipated in the 25,000-li Long March, and of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assis- the Soviet Union). We sincerely congratu- that he has been responsible for various tance. Please ask the Central Committee to late Vietnam’s joining the anti-imperialist kinds of revolutionary work. (7) Please let discuss it and report its opinions to me by and democratic family headed by the So- me know of the progress of your arrange- telegraph. Please pay attention to keeping it viet Union. We wish that the unification of ment on this matter. from the outsiders. the entire Vietnam would be soon realized. We also wish Comrade Ho Chi Minh and [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:242; transla- [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:251-2; English his comrades-in-arms good health. tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:254; transla- and the Cold War in Asia, 138-9.] Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 140-1.] tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy Document 21: Telegram, Mao Zedong Document 23: Remark, Mao Zedong, and the Cold War in Asia, 141-2.] to Liu Shaoqi, 5 a.m., 19 January 1950 “About the Negotiations on Establish- ing Diplomatic Relations with Britain,” Document 25: Telegram, Mao Zedong Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and convey to 29 January 1950 to Liu Shaoqi, 10 February 1950 [Hu] Qiaomu: (1) I have written an article in the name Zhou [Enlai]: Please make the follow- Comrade Liu Shaoqi: of [Hu] Qiaomu. Please carefully scrutinize ing response [to Beijing]: When [John C.] (1) It is approved that Su Yu may de- it and then publish it.12 (2) The article, Hutchinson comes, only the problems con- ploy four divisions in naval operation ma- “Japanese People’s Road (toward Libera- cerning the relations between Britain and neuver.16 (2) The first several phrases17 in tion),” is very good.13 It is now being trans- Jiang Jieshi and other problems related to the preface of the credit agreement, which lated into Russian, and we are preparing to establishing diplomatic relations [between mention China’s compensation to the So- submit it to Stalin to read. Britain and the PRC] should be discussed. viet Union, should not be omitted. (3) The The question of the requisitioning of the treaty and the agreements should be pub- [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:245; transla- military barracks should not be touched lished by both sides on the same day, and tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, upon. While meeting the Dutch charge you will be specially informed about the eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy d’affairs, if he mentions the recognition of date. (4) [Chen] Boda has written an edito- and the Cold War in Asia, 139.] Indonesia in exchange for [Dutch recogni- rial for the Xinhua News Agency, which we tion of the PRC], the matter should be re- will look over and send to you tomorrow. Document 22: Telegram, Mao Zedong ported to the superiors for consideration. Please ask [Hu] Qiaomu to scrutinize it, and to Liu Shaoqi, 5 a.m., 25 January 1950 then publish it at the same time the treaty is [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:253; transla- published.18 Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi]: tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, (1) [Zhou] Enlai, Li [Fuchun], and oth- eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:257-8; transla- 236 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, cil—the Soviet Union, the United States, Great to the Nosaka affair (see above, Mao Zedong tele- eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy Britain, France, Ecuador, India, Cuba, Egypt, and gram to Hu Qiaomu, 14 January 1950, and corre- and the Cold War in Asia, 142.] Norway: The Central People’s Government of the sponding footnote). People’s Republic of China is of the opinion that 14 This draft was worked out by Zhou Enlai un- Document 26: Telegram, Mao Zedong it is illegal for the representatives of the remnants der Mao’s direction. to Liu Shaoqi, 12 February 1950 of the reactionary gang of the Chinese National- 15 Ho Chi Minh, after walking for seventeen ist Party to remain in the Security Council. It days, arrived on the Chinese-Vietnamese border Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi: therefore holds that these representatives must be in late January 1950, and then he was taken to Here is an internal party telegram I expelled from the Security Council immediately. Beijing to meeting Liu Shaoqi and other CCP have just drafted. Please give it some con- I am specially calling your attention to this mat- leaders. He made it clear that his purpose to visit sideration as soon as you receive it and dis- ter by this telegram, and I hope that you will act China was to pursue substantial Chinese military patch it quickly[:] accordingly.” and other assistance to the Vietminh’s struggles All central bureaus, bureau branches, 6 In this telegram, Liu Bocheng and Deng against the French. He also expressed the desire and front-line committee: Xiaoping reported that they planned to dispatch to visit the Soviet Union. By the arrangement of A new Sino-Soviet treaty and a series the 18th Army to Tibet by the summer and fall of the CCP, Ho Chi Minh then travelled to the So- of agreements will be signed and published 1950. viet Union and met Stalin and Mao and Zhou in days. Then, when different regions hold 7 On 24 January 1950, the CCP Central Com- there. He would come back to China together with mass rallies, conduct discussions, and offer mittee formally issued the order to dispatch the Mao and Zhou and to continue discussions with opinions, it is essential to adhere to the po- 18th Army to enter Tibet. Chinese leaders. These discussions resulted in sition adopted by the Xinhua News 8 On 6 January 1950, Beijing Municipal Mili- Beijing’s (but not Stalin’s) commitment to sup- Agency’s editorial. No inappropriate opin- tary Control Commission ordered the requisition port Ho. For a more detailed discussion, see Chen ions should be allowed. of former military barracks of the American dip- Jian, “China and the First Indo-China War, 1950- lomatic compound in Beijing, which had long 1954,” The China Quarterly 132 (March 1993), [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:260-1; transla- been transformed into regular offices. Mao 85-110. tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, Zedong is here referring to this matter. 16 This refers to Su Yu’s plan to attack the GMD- eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy 9 On 6 January 1950, the Cominform Bulletin controlled Zhoushan islands. and the Cold War in Asia, 142-3.] published an article criticizing Nosaka Sanzo, a 17 The phrases to which Mao refers here are as member of the Japanese Communist Party’s Po- follows: “The Government of the Soviet Union litburo, for his alleged “mistake” of putting too agrees to satisfy the request of the Central 1 After leaving Beijing by train on 6 December much emphasis on the peaceful path to power in People’s Government of the People’s Republic 1949, Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow on 16 Japan and his “wrong understandings” of the ex- of China for a loan that is to be used in payment December and stayed in the Soviet Union until istence of U.S. influence in Japan. Although for the machines, facilities, and other material that 17 February 1950. Liu Shaoqi was put in charge Nosaka had long been known as a faithful sup- the Soviet Union has agreed to provide China.” during Mao’s absence. When Mao was in Mos- port of the CCP (he spent the war years in Yanan 18 This editorial, entitled “The New Era of Sino- cow, he maintained daily telegraphic communi- and attended the CCP’s Seventh Congress), the Soviet Friendship and Cooperation,” was pub- cations with his colleagues in Beijing, and all CCP leadership still decided to maintain as iden- lished by the Xinhua News Agency on 14 Febru- important affairs were reported to and decided tical stand with the Cominform in criticizing ary 1950. by him. Nosaka. For a more detailed description of the 2 After the Burmese government had cut off all “Nosaka affair,” see John Gittings, The World and FUTURE BULLETIN ISSUES formal relations with the GMD government in China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper and Row, Taiwan, the PRC and Burma established diplo- 1974), 160-162. Future issues of the CWIHP Bulletin are matic relations on 8 June 1950. 10 On 19 January 1950, Renmin ribao [People’s already being compiled, and you are invited 3 During the first two to three weeks of Mao Daily, the CCP Central Committee’s official to contribute! Among the themes currently projected for upcoming issues are: New Zedong’s visit in Moscow, little progress had been mouthpiece], published a statement by the Chi- Evidence on the End of the Cold War (in achieved in working out a new Sino-Soviet treaty nese government which formally recognized the both East-Central Europe and the USSR); that would replace the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty. Democratic Republic of Vietnam, announcing that New Evidence on the Indochina/Vietnam This telegram recorded the first major break- the PRC would be willing to establish diplomatic Wars; New Evidence the Cold War in the through during Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union. relations with DRV. Balkans; Stalin and the Cold War; and the 4 China’s minister of trade at that time was Ye 11 The Soviet Union and other East European Intelligence Services and the Cold War. Jizhuang. countries quickly established diplomatic relations On these and other topics relevant to 5 The full text of Zhou Enlai’s telegram to the with the DRV. Cold War history, the Bulletin welcomes United Nations, which was dispatched on 8 Janu- 12 As a response to Acheson’s speech made at submission of important new East-bloc evi- dence (particularly archival documents), as ary 1950, was as follows: “Lake Success, to Mr. the National Press Club on 12 January 1950, this well as reports on research conditions in Carlos Romulo, President of the United Nations article particularly criticized Acheson’s comments former (or present) communist countries and General Assembly; to Mr. Trygve Li, Secretary on Sino-American relations. For the text of the on research projects and activites. General of the United Nations; also to the mem- article, see Renmin ribao, 21 January 1950. ber states of the United Nations Security Coun- 13 This article was the CCP leadership’s response COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 237

THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN Kong University. In this article, spe- Stalin and Mao Zedong, requesting di- THE RUSSIAN AND CHINESE cially prepared for the Bulletin, a par- rect Soviet and Chinese military sup- VERSIONS OF MAO’S ticipant in that conference, Chinese his- port.2 Stalin immediately kicked the 2 OCTOBER 1950 MESSAGE TO torian Shen Zhihua, presents the results ball to the Chinese. In a telegram to Mao STALIN ON CHINESE ENTRY of his investigation in Beijing concern- Zedong on October 1, Stalin urged the INTO THE KOREAN WAR: ing the Chinese version of Mao’s tele- Chinese to “move at least five to six A CHINESE SCHOLAR’S REPLY gram and addresses Mansourov’s ques- divisions toward the 38th parallel at tion. An earlier version appeared in once,” without mentioning what Mos- by SHEN Zhihua spring 1996 in the Beijing publication cow would do to support the North translated by CHEN Jian* Dangshi yanjiu ziliao (Party History Koreans.3 At the most crucial moment Research Materials.--C.J.] of the Korean War, Mao and his com- [Translator’s Note: The Chinese rades in Beijing had to decide if they Communist Party leadership made the As I have argued elsewhere,1 would take on the main responsibility decision to enter the Korean War in China’s decision to enter the Korean and burden for rescuing North Korea. October 1950. For several years, schol- War was based primarily on crucial na- How did the Chinese leaders re- ars have relied upon Chinese docu- tional security (as opposed to ideologi- spond to Stalin’s and Kim Il-song’s re- ments available since the late 1980s to cal) considerations. After conflict on the quests to dispatch Chinese troops to discuss the process by which Beijing peninsula broke out into large-scale war Korea? Because of the recent emer- made that decision. Among these docu- in June 1950, and especially when the gence of two sharply different versions ments, one of the most crucial was a military situation turned from North of Mao Zedong’s telegram to Stalin telegram Mao Zedong purportedly sent Korea’s favor to disfavor that autumn, dated 2 October 1950, this has become to Stalin on 2 October 1950, in which the attitudes of China and the Soviet an issue under serious debate among the CCP chairman informed the Soviet Union toward the Korean situation ex- Chinese and foreign scholars. leader that Beijing had decided “to send perienced profound changes, leading to In 1987, the first volume of a portion of our troops, under the name divergent directions in policy. While the Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao of Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Soviet Union became increasingly cau- [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Korean comrades to fight the troops of tious about engaging itself in Korea (at Founding of the People’s Republic] was the United States and its running dog one point, Moscow even considered published under the neibu category .” abandoning the North Korean commu- (meaning “for internally circulation With the opening of Russian ar- nist regime to defeat), China began to only”). It included the main part of what chives in recent years, however, a adopt a strategy of positive defense, a was identified as a telegram by Mao sharply different version of Mao’s 2 strategy which would eventually lead Zedong to Stalin on 2 October 1950, October 1950 message to Stalin has to its entry into the War. The Chinese reading as follows: emerged, according to which Mao re- leaders’ primary concern was how to lated that because dispatching Chinese guarantee stable development—for the (1) We have decided to send a portion troops to Korea “may entail extremely People’s Republic of China, which had of our troops, under the name of [Chinese serious consequences,” many CCP only come into existence the previous People’s] Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the leaders believed China should “show fall after an exhausting civil war. How- Korean comrades in fighting the troops of caution” about entering the conflict, ever, if necessary, the Chinese leaders the United States and its running dog and consequently Beijing had tenta- did not fear entering a direct military Syngman Rhee. We regarded the mission tively decided against entering the war. confrontation with the United States, the as necessary. If Korea were completely oc- How did such a sharp discrepancy number one power in the world, under cupied by the Americans and the Korean between the Chinese and Soviet ver- the banner of “resisting America and as- revolutionary forces were substantially de- sions of this communication occur? sisting Korea, defending our home and stroyed, the American invaders would be Which (if either) is correct? What re- our nation.” more rampant, and such a situation would ally happened in Beijing and between As it is by now well known, be very unfavorable to the whole East. Beijing and Moscow in October 1950? China’s final decision to enter the war (2) We realize that since we have de- In the previous issue of the CWIHP Bul- was reached in the first three weeks of cided to send Chinese troops to Korea to letin (Winter 1995/1996), which first October 1950, after the successful U.S.- fight the Americans, we must first be able published the Russian version of the dis- U.N. landing at Inchon put the North to solve the problem, that is, that we are pre- puted telegram, Russian scholar Korean regime in danger of imminent pared to annihilate the invaders from the Alexandre Mansourov questioned the collapse. On 28 September 1950, the United States and from other countries, and accuracy and even authenticity of the (North) Korean Labor Party politburo to drive them out [of Korea]; second, since Chinese version. Debate continued in decided to solicit direct Soviet and Chi- Chinese troops will fight American troops January 1996 at a conference on “New nese military support. On September 29 in Korea (although we will use the name Evidence on the Cold War in Asia” or- and 30, Kim Il-song and Pak Hon-yong the Chinese Volunteers), we must be pre- ganized by CWIHP and hosted by Hong sent two urgent letters to, respectively, pared for an American declaration of war 238 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

on China. We must be prepared for the pos- 1500 pieces of artillery of various caliber I received your telegram of 1 October sible bombardments by American air forces ranging from 70mm to 240mm, including 1950. We originally planned to move sev- of many Chinese cities and industrial bases, tank guns and anti-aircraft guns, while each eral volunteer division to North Korea to and for attacks by American naval forces of our armies (three divisions) is equipped render assistance to the Korean comrades on China’s coastal areas. with only 36 pieces of artillery. The enemy when the enemy advanced north of the 38th (3) Of the two issues, the first one is would control the air while our air force, parallel. whether the Chinese troops would be able which has just started its training, will not However, having thought this over to defeat American troops in Korea, thus be able to enter the war with some 300 thoroughly, we now consider that such ac- effectively resolving the Korean problem. planes until February 1951. Therefore, at tions may entail extremely serious conse- If our troops could annihilate American present, we are not assured that our troops quences. troops in Korea, especially the Eighth Army will be able to annihilate an entire U. S. army In the first place, it is very difficult to (a competent veteran U.S. army), the whole once and for all. But since we have decided resolve the Korean question with a few di- situation would become favorable to the to go into the war against the Americans, visions (our troops are extremely poorly revolutionary front and China, even though we should be prepared that, when the U.S. equipped, there is no confidence in the suc- the second question ([the possibility] that high command musters up one complete cess of military operations against Ameri- the United States would declare war on army to fight us in a campaign, we should can troops), the enemy can force us to re- China) would still remain as a serious is- be able to concentrate our forces four times treat. sue. In other words, the Korean problem will greater than those of the enemy (that is, to In the second place, it is most likely end in fact with the defeat of American use four of our armies to fight against one that this will provoke an open conflict be- troops (although the war might not end in enemy army) and to marshal firing power tween the USA and China, as a consequence name, because the United States would not one and a half to two times stronger than of which the Soviet Union can also be recognize the victory of [North] Korea for that of the enemy (that is, to use 2200 to dragged into war, and the question would a long period). If this occurs, even though 3000 pieces of artillery of 70mm caliber and thus become extremely large. the United States had declared war on China, upward to deal with the enemy’s 1500 pieces Many comrades in the CC CPC judge the ongoing confrontation would not be on of of the same caliber), so that we that it is necessary to show caution here. a large-scale, nor would it last very long. can guarantee a complete and thorough de- Of course, not to send our troops to We consider that the most unfavorable situ- struction of one enemy army. render assistance is very bad for the Korean ation would be that the Chinese forces fail (6) In addition to the above-mentioned comrades, who are presently in such diffi- to destroy American troops in large num- twelve divisions, we are transferring another culty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but bers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, twenty-four divisions, as the second and if we advance several divisions and the en- and that, at the same time, the United States third echelons to assist Korea, from south emy forces us to retreat; and this moreover openly declares war on China, which would of the Yangzi River and the Shaanxi-Gansu provokes an open conflict between the USA be detrimental to China’s economic recon- areas to the Long-hai, Tianjin-Pukou, and and China, then our entire plan for peaceful struction already under way, and would Beijing-Southern Manchuria railways; we construction will be completely ruined, and cause dissatisfaction among the national expect to gradually employ these divisions many people in the country will be dissatis- bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the next spring and summer in accordance with fied (the wounds inflicted on the people by people (who are absolutely afraid of war). the situation at the time.4 the war have not yet healed, we need peace). (4) Under the current situation, we have Therefore it is better to show patience decided, starting on October 15, to move the Although the message was not pub- now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] twelve divisions, which have been earlier lished in its entirety,5 the above text has actively prepare our forces, which will be transferred to southern Manchuria, into suit- made its importance self-evident. Since more advantageous at the time of war with able areas in North Korea (not necessarily the late 1980s, Korean War historians the enemy. close to the 38th parallel); these troops will have widely cited this telegram as main Korea, while temporarily suffering only fight the enemy that venture to attack evidence to support the notion that by defeat, will change the form of the struggle areas north of the 38th parallel; our troops early October 1950, the Chinese lead- to partisan war. We will convene a meeting will employ defensive tactics, while engag- ership, Mao Zedong in particular, had of the CC, at which will be present the main ing small groups of enemies and learning made the decision to send Chinese comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A about the situation in every respect. Mean- troops to Korea.6 final decision has not been taken on this while, our troops will be awaiting the ar- However, the opening of Russian question. This is our preliminary telegram, rival of Soviet weapons and being equipped archives in recent years indicated that we wish to consult with you. If you agree, with those weapons. Only then will our Mao, via Soviet ambassador to China then we are ready immediately to send by troops, in cooperation with the Korean com- N. V. Roshchin, had sent a message to plane Comrades ZHOU ENLAI and LIN rades, launch a counter-offensive to destroy Stalin on 2 October 1950 that drastically BIAO to your vacation place to talk over the invading American forces. differs from the above-cited Chinese this matter with you and to report the situa- (5) According to our information, ev- version. The Russian version reads as tion in China and Korea. ery U.S. army (two infantry divisions and follows: We await your reply.7 one mechanized division) is armed with COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 239

The obvious contradictions be- is kept there (this author was provided Mao draft one telegram (the Chinese tween these two versions of Mao access to it). The telegram was in Mao’s version) but deliver another message Zedong’s 2 October 1950 telegram to own handwriting and was longer than (the Russian version) to Stalin via the Stalin have inevitably raised serious the version that was published in Soviet ambassador? questions concerning what really hap- Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (the If we put this issue into the context pened in Beijing and between Beijing published version did not include the of the tortuous processes through which and Moscow in October 1950. At a sections about China’s requests for So- the CCP leadership reached the decision seminar held at the Woodrow Wilson viet ammunition and military equip- to send troops to Korea, we may find International Center for Scholars in ment). However, the format of this tele- that a major reason for Mao not to dis- Washington, D.C. on 13 December gram differed from that of many of patch the draft telegram to Stalin could 1995, and in his article in the Winter Mao’s other telegrams: while other tele- lie in the fact that the Chinese leader- 1995/1996 issue of the Cold War Inter- grams usually (but not always) carried ship had not yet reached a consensus national History Project Bulletin,8 the Mao’s office staff’s signature indicat- on this issue. Since the outbreak of the Russian scholar Alexandre Y. ing how and when the telegram was Korean War, Mao Zedong had been Mansourov cited the Russian version of dispatched, this telegram does not.11 carefully considering the question of Mao’s telegram to argue that the Chi- So, while it is certain that the Chinese sending troops to Korea. After the nese leaders were reluctant to send version of Mao’s telegram is a genuine Inchon landing in mid-September, he troops to Korea, and that they might document, there exist reasonable seemed to have been determined to do have completely backed away from grounds on which to believe that it so. However, according to the materi- their original intention to send troops might not have been dispatched. als now available, the Chinese leaders to Korea early in October 1950. Fur- At the same time, the party archi- did not formally meet to discuss dis- ther, Mansourov questioned the authen- vists in Beijing could not find the Rus- patching troops to Korea until after 1 ticity of Mao’s telegram published in sian version of the 2 October 1950 tele- October 1950. The reality was that Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao. gram in Mao’s files at CCP Central Ar- many Chinese leaders had different Comparing the styles and contents of chives. This, however, does not mean views on this issue. We now know that the two versions, he pointed out that that the Russian version is not a genu- after receiving Stalin’s October 1 tele- since the Russian version is a copy of ine document. One explanation of its gram, Mao summoned a Central Sec- an actual document kept at the Presi- absence in Mao’s files might be found retariat meeting the same night. Attend- dential Archive in Moscow, it should be in the format of the document: It is not ing the meeting were Mao, Zhu De, Liu regarded as more reliable than the pub- a telegram Mao Zedong directly sent to Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. Unable to at- lished Chinese version, which, he ar- Stalin, but is a message included in tain a consensus on sending troops to gued, could be “unreliable, inaccurate, Roshchin’s telegram to the Soviet Korea, the group decided to continue unsent, or perhaps misdated.”9 He even leader. Therefore, it is quite possible that to discuss the issue the next day at an stated that one cannot “exclude the pos- Mao verbally delivered the message to enlarged Central Secretariat meeting sibility that the text was altered or fal- Roshchin and authorized the Soviet (attendants would include high-ranking sified by Chinese authorities to present ambassador to convey it to Stalin. Be- military leaders in Beijing).12 It was what they deemed to be a more ideo- cause the message may not have been after this meeting that Mao sent an ur- logically or politically correct version in written form in the first place, it may gent telegram to Gao Gang, instructing of history.”10 not be so strange that one cannot locate him to travel from the Northeast to Mansourov’s casting of doubt on a copy of it at the CCP Central Archives. Beijing immediately. Mao also ordered the authenticity of the Chinese version If the above analysis is correct, one the Northeast Border Defense Army to of Mao’s telegram was based on a must further ask a question: Why did prepare to “enter operations [in Korea] simple, yet seemingly reasonable, de- at any time.”13 BROTHERS IN ARMS: duction: because the contents of the two According to the materials now THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SINO- versions are drastically different, and SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945-1963 available, as well as the recollections because the Russian version appeared of those who had been involved, we are authentic, something must have been Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the able to draw a general picture about the seriously wrong with the Chinese ver- Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963, edited by Odd enlarged Central Secretariat meeting on Arne Westad (Research Director, Norwegian sion. Nobel Institute), contains a collection of essays the afternoon of 2 October. Mao Zedong The situation, however, is more by Russian, Chinese, and American scholars (as emphasized at the meeting that it was complicated. After the exposure of the well as Westad) presenting new evidence from urgent to send troops to Korea, and the Russian version of the telegram, party Russian and Chinese sources on the development meeting thus decided that Peng Dehuai and demise of the alliance between Moscow and archivists in Beijing carefully searched Beijing in the early years of the Cold War. should be asked to command the troops. Mao’s documents at CCP Central Ar- For ordering information, contact: Odd Arne Mao also instructed Zhou Enlai to ar- chives, and confirmed that the original Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute, range a special plane to pick up Peng in of the Chinese version of Mao’s 2 Oc- Drammensveien 19, 0255 Oslo, Norway, fax: Xi’an (where Peng was then the mili- tober 1950 message did indeed exist and (+47-22) 430168; e-mail: oaw@nobel. no tary and Party head). However, the 240 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

meeting failed to yield a unanimous decision to send troops to Korea. It thus STALIN, MAO, KIM AND KOREAN WAR ORIGINS, 1950: decided that an enlarged Politburo A RUSSIAN DOCUMENTARY DISCREPANCY meeting would be convened to discuss the issue on October 4.14 Evidently, by Dieter Heinzig before the Party leadership had reached a final decision, it would have been im- There is some evidence that Stalin and Mao, during the latter’s stay in possible for Mao to give an affirmative Moscow between December 1949 and February 1950, discussed the feasi- response to Stalin’s October 1 re- bility of a North Korean war against South Korea (cf. Chen Jian, China’s quest.15 In actuality, even at the Octo- Road to the Korean War. The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation ber 4 enlarged Politburo meeting, which [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], pp. 85-91). But what we are would last until October 5, the opinions particularly keen on knowing is whether Stalin informed Mao Zedong about of the CCP leaders were still deeply di- the fact that he, on 30 January 1950, gave North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, vided, with the majority, at one point, although in general terms, the green light for an attack on South Korea (cf. strongly opposing sending troops to Kathryn Weathersby in the CWIHP Bulletin 5 [Spring 1995], pp. 3, 9). Korea. The main tendency of the meet- At last I found strong evidence that he did not. It is contained in Mao’s ing was that “unless absolutely neces- conversation with Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin on 31 March 1956, a ver- sary, it was better not to fight the sion of which was published in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. war.”16 164-7. In this version, on page 166 a part of Yudin’s original record is omit- Within this context, it is easier to ted. It reads as follows (omitted part underlined): extrapolate what really happened with “Important things which, evidently, to some extent strengthened Stalin’s the Chinese version of Mao’s telegram. belief in the CCP, were your (my) information about the journey to China It is quite possible that as Mao was will- and the Korean War—the performance of the Chinese People’s volunteers, ing to send troops to Korea, he person- although concerning this question, said Mao Zedong, we were not consulted ally drafted this telegram after receiv- in a sufficient way. Concerning the Korean question, when I (Mao Zedong) ing Stalin’s October 1 telegram. How- was in Moscow, there was no talk about conquering South Korea, but rather ever, because the opinions of the CCP on strengthening North Korea significantly. But afterwards Kim Il Sung was leadership were still divided on the is- in Moscow, where a certain agreement was reached about which nobody sue, and because the majority of Party deemed it necessary to consult with me beforehand. It is noteworthy, said leaders either opposed or had strong Mao Zedong, that, in the Korean War a serious miscalculation took place reservations about entering the war, regarding the possibility of the appearance of international forces on the side Mao did not think it proper to dispatch of South Korea.” the telegram. In fact, the Russian ver- The source is contained in the documents on the Korean War declassified sion of Mao’s message mentions that by the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) in Moscow which were cited by “many comrades in the CC CPC judge Kathryn Weathersby in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 30. It is that it is necessary to show caution.” Ciphered telegram; Strictly secret; Taking of copies forbidden; From Beijing; This indicated that the division of opin- 20. IV. 56 (handwritten); Perechen III no. 63 kopii dokumentov Arkhiva ions among CCP leaders was a reason Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii po teme: “Voina v Koree 1950-1953,” p. for Mao to send the message found in 157; list of the archival delo: 150; nos. of fond, opis, and delo not given. Russian archives, but not his personally Before the text quoted above: “On 31 March I visited Comr. Mao Zedong,” drafted telegram, to Stalin. Of course, after “P. Yudin.” The text quoted above is introduced by the handwritten how, exactly, Mao changed his plans insertion (...), and it ends with the same insertion. Evidently, the text was regarding the message is a question that included in the Presidential Archive’s collection as an excerpt as it is the only might only be illuminated with further part of Yudin’s record which has to do with the Korean War. research, including the opening of ad- For the CWIHP version of Yudin’s record three sources are quoted (see ditional archival materials in Moscow p. 167). One is Problemy Dalnego Vostoka 5 (1994), pp. 101-109. Respon- and, especially, Beijing. sible for this publication are A. Grigorev and T. Zazerskaia. Here no refer- Now, a question that needs further ence whatsoever is made indicating that something was omitted. I did not exploration is: Does Mao’s message via see the two other (archival) sources quoted in the CWIHP Bulletin. But Roshchin, as regarded by Roshchin and obviously there is no reference to an omission either, otherwise this would Stalin at that time, as well as currently certainly have been indicated in the Bulletin version. interpreted by Mansourov, indicate that The text quoted above not only adds to our knowledge about the deci- Mao was reluctant to send troops to sion-making process during the preparatory phase of the Korean War. In Korea, or that the CCP leadership had addition, the way the text was discovered shows that Russian censors are changed its original stand on the Ko- still active—not only by withholding documents, but also by offering in- rean issue? This question should be an- complete documents. swered in relation to Mao Zedong’s COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 241 considerations before and after October sad if we stood idly by.”17 Mao finally port, especially air cover for Chinese 2, as well as by comparing the contents convinced his comrades of the need to ground forces, from the Soviet Union. of the Chinese and Russian versions of send troops to Korea at the October 5 By analyzing the two versions of Mao’s the telegram. meeting. Once the decision was made, telegram, a common point was that Mao First of all, it should be emphasized the Chinese leaders acted immediately. believed that if China was to enter the that Mao Zedong felt that he was forced (It is unclear whether this decision was war, it must win the war, and win it to make the decision to send troops to taken before or after Mao received quickly. Only a speedy victory would Korea. He fully understood that China’s Stalin’s response—which strongly solve all of China’s difficulties and involvement in the Korean War would urged Chinese intervention in Korea, worries. In order to achieve a rapid vic- entail great difficulties. On this point, even at the risk of World War III—to tory, it was necessary that the Soviet his views basically coincided with those his earlier telegram indicating doubt Union, China’s main ally, to provide the of his comrades who opposed or had about entering the war.) After the Oc- PRC with adequate military assistance, strong reservations about sending tober 5 meeting, Mao invited Zhou the air support in particular. However, troops to Korea. In actuality, those rea- Enlai, Gao Gang, and Peng Dehuai to Stalin, in his October 1 telegram to sons that Mao listed in the Russian ver- dine with him, and they further dis- Mao, as well as in several other com- sion, such as America’s technological cussed some of the details. Mao also in- munications with the Chinese leader- superiority, the danger of an open war structed Peng and Gao to travel to ship before and afterward, failed to with the United States, and the possible Shenyang to convey the Politburo’s clarify this crucial issue. Without reach- negative domestic reactions, were all decision to division-level commanders ing clearly-defined and concrete agree- reflected in the Chinese version, though of the Northeast Border Defense Army, ments with the Soviets, Mao might have from a different angle. When Mao men- preparing to enter operations in Korea felt that it was better not to give Stalin’s tioned in the Russian version that “many by October 15. The next day, Zhou request a direct and positive response. comrades in the CC CPC judge that it Enlai chaired a Central Military Com- This could have been the most impor- is necessary to show caution,” this does mission meeting, which made concrete tant reason underlying Mao’s proposal not mean that he had changed his own arrangements about how the troops to send Zhou Enlai to the USSR to meet determination. A careful comparison of should prepare to enter operations in Stalin. And this also could explain why, the two versions leads to a different con- Korea.18 under the circumstance that the Chinese clusion: Mao did not change his goals It should also be noted that there leadership had already made the deci- but rather the tactics he would use to exists no irreconcilable contradiction sion to enter the Korean War, Mao told achieve them. Instead of replying di- between the Chinese leaders’ previous Stalin on October 7 that China “would rectly and positively to Stalin’s request, agreement to send troops to Korea and not be able to send troops [to Korea] at Mao adopted a more indirect and am- Mao’s expression that China would “re- this moment, but would do so after biguous response, so that he would be frain from advancing troops” in the some time.”21 The key question had able to reconcile his own determination Russian version. Scholars who believe now become Soviet air support for Chi- to enter the war with the disagreements that China had completely changed its nese troops that were to fight in Korea. still existing among other CCP leaders, stand have ignored an important condi- while at the same time keeping the door tion, that is, every time the Chinese 1 See my paper, “China Was Forced to Enter the for further communication (and bar- leaders mentioned that China would Korean War: Causes and Decision-making Pro- gaining) with Stalin open. This inter- send troops to Korea, they made it clear cess,” prepared for “New Evidence on the Cold pretation would explain why the CCP that a crucial precondition for taking War in Asia,” international conference sponsored chairman specifically informed Stalin action was that the enemy forces by the Cold War International History Project, in the Russian version that “A final de- crossed the 38th parallel. In Zhou University of Hong Kong, 9-12 January 1996. cision has not been made on this ques- Enlai’s meeting with K. M. Pannikar, 2 For Kim’s letter to Stalin of 29 September 1950, tion. This is our preliminary telegram.” India’s ambassador to China, early in see Cold War International History Project Bul- It also explains why he proposed to send the morning of October 3, the Chinese letin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 110-111; the origi- Zhou Enlai to consult with Stalin. premier particularly emphasized that if nal is kept in the Archives of the President, Rus- That Mao had not altered his de- the U.S. (not South Korean) troops had sian Federation (APRF), Moscow, fond 45, opis termination to enter the war was most crossed the 38th parallel, China would 1, delo 347, listy 46-49. clearly demonstrated by his attitude at intervene.19 As of October 2, this pre- 3 Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou the October 4-5 Politburo meeting. Al- condition had not yet materialized.20 Enlai, 1 October 1950, Cold War International though the majority of CCP leaders at- In addition to the above factors, History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), tending the meeting continued to ex- Mao did not give Stalin a direct and 114. press strong reservations about enter- positive response because he sensed the 4 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao ing the Korean War, Mao told them that need to put more pressure on Stalin. An Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the “all of what you have said is reason- important condition for China to enter People’s Republic] (Beijing: Central Press of able, but once another nation, one that a war with the United States was that it Historical Documents, 1987), 539-540. is our neighbor, is in crisis, we’d feel would receive substantial military sup- 5 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao makes it 242 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

clear that the text of the telegram published is 15 Basing his discussion of the meeting on the incomplete. In the original of the telegram, ac- Chinese version of Mao’s 2 October 1950 tele- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL cording to Chen Jian, who based his description gram, Chen Jian, in China’s Road to the Korean HISTORY PROJECT on “interviews with Shi Zhe and Beijing’s mili- War (p. 175), asserted that top CCP leaders had WORKING PAPERS tary researchers with access to Mao’s manu- reached general consensus on sending troops to scripts,” Mao also asked Stalin to deliver to the Korea at the October 2 meeting, and that Mao #1: Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance Chinese large amounts of military equipment, proposed before the end of the meeting that he and China’s Entry into the Korean War” including tanks, heavy artillery, other heavy and would personally send a telegram to Stalin to in- #2: P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research on light weapons, and thousands of trucks, as well form the Soviet leader of the decision. This points the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, as to confirm that the Soviet Union would pro- appears to be in error if the Russian version is Prague and Warsaw” #3: James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet vide the Chinese with air support when Chinese correct. 16 Policy Towards Germany during the Beria troops entered operations in Korea. See Chen Jian, Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [Nie Interregnum” China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of Rongzhen’s Memoirs] (Beijing: People’s Libera- #4: Vladislav M. Zubok, “Soviet Intelli- the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: tion Army Press, 1984), 735. gence and the Cold War: The ‘Small’ Com- Columbia University Press, 1994), 177. 17 Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai zishu [The Auto- mittee of Information, 1952-53” 6 For examples of such citations, see the editor’s biographical Note of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: #5: Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the note in footnote 30 of Alexandre Y. Mansourov, People’s Press, 1981), 472-74. Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to En- 18 Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang [The First Test of on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Re- ter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, Strength] (Beijing: Chinese Television and Broad- lations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961” #6: Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” casting Press, 1990), 24; Chen Jian, China’s Road the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)” Cold War International History Project Bulletin to the Korean War, 185. For Stalin’s reply (n.d., #7: Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), at 107. probably October 5 or 6) to Mao’s earlier tele- “Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on 7 Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov [Stalin], 3 Oc- gram, see Stalin to Kim Il-Sung, 8 [7] October the Cold War Period: Two Reports” tober 1950, conveying 2 October 1950 message 1950, Cold War International History Project #8: Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in from Mao Zedong, Cold War International His- Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 116-17. Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, tory Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 19 Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplo- 1945-1950: New Evidence From Russian 114-115. matic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: The Cen- Archives” 8 For the article and accompanying documents, tral Press of Historical Documents, 1990), 25-27. #9: Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, “New Evidence on the Soviet Re- see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, 20 According to the intelligence reports the Chi- jection of the , 1947: Two Re- and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, nese leaders had received by October 2, only ports” September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence South Korean troops had crossed the parallel. As #10: Norman M. Naimark, “‘To Know from the Russian Archives,” Cold War Interna- late as October 14, when U.S.-South Korean Everything and To Report Everything Worth tional History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/ troops had broken up the North Korean defense Knowing’: Building the East German Po- 1996), 94-119. line for Pyongyang, Mao, in accordance with the lice State, 1945-1949” 9 Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s intelligence reports from the Chinese military, still #11: Christian F. Ostermann, “The United Decision to Enter the Korean War,” 107, fn. 30. believed that “it seems that the Americans are yet States, the East German Uprising of 1953, 10 Ibid. to decide whether or not and when they would and the Limits of ” #12: Brian Murray, “Stalin, the Cold War, 11 By comparison, early on the morning of 2 attack Pyongyang ... The American troops are now and the Division of China: A Multi-Archi- October 1950, Mao sent another telegram to Gao still stationed at the [38th] parallel.” Jianguo yilai val Mystery” Gang and Deng Hua which carries the record of Mao Zedong wengao, 1: 559-61. #13: Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Big Three when it was dispatched (2:00 am) and the signa- 21 See Cold War International History Project After World War II: New Documents on ture of Yang Shangkun, director of CCP Central Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 116. Soviet Thinking about Post-War Relations Administrative Office, to witness its dispatch. For with the United States and Great Britain” the text of the telegram, see Jianguo yilai Mao Shen Zhihua is director of Center for #14: Ruud van Dijk, “The 1952 Stalin Note Zedong wengao, 1:538. Oriental History Studies in Beijing and Debate: Myth or Missed Opportunity for 12 See Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean the author of Chaoxian zhanzheng jiemi German Unification?” #15: Natalia I. Yegorova, “The‘Iran Crisis’ War, 173. My own interviews, as well as those of [Unmasking the Secrets of the Korean of 1945-1946: A View from the Russian Ar- Xu Yan (a leading Chinese scholar on the history War] (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu, 1995). chives” of the Korean War), also confirmed that the 1 Chen Jian is an associate professor of #16: Csaba Békés, “The 1956 Hungarian October 1950 Central Secretariat meeting did not history at Southern Illinois University Revolution and World Politics” reach a consensus on sending troops to Korea. and a senior fellow at the United States 13 Telegram, Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Deng Institute of Peace in Washington, DC CWIHP Working Papers are available free Hua, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol.1, for the 1996-97 academic year. Among on request to: CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson p.538. his publications is China’s Road to the International Center for Scholars, 1000 14 Wang Yan et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan [A Biog- Korean War: The Making of the Sino- Jefferson Dr. SW, Washington, DC 20560; fax: (202) 357-4439. raphy of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Contemporary American Confrontation (New York: China Press, 1993), 400. Columbia University Press, 1994). COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 243

KHRUSHCHEV VS. MAO: good candidates for psychological ponents).4 Not only was this combina- A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF study. Those who cry out for such scru- tion of characteristics unusual; in the THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY tiny (as Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev end, all three traits were viewed as li- IN THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT all do) are distinguished by three traits. abilities by Khrushchev’s Kremlin col- First, they have great power; to use leagues. by William Taubman Sidney Hook’s well-known phrase, they Khrushchev’s rise from the hum- are “event-making” rather than “event- blest of origins makes his a success Traditional and historical differ- ful” men or women, the difference be- story. Yet almost as soon as he reached ences, ideological arguments, economic ing that the former truly transform situ- the top, his self-defeating behavior be- and geo-political issues, even racial ten- ations, whereas the latter merely attempt gan—far from all his troubles were of sions—these and other sources of the to cope with or respond to great changes his own making, of course, but many Sino-Soviet conflict have been analyzed already in progress.3 As paramount were brought on by his own actions. The along with the main episodes in the de- leaders of totalitarian (or in Khrush- Secret Speech itself triggered turmoil cades-long dispute. It has also been said chev’s case, perhaps, “post-totalitar- in Poland and then revolution in Hun- that personalities of Chinese and Soviet ian”) systems, all three men surely fit gary in 1956. The Cuban missile crisis leaders played a large role—how could this description. of 1962 was the beginning of the end they not given the likes of Stalin, Mao, Second, all three were unique; al- of Khrushchev’s decade in power. And and Khrushchev?—but that side of though leaders, like ordinary citizens, there were many other such instances events has been less studied. are influenced by values and other ideas in which Khrushchev’s behavior ended Chinese sources indicate that Mao widely shared in their societies, Stalin, up undermining his own position. took the Sino-Soviet conflict quite per- Mao, and Khrushchev nevertheless took One of the them was the Sino-So- sonally, that he did not have a high re- actions and made decisions that no one viet conflict itself. This article will look gard (to say the least) for Khrushchev, else in the Soviet or Chinese leaderships closely at several key episodes, focus- and that he even tried deliberately to would have. It is that fact that invites sing on Mao’s behavior and demean the Soviet leader. As for us to examine their personalities as a Khrushchev’s response, before trying to Khrushchev, his own memoirs indicate prime source of their actions. explain the pattern in terms of quite clearly that Mao got under his The third criterion is a pattern of Khrushchev’s personality. skin. Khrushchev prefaces his account behavior that seems contradictory, irra- At first, Khrushchev’s relations of the conflict by condemning those tional, and ultimately self-defeating. with Mao went quite well. The Chinese who imply that the split stemmed from The importance of this is that it sug- need for assistance, even greater after a mere “clash of personalities.”1 Yet he gests a leader is not simply doing what the Korean War than before it, guaran- himself keeps coming back to that same a situation dictates, or what a culture teed Khrushchev would get a warm re- cause. The trouble with Mao was his encourages or allows, but rather is ception in Beijing in 1954, especially “unwillingness to consider anyone else driven by some internal compulsion that since he arrived bearing substantial his equal.” When it came to the ques- influences his or her behavior. gifts. Khrushchev claims in his mem- tion of who would lead the world com- Although all three traits character- oirs that he returned from China warn- munist movement, “everything depends ize all three leaders, the focus here is ing his colleagues that “conflict be- on personal characteristics, on how one Khrushchev. Not only was he extremely tween us and China is inevitable.”5 But or another leader feels about himself, powerful, he was also distinctive among the fact that those same memoirs and in which direction he directs his Stalin’s potential sucessors. No one else misattribute to his 1954 visit the famous efforts.”2 in the Soviet leadership, I’d contend, Khrushchev-Mao swimming pool en- As the Communist saying goes, would have (1) unmasked Stalin as counter that actually occurred in the these and other similar references aren’t Khrushchev did in his secret speech at summer of 1958 suggests that he mis- accidental. Almost against his will, they the 20th Party Congress, (2) placed takenly read back into 1954 the alarm register Khrushchev’s conviction that nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba, and he clearly felt four years later. the personal dimension, and in particu- (3) taken those same missiles out again Even in 1954, however, lar the clash between himself and Mao, as soon as he was caught in the act. In Khrushchev probably first felt experi- was central. addition, he stood apart from his peers enced sort of irritation with Mao that But what was it about Mao that so in three key elements of “political would grow steadily over the ensuing irritated Khrushchev? Was Mao’s abil- style”: in his rhetoric (Khrushchev was years. It was then, for example, that he ity to provoke him exceptional, or was as voluble, earthy, and informal as offered to return the Port Arthur naval Khrushchev in general easily provoked? Stalin and his other colleagues were base without even being asked to by the What light does his conduct of Sino- not); in his approach to work (he was Chinese—only to have Mao demand Soviet relations shed on Khrushchev as hyperactive far beyond the Bolshevik that the Soviets also hand over free of a leader? And how did Khrushchev’s norm); and in inter-personal relations charge the Soviet weaponry located leadership affect Sino-Soviet relations? (in which he counted on face-to-face there. Not all political leaders are equally encounters to gauge and to best his op- Until 1956, recalls Mao’s doctor, 244 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Li Zhisui, the Chinese leader welcomed guest. Yet, from the moment he arrived, cooperate with us when we asked for a Khrushchev’s assumption of leadership “Mao was reserved and even a bit cool radio station on their territory,” in the Kremlin. But the latter’s speech with Khrushchev,” while in private con- Khrushchev recalls.8 When Mao denouncing Stalin soured Mao on versations with his Chinese colleagues abruptly refused to deal with Soviet Khrushchev for good. Despite his own (which the KGB probably overheard Ambassador Pavel Yudin on the issue personal and other grievances against and reported to Khrushchev), Mao over- and instead rudely demanded that Stalin, Mao now decided the new So- flowed with “private barbs against the Khrushchev himself come to China, the viet leader was “unreliable,” and after Russian leader.”7 Soviet leader dropped everything and that “never forgave Khrushchev for at- During the first half of 1958, Mao’s hurried off to Beijing, only to find him- tacking Stalin.”6 Moreover, Mao attitude toward the Soviets darkened self the target of a new round of Maoist hardly bothered to conceal how he felt even more drastically as he launched the condescension and humiliation. about Khrushchev, and later practically “Great Leap Forward,” and resolved to Talks on the radio stations and flaunted his contempt in Khrushchev’s reduce Chinese dependence on Mos- other military matters began politely. face. cow. Ironically, it was just then that But when Khrushchev took too long For example, during his November Khrushchev decided to propose still repeating points Yudin had made, Mao 1957 visit to Moscow, Mao hardly hid more military dependence to the Chi- openly displayed his contempt. Mao his disdain for his Russian hosts, their nese in the form of a radio station on smoked throughout despite hospitality, their food, and their culture. their territory to be used by Moscow for Khrushchev’s well-known aversion to Khrushchev was “friendly and respect- communicating with its new nuclear- cigarettes. He also mocked his guest’s ful,” Dr. Li recalls, and went out of his powered, missile-toting submarines. equally familiar penchant for rambling way to treat Mao as a highly honored “We fully expected the Chinese to on in disorganized fashion. Mao waved

A New “Cult of Personality”: University). The excerpts below come Draft Suslov’s Secret Report on Mao, from another recently-discovered docu- ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE Khrushchev, and Sino-Soviet ment, a secret report on Khrushchev’s SOVIET PARTY-GOVERNMENTAL Tensions, December 1959 trip to Beijing and meeting with Mao DELEGATION TO THE delivered two months later by a senior PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA member of the Politburo of the Central [Ed. note: Though still masked Committee of the Communist Party of [Suslov:...] The crux of the matter is from public view, the simmering ten- the Soviet Union, Mikhail Suslov, to a that the leadership of the Chinese Commu- sions in the Khrushchev-Mao relation- December 1959 Plenum of CC CPSU. nist party has recently developed tendencies ship burst into the open between them The excerpts suggest how the fast de- to embellish its successes and capabilities, when the Soviet and Chinese veloping Sino-Soviet split had moved to exaggerate the degree of maturity of so- leaderships met in Beijing on 2 Octo- beyond political and ideological dis- cialist relations in China. Their heads have ber 1959. Khrushchev, who had led a putes into a highly-personal conflict. gotten somewhat dizzy because China is delegation to attend celebrations mark- The document, part of a large col- back on her feet and became visibly stron- ing the tenth anniversary of the estab- lection of Plenum transcripts and sup- ger. There are elements of conceit and lishment of the People’s Republic of porting materials recently declassified haughtiness, that became particularly vis- China, was shocked when his criticisms by Russian authorities, was discovered ible after the second session of the Eighth of recent Chinese policies provoked a in the Center for the Storage of Con- Congress of the Communist Party of China furious response—and the resulting ar- temporary Documentation (TsKhSD, that took place in May of 1958 [which set gument turned so angry that officials the former CC archives) in Moscow and China on the path toward the so-called on both sides sought to suppress the translated for CWIHP by Vladislav M. “great leap forward” which Suslov harshly transcript. (A secret Chinese compila- Zubok, a scholar based at the National criticized—ed.]. tion of Mao’s meetings with foreign Security Archive, a non-governmental [Suslov described a series of policy dis communist leaders omits this encoun- research institute and declassified docu- agreements—in foreign, domestic, military, ter, and scholars have reported finding ments repository located at George economic, ideological—between Moscow Soviet documents indicating that the Washington University in Washington, and Beijing, and how these disputes flared record should be destroyed.) D.C. (Another excerpt, on the Sino-In- up during Khrushchev’s meeting with Mao Nevertheless, the Soviet transcript dian conflict, is printed after M.Y. and other Chinese leaders on 2 October of the meeting has survived—it was Prozumenschikov’s article elsewhere 1959, noting that Khrushchev had remarked cited in Dmitrii Volkogonov’s biogra- in this section of the Bulletin.) A full that the “nervousness and touchiness” of phy of Lenin—and the Cold War Inter- translation of the Suslov report is slated the “Chinese friends” “does not mesh well national History Project plans to pub- for publication by CWIHP along with with the principle of equality and comradely lish it in full when it becomes available, the Mao-Khrushchev transcript noted relations that has become customary in the with translation, commentary, and an- above.] fraternal family of communist parties...we notation by Mark Kramer (Harvard continued on page 248 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 245 his hand and said, “You’ve talked a long further lecture as if to a particularly which he had just visited, was bad time but have still not gotten to the dense student: “The British, Japanese, enough in Chinese eyes. His request that point.”9 and other foreigners who stayed in our the Chinese release two American pi- Shocked and embarrassed, country for a long time have already lots who had parachuted into Northern Khrushchev is said by a Chinese wit- been driven away by us, Comrade China during and after the Korea War, ness to have mumbled, “Yes, don’t Khrushchev. I’ll repeat it again. We do and that they accommodate the Indian worry, I will continue,” and then blamed not want anyone to use our land to leader Jawaharlal Nehru, whose strong Yudin for not making things clear. Later, achieve their own purposes anymore.” “neutralist” and “anti-imperialist” po- when Khrushchev explained his hope During the next day’s discussions sitions were all-important to the social- to build “a common fleet” to contend beside the pool Mao invited ist camp, enraged the Chinese. with America’s 7th fleet, Mao is said to Khrushchev for a swim. Since the So- At one point in the talks, have “banged his large hands against viet leader couldn’t swim very well, he Khrushchev charged that the Chinese the sofa, and stood up angrily. His face at first spluttered about in the shallow hadn’t consulted Moscow before shell- turned red and his breath turned heavy. area, then clambered out with the help ing Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. When He used his finger to point impolitely of attendants, and finally re-entered the Chen Yi counter-attacked, he provoked at Khrushchev’s nose: ‘I asked you what pool with an inner tube. As for Mao, he Khrushchev to a fury. His face turning a common fleet is. You still didn’t an- watched Khrushchev’s clumsy efforts bright red, Khrushchev shouted at Chen, swer me.’” with obvious enjoyment, and then dove “You may be a marshal in the army, and By this time, Khrushchev’s lips into the deep end and swam back and I a lieutenant general. But I am the First were pursed and white with strain, while forth using several different strokes. For Secretary of the CPSU, and you are of- his small, bright eyes flared with anger. his next trick, Mao demonstrated his fending me.” But he swallowed hard, and as if in an- skill at floating and treading water, and “You are the General Secretary, all swer to Mao’s pointing finger, spread then, highly satisfied with himself, he right,” Chen responded. “But when you out his arms. “I don’t understand why swam over to Khrushchev and struck are right I listen to you, and when you you are acting like this,” he said. “We up a conversation in what a Chinese are wrong I will certainly refute you.” came here just to discuss things to- onlooker called “a relaxed, friendly and At this, Khrushchev looked at Mao, gether.” open atmosphere.”11 After all, Dr. Li spread his arms widely, and complained “What does it mean to ‘discuss continues, “the Chairman was deliber- that he and his delegation were badly things together?’” Mao demanded. “Do ately playing the role of emperor, treat- outnumbered in a meeting with the Chi- we still have our sovereignty or don’t ing Khrushchev like the barbarian come nese political bureau. “How many we? Do you want to take away all our to pay tribute. It was a way, Mao told people do you have and how many do I coastal areas?” Tracing the shape of the me on the way back to Beidaihe, of have? The negotiation is unfair and un- Chinese coastline in the air with his fin- ‘sticking a needle up his ass.’”12 equal.” ger, Mao added sarcastically, “Why To make matters worse, the sub- Mao smiled, recalls his interpreter, don’t you take the whole Chinese sea- stantive talks went badly. Moreover, paused, and then began speaking slowly coast?”10 Khrushchev’s trip was followed by and in a low voice: “I have listened to Struggling to stay calm, Beijing’s shelling of the offshore islands you for a long time. You have accused Khrushchev shifted to the subject of of Quemoy [Jinmen] and Matsu us of quite a lot. You say we...did not refueling stops and shore leaves for [Mazu], undertaken without warning unite with Nehru, that we shouldn’t Soviet submarines at Chinese ports. But Moscow, and in order, says Dr. Li, “to have shelled Jinmen, that the Great Mao rejected the idea out of hand and demonstrate to both Khrushchev and Leap was wrong, that we brag about continued to do so even after Eisenhower that [Mao] could not be ourselves as orthodox Marxists. There- Khrushchev noted how NATO coun- controlled, and to undermine fore I have an accusation for you, too— tries mounted just such cooperation, and Khrushchev in his new quest for peace.” that you are guilty of ‘right opportun- sweetened the pie by offering access the Or as Mao himself put it, “The islands ism.’”14 Chinese access to Soviet arctic ports in are two batons that keep Khrushchev The talks ended abruptly and un- return. and Eisenhower dancing, scurrying this happily. In Vladivostok, where “We aren’t interested,” replied way and that. Don’t you see how won- Khrushchev stopped on the way home, Mao, looking at Khrushchev as if (re- derful they are?”13 he looked depressed and withdrawn. calls the Chinese witness) the Soviet In the late summer of 1959, with Part of the problem was sheer exhaus- leader “were a kid trying to do a trick an explosion building in Sino-Soviet tion after trips to both the United States in front of an adult.” Moreover, when relations, Khrushchev made his third and China. But what was also showing Khrushchev’s face turned red with an- and last trip to Beijing. Behind a facade in Khrushchev’s face was his frustra- ger, Mao seemed positively pleased. of politeness, a series of heated clashes tion and rage with Chairman Mao. “We don’t want to use your Murmansk, made even the tense 1958 talks appear The next summer, Khrushchev at- and we don’t want you to come to our warm and friendly in comparison. tacked Mao by name and was attacked country either.” After that he offered a Khrushchev’s infatuation with America, in turn by Peng Chen in a fiery clash at 246 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

a Romanian Party Congress in Bucharest. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet A Crucial Step toward the Breakdown of the Sino-Soviet Alliance: leader decided to withdraw all Soviet The Withdrawal of Soviet Experts from China in July 1960 advisers from China immediately, and to terminate all important contracts and by Chen Jian projects. According to the Chinese, For scholars of Sino-Soviet relations, that the Kremlin leadership abruptly decided Moscow withdrew 1,390 experts, tore in July 1960 to recall all Soviet experts working in the People’s Republic of China up 343 contracts, and scrapped 257 co- (PRC) is not fresh information. During the great polemical debate between Beijing and operative projects in science and tech- Moscow in the 1960s, the Chinese leaders and media repeatedly claimed that the So- nology, “all within the short span of a viet leadership took this action in order to put more pressure on Mao Zedong and his month.”15 The immediate effects were comrades, so that they would yield to Moscow’s evil intention of maintaining China as substantial; the longer-run result was to the Soviet Union’s inferior subordinate.1 As this decision came at a time when China politicize trade by adding to the long was facing great economic difficulties in the wake of the “Great Leap Forward,” Mao list of issues over which the two sides and his comrades also used it to make the Soviets the scapegoat of the Leap’s disas- were now in conflict.16 Now it was trous aftermath. Consequently, Moscow’s decision proved to be a crucial step toward but a matter of time until a full and fi- the breakdown of Sino-Soviet alliance. nal rupture took place in the summer of Despite the importance of this event, scholars have been unable to gain access to 1963, featuring an exchange of public many pertinent documents. Most of our knowledge has been based on Beijing’s and broadsides in which both Khrushchev Moscow’s official accounts, which, as one might expect, offer no more than an incom- and Mao came in for violent personal plete and sometimes distorted version of the story. Recently, however, Dieter Heinzig*, attacks. a German scholar who has extensively studied Sino-Soviet relations and is completing With these highlights (or lowlights) a monograph on the Sino-Soviet relations, 1945-1950, unearthed a key document about of the dispute in mind, let’s return to this event in the archives of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in East Ber- certain personal characteristics of lin: a copy of the note delivered by the Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Chinese Khrushchev that help to explain his al- Foreign Ministry dated 18 July 1960. It was in this note that the Soviet government lergic reaction to Mao. formally informed Beijing that it had decided to recall all Soviet experts from China One such trait was a combination and explained in detail why it had decided to do so. The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev of vaulting ambition and an extraordi- provided a copy of the note to his Communist comrades in East Germany together with narily low level of culture. Just as im- a cover letter, which introduced the background and motives of the decision, thereby portant was a persistent sense of inad- more or less repeating the arguments of the note.2 equacy centered around his lack of edu- Reading this note, one is impressed by the depth of the divergence already present cation and refinement. Khrushchev’s between Moscow and Beijing in 1960. Indeed, the language used in the note was remarkable rise slaked both his ambi- serious, revealing both disappointment and anger among Soviet leaders. While pre- tion and his shaky sense of self-esteem. senting the reasons underlying the decision to withdraw Soviet experts from China, the But with ever greater power and fame Kremlin emphasized three particular grievances. First, they made it clear that they had came more responsibility in areas about noticed Chinese “dissatisfaction with some Soviet experts and advisors.” Second, they which he knew nothing, and over which criticized the Chinese side’s “unfriendly” treatment of, and “sp[ying] on,” the Soviet he had little control. Under such circum- experts. Third, and most important, the Soviet leaders emphasized that they were ex- stances there were bound to be failures, tremely unhappy, even angry, about the Chinese practice of forcing the Soviet experts but with them came increased doubts to embrace Beijing’s viewpoints on the world situation and the orientation of the inter- about his own capacities, thus aggra- national communist movement as elaborated in the lengthy article “Long Live vating a moodiness, impulsiveness, and Leninism,”3 which explicitly revealed that the ideological divergence between the hyper-sensitivity to slight that had been Chinese and Soviet leaders was having a tremendous negative impact upon the devel- there all along but were usually covered opment of the state relations between the two Communist powers. by gregariousness and extraversion. A sensitive, controversial, yet central, concept pervading the Soviet note (in a Increasingly during his long career, more general sense, also dominating the overall development of Sino-Soviet relations) Khrushchev reacted with hostility to concerned “equality.” Throughout the note, the Soviet leaders attempted to argue that actual or implied criticism (especially they had always paid close attention to treating China and the Chinese Communist from better educated and more cultured Party (CCP), as well as other “brotherly Parties,” as equals, and that the decision to intelligentsia types), going so far in withdraw Soviet experts from China was based on the belief that it would better serve some cases as to pursue what amounted a more equal relationship between the two Communist powers. to vendettas against his antagonists. No matter how sincerely Moscow’s leaders might have believed this, the leaders Moreover, one round of failure led to in Beijing would have viewed the whole issue in a radically different way. What is another to which he reacted badly as important here is to put the note into a historical context. During the long process of the well. None of this cycle, I hasten to add, Chinese Communist revolution, the CCP had consistently regarded itself as part of the can be isolated from troubles inherent Soviet-led international Communist movement. Mao Zedong’s “lean-to-one-side” state in the Soviet system, and in any effort continued on page 249 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 247

(of the sort Khrushchev, and later attack by retreating beyond the Urals Khrushchev later claimed that he took Gorbachev, mounted) to reform it. But and holding out until the Chinese en- Mao’s 1958 sallies equably and even neither can they be separated from the tered the war, Khrushchev was not only self-critically, since he understood how personal deterioration that Khrushchev appalled by the idea itself, he was up- the Soviet request for radio stations on (and Gorbachev, too?) underwent as the set that he couldn’t tell whether the Chinese territory could rub the Chinese world they tried so hard to improve Chinese leader was being serious. the wrong way.21 But that claim reveals unravelled around them. The fact that “I looked at him closely,” more about his desire to be seen by his- Khrushchev’s Kremlin colleagues, who Khrushchev recalls. “I couldn’t tell tory as mature and statesman-like than eventually ousted him, held his mishan- from his face whether he was joking or about his actual mood at the time. dling of relations with Mao against him, not.”18 Later, when he better under- Khrushchev claims he wasn’t in- and that in part, they were correct to do stood Mao’s bluster about standing up timidated by Mao’s swimming prowess: so, underscores both Khrushchev’s self- to the United States even at the risk of “Of course, I couldn’t compete with destructiveness, and its impact on over- nuclear war, Khrushchev decided that Mao in the pool—as everyone knows, all Sino-Soviet relations. “Mao obviously regarded me as a cow- he’s since set a world record for both In the beginning of his decade in ard.”19 speed and distance. I’m a poor swim- power, Khrushchev attached a very high Given his chip-on-the-shoulder at- mer and I’m ready to take my hat off to priority to consolidating the relations titude toward his own Soviet intelligen- Mao when it comes to swimming.”22 with Beijing that he believed Stalin had tsia, the last thing Khrushchev needed But if he didn’t acknowledge what Dr. put at risk. Khrushchev condemned was to feel intimidated by Mao’s philo- Li calls this “insult,” surely that was Stalin for condescending to Mao, for re- sophical pretensions. In this context, because Khrushchev wouldn’t admit to garding the Chinese leader as a kind of consider the pompous way Mao alluded being humiliated. “cave-man Marxist,” and for manifest- to Khrushchev’s mistakes and then for- Khrushchev’s withdrawal of Soviet ing “a kind of haughty arrogance” dur- gave them in a speech in Moscow in advisers was as self-defeating as it was ing the latter’s visit to Moscow in 1949- 1957: “Lenin once said that there is not crude and precipitous. The adverse eco- 50.17 Khrushchev launched his own a single person in the world who does nomic impact affected both sides. More- relationship with Mao with the feeling not make mistakes. I have made many over, Moscow lost the chance to exert that he could, should, and would do mistakes and these mistakes have been influence, and to derive invaluable in- much better by the Chinese leader than beneficial to me and taught me a les- telligence from advisers in China. The Stalin had done. But instead of evok- son. Everyone needs support. An able then Soviet Ambassador in China, ing Mao’s gratitude and respect, the fellow need the support of three other Stepan Chervonenko, recalls he was Chinese leader seemed to be conde- people, a fence needs the support of “amazed” at news of the withdrawal, scending to him. Not only was such lack three stakes. These are Chinese prov- and took steps to try to prevent it. “We of fealty a problem in larger ideologi- erbs. Still another Chinese proverb says sent a telegram to Moscow. We said the cal and political terms, it grated irritat- with all its beauty the lotus needs the move would be a violation of interna- ingly on Khrushchev’s uneasy self of green of its leave to set it off. You, com- tional law. If our help to the Chinese self. As a white European, Khrushchev rade Khrushchev, even though you are must end, then at least let the advisers felt a sense of superiority over the up- a beautiful lotus, you too need leaves stay until their contracts were up. We start Chinese. All the more devastating to set you off. I, Mao Tse-tung, while hoped that in the meantime, things then that the upshot of Mao’s treatment not a beautiful lotus, also need leaves would get patched at the top.” 23 of him was to make Khrushchev him- to set me off. Still another Chinese prov- Nor was Chervonenko the only self feel inferior. erb says three cobblers with their wits Soviet official appalled by Both in 1954 and during their later combined equal Zhuge Liang, the mas- Khrushchev’s action. Leonid meetings, Mao’s negotiating methods ter mind. This corresponds to comrade Brezhnev’s former aide, Aleksandrov- suggested to Khrushchev that the Chi- Khrushchev’s slogan—collective lead- Agentov later traced the beginning of nese leader was playing him for a fool. ership.”20 “internal split between the leader Yet that was precisely the sort of image Even with a perfect translation into [Khrushchev] and his own associates” which Khrushchev could not abide, par- Russian, it wasn’t clear whether Mao’s to a series of “impulsive foreign policy ticularly because he had been forced to words were a compliment. At this stage measures that damaged our own state trade on it for so long to survive Stalin’s of their relationship, Mao’s sin wasn’t interests. All you have to remember is terrible suspiciousness toward his top a direct personal challenge, but rather the unexpected pull-out from China of lieutenants. his maddening inscrutability. not only of our military but also eco- As one who prided himself on tak- Knowing Khrushchev’s aversion to nomic advisers—all in spite of existing ing the measure of his interlocutors, being criticized, one can imagine the agreements and contracts. Why? Be- Khrushchev was particularly annoyed effort it took to contain himself in the cause of the ideological argument and that he couldn’t figure Mao out. When face of Mao’s attacks. Ever since 1954 the rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao tried to convince him that the he had gone out of his way to give the Mao....”24 USSR should respond to an American Chinese almost everything they wanted. The withdrawal of advisers reflects 248 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

particularly vividly the role of 1“Memuary Nikity Sergeyevicha Khrushcheva,” SUSLOV ON MAO Voprosy istorii 11-12 (1992), 66. Khrushchev’s personality. Would any continued from page 244 2 Ibid., 80. other Soviet leader have acted so 3 Sidney Hook, The Hero in History (Atlantic rashly? Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1943), 151- cannot accept that even our friends talk to Several times Khrushchev de- 170. us down their nose [svisoka razgovarivali s 4 scribed Mao and the environment See James David Barber, “Classifying and Pre- nami]”; later, after calling the discussions dicting Presidential Styles: Two Weak Presi- around him as “Asiatic,” referring es- dents,” Journal of Social Issues 24:3 (July 1968), ultimately “quite useful,” Suslov noted:] pecially to the Chinese leader’s reliance 51-79. One should not omit the fact that the on “flattery and insidiousness.” De- 5 “Memuary,” 66. aforementioned mistakes and shortcomings 6 scribing politics as “a game,” Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao in the field of domestic and foreign policy New York: Random House, 1994), 115-118. Khrushchev confessed his continuing 7 Ibid., 220-224. of the Communist Party of China are largely frustration at the way Mao played it. “I 8 Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament explained by the atmosphere of the cult of believed him,” the Soviet leader com- (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 258. personality of com. Mao Zedong. Formally 9 plained at one point, but “he was sim- Quan Yanchi, Mao Zedong yu Heluxiaofu the CC of the Communist Party of China 25 [“Mao Zedung and Khrushchev”] (Jilin: Jilin ply playing.” renmin chuban she), 126-128. observes the norms of collective leadership, When Mao boasted about Chinese 10 Quan, Mao Zedong yu Heluxiaofu; Tracy B. but in effect crucial decisions are made uniqueness, recalls Khrushchev, “I was Strong and Helene Keyssar, “Anna Louise Strong: single-handedly, and thus are often touched jolted by all that bragging.” The true Three Interviews with Chairman Mao Zedong,” by subjectivism, and in some instances are China Quarterly 103 (September 1985), 503. believing internationalist in Khrushchev 11 Quan, Mao Zedong yu Heluxiaofu, 126-128. simply not well thought through. Glorifica- was offended by Mao’s “nationalism 12 Li, Private Life, 261 tion of com. Mao Zedong is visibly on the and chauvinism.” But since no one was 13 Ibid. rise in China. In the party press one can in- 14 a bigger boaster than Khrushchev him- Li Yueren, Waijiao wutai shang de xin creasingly find such statements that “we, the Zhongguo lingxiu [“New China’s leaders on the self, surely there is an element of pro- diplomatic stage”] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chuban Chinese, live in the great epoch of Mao jection in criticizing Mao for sins she, 1989), 182-183. Zedong,” comrade Mao Zedong is portrayed Khrushchev shared. Likewise when he 15 Letter of CCP CC to CPSU CC, 29 February as a great genius. They call him the beacon charges that Mao’s “putting his own 1964, in John Gittings, ed., Survey of the Sino- illuminating the path to communism, the Soviet Dispute (London: Oxford University Press, person first created friction, and even 1968), 139. See also Steven M. Goldstein, “The embodiment of communist ideas. One more than friction in relations between Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937-1962: Ideology and equates the name of com. Mao Zedong with our two countries.”26 Unity” (manuscript), forthcoming in Harry the party, etc. One presents the works of Granted, then, that the Sino-Soviet Harding, ed., Patterns of Cooperation in the For- com. Mao Zedong in China as the last word eign Relations of China. dispute was personal as well as politi- 16 Gittings, Survey, 130-131; Goldstein, “ The of creative Marxism, of the same rank as cal, and that Khrushchev let himself be Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937-1962.” the works of the classics [klassiki] of Marx- provoked by Mao for the sorts of rea- 17 “Memuary,” 68, 74. ism-Leninism. In effect, the works of com. 18 sons I have cited. To fill out the picture Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, Mao Zedong are put in the foundation of all 256-257. further, we would need to know why 19 Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, educational work in the party and in the Mao reacted to so negatively to Brown, 1970),470. country. Even in PRC’s colleges and uni- Khrushchev. What was it about 20 Michael Schoenhals, ed., “Mao Zedong: versities the teaching of social sciences dur- Khrushchev personally that Mao found Speeches at the 1957 ‘,’” ing the last two-three years has been reduced Journal of Communist Studies, 2:2 (June 1986), so irritating? Did Mao deliberately go 121-122. to the study of Mao’s works. All this, unfor- out of his way to provoke his Soviet 21 Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, tunately, pleases [imponiruiet] com. Mao counterpart? Or was he unaware of how 260. Zedong, who, by all accounts, himself has 22 Khrushchev perceived and reacted to Ibid., p. 259. come to believe in his own infallibility. This 23 Interview with Stepan Chervonenko, Mos- him? Did aides of either or both lead- cow, 1993. reminds of the atmosphere that existed in ers play on their bosses’ sensitivities, 24 Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, “Brezhnev and our country during the last years of life of either knowingly or unknowingly, so as Khrushchev,” Novoe vremia 22 (1993), 39. I.V. Stalin. Of course, we could not talk with 25 intensify the antagonism between them? “Memuary,” 66, 70. the Chinese comrades about it, but the Ple- 26 Ibid., 70, 80. Or were they adept enough at outrag- num should be aware of this, yet another ing each other all by themselves? William Taubman, a professor of political aspect in the life of the Communist Party of Documents from still-closed Chi- science at Amherst College, is working on China.... nese archives, as well as additional a biography of Nikita Khrushchev. materials from Russian archives, and [Source: Excerpted from Suslov draft report not only memoir accounts, valuable as to CC CPSU Plenum, 18 December 1959, they may be, will be needed to address Center for the Storage of Contemporary these and many other aspects of the Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, fond 2, Mao-Khrushchev relationship. opis 1, delo 415, listy 56-91; document pro- vided and translated by V. M. Zubok.] COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 249

SOVIET EXPERTS viet withdrawal of experts from China ment presented to the PR of China and the continued from page 246 as strong evidence to claim that other socialist countries the proposal to re- Beijing’s struggle against Moscow was call the Soviet experts, taking into consid- ment in June 1949 formalized the PRC’s not just one for true communism but eration that these countries had by then trained their own cadres and were, in the foreign policy framework, essentially also one for China’s sovereignty and opinion of the Soviet Government, well ca- establishing the “new China” as the national integrity. Khrushchev and pable of solving by their own efforts the Soviet Union’s junior partner. Although other leaders in Moscow seemed also practical tasks they were encountering in the never happy with such a relationship, determined to meet Beijing’s challenge fields of economic and cultural develop- Mao and his comrades believed that it to the Soviet Union’s position as the in- ments. The majority of the people’s demo- had been necessary in order to promote disputable leader of the international cratic countries had at that time agreed to China’s economic reconstruction, safe- movement.6 In retrospect, the Soviet the proposal of the Soviet Government, and guard the nation’s security interests, and decision of July 1960 can be interpreted the Soviet experts were recalled from these create momentum for the continuation as a crucial step toward the complete countries to their motherland. After the Chi- nese leaders had expressed their critical at- of the Chinese revolution after its na- breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance. titude toward the Soviet experts in the year tionwide victory. The situation began 1958, the Soviet Government once again to change, however, after Stalin’s death Note: The Soviet Embassy in Beijing to presented to the Government of the PR of in March 1953, and especially after the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the China the proposal to recall the Soviet ex- 20th Congress of the Communist Party People’s Republic of China, 18 July perts. But this time, just as in the year of of the Soviet Union in February 1956. 1960 1957, the Chinese side pronounced that it Mao and his comrades increasingly be- favored prolonging the stay of the Soviet lieved that it was the CCP, not the Strictly confidential experts by claiming that they were needed CPSU, which should play the central in the PR of China. Recently, the Chinese side, when deal- role in the international communist The Embassy of the Union of the So- cialist Soviet Republics in the People’s Re- ing with the Soviet experts working in the movement. This growing sense of PR of China, began to pursue an apparently China’s superiority, which, in a histori- public of China has been instructed to in- form the Government of the People’s Re- unfriendly line toward the Soviet Union, cal-cultural sense, had a profound ori- public of China of the following: which was incompatible with the obligation gin in the age-old “Middle Kingdom” In strict observation of the Treaty of of the treaty as well as with the norms pre- mentality, combined with many other Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance vailing between socialist countries. Follow- more specific problems (of the sort usu- between the USSR and the PR of China, the ing the instructions from their superiors, ally present in any alliance relationship) Soviet Government sends, in compliance Chinese officials distribute specially com- to create a widening rift between the with the request of the Chinese Government, piled material in among the Soviet people propagating views di- Chinese and Soviet leaders. During a considerable number of experts to work in China. For this purpose, the Soviet orga- rected against the position of the CPSU and Khrushchev’s visit to China in Septem- of other brotherly parties. They make ef- ber-October 1959, the potential tension nizations have selected the best and most experienced experts, often bringing disad- forts to draw Soviet experts living in the PR that had long accumulated between vantages to the national economy of the of China into discussions on questions Beijing and Moscow exploded. Indeed, USSR. By taking part in the socialist con- where certain differences of opinions exist during a long meeting between struction of the PR of China, the Soviet ex- between the CPSU on the one side and other Khrushchev and Mao and other Chinese perts consider their activities as fulfilling brotherly parties on the other; they make leaders on 2 October 1959, the two sides their brotherly international obligations to- efforts to impose their viewpoints upon the emotionally criticized the other’s do- wards the friendly Chinese people. All the Soviet experts and try to lead them into op- position to the CPSU and the Soviet Gov- mestic and international policies, dem- while, the Soviet people staying in the PR of China, in true observance of the instruc- ernment. onstrating that the Sino-Soviet alliance The leading officials at the Chinese was facing a real crisis.4 tions they have received, refrain from any statements or action that could be interpreted institutions and enterprises where Soviet The Soviet note recalling all Soviet as interference in the internal affairs of the experts are working persistently try to draw experts from China further intensified PR of China or as criticism of this or that them into discussions on the above-men- the crisis. Beijing could see in it noth- aspect of the domestic or foreign policy of tioned questions. So, for instance, on May ing but Moscow’s evil intention of im- the Communist Party of China or the Gov- 19, the office director of the Scientific Re- posing new “inequalities” upon them. ernment of the PR of China. search Institute for Electric Industry of the This became particularly true when During the visit of Soviet leaders to the PR of China in Guangzhou proposed to the Soviet experts working in the institute to Moscow, according to Chinese sources, PR of China at the beginning of August 1958, the Chinese side expressed their dis- discuss the questions raised in an anthology turned down Beijing’s request that the especially published in the Russian language Soviet experts, at least some of them, satisfaction with some of the Soviet experts and advisors. This could be understood as a under the title “Long Live Leninism,” as should stay in China until they had ful- well as to express their opinions on the ar- 5 reproach directed at the Soviet Union. It is, filled their assigned tasks. however, well known that the Soviet Union ticles included in this anthology. Among These developments virtually de- had never forced its specialists and advisors several groups of Soviet experts in Beijing stroyed the foundation of the Sino-So- on anyone. Already at the end of 1956 and and other cities of China, Chinese officials viet alliance. Mao would take the So- the beginning of 1957, the Soviet Govern- forced every Soviet expert to accept copies 250 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

of this anthology, which, as it was known, side. ford University Press, 1968). contained anti-Leninist theses to which the In view of these facts it is difficult not 2 Khrushchev mentioned in the letter that as of Soviet people cannot give their agreement. to believe the information provided by some August 1958, there were about 1,500 Soviet ex- The deputy chief of the general staff of the [of our] experts indicating that they are be- perts in China. 3 The Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpiece, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Yang ing spied on. The meaning of these mea- Hongqi (Reg Flag) published this article in its Zhengwu, and the head of the Propaganda sures is at a minimum incomprehensible to April 1960 issue. It summarized the CCP’s view- Department of the General Political Depart- the Soviet people who came to the PR of points on international issues and the correct ori- ment of the Chinese People’s Liberation China with the deeply felt desire to help the entation of the international communist move- Army, Fu Zhong, both used a consultation Chinese people in building socialism. ment. 4 meeting attended by a group of Soviet mili- Of course, all of this hurts the feeling For an internal Soviet account of Khrushchev’s tary experts to propagate their views on of the Soviet experts and, even more so, it visit to Beijing, see M. A. Suslov’s report to the questions about war and peace, as well as has caused such a just indignation that they, Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 18 December 1959, contained in the Storage Cen- an assessment of the current international due to the fact that they are being denied ter for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), situation, that are incorrect, faulty and in the trust they need, are forced to present to and excerpted in this issue of the Bulletin. contradiction to the basic theses of the [No- the Soviet Government the request that they 5 See Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo vember] 1957 Moscow Declaration of fra- be allowed to return to their motherland. waijiao [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy,] ternal [communist] parties. There exist also The Soviet Government deems it nec- (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), a whole series of other cases in which lead- essary to declare that the afore-mentioned 364-365. 6 ing officials of Chinese institutions and en- actions on the part of the Chinese side are In this regard, it is revealing that the Soviet terprises endeavor to draw Soviet special- unfriendly towards the Soviet Union. They note is found in the East German archives, a clear indication that Moscow was spreading its version ists into discussions, to put them under pres- are in contradiction with the Treaty of of events to reassert its leadership role in the sure, and to influence them by suggesting Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance movement. to them viewpoints quite different from the between the USSR and the PR of China, ac- positions of the CPSU. cording to which both sides have commit- Chen Jian is associate professor of his- The Soviet experts working in the PR ted themselves, in the spirit of friendship and tory at Southern Illinois University at of China consider such activities on the part cooperation and in accordance with the prin- of the Chinese authorities as open disrespect ciples of equality and mutual interests, to Carbondale and, during the 1996-97 of themselves and of their work, as activi- developing and consolidating the economic academic year, a senior fellow at the ties intolerable in relations between social- and cultural relations between them. Such United States Institute of Peace in ist countries, and, in fact, as an open agita- activities on the part of the Chinese side Washington, D.C. tion against the CC of the CPSU and the make it practically impossible for the So- Soviet Government. viet experts to continue to stay in the PR of The Soviet experts, taking into their China. consideration a variety of facts, have been The Embassy is instructed to inform ARCHIVE ESTABLISHED compelled to conclude that they no longer the Government of the PR of China that the have the trust of the Chinese side they need Soviet experts and advisors, including the The following item appeared in the China in order to fulfill the tasks put before them, military, will be, in accordance with their News Digest of 26 November 1996; it was posted on H-Asia by Yi-Li Wu, a doctoral candidate in not to mention the respect these experts have own wishes, recalled to their motherland. the History Department at Yale University, and earned by providing assistance to the Chi- While coming to this decision, the Soviet brought to CWIHP’s attention by Odd Arne nese people for [China’s] economic and cul- side has also taken into consideration the Westad, Director of Research at the Norwegian tural development and military build-up. fact that the Government of the PR of China Nobel Institute in Oslo: There exist several cases in which the opin- itself, in the past, has raised the question of ions of the Soviet experts were grossly ig- ordering a number of Soviet experts work- Documents of Cultural Revolution nored, or in which there openly existed no ing in the PR of China to return to the So- Moved to Archive wish [on the part of the Chinese] to take their viet Union. After nearly 37,000 documents, tape record- recommendations into consideration, de- The Soviet Government expresses the ings, and exhibits of the Cultural Revolution era spite the fact that these recommendations hope that the Government of the PR of from 47 government ministries were moved to a were based upon the well-founded knowl- China will understand correctly the causes new central Cultural Revolution archive in east edge and rich experiences of these experts. that have led to this decision. Beijing, archivists said Tuesday that scores of This even went so far that the documents them are either incomplete or in poor condition, prepared by the Soviet experts, which in- [Source: Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien und United Press International reports from Beijing. cluded respective recommendations and Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen A worker at the Beijing Municipal Government technical rules, were demonstratively DDR” im Bundesarchiv J IV 2/202/280. Archive said: “One of the biggest problems is there are no indices for the information and there burned. Translation from Russian: Dieter Heinzig is no way of knowing what is and isn’t there.” This information leads to the conclu- and Anna Eckner. The copy of the Russian Many of the documents were issued by the late sion that the Soviet experts in the PR of note is not dated but known from other Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The China are being deprived of the opportunity sources.] new archive will not be open to the public or aca- to fulfill their useful functions and to con- demics, and government archivists will spend a tribute their knowledge and experiences to * Dieter Heinzig is deputy director of the Federal year or so studying the materials and indexing the fullest degree. They are practically put Institute for East European and International Stud- them in the hope of finding what are missing. into such a situation that their selfless work ies in Cologne, Germany. They will also attempt to search for more docu- 1 ments although some concede that many of the is not being appreciated, and that they are See, e.g., John Gittings, Survey of the Sino- Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from most sensitive documents will never resurface.” encountering ingratitude from the Chinese the Recent Polemics, 1963-1967 (London: Ox- (Vic CHIN, YIN De An) COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 251 The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives

by M.Y. Prozumenschikov desire to strengthen its influence in the The fact that the USSR did not take a “third world,” in the process squeezing clear “class” position in a conflict be- The year 1962 was marked by a the Soviet Union out.3 tween a socialist state and a bourgeois further intensification of the discord Unitl the fall of 1962, however, state provoked indignation in China. In between the Communist Party of the both countries succeeded in preserving a 13 September 1959 letter to the CC Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese a semblance of outward unity: the CPSU, the CC CCP accused the Soviet Community Party (CCP) and, corre- “cracks” in the Soviet–Chinese “mono- government (although in a veiled form) spondingly, between the Soviet Union lith” were already apparent to the na- of “accomodation and compromise on and the People’s Republic of China ked eye, yet it was still not clear whether important matters of principle” and (PRC). Beijing’s refusal to stay within they were leading to an outright schism. noted that “the TASS statement showed the boundaries defined by Moscow, The events of October 1962, when new to the whole world the different posi- which was especially marked after the clashes on the Sino–Indian border and tions of China and the Soviet Union in 22nd CPSU congress at the end of 1961, the Caribbean Crisis (Cuban Missile regard to the incident on the Indian– caused serious anxiety among Soviet Crisis) broke out practically simulta- Chinese border, which causes a virtual officials who frequently spoke of the neously, constitute a turning point in the glee and jubilation among the Indian CCP leadership’s deviation “from the development of Sino–Soviet relations bourgeoisie and the American and En- generally fraternal countries and par- and signified the beginning of the open glish imperialists, who are in every way ties” and described Beijing’s authorities split between the two countries. possible driving a wedge between China as seeking “to more widely bring into This article does not attempt to il- and the Soviet Union.”5 the open their disagreements [with us], luminate the causes or recount the The border conflict placed the both in theory and in practice.”1 courses of the border conflict or the USSR in a complicated position for a In the international arena, these Cuban crisis, but rather, on the basis of number of reasons. First of all, Mao disagreements touched on a wide circle archival documents in the former Cen- Zedong persistently tried to confer on of problems, including questions of war tral Committee (CC) of the CPSU this conflict the character of an impor- and peace, peaceful coexistence, evalu- stored in the Storage Center for Con- tant question of the class struggle on an ations of the character of the contem- temporary Documentation (TsKhSD) in international scale and, accordingly, porary period, and others. Soviet leader Moscow, to analyze the influence of sought support for their actions from all Nikita S. Khrushchev, who was trying these dual conflicts in the fall of 1962 “fraternal” parties. This did not at all (albeit inconsistently) to conduct a on Sino–Soviet relations. correspond to Khrushchev’s views, nei- policy of peaceful coexistence with the Armed conflicts on the Sino-Indian ther in principle nor in the specific con- West, could hardly agree with the dec- border first occurred in August 1959 and crete case; while the Soviet leader ear- larations coming from Beijing to the already caused at that time a mutual lack nestly desired to preserve good relations effect that the aspiration “to achieve of understanding between the PRC and with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal peace without wars is sheer nonsense,” USSR. Moscow, having supported Nehru, for Mao Nehru was “half man, that impirialism “will never fall if it isn’t Beijing during the suppression of the half devil” and the task of communists pushed,” and which characterized the uprising in Tibet in early 1959,4 refused was to “wash off his face so that it won’t atom bomb as a “paper tiger.”2 Mos- to stand so unequivocally on China’s be frightening, like a devil’s.”6 cow reacted especially sensitively to side in the border incident. Soviet lead- Secondly, the Soviet Union could Beijing’s efforts to depreciate the role ers believed that in many ways the flare- not act as a peacemaker between social- of the socialist countries and the inter- up was provoked by the Chinese them- ist China and bourgeois India without national communist movement, having selves, in order to demonstrate in prac- violating the principles of proletarian declared the decisive factor of the de- tice their refusal to accept the McMahon internationalism. Not wishing simply velopment of human society in the con- line (a 1914 boundary agreed on by to embrace the Chinese position in the temporary epoch to be the national lib- British and Tibetan officials which In- border dispute, the USSR remained deaf eration movements of the countries of dian accepted as the correct Sino-Indian to numerous Indian requests to act as a Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the frontier) as the state border between the mediator. In this question, Moscow dis- USSR it was feared, not without rea- PRC and India. Moscow clarified its played extreme caution; the CC CPSU, son, that one reason why the “wind from stance in a September 1959 TASS state- for example, categorically rejected a the East had come to prevail over the ment calling on both warring sides to proposal of the director of the Institute wind from the West,” was the PRC’s resolve the conflict by peaceful means. of Oriental Studies of the USSR Acad- 252 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

emy of Sciences, P. Gafurov, to orga- conflict. From time to time Moscow Havana established diplomatic relations nize in Moscow a meeting with the par- cautiously attempted to influence in September 1960; now the PRC be- ticipation of Chinese and Indian schol- Beijing to take a more moderate posi- gan actively to invite envoys from the ars on questions connected with the his- tion and agree to compromise with In- “island of freedom” and recruit from tory and mutual influences of Chinese dia. At that time, Soviet officials be- them advocates of their own course.13 and Indian cultures.7 lieved that such a change in China’s Considering that the Chinese revo- Third, the border conflict sharply approach could occur only “as a result lutionaries’ militant language in many worsened the position of the Commu- of review by the leaders of the PRC of respects echoed the Cubans’, Moscow nist Party of India (CPI): subjected to their foreign policy conceptions as a tried by all means to lessen Chinese in- attacks from the bourgeois parties of In- whole,” but this “in the near future is fluence. These efforts did not go to dia, the CPI also itself split between extremely problematic.”9 In contrast waste. During a visit to China at the those who felt that only India was at to the diplomats, Khrushchev, dis- end of 1960, Cuban revolutionary Che fault in the conflict and those who sug- pleased by the Mao’s refusal to heed Guevara in a joint Chinese–Cuban com- gested that responsibility could be di- Moscow’s advice, stated in a much munique expressed approval of the PRC vided between both countries. At the sharper way that when he converses policy of “three red banners”; but one 6th CPI Congress in 1961, Soviet rep- with Mao, when he listens to him, he year later, Cuban President Oswaldo resentative M. Suslov exerted consid- gets the impression that he is speaking Dorticos, in a visit to the PRC, did not erable effort so that, on the one hand, with Stalin, is listening to Stalin.10 once touch on this question despite con- militant pro-Beijing party members From their part, the Chinese persistently siderable Chinese efforts.14 who felt the CPI must always align it- told Soviet representatives that resolv- In Cuba itself, authorities generally self with the CCP would not prevail, and ing the border dispute required influ- tried to minimize the disagreements that on the other hand, to block discussion encing India, not the PRC; that “Nehru had arisen in the communist world. at the Congress of a resolution proposed is the central figure in the anti–Chinese Havana even specially appealed to by a number of prominent Indian com- campaign in India, that he does not in Moscow and Beijing with a request not munists criticizing the PRC and back- any case want to resolve the question to publish anti–Soviet and anti–Chinese ing Nehru. These Soviet actions could of the Sino–Indian border, even in some materials in TASS and Xinhua bulletins hardly pass unnoticed in Beijing; in a fixed period.”11 Moscow listened to distributed in Cuba, for this could, the talk with Soviet ambassador S. these statements in silence, leaving Cuban leadership feared, damage the Chervonenko, CC CCP secretary Deng them without commentary. unity of the Cuban people and create Xiaoping made a point of referring in- Concurrently with the Sino–Indian additional political difficulties within dignantly to “some Indian communists, border conflict, Soviet and Chinese at- the country.15 The Cuban press care- who are even praising Nehru.”8 tention was drawn to events in the West- fully “filtered” all statements by Chi- Finally, another relevant aspect of ern hemisphere, where in 1959 the Cu- nese leaders critical of Soviet policy (in the problem was the fact that Moscow ban revolution triumphed. The chance particular, most newspapers excised clearly grasped that Beijing’s bellicose to spread their respective understand- such remarks from the speech of Chi- method of resolving border questions ings of Marxism among the Cuban nese Premier Zhou Enlai at the CPSU with India could also be repeated in revolutionaries sparked a lively compe- 22nd congress); at the same time the other disputed portions of the Chinese tition between the two communist gi- Cubans politely but firmly suppressed border, and not necessarily only with ants for ideological influence in Cuba. Soviet attempts to distribute literature countries liberated from colonial depen- Initially, Moscow seized the lead- in Cuba that enunciated Moscow’s point dence. As early as 8 September 1959, ership in this “contest for Cuba,” which of view on the dispute.16 two weeks after fighting broke out on was in many ways determined by So- Both the Soviet Union and China the Sino-Indian border, the CC CPSU viet military and economic aid to Ha- naturally counted on extracting advan- received from the USSR Ministry of vana. By contrast, although Chinese tages from the “special relations” they Foreign Affairs a detailed report “On leaders welcomed the Cuban revolu- hoped to establish with Cuba. However, the Question of the Soviet–Chinese tion, if they took a wait–and–see ap- if Beijing embarked on a path of pro- Border.” The preparation of such a re- proach with regard to its leader Fidel pagandistic expansion through Cuba port at a time when Sino–Soviet rela- Castro, in part to preserve diplomatic onto the Latin American continent, then tions, at least on this question, were communications with Taiwan via Cuba. in the USSR a plan took shape to use ostensibly satisfactory strongly suggests In this regard, noted Soviet representa- the island as an unsinkable nuclear base that at least some Soviet officials al- tives in China, who closely monitored near the shores of the USA. Khrush- ready foresaw the danger of border the development of Chinese–Cuban re- chev preferred not to let Mao Zedong problems with China. lations, in its propaganda during this know about this plan, not only because For the previous three years a situ- early period the CCP leadership made of the existing disagreements, but also, ation of unstable equilibrium had been no attempt to counterpose their policy perhaps, out of a wish to reap future maintained on the Sino–Indian border, toward Cuba to that of the CPSU.12 laurels himself and at the same time to threatening the outbreak of new armed The situation changed after Beijing and strengthen the Soviet position in the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 253

“third world.” This desire might account onstrate the seriousness of the situation whole world with catastrophe, the sec- for the thoroughness and satisfaction on the Indian–Chinese border,” and to ond was acutely painful for the USSR with which the CC CPSU apparatus urge “the press organs of the fraternal and its leader. Searching for a way out, collected the enthusiastic reactions from parties to come forward on the given Moscow, in the midst of everything, the developing countries to the TASS question with accounts of the Chinese turned its attention to Beijing. The ex- report of 11 September 1962 vowing side’s positions.”20 A week later, So- perience of recent years made it pos- that the USSR would protect Cuba viet ambassador Chervonenko, as he sible for Khrushchev to hope that, at this against U.S. aggression. In China, de- reported to Moscow, spoke on this very critical moment in the battle with inter- spite the fact that this report fit Beijing’s question with PRC Vice–Minister of national imperialism, China would at propaganda style, only 32 lines were Foreign Affairs Zhang Hanfu, and “em- least momentarily “close its eyes” to the allotted to it in the periodical press. phatically declared to Zhang Hanfu that discord and steadfastly support any The CC CCP 10th Plenum, which it was necessary to understand who was Soviet action. That had occurred (at took place in the fall of 1962, strength- right and who was not right [in the bor- least on the surface) in 1956 during the ened anti–Soviet moods in Beijing. On der conflicts]. It would be incorrect not crises in Hungary and Poland, and in October 12, Chinese leaders stated that to distinguish between those who were 1961 during the Berlin crisis.23 For his the conclusion of a nuclear weapons guilty and those who were not guilty. part, Khrushchev was ready to compro- nonproliferation treaty (which It would likewise not be right to blur mise with Mao on a whole series of is- Khrushchev supported), would further the distinction between the guilty and sues, including the Sino-Indian conflict. the interests only of the USA, which the innocent.”21 Such an answer could On October 25, with war with the was trying “to bind China by the hands not be reassuring to Beijing. Cher- United States potentially imminent, the and feet” in the development of its own vonenko also mentioned certain prob- newspaper Pravda published a front– nuclear arsenal.17 An October 20 mem- lems which were raised by Zhang Hanfu page article, which had been approved orandum from the PRC government to and which evidently were connected by the CC CPSU, essentially rejecting the USSR government on the nonpro- “with the aggravation of the situation the position that Moscow had main- liferation question, distributed also to on the Sino-Indian border, in light of tained during the course of the whole representatives of other socialist coun- the fact that the Chinese leadership ex- Sino-Indian border conflict. The article tries, declared: “However strong the pected different reactions on the part of called the McMahon line, which New military capabilities of the Soviet the Soviet leadership.”22 Delhi accepted, “notorious,” “the re- Union, it is not able to solve the defense One must also note that at first, the sult of British imperialism,” and con- issue of all the socialist nations. For Sovie leadership, preoccupied with sequently legally invalid. Moreover, example, on the question of the defense Cuban affairs, did not pay particular having made this assertion on the eve by the Chinese of their borders with In- attention to the renewed aggravation of of the execution of Chinese plans to dia, the Soviet side played just the op- tensions on the Sino-Indian frontier. settle the conflict, Pravda also accused posite role.”18 A similar announcement The documents relating to events on the India of being incited by imperialists explained that the military conflict on border, which various organs of the CC and being the main ringleaders of the the Sino-Indian border, which was again CPSU issued during this period, did not, conflict and charged that the CPI was flaring in autumn 1962, had not only as a rule, go further than the Interna- sliding toward chauvinism to the detri- failed to move the Soviet Union to tional Department of the Central Com- ment of proletarian internationalism.24 change its fundamental position but mittee, and they were labeled: “Infor- Moscow’s unexpected and abrupt also, from the Chinese perspective, mational Material. To the archive.” reversal—clearly intended as a gesture caused Moscow to become even more The lack of upper–level Soviet en- to shore up the all but moribund Sino- pro–Indian, since prior to these events gagement on the border conflict was re- Soviet alliance in the event of war with it had given India the military helicop- flected in Soviet newspaper articles the West—provoked a sharp reaction, ters and transport planes, which took which gave stingy information and, but not exactly the one that the Soviet part in the border clashes. moreover, did not appear in prominent leadership had expected. From the In October 1962, Beijing made a locations. The same lack of top level documents at TsKhSD, it is clear that last attempt to compel Moscow to take leadership manifested itself in the con- the article came as a bombshell, espe- a “class position” on China’s border versations of Soviet officials with for- cially in India. Nehru declared that he dispute with India and “to teach certain eign representatives, in which the So- was very pained by the article, which comrades to separate truth from un- viets reiterated the old thesis about the caused significant damage to India’s truth.”19 On October 15, Renmin Ribao need to prevent world conflict. friendship with the USSR.25 Even (People’s Daily) assistant editor Chen The situation changed on October more severe embarrassment arose in the Tseiun organized in the newspaper’s 22, when the speech of U.S. President CPI; one party leader, Shripad Amrit editorial office a meeting with foreign John F. Kennedy effectively put a tough Dange, sent the CC CPSU a telegram correspondents, which was intended, choice before Khrushchev: conflict, requesting that it take at least some ac- according to the opinion of the Soviet with likely use of nuclear weapons, or tion to repudiate some of the article’s journalists who were present, “to dem- retreat. The first scenario threatened the statements. Very familiar with the sys- 254 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tem, under which the representatives of Cuban question expressing “complete sacrifice hundreds of millions of human the other fraternal nations and parties support for the correct position of the lives on the victory altar of Commu- usually followed the Soviet position, Soviet government,” and two large ar- nism, the Beijing leadership evidently unwervingly supporting the Kremlin, ticles in Renmin Ribao with bellicose firmly believed that such a catastrophe Dange begged Moscow “to stop all the headlines that typified Chinese propa- would not happen in October 1962. In fraternal parties so that they would not ganda of that period, and which ap- the conflict’s tensest moments, Chinese write in their newspapers about the proved of the Soviet’s actions in the officials remained convinced that there McMahon line, things which were simi- Caribbean.31 This was the last praise was no danger of thermonuclear war, lar to that which they would otherwise that Beijing officially conferred upon and that if the affair went so far as a write.”26 The telegram went unan- Moscow. While the Soviet propagan- military conflict, it would be of a gue- swered. Predictably, the pro–Chinese dists tried with limited success to orga- rilla character, as in Algeria, Laos, or faction of the CPI became noticeably nize massive rallies and demonstrations South Vietnam.32 According to Mao, more active, announcing triumphantly within other nations for the support of the main reason that war would not that the CPSU was finally “convinced their policy, nothing of the sort was at- break out was that the American impe- of the folly of its ways and accepted the tempted in China in October 1962. rialists, who feared for their stolen Chinese perspective.”27 Soviet leaders, it seems, did not riches, had no reason to desire it. Simi- In the tangled position in which grasp the fact that during this period the larly, the “Soviet bourgeoisie” that had Soviet diplomats in New Delhi found disagreements between the two govern- emerged under Khrushchev and had not themselves, they were obliged, in con- ments had become too strong to be sur- forgotten about the Stalinist purges versations with Indians, to speak of the mounted with the stroke of a newspa- maintained a death grip on their privi- complicated and confused situation, per writer’s pen. Nor did they realize leges. Consequently, Beijing figured about the impossibility of defining the that Khrushchev’s actions in Cuba cre- that one side or the other had to yield. reality of any border, even proposing ated a dream-like situation for the Chi- In the end an understanding of the that India wait while Chinese and In- nese—ensuring a positive outcome, lethal danger of nuclear conflict com- dian academicians defined the precise from their standpoint, without requir- pelled Khrushchev to retreat.33 Al- border on the basis of archival docu- ing them to modify their basic position. though the Soviet Union understood ments.28 The Indians understood what For if Kennedy retreated and the mis- that their leader lacked the absolute was happening, inferring that the ap- siles remained on the island, it would power over his allies in the communist pearance of “such bad articles” in the vindicate the CCP’s militant thesis that camp to represent the defeat as a “vic- Soviet press could only be explained imperialism was a “paper tiger” to tory in the name of peace,” nonetheless, “by the situation of the Cuban crisis and which one needed to apply the principle the USSR did not expect the violent re- the threat of war.”29 of intensified pressure; conversely, action to Khruschev’s agreement to Soviet officials had expected such Khrushchev’s retreat would strengthen withdraw the missiles which was to reactions, but they hoped to be repaid Beijing’s slogan denouncing “contem- come from Beijing. with active Chinese support in the Car- porary revisionists,” i.e., the Soviets. As soon as the news of Khrush- ibbean (Cuban Missile) crisis. It was Moreover, the future of Sino–Soviet chev’s retreat reached them, the Chinese no coincidence that during this period, relations and the situation in the Com- authorities put their propaganda ma- in conversations with Chinese officials, munist world as a whole depended, in chine to work at full throttle; newspa- East German and Hungarian diplomats large measure, on the result of the So- pers displayed discussions about the stressed the need for compromise and viet-American stand-off. If events de- situation in the Caribbean, the cities cooperation between fraternal socialist veloped according to the first scenario, were covered in slogans in support of parties, rejecting the “clarification of Khrushchev would probably conduct Cuba, and the speeches that Castro had relationships” while there was bitter relations with Washington as if with a given on Cuban television explaining hostility and potential war with the im- “paper tiger,” a development which the basic disagreements between the perialists.30 Since the records of these Beijing could interpret as strengthening Cuban and the Soviet leaderships actu- conversations were almost immediately the correctness of the Chinese line. The ally became bestsellers in China at that sent to the Soviet embassy in Beijing, second possibility would lead to a final time. Soviet diplomats in Beijing dis- and from there efficiently dispatched to split, between the USSR and China, and consolately reported that events on the the CC CPSU, it is not hard to guess the anti-Soviet mood would intensify. Sino-Indian border, to which Chinese that such conversations were, to a large Analyzing the documents available propaganda up until that time had been extent, inspired by Moscow. in TsKhSD, one may conclude that the devoting most of its attention, had been However, the effort which the Chinese leaders did not believe that a swept aside and lost in this midst of the USSR expended to obtain China’s sup- third, more tragic variant might de- uproar over Cuba.34 Only now, after port proved to be entirely disproportion- velop: that the flare-up over Cuba would the Soviet concession had ended the ate to the return it received. All that escalate into World War III. Since Mao crisis, came the rallies the Soviet lead- Moscow got from the PRC leadership loved to issue judgment on themes of ers had desired in its first days, featur- was an October 25 declaration on the global war and was even prepared to ing appearances and speeches by the up- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 255 per–level Chinese leadership: Deng ability of any sort of “wishy-washiness” outset of military actions on the Sino- Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, et in relations with the imperialist aggres- Indian border, the Soviets had sought al.35 The political campaign culmi- sors.41 Obviously with the approval, basic operational data from Chinese au- nated with elaborately orchestrated36 of the PRC leadership, Renmin Ribao thorities about the situation, but for a mass demonstrations of solidarity at the compared the Cuba situation with the long time was unable to get any. In fact, Cuban Embassy in Beijing, which took 1938 Munich Pact—e.g., charging the USSR didn’t even know from the place non–stop from the 3rd to the 6th Moscow with appeasement of imperi- beginning that military operations al- of November and in which, the Chinese alism.42 At that moment, a stronger ready were going full steam: A secret media reported, more than five million accusation was difficult to imagine. report of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing people participated.37 The anti–Soviet orientation of noted that in 1958 the “Chinese friends” Soviet officials well understood the statements in China was not limited had informed Moscow “about the po- ulterior motive behind these mass dem- only to means of mass communication. litical goals which are being pursued by onstrations. While under the ostensible The CC CPSU received information this action [in the Taiwan straits] only slogan of solidarity with Cuba, they that in enterprises, offices and even in after two weeks,”44 while in 1959 sharply criticized those “who were certain schools across China closed Moscow received China’s report about frightened in the face of imperial ag- meetings were being held to elucidate the events on the border only after “a gression,” who “bartered with the free- the situation around Cuba and the role great delay.”45 Insofar as “the recog- dom and independence of another of the Soviet Union. At these meetings nition and stressing by the Chinese com- people,” and so on.38 However, at that it was essentially stated for the first time rades of the formula about the leading moment Moscow was not up to a clari- openly, and not through hints, that the role of the Soviet Union in the Social- fication of relations with China; rather, USSR was conducting a “revisionist” ist [bloc] might create in world public it sought at any price to get out of the foreign as well as domestic policy. It opinion the impression that the harsh conflict with minimal losses. In fact, was true that the responsible party course and the foreign policy actions of in November 1962, Moscow switched workers who conducted these meetings the PRC were taken upon agreement roles with Beijing; if during the Sino- explained that accusing the Soviet with the Soviet Union,”46 Soviet offi- Indian border clashes China unsuccess- Union of revisionism out loud—like, cials viewed Beijing’s behavior very fully appealed for the support of the for example, Yugoslavia—for the time negatively, and demanded that China Soviet Union, now the USSR faced the being was not permitted by the tense coordinate positions in situations where analogous response from the PRC. international situation. But they let it be the collective security of the two coun- During this period, the Soviet ambas- known that this would be a matter for tries—which under the 1950 treaty cre- sador repeatedly tried to secure a meet- the coming months. At the same time, ating the Sino-Soviet alliance were ing directly with Mao, who cited vari- it was said in China that the peoples of linked together by, inter alia, the obli- ous reasons for avoiding a personal en- the socialist countries of Eastern Europe gation to provide military assistance to counter, instead sending much lower– could not sleep at night because of fear one another—was involved.47 ranking officials. The Soviet Embassy of a nuclear conflict. There was great amazement in knew full well that during these very Judging by the information which Moscow when in November 1962 the days, when Chinese officials asserted flowed into the CC CPSU, one reason Chinese virtually repeated the old So- that Mao was feeling indisposed and behind Beijing’s extreme negative re- viet theses, declaring that the Kremlin’s could not receive the Soviet ambassa- action to Moscow’s actions was the fact poorly thought out actions in the Car- dor, the PRC leader was seeing party that the Soviet Union had deployed ibbean might have involved the Chinese delegations and representatives of other missiles to Cuba without saying a word people in a nuclear war against its will, states.39 All this amounted to a clear to China. Reproaches that Khrushchev since although the PRC didn’t know demonstration of the poor relations be- had hidden important international in- anything about the Soviet preparations, tween the PRC and USSR. formation from his allies were heard by the terms of the 1950 alliance treaty Moscow might have put up with frequently in China in those days along in the event of the outbreak of war, it Beijing simply taking a neutral position. with unfavorable comparisons to Sino- would have had to enter the conflict on However, the PRC decided to exploit Soviet consultations during the events the USSR’s side.48 the Cuban crisis to explain to “certain in Poland, Hungary, and Laos, when the All this taken together could not comrades that under no conditions is it sides informed each other in a timely but attract the attention of Moscow, permissible to trade in the liberty and manner and therefore made correct de- which decided, as soon as the clouds rights” of other states.40 The PRC For- cisions.43 More to the point, on this over Cuba bagan to disperse a little, “to eign Minister, Chen Yi, speaking on issue it was as if Moscow and Beijing bring affairs to order” in the socialist November 7 in the Soviet Embassy on had traded places: now it fell to house. On November 5, Pravda pub- the occasion of the 45th anniversary of Khrushchev to listen to the reproaches lished a new lead article on the situa- the October Revolution, as Soviet dip- which he had only recently addressed tion on the Sino-Indian border, which lomats later reported, lectured them in to Mao. In autumn 1958, during the in its content sharply contrasted with its a “mentor’s tone” about the inadmiss- Taiwan Straits crisis, and in 1959, at the predecessor of ten days before and on 256 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the principal issues once again returned and well–known impulsiveness which Leninism.”57 Sensing that the danger to the USSR’s old viewpoint on that marked Khrushchev’s actions. Indig- of isolation inside the Communist world conflict, in which China did not at all nant at Beijing’s position during the no longer threatened China, Beijing appear to be the victimized side.49 The Caribbean crisis, Khrushchev, not began to say that “if the international new Pravda article, however, could thinking out very well the consequences Communist movement collapsed, this scarcely seriously change anything, of his actions, decided to activate all the will not cause the sky to fall down.”58 because by then the border situation had levers of pressure in order to teach the The PRC derived confidence also from largely stabilized and, in the opinion of Chinese a good lesson in the newly the fact that if before only Albania diplomats from the socialist countries, brought to light “classics of Marxism– openly and unconditionally supported both combatants were searching for a Leninism.”52 However, the Soviet China, now a whole group of Asian means to withdraw from the conflict leader still hoped to preserve a certain communist parties, including those in with as much dignity as possible. unity of the Communist world, view- power, shared clearly pro-Chinese po- In its main counterattack, Moscow ing these disagreements with the PRC sitions. Exploiting another of Khrush- turned to the congresses of the Com- as an annoying misunderstanding which chev’s ill-considered steps, which in the munist parties of a number of countries could be settled. The limits to the So- customs of the time mobilized “progres- which took place in late 1962 and early viet leadership’s readiness to trumpet its sive people in the West” to criticize 1963, and also to the session of the Su- fall-out with Beijing surfaced in De- China, Beijing began a propaganda preme Soviet of the USSR which took cember 1962 when the Indians decided counterattack against the Communist place in December 1962. Those who to take advantage of the sharpening of parties of France, Italy, and the USA, did not support Khrushchev were de- Sino–Soviet contradictions and began posing a choice to the USSR itself—to clared “babblers,” “ultra-revolutionar- to distribute in Moscow, through its take its satellites under its protection ies,” and “reckless adventurists.” In his embassy, materials about the events on and in this way intensify the contradic- indignation, the Soviet leader went to the Sino-Indian border. This measure tions with China, or to stay silent, cre- the point that he named as the main in- was immediately nipped in the bud by ating grounds for disagreement with the stigators of war not U.S. President the Soviet side, prompting a sharp pro- Western communist parties. Kennedy or West German Chancellor test by the Indian representatives.53 The events of the end of 1962 were (which at the time The Kremlin also noted the a borderline, beyond which the dis- would have been entirely normal), but strengthening of the “intellectual fer- agreements between Moscow and ... the Albanians! And although at these ment” generated by these disagreements Beijing and the corresponding split in congresses there was still preserved the inside the Communist world itself. the Communist world began to assume ritual, accepted in the last few years in Romania’s leaders blatantly tried to an irreversible character. For the first the Communist world, when Moscow, exploit the situation to distance itself time during the whole period of the cursing the Albanians, really had the from the USSR and from China.54 One “Cold War” under conditions of the Chinese in mind, and the PRC, cursing alarming tendency, to Soviet officials, fierce confrontation between the USSR the Yugoslavs, meant the USSR, a new was the new willingness of ambassa- and the USA, China not only did not step on the path to a total split had been dors from Romania, Hungary, and support the USSR, but even dared to taken. Khrushchev, in particular, China, in conversations with Soviet condemn Moscow’s actions. For the stressed that “someone taught the Al- counterparts, to criticize, albeit vaguely, first time disagreements were widely banians to pronounce vile words,” and certain actions of the USSR, complain- published not on questions of second- Wu Xiuquan, CC CPC member and ing that Moscow often failed to consult ary importance, but on the principal former Chinese ambassador to Yugosla- with its allies.55 Under these condi- ideological issues. Finaly, for the first via, speaking in his capacity as the per- tions, Khrushchev was obliged to call time a party which had incited a revolt manent leader of the CPC delegation to for an end to polemics between parties against the hegemony of the Kremlin the Communist party congresses which so that passions could subside. did not end up in total isolation; a num- were taking place during that period, This appeal did not elicit, however, ber of Communist parties unequivocally was subject to well-organized filibus- a positive response in Beijing, for expressed support for her, and inside ters.50 In its turn, the CPC responded China’s leaders had no desire to retreat Communist parties of pro–Soviet ori- in a series of articles in Renmin Ribao from the positions which had been won, entation there began to appear Maoist showing that the world had by no means believing that the USSR’s actions in late fractions. The trumpet call of the revo- been put on the brink of nuclear war by 1962 had conclusively unmasked lution became more muffled and un- “babblers” and that “the juggling of Moscow’s “revisionist policy.”56 If clear, and Communism itself turned out nuclear weapons as the solution to in- previously Mao had likened the diver- to be split not only as an ideological ternational arguments” was in no way gences between the two countries to the credo, but also as a movement which a true Marxist–Leninist position.51 gap between one finger and the remain- carried out practical work in various Analyzing Soviet policy toward the ing nine on a person’s hands, now Chi- countries of the world. PRC during this period, it makes sense nese officials described the differences to take into account the inconsistency as “diverse interpretations of Marxism– COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 257

1 Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China sador to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the Deputy gard to the Cuban Crisis, ibid., l. 439. for 1962, Center for the Preservation of Contem- Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the PRC Zhang 41 Ibid., l. 440. porary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, f. 5, Hanfu, ibid., l. 366. 42 Renmin Ribao, 5 November 1962. op. 49, d. 536, l. 58. 22 Ibid., l 367. 43 Record of Conversation of the Attache of the 2 Ibid, l. 64. 23 Although in 1961 disagreements already ex- USSR Embassy in China V. Zhdanovich with 3 Ibid, l. 61. isted between the USSR and China, during the Employees of Various Embassies in China, 4 The anti–Chinese position in this conflict of the Berlin crisis and after the Soviet announcement TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 531, ll. 511–513. ruling circles of India, who defended the Dalai that autumn of the renewal of nuclear testing, 44 Political Letter of the USSR Embassy in China Lama and who tried to organize assistance to the mass pro-Moscow demonstrations were orga- on the Situation in China on the Occasion of the rebels in Tibet, constituted a major source of the nized in China, and other steps were taken to show 10 Year Celebration of the PRC, TsKhSD, f. 5, sharpening tension on the Sino-Indian border. As PRC solidarity with the USSR and GDR. op. 49, d. 239, l. 202. far as the USSR was concerned, although Mos- 24 Pravda, 25 October 1962. 45 Report on the Work of the USSR Embassy in cow also expressed cautious doubts about the law- 25 Letter of S. Dange to the CC CPSU, 29 Octo- China for 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 240, l. fulness of some of Beijing’s actions, overall the ber 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 424, l. 105. 95. Kremlin unconditionally supported the PRC, pro- 26 Ibid., l. 107. 46 Ibid., l. 94. ceeding from the main directive: “Support China’s 27 Ibid., l. 102. 47 Under pressure from the USSR the Chinese at just cause, don’t aggravate relations with Nehru.” 28 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50. the end of 1958 promised that “they would not Note of the Editor of the Newspaper Pravda V.V. 29 Letter of S. Dange to the CC CPSU, 29 Octo- allow any further adventurism.” Report on the Maevskii to CC CPSU, 12 April 1959, TsKhSD, ber 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 424, l. 106. Work of the USSR Embassy in China for 1958, f. 5, op. 30, d. 302, l. 75. At the same time, the 30 See, e.g., Record of Conversation of the Staff TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 134, ll. 84–85. USSR was ready to provide assistance to the PRC Members of the USSR Embassy in the PRC V. 48 Information of the USSR Embassy in the PRC in the international arena, where events in Tibet Mogul’skii and G. Kireev with the Counselor of on Chinese–Cuban Relations (December 1962– prompted an ambiguous reaction. Information the Embassy of Hungary J. Kukuchka, TsKhSD, January 1963), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 624, ll. Sheet of the Department of the CC CPSU on Re- f. 5, op. 50, d. 531, ll. 426–435. 49–50. lations with Communist and Working Class Par- 31 One of the articles, for example, was called, 49 Pravda, 5 November 1962. ties of the Socialist Countries, “About the Situa- “The Soviet Army is Ready to Strike a Blow to 50 The very naming of Wu Xiuquan, who was tion in Tibet,” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 302, l. 75. the Enemy.” Renmin Ribao, 26 October 1962. only a member of the CC CPC, as the leader of 5 Letter of the CC CPC to the CC CPSU Con- 32 Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the CPC delegation to the congresses of the cerning the incident on the Indo–Chinese Bor- the PRC about the Positions of the Leadership of “brother parties” should have demonstrated the der, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 246, ll. 164–165. the CPC in Connection with the Cuban Crisis. true relation of Beijing to those parties. 6 Record of Conversation of Mao Zedong with TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 438. 51 Renmin Ribao, 15, 31 December 1962. Representatives of Socialist Countries, TsKhSD, 33 Khrushchev seriously worried that Kennedy 52 Khrushchev reacted extremely painfully when f. 5, op. 30, d. 238, ll. 77–78. might embark on a military conflict using nuclear Mao was extolled as a great theoretician, evidently 7 Letter of the Institute of Oriental Studies to the weapons, pushed not only by American “hawks” feeling his own weakness on that issue. Cf. CC CPSU about the Conduct in the USSR of but also by the majority of the U.S. population. Speech of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU at Meetings between Chinese and Indian Scholars, According to an information sheet of the Insti- the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 1960, TsKhSD, f. TsKhSD, f.5, op. 50, d. 179, l. 195. tute of World Economy and International Rela- 2, op. 1, d. 469, ll. 127–130. 8 Record of Conversation of the Ambassador of tions specially prepared for the top Soviet lead- 53 Record of Conversation, Head of Press the USSR to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the ership, Americans, as of early 1962, asked Departrnent, MFA USSR Iu. Cherniakov, with General Secretary of the CC CPC Deng Xiao– whether they would favor a nuclear war or sub- Press Attache of the Indian Embassy in Moscow Ping, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 132. mitting to Communism, responded: for war–– I. Dzhein, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, ll. 85–86. 9 Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China 81%. Information Sheet of IMEMO to the CC 54 [Ed. note: See Raymond L. Garthoff, “When for 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 240, l. 97. CPSU, “Regarding the issue of correlation of 10 and Why Romania Distanced itself from the War- Cf. Speech of the First Secretary of the CC forces in the ruling circles of the USA,” TsKhSD, saw Pact,” CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 111.] CPSU N.S. Khrushchev at the Plenum of the CC f. 5, op. 30, d. 398, l. 73. 55 34 Information Sheet, USSR Embassy in the PRC, CPSU, 1960, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 469, l. 127. Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in On the Situation in the PRC on the Eve of the 11 Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambas- the PRC about the Relations of the PRC with Bilateral Meeting Between the CPC and the sador to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the Gen- Cuba, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 477. 35 CPSU, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, ll. 125–126. eral Secretary of the CC CPC Deng Xiao–Ping, Ibid., l. 434. 56 36 Here one may refer also to the visit in autumn TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 131. Ibid., l. 435. 1962 of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme So- 12 37 Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in Demonstrations at the Cuban Embassy were viet L. I. Brezhnev to “revisionist” Yugoslavia, the PRC on the Relations of the PRC with Cuba, meticulously organized: the schedule of proces- which in the same way prompted a storm of in- TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 464. sions was reported to the Cubans in advance with dignation in China. 13 Moscow carefully watched these ties, even breaks for lunch and rest. The Soviet Embassy 57 Information Sheet, USSR Embassy in the PRC, noting how often in his speeches Dorticos com- reported following the first day of the demonstra- On the Situation in the PRC on the Eve of the pared the Cuban and Chinese revolutions; ibid., tions, when the enthusiasm of the participants Bilateral Meeting between the CPC and CPSU, l. 467. turned out not to be too great (in the opinion of TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, ll. 96–97. 14 the organizers of these demonstrations), in the fac- Ibid. 58 Ibid. 15 Ibid., l. 475. tories and enterprises supplementary explanatory 16 Ibid. work was conducted. Ibid. 17 Renmin Ribao, 12 October 1962. 38 Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in M.Y. Prozumenschikov works at the 18 Political Report of the USSR Embassy in the PRC on the Positions of the Leadership of the Center for the Storage of Contemporary China for 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 536, l. CPC in Connection with the Cuban Crisis, Documentation in Moscow. This paper 72. TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 439. 39 was presented at CWIHP’s conference 19 Ibid., ll 72–73. Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambas- 20 Information Sheet of the Pravda Correspon- sador in China S. Chervonenko with the Deputy on “New Evidence on the Cold War in dents to the CC CPSU about the Meetings of the Head of the Department for Relations with Fra- Asia,” held at Hong Kong University Correspondents from Newspapers of the Social- ternal Communist Parties, CC CPC Zhao Yimin, in January 1996, and translated by K. ist Countries in the Editorial Offices of the News- TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 534, ll. 206–207. 40 Weathersby, S. Kirchhoff, and M. paper Renmin Ribao, ibid., l. 355. Report of the USSR Embassy in the PRC about 21 Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambas- the Position of the Leadership of the CPC in Re- Doctoroff. 258 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

NEW EAST-BLOC DOCUMENTS ON THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT, 1959 & 1962

Editor’s note: The following three Zedong, likening it to that which had the Cold War International History selections from Russian and East Ger- surrounded Stalin, while the Chinese Project by Vladislav M. Zubok of the man documents exemplify the new East- did little to conceal their contempt for National Security Archive from the Cen- bloc archival evidence that is becom- Khrushchev. ter for the Storage of Contemporary ing available on the triangular Sino-In- The excerpt reproduced below con- Documents (TsKhSD) in Moscow. The dian-Soviet relations examined in M.Y. centrates on Suslov’s criticism of document was located in Fond 2, a Prozumenschikov’s article above. (Un- China’s handling of Sino-Indian rela- newly-opened collection of declassified fortunately, Chinese and Indian ar- tions, particularly regarding the border transcripts and related materials of chives on these issues are currently un- clashes which erupted beginning in the CPSU Plenums. Zubok also translated available.) summer of 1959. While agreeing with the excerpt reprinted below from Rus- The first excerpt is from a much- Beijing’s suppression of the “counter- sian into English. A translation and longer document from the Russian ar- revolutionary rebellion” in Tibet of analysis of the entire Suslov report, as chives—a draft report “On the [Octo- March 1959, which had ended in the well as of the transcript of the climac- ber 1959] trip of the Soviet party-gov- Dalai Lama’s receiving asylum in In- tic 2 October 1959 Mao-Khrushchev ernmental delegation to the PRC dia, Suslov condemned as misguided summit meeting in Beijing, is in prepa- [People’s Republic of China],” dated and damaging China’s personal invec- ration by Mark Kramer of the Davis 18 December 1959, by Mikhail Suslov tive against Indian Prime Minister Center for Russian Studies (formerly the to Central Committee of the Commu- Jawaharlal Nehru and its strategy of Russian Research Center) at Harvard nist Party of the Soviet Union (CC using the border clashes to exacerbate University for future publication by the CPSU) Presidium for presentation to a Sino-Indian relations and push Nehru Cold War International History Project. forthcoming CC CPSU Plenum. Suslov, toward the West in hopes of inciting The second section of excerpts, a senior member of the CC CPSU lead- revolution in India. Rather than fur- drawn from Russian documents on So- ership, harshly criticized Chinese do- thering the cause of revolution, Suslov viet-Indian relations and the Sino-In- mestic and foreign policies in the wake stated, China’s actions were damaging dian border dispute in 1962, is culled of a contentious meeting between the “progressive forces” (i.e., the Commu- from a much larger selection of docu- Soviet and Chinese leaderships during nist Party) in India, weakening China’s ments from the Russian Foreign Minis- USSR leader Nikita Khrushchev’s visit (and improving Washington’s) standing try archives in Moscow, known officially to Beijing in early October 1959 for in Asia, and also impeding Sino-Soviet as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the commemorations of the tenth anniver- relations—for the Chinese Communist Russian Federation (AVP RF). They sary of the PRC’s establishment. Party blamed the CPSU for not openly were located during research at AVP RF Although at this point the Sino-So- siding with Beijing against India. in June 1996 by CWIHP Director James viet split remained publicly concealed, Suslov, in fact, depicted China’s actions G. Hershberg in the so-called the angry exchanges at that meeting as directed not only against India but “referentura” (reference) files for So- demonstrated that bitterness between against the USSR, for they embarrassed viet relations with India, in Fond 090 the two communist powers was reach- Khrushchev on the eve of his own long- (secret fonds or collection groups be- ing the boiling point. Not only did sought summit in the United States with gin with a zero; Fond 90 contains “non- Moscow and Beijing seem split on ba- President Eisenhower in September secret” records on Soviet relations with sic approaches to issues of foreign 1959, just prior to the trip to Beijing. India, though these can also be reveal- policy (the Soviets favored a more mod- In sum, Beijing’s policy toward India ing). The translations from Russian erate rivalry with the West, the Chinese was putting Soviet leaders in an impos- were done for CWIHP by Kathryn a more militant and confrontational sible quandary—either to back what Weathersby, who also aided in select- approach), domestic policy (the Sovi- they saw as Mao’s ill-conceived actions ing the materials for translation. ets found the “Great Leap Forward” to preserve an increasingly illusory The excerpts, mostly from reports an economic disaster), and ideology Sino-Soviet alliance (at the price of from the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, (both sides clearly sought the mantle of undercutting Soviet efforts to improve were chosen to illustrate such topics as leadership within the communist relations with India and the West), or Soviet ties to the Indian Communist world), but a bitter personal antago- to take a balanced position at the risk Party, Soviet perceptions of the Sino- nism had been revealed: Suslov (clearly of an open split with Mao and the Chi- Indian border dispute, and the impact reflecting Khrushchev’s views) decried nese. of the border crisis on Soviet-Indian the “cult of personality” around Mao The Suslov report was obtained for relations, as shown in direct communi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 259 cations between Nehru and The document itself was located in I. Draft report dated 18 December 1959, Khrushchev. While these excerpts hint the archives of the Socialist Unity Party “On the [October 1959] trip of the Soviet at how the Soviet archives can offer a of Germany (SED) in East Berlin by party-governmental delegation to the fascinating and rich window into these scholars collecting materials for a vol- PRC [People’s Republic of China],” by and many other aspects of the still- ume on relations between the People’s M. Suslov to CC CPSU Presidium for pre- murky Sino-Indian border dispute, Republic of China and the German sentation to a forthcoming CC CPSU Ple- much further research in Moscow is still Democratic Republic: Werner num (excerpt) necessary, particularly with key Chi- Meissner, ed., Die Deutsche nese and Indian archives still closed. Demokratische Republik und China, Draft In any event, CWIHP would be pleased 1949-1990: Politik-Wirtschaft- to assist scholars interested in examin- Wissenschaft-Kultur. Eine Quellen- ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET ing the photocopies of these and other sammlung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, PARTY-GOVERNMENTAL Russian documents obtained during 1995). The document was not included DELEGATION TO THE research on Soviet-Indian relations, in the published volume, but was re- PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1959 and 1962, or in commissioning cently obtained by David Wolff, who. English translations of more of them. thanks Prof. Meissner (Hong Kong [lengthy sections on bilateral questions, in- The documents are on file as part of the Baptist University) and his colleagues cluding criticism of China’s domestic and Russian Archives Documents Database at the Free University in Berlin, Anja ideological policies omitted--ed.] (RADD) at the National Security Feege, M. Leutner, and Tim ...Now let me move to some issues of Archive, a non-governmental research Trampedach, for providing access to foreign policy where certain differences institute and declassified documents re- this and other documnents on China emerged between us and the Chinese com- pository located at the George Wash- from the former East German archives. rades. ington University on the 7th floor of the The Zhou-Zedenbal record—which [here followed criticisms of Beijing’s Gelman Library, 2130 H St. NW, Wash- made its way into the East German ar- exacerbations of international tensions, ington, DC 20037, tel. (202) 994-7000; chives and the in a Mao’s thesis that imperialists were “paper e-mail: [email protected]; manner that remains unclear—was tigers” and seemingly cavalier attitude to- fax: (202) 994-7000. translated into English by Wolff with ward nuclear war, and China’s “inconsis- The third section below is the tran- assistance by Christian Ostermann, tent” handling of the Taiwan Straits crisis script, found in the East German ar- Oliver Corff, and James G. Hershberg. of 1958 and relations with Japan—ed.] chives, of a 26 December 1962 conver- It should be stressed that the mate- During this spring relations between sation in Beijing between Chinese Pre- rials reprinted below represent only an the People’s Republic of China and India mier Zhou Enlai and the Chairman of early sampling of the types of materi- have seriously deteriorated. This deteriora- the Council of Ministers of Mongolia, als that could become available for tion is linked to the counterrevolutionary Premier Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal (J. studying the complicated Sino-Indian- rebellion in Tibet in March 1959. Reaction- Zedenbal in German). Although the oc- Soviet triangle with the opening of new ary circles of India to some extent were casion of the talk was the signing of a archives. In coming years, CWIHP probably involved in this rebellion. How- Sino-Mongolian boundary treaty, the hopes to work with scholars using ever, the rebellion in Tibet would not have conversation soon turned to the recent American, Russian, and other ar- taken place, had one implemented timely clashes along the Sino-Indian border. chives—particularly the Chinese and democratic reforms and appropriate mea- According to the transcript—presum- Indian archives, should they relax their sures to improve economy and culture with ably kept by the Mongolians, though it current secrecy—to explore this impor- a view on historical specifics of Tibet, and is unclear from the document how it tant subject, involving an issue that has had one been duly vigilant with regard to came to be translated into German and outlasted the Cold War. While in late reactionary elements. Unfortunately, Chi- rest in the East German archives— November 1996, during a visit to New nese comrades also did not draw appropri- Zedenbal took the opportunity to criti- Delhi by Chinese President Jiang ate conclusions from the warnings of the CC cize Chinese policy in the border dis- Zemin, PRC and Indian leaders signed CPSU about the activities of reactionaries pute with India as detrimental to the an agreement not to use force to resolve aimed at the forceful separation [otriv] of interests of the international socialist their border dispute, the sometimes Tibet from the People’s Republic of China. camp, producing a tense exchange with tense recent history of relations between Chinese comrades were correct when Zhou. Whether or not the transcript is the world’s two most populous countries they put down decisively the counterrevo- accurate—no Chinese version is avail- clearly merits further research and lutionary rebellion in Tibet. They claim with able—the Mongolians clearly wanted study. justification that the issue of Tibet is a do- to show their Soviet-bloc patrons that —James G. Hershberg mestic affair of the PRC. We give them full they were standing up for Moscow’s support on this. We stand against the at- policy, and Ulan Bator may have cir- tempts of Western powers to sever Tibet culated the transcript to Moscow and/ from China, to exploit the Tibetan issue for or its allies precisely for that reason. aggravation of international situation. At the 260 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

last (16th) session of the UN General As- direction, to the path of alliance with West- and as a result the Hindus lost several people sembly the representatives of the USSR and ern powers. If reactionary circles of India as killed and wounded. Exploiting this con- fraternal socialist countries resolutely sup- succeed in achieving these goals, it would flict, imperialist propaganda raised the up- ported the PRC, protesting against the dis- cause serious damage to the socialist camp roar about “the aggression of red China.” cussion of the so-called “Tibetan question” and the whole cause of peace, since the Reactionary nationalists inside India un- and other attempts to blacken the People’s present foreign policy line of the Nehru gov- leashed a fierce anti-Chinese campaign that China, including the one using the Sino- ernment is a positive factor in the struggle was accompanied by attacks against Nehru, Indian border dispute. for strengthening peace. as well as [against] the Indian communist The imperialist tactics aim at making One should ask, what aims did Chinese party. the Tibetan issue a bone of contention first comrades pursue in attacking Nehru so un- One should mention that these events of all between China and India, to pit these compromisingly? As they explained it them- took place only a few days before the visit two great Asian powers against each other, selves, they stood by the principle of “co- of comrade Khrushchev to the United States. to aggravate the situation in the South-East hesion and struggle.” According to com. The enemy propaganda did everything to Asia, to undermine the influence of the so- Mao Zedong, they unmask Nehru as a exploit the Sino-Indian conflict for the pur- cialist camp, including China, in this region “double-dealer,” “half a man, half a devil,” pose of disruption of the Soviet peace ini- of the world, to weaken the positions of “half a gentlemen, half a hooligan,” and in tiative, to lay blame for China’s actions on communists in the movement of national doing this they allegedly “force” him to the Soviet Union and thereby to cause a liberation. The American press openly ad- strengthen friendship with the PRC. quarrel between us and India. mits that one word from India compromises A question, naturally, was raised how With all this in mind, the CC CPSU the prestige of the PRC more than one thou- to live side by side with this “devil”? How decided to send a letter to Beijing, express- sand words spoken in the USA. to build relations with India? The Chinese ing our concern about the situation that Regrettably, the Chinese comrades did comrades found a solution in forcing Nehru emerged as a result of the Sino-Indian con- not take into account this tactic of the impe- to repent and in pressuring him into coop- flict. It also took a decision to publish a rialists. Responding to the noisy campaign eration with China. At the same time the TASS announcement in order to encourage in imperialist mass media about Tibet, they Chinese said that they visualize the possi- peaceful settlement of the conflict and to unleashed their own propagandist campaign bility of the downfall of the Nehru govern- give the world public opinion the correct and concentrated their fire mainly on India ment and see no great trouble if a reaction- idea about our position. The declaration of and personally on [Indian Prime Minister ary pro-Western government comes to the Soviet Union at that time halted escala- Jawaharlal] Nehru. They accused the Indian power in India. In their opinion, this would tion of the conflict and thwarted the dan- government and personally Nehru of an only bring us closer to a revolution in India. gerous game of the imperialists. The gov- imperialist policy, aimed against China. This Obviously this course inevitably had ernments of the PRC and India announced was the essence of a large editorial article to lead to further aggravation of relations that further intensification of the dispute in “Renmin Ribao” [“People’s Daily”] on 6 with India. And it happened, indeed, when would not be in the interests of peace nor in May 1959, under the title “The revolution after suppression of the Tibet rebellion the their own interests, and that they would re- in Tibet and the philosophy of Nehru.” Chinese troops approached the borders with solve border issues according to “five prin- Nehru is a well-known politician. One India. ciples” [pancha sila] of peaceful coexist- cannot exclude that to some degree he was The People’s China and India inherited ence. involved in the intrigues against the PRC. from the past unresolved border issues. It is The course of events, however, dem- But Nehru is far-sighted enough to recog- not possible here to dwell on the history and onstrated that the question of the Sino-In- nize the vital importance of India’s friend- the essence of these issues that deal with dian border is rife with new complications. ship with China, with the Soviet Union and some territories located in the Himalayas. It is known that on 21 October [1959] there the whole socialist camp. Nehru behaved But it is important to notice by what meth- was another armed clash on the Sino-Indian with reserve. In his numerous speeches he ods the Chinese comrades attempted to re- border that caused the loss of lives. After it admitted that Tibet is a part of China, he solve this problem, so acute and painful for the anti-Chinese campaign in India flared spoke against the establishment of a so- both sides. up with new vigor. called “government of Dalai-Lama in ex- For a long time the Chinese comrades One should keep in mind that there are ile,” stressing the significance of the Sino- postponed a solution of this question. They very influential forces in India that seek to Indian friendship. India repeatedly raised the stressed that in the interests of maintaining aggravate relations with China. Regrettably, issue of restoration of rights of the People’s good relations with India they would not the position of the Chinese comrades on this Republic of China in the UN. Precisely these press with demarcation of the borders and question is such that it facilitates for the In- actions made the rightist bourgeois circles would reckon with the existing realties. dian reactionaries mobilization of public in India, who are linked to Anglo-Ameri- However, in the heated atmosphere of the opinion in the country against the People’s can capital, to assail Nehru, blaming him Sino-Indian disputes with regard to the re- China and puts the progressive forces of for “indecisiveness” and “appeasement” bellion of Tibet the issue of the border terri- India in a quandary. with regard to the People’s China. Their goal tories became extremely acute. On 25 Au- The Chinese comrades insist that they is to unseat Nehru, to revise the neutralist gust [1959] an armed clash took place be- are guided by the considerations of self-de- foreign policy of India, to tilt it in a rightist tween the Chinese and Indian border-guards, fense and prestige of their country, that the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 261 truth and justice is on China’s side. In this reactionary forces in India and would cause Khrushchev, Suslov and Gromyko. From the regard one must inform the Plenum that the a negative influence on the masses of the Chinese side participated comrades Mao letter we addressed to the CC of the Com- Indian population.” Indian comrades justi- Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, munist Party of China and the TASS an- fiably believe that further exacerbation of Lin Biao, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Wang nouncement about the Indo-Chinese border the Indo-Chinese relations could weaken Jiaxiang. conflict did not evoke a proper understand- the democratic movement in India, gravely The discussion took place on 2 Octo- ing among the Chinese leaders. In their an- undercut the position of the Indian commu- ber in the residence of the Politburo of the swer to our letter the Chinese comrades nist party and threaten it with a ban. In the CC Communist Party of China. Comrade claimed that the incident on the Sino-Indian words of the General Secretary of the Com- Khrushchev informed the Chinese friends border had been provoked by the Nehru munist Party of India comr. [Ajoy Kumar] about his trip to the USA and his talks with government, which, as the letter of the Chi- Ghosh, Indian communists do not know how President D. Eisenhower. He stressed that nese friends reads, “has long been march- to explain the position of the PRC, the rea- among American political figures there is ing in its domestic and foreign policies in son why it raised the border issue if China growing sentiment in favor of peaceful the reactionary direction.” It follows: “We at this time and what hides behind it. All settlement of unresolved, disputed questions believe that if one carries out only the policy leading officials of the Communist Party of and that at the present time there is a very of unprincipled adjustment and concessions India wonder why the government of the real possibility for further resolute steps to- to Nehru and the Indian government, not PRC let itself be pulled by Indian reaction ward a more durable peace. In this regard only would it not make them change their into this border conflict. he brought the attention of the Chinese position for the better, but, on the contrary, And as to the statement of the Chinese friends to the necessity for the socialist camp in the situation of the growing offensive on comrades about the glee and jubilation of to avoid anything that could be exploited their side, if China still does not rebuff them Indian bourgeoisie, American and British by the reactionaries to push the world back and denounce them, such a policy would imperialists, with regard to dissimilar posi- to the tracks of the cold war. only encourage their atrocity. It would not tions of China and the Soviet Union on the Comrade Khrushchev told the Chinese be advantageous for the friendship between incident on the Sino-Indian border, it is er- comrades that we do not completely under- China and India, and also not be advanta- roneous in its basic premises. The imperi- stand their foreign policy, particularly with geous to make Nehru and the Indian gov- alists rejoiced indeed, but they did so at the regard to India, and on the issue of Taiwan. ernment improve, instead of moving toward moment when the Indo-Chinese conflict Comrade Khrushchev pointed out at further rapprochement with the West.” flared up. One can imagine them exulting the necessity to improve mutual informa- The letter contains a reproach that “the and rejoicing even more, if the Soviet Union tion between the leadership of our parties TASS announcement displayed to the whole had become enmeshed in this conflict and on the issues of foreign policy. One cannot world the different positions of China and the impression had been created that there regard as normal the situation, when we, the Soviet Union toward the incident on the was a united front of all socialist countries China’s ally, do not know what the Chinese Sino-Indian border, which causes a virtual against Nehru. Facts demonstrate that the comrades may undertake tomorrow in the glee and jubilation among the Indian bour- uproar among imperialists seriously abated area of foreign policy. Indeed, all countries geoisie, American and British imperialists, after the Soviet Union came forth in favor of the socialist camp are linked not only by who use this to drive a wedge into the rela- of a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chi- the common ideas and goals, but also by the tions between China and the Soviet Union. nese conflict. alliance commitments. Incorrect actions of This cannot help evoking regrets.” What did aggravation of relations be- one country may hurt international situation The analysis of this letter of the CC of tween China and India and other foreign of the whole socialist camp. One should the Communist Party of China leads us to policy gaffes of the Chinese comrades lead keep in mind that imperialist propaganda two conclusions of fundamental importance. to? They led to a diminution of the interna- directly link activity of Chinese comrades They are the following: the Chinese com- tional prestige of the PRC, to the weaken- to the policy of the USSR and other social- rades could neither correctly assess their ing of her positions in Asia, to an increased ist countries. Indeed, communist parties al- own mistakes committed in their relations tendency, in a number of countries of Asia, ways emphasize that the socialist camp has with India, nor the measures taken by the to ally oneself with Western powers, with one line in foreign policy. CC CPSU for regulation of the Sino-Indian the USA, despite strong hatred among the As far as the CC CPSU is concerned, conflict. The Chinese leadership’s assess- peoples of Asian countries towards their pe- we systematically inform the leadership of ments of the situation in India and the be- rennial enemies - the colonizers. fraternal parties of socialist countries about havior of Nehru with regard to the conflict [after discussion of Soviet-Chinese dif- most important foreign policy steps of the are undoubtedly erroneous and arbitrary. ferences over Indonesia and other foreign USSR and, in special cases, we seek their Let me refer to the opinion of our In- policy issues, Suslov recounted the summit advice. dian friends expressed in their letters to the meeting in Beijing on 2 October 1959 be- One must admit that the Chinese com- CC CPSU and the CC of the Communist tween Khrushchev and Mao; his description rades reacted to the remarks of comrade Party of China. While registering the aggra- of the exchange dealing with the Sino-In- Khrushchev painfully. They claimed that vation of the situation in India as a result of dian border conflict is printed below—ed.] their policy with regard to Taiwan and the the conflict, the Indian comrades stated that From our side in the discussion of for- off-shore straits has been fully justified and “if the disputes continue, it would benefit eign policy issues took part comrades is conducted with skill, that their line toward 262 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the Nehru government is correct. At times tion for CWIHP by Vladislav M. Zubok.] questions of assistance, therefore he consid- the tone of our discussion became quite ers it necessary to consult with sharp. It came to the point when a member II. Russian Foreign Ministry Documents Nambudiripad, whom he characterized as a of the Politburo CC Communist Party of on Soviet-Indian Relations and the Sino- person of crystalline honesty and whom China, minister of foreign affairs Chen Yi, Indian Border Conflict, 1962 (excerpts) Ghosh trusted. Gupta confidentially re- claimed that our line on Nehru is allegedly ported that A. Ghosh had not consulted on opportunistic [prisposoblencheskaia], and [The first excerpt is from a 17 January this problem with Akhmed or with [Shripad the policy of China is more firm and cor- 1962 entry from the journal of Soviet Amrit] Dange, who once proposed that he rect. Naturally, we gave a resolute rebuff to ambassador to India I.A. Benediktov entrust to him alone all matters connected these pronouncements. describing a conversation with the Sec- with the receipt of aid from abroad. In connection with the remarks of the retary of the National Council of the Gupta categorically denied that the Chinese leaders one cannot help wondering Communist Party of India (CPI), Chinese friends are giving the CC CPI [Cen- how they understand the Leninist principle Bhupesh Gupta. During the conversa- tral Committee of the Communist Party of of peaceful coexistence, whether they see it tion, Gupta urgently requests Soviet fi- India] financial assistance. The National as a general line of foreign policy of the nancial aid for the Indian party for use Council has not received, is not receiving, socialist camp, whether they think it is nec- in an upcoming election campaign; the and will not receive assistance from the CCP essary to struggle for relaxation of interna- answer conveyed by Benediktov ten [Chinese Communist Party], Gupta de- tional tension and for securing general days later suggests that the Soviets re- clared, and we never will appeal to them peace. sponded positively to the request, al- with such a request. Moreover, the inter- We are getting an impression that, though the amount is not indicated:] locutor underscored, the Chinese do not while recognizing formally the principle of know anything about Soviet aid. Gupta peaceful coexistence between the two glo- Today I received Gupta at his request. noted that he knows this precisely, since he bal systems, the Chinese comrades tend to Gupta communicated that on 16-17 Janu- enjoys the trust of both groups in the party. regard this principle just as a temporary ary a meeting of the Secretariat of the CPI The interlocutor further underscored that the tactical maneuver. took place in Delhi, at which was discussed only other channels of aid from abroad are [ed. note: after additional critical re- the future work of the party apparatus in the aid received by the Punjab organization marks and recounting of discussion of other connection with the death of A[joy]. from Sikhs living in England and also the matters at the meeting, Suslov noted:] [Kumar] Ghosh....Gupta said that he desires aid at the trade union level through Dange. One should say that at the end of the that the ties of the CPI and CPSU do not Gupta repeated several times that the conversation on 2 October Mao Zedong and become weakened in any way after the death aid is needed precisely now, since the pre- other Chinese comrades declared that they of Ghosh. The assistance in various forms election struggle must be concluded in the did not want war; that they would resolve and the comradely advice of the CC CPSU first week of February. After the elections the Taiwan issue by peaceful means and have always been enormously useful to us, we would like to receive your suppport in would settle the conflict with India through he underscored....Gupta said that no other the matter of the theoretical preparation of negotiations. They confirmed again that the party, not even the communist party of party cadres, he said. Gupta expressed the Communist party of China has a common China, can occupy in the hearts of Indian conviction that the CPI not only will pre- line and common goals with us. We ex- communists the place which belongs to the serve its seats in parliament, but also will pressed our satisfaction in this regard. CPSU... be able to increase their number. [noting that Khrushchev had pointed Gupta reported that after the death of Gupta said that in the election struggle out the Chinese leadership’s “nervousness Ghosh at the present time in the party there the reactionary forces within the country are and touchiness” at being criticised, Suslov is an acute insufficiency of means for the now directing their main blow at the author- harshly criticized the “atmosphere of the preelection campaign. He expressed the fear ity of the USSR, which has increased in cult of personality” surrounding Mao, which that with the death of Ghosh the source for connection with its position on Goa, Kash- he likened to that of Stalin; recalling that receiving means for the communist party mir and other questions. The main task of during a 1958 conversation with from the CPSU might be closed. These the CPI in the pre-election struggle, Gupta Khrushchev, Mao had compared Soviet- questions were handled by Ghosh alone, said, is to make clear to the population that Chinese relations to two hands in which nine Gupta underscored. He never consulted the Soviet Union is giving selfless aid to fingers were fully unified “and only in one, with him /Gupta/, and even less with India, is its true friend... little finger we have disagreements,” Suslov [Elamulam M.S.] Nambudiripad and G. ended his report on an optimistic note, vow- Nair/ with the latter two only about using [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian ing that the Soviet leadership would do its the assistance/. All these matters were held Federation (AVPRF), Fond 090, Opis 24, utmost to promote strong ties and friend- in strictest secrecy from other leaders of the Delo 5, Papka 80, Listy 14-19; document ship between Moscow and Beijing—ed.] party and members of the National Coun- obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. cil. This explains the fact that not a single Weathersby.] [Source: Center for the Storage of Contem- report on this question has appeared in the porary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, press. Gupta said that he cannot [Benediktov met with Gupta again on 27 fond 2, opis 1, delo 415, ll. 56-91; transla- singlehandedly take on responsibility in January 1962 (as the Soviet envoy recorded COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 263 in his diary four days later):] versation Comrade E. asked Menon to take E.M. Nambudiripad and informed him of a map of the eastern part of the border, pub- the statement of the CC CPSU on the In- On 27 January of this year I and Com- lished in India in 1960, and find on it the dian-Chinese border conflict. He listened rade Zhukov G.A. had a conversation with region in which the clashes are now occur- most attentively to the statement of the CC the secretary of the CC CPI Comrade Gupta. ring, orienting by latitude and longitude the and promised immediately to convey its We stated to him the answer of the CC places indicated in the Indian notes. As a contents to the members of the secretariat CPSU in connection with his earlier con- result it turned out that this region, the lati- of the National Council of the CPI. versation with me. Gupta expressed grati- tude and longitude of which were indicated Nambudiripad said that four members tude for the readiness of the CC and the Pre- by the Indians themselves, is located sig- of the secretariat, who were in Delhi, today sidium of the CC CPSU to assist the leader- nificantly to the north of the McMahon line carefully studied and discussed at length the ship of the CPI in this difficult moment and on Chinese territory. Menon, in the words Pravda article of October 25 on the border to support it. He promised to inform the of Comrade E., was forced to acknowledge question. “We ask that you transmit this to CC CPSU about the situation in the party in this, but maintained at the same time that it the CC CPSU, - he continued, - that the pub- the future as well... was not possible that the Indians had crossed lication of this article and the advice of the the McMahon line and so forth. CPSU contained in this letter of the CC [Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 5, p. 80, Comrade E. stated that the main things CPSU, truly will help our party get out of ll. 31-36; document obtained by J. that will motivate India to end the conflict the extremely difficult position it is now in. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.] with the PRC are, on the international level, Before this [help] there were moments when the wish to receive money from the USA, we felt ourselves to be simply helpless, but [The second excerpt, dealing with the brew- and on the domestic level the desire to sup- now the party will be able to remedy this ing crisis over the Sino-Indian border dis- press political forces which are objection- situation. We are grateful to the CC CPSU pute, is from a 10 October 1962 entry from able to the ruling circles. Moreover, in the for this help; you can transmit this person- Benediktov’s diary, this one describing a opinion of Comrade E., the Indian govern- ally from me and from Comrade B. Gupta.” conversation with the provisional charge ment has already gone too far in this con- He pointed out the whole array of difficul- d’affairs of the Chinese Embassy in India, flict to have the possibility of returning to ties the CPI faces in correcting its earlier “Comrade E. Cheng-Chang,” referred to as normal relations.... positions and statements on the border ques- “Comrade E.” in the document. In the con- tion. The most typical mistake of many versation, the Chinese official gave Beijing’s [Source: AVPRF, f. 90, op. 24, d. 5, p. 44, ll. communists, in his words, is that they can- version of the building confrontation, blam- 147-148; document obtained by J. not clearly distinguish [between] patriotism ing India for attacking Chinese posts along Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.] and bourgeois nationalism. Some of the the border, and asserting that India had members of the party considered it possible “gone too far” to resume normal relations [This third excerpt from Benediktov’s diary, [that there would be] support for the Indian with the PRC. Ten days later, China dated 26 October 1962, describes a conver- position in this dispute from a number of launched a broad attack on Indian positions sation with the General Secretary of the communist parties of the socialist countries along the disputed frontier.] Communist Party of India, E.M. in light of the ideological differences be- Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a tween the CCP PRC and other fraternal par- I received Comrade E. in connection day after the Soviet leadership had dramati- ties, although - he continued, - I knew that with his departure for his homeland and had cally modified its policy on the Sino-Indian this was impossible and incorrect. More- a conversation with him. dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), over, it is very difficult in general to sharply Comrade E. on his own initiative dwelt suddenly taking a pro-China position, evi- reformulate the whole system of views on in detail on the problem of the Indian-Chi- dently due to the danger of global war the border conflict held by members of the nese border dispute. He said that India has breaking out as a result of the Cuban Mis- party, since these views in many cases were finally rejected the proposal of the PRC sile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains contradictory to those expressed in Pravda about negotiations [for] 15 October in to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in and in this letter of the CC CPSU. In par- Beijing. The Indian side continues to main- correcting misunderstandings among Indian ticular, the CPI for three years considered tain that the recent clash on the eastern bor- Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged the McMahon line the real border between der occurred on Indian territory, south of the that the party secretariat had concluded that the two states. Many rank and file mem- McMahon line, and was elicited by the ad- “this publication in all probability will in- bers of the party and some members of the vance of Chinese troops to the south and augurate a new period of anti-Soviet hyste- leading organs, in solidarity with the wide- their attack on Indian posts. In fact, Com- ria in India,” pushing the Indian Govern- spread opinion among the population, hold rade E. said, the entire affair was completely ment toward the West, and he pleaded with to the view that the PRC is [the] guilty the opposite. Indian troops crossed the the Soviets to influence China to resolve the [party] in the origin and exacerbation of the McMahon line and attacked Chinese posts border dispute “without damage to the pres- border conflict.” “Undoubtedly the article far to the north of that line. Comrade E. tige of India and of Nehru himself.”] in Pravda will have an influence on these talked about his last conversation in the In- comrades, he said, it will force them to think dian Foreign Ministry with the head of the Today at my own initiative, fulfilling through the whole question again.” Mem- China department, Menon. During this con- the commission of the CC CPSU, I met with bers of the secretariat Nair and Sharma at 264 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

today’s meeting pointed out that the Pravda opposed the current militant policy toward views of each of them. I am convinced, for article, while in fact criticizing the position India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians example, that Zhou Enlai does not approve of the Indian communists and India’s rela- within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu the policy of the PRC regarding India, while tion to this question as a whole, did not ex- Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru Liu Shaoqi can approve it.” press any critical comments with regard to reportedly maintained, not because of the 3. “I am absolutely convinced that the the PRC and the Chinese comrades. border dispute, but to strike a blow against given events are not simply a border con- Nambudiripad reported that the secre- the general phenomenon of neutrality in flict, but something more. This is part of a tariat of the CPI after the discussion of the order to discredit Moscow’s line of peace- general strategy of Chinese leftist dogma- Pravda article today reached the conclusion ful coexistence and competition with the tists - sectarians who obviously now have that “this publication in all probability will West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In the upper hand in the leadership of the CCP inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hys- fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese (Chinese Communist Party). This is the teria in India.” The campaign that is going threatened to embroil the entire world in mainspring of the events. These sectarian on everywhere against the PRC will, obvi- war, and had divided the globe into two new elements in the CCP are trying to prove their ously, be extended to the Soviet Union, and camps: not East and West, but “one - for thesis that India, as a capitalist country, will then to all countries of the socialist the continuation of the human species, the surely join the bloc of western countries, that system....He expressed the opinion of the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against.”] it cannot conduct a policy of nonalignment secretariat that in connection with this state- for any length of time. They regard Nehru ment of the Soviet press and in connection At a reception I met R.K. Nehru, who not as a nationalist leader but as a reaction- with the pressure on India from many neu- approached me and began a conversation. ary bourgeois. They are trying by their ac- tral countries regarding a more rapid peace- He set forth in great detail his views on the tions to force India to reject the policy of ful settlement of this conflict, the Indian Indian-Chinese border conflict, noting that nonalignment, to draw it into the western government...can reach the conclusion that he had expressed them to the prime minis- bloc, to strike a blow at the entire policy of only western countries are our true friends... ter. R.K. Nehru said that the prime minister neutrality, nonalignment, peaceful coexist- “In this connection we very much gave him a letter to N.S. Khrushchev and ence. India, as the largest of the neutral would like to find out if Soviet leaders could spoke about his conversation with the So- countries of Asia, is their first and main tar- help the CPI give an understanding to the viet ambassador. In his words, the prime get. Thus the issue is not this or that border Chinese comrades that it is extremely de- minister greatly appreciates the concern and or territory; the essence of the events is the sirable to give the possibility to Nehru to anxiety of the government of the USSR and attempts of the party sectarians of the CCP move toward peace negotiations and cease the general approach of N.S. Khrushchev to prove in practice their theoretical posi- military actions without damage to the pres- to the problem of the Indian-Chinese confict. tion, an attempt to cross over to the offen- tige of India and of Nehru himself, - “At another time, noted R.K. Nehru, it is sive on the ideological front.” Nambudiripad stated. The Secretariat has possible that the prime minister himself 4. “I am convinced that their actions unanimously reached the conclusion that would have spoken about this problem in are an extension of the CCP’s ideological such a step by the PRC would have a huge detail, but now he is exceptionally busy, very disputes with the CPSU, and that the Chi- significance for the cause of world peace, tired and we must help him. Therefore I nese sectarians are directing the main blow for all progressive forces, for the anti-im- myself will tell you our views.” against the Soviet Union and its foreign perialist struggle...” 1. “After my return from China two policy principles—against peaceful coexist- years ago I personally did everything pos- ence, the possibility of avoiding war in our [Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 6, p. 80, sible for the peaceful settlement of the bor- atomic age, the possibility of the victory of ll. 134-139; document obtained by J. der dispute. No one else has played a more communism not through war but through Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.] important role in this matter than I. To some peaceful economic competition with the degree I have weakened my authority by West. We value highly these principles of [This fourth excerpt is from a 2 November having taken the hardest line on resolving Soviet policy. I personally don’t have any- 1962 entry from Benediktov’s diary, describ- the conflict by means of negotiations. The thing against the establishment of commu- ing a conversation with Indian Foreign Min- foreign policy leaders of India tried to the nism in the entire world, if communism istry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru. Ap- best of their abilities to solve this dispute proves its superiority by means of economic, proaching the Soviet envoy at a social gath- and preserve friendly relations with the social, and cultural achievements, but not ering, the Indian official relayed an oral PRC. We did not cease to hope for a peace- by bombs.” message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime ful settlement of the dispute and did not 5. “However, the Chinese fanatics, who Minister Nehru (whom he described as “ex- make any military preparations, completely apparently have gained strength recently, are ceptionally busy, very tired”), giving his not supposing that military actions on the conducting (and intend to conduct in the analysis of the underlying motives behind border were possible. The result is our future) a senseless course for achieving their China’s actions in the border dispute. The present retreat.” goals by any means, including military ac- Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier 2. “After many years in China, I know tions, which is dangerous for all peoples. Zhou Enlai—with whom Nehru had coop- very well and am closely acquainted with They, unlike the USSR and even the USA, erated in championing the rise of the non- all the leaders of China and with all the main do not understand the danger of nuclear war. aligned movement only a few years earlier— party leaders. I [can] clearly present the The world is now divided not into East and COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 265

West, but into two camps: one - for the con- viet Union. I set forth the opinion of N.S. We, of course, never will make an incur- tinuation of the human species, the other (the Khrushchev on questions of the necessity sion into Chinese territory, but it is neces- Chinese sectarians) - against.” of activating in every way the struggle for sary to consider that the people insist on the 6. “We are on the leading edge of the peace and general disarmament, for carry- liberation of the territory that belongs to struggle against the realization in practice ing out the policy of peaceful coexistence India.” by these fanatics of their theoretical pro- and resolution of disputed international In answer to my statement about the gram, which is a threat to the entire world, questions through negotiations. I expressed necessity of a peaceful resolution of the to all peoples. Therefore, everyone must the wish of N.S. Khrushchev that the bor- problem and of explaining to the people the assist our struggle. Therefore we must not der conflict between India and the PRC also correctness of peaceful means, Nehru said: in any case retreat before them, not submit will be resolved through peaceful means, “We are trying to explain this necessity and to their threats, not agree to conditions which through negotiations. will do this in the future.” He noted in this they dictate on the basis of force and sei- Nehru listened to all of this attentively regard that attempts at peaceful resolution zure of our territory. On the contrary, we and with great interest, taking notes in his of the dispute have not yet given results. must without fail defeat them, smash their notebook. He expressed great satisfaction “We would like to sit at the negotiating table first practical attempt to prove their thesis. with the friendly relations which exist be- with the Chinese. We are ready. But the Only their defeat and the preservation by tween the USSR and India, between the government has explained to them that for India of its policy of nonalignment can teach governments of both countries and also be- this it is necessary that the position on the them a lesson and force them to reconsider tween Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and him border that existed 3 months ago be restored their theoretical convictions.”... personally. He expressed also the convic- - the position on 8 September.” tion that these relations will not only be pre- Further J. Nehru in detail and confi- [Source: AVPRF, f. 90, op. 24, d. 5, p. 44, ll. served, but also will further develop in the dentially illuminated the question of the re- 120-124; document obtained by J. future. lations of India with Pakistan... Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.] The prime minister stated further that he “fully agrees with Mr. Khrushchev in [Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 6, p. 80, [The fifth and final selection from Ambas- regard to the necessity of our general ll. 197-203; document obtained by J. sador Benediktov’s diary is from a 12 De- struggle for peace and disarmament.” He Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.] cember 1962 entry recording a conversa- gave us to understand that the USSR can tion with Indian Prime Minister Nehru. In count on the support of India in these ques- III. Record of Conversation (from East the excerpt presented here, Nehru expressed tions. German archives) between Chinese Pre- a positive evaluation of Soviet-Indian rela- Concerning the question of the peace- mier Zhou Enlai and Mongolian leader tions, complimenting Khrushchev for his ful resolution of sharp international prob- J. Zedenbal, Beijing, 26 December 1962 role in resolving the Cuban crisis, but in re- lems, Nehru stated that “in this regard Mr. sponse to the Soviet envoy’s emphasis that Khrushchev has given us all a great example 4 Cop[ies]. the border crisis with China be settled during the incident with Cuba.” II. peacefully he firmly defended India’s stand Nehru then dwelt in detail on the posi- About the Meeting of Comrade Zhou that PRC forces must withdraw from re- tion of India in the Indian-Chinese border Enlai and Comrade J. Zedenbal cently-occupied positions (e.g., return to the dispute. He said that “all this began not from line held on September 8) before talks could our side, - it was thrust on us. We do not On 26 December the Premier of the start.] want it to be prolonged, we do not want to State Council of the People’s Republic of carry out military actions. We would like it China [PRC; VRCh in German], Comrade In accordance with the commission of to be settled....” Zhou Enlai, paid a return visit to the Chair- Comrade N.S. Khrushchev today I visited Nehru noted the truth of Khrushchev’s man of the Council of Ministers of the Mon- prime minister of India J. Nehru. I gave him observation about the presence of reaction- golian People’s Republic [MPR; MVR in warm greetings and best wishes from N.S. ary forces that are trying to push the gov- German], Comrade J. Zedenbal. Khrushchev and other members of the So- ernment to a resolution of the border dis- During this meeting, which took place viet government. pute by military means. He stated in this in the residence of Comrade Zedenbal, a Nehru first of all inquired about the regard that the government knows about the conversation [took place] between the two health of N.S. Khrushchev... activities of these forces, but does not con- [men], which lasted from 11 until 14 hours. I further set forth the substance of the sider this the main thing. In his words a Present during the conversation were: questions which I was commissioned by very important point is the fact that all the on the Mongolian side—the deputy Chair- Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to communicate people of India, simple peasants, workers man of the Council of Ministers of the MPR, to Nehru. I said to Nehru that the Soviet and employees, “all feel the harshest feel- Comrade Shagwaral, the deputy Foreign government appreciates the efforts of the ings toward China, toward what it did Minister Schagda[r]suren, the Ambassador Indian government and of Nehru personally against India. They, of course, do not want of the MPR in Peking [Beijing], Zewegmid, which are aimed at preserving the policy of war (no one wants it), but they demand the the Deputy of the Great People’s Hural [Par- nonalignment, at preserving and further de- withdrawal of Chinese from Indian territory, liament] of the MPR, S. Bata, the Head of veloping the friendly relations with the So- they demand the defense of our territory. the 1st Division of the Foreign Ministry of 266 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the MPR, Comrade Tschimiddorsh; on the down the border line with these countries. lution of the Chinese-Pakistani border ques- Chinese side—the deputy Premier of the The border agreement between China tion and the settlement of the Chinese-In- State Council and Foreign Minister of the and Mongolia will also contribute to the dia border question could hinder their ag- PRC, Comrade Tschen Ji [Chen Yi], the resolution of the border question with our gression. deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Tschi other neighboring countries. Recently the Americans have exerted Peng-fei, the Head of the 2nd Asian Divi- China recently started border negotia- increased pressure on India and Pakistan sion of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, tions with Pakistan. We think that [we] will demanding a solution to the Kashmir ques- Comrade Zhou Tschu-je, the Chief of Pro- soon reach an agreement as our negotiations tion as soon as possible. It is expected that tocol of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, with Pakistan are taking place in a good at- in the near-future negotiations on the bor- Jui Pei-weng, the Extraordinary and mosphere. The border question with Paki- der question will begin between India and plenipotentary Ambassador of the PRC in stan is also linked to the Kashmir question, Pakistan on the ministerial level. the MPR, Se Fu-schen. that is, with the question that concerns both The English are trying to influence Erdenebulag served as translator on the Pakistan and India directly. After the con- these matters either in the direction that Chinese side and Adja on the Mongolian clusion of the negotiations between China Kashmir belongs to both countries or that side. and Pakistan, we will sign a provisional pro- Pakistan connects itself into Indian society After offering tea, fruit, and cigarettes tocol; the signing of an official treaty will [dass sich Pakistan der indischen to the guests, and after a short conversation follow if the Kashmir question between In- Gemeinschaft anschliesst]. of a protocol nature, photographs were taken dia and Pakistan has been settled. We are of the opinion that the border and the guests entered a special room where Anyway, the aforementioned border negotiations between India and Pakistan a three-hour conversation occurred. treaty will reflect the real situation. We are cannot lead to positive results. Nehru is Hereafter follows a presentation of the not going to define officially the border be- searching for a way to subordinate India and contents of the conversation between the tween China and Pakistan today. That would Pakistan to American domination. Clearly, Premier of the State Council of the PRC, be to lead India into a dead end [Sackgasse]. he has no other way out [Ausweg]. If this and the Chairman of the Council of Minis- The border between India and Pakistan is occurs, the situation will become even more ters of the MPR, Zedenbal. still officially unresolved. complicated, and it will become difficult to ZHOU ENLAI: We are very happy, When you visited India in [September] explain this problem to the Indian people. Comrade Chairman Zedenbal, that you have 1959, Comrade Zedenbal, the border con- We have sent a letter to the countries come to our land, in order to sign a treaty flict between China and India had just of Asia and Africa explaining the Chinese- concerning the border between our coun- reached a climax. At that time, I informed Indian border question in detail. You have tries. This is a good thing, the meaning of you regarding the Chinese-India border also received this letter, Comrade Chairman which is to legally define the borders be- question, but during your stay in India you Zedenbal. tween our friendly lands. tried to avoid this question. We are very Since 1961 India is conducting inva- Yesterday you said quite correctly, that interested in this matter. sions into our border districts and has es- the signing of a border agreement would be The major border conflict between In- tablished 43 border posts there. The area in very meaningful for peace and friendship. dia and Pakistan is caused by the Kashmir question is mountainous, has a raw climate, A reasonable settlement of the border ques- question. At the western sector of our bor- and it snows a lot there. tion between China and Mongolia will be der with India, this [area] borders on the After the Chinese-Indian border con- an example and an encouragement for bor- Aksai and on the Tibetan district of Ali. This flict broke out and India continued its inva- der negotiations with other countries. was a historically established traditional sion systematically, we were forced to re- Basically, we have reached an agree- border line. Pakistan’s position on the bor- move the aforementioned 43 posts. Several ment concerning the border question with der question is correct. The border agree- of these were overrun and the entire district [North] Korea. But we are waiting still for ment between our countries will undoubt- cleansed. an answer from Korea and therefore have edly be signed, once the status On 21 November [1962] our govern- not yet made a public announcement to the [zugehorigkeit] of Kashmir is clarified. In- ment made the decision to cease fire and to press. dia, however, is trying in every way to pre- withdraw the border units 20 kilometers into Since the Chinese-Mongolian and Chi- vent the conclusion of an agreement. But the hinterlands. We suggested the establish- nese-Korean border issues are already these attempts lack any grounds. ment of an unpopulated zone 20 kilometers settled, all that remains to be done, is to set The Western press—especially the deep [on each side--ed.]. One must say that up joint Commissions on Demarcation of English papers—write, that the Chinese- in the past there were no Chinese troops in- Borders according to the agreed-upon prin- Pakistani border question corresponds com- volved in the border conflict. There was ciples. pletely to the norms of international rela- not a single border guard or [border]-post We are at present conducting negotia- tions. But this question only worries the there, rather, only a patrol [service]. But, tions regarding border demarcation with American reactionaries. They think that if administratively, this district was subject to Burma and Nepal. We have the opportu- China, Pakistan, and India delineate their us [our authority]. Since 1949, however, nity to resolve this question with the afore- borders, that would be a blow to the India began to threaten and attack this area. mentioned countries on a mutually-agreed agressive Asia policy of America and other Now, after this area is cleansed, we again basis. In this manner we will officially pin imperialist states. They assume that the so- have no border guard there. If India, under COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 267 these conditions, begins an invasion again, its so-called neutrality. Furthermore, there perity. this will be a true challenge and provoca- is a less important border question between J. ZEDENBAL: The states and nations tion. China and Afghanistan. In short, we will will strengthen their independence and de- If India gives up Kashmir to Pakistan start negotiations. Experience shows that we velop their countries, consequently and defi- and tries to annex our Aksai district again, can solve the border problems handed down nitely crossing over into a communist or- this will only be a proof that India is really to us by history through friendly negotia- der. This is the dialectic of development. working for and under the orders of the tions both with socialist countries and with ZHOU ENLAI: This is clearly a ques- Americans. the new states of Asia. The treaty regarding tion of the distant future. India’s attempts to give Pakistan the the Chinese-Mongolian border demonstrates J. ZEDENBAL: Of course. Our gov- rich, bounteous Kashmir and, in exchange, this. Both of our states are socialist coun- ernment and our people deeply regret that to occupy our unpopulated, poor district, tries and in a short period we have solved there was a border conflict between China only proves [India’s] aggressiveness. Un- the border question correctly, according to and India. They are convinced that this prob- der these conditions, we have ceased fire and principles of friendship, equality, mutual un- lem must be solved in a peaceful manner. withdrawn our troops. derstanding and mutual concessions. Our That is our position. This conflict between The people of Asia and Africa, [and] countries’ governmental delegations have two Asian great-powers and the disturbance all the peace-loving people of the Earth, sup- successfully concluded negotiations over the of the friendship between them is disadvan- port our policy and our measures. We thank border question. This opens the way to the tageous both for the peoples of both coun- you for the fact that your government wel- signature of a border agreement. Conse- tries and for the maintenance of peace in comed the explanation of the government quently, we will have to form a joint com- general. of the PRC. mission that will undertake border demar- Our visit to India in 1959 coincided with Presently, India is in a difficult posi- cation on the spot. the heightening [of tensions] on the Chinese- tion. The countries of Asia and Africa are J. ZEDENBAL: Thank you, Premier Indian border. I remember, Comrade Pre- supporting our proposal, and that puts India Zhou Enlai both for the information regard- mier, that you informed us at that time re- in an even more exit-less [ausweglosere] ing the course of negotiations you are con- garding the state of affairs. situation. ducting with neighboring countries and for As soon as we were on Indian soil, the Not long ago, a meeting of leading the information about your government’s correspondents fell upon us with questions statesmen from many countries took place position on this question. regarding the border conflict. Our answer in Colombo [Ceylon; now Sri Lanka] con- The negotiations between our countries to the correspondents ran: we hope that the cerning the Sino-Indian border question. to define exactly and mark the borderline border question between these two great They decided to send the Ceylonese prime have been successfully concluded, and noth- powers can be settled in a peaceful manner. minister [Sirimavo Bandaranaike] to China ing more stands in the way of signing an At the meeting with Nehru, I said to him in order to inform us of the results of the agreement. Comrade Premier, you have cor- that the correspondents had turned to us with conference. It was confirmed that the rectly stated that our countries’ governmen- this question; I assume that the border ques- Ceylonese Minister-president would arrive tal delegations negotiated successfully on tion between the two countries will be [in China] on 31 December. We have al- the basis of mutual understanding, mutual settled in a friendly manner. At that time the ready received a special plenipotentary in consideration of interests, mutual conces- question was, it seems to me, mainly about order to confer on this question. The afore- sions and mutual regard. I value this as much a border area of 90,000 square kilometers. mentioned countries are making efforts to as you do. Since socialist countries have a Nehru said that if it was a border dis- reconcile India and China and to initiate ne- common goal and ideology, we definitely agreement involving a few kilometers, one gotiations between our countries in order to must solve all questions that come up be- could make mutual concessions, but that in confirm our cease-fire. We are ready to re- tween us in the spirit of friendship. The bor- this case it was a matter of 90,000 square spond to these efforts. The most important der question between our countries was kilometers, whose inhabitants are Indian [thing] is that both sides do not allow any settled on just such a basis. The goal of the citizens, who elect representatives to the renewed clashes. That is our main goal. peoples who are building socialism and Indian parliament. Therefore, he said, this Many ask, why there is no settlement of the communism is to eliminate once and for all question is not so simply solved. Indian-Chinese border conflict, because the such problems as border drawing and the It seems to me that, in fact, it is not easy border question between China and Paki- like that divide nations from each other. to reach an agreement involving such a large stan is actively discussed[?] We think that But for the time being borders will re- area. A longer time is clearly necessary for Pakistan negotiates with us without submit- main. I only say this, because I am taking this. As it turned out, the outbreak of the ting itself to America and England, although our final goal, Communism, as my point of border conflict and the armed clashes have, it belongs to an aggressive bloc. India, how- departure. in essence, complicated the situation. Now, ever, speaks the language of America, al- ZHOU ENLAI: There is a Chinese say- obviously, an even bigger area is involved though it maintains that it does not belong ing that says that in the end the world will than before. to any aggressive blocs. be an unitary whole, that there will be no We think that the Chinese government’s J. ZEDENBAL: Do you consider In- exploitation of man by man. But before we unilateral ceasefire is a reasonable step, dia a neutral country? join in one whole, we must establish the taken after full consideration of the circum- ZHOU ENLAI: India is diverging from borders and provide for our affairs and pros- stances. We hold the view that you are un- 268 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

dertaking flexible measures towards settle- occurred, because there are no other woods those from Inner Mongolia (Zedenbal as- ment of the Indian-Chinese border conflict nearby. But it can be solved on the basis of sured Zhou that these are needed for lin- in a peaceful manner by negotiations. friendly, mutual understanding. guistic, not nationalistic reasons); resettle- In general, life confirms daily the need Since the founding of the PRC it has be- ment of Mongolians in China; Sino- for flexible policies to solve international come a good tradition that during tempo- Mongolia trade relations—trans.] problems. We do not doubt that the Chinese- rary difficulties caused by drought and dry ZHOU ENLAI: With regard to China’s Indian border conflict can be settled peace- wind, the administrations of individual dis- economic help to Mongolia, we can discuss fully. tricts of our countries, in friendly contacts, this tomorrow afternoon, since we have too By “speculating” on the Chinese-Indian have permitted the reciprocal use of pasture little time today to negotiate concrete mat- border conflict, the reactionary forces in land. We hope that it will also be possible ters, such as workers, construction, trade and India have strengthened their activity and in the future, in case of difficulties, to con- railway freight traffic. their offensive against the country’s [India’s] tinue this excellent tradition. I do not understand the word “regret- Communist Party and democratic forces. I suppose that our Comrade “Land- table”, that you used regarding the Chinese- We are convinced that the measures that owner” [“Gutsbesitzer”] Shagwaral, who is Indian border conflict. If this refers to In- your government has taken towards a responsible for agricultural questions would dia, it is correct. If you said it in reference ceasefire on the Indian-Chinese border, to- be very interested in this. to China, in order to make us out to be the ward the withdrawal of border troops and We thank you for the help that you have guilty [party], then that is false. On this ques- towards the future settlement of this prob- provided in difficult times to the cattle- tion there are differences of opinion among lem by negotiation will generate positive breeders in our Aimaks and Somons, espe- the fraternal parties. results. We are of the opinion that this would cially in winter and spring. We also express We have undertaken considerable work be, on the one hand a blow against reaction- further our satisfaction that the border ques- to inform and provide explanations to the ary forces in India itself, and on the other tion between our countries will soon be appropriate states and countries. The Indian hand a blow against the forces of imperial- settled. side put us in an intolerable position. We ism, with the USA at its head. We assume I would like to make use of this meeting, were forced to take measures. India began a that such measures will strengthen India’s Comrade Premier, to broach two aspects [of new invasion and set off a conflict. We re- neutral stance and will prevent India from Sino-Mongolian relations]. buffed them, since it was such a serious situ- abandoning this position. This will advance We were and are grateful that for the con- ation. We have taken measures to defuse the the battle for peace in the whole world. The struction of our country the PRC has pro- situation. We have ceased fire and pulled American imperialists are making efforts to vided us with financial and economic help out troops back. These are unilateral steps. derive advantages from this conflict. The as well as qualified workers. The appropri- There is no guarantee that this problem is peaceful settlement would undoubtedly be ate authorities in our countries are already definitively solved. The cause is the aggres- a serious [line illegible—trans.] for imperi- negotiating regarding the building of objects sive policies of the ruling circles of the In- alism. agreed upon earlier by our governments. I dian government. The Nehru government is After the signing of the border agreement suppose that these negotiations will con- wavering and turning away from neutrality. between our countries, we will begin the tinue. India did indeed declare non-alignment to demarcation of the borderline. As is well I would like to pose the following two aggressive blocs, but became ever more known, during the negotiations our delega- questions to you: First, has railway freight dependent on American dollars. India re- tion raised the question of the village of traffic gone down considerably in the last ceived 640 million dollars from America for Hurimt in the Balgan-Ulgiisk district in years? Maybe that is also an effect of your military purposes. Nehru’s government is western Mongolia. Our inhabitants have drought. We hope that railway freight traf- turning away from the policy of peace. We erected several buildings there and begun fic will go up in the future. The full use of must understand imperialism’s threat and lumbering. Your delegation, however, re- the railway that will be built as a conse- danger. In India itself, the domestic forces plied that this place cannot be recognized quence of a three-sided agreement between of reaction are becoming ever more active. as Mongolia, because this would meet with us and the Soviet comrades is economically India is turning away from the policy of difficulties. At the same time, your delega- advantageous for our country, Comrade Pre- peace. Our country, however, ceased fire and tion answered that the inhabitants on both mier. We are convinced that you will take took the initiative towards negotiations. The sides have come to an agreement and can this factor into consideration. Indian government has not yet expressed find a reasonable solution [to the problem Secondly, one of the forms of help that itself regarding our proposals and the mea- of] the use of the forest’s riches. Therefore, you provide to us is the provision of work- sures we took. Under these circumstances, I do not want to insist that Hurimt should ers from appropriate professions. This la- I ask you to understand Indian-Chinese re- necessarily belong inside Mongolian bor- bor is a great help in the building up of our lations correctly. ders. Of course, I think that this question country. Recently, it has nevertheless hap- The MPR, as is known, has entered the must be decided by taking both sides inter- pened that a few less conscientious and in- United Nations. Therefore, the circum- ests into consideration. We are grateful that experienced people put down their work. I stances must be understandable for you. you have declared yourselves ready to make think you know about this. India’s representative in the UN is follow- possible our use of our buildings as well as [segment of conversation not printed re- ing the policy of the Western countries. In- the forests in this district. This problem garding Chinese guest workers, particularly dia supports the Western powers’ policy on COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 269 the Hungarian, Korean, and Chinese ques- the conflict and its connections to interna- the head of a Communist. tions as well as on disarmament. In this way, tional problems and in consideration of all The kindling of conflict and noise over India is getting ever further onto the side of the complicated factors, correspond to the some 5-10 kilometers of land will, in the the reactionary imperialists. interests of the peoples of the socialist camp end, result in the strengthening of the do- You, Comrade Zedenbal, will probably and all progressive mankind. mestic reactionary forces in India and the agree with some of what I’m saying and dis- ZHOU ENLAI: The hitch is that the fanning of nationalistic passions. This would agree with part. I am not forcing my opin- Nehru government represents the effect the Communists negatively and be ion on you. Further development will show Grossbourgeoisie and is two-faced. It is cor- disadvantageous for Socialism. who is right. Our policy is a peace-loving rect that in the fight for peace one must also You Chinese Communists are much more foreign policy that is guided by the prin- exploit the bourgeoisie. Nehru is however a experienced than us, and tempered in revo- ciples of Marxism-Leninism. representative of the Grossbourgeoisie. The lutionary battle. I am only saying what I J. ZEDENBAL: Our main task is the reactionary tendency has the upper hand in think about this question and how I under- signing of the Mongolian-Chinese border the Nehru government’s policies. We must stand it. agreement. This work is on the verge of a lead a decisive struggle against him, we must ZHOU ENLAI: (Becoming nervous, successful conclusion. unmask his treacherous machinations. In his with altered facial expression) Clearly, the Soviet Union, the PRC and pro-American policy, there is no difference If you are interested in the Indian-Chi- the other countries of the socialist camp play between Nehru and Desai. Resumption of nese border question, please examine again a major role in keeping peace in the whole negotiations to strengthen peace will be use- the literature that we have provided for the world. The socialist countries have taken ful. But the Communists see this question Asian and African countries. Our govern- on the goal to contribute to the fight for differently from other men. The Commu- ment is not fighting with India because of a peace, each according to his strength. Natu- nist Party of England has differences of few dozen kilometers of area. We have made rally the socialist countries are interested in opinion with us on other matters, but on the absolutely no territorial claims, only the In- the peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chi- Indian-Chinese border question, we are of dian side has. One must understand this cor- nese border conflict. It is my understanding the same opinion. It would be good, if in rectly. The essence of the matter is that the that our discussion takes this standpoint, as the future you kept this in mind. Indian side is trying to annex an even larger a point of departure. We and you both know J. ZEDENBAL: I understand that the area on the Western sector of the border. that Nehru is not a Communist, but a bour- Chinese side does not unconditionally in- How quickly India treads the path of social- geois politician. But we and you both un- sist on immediately incorporating a 90,000 ism depends, above all, on the revolution- derstand how important it is, in the inter- square kilometer area on the eastern border, ary struggle of the Indian Communist Party ests of the whole socialist camp, to exploit that this question will be decided in the fu- and the Indian people. It is important to ex- the positive sides of individual bourgeois ture. Is that true or not? pose to the world public the evil machina- politicians. We know that your party in its ZHOU ENLAI: I already went to In- tions and dangers, that the reactionary forces long history has garnered much experience dia with Comrade [Foreign Minister] Chen of India represent. If we do not expose their in the exploitation of the deeds of individu- Yi in 1960 in order to settle the Chinese- reactionary activity, they will go over to the als, who are on the enemy’s side. Indian border question, but we returned with American side, and that is even more disad- The exploitation of India’s policy of neu- empty hands. vantageous. trality is very important for the socialist J. ZEDENBAL: The Chinese-Indian J. ZEDENBAL: The main thing is not camp. We assume that this is what the five border question must not be solved only in to play into the hands of American imperi- principles of co-existence that you, Com- the interests of China, but also in accordance alism. rade Premier Zhou Enlai, together with with the interests of the whole international Nehru, proclaimed. It will be very disadvan- communist movement. Given this, I person- It was agreed to continue the conversation tageous for our camp, if in place of Nehru, ally think that it would be somewhat better, the next day. a man such as [Moraji] Desai comes to if you didn’t bring up the matter of the 29 December 1962 power. Then there will be a danger that In- 90,000 square kilometers on the eastern sec- dia will join an aggressive bloc. In general, tor of the border, but, on the contrary, sup- [Source: Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien und we attach the greatest meaning to the pres- port the development of class struggle Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen ervation and exploitation of India’s neutral- within India in favor of socialism and com- DDR im Bundesarchiv,” Berlin, JIV 2/202- ity. I think you will probably agree with this. munism, so that it can contribute to the 283, B1.0; obtained by D. Wolff; transla- The Chinese-Indian border conflict is now strengthening of the Communist Party and tion by Wolff, O. Corff, and C. Ostermann, on all lips, since in contemporary interna- the democratic forces whereby you would with the assistance of J. Hershberg.] tional relations every event, even if of local help to accelerate India’s transition to com- character, becomes widely known. munism. There can be no doubt that the We think that the ceasefire, the pulling border question will be resolved in the fu- VISIT CWIHP’S SITE back of troops and the readiness for a nego- ture. I repudiate the thought of your intend- ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB AT: tiated settlement of the border conflict ing to weaken or undermine in any way the through negotiations, a readiness that you forces of the Communist Party of India. It http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/cwihp decided on after appropriate evaluation of would be absurd, if such an idea came into 270 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives

by James G. Hershberg The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 continues to exert an intense fascination on historians, political scientists, journalists, and the general public, and—as apparently the world’s closest brush to thermonuclear war—is likely to continue to do so. Over the past decade, the study of this crisis has expanded to encompass a major influx of new sources and perspectives, primarily stemming from the declassification of new U.S. (and British) documents, but also the addition of Soviet and then Cuban archival materials and perspec- tives—a process expedited by international scholarly projects as well as the anti-communist upheavals that led to the (partial) opening of Russian archives.1 The Cold War International History Project Bulletin has previously reported on various new findings regarding the crisis—known to Russians as the “Caribbean Crisis” and Cubans as the “October Crisis”—particularly in issue no. 5 (Spring 1995), which featured an extensive compilation of translated documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow.2 In this issue, the Bulletin presents more translated materials from that repository—the Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF)—documenting various aspects of Soviet policy during the events of the fall of 1962. Most were declassified by Soviet/Russian authorities in 1991-1992 and provided to NHK Japanese television in connection with a documentary on the Cuban Missile Crisis aired to mark the 30th anniversary of the event in October 1992; Prof. Philip Brenner (American University), one of the consultants to the show, in turn, subsequently gave copies of the documents to CWIHP and the National Security Archive—a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University—where they are now deposited and available for research. That collection also contains photocopies of some of the same documents that were separately obtained from AVPRF by Raymond L. Garthoff (Brookings Institution) with the Archive’s assistance. The translations into English came primarily from two sources. Many of the AVPRF documents obtained by NHK were translated by Vladimir Zaemsky of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who granted permission for their use here. For most of the rest of the documents, the Bulletin is grateful to Philip Zelikow, Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University, and Harvard’s Center for Science and International Affairs, for commissioning translations from John Henriksen of Harvard. (Prof. Zelikow, the co-author, with Condoleezza Rice, of Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Harvard University Press, 1995), is currently involved with two Cuban Missile Crisis-related publication projects, a revision of Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, originally published in 1970, and, with Prof. Ernest R. May of Harvard, an edited compilation of transcripts of declassified tape recordings of “Excomm” meetings involving President John F. Kennedy and senior advisors during the crisis, which were recently released by the Kennedy Library in Boston.) In addition, Vladislav M. Zubok, a Russian scholar based at the National Security Archive, translated the records of the two conversations of Soviet Politburo member (with U Thant and John McCloy) in New York on 1 November 1962, and CWIHP Director David Wolff translated a conversation between Mikoyan and Robert Kennedy. The translations themselves are broken into three sections: 1) before the crisis, 14 September-21 October 1962 (although for Kennedy and his advisors the crisis began on October 16, when the president was informed that a U.S. U-2 spy plane had photographed evidence of Soviet missile sites under construction in Cuba, for the Soviets the crisis only started on October 22, when Kennedy announced the discovery and the American blockade of Cuba in a televised address); 2) the crisis itself, 22-28 October 1962 (from Kennedy’s speech to Moscow’s announcement of its agreement to withdraw the missiles under United Nations supervision in exchange for Washington’s lifting of the blockade, its pledge not to attack Cuba, and its private assurance that American Jupiter missiles in Turkey would shortly also be removed); and 3) the aftermath, 28 October-10 December 1962 (which included a period of wrangling between Washington and Moscow—and between Moscow and Havana—over the crisis’ settlement, especially over the terms of U.N. inspection of the missile removal and the inclusion of Soviet IL-28 bombers in the weapons to be pulled out, which was not finally nailed down, permitting the blockade to be lifted, until November 20). For the most part, unfortunately, these materials shed little light on the actual process of decision-making at the highest levels of the Kremlin, and minutes or notes of the discussions among Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev and his associates during the crisis have still not emerged.3 The Russian Foreign Ministry documents did include top-level correspondence between Khrushchev and Kennedy, and between Khrushchev and Castro, but these have already been published elsewhere4 and are omitted from the selection below, as are other documents containing material already available to researchers, such as translations of press reports, correspondence between Khrushchev and U.N. Secretary U Thant (and between Khrushchev and British philosopher Bertrand Russell), and cables to Soviet diplomats circu- lating or reiterating public Soviet positions. Nevertheless, the Russian archival materials presented here make fascinating reading for anyone interested in the missile crisis, in Soviet or Cuban foreign policy, in crisis politics or diplomacy generally, in some of the leading characters involved in the drama (such as Robert Kennedy, Fidel Castro, Mikoyan, and U Thant), or in reassessing the accuracy and efficacy of American policy and perceptions during perhaps the Cold War’s most perilous passages. For the most part, they consist of Soviet cables from three diplomatic venues (with occasional instructions from “the center,” or Moscow): COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 271

* the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., including reports from the USSR’s newly-arrived ambassador to the United States, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, on the situation in Washington and his meetings with leading personages, and from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on his conversation with Kennedy on October 18; * the United Nations in New York, from which USSR ambassador Valerian Zorin reported on debates in the Security Council, and on contacts with other delegates and U.N. officials, and then more senior Soviet officials sent to handle the diplomacy of the settlement, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov and Mikoyan, reported on their negotiations with U.S. negotiators John J. McCloy and Adlai Stevenson as well as conversations with U Thant; * and the Soviet Embassy in Havana, from which USSR Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseev reported on Cuban developments, includ- ing the fervor gripping the country when it seemed war might be imminent, the leadership’s angry reaction when Khrushchev accepted Kennedy’s request to withdraw the missiles without advance consultation with Castro, and the difficult conversations which ensued as Soviet officials, in particular Mikoyan, tried to mollify the upset Cubans and at the same time secure Havana’s acquiescence to the measures Moscow had accepted in order to resolve the crisis. The fact that almost all of the documents below came from the Foreign Ministry archive should induce some caution among readers seeking an understanding of Soviet policy regarding the crisis. Not surprisingly, for instance, they illuminate diplomatic aspects of the events far more than, for instance, either military or intelligence aspects. In fact, the Russian Defense Ministry has declassified a substan- tial amount of material on “”—the code-name for the Soviet missile deployment to Cuba—and other military actions related to the crisis, and the Bulletin plans to present some of those materials, with translation, annotation, and commentary by Mark Kramer (Harvard University), in a future issue.5 As for Soviet intelligence archives, these have not been opened to researchers except on a highly selective basis; however, a book scheduled for publication in 1997 by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali is expected to draw on these sources. Finally, as noted above, documentation on decision-making at the highest level of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) remains classified, presumably in the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF). It is not possible to provide a comprehensive commentary on the significance of the documents, both because of space limitations and also because they may be used by researchers for so many different purposes—not only historians of the Cold War but political scientists, specialists in bureaucratic politics, nuclear theory, and “crisis management,” psychologists, specialists in U.S., Soviet, and Cuban foreign policy, biographers of key figures, and many others have looked to the Cuban Missile Crisis for answers and illumination. Best read in conjunction with the other Russian documents published in Bulletin 5 and elsewhere, as well as American materials, the documents below are offered merely as useful raw primary source material rather than as evidence for any particular interpretation. Nevertheless, some preliminary reactions can be offered on a few issues.

Pre-Crisis U.S. Military and Covert Policies Toward Cuba

One issue of vital importance during the run-up to the crisis on which the documents here (and in Bulletin 5) provide some evidence is the question of how the Soviets perceived the Kennedy Administration’s policies and actions toward Cuba, particularly Washington’s covert operations against the Castro regime and the likelihood that it would take more direct military action. They clearly show that Moscow’s representatives noted, and blamed the United States government in general and the Central Intelligence Agency in particular for, what it called the “piratical raids” by anti-Castro Cuban exile groups being carried out with U.S. support against the island. Although one does not find specific references to “Operation Mongoose”—the code-name for the massive CIA covert operation undertaken with the aim of toppling Castro after the failure of the in April 1961—the reports of Ambassador Alekseev in Havana and Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington in September and early October 1962 show that Moscow had no doubt as to who was responsible for what the former called the “landing of counter-revolutionary bands of spies and arms” and “constant acts of provocation.”6 Dobrynin’s cable of 15 October, for instance, lays out the role of the CIA in supporting actions of the exile group “Alpha 66.” However, the documents suggest that the Soviets had only a general knowledge of “Operation Mongoose”—although Soviet mili- tary intelligence (GRU) archives might well contain more detailed reports—and Moscow remained uncertain as to the significance of the American support of the harassment operations—i.e., whether they presaged a direct U.S. military intervention to overthrow Castro— right up to the eve of the crisis. As the crisis approached, however, Soviet officials appeared to feel more assured that U.S. military action against Cuba was not imminent (which to those in the know in Moscow signified that the secret deployment of missiles could proceed safely). In a document published in Bulletin 5, Foreign Minister Gromyko, in fact, cabled Moscow after meeting Kennedy on October 18 in the Oval Office—unaware that the American already knew about the Soviet missile bases in Cuba—that “Everything we know about the position of the USA government on the Cuban question allows us to conclude that the overall situation is completely satisfactory...There is reason to believe that the USA is not preparing an intervention and has put its money” on economic sanctions.7 The actual Soviet record of the Gromyko-Kennedy conversation, excerpted here, offers readers a chance to follow in detail this duplicity-filled conversation, in which neither man told the other the most important fact in the situation under discussion. Gromyko dutifully criticized Washington for its actions against Cuba, and acknowledged only that Moscow was providing Cuba with “exclusively defensive armaments” which could not “represent a threat to anybody.” Kennedy, for his part, with the U-2 photographs of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba under construction lying in his desk drawer, told Gromyko that the United States “take[s] on trust” Soviet state- ments about the defensive character of the weapons it was shipping to Castro but reiterated his public warnings that “were it otherwise, 272 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the gravest issues would arise.” While stressing that the situation had taken a turn for the worse since July as a result of Moscow’s stepping-up of military aid to Cuba—calling the situation “perhaps the most dangerous since the end of the Second World War”— Kennedy made no mention of the missiles. After reading the account of the conversation, it is hard to explain Gromyko’s smug assessment that the situation was “completely satisfactory,” other than as a spectacular case of wishful thinking (or a blase memo to mask a more candid assessment relayed through other channels). It is clear, from his repeated statements of concern, that Kennedy was trying to caution Moscow to rethink its adventure without tipping his cards—and perhaps even signalling a possible way out of the crisis that had (so far as Moscow knew) not even begun. Repeatedly assuring Gromyko that the United States had “no intentions to launch an aggression against Cuba,” Kennedy noted pointedly that, “If Mr. Khrushchev addressed me on this issue, we could give him corresponding assurances on that score,” and repeated the offer twice later in the conversation. A little more than a week later, of course, after the world had been brought to the brink, precisely such a declaration from Kennedy would give Khrushchev the fig leaf he needed to swallow his pride and accept the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. The Russian documents reveal nothing new on the issue of whether, in fact, the Kennedy Administration had been moving toward taking military action against Cuba even before it discovered the existence of the Soviet nuclear-capable missiles on the island in mid- October. In a previous publication, the current author presented evidence that the U.S. government and military undertook serious contingency planning, and even some preliminary redeployments, in September and the first two weeks of October 1962 toward the objective of achieving, by October 20, “maximum readiness” for either an air strike against or invasion of Cuba, or both, although the article remained agnostic on the issue of whether Kennedy had actually made a decision to attack Cuba or simply wanted the option available.8 Recently, a potentially crucial, yet still problematic, piece of evidence from American archives has surfaced to suggest that, literally on the eve of the crisis, the Kennedy Administration was not on the verge of imminent military action against Cuba. At issue is a recently declassified purported fragment of notes of a conversation on the afternoon of Monday, 15 October 1962, between Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. (At that point, the U-2 photographs taken over Cuba the previous day had not yet been identified as revealing Soviet missile sites under construc- tion, a development that would take place only later that afternoon and evening and be reported to the president the following morning, October 16.) During a discussion of contingency plans concerning Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) minutes—obtained by the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act—paraphrase McNamara as saying: “President wants no military action within the next three months, but he can’t be sure as he does not control events. For instance, aerial photos made available this morning show 68 boxes on ships that are not believed to be Il-28s and cannot be identified. However, the probabilities are strongly against military action in the next 30 days.”9 Similarly, a recently-declassified JCS historical report prepared in 1981 evidently relies on those notes in stating (without citation) that in their meeting on October 15, “the Secretary [McNamara] said that President Kennedy wanted, if possible, to avoid military measures against Cuba during the next three months.”10 If accurate, the notes would certainly constitute a strong piece of evidence against the hypothesis that the Kennedy Administration believed it was headed toward, let alone desired, a military confrontation with Cuba in the immediate future, just before news of the missiles. The evidence is problematic, however, due to an unfortunate case of destruction of historical evidence by the JCS that appar- ently makes it impossible to evaluate the context or provenance of McNamara’s reported remarks (see footnote for details).11

Berlin and Cuba

One issue which has long intrigued students of the crisis is the nature of its connection, if any, to the simmering U.S.-Soviet confrontation over Berlin—which had quieted somewhat since the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the Checkpoint Charlie confrontation between Soviet and U.S. tanks two months later, but remained unfinished business and a potential flashpoint. Given the centrality of Berlin and Germany to the Cold War in Europe, in fact, some U.S. officials jumped to the conclusion upon the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba that their deployment was actually a Khrushchevian gambit to distract American attention and energy from Berlin, where Moscow might make its next move. Indeed, during the crisis, a special subcommittee of the White House “Excomm” (Executive Committee) was formed, under the chairmanship of Paul H. Nitze, specifically to assess the situation in Berlin in the event that the crisis spread there, perhaps if the Kremlin applied renewed pressure there in response to U.S. threats or use of military force against Cuba. Some evidence has surfaced to show that at least some Soviet officials did suggest the option of opening up a Berlin front in response to Kennedy’s speech announcing the blockade of Cuba on October 22. In a toughly-worded cable the next day, Ambassador Dobrynin cabled an analysis from Washington recommending an “appropriate rebuff” that might include “hinting to Kennedy in no uncertain terms about the possibility of repressions against the Western powers in West Berlin (as a first step, the organization of a blockade of ground routes, leaving out for the time being air routes so as not to give grounds for a quick confrontation).”12 Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov also suggested that Khrushchev respond with a troop build-up around Berlin.13 Years later, in his smuggled-out memoirs, Khrushchev blustered that during the crisis, “The Americans knew that if Russian blood were shed in Cuba, American blood would be shed in Germany.”14 But in fact Khrushchev acted cautiously with regard to Berlin and rejected suggestions to mass Soviet forces around the city. Instead, a different Berlin connection seems to emerge from the Russian documents—that Soviet leaders had, in September and COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 273 early October 1962, deliberately floated the idea of an imminent intensive diplomatic effort (or possibly a renewed superpower show- down) on Berlin, to take place in late November after the U.S. Congressional mid-term elections, in order to distract American attention from Cuba long enough to allow Moscow to complete its secret missile deployment. Such is, at any rate, the strategy that Anastas Mikoyan privately described to Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership on 4 November 1962 (published in Bulletin 5) as the one the Kremlin had followed in the weeks and months preceding the crisis: “We let the Americans know that we wanted to solve the question of Berlin in the nearest future. This was done in order to distract their attention away from Cuba. So, we used a diversionary maneuver. In reality, we had no intention of resolving the Berlin question at that time.”15 In the memorandum of the Gromyko-Kennedy conversation on October 18, one can see the Soviet Foreign Minister dangling the Berlin bait, suggesting that a summit meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev take place in the United States “in the second half of November”—when Khrushchev would attend a session of the U.N. General Assembly—”in order to discuss the issues that separate [the USA and USSR] and first of all the questions of the German peace treaty and West Berlin.”16 Gromyko’s message, in turn, came on the heels of a letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy dated 28 September 1962 threatening to sign a German peace treaty—the same vow that had triggered the Berlin Crisis in November 1958, for it implied an agreement between Moscow and East Berlin that would cut off Western access to West Berlin—but grandly (and ominously) informing Kennedy that in deference to the passions of American domestic politics, “we decided to put the German problem, so to say, on ice until the end of the elections” and will “do nothing with regard to West Berlin until the elections ... [afterwards], apparently in the second half of November, it would be necessary in our opinion to continue the dialogue.”17 “Some sort of crisis relating to Berlin is clearly brewing now, and we will have to see whether we can surmount it without recourse to military action,” Dobrynin quoted Kennedy as saying in a background meeting with reporters on October 16 in a cable to Moscow three days later.18 On the same day, with evident satisfaction, Gromyko reported to the CPSU CC after his conversation with Kennedy that in recent days “the sharpness of the anti-Cuban campaign in the USA has subsided somewhat while the sharpness of the West Berlin question has stood out all the more. Newspapers bleat about the approaching crisis vis-a-vis West Berlin, the impending in the very near future of a [Soviet treaty] with the GDR, and so on.” Gromyko even detected a White House-inspired propaganda campaign “to divert public attention from the Cuba issue.”19 Only afterward did Mikoyan, at least, realize that at the October 18 encounter Kennedy had been playing along with Gromyko just as Gromyko had been deceiving him—as soon as they discovered the missiles, he related to Castro, they “began crying about Berlin,” and both the Soviet Union and United States were talking about the Berlin Crisis but simultaneously knew that the real crisis was about to erupt in Cuba.20

Soviet Perceptions of Washington During the Crisis

While evidence (such as Politburo minutes) necessary to judge the evolution of Kremlin perceptions of Kennedy during the crisis is still lacking, and intelligence assessments remain off-limits, the reports of USSR Ambassador in Washington Dobrynin between 22 and 28 October that have emerged thus far raise some interesting questions about the accuracy and impact of Soviet reporting on its “main enemy” at a critical moment. How is one to evaluate, for example, a cable sent over Dobrynin’s name on 25 October 1962 relaying gossip around the bar of the Washington Press Club at 3 o’clock in the morning to the effect that Kennedy had “supposedly taken a decision to invade Cuba” that night or the next one? Of similarly questionable accuracy was Dobrynin’s “line-up” of hawks and doves within the Kennedy Administration as reported (without giving sources) in a cable of 25 October—listing Robert Kennedy, McNamara, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and the military as the most ardent supporters of an attack on Cuba, and Secretary of State Dean G. Rusk and Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon as holding a more “restrained” and “cautious” position; actually, although almost all mem- bers of the Excomm shifted their positions during the “13 Days” of the crisis, some more than once, Robert Kennedy and McNamara had been among the less militant, preferring a blockade to an immediate airstrike, while Dillon had more frequently sympathized with military action. Perhaps most interesting, though, in this assessment is the Soviet diplomat’s jaundiced view of John F. Kennedy, who is described as a “hot-tempered gambler” who might be tempted into an “adventurist step” because his reputation, political future, and 1964 re-election had been put at stake.21 Many other interesting details emerge from Dobrynin’s accounts—above all the evolution of his back-channel relationship with Robert F. Kennedy, the president’s brother and Attorney General (see box)—but perhaps most interesting are the possibilities such documents offer for reassessing with far more precision how nuclear adversaries perceive (and misperceive) each other during crises.

At the United Nations

The documents from the United Nations also permit a much fuller analysis of the difficult U.S.-Soviet negotiations in New York to work out the terms to resolve the crisis, particularly in combination with the large amount of American documents on the talks between McCloy and various Soviet envoys that have been declassified by the State Department in recent years.22 Issues dealt with at length include the terms of verifying the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, haggling over which Soviet weapons should be removed under the rubric of “offensive” weapons, and a good deal of give-and-take over the basic divisions between the United States and Cuba. One dog that did not bark in New York City was that of U.S. withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey—a subject that was covered in a special understanding reached between Robert Kennedy and Dobrynin in Washington—and one finds (on November 1) a firm instruc- tion from Gromyko in Moscow to “Comrades” Kuznetsov and Zorin “not in any circumstances” to touch on the Turkish issue (despite its 274 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

having been raised only days earlier in Khrushchev’s public October 27 letter to Kennedy), “since it is the subject of direct negotiations between Washington and Moscow.” The documents also permit a far fuller analysis of the role of the United Nations, and particularly Acting Secretary General U Thant, in trying to navigate a delicate neutral role between the superpowers and actively seeking a United Nations role in the resolution of the crisis. Writing both Khrushchev and Kennedy to propose compromise measures to assuage the crisis, traveling to Cuba to seek Castro’s approval for UN inspection of the missile removals, negotiating with Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, and Zorin over the mechanisms to conclude the dispute, U Thant emerges as a fuller figure, particularly as the Soviets courted his support (by backing his inspection plan) even at the price of additional tensions with Havana.

Soviet-Cuban (and Khrushchev-Castro) Tensions

The reports of Soviet envoys’ reports dealing with Cuba, particularly those of USSR ambassador Alekseev in Havana, add to the emerging story of differences between Khrushchev and Castro that has long been known of in general but which became far more vivid and concrete with the appearance, first, of the third volume of Khrushchev’s posthumously-published tape-recorded memoirs in 1990,23 followed by the release later that year of the Castro-Khrushchev correspondence at the height of the crisis,24 and finally, in January 1992, with the holding of an oral history conference on the crisis in Havana with Castro’s enthusiastic participation.25 From a peak of ostensible revolutionary solidarity in the early days of the crisis, Soviet-Cuban ties became strained as the crisis wore on by a series of disagreements—from Moscow’s concern that Cuban zeal (reflected in the shooting down of an American U-2 plane on October 27) might provoke a U.S. invasion, to Khrushchev’s belief (hotly disputed by Castro) that the Cuban leader had advocated a recourse to nuclear war (if the U.S. attacked Cuba) in his cable to Khrushchev on October 26, to Khrushchev’s failure to consult with Castro before agreeing to Kennedy’s terms for withdrawing the missiles on October 28, to a dispute over whether to permit UN inspec- tion of Soviet ships in Cuban ports to verify the withdrawal of missiles, to a Cuban anger over Moscow’s succumbing to Washington’s demand to pull out Soviet IL-28 bombers as well as the nuclear missiles. The alarming reports received by Moscow from its envoy in Havana helped lead Khrushchev to dispatch his trusted trouble-shooter, MORE ON BOBBY AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

by Jim Hershberg In accounts of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert F. Kennedy—the Attorney General and brother to President John F. Kennedy—has occupied a singular place, and not merely because his posthumously-published memoir, Thirteen Days, became a best-selling (and sometimes controversial) account of the crisis as well as a unique portrait of what it felt like to be a high-level decision-maker looking down the gun barrel of nuclear war.1 RFK also garners special attention for his key role at two particular points in the crisis. One came early on, in the secret debates in the White House “Excomm” (Execu- tive Committee) after the missiles were discovered in mid-October, when he ardently opposed a surprise U.S. air strike against the sites under construction in Cuba, likening such an action to Pearl Harbor (“I now know how Tojo felt,” he noted at one point in the debate) and condemning it as morally unworthy; the argument helped turn the tide in the debate away from an air strike and toward a blockade or “quarantine,” which Kennedy announced to the world on October 22. The second key moment came at the climax of the crisis, on Saturday evening, October 27, with Moscow and Washington seemingly on a collision course, when Robert Kennedy met secretly with Dobrynin at the Justice Department and the two men hammered out the terms of a secret arrangement whereby the Attorney General conveyed his brother’s oral pledge that Washington would quickly pull its Jupiter missiles out of Turkey, as Khrushchev had publicly proposed earlier that day, so long as the Soviets removed their own missiles from Cuba and kept quiet about the Turkish aspect of the deal.2 Recently-released Russian archival documents, published in English translation in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (the present issue and no. 5, Spring 1995), shed additional light on Robert F. Kennedy’s actions during the crisis, particularly his back-channel contacts with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin. This article seeks to note briefly some of these new findings, and also appends Robert F. Kennedy’s own declassified memorandum of the controversial 27 October 1962 encounter with Dobrynin to supplement the Dobrynin’s version (and other accounts) published in the Bulletin in early 1995.3 (The Bulletin thanks Prof. Peter Roman of Duquesne University for providing this document.) First worth noting from Dobrynin’s cables is his initial impression of Robert Kennedy as a hardliner and “hot-head,” driven by political ambition, liable to support impulsive actions, and hardly a character one would predict that Dobrynin would end up collaborating with to resolve the crisis. This is not altogether surprising given the contentiousness of the issues, the combativeness of Robert Kennedy’s personality, and the fact that President Kennedy had used his brother to transmit personally to Dobrynin on 4 September 1962 a strong message of concern regarding Soviet military aid to Cuba. Moreover, in Dobrynin’s cabled report of his first meeting with Robert Kennedy during the crisis, late on the evening of October 23 (the night after the president’s speech), RFK’s deep anger and sense of personal betrayal toward Khrushchev continued on page 344 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 275

Anastas Mikoyan, to smooth the Cubans’ ruffled feathers, and the Soviet records of Mikoyan’s conversations with Cuban leaders in early November 1962, published in Bulletin 5, dramatically reveal the emotional rift which had emerged between the two communist allies.26 (Cuban authorities subsequently released their own minutes of two of those conversations, which are printed below; see box.) The Alekseev cables printed in the current Bulletin, when read in conjunction with the other sources noted above (particularly the Castro-Khrushchev correspondence) helps show how these tensions developed. On October 23 and 25, as the crisis mounted, Alekseev sent highly positive reports on the Cuban people’s “calm,” confidence, and preparedness for military confrontation, even noting that the imminent danger had prompted a “special business-like efficiency and energy” that had even dispelled the “ostentation and verbosity that are characteristic of Cubans.” In the second of the aforementioned cables, however, a glimmer of disagreement appears when Alekseev states that Castro “approves of our policy of not giving in to provocations, and [avoiding] unnecessary conflicts,” yet at the same time “expressed a belief in the necessity of shooting down one or two piratic American [reconnaissance] planes over Cuban territory.” An- other potential disagreement begins to surface when U Thant explores using Cuban President Oswaldo Dorticos’ proposal to the UN General Assembly of October 8—in which the Cuban said a guaranteed U.S. pledge of non-aggression against Cuba would remove the need for Cuban military preparations; while Moscow echoed this formulation in Khrushchev’s secret October 26 letter to Kennedy, the Cubans were now deeply distrustful that such a promise could be trusted. By October 27, a new fissure had opened up over Khrushchev’s public letter that day to Kennedy, which for the first time raised the possibility of a trade of Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey—an idea raised without regard to the sensibilities of the Cubans, who thought they had an iron-clad agreement with Moscow to deploy the missiles that could not be “swapped” for American missiles elsewhere in the world. When Gromyko dispatched a message to Castro through the Soviet Embassy in Havana informing him that it would be “advisable” for him to quickly endorse Khrushchev’s letter to Kennedy, Castro responded via Alekseev complimenting Khrushchev’s “great diplomatic skill” but also noting that it had provoked “symptoms of a certain confusion in various sectors of the Cuban population and among some members of the military,” who were asking “whether it constitutes a rejection by the USSR of its former obligations.” Castro also defended the downing of the American U-2 that day, brushing aside Alekseev’s admonition not to “aggravate the situation and initiate provocations.” On the following day, October 28, Cuban anger deepened as Moscow and Washington settled the crisis over their heads, and to add insult to injury Moscow began pressuring Castro to agree to allow United Nations inspectors to examine the Soviet missile sites on the island to verify that work had stopped. “Confusion and bewilderment are reigning inside the Cuban leadership” as a result of Khrushchev’s agreement to dismantle the missiles, Dorticos told Alekseev, adding that “under the present conditions of great patriotic enthusiasm of our people this report would be perceived by the infinitely electrified masses as a cold shower.” Alekseev’s excuses that technical problems had delayed the sending to Havana of an advance copy of Khrushchev’s letter to Kennedy—which had been read out over Moscow Radio before Castro (let alone Kennedy) received a copy—made hardly a dent in the “picture of incomprehension” painted by another senior official, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. In subsequent days, as Castro and Khrushchev jousted in their correspondence and Cuban forces continued to fire on American U- 2 planes, the Soviets implored the Cubans to display “self-restraint” and not take actions that could “give the aggressors a pretext to blame our side,” and vainly reiterated that “we consider it necessary” to satisfy U Thant’s desire to have the UN conduct on-site inspec- tions on Cuban territory—a demand Castro and the Cuban leadership angrily rejected in an open show of defiance. But it was Khrushchev’s letter of October 30 that sent Castro’s anger to an even higher pitch; in it the Soviet leader acknowl- edged that “some Cubans” wished that he had not declared his willingness to withdraw the nuclear missiles, but that the alternative would have been to “be carried away by certain passionate sectors of the population and [to have] refused to come to a reasonable settlement with the U.S. government,” leading to a war in which millions would have died; Khrushchev also said he had viewed Castro’s cable of October 26 “with extreme alarm,” considering “incorrect” its proposal that the Soviet Union “be the first to launch a nuclear strike against the territory of the enemy [in response to a non-nuclear U.S. invasion of Cuba] ... Rather than a simple strike, it would have been the start of thermonuclear war.”27 Reading the letter “attentively,” as described in Alekseev’s report of the meeting (printed below), Castro had only two, terse responses: there were not merely “some” Cuban comrades who failed to understand Khrushchev’s position, “but the whole Cuban people”—and as for the second item, Castro denied proposing that Khrushchev be “the first in delivering a blow against the adversary territory,” only in the event that Cuba had been attacked and Cubans and Soviets were dying together; perhaps Khrushchev misunder- stood or the translation was in error. Alekseev, unfazed, not only defended the translation but made it clear that Khrushchev had understood him all too well—”even in this case [of aggression],” the Soviet envoy admonished Castro, “it is hardly possible merely to approach mechanically such an important issue and to use nuclear arms without looking for other means.” The message: just as West Europeans had cause to wonder whether Americans would “trade New York for Hamburg,” linking local to strategic deterrence, the Cubans were sadly mistaken if they believed Moscow was ready to undertake global thermonuclear war—with the suicidal conse- quences that entailed—in defense of the Cuban Revolution.

1 Books that have appeared on the crisis in English in recent years incorporating newly-available evidence include: James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Noonday, 1990); James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba On the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993); James A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National 276 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: New Press, 1992); Robert Smith Thompson, : The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, October 1992); Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994); and Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis, updated ed. (New York: Random House, 1990, 1991, [1992?]). The volume of Foreign Relations of the United States covering the crisis, previously scheduled for publication in 1993, had still not appeared as of the end of 1996, but should include additional declassified U.S. documentation when it appears; mention should be made, however, of a FRUS volume that appeared in 1996 compiling Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence and communica- tions during the Kennedy Administration: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996). The National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at the Gelman Library at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., published a microfiche collection of declas- sified documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1992 and maintains files of additional documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act that are available for scholarly research. 2 In Cold War International History Project Bulletin 1 (Spring 1992), see Raymond L. Garthoff, “The Havana Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 2-4; in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), see Mark Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 40, 42-46; and James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, “KRAMER VS. KRAMER: Or, How Can You Have Revisionism in the Absence of Orthodoxy?” pp. 41, 47-50; in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), see Philip Brenner and James G. Blight, “Cuba, 1962: The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,” pp. 1, 81-85; Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “Using KGB Documents: The Scali-Feklisov Channel in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 58, 60-62; Raymond L. Garthoff, intro., “Russian Foreign Ministry Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 58, 63-77; Vladislav M. Zubok, “`Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union’: Mikoyan’s talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, November 1962,” pp. 59, 89-92, 93-109, 159; Mark Kramer, “The `Lessons’ of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations,” pp. 59, 110, 112-115, 160 (see corrected version in this issue); Jim Hershberg, “Anatomy of a Controversy: Anatoly F. Dobrynin’s Meeting With Robert F. Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962,” pp. 75, 77-80; and Georgy Shakhnazarov, “Fidel Castro, , and the Caribbean Crisis,” pp. 83, 87-89. 3 Although it appears that verbatim records of meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) Politburo may not exist for this period, the declassification of notes of Kremlin discussions concerning the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises, taken by V.M. Malin, prompts hope that similar materials may soon become available in Moscow. A full report on the Malin notes on the 1956 crises, translated, introduced, and annotated by Mark Kramer, appears elsewhere in this Bulletin. 4 For Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, see FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges, cited above, which includes many ex- changes during the missile crisis declassified by the U.S. government in 1991 in response to a Freedom of Information Act filed by the National Security Archive; these were first published in a special Spring 1992 issue of Problems of Communism. Correspondence between Castro and Khrushchev during the crisis was published in November 1990 in the Cuban Communist Party newspaper Granma; an English translation can be found in an appendix of Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba On the Brink, 474-491. 5 On the Soviet military during the crisis, see Gribkov and Smith, Operation ANADYR, cited above; Soviet military evidence on the crisis was also presented in a conference in Moscow in September 1994 organized by the then-head of the Russian Archival Service, R. Pikhoia. 6 See Alekseev to Foreign Ministry, 7 September 1962, in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 63. 7 Telegram from Gromyko to Foreign Ministry, 19 October 1962, CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 66-67. 8 James G. Hershberg, “Before `The Missiles of October’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?” in Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, 237-280, a slightly revised version of an article that appeared in Diplomatic History 14 (Spring 1990), 163-198. 9 “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October-November 1962, dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis (handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993),” released under the Freedom of Information Act, copy made available by National Security Archive. 10 Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 1981, “Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Military Responses to the Threat of Castro’s Cuba,” pp. 11-12; the report, formerly Top Secret, was declassified on 7 May 1996 and released under the Freedom of Information Act; a copy was made available courtesy of the National Security Archive. 11 In correspondence between the JCS and the National Archives in 1993, subsequently obtained and made available to CWIHP by William Burr of the National Security Archive, the JCS acknowledged that in August 1974, the Secretary, JCS had decided to destroy systematically all transcripts of JCS meetings between 1947 and 1974, as well as subsequent meetings after a six-month waiting period. (August 1974 was, coincidentally or not, the month that Richard M. Nixon resigned the presidency in part, many said, due to his failure to destroy the Watergate tapes.) This reason given for this action was that the transcripts “did not constitute official minutes of the meetings but were merely working papers reflecting the reporter’s version of events.” In 1978, the JCS communication to the National Archives noted, “The practice of recording the meetings terminated in August of 1978 and all materials were subsequently destroyed.” The only exception to this destruction of records, it was reported, was that the JCS History Office took “notes (approximately 30 typed pages) from selected transcripts relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis and various other crises through the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war”—hence the notation on the top of the Cuban Missile Crisis notes in which the McNamara quotation appears that they were “handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.” The letter from the JCS to the National Archives reads as follows:

The Joint Staff Washington, D.C. 20318-0400 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 277

January 25, 1993 Mr. James J. Hastings Director Records Appraisal and Disposition Division National Archives Washington, DC 20408

Dear Mr. Hastings:

This responds to your letter seeking information concerning the destruction of recorded minutes of the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to in an article by the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff History Office which you forwarded me as an enclosure. The minutes of the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were recorded in various forms from 1947 to 1978. In August of 1974 the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that the transcripts generated did not constitute official minutes of the meetings but were merely working papers reflecting the reporter’s version of events. Accordingly, the Secretary ordered the destruction of virtually all transcripts over six months old after screening for historical significance. He also directed that all future minutes/transcripts, with minor exceptions, would be destroyed at the six month point. The practice of recording the meetings terminated in August of 1978 and all materials were subsequently destroyed. However, it should be noted all of these actions were taken prior to approval of the first Joint Chiefs of Staff records disposition schedule by the Archivists of the United States on 11 December 1980. The Joint Staff History Office did take notes (approximately 30 typed pages) from selected transcripts relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis and various other crises through the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The Joint Staff concurs with your determination that these notes are records under File Number 00-1 of JAI 5760.2F and will accession them into the National Archives at the appropriate time. Any further questions you have regarding this matter may be directed to Mr. Sterling Smith on (703) 697-6906.

Sincerely,

/s/ EDMUND F. McBRIDE Chief, Documents Division Joint Secretariat 12 Telegram from Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 23 October 1962, CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 70-71. 13 Interview with Georgy Kornienko, cited in Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 260, 266. 14 Khrushchev Remembers, intro., commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; citation from New York: Bantam Books paperback ed., 1971), 555. 15 Mikoyan-Castro conversation, 4 November 1962, CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 96; see also the Cuban version printed in this Bulletin. 16 See excerpts from Gromyko-Kennedy conversation printed below; the document released by the Russian Foreign Ministry archives omits the section of the record dealing specifically with the Berlin question, but the American record appears in U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XV: Berlin Crisis 1962-1963 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 370-376. On the Berlin-Cuba connection, see Thomas A. Schwartz, “The Berlin Crisis and the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 21:1 (Winter 1997), 143-144. 17 Khrushchev to Kennedy, 28 September 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges, 152-161. 18 Dobrynin to Foreign Ministry, 19 October 1962, published in this issue. 19 Telegram from Gromyko to CC CPSU, 19 October 1962, CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 66-67. 20 Mikoyan-Castro conversation, 4 November 1962, CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 97. 21 For Dobrynin’s own recollections of the crisis, see Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, 1995), 71-95. 22 Much of this documentation was declassified as a result of Freedom of Information Act requests filed by the National Security Archive and is available for research there. Many of the most important documents on the negotiations should appear in forthcoming FRUS volumes dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-Soviet relations during the Kennedy Administration 23 Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), esp. 161-183. 24 See fn. 4, above. 25 See Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba On the Brink, passim. 26 See Zubok, “`Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union’: Mikoyan’s talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, November 1962,” CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995). 59, 89-92, 93-109, 159, for records of Mikoyan-Cuban talks on 3-5 November 1962, and Gribkov and Smith, Operation ANADYR, 189-190, 191-199, for Mikoyan’s conversation with Castro on 12 November 1962. 27 Khrushchev to Castro, 30 October 1962, English translation in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba On the Brink, 485-488. 278 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS and submarines belonging to the USA and [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian ON THE to the Cuban counterrevolutionaries. Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS M. Zakharov tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- S. P. Ivanov vided to CWIHP, and on file at National I. BEFORE THE CRISIS: 14 September 1962 Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- 14 SEPTEMBER-21 OCTOBER 1962 lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- [Source: Central Archive of the Ministry of sity.] M. Zakharov and S. P. Ivanov to Defense (TsAMO), Moscow; copy provided N.S. Khrushchev, 14 September 1962 to CWIHP by R. Pikhoia at September 1994 Cable from USSR Ambassador to the Moscow Conference, and on file at National USA A.F. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Personal memorandum to N. S. Khrushchev Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- Ministry, 19 October 1962 lation by John Hendriksen, Harvard Uni- The USA is conducting intensive air versity.] At a closed conference taking place on and naval patrols around Cuba, giving spe- 16 October for the editors and leading cor- cial attention to the reconnaissance of So- Cable from USSR Ambassador to the respondents of the American press, radio, viet vessels. USA A.F. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign and television, to provide information on the The head of the Cuban counterrevolu- Ministry, 15 October 1962 evaluation of the current international situ- tionaries, Juan Manuel Salvat, announced ation and the USA’s official position in it, in a press conference on September 7 that According to separate confidential re- President Kennedy spoke. This speech was any vessel sailing under a Communist flag ports, the piratic raids by the so-called “Al- given exclusively for the personal edifica- in Cuban territorial waters, regardless of its pha 66” group on the Cuban coast and on tion of those present, and it was denied all nationality, will be considered a military tar- several vessels near Cuba are being carried publication rights. get and subject to attack without warning. out not from a base on the American main- The content of the President’s speech At present, Soviet vessels approaching land, but rather directly from the sea, from came down to the following. the island of Cuba are systematically sub- American landing ships carrying the corre- The government’s duty is to seek out jected to air-patrols by USA planes. In Sep- sponding cutters. The crews of these cut- global solutions to the global problems fac- tember of this year as many as 50 cases were ters are dispatched directly onto these ships ing the USA. There was once a time when recorded of Soviet vessels being air-pa- by helicopters in the possession of the Cu- war could be seen as an acceptable exten- trolled. The patrols were carried out at criti- ban members of the group “Alpha 66,” who sion of politics, but nuclear war in its ex- cally dangerous altitudes (50-100 meters). are based in Miami, Puerto Rico, and the treme form cannot be seen as such, since it With the aim of ensuring the safety of Yucatan. would lead to huge destruction and the loss our vessels from acts of piracy on the part The American ships carrying these cut- of millions of lives in the countries taking of Americans and Cuban counterrevolution- ters maintain a constant readiness for mili- part in it. The USA must learn to accept aries, we ask to authorize the following: tary action, and meticulously care for the and live in the current conditions of direct 1. On every transport vessel bound for technical condition of the cutters, perform- confrontation between the USA and the Cuba with personnel and arms for one unit ing repairs in the case of damage. During USSR, and between Communism’s strivings (of a formation), to place for self-defense, this time, the American instructors on these for expansion and the USA’s strivings to above and beyond each ship’s own arma- ships direct the training, both tactical and support the sort of alignment of forces that ments, two 23 mm. anti-aircraft combina- otherwise, of the Cuban crews who carry allows the free nations to thrive, and that tion gun-mounts with a reserve supply of 2 out operations directly on the cutters. allows the USA in particular to safeguard complements (2,400 missiles) for each gun- This sort of tactic allows the Ameri- its own interests. In similar situations ear- mount. These gun-mounts are found on the can forces to assert that the cutters belong- lier, the result of such confrontation has al- arms of the airborne-landing forces, and they ing to the “Alpha 66” group are not acting ways been war—but now the question is are a powerful strategic tool both for air tar- from a base within USA territory, but from how we can get through this period without gets at distances of up to 2,500 meters at some “unknown bases.” As far as the Ameri- war and, especially importantly, without heights of up to 1,500 meters, as well as for can vessels carrying the cutters are con- nuclear war. light-armoured naval targets at distances of cerned, the Central Intelligence Agency of Some sort of crisis relating to Berlin is up to 2,000 meters. On practice shootings the USA, which to judge from all available clearly brewing now, and we will have to the gun-mount has penetrated armour-plat- information is directing all these operations, see whether we can surmount it without re- ing 25 mm. thick. The gun-mount requires is counting on the fact that detecting and course to military action. There are no signs a three-man crew. All in all it is necessary identifying this sort of vessel will not be that the Russians are preparing to soften their to arm 34 vessels. easy, since there is a lively traffic of Ameri- demands with regard to Berlin; they want 2. To confirm instructions given to the can vessels between Florida and the Ameri- us either to get out of there, or to share with captain of the vessel and the head of the can base Guantanamo in Cuba. them our rights in West Berlin. They would military echelon regarding the defense of like to start a chain reaction that would ulti- transport vessels crossing the sea against 15.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN mately lead to the elimination of American acts of piracy committed by airplanes, ships, positions in West Berlin and many other COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 279 places. The USA is determined not to let this understand that the military equipment of the Soviet government N.S. Khrushchev happen. It cannot be allowed to occur. The which they are supplying to Cuba, or can and from Nina Petrovna. West’s presence in Berlin and its access to supply in the future, would make little dif- Kennedy expressed his gratitude to the city represent, as before, vitally impor- ference if the USA were to consider itself N.S. Khrushchev for the regards. tant interests, and no concessions with re- forced to take military action against it. They Further I said that I would like to give gard to them can or will be made to Soviet have enough experience as well in East an account of the Soviet government policy pressure, whatever form that pressure may Germany and the Eastern European coun- on a number of important issues. take. The problem now consists of the fact tries to recognize the limits of their capaci- [section deleted—trans.] that we both have locked horns [in confron- ties to revitalize and strengthen the Cuban Now I would like to expound the So- tation—ed.]. economy, especially bearing in mind the viet government’s position on the Cuban Nuclear war may be an irrational phe- distances involved. Meanwhile the Latin issue and the USSR’s assessment of the ac- nomenon, but there is more to it than this, American countries have taken measures tions of the USA. since recognizing it as irrational does not towards isolating Cuba and condemning to The Soviet government stands for the necessarily signify being saved from it. If failure the Communists’ attempts to spread peaceful coexistence of states with differ- both sides come to the negotiating table with their system throughout the other countries ent social systems, against the interference an absolute certainty that the other side will of the Western hemisphere. of one state into the internal affairs of oth- in no circumstances have recourse to nuclear There can be no talk of a recognition ers, against the intervention of large states war, then that would be one of the surest by the United States of some Cuban gov- into the affairs of small countries. Liter- paths toward such a war, because one side ernment in exile, since that step could free ally, that is the core of the Soviet Union’s or the other could go one step further and the current Cuban regime from the obliga- foreign policy. apply a pressure beyond what the other side tions fixed by treaty toward Guantanamo It is well known to you, Mr. President, is able to put up with, and for all intents and base and American citizens in Cuba. the attitude of the Soviet government and purposes we would be heading for catastro- There can be no deal struck with the personally of N.S. Khrushchev toward the phe. USSR regarding its renunciation of bases dangerous developments connected with the In government circles there is a feel- in Cuba in exchange for the USA’s renun- USA administration position on the issue of ing that we quite possibly have some diffi- ciation of bases in other parts of the world Cuba. An unrestrained anti-Cuban cam- cult weeks and months ahead of us due to (in Turkey, for example). It is necessary to paign has been going on in the USA for a Berlin, and that a crisis of the first order may treat Cuba in such a way as to advance our long time and apparently there is a definite arise before Christmas. cause in the general battle into which the USA administration policy behind it. Right With Cuba the situation is different. USA has been drawn. The strategy and tac- now the USA are making an attempt to Berlin is a vitally important issue for both tics of the USA should be defined by con- blockade Cuban trade with other states. sides, and the fundamental positions of both siderations of the defense of its vital inter- There is talk about a possibility of actions sides with regard to it remain inflexible. ests and its security not only in connection of organized policy in this region under the Latin American is another vitally important with the Cuban situation, but also in con- USA aegis. region. Berlin and Latin America are two nection with other more serious threats. But all of this amounts to a path that dangerous regions. No [U.S.] military ac- The preceding is communicated by can lead to grave consequences, to a mis- tions concerning Cuba could be or should way of information. fortune for all mankind, and we are confi- be undertaken until there are signs of overt dent that such an outcome is not desired by Cuban aggression against the countries of 19.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN any people, including the people of the USA. the Western hemisphere. Cuba should be and The USA administration for some rea- is now under close observation, and the USA [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian son considers that the Cubans must solve has been kept informed of what is happen- Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- their domestic affairs not at their discretion, ing there. The USA’s policy consists, as be- tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- but at the discretion of the USA. But on fore, in ensuring that the maintenance of vided to CWIHP, and on file at National what grounds? Cuba belongs to the Cuban Cuba be as expensive as possible both for Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- people, not to the USA or any other state. the USSR and for Castro’s regime. It ap- lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- And since it is so, then why are the state- pears unlikely that the USSR could afford sity.] ments made in the USA calling for an inva- to invest funds in Cuba that would be suffi- sion of Cuba? What do the USA need Cuba cient to meet Cuba’s actual and long-term Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister for? needs. Only the USA alone had a billion- Gromyko on 18 October 1962 meeting Who can in earnest believe that Cuba dollar trade with Cuba before the Castro with President Kennedy, 20 October represents a threat to the USA? If we speak revolution. 1962 (excerpts) about dimensions and resources of the two According to the American govern- countries - the USA and Cuba - then it is ment’s calculations, there are currently in During the meeting with President clear that they are a giant and a baby. The Cuba around five thousand Russian military Kennedy at the White House on 18 October flagrant groundlessness of such charges specialists. One must suppose that the Rus- I transmitted to him, his spouse and other against Cuba is obvious. sians are sufficiently experienced people to members of his family regards from the head Cuba does not represent, and cannot 280 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

represent, any threat to the countries of Latin Giving an account of the Soviet government specialists to teach them to use some defen- America. It is strange to think as if small position frankly as well, I would like to sive types of armaments, can represent a Cuba can encroach on the independence of stress that nowadays is not the middle of threat to anybody. Had it been otherwise, either this or that country of Latin America. the XIX century, is not the time of colonial the Soviet government would never be in- Cuban leaders and personally Fidel Castro partition and not the times when a victim of volved in such aid. And such an approach have declared more than once in front of aggression could raise its voice only weeks applies to any country. the whole world and in a most solemn man- and months after an assault. American The example of Laos convincingly il- ner that Cuba does not intend to impose their statesmen frequently declare that the USA lustrates this. If the Soviet Union were con- system, that they firmly favor the non-in- is a great power. This is correct, the USA is ducting another policy, not the present one, terference of states into the internal affairs a great power, a rich and strong power. And then the situation in Laos would be differ- of each other. what kind of power is the Soviet Union? ent. For the Soviet Union and its friends The people who call for an aggression You know that N.S. Khrushchev was seem to have more possibility to influence against Cuba allege that, they say, it is not positively impressed by your realistic state- the situation in Laos than the USA. But we sufficient to have those statements of the ment during the Vienna meeting about the were trying to achieve an agreement because Cuban government, though those statements equality of forces of the two powers—the we cannot step aside from the main prin- are supported by deeds. But by that what- USSR and USA. But insofar as it is so, in- ciples of our foreign policy designed for ever aggressive action or adventure can be asmuch as the USSR is also a great and lessening international tension, for undoing justified. Solutions of almost all the inter- strong power it cannot be a mere spectator knots of still existing contradictions between national issues are results, you know, of while there is appearing a threat of unleash- powers, for the peaceful solution of un- statements, dictums, or negotiations be- ing a large war either in connection with the settled international problems. And in this tween states, in the course of which corre- Cuban issue or [with a] situation in what- regard our policy is unvarying. sponding governments give an account of ever other region of the world. Here is the position and views of the their positions on either these or those ques- You are very well aware of the Soviet Soviet government on the Cuban issue. The tions, as for example takes place now dur- government attitude toward such an action Soviet government calls on you and the USA ing the conversations that we have with the of the USA, as the decision about the draft administration not to permit whatever steps USA administration. But does the USA ad- of 150 thousand reservists.2 The Soviet are incompatible with the interests of peace ministration not believe the statements of government is convinced that if both of our and the lessening of international tension, the Cuban government? Really, is it not countries favor a lessening of international with the UN principles which have been convincing when the Cuban government tension and a solution of unsettled interna- solemnly signed both by the USSR and the officially declares its aspiration to settle all tional problems, then such steps should be USA. We call on you to ensure that in this disputed questions with the USA adminis- avoided because they are intended for sharp- issue too the policies of the two largest pow- tration by means of negotiations? In this ening the international situation. ers pursue the object of peace and only of regard may be quoted the well-known state- If it came to the worst, if a war began, peace. ment made by Mr. [Oswaldo] Dorticos, certainly, a mobilization of an additional 150 Having listened to our statement, President of the Republic of Cuba, during thousand reservists to the USA armed forces Kennedy said that he was glad to hear the the current session of the UN General As- would not have significance. And undoubt- reference to the settlement of the Laotian sembly, a statement of which the USA Presi- edly you are very well aware of this. For problem. We believe, he continued, that the dent is undoubtedly aware.1 the present is not the year 1812 when Na- Soviet Union really acts precisely in the way The Cubans want to make secure their poleon was setting all his hopes upon the which you are describing, and just as the own home, their independence. They ap- number of soldiers, of sabres and cannons. USA the USSR is endeavoring to comply peal for reason, for conscience. They call Neither is it 1941, when Hitler was relying with its commitments. on the USA to renounce encroachments upon his mass armies, automatic rifles, and Regarding the Cuban issue I [Kennedy] upon the independence of Cuba, to estab- tanks. Today life and and military equip- must say that really it became grave only lish normal relations with the Cuban state. ment have made a large step forward. this summer. Until then the Cuban ques- The question is: Is it worthwhile to Nowadays the situation is quite different and tion had been pushed by us to the back- whip up a campaign and organize different it would be better not to rely on armaments ground. True, Americans had a certain opin- sorts of hostile activity around Cuba and at while solving disputed problems. ion about the present Cuban government and the same time inimical actions against those So far as the aid of the Soviet Union to refugees from Cuba were exciting public states which maintain good relations with Cuba is concerned, the Soviet government opinion against that government. But the Cuba, respect its independence, and lend has declared and I have been instructed to USA administration had no intentions to Cuba a helping hand at a difficult moment? reaffirm it once more, our aid pursues ex- launch an aggression against Cuba. Sud- Is it not a destruction of international law, clusively the object of rendering Cuba as- denly, Mr. Khrushchev, without notifying of the UN principles and purposes? sistance to its defensive capacity and devel- me, began to increase at a brisk pace sup- Is it possible, Mr. President, for the opment of its peaceful economy. Neither plies of armaments to Cuba, although there Soviet Union, taking into account all of this, industry nor agriculture in Cuba, neither was no threat on our side that could cause to sit cross-handed and to be a detached land-improvement works nor training of the such a necessity. If Mr. Khrushchev ad- onlooker? You say that you like frankness. Cuban personnel carried out by the Soviet dressed me on this issue, we could give him COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 281 corresponding assurances on that score. The I should be glad, Kennedy stressed, to Along with these missiles, the Soviets build-up of the Cuban military might has give assurances that an invasion would not are apparently supplying the extensive ra- badly impressed the American people and be repeated neither on the part of Cuban dar and other electronic equipment which the USA congress. As President I was try- refugees, nor on the part of the USA armed is required for their operation. ing to calm public opinion and I have de- forces. We can also confirm the presence of clared that, taking into account the kind of But the issue is, Kennedy said, that as several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats aid rendered by the Soviet Union to Cuba, a result of the USSR government’s action carrying ship-to-ship missiles having a range we must keep cool and self-controlled. But in July of the current year the situation sud- of 15 miles. I was not able to find a satisfactory expla- denly has changed for the worse. The number of Soviet military techni- nation for those actions of the Soviet Union. Proceeding with the previous idea, I cians now known to be in Cuba or en route— Kennedy said later, that the Soviet said that for the Cuban government the vi- approximately 3,500—is consistent with Union is aware of the American opinion re- tal issue is the question what is to be done assistance in setting up and learning to use garding the present regime in Cuba. We next. The question comes to the following: this equipment. consider that it would be better if there were either they will stay unprepared to repulse As I stated last week, we shall continue another government. But we do not have new attempts at invasion or they must un- to make information available as fast as it is any intentions to attack Cuba. dertake steps to ensure their country from obtained and properly verified. You are saying that we have established attack, take care of their defense. We have There is no evidence of any organized a blockade around Cuba, but that is not the already said that the Soviet government has combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc case. We have only taken the decision that responded to the call of Cuba for help only country; of military base provided to Rus- the ships, after bringing cargo to Cuba, will because that appeal had the aim of provid- sia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating be barred entry to the American ports to pick ing Cubans with bread and removing the to Guantanamo; of the presence of offen- up freight. threat hanging over Cuba by strengthening sive ground-to-ground missiles; or of other The actions of the Soviet Union create its defensive capacity. Regarding help, ren- significant offensive capability either in a very complicated situation and I don’t dered by the Soviet Union, in the use of Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and know where the whole thing can bring us. some exclusively defensive armaments, by guidance. The present situation is, perhaps, the most no means can it be seen as a threat to the Were it to be otherwise, the gravest is- dangerous since the end of the Second World USA. If, I repeat, the situation were differ- sues would arise.” War. We, certainly, take on trust statements ent the Soviet government never would have That is our position on this issue, said of the Soviet Union about the sort of arma- gone along with such an aid. Kennedy, and in this way it has been ex- ments supplied by you to Cuba. As Presi- Kennedy said that, to make things com- pounded by our Attorney General, Robert dent I am trying to restrain those people in pletely clear on this issue, he would like to Kennedy, in his conversation with the So- the USA who are favoring an invasion of announce once more that the USA do not viet Ambassador.5 From that position I was Cuba. For example, last Sunday in one of have any intentions to invade Cuba. Nev- proceeding last Sunday when I was voicing my speeches I declared against one of the ertheless, intensified armaments supplies to the aforementioned statement. Thus, in all American senators, who had previously sup- Cuba on the part of the Soviet Union, which my actions I proceed with due regard for ported such an invasion.3 began in July of the current year, have com- statements of the Soviet Union that the ar- I repeat, a very dangerous situation has plicated the situation greatly and made it maments supplied to Cuba have an exclu- nevertheless arisen regarding this issue and more dangerous. sively defensive character. I don’t know what can be the outcome. My intention, Kennedy stressed, con- I [Gromyko] said in conclusion that I answered Kennedy that once there sists in preventing any actions that could from the corresponding statements of the was an attempt to organize an invasion of lead to war, so long as those actions would Soviet government, including the statement Cuba and it is known what was the end of not be occasioned by some activty of the delivered to the President today, the USA the affair.4 From different official statements Soviet Union or Cuba. In order to confirm administration has a clear view of policy of and your own statements, Mr. President, that the USA administration believes the the Soviet Union on the Cuban issue and everybody know what were the circum- declarations of the Soviet government about also of our assessment of the USA policy stances and how that invasion was arranged. the defensive character of the armaments and actions regarding Cuba. I had the task Everybody knows also that the USA admin- supplied to Cuba, Kennedy read the follow- of giving the President an account of all of istration needs only to move a finger and no ing passage from his statement on the Cu- it. Cuban exiles, nor those who support them ban issue of 4 September 1962: [section deleted—trans.] in the USA and some countries of the Car- “Information has reached this Govern- Fourth. After the exchange of opin- ibbean, would dare launch any adventure ment in the last four days from a variety of ions on the issue of the [atomic] tests I against Cuba. sources which established without a doubt broached the subject of the main principles At this moment Kennedy put in a re- that the Soviets have provided the Cuban of foreign policy of the USSR and the ne- mark that he had already had an exchange Government with a number of anti-aircraft cessity to proceed from the thesis that dif- of opinions with N.S. Khrushchev on the defense missiles with a slant range of ference of ideologies need not be an obstacle issue of the invasion of Cuba in 1961 and twenty-five miles similar to early models of to peaceful cooperation between the USSR had said that it was a mistake. our “Nike” [missile]. and the USA. According to the instructions, 282 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

received before departure, the question of a the signing of the German peace treaty,” of differences in the relations among all possible meeting of the heads of the two because there are others who are also inter- countries, above all in relations between the powers has been touched upon. ested in discussing those questions besides USSR and the USA, with whom the Soviet The Soviet government, as before, is our two countries. If Mr. Khrushchev comes Union wants to live in peace and friendship. building its foreign policy on the recogni- to the General Assembly I would be glad to [This policy] also applies to the Cu- tion of that indisputable concept that differ- discuss with him questions that we are in- ban issue, which was not invented by the ence in ideologies, to which our states ad- terested in without any formal agenda and Soviet Union, it applies to the question of here, need not be a barrier to their peaceful without picking out any concrete issue that signing the German peace treaty and nor- coexistence and cooperation in the interests must be discussed. malization on its basis of the situation in of strengthening the peace. You and we, as I thanked the President for the conver- West Berlin and it applies to all the other it was underlined more than once by N.S. sation during which we have discussed ques- issues that separate our two countries. Our Khrushchev, are human beings and you have tions that represent interests for both coun- policy is the policy of peace, friendship, the your own ideology, and you are well aware tries, concerning important aspects of the policy of removing differences by peaceful of our attitude towards it. The USSR is a foreign policies of the USSR and the USA. means. socialist state, and is building communism. I also underlined the view of the Soviet gov- In conclusion I promised to convey the We are guided by communist ideology. Who ernment that it would be a great historic regards from the President to the Head of will gain the victory in the end—this ques- achievement if the USSR and the USA come the Soviet government N.S. Khrushchev and tion must be solved not by the force of ar- to terms over those questions that divide us. expressed confidence that he would accept maments, but by the way of peaceful com- Kennedy responded that he agrees with it with pleasure. petition and we, the communists, have urged that remark. As I have already told Mr. The conversation lasted 2 hours and 20 this since the days of Lenin. Khrushchev, the USA is a large and rich minutes. There were present: on the Ameri- We resolutely condemn the calls to country. The Soviet Union is also a large can side - Rusk, Thompson, Hillenbrandt solve ideological disputes by the force of and rich country. Each of our countries has and Akalovsky, on the Soviet side - armaments. A competition in economics, a lot of things to do inside our countries. As Semenov, Dobrynin, and Sukhodrev. in satisfying the material and spiritual re- to the outcome of the competition between quirements of the peope—that is the field the, which I hope will be a peaceful one, A. GROMYKO where in a historic, peaceful “battle,” with- history will decide it. On Mr. Khrushchev, 20/10/1962 out use of armaments, must be solved the as the head of the Soviet government, and question of which ideology would prevail on me, as the USA President, rests enormous [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, and which one would quit the stage of his- responsibility and we have no right to al- provided to CWIHP, and on file at National tory. On behalf of the Soviet government I low any actions that can lead to a collision. Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- would like to reaffirm that [position] once During the last 9 months while I am lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.] more because it is one of the main principles holding the post of President we were seek- of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. ing by all means to settle relations between II. THE CRISIS: 22-28 OCTOBER 1962 In conclusion I would like to say the our two countries. We have reached some following: success on the Laotian issue. We were as- Telegram from Soviet representative to The Head of the Soviet government piring to reach agreements both on Berlin the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR N.S. Khrushchev has entrusted me to con- and German problems. Unfortunately we Foreign Ministry, 22 October 1962 vey to you that his opinion is that it would didn’t manage to do it. apparently be useful to have a meeting be- As to Cuba I cannot understand what 22 October 1962 tween the Head of the Soviet government has happened in July of this year, particu- and the USA President in order to discuss larly taking into account statements made On the evening of 22 October, during the issues that separate us and first of all the by Mr. Khrushchev that he understands the Kennedy’s speech, the United States sent questions of the German peace treaty and basis of the USA approach. In spite of suc- me, as chair of the Security Council, a letter West Berlin. cess achieved on the Laotian question, the demanding an urgent convocation of the If N.S. Khrushchev has the opportu- situation around the Cuban issue is becom- Security Council for a discussion of the “se- nity, he will arrive in New York in the sec- ing more and more complicated. rious threat to the security of the Western ond half of November in order to attend the In conclusion Kennedy transmitted his hemisphere, and to peace throughout the session of the UN General Assembly. Thus, regards to N.S. Khrushchev and expressed whole world, posed by continuing and grow- we are speaking about a possibility of his gratitude for receiving the USA Ambassa- ing foreign intervention in the Caribbean arrival in the USA after the elections to Con- dor in Moscow Mr. [Foy] Kohler and sev- basin.” In oral communication, the Ameri- gress. Kennedy said that in the case of N.S. eral American representatives who had vis- cans called for a convocation of the Secu- Khrushchev coming to the USA he would ited the Soviet Union. rity Council on 23 October at 10:30 a.m. be glad to meet him once more. Neverthe- For my part I assured the President Eastern Standard Time. less, he said, it would be erroneous to speak once more that the policy of the Soviet [U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai] about the only point of the agenda of this Union always has been and remains directed Stevenson’s letter reiterated the points made meeting - to discuss “the Berlin problem and at strengthening peace and the elimination by Kennedy in his radio and television COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 283 speech. Appended to the letter was the draft its immediate convocation has already been The Cuban leaders are awaiting the of a resolution which in its main strategic exerted. Soviet government’s reaction to Kennedy’s part runs as follows: We will provide supplementary infor- announcement, and are placing their hopes “The Security Council... mation on our position in the Security Coun- on the wisdom of our decisions. 1. Demands, as a temporary measure, cil. Castro said that the USSR, which is in accordance with Article 40 of the Char- 22.X.62 V. ZORIN surrounded by American bases, has strong ter, the immediate dismantling and removal arguments to marshal in response to from Cuba of all ballistic missiles and other [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, Kennedy, and may enter negotiations with armaments used for offensive purposes. provided to CWIHP, and on file at National him. With regard to the UN observers who 2. Authorizes and requests the acting Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- are now being sent to Cuba by the USA, we secretary general to dispatch to Cuba a corps lation by John Henriksen.] as a sovereign nation will never admit them of UN observers to ensure fulfillment of this onto our soil. resolution and to deliver a report. Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to A complete calm and certainty domi- 3. Demands the cessation of quaran- Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign nate Cuba’s leading officials and army com- tine measures directed against military de- Ministry, 23 October 1962 manders, just as they do the popular masses. liveries to Cuba after the UN has been as- To avoid provocations, the troops have sured of the fulfillment of Point 1. 23 October been given orders to open fire on enemy air- 4. Strongly recommends that the planes and ships only in cases when the en- United States of America and the Union of Raul Castro has announced that in re- emy has initiated attack first. Soviet Socialist Republics immediately dis- sponse to Kennedy’s threat, the Cuban gov- According to Castro, the Americans cuss the issue of measures to be taken to ernment would make a decision regarding have denied Cuban workers access to eliminate the currently existing threat to the the mobilization of all subdivisions of the Guantanamo base. security of the Western hemisphere and to popular militia. All American civilian planes have been peace throughout the world, and to deliver All in all, 350,000 persons will be prohibited from flying over Cuba and from a report on this to the Security Council.” mobilized. approaching its shores. We will forward the text of Stevenson’s The full mobilization of this group will A radio interception has also been re- letter and the draft of the resolution to the take 72 hours. ceived which prohibits American ships from Ministry of Foreign Affairs by teletype. The forces of the military units in this conducting negotiations with the bases on The United States’ formulation of the group (105,000 persons) have been brought open channels. imaginary threat posed by Cuba and the to military readiness, and are occupying All new facts will be immediately com- USSR is clearly aimed at concealing and departure positions. municated. justifying to public opinion the USA’s uni- The mass labor organizations are de- laterally imposed military blockade of Cuba, voting all their energy to helping the army 23.X.62 ALEKSEEV which is an overtly aggressive act. In light and to replacing workers in businesses. of this, the demand for convening the Secu- The mobilization will prove to be a new [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, rity Council is put forth after the USA has and heavy burden for the Cuban economy, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National in fact established a blockade and under- given that the maintenance of the army will Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- taken a series of other aggressive actions cost the country up to one million pesos per lation by John Henriksen.] against revolutionary Cuba. Thus the Ameri- day, not counting losses from reductions in cans have presented the Security Council, production connected with the transfer of Telegram from Soviet delegate to the as they have done in the past, with a fait significant numbers of workers to the army. United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR accompli. Tomorrow at 12:00 noon, Fidel Castro Foreign Ministry, 23 October 1962 Before consulting with the other mem- will deliver a television and radio address bers of the Security Council on the time for to the Cuban people. 23 October 1962 convening the meeting of the Council, we Commenting on Kennedy’s speech, met with the Cuban representative and had Raul Castro said that it was undoubtedly As chairman of the Security Council, I a preliminary discussion of the possibility aimed at American voters and at the Latin have been sent a letter by the Cuban del- of Cuba’s submitting to Council an exami- American governments that still have dip- egate to the UN, [Mario Garcia-] nation of the issue of the USA’s aggressive lomatic ties with Cuba. Inchaustegi, in agreement with his govern- actions against Cuba. Castro thinks that, under this pressure, ment, demanding an urgent convocation of The Cuban representative is conferring a whole series of these governments, if not the Council to discuss the USA’s aggressive with his government on this issue. all of them, will break off relations with actions and its blockade of Cuba as acts of We will undertake measures toward Cuba. war. initiating the meeting of the Council no ear- The Cuban government, said Castro, According to Inchaustegi, the Cuban lier than 3:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time is firmly and resolutely behind the nation’s minister of foreign affairs, [Raul] Roa, may on 23 October, although pressure from the military spirit and the unity of its people in arrive in New York to take part in the Western majority of Council members for its resistance to the aggressor. Council’s examination of this issue. In con- 284 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

nection with this we are taking steps to make The next speaker was the Cuban del- the convocation of the Council contingent Telegram from Soviet delegate to the egate Garcia-Inchaustegi, who delivered a on Roa’s arrival. Nevertheless it can be ex- United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR clear speech exposing the provocative ac- pected that the Council meeting will have Foreign Ministry, 23 October 1962 tions of the USA against Cuba, and declar- to be convened (given the demands of the ing the the steadfast determination of the Western majority of the Council’s members) 23 October 1962 Cuban people to take up arms, if necessary, on 23 October of this year at 3:00 p.m. East- to defend their revoluionary achievements. ern Standard Time. On 23 October at 4:00 p.m., under the The Cuban delegate demanded the imme- During the examination of the issue in chairmanship of the USSR delegate, a meet- diate revocation of the measures announced the Council, we will declare our objections ing of the Security Council took place, on by Kennedy. Characteristically, the Cuban’s to the misleading American formulation of the agenda of which was our issue of the speech was greeted with friendly applause it. Bearing in mind the Cubans’ demand for violation of the UN Charter and the threat from the audience. entering on the agenda the issue of USA to peace on the part of the USA. We will teletype the full text of the aggressions that they introduced, it can be Attention paid to this meeting was Cuban’s speech as well. expected that the affair will come down to enormous: the assembly hall was filled to After that we gave a speech with a dec- entering American as well as Cuban state- capacity, and virtually all the representatives laration in accordance with your number ments on the Council’s agenda. of the Anglo-American bloc of the UN were 1197, and introduced a draft resolution. An In examining the affair in its essence, present. account of the spech was transmitted by guided by the Soviet government’s most On approving the agenda we made a TASS. We are teletyping the full text to the recent announcements on the Cuban ques- declaration in which made note of the false Ministry of Foreign Affairs. tion, we will point out that the USA’s ag- nature of the USA’s address to the Security The next meeting has been set for to- gressions against Cuba cannot be evaluated Council, which was a clumsy attempt to morrow, 24 October, at 9:00 a.m. Eastern as anything other than a provocation push- conceal the USA’s aggressions. We declared Standard Time. ing the world to the verge of nuclear war. that, in reality, there were some pressing is- In the course of the day we have had We will demand a condemnation of the USA sues to be brought before the Council by conversations with a series of delegates from aggressions, the immediate cessation of the the USSR and Cuba: concerning violations African and Asian countries, including del- blockade they have declared and all infrac- of the UN Charter and the USA’s threat to egates from the United Arab Republic, tions of maritime freedom; and an immedi- peace, and concerning USA aggressions Ghana, Ceylon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, ate end to all forms of intervention in the against Cuba. and others. All of these countries share a domestic affairs of the Republic of Cuba. After that the agenda was approved serious anxiety about the situation created We will also propose that the USA gov- without objections from the Council mem- by the USA’s actions. All of them recognize ernment immediately enter into direct ne- bers. the clear illegality of the USA’s actions. gotiations with the Cuban government on The text of the Soviet government’s They do not yet, however, show sufficient the settling of its conflicts with Cuba though declaration on Cuba was distributed as an determination to take any concrete steps. peaceful means, as suggested by Dorticos official UN document, and also as a press Thus, for example, the delegate from the in his speech in the UN General Assembly. release. United Arab Republic initially made much In coordination with the Cuban delegation, The first to speak was Stevenson (reg- of the unofficial Council draft resolution we will introduce a draft resolution that in- istered on the list of speakers yesterday, at calling for the respective parties to remove cludes the above-mentioned points. the time of Kennedy’s radio speech). In his the blockade and to end arms stockpiling in We will of course vote against the long speech, which was marked by dema- Cuba. When we categorically rejected this American draft resolution. goguery and hypocrisy, Stevenson tried in proposal because it essentially replicated We will take action as indicated above, various ways to justify the unprecedented one of the USA’s basic ideas—revoking the unless we receive other instructions before actions of the USA government, the naval blockade after the cessation of arms deliv- the meeting of the Council begins. blockade of Cuba imposed by the United eries to the Cubans—the neutral parties pre- It is not impossible that, when both States, and the acts of piracy on the open pared another draft resolution. draft resolutions are vetoed, the USA will sea. Unable to adduce any facts with which This draft makes the following stipu- then propose that the Council vote on trans- to prove the presence of a Cuban threat, lations: ferring the issue to the General Assembly. Stevenson instead fell into a lengthy descrip- 1. To call upon all interested parties to tion of the post-war history of international abstain from any actions which could di- 23.X.62 V. ZORIN relations, attempting to depict in a distorted rectly or indirectly aggravate the situation, [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian manner the foreign policy of the Soviet and to work towards returning the Carib- Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- Union and the other socialist states. In con- bean area to the condition it was in before tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- clusion he formally presented the American 22 October; vided to CWIHP, and on file at National draft resolution (relayed to the Ministry of 2. To request that the acting Secretary Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- Foreign Affairs by teletype on 22 October). General immediately discuss with the inter- lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- We will teletype the full text of Stevenson’s ested parties direct measures to be taken for sity.] speech to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. removing the current threat to the general COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 285 peace. tions of the Soviet Union’s alleged installa- UN Charter and by the Bandung and 3. To call upon the interested parties tion in Cuba of offensive nuclear missile Belgrade conferences of nonaligned nations to carry out this resolution immediately, and weaponry, the accusations by means of (we are teletyping the full texts of these to cooperate with the acting Secretary Gen- which the USA is trying to justify its ag- speeches). Proceeding from these principles, eral in the fulfillment of this aim. gressions against Cuba (we are teletyping the delegates from the United Arab Repub- 4. To ask the acting Secretary General the full text of the speech). Dean asserted lic and Ghana defended the right of Cuba to to report to the Security Council on the ful- that the only way to restore peace and trust choose its own political regime, and to carry fillment of the second point. is to remove from Cuban territory the “of- out the necessary defense measures for safe- We remarked that even this draft is not fensive missiles.” It is revealing that Dean guarding its political freedom and territo- fully satisfactory, in part because it does not tried as hard as he could to get around the rial integrity. even indicate (in clear and unambiguous question of the naval blockade imposed by In the speeches of both delegates, doubt terms) that the USA’s declared blockade of the USA on Cuba. was expressed about the reliability and well- Cuba must be immediately ended. Declaring England’s support for the groundedness of the American assertions This evening, after the Security Coun- American draft resolution, Dean at the same about the allegedly offensive character of cil meeting, the delegates from neutral Asian time expressed his thoughts on the neces- the weaponry installed in it. Quaison-Sackey and African countries will hold a meeting sity of negotiations between the interested recalled with regard to this the fabrication to discuss the general policy that it would parties. by USA intelligence of false information be most advisable for them to follow with The French delegate [Roger] Seydoux that has already been used in the past for regard to this issue. In the course of also supported the American draft resolu- justifying aggressive actions against Cuba. tomorrow’s meeting we will decisively de- tion, representing it as allegedly furthering The delegates from the United Arab fend the position laid out in our draft reso- the interests of a peaceful settlement of the Republic and Ghana declared that they can- lution, and will exert pressure on the neutrals conflict. Like Dean, he reiterated the false not justify the USA actions aimed at estab- to do the same. assertions by the USA of the allegedly of- lishing a blockade of Cuba. They both em- fensive nature of the armaments supplied by phasized that these actions by the USA con- 23.X.62 V. ZORIN the Soviet Union to Cuba (we are teletyping stitute a violation of the principle of mari- the full text). time freedom, and pose a serious threat to [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian In the speeches by the delegates from peace and general security. In their speeches, Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- Venezuela and Chile, support was given to they noted the fact that the USA took its tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- the justification of the resolution, approved unilateral actions behind the back of the vided to CWIHP, and on file at National under pressure from the USA, of the Orga- Security Council. Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- nization of American States, which is op- The delegates of the United Arab Re- lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- posed to Cuba. They asserted, following public and Ghana have appealed to the par- sity.] USA crib-notes, that the Soviet arms in Cuba ties involved—the USA, the USSR, and upset the balance of power in the Western Cuba—to resolve the conflict through Telegram from Soviet delegate to the hemisphere, and constitute a threat to the peaceful negotiations, and have jointly in- United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR security of the nations of this area. The del- troduced a draft resolution (transmitted by Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1962, on egates from Venezuela and Chile declared teletype). UN Security Council Meeting of their support for the American draft resolu- The last to speak at today’s meeting 24 October 1962 tion. was the acting Secretary General of the UN, The delegate from Ireland, [Minister U Thant, who read the text of messages he 25 October 1962 for External Affairs Frank] Aiken, recogniz- sent today to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and ing the right of the Cuban nation to decide to Kennedy. In these messages, U Thant pro- On 24 October speeches were deliv- its own fate and to take measures to guaran- posed that for a period of two to three weeks ered in the Security Council by the delegates tee its defense capabilities, expressed regret “all arms provisioning in Cuba be voluntar- from Venezuela, England, Rumania, Ireland, at the same time concerning the fact that the ily suspended, and that all quarantine activ- France, Chile, the United Arab Republic, weaponry installed in Cuba represents huge ity be suspended by the opposing party.” U Ghana, and also by U Thant. nuclear forces that threaten the neighboring Thant expressed his support for the proposal Comrade [Deputy Foreign Minister countries. Aiken appealed for a peaceful that the interested parties meet during this Mircea] Malitza, the delegate from Ruma- settlement by means of negotiations. He period and discuss the situation. He, U nia, fully supported the Soviet Union’s for- declined to express his position with regard Thant, is willing to provide all necessary mulation of the issue of the USA violation to both the American and the Soviet draft services for this purpose, and is at the dis- of the UN Charter and the USA threat to resolutions. posal of the parties involved. peace, and supports with equal conviction The delegates from the United Arab Having learned in the afternoon of the the Security Council draft resolution intro- Republic, [Mahmoud] Riad, and from content of the message to the USSR and the duced by the Soviet Union. Ghana, [Alex] Quaison-Sackey, pointed out USA prepared by U Thant, we told him that The speech of the English delegate, [Sir that they are approaching the issue at hand we considered it incorrect and wrong- Patrick] Dean, supported the false accusa- in light of the principles established by the headed of the acting Secretary General to 286 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

place on the same level a party on one hand will be difficult to count on the approval of lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- that has taken provocative actions and im- a better resolution, since at present a major- sity.] posed a naval blockade, and on the other ity of the Afro-Asian group supports the hand parties that have been engaging in nor- draft put forth by the United Arab Republic Cable from Soviet Ambassador to the mal shipping activity and taking lawful and Ghana. USA A. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign measures for safeguarding their countries’ Proceeding from this point, and bear- Ministry, 25 October 1962 defense. We emphasized that the acting Sec- ing in mind the Cuban government’s views, retary General’s most urgent obligation is we believe that it is possible, when the This night (around 3 o’clock in the to exert necessary pressure on the govern- United Arab Republic and Ghanaian draft morning Washington time) our journalist ment of the USA to make them lift the ille- resolution is voted on, that we, after issuing [half-line deleted—ed.] was at the bar of the gal blockade of the Cuban coast, and end a statement of its shortcomings and weak- press club of Washington where usually their acts of piracy that violate maritime nesses, might abstain from voting on it if it many correspondents gather. freedom. can be passed without our votes (that is, Barman6 approached him [one line Nevertheless, U Thant did not change without the votes of the delegates from the deleted—ed.] and whispered that he had the content of his messages. The text of U USSR and Romania), and vote in favor of it overheard a conversation of two prominent Thant’s message to Comrade N.S. if it fails to win the necessary number of American journalists (Donovan7 and [War- Khrushchev has been teletyped to the Min- votes without our support. ren] Rogers) that the President had suppos- istry of Foreign Affairs. We do not rule out the possibility that edly taken a decision to invade Cuba today Throughout the entire day, delegations Ghana and the United Arab Republic may or tomorrow night. from the neutral countries of Asia and Af- alter their draft resolution, reducing it to an Our correspondent also had an oppor- rica worked on a draft resolution for the appeal to the interested parties to conduct tunity to talk to Rogers, a correspondent of Security Council. We have repeatedly met immediate negotiations towards a settlement the “New York Herald Tribune,” perma- with the delegates from the United Arab of the Caribbean crisis that threatens the nently accredited to the Pentagon. He con- Republic, Ghana, and other countries, ex- general peace. In voting on such a resolu- firmed that report. plaining to them the necessity of including tion we will, having voiced our views on its [Half-line deleted—ed.] there is infor- in the Council resolution a clear demand that shortcomings, take a similar position: in mation that an order has been issued to bring the USA lift its naval blockade and cease its other words, we will abstain from voting if the armed forces into maximum battle readi- other provocative actions against Cuba. the resolution can be approved without our ness including readiness to repulse nuclear The draft resolution introduced by the votes, and we will vote in favor of it if it attack. delegates from the United Arab Republic would not pass without the votes of the We are taking steps to check this in- and Ghana (the text of which has been USSR and Romania. formation. teletyped) nevertheless does not mention In the event that none of the resolu- this directly. The draft resolution proposes tions is approved by the Council, then ob- 25/X/62 A. DOBRYNIN that the acting General Secretary reach an viously an extraordinary special session of agreement without delay with the immedi- the Assembly will have to be convened, [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian ately interested parties regarding the steps which we will not object to. Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- that must urgently be taken to remove the We will act as outlined above unless tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- present threat to peace and to normalize the we receive other instructions. vided to CWIHP, and on file at National Caribbean situation, and it appeals to the The Council meeting will be held on Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- interested parties to “refrain during this pe- 25 October at 4:00 p.m. local time, when lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.] riod from any actions which could directly the vote on the resolution will also take or indirectly aggravate the present situa- place. Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to tion.” It would be valuable if for this occa- Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Although the formulation of this last sion we had the text of the official response Ministry, 25 October 1962 point is vague, the interpretation offered in to U Thant’s message to N. S. Khrushchev, the United Arab Republic and Ghanaian if such a response has been made by that 25 October delgates’ speeches, and the whole tenor of time. their speeches, nevertheless clearly indicate According to available information, the The domestic situation in Cuba with that the gist of that formulation is a demand USA will respond to U Thant’s message in regard to the USA provocations continues for the revocation of the measures an- the next few hours. to remain calm and confident. The mobili- nounced by Kennedy. Despite the shortcom- 25.X.62 V. ZORIN zation of the popular militia and the station- ings of the draft, it must be noted that, if ing of military units have been successfully approved, it would significantly limit the [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian completed. The industrial and commercial USA’s capacity to carry out the blockade and Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- centers of the country are operating nor- its other aggressions against Cuba. tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- mally. We are also taking into account that, if vided to CWIHP, and on file at National A special business-like efficiency and the matter is transferred to the Assembly, it Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- energy can be observed among the Cuban COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 287 leaders and people. At meetings and gath- avoidance of unnecessary conflicts. Castro, opinion that steps undertaken by the erings there is almost no trace of the osten- for example, approves of the fact that sev- Kennedy administration regarding Cuba had tation and verbosity that are characteristic eral of our vessels have turned back from been dictated by the desire to stop the gen- of Cubans. The awareness of an immediate their courses, and thus have not given occa- erally unfavorable for the USA develop- threat has brought the Cuban people even sion for any major conflicts. ments in the world and to try to reestablish closer, and has strengthened their hatred of At the same time Castro, in the course the status-quo which had existed at the mo- American imperialism. of conversations with our military experts, ment of the meeting between N.S. The Soviet Union’s authority has has expressed a belief in the necessity of Khrushchev and Kennedy in Vienna last climbed to unprecedented heights. The ac- shooting down one or two piratic American year. Risk, entailed with these steps made tions of the USSR government in its defense planes over Cuban territory. by Kennedy’s administration, is outweighed, of Cuba are completely convincing the Unverifiable information has been re- in his view, by those unfavorable conse- people of the failure of the American provo- ceived by us and the Czechs from unverifi- quences for the USA military-strategic situ- cations. The whole country is preparing to able sources on the possibility of an inter- ation, which would appear in the case of the rebuff the aggressors. Committees for the ventionist landing or a bombing of Cuban placing in Cuba of Soviet medium and long- defense of the revolution are establishing, military targets on 26-27 October. The lead- range missiles. in every city neighborhood, in factories, on ership has taken this information into con- 2. Regarding how far the Kennedy ad- the national estates and institutions, first- sideration, but is not taking it very seriously. ministration is ready to go against Cuba, the aid brigades offering immediate help to the The situation in the Soviet colony is following impression has been forming. wounded. Volunteer brigades are on the alert normal. All necessary measures have been Judging from available data, the ad- for profiteers, and are prohibiting the pur- taken for a possible exacerbation of the situ- ministration sets itself, as a minimal aim, chase of excessive quantities of goods in ation. the object of not allowing the emplacement stores. 25.X.62 ALEKSEEV in Cuba the aforementioned missile launch- Militia observation posts have been ers. Meanwhile, according to some sources, placed on all streets. There are no signs of [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian whose reports still need additional check- panic, and no false alarmist rumors are be- Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- ing, the possibility is discussed—in case of ing spread. tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- not achieving that aim by other means—to The domestic counterrevolution has vided to CWIHP, and on file at National destroy the missile launchers in Cuba un- fallen completely silent, and has not yet Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- der construction by a massive air-raid of shown any signs of activity. lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- American aviation. It is necessary to men- The nation is anxiously awaiting the sity.] tion that, according to all reports, the Ameri- first clashes between Soviet steamers and cans are not aware of exact numbers and the American ships constituting the block- Cable from Soviet Ambassador to the kinds of our missile weapons in Cuba. This ade. USA A. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign circumstance makes them rather nervous. The arrival yesterday and today of two Ministry, 25 October 1962 3. The most militant line in the USA Soviet steamers in Cuban ports without se- administration still is held by [Attorney rious complications was met with great re- The situation in Washington remains General] R. Kennedy, [Secretary of Defense lief. tense and complicated. At the same time, Robert S.] McNamara, [National Security Secretary General U Thant’s appeal, today in political and diplomatic circles and Adviser McGeorge] Bundy and military and Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s response in the comments of American press, radio, men, who insist on a firm approach with the to it and to Bertrand Russell, were com- and television, began appearing rays of hope purpose of destroying the missile bases in mented upon here as events of the greatest for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban issue Cuba, not even stopping at invasion of the importance. and they are related to the quiet, restrained island. [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and Meanwhile the radio and newspapers behavior of the Soviet government and its [Secretary of the Treasury Douglas] Dillon attribute great significance to [Soviet De- readiness for negotiations with the USA (it are now holding a somewhat restrained and fense Minister] Marshal R.Ya. Malinsky’s is necessary to mention that the Embassy is more cautious position, though they also speech. receiving quite a number of cables and let- favor continued pressure upon us. Moreover, Fidel Castro finds great sig- ters from ordinary Americans in which they In this regard the course of the discus- nificance in the emergence of a movement express their gratitude to the Soviet govern- sion inside the administration of the for solidarity with Cuba, especially in the ment and N.S. Khrushchev for their posi- President’s response to U Thant’s appeal [of countries of Latin America. tion in the current situation). October 24; see above] seems significant. It is his view that the USA’s current Nevertheless, prevailing here are the According to our information, the first group insane actions against Cuba provide firm expectations for further mounting of crisis was insisting on a categorical rejection of ground for the further expansion of this in the relations between the USA and the that appeal. Such an answer had been al- movement, which will be able to force the USSR over Cuba. In addition to our previ- ready elaborated and it was even supposed Americans to rethink their plans. ous considerations currently we would like to be transmitted to the largest information He approves of our policy of not giv- to say the following: agencies. But at the last moment (around ing in to provocations, and of the possibile 1. It is becoming daily stronger the 12 o’clock midnight) the President inclined 288 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

to the current, more flexible, [version] pre- Members of the diplomatic corps who Telgram from Soviet delegate to the pared by Rusk. in these days have visited other parts of the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR The President is vacillating right now, country, relate that at the beginning many Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1962 but, judging from everything, especially the people in those locations, especially in the principal direction of USA policy, he is western states, perceived Kennedy’s speech 25 October 1962 heeding the first group, particularly, his of October 22 as a pre-election maneuver, brother. A certain danger of the situation is but now the mood has changed. People, We have been informed that U Thant that the President has largely engaged him- among them those who even not long ago has declared his intention to meet succes- self before the public opinion of America were saying that it was “necessary to do sively with the Americans, us, and the Cu- and not only America. In essence, he, as a something to Castro,” now are badly fright- bans on 26 October. He has proposed meet- hot-tempered gambler, has put at stake his ened about what may be the outcome. ing with us at 4:30 p.m. Eastern Standard reputation as a statesman and politician, and Noticeably fewer people can be seen Time; before that he is meeting with thus his prospects for re-election in 1964, on Washington streets. Government offices Stevenson, and after us with Garcia- what—being an ambitious man—he pas- are working until late at night. Preoccupa- Inchaustegui. We will agree to this first sionately seeks. This is why it is not pos- tion over the possibility of a major war is meeting with U Thant. sible to exclude completely the possibility sensed in business circles too, and it is re- In our talks with U Thant we will trans- that he can, especially taking into consider- flected in sharp ups and downs of actions mit Comrade N. S. Khrushchev’s response ation his circle, undertake such an on the New York stock exchange. to the former’s message, and Khrushchev’s adventurist step as an invasion of Cuba. African embassies warned their stu- response to Kennedy and Russell as well. 4. Of course, it is difficult to draw a dents at American universities to be ready We understand Comrade N.S. final conclusion whether there will be such for evacuation home. Khrushchev’s response to U Thant to be an invasion or not. In the “war of nerves”, 6. In general it is necessary to say that saying that the Soviet Union agrees with U which now is going on, the elements of different sources in the journalist and dip- Thant’s proposal in its goal of holding pre- disinformation, for sure, can play a role. In lomatic corps in Washington agree that cur- liminary negotiations— allowing the inter- this regard it is necessary to mention that rently the probability of a USA armed in- ested parties to meet for a peaceful settle- the USA administration has undertaken un- tervention against Cuba is great. They con- ment of the crisis and for a normalization of usual measures of control over the press. In sider that the Kennedy administration needs the situation in the Caribbean area. This in- essence an unofficial censorship has been only a plausible excuse to “justify” such an cludes, on the part of the Soviet Union, the introduced in great measure. Immediate action. In this regard it calls attention to the voluntary suspension for 2 to 3 weeks of “conducting” [guidance—ed.] of the press strong underlining (in the evening edition arms stockpiling in Cuba, and, on the part on the part of the Kennedy administration papers and radio transmissions) of the as- of the USA, the voluntary suspension for has been strengthened. For example, ac- sertions as if in Cuba the construction of the same period of its “quarantine” activity, cording to confidential data, today Rusk has missile sites is rapidly proceeding. including the inspection of ships bound for summoned the most important American The majority of sources agree that the Cuba. journalists and told [them] that that the ten- nearest future days will be most critical, in- To judge from Kennedy’s response, the dency [that has] just appeared in some pa- sofar as they consider that if the USA finds USA is attempting to put forth as the basis pers to show some decrease of tension (in themselves [itself] involved in negotiations of its negotiations its demand for the re- connection with the first Soviet tanker which or diplomatic discussions of the whole is- moval of “offensive weaponry” from Cuba. has passed through the blockade) did not sue, then it will be difficult to carry out an For this reason we should expect that meet the requirements of the moment and invasion because of political considerations. the Americans will not agree to the suspen- the real state of affairs. The USA adminis- In this regard, as it is recognized nearly by sion of “quarantine” activity unless this de- tration as before is fully resolved to achieve everybody here, a very important role is mand of theirs is met. by “whatever means” the liquidation of the played by the self-possessed and construc- We of course firmly reject any attempts missile bases in Cuba,—underscored Rusk. tive position of the Soviet government, by the USA to impose stipulations either on He also refuted several reports about USA which is restraining futher broadening of the us or on Cuba. In this matter we will pro- readiness to “exchange” Soviet bases in conflict, restraining the hottest heads in ceed from the condition that negotiations can Cuba for American bases in other countries, Washington. only be conducted on the basis of U Thant’s for example in Turkey (in this regard Rusk proposal, that is on the basis of the point criticized today’s article by [Walter] 25/X/62 A. DOBRYNIN about suspending arms stockpiling in Cuba, Lippmann). a proposal which the neutral countries sup- 5. Apparently, in order to force the at- [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian port. mosphere, there are transmitted (on radio, Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- The possibility cannot be ruled out that TV and through the press) reports from dif- tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- U Thant, under American influence, is at- ferent states about bringing to full readiness vided to CWIHP, and on file at National tempting to put forth as a primary measure the systems of civil defense, antinuclear Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- the proposals made by him in his second shelters, about food and emergency pur- lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.] message to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, es- chases by the population. pecially the one stipulating that Soviet ves- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 289 sels bound for Cuba keep away from the intend to attack Cuba, but that now it had fact that once again his proposal had been interception area for a certain period of time, broken their promise. approved. After this, U Thant told us that and that the USA for the duration of that To this U Thant responded that for this tonight he had received a response to his same period avoid immediate encounters reason it is necessary to specify what guar- second message from Kennedy as well, and between their ships and Soviet vessels. In antees should be made by the USA to as- at our insistence he provided us with the text this event we will declare that U Thant’s sure that it will not take any antagonistic of that response (after he had submitted this proposal, which is the basis on which all the actions against Cuba, and asked Garcia- disclosure to the approval of the USA lega- interested parties have agreed to conduct ne- Inchaustegui to explain the views of the tion, and after receiving our consent to his gotiations, goes above and beyond the “pri- Cuban government on this matter. disclosing to the USA legation the content mary measures” that he put forth in his sec- 2. The head of the Brazilian delegation, of our own response). ond message. [Alfonso] Arinos [de Melo Franco], has We are communicating the text of Since the forthcoming meeting with U worked out a draft resolution on the de- Kennedy’s response as a separate telegram. Thant is a preliminary one and raises the nuclearization of Latin America and Africa U Thant presented us with the possi- issue of further negotiations, including a under the observation of a monitoring com- bility of his immediate publication of both conclusive normalization of the whole situ- mittee (we will send this as a separate tele- his messagees to N.S. Khrushchev and to ation in the Caribbean region, we ask to be gram). In a conversation with Garcia- Kennedy, and of both responses given to briefed on your decision as to the level, Inchaustegui, Arinos expressed his view that those messagees by the USSR and the USA. form, and direction of further negotiations. approving this resolution would allow Cuba He led us to understand that a comparison If there are supplementary instructions to “avoid humiliation” if it is forced to re- of both responses would show the world for the first meeting with U Thant, we ask nounce the construction of missile bases. community that the Soviet Union, unlike the you to take into consideration the meeting According to Garcia-Inchaustegui, this USA, was continuing to aim for support of time proposed by U Thant. draft resolution has received great currency peace and the prevention of war. among the Latin American countries, and We responded to the effect that we were 25.X.62 V. ZORIN the delegates from the Latin American con- not yet authorized to agree to the publica- tingents who met with U Thant this evening tion of N.S. Khrushchev’s response, and [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian should discuss the draft with the acting Sec- would give him an answer later. Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- retary General. We believe it would be expedient to tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- Garcia-Inchaustegui told the Brazilian give our consent to the publication of the vided to CWIHP, and on file at National himself that, in his personal opinion, it documents mentioned. Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- would be better that the issue of the elimi- Today at 16:00 there will be a meeting lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- nation of all foreign military bases in Latin between Stevenson and U Thant. At 18:00 sity.] America be brought up, since then such a Eastern Standard Time we are once again formulation would include the base at meeting with U Thant, and if we do not re- Telegram from Soviet delegate to the Guantanamo as well. ceive other instructions by that time, we will United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR give our consent to the publication of N. S. Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962 26.X.62 V. ZORIN Khrushchev’s second response.

26 October 1962 [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian 26.X.62 V. ZORIN Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- The Cuban delegate, Garcia- tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Inchaustegui, met with U Thant on 26 Oc- vided to CWIHP, and on file at National Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- tober, at which time U Thant entrusted him Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- to deliver to Havana a message from him to lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- vided to CWIHP, and on file at National Fidel Castro (we are sending this as a sepa- sity.] Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- rate telegram). lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- In the conversation with Garcia- Telegram from Soviet delegate to the sity.] Inchaustegui, U Thant, who had informed United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR him of the correspondence between U Thant Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962 Telegram from Soviet delegate to the and Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, and Presi- United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR dent Kennedy as well, expressed his ideas Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962 for using Dorticos’s proposal of 8 October in the General Assembly as a way to achieve 26 October 1962 26 October 1962 a lasting normalization of the Caribbean basin situation. The Cuban reminded U I delivered N.S. Khrushchev’s response On the evening of 26 October we Thant that Dorticos in his speech had em- to U Thant’s second message (at 13:00 lo- ([Platon] Morozov and I) met with U Thant, phasized the extenuating circumstance that cal time). in the presence of [UN Under Secretary for the USA had already declared that it did not U Thant expressed satisfaction with the Special Political Affairs Chakravanthi V.] 290 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Narasiman, [UN official Omar] Loutfi, bound for, or in the ports of, their destina- We emphasized that it is necessary to [Military Advisor to the UN Secretary-Gen- tions. act quickly, since our ships cannot remain eral Brig.-] General [Indar J.] Rikhye, and, We declared to U Thant that the Ameri- on the open sea for an indefinite period of on our request, Comrade [E.D.] Kiselev. can proposal was at odds with U Thant’s time, and since the situation cannot be al- After giving our consent to the publication own proposal, and shows that the USA, un- lowed to get out of control. U Thant said of N.S. Khrushchev’s response to U Thant’s like the Soviet Union, is not ready to agree that he would do all he could, although he second message, U Thant immediately re- to that proposal. We remarked that in giv- asks us as well to think of measures that leased for publication both his message and ing consent to U Thant’s proposal, the So- would be favorably received by the USA. the responses to them by the Soviet Union viet Union was taking a highly important At the end of the conversation, U Thant and the USA. In so doing, U Thant again step toward preserving the peace. We said that today he had presented the Cuban emphasized that now the whole world would pointed out that the Soviet Union would delegate to the UN with the message, to be be again convinced that the Soviet Union is stick to its obligations with unconditional conveyed to Castro, in which he asked that positively and constructively working to- steadfastness if an agreemnt was reached on missile installation work in Cuba, which wards the peace initiative that it undertook, the basis of U Thant’s own proposal. No according to reports received by him from and he also asked to convey his thanks to checks on this are needed, not only because the Americans continues day and night, be the Soviet government and personally to of what has been put forth, but also because suspended for the 2 to 3 week period that is N.S. Khrushchev for the speedy and posi- if the arms provisioning continued, it would necessary for negotiations. tive response to his second message. not be hard to detect anyway. For this rea- In response to our question about what U Thant said furthermore that son, the Americans’ push for the above- plans U Thant had concerning the basis upon Kennedy’s reponse to his second message mentioned proposal proves that they are which a conclusive settlement would be at- was not as clear as N.S. Khrushchev’s re- looking for a pretext for not fulfilling the tainable, U Thant answered that he found sponse. Nevertheless U Thant noted that, as very agreement that would facilitate a con- the key to this in Dorticos’s speech to the he sees it, an agreement has been reached at clusive settlement. General Assembly on 8 October of this year, the present moment between the Soviet We also noted that while the USA is in which the latter announced that if the USA Union and the USA which, although for only advancing a new proposal that complicates were to give effective guarantees that they a short period (2 to 5 days, as he put it), matters, they themselves are continuing to will not undertake a military invasion of ensures the possibility of avoiding danger- prepare intensively for an invasion of Cuba. Cuba, and will not aid its invasion by any- ous encounters on the open sea. In this way, If we are to talk about UN observation, then one else, it would not be necessary for Cuba a situation will be created in which further we must first of all demand an immediate to take military measures, or even to main- steps can be taken towards the lessening of end to that sort of military preparation tain its army. tensions. against Cuba, which threatens the general U Thant said that today he had ex- Stevenson today announced to U Thant peace. plained his point of view to Stevenson, and that the USA was prepared to approve U We noted as well that we cannot enter that the latter had promised to inform Thant’s proposal contained in his first mes- discussions about what actions may be taken Kennedy about it. sage (concerning the cessation for 2 to 3 on Cuban territory, since that is a matter for In conclusion, we arranged with U weeks of arms stockpiling in Cuba, and the the Cuban government alone to decide. But Thant that he inform the Americans of our USA’s simultaneous suspension of block- the forms of monitoring proposed would conversation, and agreed that our forthcom- ade activities), on the proviso that measures constitute an obvious interference in the ing meeting would be contingent upon how would be taken to guarantee that ships ar- domestic affairs of Cuba. events unfold. riving in Cuba (Soviet ships, as well as U Thant said that he understood all this At the next meeting, if we do not re- freight vessels) are not supplying any weap- personally, and that he firmly believed that ceive other instructions, we will continue onry during this this period. the Soviet Union would keep its word. to push for the provisional agreement on the U Thant explained that the satisfaction Nonetheless it is clear that the USA is act- 2 to 3 week period, based on U Thant’s pro- of this demand, either in this way or in some ing as it is in order to justify before Ameri- posal that was approved in Comrade N. S. other fashion, is a very important issue for can public opinion its refusal to take the Khrushchev’s response, without the supple- American public opinion. It would be pos- appropriate blockade measures that have mentary conditions advanced by the USA. sible to discuss a particular procedure for been announced. maritime traffic, or for particular ports of We told U Thant that the Soviet Union 26.X.62 V. ZORIN call in Cuba, whereby for example UN del- has already approved two of his proposals, egates from neutral countries, selected by proceeding in such a way as to frustrate the [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian agreement, or representatives of the Inter- American provocation that threatens the Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- national Red Cross might one way or an- peace, and also that it is now up to U Thant, tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- other ascertain that vessels arriving in Cuba in his capacity as acting General Secretary vided to CWIHP, and on file at National are not carrying arms. He implied that the of the UN, to exert the necessary pressure Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- Americans would apparently be satisfied on the USA with the aim of reaching a pro- lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- with a simple procedure, and would not de- visional agreement for 2 to 3 weeks, based sity.] mand searches or inspections of vessels on the initial proposal of U Thant himself. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 291

Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- former obligations. Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to vided to CWIHP, and on file at National Castro believes that the publication Cuba Alekseev, 27 October 1962 Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- tomorrow of the full text of the letter will lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.] disperse these doubts, and he will take the 27 October 1962 first opportunity to explain its main content Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to in a way that is accessible to the public. You should urgently meet comrade Fi- Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign After receiving Comrade N.S. Khrush- del Castro and, quoting instructions of the Ministry, 27 October 1962 chev’s letter and your report, Castro began Soviet government, say the following: to assess the situation more calmly and re- “It is considered in Moscow that com- 27 October alistically, believing that the opportunity had rade Fidel Castro should urgently make a arrived for a peaceful settlement of the Cu- statement in support of the proposals of the We have met with Fidel Castro and ban conflict. He nevertheless continues to Soviet government listed in the message Dorticos, and have informed them of what believe that the danger of sudden attack still from N.S. Khrushchev to President Kennedy you communicated in your telegram. exists as before. of October 27. Castro said that the Cuban leaders Castro told how a U-2 airplane had It would be also advisable to give a would discuss the form and substance of his been shot down from an altitude of 21 kilo- quick answer to the appeal from U Thant statement on the issues broached by you, and meters, and that the Cuban military powers and underline in that response that there are that this would be done in the briefest pos- had collected its fragments and the corpse no works in Cuba on construction of mili- sible time. of its pilot. tary units - the issue mentioned in the ap- The letter to U Thant, they said, has Meanwhile it has been announced in peal by U Thant. In addition, in the letter to already been sent, and for that reason the the newspapers that an invading plane of U Thant it should be also advisable to voice issue you put forth would be explained in unkown nationality has been shot down. support for the proposals of the Soviet gov- Fidel Castro’s speech. According to American press reports, USA ernment espoused in the aforementioned Castro and Dorticos declared that the military forces have acknowledged the message from N.S. Khrushchev. only difficult point would be finding an ap- plane’s downing, and have brought to a state Regarding the communication (deliv- propriate form for the declaration of the pro- of readiness a formation of paratroopers ered by comrades Fidel Castro and Oswaldo hibition on special arms installation projects, amounting to 14,000 men, which is alleg- Dorticos to comrade Alekseev) that accord- since the Americans are following the edly intended to be launched over Cuba. ing to the available data an armed Ameri- progress of those projects with the help of Castro said that in the event of such an can intervention in Cuba is imminent, we reconnaissance flights, and know a lot about attack, full fire would be turned against the would like to say that our last action of Oc- them. aggressor, and that he was sure of success. tober 27 is intended precisely to interrupt They said that an appropriate form During this conversation I informed Castro the past or present USA preparations, if in- would nonetheless be found, and that a likely and Dorticos in an appropriate way of the deed your information about the threat of condition would be a prohibition on similiar content of your letter, telling him that in the an invasion was correct. projects in Guantanamo base as well. present circumstances it would not be fit- It is almost impossible for the Ameri- Referring to Comrade N.S. Khrush- ting to aggravate the situation and initiate cans to launch an adventurist invasion of chev’s letter to Kennedy of 27 October, provocations. Cuba, using their armed forces, in response Castro said that it had been composed with Castro said that he understood the cru- to our steps, undertaken in connection with great diplomatic skill, and that it would have cial nature of these actions, but that, con- U Thant’s initiative, particularly in reponse a huge influence on global public opinion. sidering the rise in the army’s martial spirit to our last action. They know very well that Moreover it puts the USA government and the Americans’ warning, our friends if under present circumstances they were to in a difficult position, and exposes the ille- were compelled to take such a step. start an intervention it would brand them as gality of its actions. aggressors and hold them up to shame as Castro supposes that the USA will not 27.X.62 ALEKSEEV enemies of peace imitating the worst pat- agree to the elimination of bases in Turkey, terns of Hitlerian perfidy.”8 which will make it easier to justify before [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian You should inform comrade Pavlov [a public opinion the presence of special weap- Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- pseudonym for USSR Gen. Issa A. Pliyev, onry in Cuba. tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- commander of Soviet forces in Cuba] about Castro said, however, that concise in- vided to CWIHP, and on file at National our advice to the Cuban friends. formation supplied by the agency and the Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- Wire the report on the fulfillment of evening newspaper on the basic content of lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- these instructions. this letter brought about symptoms of a cer- sity.] tain confusion in various sectors of the Cu- A. GROMYKO ban population and among some members Telegram from Soviet delegate to the of the military. A number of officers have United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian spoken to him about it, asking whether it Foreign Ministry, 27 October 1962 Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- constitutes a rejection by the USSR of its 292 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

27 October 1962 We again asserted our negative view clashes in the very first days after the Ameri- of the USA demands that go beyond the can provocation. Now they have started to On 27 October I visited U Thant and bounds of U Thant’s proposal, and we in- say that the settlement of the conflict is gave him Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s let- sisted that he exert the necessary pressure mainly a concern for the USSR and the ter of 27 October, as well as a copy of the on the Americans to make them adopt his USA, that smaller countries cannot advise message to Kennedy of the same date. plan. In all respects it was clear that in the great powers on what they should do, and U Thant said that he would study the last 24 hours U Thant under American pres- so on. documents attentively, and that he hoped sure had not taken the necessary measures We will continue to exert pressure on they would prove to be a constructive con- in that direction, and that he intended to win U Thant and the UN delegates from the neu- tribution to the resolution of the problem. consent, if only from the Cubans, for estab- tral countries (in particular, we had a con- U Thant then informed me that around lishing a procedure that to some degree at versation today to this effect with the del- noon today Stevenson had visited him and least could be considered to guarantee that egate from the United Arab Republic in the told him about N.S. Khrushchev’s message ships arriving in the next 2 to 3 weeks in Security Council) with the aim of persuad- to Kennedy of 26 October of this year. Cuba are not carrying arms. We expressed ing them to support the Soviet proposals, Stevenson did not leave U Thant the text of our dissatisfaction with that course of af- and of exerting pressure on the USA and its this message, saying that Kennedy had not fairs, and stressed the importance of imme- allies. authorized him to do so. diately winning approval for this procedure It would be expedient to give U Thant It must however be noted that, as in order to avert the threat of armed encoun- the text of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s Stevenson told U Thant, Kennedy is exam- ter, after which any further negotiations message to Kennedy of 26 October, since ining this message in a positive and benevo- would be rendered impossible. Stevenson has already informed him about lent frame of mind. Stevenson also let a U Thant said that he shared our con- it, albeit in his own interpretation. mistake pass when giving an account of the cern, and would take action. We request your consent. 26 October message to U Thant, declaring U Thant tried (honoring Stevenson’s that this message allegedly says that the request) to give us the USA legation’s letter 27.X.62 V. ZORIN Soviet Union is prepared to remove all its to the Soviet government, which contained missiles, missile launch pads, and warheads a description of the blockade area around [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian from Cuba. Cuba, on the pretext that N.S. Khrushchev’s Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- We indicated that the message made response to U Thant’s second message al- tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- no mention of such points, but we declined legedly contains an agreement to avoid vided to CWIHP, and on file at National to discuss the matter, pleading our lack of clashes between Soviet vessels and the Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- authorization to do so. American naval ships carrying out the lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- U Thant asked us to convey to him, if blockade, and because they claim that it is sity.] possible, the text of the above-mentioned important to know which areas are forbid- message of 26 October in order to take it den. We refused to accept this letter on the Telegram from USSR Foreign Ministry into account when he examines N.S. grounds that, as is well known, the Soviet to Soviet diplomats in Washington, Khrushchev’s message of 27 October. government considers the blockade illegal Havana, and New York, Later we asked what U Thant had ac- (in this we were bearing in mind the fact 28 October 1962 complished in the past 24 hours by way of that in Moscow similar notes from the USA progress towards the provisional agreement, were also returned). U Thant said that he SOVIET EMBASSY WASHINGTON for 2 to 3 weeks, based on the proposal ap- would give the indicated letter back to SOVIET EMBASSY HAVANA proved by the Soviet Union (whereby the Stevenson. Copy: New York USSR suspends arms stockpiling in Cuba, (The letter indicated that the blockade To Comrades Kuznetsov, Zorin and the USA suspends its blockade activi- area includes: the region with its center in ties). Havana and with a radius of 500 nautical On 27 October of this year, the USA U Thant responded that he had not yet miles, and the region with its center in Cape consul in Moscow sent a letter to the Minis- discussed that matter with Stevenson again, Maisi on the eastern extremity of Cuba and try of Foreign Affairs telling of the proce- and was waiting for Cuba’s response to his with a radius of 500 nautical miles as well.) dure introduced by the USA government 26 October message on the suspension of U Thant gave us the letter in which he with regard to the so-called quarantine, a missile-base construction. He again reiter- expresses his sincere thanks to N.S. procedure that will be carried out abroad by ated that the USA was very concerned that Khrushchev for his very constructive 26 USA consulate officials, and within the work there, including the assembly of bomb- October response to U Thant’s message of United States by customs personnel. ers, is proceeding day and night. “After re- 25 October of this year. In accordance with this procedure, for- ceiving the Cuban response,” U Thant said, It should be noted that the UN del- eign ships bound for Cuba or in transit in- “I intend to put before Cuba the possibility egates from the neutral countries, like the side the interception area are required to of creating some monitoring device (in ports United Arab Republic and Ghana, have be- present to the USA customs official a “Tran- of call) for ascertaining that ships arriving gun to calm down a bit in recent days, since sit Notification” or a “Certificate of the in Cuba are not carrying arms.” Soviet efforts were able to avert dangerous Completion of Customs Formalities.” COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 293

Samples of the above-mentioned docu- a request before U Thant to organize the visit trip to Cuba and granting him [and] accom- ments were appended to the letter. so that UN representatives could conduct an panying aides and experts an opportunity to On 28 October of this year, the USA on-site inspection on the cessation of the see themselves that work on creating launch- embassy forwarded to the Ministry of For- construction projects mentioned above. ers, characterized by Americans as offen- eign Affairs the text of the letter that In doing so, said U Thant, Stevenson sive weapons, had stopped. Stevenson gave U Thant concerning the in- emphasized in various ways that if these Moscow adheres to the opinion that U terception areas for vessels. projects had not been stopped, then the USA Thant should be given a positive answer to Both documents have been returned to would take new actions. In response to his appeal. If the Cuban friends share this the American embassy. Garcia-Inchaustegui’s question as to what view we shall inform comrade Pavlov This is conveyed for purposes of intel- this would mean concretely, Stevenson re- [Pliyev] and give him corresponding instruc- ligence and familiarization. ferred, said U Thant, to the strengthening tions about access to launchers for U Thant of the blockade and to a USA demand for and accompanying persons. (illegibly signed) the convocation of the Security Council. As is generally known, U Thant made According to U Thant, Stevenson also a proposal so that representatives of the In- [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian said that Kennedy is examining with great ternational Red Cross (IRC) were allowed Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- earnestness and urgency the idea put forward to visit Soviet ships going to Cuba in order tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- by Dorticos in his 8 October speech before to ascertain that there are no weapons, seen vided to CWIHP, and on file at National the General Assembly as the basis for a by the American administration as offensive. Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- settlement. We sent instructions to our representatives lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- U Thant then put before the Cubans the to the UN in order to give consent to that sity.] matter of the establishing of some proce- suggestion, bearing in mind that transpor- dure that would help ascertain that vessels tation of the IRC to the Soviet ships will Telegram from Soviet delegate to the arriving in Cuba in the next 2 to 3 weeks also be done on Soviet vessels or ships of United Nations Zorin to USSR Foreign are not supplying arms. neutral countries. Ministry, 28 October 1962, on meeting With regard to the issue of Comrade We would like to inform you that ships with Cuban delegate to the UN Garcia- N.S. Khrushchev’s message of 27 October, going to Cuba right now do not carry any Inchaustegui on 27 October 1962 U Thant declared that the formulation con- weapons.” tained in it appears to him a positive one. Telegraph the report on the fulfillment 28 October 1962 2. Garcia-Inchaustegui informed us of these instructions. that at 20:30 Eastern Standard Time he heard 1. The UN delegate from Cuba, Garcia- a Cuban radio broadcast from Havana about A. GROMYKO Inchaustegui, has conveyed the following the downing by Cuban coastal batteries of information about his meeting with U Thant an American plane that had invaded Cuban [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian on 27 October. air space. Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- U Thant expressed gratitude for the tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- invitation to visit Cuba that had been ex- 28.X.62 V. ZORIN vided to CWIHP, and on file at National tended to him; he valued it as a highly im- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- portant step, and on 28 October promised [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.] to give a definitive answer. Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- My visit to Cuba, the presence of UN tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- III. THE AFTERMATH: representatives there, declared U Thant, vided to CWIHP, and on file at National 28 OCTOBER-10 DECEMBER 1962 would help avert American aggression Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- against Cuba, since the USA could not carry lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- Cable from USSR Ambassador to Cuba out an attack while he was there. sity.] Alekseev to Soviet Ministry of Foreign U Thant said that in the event that he Affairs, 28 October 1962 decides to go, he would intend to take sev- Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister eral aides and experts along with him. Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to 28 October 1962 U Thant also asked whether the gov- Cuba Alekseev, 28 October 1962 ernment of Cuba (in the event of his group’s Due to F. Castro’s absence from Ha- journey to Havana) could, on its own initia- 28 October 1962 vana and according to his instructions, I gave tive, and not because they were official ob- both letters to President Dorticos.9 In my servers, invite U Thant to see first hand You should meet comrade Fidel Castro presence Dorticos called Castro and in- whether the construction of missile launch and tell him the following: formed him in a prearranged form that the pads and the assembly of bombers had been “In Moscow they have received infor- letters had been received. Castro promised suspended. mation from comrade Zorin regarding U to meet me on his return. Before this, U Thant had told Garcia- Thant’s proposal to the Cuban representa- Upon several statements and Dorticos’ Inchaustegui that Stevenson today had put tive at the UN about the possibility of his reaction to N.S. Khrushchev’s letter to F. 294 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Castro and to the latest message to Kennedy Dorticos considers that the Americans, regards Kennedy’s assurances and is con- about the dismantling of special weaponry probably, will not stop at our consent to dis- vinced that the Americans will go further it became clear that confusion and bewil- mantle bases of special weapons and will and put forward new demands. derment are reigning inside the Cuban lead- demand additional concessions, in particu- In my conversations with Dorticos and ership. lar, the withdrawal of all the [Soviet] mili- Rodriguez I said that, in my view, the deci- Dorticos said that, unfortunately, Cu- tary units. sion on dismantling those installations did ban and Latin American peoples would per- He also showed concern about possible not interfere with Cuban defensive interests. ceive the decision to dismantle the special solution of the question of the remaining in It will not only save universal peace and weaponry, relying only upon Kennedy’s as- Cuba of our military specialists and the de- ensure its strengthening, but this decision surances, as a defeat for the Soviet govern- fensive weapons at their disposal, attached of the Soviet Government will eliminate the ment. for the defense of military objectives. threat of invasion to Cuba and make it more He said that whatever assertions Dorticos didn’t say it openly, but per- difficult in the future. Kennedy made, the Cuban government mitted me to understand that the Cubans Regarding the issue of the incompre- could not weaken its vigilance. were not happy with our decision [to remove hension of this decision by the politically We understand, declared Dorticos, that the missiles under UN inspection] under- literate groups of the population, I said that this decision of the Soviet government is taken without previously consulting them. this phenomenon had to be very short and directed to the preserving of peace and in I told them that the small delay [in pro- the people itself would understand the wis- the end it will be advantageous for the whole viding] the letter [from Khrushchev to dom of the decision and thus raise its politi- socialist camp, including Cuba, but under Kennedy] was due to merely technical rea- cal maturity. We are confident that Dorticos, the present conditions of great patriotic en- sons (enciphering, transmission, translation) Rodriguez, F. Castro and the majority of the thusiasm of our people this report would be and made the assumption that insofar as the [Cuban] leaders will understand correctly perceived by infinitely electrified masses as Cuban comrades had several times informed our decision and we will find a common lan- a cold shower. Moscow about the inevitability of [U.S.] guage with them. Indeed, there are diffi- He said that for the Cuban leaders the intervention and bombings, probably, some culties to explain it to the people, insofar as most important thing right now is to pre- quick and operational actions were needed, it has been excited beyond limits by anti- serve the Soviet Union’s prestige, which had so there was no time for coordinations. American propaganda, but we consider that been raised so high in Cuba. Dorticos agreed. there will not be serious consequences and According to him, the counterrevolu- After my visit to Dorticos, Carlos the nearest future will prove the correctness tion will immediately seize this opportunity Rafael Rodriguez came to see me (he was of our decision. and direct all its work to revive distrust to- informed by Dorticos about the content of ward the Soviet Union. the letter from N.S. Khrushchev to Fidel 28/X/62 A. ALEKSEEV Here, said Dorticos, we must rise to the Castro) and presented a dismal picture of occasion in order to explain correctly to our incomprehension among the Cuban people [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian people the meaning of the adopted decisions. and several leaders of our decision to dis- Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- He declared that under the created cir- mantle the special installations. tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- cumstances the Cubans were obliged to pub- He said that a lot of people think that vided to CWIHP, and on file at National lish a statement, differing in tone from N.S. all our specialists and their weapons would Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- Khrushchev’s letter, and there was suggested be withdrawn and they were taking it hard. lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.] a preliminary acceptance by the Americans According to C.R. Rodriguez, F. Castro of the five [Cuban] conditions, including has also reacted very painfully regarding this Memorandum of Conversation between evacuation of the Guantanamo base. (trans- decision—and not the content of the deci- Soviet Foreign Ministry A.A. Gromyko mitted to TASS) sion itself because he considered it to be and Cuban Ambassador to the USSR Besides, Dorticos explained, we found advantageous for mankind and the Cuban Carlos Olivares Sanchez, ourselves in a difficult situation insofar as people—but the procedure of its adoption— 29 October 1962 we had officially declared that we would not without a previous consultation. allow any UN observers on our territory. Particularly, he said, Dorticos had a 29 October 1962 Until a certain time we will have to presentiment that Castro’s dissatisfaction stick to this “maximum program” and seek would be caused by the phrase that the text At the request of Olivares Sanchez [I] ways of achieving an honorable agreement of the response to Kennedy was being trans- received him at 16.00. [4 p.m.] which could be reached only if we receive mitted by radio. The Ambassador asked [me] to inform from the USA absolute guarantees of our C.R. Rodriguez explained that F. him about our assessment of the interna- security. Castro was defending our decision in con- tional situation created as a result of the na- According to Dorticos, no Kennedy versations with the Cuban leaders, trying to val blockade around Cuba, announced by statements could be trusted inasmuch as convince them that its results would be seen the USA administration. even now the piratical flights over Cuban later, but he had not yet found intelligible [I] Responded to him that we, the So- territory were occurring and this was done arguments for an electrified people. But the viet Government, consider to be a good one not without Kennedy’s knowledge. most important [thing] is that he skeptically the outcome of the recent events in the Car- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 295 ibbean. As a result of the efforts undertaken available data, Olivares informed [me] that Chernyshov, Second Secretary of the by the Soviet and Cuban sides there have a series of neutral countries accuse Cuba of Latinamerican Department. been received guarantees on the part of the violating the Belgrade Declaration, explain- USA administration of non-aggression ing their conclusions by the accepted fact A. GROMYKO against the Republic of Cuba, which will be of the presence of a “Soviet military base” officially formalized after the end of nego- in Cuba. [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian tiations with the participation of Mr. U [I] Told Olivares that such assumptions Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- Thant, Acting UN Secretary General. In our do not have the slightest grounds. Each tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- opinion the result is also a further strength- country can use the right not only for indi- vided to CWIHP, and on file at National ening of the international position of the vidual, but also a collective defense against Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- Republic of Cuba. Nowadays the Cuban aggression. It is clear that being the object lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.] people is seen even more than before as a of continuous aggressive provocations on heroic people who has convincingly dem- the part of the USA and even having already Record of Conversation between Soviet onstrated to the whole world its resolute- been a victim of invasion, Cuba cannot be- Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov ness to defend—arms in hand—the liberty come like a frog voluntarily jumping into and U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, and independence of its motherland. the boa’s jaws. Measures undertaken by the 29 October 1962 Olivares asked about our opinion re- Cuban government to strengthen its national garding the statement made by Fidel Castro defenses are in full accordance with inter- From the diary of V. V. Kuznetsov on October 28 of the current year. national law and do not contradict a single [I] Responded to him that this state- commonly accepted international norm. RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION ment has received the full comprehension At the conclusion of the conversation WITH ACTING U.N. SECRETARY and support of the Soviet Government. Olivares expressed his desire to broaden GENERAL U THANT Speaking of time limits for the with- contacts between officials of the MFA [Min- on 29 October 1962 drawal from Cuba of the “Soviet weapons istry of Foreign Affairs] of the USSR and for strategic defense” the Ambassador asked those of the Cuban embassy in such circum- The meeting took place in the UN Sec- to be informed if those armaments would stances. He spoke about his interest to re- retariat. Present were: on the Soviet side, be returned to the Soviet Union before the ceive from the MFA a more complete infor- V.A. Zorin, P.D. Morozov, L.I. Men- Americans fulfill the Cuban government’s mation [report] about the most important delevich, and V.N. Zherebtsov; from the UN demand for liquidation of the USA navy decisions adopted in Moscow and referring Secretariat, U Thant, E.D. Kiselev, O. base in Guantanamo. to Soviet-Cuban relations, for his own ori- Loutfi, Narasimhan, and General Rikhye. [I] Responded to him that, in our opin- entation and in order to have the possibility At the beginning of the conversation, ion, the solution of the question of the liq- to inform his government personally. V.V. Kuznetsov conveyed to U Thant the uidation of the Guantanamo base, appar- [I] Responded to him that I do under- heartfelt greetings of Comrade N.S. ently, will require a long time and therefore stand such an interest, adding that the Khrushchev, and the latter’s great apprecia- the presence of certain types of Soviet ar- Ambassador’s desire would certainly be tion for U Thant’s efforts in a noble en- maments in Cuba during that period will taken into account. [I] Explained that dur- deavor, the attainment of a speedy settle- hardly contribute to solving it positively. ing the recent events we were obliged, in ment of the Cuban crisis. Olivares asked if this meant that the order to save time, to use communication He said that the government of the Soviet armaments would be withdrawn from lines of our Embassy in Havana, which en- USSR had ordered him to arrive in New Cuba before the USA administration satis- sure an uninterrupted, secure, and quick York to aid U Thant in his efforts to elimi- fies other demands listed by Fidel Castro in transmission of reports to Cuba. The Am- nate the dangerous situation that has arisen. his statement: to end the economic block- bassador said that he entirely understands Although the USSR’s position with regard ade, subversive activity, piratical actions, this and agrees with this. He gave me to to the crisis in the Caribbean area seems to and incursions of whatever kind into the air understand that from the point of view of be quite familiar to U Thant, V.V. Kuznetsov space or territorial waters of Cuba. reliability (code) the communication would nevertheless like to make use of this [I] Responded to him that when we are through our Embassy in Havana is a more first meeting with U Thant first and fore- speaking about the return of Soviet arma- suitable method than through the Cuban most emphasize to certain basic features of ments from Cuba to the USSR we mean only embassy in Moscow. the Soviet Union’s position, and the steps a certain kind of armaments, but not arma- In parting Olivares expressed deep taken by the USSR government to assure ments in general. Regarding the fulfillment gratitude to the peoples of the Soviet Union the fastest possible settlement of the crisis of the above-listed demands of the Cuban and the Soviet Government for continuous through peaceful means, with the goal of government, we see it as a process that re- support of the Cuban people’s struggle for affirming peace and security, and taking into quires a certain time to satisfy all the de- the independence of their motherland. account the interests of all parties. mands mentioned in the cited statement by [I] Thanked Olivares for these senti- V. V. Kuznetsov reminded U Thant that Fidel Castro. ments. the government of the Soviet Union has in- Having made a reference to a note re- At the conversation were present: A. troduced a series of constructive proposals ceived from the Embassy of Sudan and other Gonzales, Ambassador’s translator, and V. that received general recognition, and that 296 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

provide a good and fair foundation for re- N.S. Khrushchev’s message testifies to the V.A. Zorin and U Thant on 28 October, he solving the whole problem. The Soviet gov- fact that the American government believes again addressed a request to the United ernment, bearing in mind U Thant’s recom- it possible to reach an agreement on the ba- States to suspend its blockade. In doing so mendation, has undertaken to suspend tem- sis of the USSR’s proposals. This we con- he emphasized that the Soviet Union had porarily the traffic of its ships bound for sider to be a positive factor. With regard to undertaken to give orders to its ships to tem- Cuba, and to keep them away for a short this it seems to us that the moment has ar- porarily suspend traffic to Cuba, which sig- period of time from the region declared by rived for making a transition from general nals the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the United States as being under quarantine. statements to concrete matters. The govern- the preliminary settlement proposed by U The government of the USSR has also ment of the USSR is ready to do so. Thant. U Thant said that he had also declared declared that on board these ships there are U Thant has expressed his hope that to the Americans that a continuation of the not, and will not be, any arms that President the exchange of opinions will be fruitful and blockade is especially undesirable during his Kennedy and the USA government see as positive, and that it will help eliminate the visit to Cuba. U Thant has still not received “offensive.” threat now present in the Caribbean region. a response from the Americans, but hopes Later the government of the USSR He has also expressed his thanks to N.S. to have one in the near future, possibly even agreed to dismantle and send back to the Khrushchev for his greetings and his appre- today. Soviet Union the launchers now in Cuba that ciation of his (U Thant’s) efforts to main- V.V. Kuznetsov thanked U Thant for are seen by the United States as “offensive.” tain peace. U Thant has asked V.V. the warm words addressed to the USSR In brief, said V.V. Kuznetsov, the gov- Kuznetsov to convey his sincere gratitude government and personally to N.S. ernment of the USSR has undertaken to ap- for all the understanding and cooperation he Khrushchev, and said that he would imme- prove and accept U Thant’s proposal; at the has received. diately convey them to their destination. same time it has declared and still declares After this U Thant said that he recog- V.V. Kuznetsov agreed that the time has that for its part it will take any and all mea- nizes the danger of the existing situation. come for turning to concrete problems and sures to prevent an exacerbation of the situa- That danger intensified late Saturday night ranking them on the basis of their urgency tion, which could lead to a worsening of the and early Sunday morning. At that time there and importance. He was happy to note that, conflict and an unleashing of thermonuclear were indications that the point of no return in his outlines as in U Thant’s plans, the war. In its actions the government of the had arrived. U Thant did not sleep that night, quarantine issue occupies first place. This USSR is bearing in mind the sincere desire conducting endless consultations with suggests that our thoughts and desires are of nations to safeguard peace and calm Narasimhan and Rikhye. Fortunately noth- heading in the same direction. throughout the globe. ing tragic occurred. In connection with this, V.V. Kuznetsov The Soviet government has stressed Khrushchev’s response yesterday to recalled that the Soviet government, as N.S. and continues to stress that the actions of Kennedy’s message represents a very great Khrushchev informed U Thant on 25 Octo- the United States, manifested by the impo- commitment to the peaceful resolution of ber, had accepted the first proposal of U sition of the blockade, as well as the whole the Cuban crisis. U Thant emphasized that Thant, which stipulated in particular a vol- USA policy towards Cuba, are aggressive, this was not just his personal opinion, but untary suspension of all arms transfers to and aimed at an exacerbation of the situa- also the opinion of all his colleagues and Cuba for a period of two to three weeks, tion rather than a normalization of it. There the overwhelming majority of the perma- and the simultaneous temporary cessation is no need at present to provide a detailed nent UN delegates with whom he has met. of the quarantine activity on the part of the description of American actions during the For this fruitful and positive gesture, said U United States. past week. That has lucidly been done by Thant, the whole world expressed its grati- The most recent declarations of the the Soviet government’s statement, as well tude to N.S. Khrushchev and to the govern- USSR government have created even more as by N.S. Khrushchev’s messages to the ment of the Soviet Union. favorable conditions for carrying out the USA President Kennedy and to U Thant. U Thant said that he too was concerned proposal to end the quarantine. Neverthe- If it were to asess the situation as it about the continuing blockade of Cuba on less the quarantine activity still continues. exists today, V.V. Kuznetsov continued, the the part of the United States. He recalled However, as U Thant knows, ship captains Soviet government would note with satis- his own proposals for a voluntary suspen- have received instructions to remain on the faction, as has already been noted in N.S. sion by the Soviet Union of arms stockpil- open sea, outside the boundaries of the quar- Khrushchev’s message, that the USA at the ing in Cuba for a short period of time in re- antine activity, for a certain period of time. present moment has taken a position which turn for the United States’ voluntary suspen- Such a situation cannot continue for long, makes it possible to settle the whole Cuban sion of the blockade. After three-day talks since it is depriving Cuba of peaceful goods problem on the basis of the Soviet propos- on this issue with the Soviet delegate to the that are necessary to it, it is creating diffi- als. All this has been the result of the efforts UN, V.A. Zorin, and the USA delegate to culties for the fueling of the ships remain- made by the Soviet government, as well as the UN Stevenson, U Thant put all his ef- ing on the open sea, and it is incurring losses by the United Nations Organization and by forts, he said, into finding the fastest reso- because of their enforced inactivity. With U Thant himself. The Soviet Union ac- lution of this issue. regard to this, we welcomed U Thant’s knowledges the great efforts that were dis- At the present time, U Thant said, af- thoughts on the necessity of resolving this played by U Thant. ter his trip to Cuba had been decided, and whole issue in the next one or two days. But President Kennedy’s latest response to after the conversation taking place between the imposed quarantine has already been COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 297 going on for more than five days, and now which the issue could be resolved: procedure, the national composition of the there are no longer any reasons for not sus- 1) the monitoring of Soviet vessels by inspectors. He asked V. V. Kuznetsov to give pending the quarantine activity. American ships; his opinion on this matter. The declaration of the quarantine by 2) checks on the vessels by certain neu- V. V. Kuznetsov said again that we had the United States is illegal, and is recognized tral countries; not yet given thought to the details, but that as such by the whole world. Nevertheless, 3) sharing these functions with the In- we would prefer that the groups of Red proceeding from the situation at hand and ternational Red Cross. Cross inspectors be made up of citizens of guided by the interests of peace, the gov- The government of the USSR has ex- neutral countries. If U Thant has any ernment of the USSR at the present moment amined the issue and has asked to commu- thoughts, then they could be discussed, and is set on the issue of suspending the practi- nicate that, if U Thant is not successful in the Soviet government’s views on them cal operations of the quarantine. It is quite reaching an agreement with the Americans could be sought. natural that we would like these operations on the temporary suspension of the block- U Thant said that, as practice shows, to cease immediately. In any case we have ade with the observation of our vessels in all cases in which the aid of the Red Cross every right to expect a response from the bound for Cuba, then the Soviet government was requested, the national make-up of its United States in the very near future, per- is prepared to allow, as a temporary mea- representatives was 95% Swiss. haps even before U Thant’s departure for sure, the boarding of Soviet vessels bound V. V. Kuznetsov asked U Thant that on Cuba. for Cuba by representatives of the Red Cross future considerations of this matter he take U Thant again repeated that the day for ascertaining that those ships contain no into account our views, as well as the fact before he had addressed this question to the sorts of weapons that concern the President that Switzerland is not a memeber of the UN. Americans, and was awaiting an answer and government of the USA, who refer to Then he asked U Thant to describe the from them that day. them as “offensive weapons.” goal of his trip to Cuba, and any thoughts V.V. Kuznetsov asked U Thant what the V.V. Kuznetsov emphasized that the he has in connection with this trip. basic difficulties were in settling this issue. USSR government, in taking this step, is U Thant said that the problem most U Thant answered that the Americans acting on a sincere desire to resolve this immediately faced by the Security Council are fully aware of the instructions given to problem in the interests of peace, taking into involves three governments: those of the Soviet ships to remain for a short period of full account the position of the Republic of Soviet Union, the USA, and Cuba. For the time outside the boundaries of the quaran- Cuba. USA the most urgent problem is the lifting tine activity. They are also aware that these U Thant expressed his thanks to the of the quarantine. For the USSR, it is the instructions have a definite time limit. Be- government of the Soviet Union for this matter of arms provisioning, the dismantling fore this they have been trying to avoid di- important decision, made with the purpose of missile launchers, and the shipping of rect contact between Soviet and American of reducing tension and contributing to set- them back to the Soviet Union. The Soviet vessels. However, the Americans are afraid tling the Cuban problem through peaceful Union has already given its consent to all that if they allow Soviet ships to approach means. He promised to convey immediately this, and has even agreed to the 2 to 3 week Cuba, those ships may be carrying arms. For the content of this Soviet proposal to the arms provisioning point. The United States this reason they are insisting that some United States. has not fully agreed to U Thant’s proposal. mechanism be created for ascertaining V.V. Kuznetsov noted that, in accept- The quarantine continues even now, and the whether or not such ships are conveying ing one of U Thant’s ideas, the Soviet gov- United States is demanding the creation of weaponry. ernment had not yet worked out the details a mechanism for ascertaining that arms pro- After his talks with V.A. Zorin, U Thant of the monitoring system, but is raising the visioning is not continuing. met with the UN delegate from Cuba, pssibility that Red Cross representatives The Soviet Union’s decision on the Garcia-Inchaustegui, to whom he declared could be conveyed onto the Soviet vessels possible use of Red Cross services will in that, since the USSR is not agreeing to the either by Soviet ships, or by the ships of many ways contribute to the settling of this creation of some verification mechanism for neutral countries. As far as possible cargo problem. ships on the open sea, he, U Thant, proposes checks in the ports of call are concerned, One of the goals that U Thant is set- to the government of Cuba to examine the this issue if for the Cuban government to ting for himself on his trip to Cuba is get an possibility of creating such a mechanism in decide, since that is its own territory, and idea of what is being done or has already ports of call. In doing so he informed the the Soviet government itself cannot make been done with regard to the removal of Cuban delegate of the Soviet views on this any decision on this matter without Cuban missile launchers from Cuba. He intends to matter. consent. give a report on this to the Security Coun- V.V. Kuznetsov thanked U Thant for U Thant thanked V.V. Kuznetsov for cil. the information, and said that he understood his explanation, and said that he would im- U Thant intends moreover to discuss the latter’s position. mediately pass this information on to the with Castro measures for the safeguarding He went on to say that the government government of Cuba. of the security of Cuba, as well as for the of the USSR has examined in a spirit of co- U Thant noted that in the event that the elimination of threats from the USA and operation the ideas expressed by U Thant Red Cross takes on the execution of these certain other countries of Latin America. U on the fastest suspension of the quarantine. functions, he himself would determine, ac- Thant emphasized that precise and definite U Thant proposed three possible ways in cording to existing practices and rules of guarantees were equally important both for 298 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the United States and other Latin American With regard to this he recalled N. S. and especially: the USA government will countries, and for Cuba. For this reason, U Khrushchev’s message to Kennedy of 28 declare in the Security Council that the USA Thant intends to propose that United Na- October, which said that the Soviet Union will respect the inviolability of Cuba’s bor- tions observers be placed not only on Cu- was prepared to reach an agreement with ders, its sovereignty, and that it pledges not ban territory, but also on the territory of the the United States on the possibility of UN to interfere in its domestic affairs, not to United States and several Latin American representatives monitoring this dismantling invade it or let its territory serve as a base countries neighboring Cuba. process. In doing so, Khrushchev referred for any invasion of Cuba, and that it will V. V. Kuznetsov said that we now have to his earlier message of 27 October, which also restrain those who wish to take aggres- a clearer idea of the task that U Thant is set- said that agents of the UN Security Council sive action against Cuba either from within ting for himself during his trip to Cuba. In could conduct on-site inspections on the ful- USA territory, or from the territory of the connection with this he expressed some of fillment of the obligations that have been countries that neighbor Cuba. the Soviet views on this matter. First and taken on. Of course it will be necessary to V. V. Kuznetsov remarked that, as can foremost, Kuznetsov stressed, as is already receive the permission of the government be inferred from the Soviet Union’s propos- known from N. S. Khrushchev’s messages, of the Republic of Cuba to allow these au- als, the duties of all parties should be for- the missile installations in Cuba are in the thorized officials to enter the country. mulated and represented in the form of joint hands of Soviet specialists. The Soviet gov- U Thant declared that he now under- or individual declarations to the Security ernment has stated that it is dismantling and stands better the problem connected with Council that express their positions. In this removing these launchers from Cuba. establishing on-site inspections on the dis- way such obligations will have a more defi- It is evident from the message sent by mantling and removal of the missile launch- nite character. This can be inferred as well N. S. Khrushchev to Kennedy on 27 Octo- ers from Cuba. Now, after N. S. from the proposals of U Thant himself. ber and from the later message with which Khrushchev’s messages of 27 and 28 Octo- According to the Soviet Union, in ex- the American government generally agreed, ber, and the explanations offered by V. V. amining the issue of guarantees it is neces- that the Soviet government has agreed to the Kuznetsov, he has a clear idea of the Soviet sary to take into consideration the views that imposition of on-site checks after the above- government’s position. have been expressed on this matter by Prime mentioned dismantlings, of course with the During his stay in Cuba he, U Thant, Minister Castro of Cuba. consent of the government of the Republic intends to raise the issue of the dismantling V. V. Kuznetsov again asked about the of Cuba. and removal of missile materials from Cuba desirability of receiving an answer regard- V. V. Kuznetsov asked whether the in his talks with Prime Minister Fidel Castro, ing the temporary suspension of the quar- Americans are not moving away from the and it is possible that the latter will have antine before U Thant’s departure for Cuba. position laid out in Kennedy’s message. something to say on this matter. In doing so he emphasized that the Soviet V. V. Kuznetsov expressed his agree- Returning to the question of guaran- Union for its part has made many concilia- ment with the Soviet Union’s granting of tees, U Thant said that such guarantees tory gestures, and that now it is necessary guarantees on arms provisioning and the should be bilateral. On his own initiative he to persuade the other side to make similar dismantling of missile installations, and so decided to raise the issue of the presence of ones. too the United States should make guaran- UN representatives in all the countries of U Thant said that he would immedi- tees to the effect that it will not infringe upon this region. If the government of Cuba ately communicate information about the the security and sovereignty of Cuba either agrees to some UN presence, said U Thant, Soviet Union’s favorable reaction to his pro- with its own armed forces, or through sup- then he intends to propose to the Organiza- posal about possibly making use of the ser- port for other countries, and that it will not tion of American States and the United vices of the Red Cross, and with regard to permit or aid the activity on its own terri- States to admit UN representatives onto the this he wanted to clarify certain details. First, tory of subversive sabotage groups. These territory of the USA and the Latin Ameri- in the event that the Red Cross agrees, the pledges must be firm. can countries, in the interests of removing personnel of the inspection groups can be We have made note of Kennedy’s state- the threat to peace in this area. In its general appointed only by that organization. The UN ment that the USA will guarantee that no outlines, U Thant has informed the Ameri- cannot make recommendations to it on that aggression against Cuba will take place. cans of this idea. matter. Second, as U Thant understands it, However, on one hand Kennedy declares V. V. Kuznetsov declared that the So- vessels carrying the inspection groups will that the Soviet Union’s statements are reas- viet Union has formulated its duties clearly be supplied by the Soviet Union or neutral suring, while on the other hand the USA is and concisely, and that there should be no countries. Third, the Americans in their talks making new demands that place the two doubt in anyone’s mind about the fulfillment with U Thant have asked about the vessels parties in unfairly different positions. of these duties. As far as the USA guaran- chartered by the Soviet Union for carrying V. V. Kuznetsov concluded that his idea tees to Cuba are concerned, they have al- its own cargo. comes down to the point that the statements ready been generally laid out in outline form. V. V. Kuznetsov said that he was au- existing at the present time are sufficient to With regard to this, V. V. Kuznetsov has di- thorized, naturally, to speak only about So- lift the quarantine without having to take any rected U Thant’s attention to the passage viet vessels. measures related to the speedy establishment from N. S. Khrushchev’s message of 27 V. A. Zorin added that the Americans of checks on the dismantling of missile sites October which refers to what the USA can be sure that Lebanese or Swedish ves- in Cuba. should do about making guarantees to Cuba, sels, say, are not carrying arms, as these COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 299 governments have officially declared. and best wishes. He remarked that the situ- be relieved if the Soviet Union agreed to V. V. Kuznetsov noted that if the USA ation had been extraordinarily serious, es- the carrying out of these checks through wanted an agreement, they would have pecially towards the end of 27 October, al- some “independent agency.” quickly resolved this matter. If they have no though Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s mes- In accordance with your instructions, such desire, they can find a million pretexts sage of 28 October had relieved the situa- we informed U Thant that the Soviet gov- and ask a million questions. V. A. Zorin said tion. U Thant called that message “a most ernment is prepared to give its consent to that such an agreement could indeed be considerable contribution to peace” and checks on Soviet vessels bound for Cuba, reached today, since the positions of all the emphasized that this was the general opin- as U Thant proposed in one of his earlier interested parties have in general been ion in the UN. talks with Comrade Zorin, by representa- clearly presented. U Thant said furthermore that he also tive of the International Red Cross, if the At the conclusion of the meeting it was considered it expedient to move towards the USA refuses to lift the blockade unless such agreed that during U Thant’s stay in Cuba, working out of an agreement on concrete checks are instituted. I emphasized that this contact with him would be sustained through measures for the settlement of the Cuban is of course a temporary measure, for 2 to 3 Narasimhan. situation, and precisely for this purpose he weeks until the settlement of the Cuban The conversation was recorded by V. had addressed a request the day before (on problem. Zherebtsov. 28 October) to the Americans to lift the U Thant received this information with blockade of Cuba immediately (U Thant very great interest, and expressed gratitude [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian used the word “blockade”) for a period of 2 to the Soviet government for this new and Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- to 3 weeks, as had been stipulated in U important step towards settling the Cuban tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- Thant’s first message of 25 October. In do- conflict. He said that he would meet today vided to CWIHP, and on file at National ing so, U Thant emphasized that the USSR with the Americans, and would secure the Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- had already done what U Thant had re- lifting of the “quarantine.” With regard to lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- quested in that message, suspending arms the practical issues connected with our pro- sity.] provisioning in Cuba, while the USA had posal for carrying out checks on vessels by not yet lifted the blockade. It still cannot be representatives of the International Red Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign said that the Americans have done so, U Cross, we explained to U Thant in accor- Minister Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign Thant continued. For him (U Thant) a very dance with your instructions that the main Ministry, 29 October 1962 strange situation could arise if he is in Cuba issue here concerns the checks at sea, in (he will fly to Havana tomorrow to meet which Red Cross representatives would be 29 October 1962 with Fidel Castro), and the American navy conveyed on board Soviet ships by USSR is still continuing the blockade at that time. vessels or by those belonging to neutral On 29 October we met with U Thant. We asked U Thant how the Americans countries. As far as checks in the ports are We conveyed greetings to U Thant are explaining their delay in accepting the concerned, we noted that this falls not within from Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, as well as decision about lifting the so-called quaran- our own jurisdiction, but that of the Cuban the latter’s wishes for U Thant’s success in tine, even though it is obvious that such a government. U Thant came back to this point averting a war, strengthening the peace, and lifting is absolutely necessary both politi- several times, and it was clear that he pre- safeguarding the seccurity of all nations. U cally and practically. With regard to this, we fers instituting checks in the Cuban ports. Thant was told that I had been entrusted by pointed out the urgency of lifting the quar- For our part we consider it feasible to agree the Soviet government to aid him, U Thant, antine first and foremost because of the ne- with this, as long as our Cuban friends do in his efforts to eliminate the current dan- cessity of laying a foundation, as U Thant not object. It is technically possible to carry gerous situation. We then laid out the basic himself suggested, for negotiating a settle- out checks in ports much faster than on the points of the USSR’s position in the Cuban ment of the Cuban problem. Moreover, be- open sea, and this would keep the Ameri- affair, as they were defined in Comrade N.S. cause of the continuing blockade, ships car- cans from delaying any longer the lifting of Khrushchev’s messages to Kennedy of 26, rying exclusively peace-time goods cannot the “quarantine.” 27, and 28 October 1962. We noted that the get these goods to Cuba, where they are U Thant then asked how we feel about USA had declared the Soviet proposals to needed, and furthermore the ships are ex- the fact that the Red Cross will use mainly be generally practicable, which allows the periencing fueling difficulties, and their idle- Swiss personnel to carry out the checks. In Cuban problem to be resolved on the basis ness is bringing losses. We emphasized that doing so he emphasized that, as he knows of those Soviet proposals. We emphasized the Soviet Union has agreed to U Thant’s from past experience, the International Red that in view of this, the moment had arrived proposal to hold back these vessels bound Cross does not accept any recommendations for moving away from general statements for Cuba for several days, but that the on the make-up of its personnel, and its own about the positions of the parties, and to- Americans keep prolonging the period. personnel is 95% Swiss. I said that we would wards an agreement on concrete steps to be U Thant answered that the Americans prefer that the personnel of the inspection taken. We declared that the Soviet govern- are demanding checks on the Soviet vessels groups consisted of citizens from neutral ment is ready to take on this practical work. carrying cargo to Cuba, as one of the condi- countries that are represented in the UN. U Thant asked us to convey to Com- tions on their lifting the quarantine. With U Thant also asked whether we agreed rade N.S. Khrushchev his sincere gratitude regard to this he said that the situation would to the Red Cross checks on Soviet ships 300 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

only, or also on vessels chartered by the from attack in only a very general way. It is sity.] Soviet Union. We said that we cannot speak necessary to concretize these statements, of any vessels other than Soviet ones, but and to confirm the whole settlement of the Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign that it would be absurd if the Americans Cuban issue, including guarantees for Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to USSR started suspecting the Soviet Union of con- Cuba’s security, through the Security Coun- Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1962 veying arms that it calls “offensive” on char- cil. With regard to this we referred to the tered vessels belonging, for example, to relevant point about guarantees on Cuban 30 October 1962 Sweden or Lebanon. U Thant agreed that security contained in Comrade N. S. this would be an absurdity. Khrushchev’s message of 27 October. We On 29 October I received the perma- We asked U Thant what his intentions also recalled the guarantees that Fidel Castro nent UN delegate from Cuba, Garcia- were with regard to the forthcoming nego- demanded in his statement of 28 October. Inchaustegui. I welcomed him as represen- tiations in Cuba. U Thant said that he wanted U Thant did not show any reaction to tative of the courageous Cuban nation, to exchange views with Fidel Castro prima- any of this, although he did not object of which is self-sacrificingly standing up for rily on how the dismantling of war sites, any of it, but rather returned again to the its freedom and independence in its struggle which is referred to in Comrade N.S. question of a “UN presence” in Cuba. He with a powerful and dangerous enemy— Khrushchev’s message of 28 October, would said that if Fidel Castro approves this pro- American imperialism. be carried out. posal, he will then address a similar I said that I considered it necessary to We told U Thant that the military sites proposeal to the other party regarding the meet first of all with the Cuban delegate, mentioned there were in the hands of So- “UN presence” in the USA and certain Latin and I expressed the hope that, in carrying viet officers. U Thant answered that he knew American countries. We were given to un- out the task that stands before us both, we this, and of course would consult with the derstand that the goal of this “UN presence” would work in close contact with our Cu- Soviet Union on this matter. would be to avert attacks on Cuba by coun- ban comrades, keeping each other informed With regard to this, we reminded U terrevolutionary Cuban emigres now living and consulting with each other. Thant that, as noted in Comrade N.S. in the USA and certain countries of Latin Garcia-Inchaustegui gratefully ac- Khrushchev’s letter of 27 October, the America. knowledged the constant support offered to checks should be carried out after the arms We did not meanwhile express to U the Cuban nation by the Soviet Union, and are removed from Cuba. What will have to Thant our attitude to this proposal of his. said that the Cuban delegates in New York be checked is not the weaponry, but the fact We assume that it could be viewed positively also constantly feel support from their So- that it is no longer in Cuba. U Thant declined when one takes into account that U Thant viet comrades in their joint work in the to spell out his own point of view on this has in mind a “UN presence” on the territo- United Nations Organization. matter. It can be supposed that the Ameri- ries of both parties—of Cuba as well as of Garcia-Inchaustegui said that he had cans will insist that inspections be carried the USA and certain Latin American coun- had a meeting with U Thant during which out even during the process of dismantling. tries. This would mean that with regard to they discussed the latter’s trip to Cuba. U U Thant said that he meant to exchange this issue the UN would be keeping the same Thant intends, after the negotiations in Ha- views with Fidel Castro as well on the mat- watch over Cuba as over the USA, which is vana, to leave General Rikhye behind in ters connected with the checks on vessels certainly advantageous. Cuba as his representative, along with a bound for Cuba. In their relations to us, the Americans group of workers supposedly for continu- The goal of his trip to Cuba, U Thant are remaining passive, and decline to meet. ing the negotiations with the Cuban govern- said, would also be a discussion with Fidel Intending to initiate contact with Stevenson, ment and for sustaining relations with the Castro on obtaining guarantees for Cuban we suggested to U Thant through Kiselev UN. The issue of leaving General Rikhye security, and guarantees for the security of that he arrange a breakfast today and invite in Cuba will in Garcia-Inchaustegui’s opin- other countries which maintain that Cuba the Americans and us. U Thant liked this ion be the subject of negotiations between represents a threat to them. He said that he idea, and he contacted Stevenson. Steven- U Thant and the Cuban government in Ha- wanted to propose to Castro a formulation son, however, refused to accept his invita- vana. that would stipulate a “UN presence” in tion, referring to the fact that he had no in- On the question of the most urgent Cuba on the model of the “UN presence” in structions from the State Department, and matters to which, in his view, U Thant’s at- the United Arab Republic (Gaza and Aqaba) that without such authorization he could not tention should be given, Garcia-Inchaust- as a guarantee that nobody will invade Cuba, meet with Soviet representatives. egui said that the task of primary importance and that Cuba will not take actions against is the safeguarding of unhindered passage anybody else. 29.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV for vessels bound for Cuba and the lifting We told U Thant that really the point of the blockade. He has already spoken to about guarantees for Cuban security ought [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian U Thant about this, as well as with the del- to constitute the most important part of the Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- egates from other countries, especially the final settling of the whole problem. tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- Afro-Asian countries. Kennedy’s statements on this matter are vided to CWIHP, and on file at National Garcia-Inchaustegui said that the min- positive, but they seem to have a provisional Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- ister of foreign affairs Raul Roa would ar- character, and refer to Cuba’s inviolability lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- rive in New York at the end of this week. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 301

completion, especially if the dismantling is 30 and 31 October. U Thant asked how we 30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV to take a long time. With regard to this it is felt about this. We said that such a period advantageous to accelerate the dismantlings, was too short for even the vessels located [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian in order not to show the installations to the near the blockade zone to make it to the ports Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- inspectors. The Americans prefer that the of disembarkation. tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- inspection be carried out by the UN, and for U Thant noted in regard to this that he vided to CWIHP, and on file at National the composition of the inspection groups gave very great significance to the require- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- they propose two variants: representatives ment that during his stay in Cuba his people, lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- of neutral countries, or representatives of the like Rikhye, be shown at least from a dis- sity.] immediately interested parties—the USA, tance that the installations are being dis- the USSR, and Cuba. The Americans, how- mantled. In this case, U Thant said, on his Telegram from Deputy Foreign ever, according to U Thant, have started in- return from New York he would issue a Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to the Soviet sisting less strongly lately on UN inspec- statement that his people have been con- Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1962 tion during the dismantling process. They vinced of the Soviet Union’s fulfillment of are said to declare that if it is not possible to its dismantling obligation, and that for this 30 October 1962 reach an agreement about UN inspections, reason the “quarantine” should not be re- they will carry out the inspections them- imposed. U Thant asked whether the Soviet On 29 October a second meeting with selves, and that they have the necessary government could agree to this. U Thant was held at his initiative. means to do so. We propose that it would be appropri- 1. U Thant informed me that the Ameri- General Rikhye (U Thant’s military ate to show U Thant himself the disman- cans have favorably received our agreement advisor) who was present at the conversa- tling of certain installations during his stay to the inspection of Soviet vessels bound for tion explained that with inspections by their in Cuba on 30 and 31 October. In such an Cuba by representatives of the International own forces, the Americans have in mind event he would take a firmer stance, and it Red Cross. flights over Cuba by their own planes car- would be more difficult for the Americans U Thant also informed us that he had rying photographic equipment, and at low to renew their “quarantine” of Cuba. contacted the Red Cross and received a pre- altitudes. If this is recognized as expedient, I re- liminary response that the Red Cross was U Thant told Stevenson that the UN quest urgently to give corresponding instruc- ready to undertake the inspection of vessels can carry out dismantling inspections in tions to Havana. both on the open sea, and in ports of disem- Cuba only in the event that the Soviet Union barkation. U Thant intends to negotiate with and Cuba agree to it. He asked that there be 30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV Fidel Castro on carrying out the inspection notification of the Soviet government’s po- in ports. sition on inspection by UN forces during the [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian In the Red Cross’s preliminary reponse dismantling process. Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- received by U Thant, it is indicated that all It appears to us expedient to insist on tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- personnel carrying out the inspection of the our present position, in accordance with vided to CWIHP, and on file at National vessels will consist of Swiss citizens. which the appointees of the Security Coun- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- 2. U Thant explained to Stevenson our cil should carry out inspections not of the lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- position on the inspection of the process of dismantling, but of the Soviet sity.] dismantlings and the removal of the so- Union’s fulfillment of its promise to dis- called “offensive” weaponry from Cuba. mantle the installations of weapons which Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign The Americans asked U Thant to clarify how the Americans refer to as “offensive.” This Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to long the dismantling would take. On his own would mean that the inspectors would be the UN Zorin to USSR Foreign initiative U Thant put this question to us. admitted to sites where there are installa- Ministry, 30 October 1962 We told U Thant that we would ask our gov- tions when they have not yet been fully dis- ernment, but provisionally the dismantling mantled, and the arms not yet removed. In 30 October 1962 will be expected to take 2 to 3 weeks. (In regard to this, it is expedient to speed up the On 30 October Comrade Zorin, in his provisionally specifying this time frame, we dismantling of the installations and the re- capacity as chairman of the Security Coun- were proceeding from the relevant points moval of the arms. If the dismantling is car- cil, the term of which expires tomorrow, held made in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s mes- ried out in a short time, then the issue of the traditional breakfast for members of the sage to Kennedy of 27 October.) inspection during the dismantling process Council. Present were the heads of the del- We request to be informed about the will not arise at all. egations of all the countries represented by duration of the dismantling processes in or- We request that you consider this. the Security Council, including Stevenson. der to give an answer to U Thant. 4. During the talks with U Thant, his From the talks during the breakfast, the fol- 3. According to U Thant, the Ameri- aides delivered reports to him on Kennedy’s lowing is worthy of attention: cans are insisting that the monitoring of the statement concerning the suspension of the 1. Stevenson said that the government dismantling be carried out during the very “quarantine” of vessels bound for Cuba dur- of the USA agrees to our proposal for checks process of dismantling, and not after its ing the period of U Thant’s stay in Cuba on on vessels carried out by representatives of 302 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the International Red Cross, and prefers that sity.] Cuba with their own armed forces. At the such checks be carried out not on the open same time they are trying to keep their hands sea, but in Cuban ports. Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign free not only in relation to the economic Stevenson said furthermore that now Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to blockade of Cuba and subversive operations the USA attributes primary importance to the UN Zorin to USSR Foreign against it, but also in their support, perhaps reaching an agreement on the inspection of Ministry, 30 October 1962 somewhat more disguised than earlier, for the dismantling of the Soviet military em- the preparation by counterrevolutionary placements in Cuba, insisting that such in- 30 October 1962 Cuban emigres of military activities against spection be carried out during the disman- Cuba. tling process. The Americans imagine in- We are communicating several Second. As far as U Thant’s line is con- spections, as Stevenson said, in the form of thoughts on the situation that has arisen cerned, he intends, as he told us, to exchange planes flying over Cuba with inspection around the Cuban issue, and on our possible views with Fidel Castro primarily on the groups on board. position and tactics in the course of future issue of the verficiation of the dismantling 2. The Irish delegate [Frederick H.] negotiations with U Thant and the Ameri- of Soviet military sites, and also to ascer- Boland voiced a proposal, clearly not with- cans. tain that this dismantling is actually going out American consent, for convening the First. From talks with U Thant, con- on. On his return he intends to present a re- Security Council immediately after U versations at the UN, and information from port to the Security Council precisely on Thant’s return from Cuba, and, without dis- the American press, we have received the these issues, after which the Council will cussing in detail any other matters at this impression that the strategy of the USA gov- face the practical issue of creating a moni- meeting, to hear U Thant’s report and make ernment is at present directed towards the toring apparatus. a decision about authorizing U Thant to cre- carrying out of our decision to dismantle It is true that U Thant, taking into ac- ate an inspection mechanism for the military sites in Cuba, rejecting at the same count how we put before him the issue of dismantlings in Cuba. As far as the other time the necessity of giving clear and firm guarantees for Cuba, is preparing at the same matters in the Cuban settlement are con- guarantees of Cuban security, restricted in time to put before Castro the issue of the cerned, including the matter of guarantees this regard by the statements issued earlier so-called “UN presence” in Cuba as a guar- for Cuban security, Boland believes that by Kennedy in his messages to Comrade antee of its security and a guarantee against those matters can be raised in speeches at N.S. Khrushchev of 27 and 28 October, or any Cuban actions against the other Latin- the above-mentioned meeting of the Secu- in the last resort by the Security Council’s American countries. In the event of the Cu- rity Council, but that approving resolutions approval of those statements. ban government’s consenting to this sort of on them should be left for a later date. In this regard it is significant that the “UN presence” in Cuba, U Thant intends to The delegates from the United Arab Americans, as is evident from available in- pose the same question about a “UN pres- Republic (Riad) and Ghana (Quaison- formation, want the future role of the Secu- ence” on the territory of the USA and cer- Sackey) voiced objections to Boland’s pro- rity Council and especially of U Thant to tain Latin-American countries. It is however posal (Riad more firmly, Quaison-Sackey come down basically to organizing and car- evident that the Americans will try to ar- somewhat evasively). They believe that the rying out inspections on the dismantling of range the Security Council affair in such a first priority is resolving the matter of guar- our missile installations in Cuba. way as to give priority to the issue of the antees for Cuban security. As far as guarantees of Cuban security mechanism for inspections on the war-site 3. The Ghanaian delegate Quaison- are concerned, the Americans understand dismantling, and not to the issue of guaran- Sackey made several remarks about the that a clear and concrete resolution of the tees for Cuba. Moreover, U Thant’s plans Congo. The substance of these remarks Security Council could in this respect tie with regard to the guarantees for Cuba are comes down to the fact that the situation in their hands and keep them from proceeding not yet fully clear. the Congo is bad, is becoming worse all the with their aggressive policy toward Cuba, Third. It appears to us that in these time, and that the recourse at present is the which it seems they do not intend to re- conditions it would be expedient, in the in- use of UN forces against [Moise] nounce. On 29 October a UPI press bulletin terests of safeguarding guarantees for Cu- Tshombe.10 said that Rusk “had assured the Latin Ameri- ban security, to try to bring together into one 4. Our thoughts on our position and on can envoys that any Soviet-American agree- knot the main issues that must be resolved tactical matters will be sent by separate tele- ment would pursue the goal of the removal for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban cri- gram. of missiles from Cuba, and in no way would sis, most importantly the issues of control exclude the possibility of new collective on the dismantling inspections and of guar- 30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV V. ZORIN measures against Castro.” antees for Cuba, and to reach a simultaneous In light of this, there is reason to ex- settlement of these issues through the Se- [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian pect that Kennedy’s statement about the curity Council. We intend to suggest that Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- USA government’s readiness to “give assur- such a resolution be given the form of a joint tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- ances that there will be no invasion of Cuba” declaration made in the Security Council by vided to CWIHP, and on file at National will be interpreted by the Americans in the the governments of the USSR and the USA Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- narrow sense, as saying that the USA and (or by these two separately) concerning a lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- the Latin American countries will not attack peaceful settlement of the Cuban crisis, the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 303

Cuban government’s input on this issue, and [and] Yugoslavia, and also Switzerland. Fourth. Taking into account President the Council’s resolution approving all these There is also an idea about delegating the Kennedy’s desire, communicated through declarations and entrusting the acting Sec- monitoring process to eight neutral coun- Robert Kennedy in his conversation with retary General of the UN, under the super- tries represented in the Committee on Dis- Comrade Dobrynin on 27 October (your vision of the Security Council, to carry out armament (India, Burma, the United Arab #1255), we will not raise the issue of the the necessary measures according to the pro- Republic, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mexico, Bra- American bases in Turkey in our negotia- cedures of the UN apparatus. zil, Sweden), possibly, with the goal of set- tions with U Thant and the Americans in We will propose in the framework of ting a precedent for resolving questions in- New York. At the same time it seems to us these declarations to stipulate, as a guaran- volving inspections on full and general dis- possible and expedient to reach an agree- tee of Cuban security, the final end to all armament. The Americans, U Thant has in- ment with the USA that in the joint Soviet- blockade activity against Cuba, and the du- formed us, are putting forth a variant in American declaration in the Security Coun- ties of the USA in the capacity proposed by which the monitoring groups consist of rep- cil, there be a record of both sides’ inten- Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s message to resentatives from the USA, the USSR, and tion to enter in the near future negotiations Kennedy of 27 October, and taking into ac- Cuba. for normalizing relations between the NATO count Fidel Castro’s statement of 28 Octo- We propose that it would be appropri- countries and the countries of the Warsaw ber. ate to stipulate that the monitoring groups Pact, as has already been outlined in the cor- If the Americans insist, we will con- include representatives from countries like respondence between Comrade N.S. sider the possibility of approving the explicit Indonesia, Ceylon, the United Arab Repub- Khrushchev and President Kennedy. In do- mention in the declaration of the Soviet lic, and Ghana. In the course of negotiations ing so it might be possible to include in such government’s obligation to dismantle the it would be possible to agree on a variant in a declaration a reference both to Comrade Soviet military sites in Cuba which the which the groups are composed of repre- N.S. Khrushchev’s message of 28 October Americans call offensive, and of the Soviet sentatives from eight neutral countries be- and Kennedy’s messages of 27 and 28 Oc- government’s approval of the inspection longing to the 18th Committee on Disarma- tober, as well as to Comrade N.S. system that has been worked out. ment. Khrushchev’s message of 27 October, in The Americans will obviously demand Furthermore a question arises about which the question about Turkey is raised. a declaration from the Cuban government future UN measures on strengthening peace Fifth. Until now, in our official docu- that contains an expression of consent to the in the Caribbean region after the comple- ments and during negotiations here in New elaborated guarantees of security and of the tion of the inspections of dismantling, and York, our weaponry now being dismantled inspection system, as well as a formulation also on the inspection (by International Red in Cuba has been referred to as “weaponry of Cuba’s non-attack obligations with regard Cross forces) of Soviet vessels bound for considered offensive by the Americans.” In to its neighbors, in accordance with the goals Cuba. the course of future negotiations, and espe- of the UN Charter. We will consult with the In our opinion, it would be possible to cially during the preparation of the texts of Cuban delegation on this issue. agree to the presence in Havana (or in sev- the Security Council documents, we will As far as the inspection system on the eral Cuban commercial ports) of small have to oppose our own concrete formula- dismantling is concerned, we propose that groups of UN representatives (of the same tion to the American formulation “offensive our primary position should be to agree to composition as the groups verifying mili- weaponry.” It might be possible in our opin- the implementation of the inspections after tary-site dismantling) with the right to carry ion to use, say, the formula “means for con- the completion of the dismantling process. out selective inspections on the vessels of veying nuclear arms at an operational dis- If the Americans insist on carrying out in- various countries arriving in Cuba, with the tance a certain number of kilometers.” spections during the dismantling process, it purpose of determining whether or not they All the issues laid out here will be the might be possible to agree to this as long as are carrying so-called “offensive” sorts of subject of discussions immediately after U we had guarantees for a monitoring proce- armaments. [One could] make this condi- Thant’s return from Cuba, i.e., after 1 No- dure that would of course keep hidden from tional upon the requirement that the same vember. the inspectors anything we did not want to groups of UN representatives be placed in We request your examination. reveal. The monitoring process should take the USA and the Latin-American countries only a short time to be carried out— only a neighboring Cuba with the right to make 30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV period necessary for ascertaining that the periodic inspections of certain regions of V. ZORIN dismantling has been completed. these countries with the purpose of deter- With regard to the composition of the mining whether preparations are being made [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian inspection apparatus, there are now several for the invasion of Cuba, either by these Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- variants being advanced in UN circles. countries themselves or by Cuban emigres. tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- According to facts released by the UN It would be possible to propose that this vided to CWIHP, and on file at National secretariat, U Thant wants to create a moni- system of observation operate for the dura- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- toring apparatus composed of representa- tion, for example, of one year, after which lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- tives from a selection of neutral countries the Security Council would again examine sity.] belonging to the UN—Sweden, Ethiopia, the issue of whether a continuation of the the United Arab Republic, Mexico, Brazil, observation is needed. Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to 304 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the USA A.F. Dobrynin to the USSR ing understanding: they are [Secretary of handled more by the State Department than Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1962 State Dean] Rusk and [advisor on Soviet by him personally, taking into account the affairs Llewellyn] Thompson. If you do not delicacy of his situation as the President’s 30 October 1962 believe me, discuss it with them, and they brother and as Attorney General of the will tell you the same thing. But it is better United States. I do not want, Robert Today Robert Kennedy invited me to not to transfer this understanding into a for- Kennedy added, to claim for myself the meet with him. He said that he would like mal, albeit confidential, exchange of letters function of the State Department, but my to talk about N.S. Khrushchev’s letter to the (as can be noted, the greatest suspicion in “solitary diplomacy” may be needed sev- President yesterday.11 the two Kennedy brothers was elicited by eral more times, and we will meeting with The President, Robert Kennedy said, the part of Khrushchev’s letter which speaks each other periodically. confirms the understanding [dogovorion- directly of a link between the Cuban events I answered to Robert Kennedy that I nost] with N.S. Khrushchev on the elimina- and the bases in Turkey). We hope that N.S. was prepared to maintain contact with him tion of the American missile bases in Tur- Khrushchev will understand us correctly. In on highly important issues in the future, key (Robert Kennedy confirmed that one regard to this Robert Kennedy insistently passing over the heads, as he himself sug- speaks of an understanding). Correspond- asked to take the letter back without delay. gested, of all intermediaries. Robert ing measures will be taken towards fulfill- I told Robert Kennedy that everything Kennedy confirmed this. From what Rob- ing this understanding within the period of said above I would report to N.S. ert Kennedy said it was clear that the Presi- time indicated earlier, in confidential obser- Khrushchev, emphasizing in doing so that dent is trying now to avoid exchanging any vance of NATO guidelines, but of course even the President and he, Robert Kennedy, documents on issues of a highly delicate without any mention that this is connected could be sure of the fact that the Soviet gov- nature like Turkey which could leave a trace to the Cuban events. ernment is regarding the understanding that anywhere, but that he favors the continua- We, however, said Robert Kennedy, are has been reached as strictly secret and not tion of a confidential exchange of opinions not prepared to formulate such an under- for publication. At the same time, in order between the heads of the two governments. standing in the form of letters, even the most to confirm Robert Kennedy’s statement We believe it expedient to visit Robert confidential letters, between the President about the understanding, I asked him again Kennedy once again and to issue a state- and the head of the Soviet government when about whether the President really confirms ment, in referring to our mission, that the it concerns such a highly delicate issue. the understanding with N.S. Khrushchev on Soviet government and N.S. Khrushchev Speaking in all candor, I myself, for ex- the elimination of American missile bases personally are prepared to take into account ample, do not want to risk getting involved in Turkey. Robert Kennedy said once again the President’s desire for maintaining the in the transmission of this sort of letter, since that he confirmed it, and again that he hoped secrecy of the oral understanding on the re- who knows where and when such letters can that their motivations would be properly moval of the American missile bases from surface or be somehow published—not now, understood in Moscow. Taking what they Turkey. It is also expedient to tell of our but in the future—and any changes in the explained into account, I believed it condi- willingness, if the President is also prepared course of events are possible. The appear- tionally possible—before receiving any in- for this, to continue the confidential ex- ance of such a document could cause irrepa- structions from Moscow—to take this let- change of opinions between the heads of the rable harm to my political career in the fu- ter [back], since a categorical refusal to do governments on many important unresolved ture. This is why we request that you take so would, in my opinion, only weaken Rob- issues, on whose resolution the lessing of this letter back. ert Kennedy’s firm statements on the under- international tension, and of the tension be- It is possible, Robert Kennedy contin- standing that has been reached. Moreover, tween our two countries in particular, is to a ued, that you do not believe us and through leaving the letter with him, after he had very great degree dependent. letters you want to put the understanding in clearly expressed the President’s desire not I request instructions. writing. The issue of Soviet missile bases to exchange letters, could scarcely be in the in Cuba has unfortunately introduced a real interests of doing business [in the future]. 30.X.62 A.DOBRYNIN element of uncertainty and suspicion even In conclusion Robert Kennedy said into confidential channels of contact. We that, in his opinion, the events connected [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian will however live up to our promise, even if with the Cuban issue have been developing Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- it is given in this oral form. As you know, it quite favorably, and that he hoped that tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- was in precisely the same oral form that the everthing would eventually be settled. He vided to CWIHP, and on file at National President made his promise to N.S. added that, on the Turkish issue and other Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- Khrushchev regarding the removal of a cer- highly confidential issues he was prepared lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- tain number of American soldiers from Thai- to maintain a direct contact with me as ear- sity.] land.12 That promise was kept. So too will lier, emphasizing in doing so that the point this promise be kept. was the the possible oral considerations of Telegram from USSR Foreign Ministry As a guarantee, Robert Kennedy the President and the head of the Soviet gov- to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. added, I can only give you my word. More- ernment N.S. Khrushchev on the exchange Kuznetsov, New York, 31 October 1962 over I can tell you that two other people of letters on such delicate issues as missile besides the President know about the exist- bases in Turkey, or issues which need to be In the negotiations between the del- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 305 egates of the USSR, the USA, and Cuba with tension that had had arisen in the relations following. the participation of the acting Secretary among the countries. Currently there is a lessening in mili- General of the UN on the normalization of 2. The Security Council takes into con- tary tension created around Cuba. But on the situation that has arisen around Cuba, sideration the obligations of the govern- the diplomatic field we have to accomplish you should follow the messages of N.S. ments of the USSR, the USA, and the Re- a crucial stage in order to consolidate the Khrushchev to President John Kennedy and public of Cuba recorded in the protocol pre- achieved success and to bind the Amerians U Thant, and also by the instructions given sented to the Security Council, including by commitments ensuing from the exchange in our dispatches #1254 and #1267. precisely: of messages between N.S. Khrushchev and In the negotiations you should try to (Here the text of all 17 articles of the Kennedy and F. Castro’s statement of 28 record the agreement deriving from the ex- protocol statement is given.) October. change of messages between N.S. 3. The Security Council is proceeding We consider that under current condi- Khrushchev and John Kennedy in the form from the stipulation that the governments tions we and you should display self-re- of a protocol statement that would be pre- of the countries participating in the proto- straint in our official declarations and state- sented to the Security Council for all mea- col statement will strictly carry out the ob- ments and also in the press, in order to not sures taken in accordance with the UN Char- ligations they have taken on, which will to give the aggressors a pretext to blame our ter. As a basis for negotiations, after receiv- contribute to the strengthening of trust side for irreconciliability and intractability. ing the consent of our Cuban friends, con- among the countries and to affirming peace We must hold to a firm, but constructive vey to the Americans and to U Thant the generally. stand. We would like it to be taken into ac- statement of protocol, and declare that this 4. In accordance with articles 10 and count in your statements, too. It would be statement is being introduced jointly by the 13 of the protocol statement, the Security good if you in your appearances underline governments of the USSR and Cuba. (The Council requests the governments of [gap Cuba’s readiness to normalize diplomatic text of the statement of protocol is being in text] countries to share their own del- and economic relations with the USA and communicated by separate telegram.) egates as agents for ascertaining the carry- countries of Latin America. It should also Since Fidel Castro’s statement of 28 ing out of the obligations to dismantle and be repeated what you have declared more October contains a demand concerning the remove the weaponry indicated in articles than once about Cuba’s devotion to the cause evacuation of the USA naval base in 9 and 12 of the protocol statement. of peace, to the UN principles, among them Guantanamo, the protocol statement in- 5. The Security Council asks acting UN non-interference of states into the internal cludes a point concerning the negotiations Secretary General U Thant to grant the affairs of each other. of the USA and the Republic of Cuba on group of agents the necessary means and All of this is needed, of course, not for this matter. If however the USA objects to cooperation for carrying out the functions the aggressors’ ears, but for international the inclusion of this point, and this impedes with which they have been entrusted.” public opinion. the reaching of an agreement according to The text of the protocol statement is Telegraph the implementation of these the whole protocol statement, then with the now being submitted to the approval of Fi- instructions. consent of the Cuban representative you del Castro. may not insist on a separate mention of the On receiving the approval of Fidel 31.X.62 A. GROMYKO Guantanamo base in the protocol statement. Castro, we will notify you of the possibility In this we proceed from the fact that the pro- of forwarding this text to the Americans and {Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian tocol statement contains Article 16, which U Thant on behalf of the Soviet Union and Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- stipulates the necessity of carrying out ne- Cuba. tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- gotiations on other issues, including issues If you have any thoughts pertaining to vided to CWIHP, and on file at National raised in Fidel Castro’s statement of 28 Oc- the local situation, communicate them. Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- tober, i.e. in other words, the issue of the Confirm reception of this telegram. lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.] military base in Guantanamo. As far as a possible Security Council [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian resolution with regard to the protocol state- Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister ment is concerned, in negotiations you tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to should aim for the Council’s approving a vided to CWIHP, and on file at National Cuba A.I. Alekseev, 31 October 1962 resolution that would generally contain the Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- following basic points: lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- Visit Fidel Castro and tell him the fol- “1. The Security Council welcomes sity.] lowing: with satisfaction and expresses its approval 1. Say, that in Moscow we consider it of the agreement reached by the govern- Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister necessary to satisfy U Thant’s desire that ments of the USSR, the USA, and Cuba with Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to the launchers, which are being dismantled, the participation of the acting Secretary Cuba A.I. Alekseev, 31 October 1962 be shown to him and persons accompany- General of the UN U Thant, on measures to ing him, among them General Rikhye, even be taken for normalizing the Caribbean situ- You should visit F. Castro and, after in the course of dismantling. It is advanta- ation, which facilitates the lessening of the reference to these instructions, tell him the geous for us, especially taking into account 306 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

that U Thant has promised to make a state- Met Fidel Castro and gave to him let- ment immediately on his return to the USA, After we learned that the Cubans will ter from N.S. Khrushchev.14 that the Soviet Union had fulfilled its com- not permit U Thant and his advisors to visit Castro read it attentively and, while mitments. the dismantling of military sites, and hon- doing so, made two remarks. Inform [Castro] also about our consent oring Rikhye’s request to meet with the So- 1. There are not [merely] some Cuban to permit U Thant’s representatives, if he viet general, Comrade Pavlov [Pliyev] and comrades who do not understand the deci- raises such a question, to be allowed to visit I made the decision to engage U Thant in sion regarding the removal of the special sites of dismantling even after U Thant’s talks with myself and General [Igor D.] weapons, but the whole Cuban people. departure from Cuba, in order to check that Statsenko,13 who would offer him and 2. Apparently, N.S. Khrushchev did not the dismantling has been carried out and to Rikhye detailed information on the issues understand me or the translation was not be sure about the launchers’ withdrawal raised by them yesterday. correct since in the cable of 27 [26?] Octo- from Cuba. Preliminary to our decision to visit U ber I did not suggest to be the first in deliv- Immediately inform about these in- Thant, I informed President Dorticos, who ering a blow against the adversary territory structions Pavlov [Pliyev], who has to ful- supported this step. during the crisis, but in the case if there were fill them without delay. In our talks with U Thant and Rikhye an aggression against Cuba and Soviet 2. Inform Fidel Castro that in Moscow we provided the following information: people would be perishing together with the it is considered advantageous U Thant’s pro- The dismantling of the weaponry was Cubans.15 posal about creating UN posts on the terri- begun on the evening of 28 October, and in I told Castro that the translation had tory of Cuba, corresponding countries of a general way has practically already been been made correctly and, I suppose, the Latin America, and in the USA territory in completed by today. By the end of 1 No- sense of his cable had been understood cor- order to observe compliance with the com- vember or at the latest 2 November all weap- rectly in Moscow since it was clearly said mitments; this proposal corresponds to both onry will have been sent to ports for load- there about the condition of an aggression the interests of Cuba and our common in- ing onto ships. The arrival times of the ships against Cuba, but even in this case it is terests. Implementation of this proposal for may be known only by Moscow, and we hardly possible to approach merely me- a “UN presence,” made by U Thant, would requested that the answer to U Thant on this chanically such an important issue and to mean that the UN equally regard Cuba and issue be sent to New York. use nuclear arms without looking for other the USA on this issue. That is advantageous U Thant and Rikhye expressed thanks means. for the party which does not intend to at- for the information, saying that for them it Castro didn’t make any additional com- tack, i.e. for Cuba, and it is not advantageous was the chief result of the trip to Cuba, and ment on the letter and said that it was nec- for the party with aggressive intentions, i.e. probably the most significant one after Com- essary to read it once more and to think. for the USA and their assistants from the rade N.S. Khrushchev’s letter of 28 Octo- Today Castro was more composed and Latin American countries. ber. said that Da’Cunha, a Brazilian general, had Immediately inform Pavlov [Pliyev] U Thant asked General Statsenko come to see him with a personal message about these instructions too. whether he could refer to the latter in his from [Brazilian President Joao] Goulart and Express confidence that Fidel Castro report and mention his family name. suggested the good offices of Brazil in set- and his friends would also accept U Thant’s We gave a positive response, saying tling the conflict with the USA upon receiv- proposal, which is very important for us. that Comrade Statsenko had been entrusted ing from them non-aggression guarantees. We proceed from the assumption that with the dismantling of the weaponry, and Da’Cunha said that Brazil would not break the Cuban government and comrade Pavlov he answered these questions responsibly. relations with Cuba and would continue to [Pliyev] would undertake all the necessary U Thant said nothing about his talks trade. measures on site. with Fidel Castro. Your instructions were He suggested to begin gradual disar- Cable report on the execution of these received after the talks with U Thant. mament upon receiving guarantees and to instructions. come forward with a statement about Cuba’s A. GROMYKO 31.X.62 ALEKSEEV non-interference into affairs of the Latin American countries. [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Castro said that such an approach is the Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- most correct one and therefore the Cubans tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- had told Da’Cunha that they had been ac- vided to CWIHP, and on file at National vided to CWIHP, and on file at National cepting such a mediation and were ready for Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- the suggested measures under the condition lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.] lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- that the USA accept the 5 points of the Cu- sity.] ban statement including that of eliminating Telegram from Soviet ambassador to the Guantanamo base. Castro asked what Cuba A. I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Cable from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba have we spoken about with U Thant and Ministry, 31 October 1962 Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, himself informed [me] about their conver- 31 October 1962 sation, what has already been recounted to 31 October me by Dorticos. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 307

ban government would carry on negotiations 31/X/62 ALEKSEEV 1 November 1962 within the framework of the UN only on the basis of the five principles laid out in [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian On 31 October U Thant, after his re- Castro’s statement of 28 October, and on no Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- turn from Cuba, informed us of the results other basis. U Thant has communicated this tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- of his trip. to Stevenson. vided to CWIHP, and on file at National 1. According to U Thant, his main task Stevenson told U Thant that he would Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- was to ask whether Fidel Castro would give pass all this on to President Kennedy today. lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.] his consent to the establishment in Cuba of 6. We asked U Thant what further steps UN groups monitoring the dismantling of he intended to take. U Thant said that on Telegram from Soviet Foreign Ministry Soviet military installations. Castro’s re- the next day, 1 November, he would inform to A.A. Soboleva and A.F. Dobrynin at sponse was negative. Castro said that Cuba the members of the Security Council, each the Soviet Embassy in Washington, was a sovereign, independent state, and that one separately, of the results of his visit to 31 October 1962 if it allowed UN monitoring on its territory, Cuba, but that he was not prepared to call a it would be a humiliation for the Republic. meeting of the Council before 6 November 31 October 1962 If the Soviet government gives its consent (the day on which the national elections will to the monitoring, then such monitoring be held in the USA). 1. On 28 October the Ministry sent to should be carried out outside the borders of U Thant said as well that he consid- the USA embassy a note of protest from the Cuba’s territorial waters. ered it expedient to begin the next day to Soviet government to the American govern- 2. U Thant then asked Castro whether work out the details of the monitoring of ment concerning the flights around the So- he could leave his own representatives be- Soviet vessels bound for Cuba by represen- viet ship “Simferopol” by American planes hind in Havana for contact with the Cuban tatives of the International Red Cross. He on 24 October of this year, and also con- government. Castro said that it would be asked to select a representative from among cerning the cannon-fire during these flights. better to maintain such contact in New York ourselves. In response to our question as to On 31 October the embassy in a through the new Cuban delegate to the UN, how U Thant envisaged, after his visit to reponse note declares that no artillery shots C[arlos]. Lechuga (who arrived from Cuba Cuba, the monitoring of these vessels, he at the “Simferopol” or near it had been car- with U Thant) and through the minister of said that such monitoring would have to be ried out, and that the command of the foreign affairs, Roa, who would soon arrive carried out not in Cuban ports, but on the “Simferopol” could have mistaken for gun- in New York. open sea. fire the use by the plane’s pilot of several 3. U Thant met in Cuba with the So- magnetic photo-illuminating cartridges. viet ambassador and a Soviet general, who 1.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV 2. On 30 October the embassy sent to informed him that the dismantling of mili- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note of tary installations had begun on 28 October [Source: AVP RF, Moscow; copy obtained protest concerning the “obvious inability or and would be finished by 1 or 2 November. by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at refusal of the Soviet powers responsible for On his return to New York, U Thant National Security Archive, Washington, upholding the social order to take measures informed Stevenson of the dismantling, and D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, in recent days to defend the personnel and appealed to him to cease the “quarantine,” Harvard University.] the property of the embassy.”16 for which there seems, even from the Ameri- The embassy raises the issue of the re- can point of view, to be no need. Prolong- pair of or compensation for damages in- ing the “quarantine” will put the Cuban Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to curred by embassy property and personnel, people in a difficult situation. the USA A. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign and also “expects appropriate measures to 4. U Thant addressed a request to Ministry, forwarding telegram from G. be taken for averting a repetition of such Castro to return to the USA the pilot of the A. Zhukov, 1 November 1962 cases.” This has been conveyed for infor- U-2 ariplane that had been shot down over mational purposes. Cuba, if that pilot was still alive. Castro said We relay a telegram from Comrade that the pilot was dead, but that he would Zhukov: [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian send his body back to the USA, if the UN “On 31 October I met successively Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob- would take care of the transportation mat- with [White House spokesman Pierre] tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro- ters. Castro also said that the Cuban gov- Salinger, Thompson, [Assistant Secretary of vided to CWIHP, and on file at National ernment would be continuing to act as it had State for Far Eastern Affairs and Averell] Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- been up to this point with regard to Ameri- Harriman, and Lippmann. The welcome was lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- can planes violating the air space of Cuba. decidedly cordial, and all communicated sity.] U Thant has communicated this to their warm greetings to N.S. Khrushchev, Stevenson. and expressed gratitude for his wise actions Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign 5. U Thant asked Castro what he imag- that have opened up the way toward a settle- Minister V.V. Kuznetsov to USSR ined the future role of the UN to be in the ment of the Cuban problem. Foreign Ministry, 1 November 1962 Cuban affair. Castro answered that the Cu- At the same time all the participants 308 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

emphasized the necessity of confirming as article had suggested to N.S. Khrushchev quickly as possible, by way of inspection the idea of raising such a question. It is necessary that you meet with [U.S. through any means (through the Red Cross, Lippmann said that he had been writing the negotiator John J.] McCloy. Inform him that neutral observers, or aerial photos), that the article taking into consideration data which you have delivered a report on the content Soviet bases are being dismantled and the had previously received from high-ranking of the conversation with him, as well as on missiles are being removed. They referred officers of the U.S. Agency for disarma- the statement that the government of the to the growing campaign of right-wing fig- ment.17 Several officers of this Agency USA, in an expression of its goodwill, has ures who assert that “Kennedy has once believe that the question of bases has be- agreed that there be no monitoring of So- again become the victim of Soviet decep- come rather obsolete and it must be solved. viet vessels bound for Cuba until the Inter- tion.” This is especially dangerous for Lippmann himself proceeds from the national Red Cross is involved in such moni- Kennedy on the eve of the national elections. assumption that the issues of American toring. In reponse to this, you have been in- For this reason it is extremely urgent for him bases in Turkey and Italy can be solved in structed by Moscow to inform McCloy that to receive any available evidence that the the relatively near future. There is a certain our view of this goodwill gesture is a sym- agreement with N.S. Khrushchev has been progress of mood regarding this issue in pathetic one. It will allow the speedy arrival carried out. Washington. Nevertheless, by no means can of Soviet ships into Cuban ports, and will All participants said that settling the it be related to the Cuban events. For a num- facilitate the removal of the dismantled in- Cuban crisis would open the way to resolu- ber of reasons, Kennedy’s administration stallations from Cuba. tions of other emerging problems: a prohi- can’t do that. A corresponding decision can The question of whether to allow ob- bition on nuclear testing, an agreement on be formalized as one of the first, partial ac- servers onto Cuban territory is, of course, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, an tions in the framework of disarmament, but an issue that must be decided by Cuba, in agreement between NATO and the Warsaw necessarily waiting for a final agreement its capacity as a sovereign state. The Cu- Pact members on a series of issues, and so upon a plan of general and complete disar- bans, and only the Cubans, can make deci- on. mament. sions on questions of that sort. They still consider the prospect of a Lippmann also said that during the We would like, however, to reach an meeting between N.S. Khrushchev and Cuban crisis Thompson played a certain agreement with the Americans that will keep Kennedy to be a distant one, but they assert positive deterrent role at the White House. this whole affair under control. that it will become a necessity when the But in general in the course of the last year, In the next few days, until 7 or 8 or at Cuban problem is settled, and when appro- according to Lippmann, Thompson has con- the very latest 10 November, we intend to priate preparations are made on the level of siderably evolved and become closer to [So- load the dismantled materials onto ships and the staff for guaranteeing that constructive viet expert Charles] Bohlen’s point of view, remove them from Cuba. We have no ob- decisions will be made. i.e., there is no hope of reaching an agree- jections to disclosing photographs of the I will relay details from New York. ment with the Soviet Union on principal is- dismantled and disabled launch pads, as well Zhukov.” sues due to its extreme obstinacy. With such as of the loaded missiles, which the Presi- a pessemistic mood Thompson has returned dent and the government of the USA have 1.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN from the Soviet Union. called offensive weaponry. Lippmann confirmed that during the We also would have no objections to [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, Cuban conflict the USA had been very close your ships being shown, at close distance, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National to war. Even dates for the bombing of the the missiles loaded on the Soviet ships. But Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- Soviet missile bases in Cuba had been we think that there will scarcely be any lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- planned — October 29 or 30, but N.S. doubts in your minds as to the certainty that, sity.] Khrushchev’s response of October 28 to once we have announced the dismantling of Kennedy’s “great relief” drastically altered the military installations and the removal of Cable from Soviet ambassador to the the subsequent course of events. the missiles, we will carry out these actions USA A. F. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign within the period indicated by us. Ministry, 1 November 1962 01/XI/62 A. DOBRYNIN I have been entrusted with the task of emphasizing that the Soviet party is trying 1 November 1962 [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, to settle this whole issue quickly on the ba- provided to CWIHP, and on file at National sis of compromise, mutual concessions, and At one of the receptions I had a con- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- on the conditions put forth in statements by versation with W. Lippmann. He confirmed, lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.] the Chair of the Council of Ministers of the half in jest, that he “caught it hot” for hav- USSR [Khrushchev] and by the President ing published [in a column published on 25 Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister of the USA. October—ed.], in the middle of the Cuban A. Gromyko to Deputy Foreign As far as the flights by American planes crisis, an article about the possibility of ex- Minister V.V. Kuznetsov at the Soviet over Cuban territory are concerned, the changing Soviet missile bases in Cuba for Mission in New York, 1 November 1962 Cubans’ categorical objections are fully American missile bases in Turkey, insofar understood and are believed to be justifi- as “a lot of people” here considered that his 1 November 1962 able, since such flights represent a blatant COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 309 violation of the sovereignty of the Republic be unleashed. It is necessary that you and Comrade of Cuba. The Americans should take into The second course of action is to get Pavlov [Pliyev] to be guided by this infor- account that such actions affect the national from the UN some information on the dis- mation. Similar instructions to Comrade feelings of the Cuban people, which can mantling of the bases. The government of Pavlov are being given though the Ministry only complicate the settlement of the diffi- the USA could then be satisfied with this as of Defense. cult issues before us. The Americans would a prerequisite for lifting the quarantine. Confirm reception of this telegram. have acted reasonably if they had already Robert Kennedy emphasized that he was not ceased this sort of flight, as they should have yet prepared to talk about the details of this A.G. done given that the condition expressed in whole affair, since the President did not yet the above-mentioned statements stipulating have any information on the results of U [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, the dismantling of missile installations has Thant’s trip. Within an hour, said Robert provided to CWIHP, and on file at National been fulfilled, and given that the dismantled Kennedy, a government meeting would take Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- materials are being brought together for place in which this issue would be exam- lation by John Henriksen.] loading onto ships. ined. He promised in the event of an emer- In conclusion, tell McCloy that we ex- gency to get in touch with me directly, or, if Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister pect the Americans to lift the quarantine this occurs during my trip to New York to A. A. Gromyko to the Soviet Mission in immediately and completely. meet with [CPSU CC Politburo member] New York, 1 November 1962 A.I. Mikoyan, through Stevenson and AG Kuznetsov. To the SOVIET MISSION— COMRADES Robert Kennedy emphasized that the KUZNETSOV, ZORIN [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, point was not that they do not trust our in- provided to CWIHP, and on file at National formation on this account, but rather the First. Judging by your reports [several Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- question of how to present this whole affair words deleted—ed.], the USA and several lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- to the public opinion of the USA in connec- other states belonging to the Security Coun- sity.] tion with the earlier statements offered by cil may try to complicate the negotiations the President. It was felt that he had been underway now in New York among the rep- Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to somewhat worried by how Fidel Castro resentatives of the USSR, Cuba, and the the USA A. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign might hinder the carrying out of the agree- USA, by submitting all the issues being dis- Ministry, 1 November 1962 ment that had been reached. cussed in the course of the negotiations to the consideration of the Security Council. [first page of two-page document is miss- 1.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN This is visible in the proposal by the Irish ing from copy obtained by CWIHP—ed.] delegate, Boland, that the Security Council [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, hear U Thant’s report and pass a resolution [...Dobrynin] expressed the hope, in accor- provided to CWIHP, and on file at National for delegating to U Thant the task of creat- dance with the letter sent by N.S. Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- ing a special UN mechanism for monitor- Khrushchev, that the USA would renounce lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- ing the dismantling of the special installa- the quarantine without waiting for the in- sity.] tions in Cuba. Besides this, his proposal also troduction of a supplementary procedure for stipulates that the other issues of the “Cu- inspecting ships, and so on. Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister ban settlement” may also be discussed in Robert Kennedy has said that this is- A. Gromyko to Soviet Ambassador in the Security Council, although the decision sue does not represent any difficulties. The Havana, with a copy sent to Kuznetsov on it may be postponed somewhat. All this important thing for us now (he implied that in New York, 1 November 1962 means that the USA, along with other coun- he was talking about public opinion, rather tries that support its policy, wants to take than the thoughts of the President himself), 1 November 1962 all these issues into its own hands in order is to have some confirmation, from the UN to drag out the resolution of the issues con- for example, that the Soviet bases are being The date for the removal of the dis- cerning the security guarantees for Cuba, as dismantled, and that the corresponding mis- mantled special materials from Cuba has well as the securing, by way of agreements, sile weaponry is being removed. been set for 7 or 8 November, but not later of the USA duties that have emerged from We and the USA government have es- than 10 November. This has become pos- the exchange of messages between Comrade sentially two possible courses of actions in sible as a result of the fact that the necessity N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy. this matter: first, to carry out reconnaissance of observing strict secrecy in the transfer of You should firmly object to such an flights over Cuba. But this entails the dan- the special materials has fallen away. For attempt to replace the trilateral negotiations, ger that the Cubans (he emphasized the the removal of these materials it is now pos- in which U Thant is participating, with a Cubans, and not the Russians) may shoot sible and advisable to use our usual ships submission of all the issues to the consider- down an American plane, and thus a pos- located in Cuban ports or arriving there in ation of the Security Council, in which it sible new and highly undesirable chain re- the coming days, and there is no need to hide would be impossible, given its present com- action of events in the Cuban affair would such materials in the ship holds. position, to reach resolutions that are advan- 310 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tageous for us. Make a statement about this duration, for example, of a year, is not ap- in categorical form to U Thant, Stevenson, propriate. [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, as well as to the UN delegates of the other 4. On UN posts. In connection with the provided to CWIHP, and on file at National nations that will deal with this issue along issue you proposed of monitoring certain Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- with you. Insist on the necessity of prolong- regions of the USA and several Latin Ameri- lation by John Henriksen.] ing the trilateral negoatiations with U can countries with the goal of determining Thant’s participation, and on their speedy whether preparations for the invasion of Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister completion by securing the results of the Cuba are underway, follow the instructions Gromyko to Soviet Mission in New negotiations in a corresponding written in which we expressed our positive view of York, for A. I. Mikoyan, agreement (a protocol statement). U Thant’s proposal concerning the “UN 1 November 1962 Second. 1. On the monitoring of the presence” in these countries and in Cuba. dismantling and the removal of the special You may approve the proposal that the 1 November 1962 installations. Concerning the issue of moni- composition of the UN posts for carrying toring the performance of work towards dis- out the indicated functions be similar to the Comrade N.S. Khrushchev has en- mantling the special installations in Cuba, composition of the groups of agents for trusted me with the task of relaying the fol- you should operate on the assumption that monitoring the dismantling and removal of lowing to you: the dismantling process will be completed special missile materials from the territory 1. We have specified here that our in- by 2 November, and that the dismantled of Cuba. stallations now being dismantled can be materials will be removed from Cuba by 7 5. On American bases in Turkey. We shipped out of Cuba by 7 or 8 or at the lat- or 8 November, or at the very latest 10 No- agree with your opinion. You should not in est 10 November. This must be your point vember, if our ships arrive without hindrance any circumstance touch on this issue in your of departure in your talks with U Thant, in Cuban ports. negotiations with U Thant and the USA rep- McCloy, and our Cuban friends. Of course 2. On the composition of the group of resentatives in New York, since it is the sub- this is only on the condition that our ships Security Council agents. Proceed on the as- ject of direct negotiations between Moscow will be granted safe passage into Cuban sumption that for us it is acceptable that the and Washington. On this point we are keep- ports. group monitoring the fulfillment of duties ing you informed only for your personal 2. In the talks with Fidel Castro, de- to dismantle and remove the special missile edification. pending on how these talks unfold, you installations from Cuba contain representa- 6. On the concept of “offensive weap- should make use of the following points in tives from the neutral states proposed by U onry.” We consider it inexpedient to change your argumentation: Thant (Sweden, Ethiopia, the United Arab the formula that was used in Comrade N.S. Emphasize that it is the necessity of a Republic, Mexico, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Swit- Khrushchev’s messages and in the protocol speedy lifting of the so-called quarantine zerland). Also you may not object to the draft communicated by you, namely: “weap- that, in our opinion, our Cuban friends are proposal that this group consist of eight rep- onry which the USA government has called most interested in. They know better than resentatives of the neutral nations belong- offensive.” anyone else whether Cuba needs the ship- ing to the Disarmament Committee (India, Your proposal to call this weaponry ments of goods presently on Soviet ships Burma, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, “means for launching nuclear arms at an on the open sea. These cargoes cannot re- Ethiopia, Mexico, Brazil, Sweden), if such operational distance greater than (so many) main on the open sea for long. Among them a proposal is introduced. There are also no kilometers” could allow the discussion of are perishable cargoes. Moreover, it must objections to including in the group the rep- this issue to acquire an undesirable charac- be taken into account that there is also an resentatives of Indonesia, Ceylon, the ter for us, since the Americans will natu- economic aspect to this issue: we are suf- United Arab Republic, and Ghana, as you rally be trying to broaden the scope of the fering great expenses because the vessels are propose. weaponry prohibited from installations in being detained on their courses. A further We consider unacceptable the Ameri- Cuba. detainment will only increase these finan- cans’ proposal for the creation of monitor- Third. Concerning all the main issues cial losses. Cuba is not concealing these ing groups composed of the USA, the relevant to the duties of the parties— the losses from us. Of course it may be that Cuba USSR, and Cuba. USA, the USSR, and Cuba— and the se- is ready to bear the burden of these doubled 3. On the monitoring of vessels bound curing of their corresponding pledges, fol- expenses, in which case it is a different story. for Cuba, after the lifting of the blockade. low the text of the protocol statement and We see that you and we have different ap- You should proceed from the fact that we the instructions contained in our memo- proaches to how this issue must be resolved. have given our consent to the monitoring of randa. Bear in mind, however, that as we If our Cuban friends are for some rea- Soviet vessels bound for Cuba by the Inter- have already informed you, you will be car- son not willing to facilitate the resolution national Red Cross. It is envisaged that this rying out these instructions, as well as the of this issue, we will be placed in a situa- monitoring will be carried out until the end instructions contained in the “second” point tion in which we will have to recall the ships. of the so-called “quarantine.” From this it of the present telegram, only on receiving For at present we are suffering unjustified follows that the monitoring will be short- reports from us that our Cuban friends have expenses. term. Your proposal that the system for agreed to these proposals. It is impossible not to take into account monitoring the vessels be operative for the A.G. the damages being inflicted on our prestige COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 311 because of the present situation in which our U Thant took a good initiative with the aim the exchange of letters between him and vessels remain immobilized on the open sea. of resolving the Cuban crisis and that in this Fidel Castro. In his first appeal to Castro, U This cannot continue endlessly. regard we are ackowledging his large con- Thant called on him to cooperate with the We believe that the missiles have tribution. This raises the authority of U UN in the name of securing peace. In his achieved their effect, and achieved it well. Thant himself as well as of the United Na- reply, Castro invited U Thant to visit Cuba You say that you do not believe the Ameri- tions that could express itself in such a dan- personally in his capacity of acting UN Sec- cans. We too do not believe them. But we gerous situation. retary General and to discuss with him the are operating on the assumption that the He remarked then that although the issues concerning the attitude of the gov- socialist states should take the necessary immediate danger of war has ebbed, never- ernment of Cuba on the question under con- steps to ensure their security, and to coexist theless there are political and diplomatic sideration of the Security Council. with the USA. It is possible that I am sim- difficulties and they should be resolved ac- U Thant accepted this invitation and ply repeating here what I was saying to you cording to the ideas and proposals advanced visited Cuba, staying there on 30 and 31 before your trip, but I think that these con- in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev [and] October. He held two meetings with Prime cerns should be borne in mind when you Kennedy and in the declaration of Castro. Minister Castro, when the Cuban issue was are presenting our case to Castro. This does He stressed that for its part the Soviet Union discussed. In Havana he met some diplo- not mean, of course, that they should be was ready to continue its efforts to achieve mats accredited by the government of expressed literally and explicitly. But you final resolution of the Cuban issue. He re- Castro. The most useful conversations were must make him clearly understand that we marked that the acting Secretary General ones with the Ambassadors of Brazil, Yu- are worried by the unreasonable position that could exercise a certain influence, using his goslavia, the UAR [United Arab Republic], our Cuban comrades have been forced to authority, in the process of ultimate settle- and the USSR. take. ment of the conflict. One of the issues on U Thant’s agenda He informed that he was heading for during the trip was to clarify the reaction of 1.XI.62 A. GROMYKO Cuba to meet with the Cuban friends, and the Cuban government concerning the decided to stop in New York in order to see agreement of the Soviet Union to allow U.N. [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, U Thant and hear his considerations with observers to check on the fulfillment of the provided to CWIHP, and on file at National regard to his recent trip to Cuba. commitment to dismantle Soviet missile Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- U Thant welcomed com. Mikoyan. He launchers in Cuba and to return them to the lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- reminded him of their meetings in Yalta in USSR. sity.] November 1955 when U Thant accompa- Castro said in categorical form that nied [Burmese leader] U Nu, and then in Cuba is a sovereign and independent state Cable of V.V. Kuznetsov on 1 November Burma. U Thant recalled with warmth his and it would not allow any external organi- 1962 Conversation between CPSU CC meetings with N.S. Khrushchev in 1955 in zation - be it the UN or anything else - to Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan and Yalta as well as during the trip of N.S. interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba. Im- Acting UN Secretary General U Thant, Khrushchev to Burma, and also in the position of inspection on the part of the UN 2 November 1962 United Nations in 1960 and again this year would be considered by the Cuban people in the Soviet Union. U Thant expressed his as an infringement on its sovereign rights Ciphered telegram sincere gratitude to N.S. Khrushchev for his and would be considered as a humiliation Top Secret encouraging words passed to him in his let- of the people of Cuba. Such a step cannot No copying is allowed ters to U Thant and also through our repre- be accepted by the Cuban government. If Copy no. 1 sentatives in the UN. He values highly and the USSR wants to meet the announced rejoices at the assessment that the Soviet goals of sending the groups of inspectors, 2 November 1962 Union gives to his efforts in the resolution then Castro believes that such inspections of the Cuban issue. might be carried out outside of the territo- CC CPSU U Thant stressed that the position of rial waters of Cuba. the Soviet government and its head N.S. Castro informed U Thant that on Thurs- Transmitting the record of conversa- Khrushchev in the Cuban crisis was grate- day, 1 November, he was going to speak on tion of com. A.I. Mikoyan fully received by the vast majority of the radio and television with a speech where he The conversation took place with U peoples of all the world and met with grati- intends to mention this issue. U Thant re- Thant on 1 November 1962 in the U.N. mis- tude by the whole mankind. He remarked portedly advised Castro to postpone this sion [of the USSR - trans.]. that the people now see much more clearly speech, since it is very delicate and would At the start com. Mikoyan passed to U the sincere desire of the Soviet Union to be assessed as a declaration of policy with Thant regard from com. N.S. Khrushchev have the UN as an efficacious instrument all consequences that flow out of it. Castro as well as on his own behalf. He told U Thant for maintaining peace and for preventing responded to U Thant that he had already that N.S. Khrushchev recalls with warmth war. put off making of this speech with regard to the conversations that he had with the act- After that U Thant turned to his trip to [U Thant’s] visit in Cuba. If the speech were ing Secretary General. Personally N.S. Cuba and said the following. delayed one more time, then people would Khrushchev and his colleagues believe that The trip was taken in connection with not understand it. Therefore Castro could not 312 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

once again postpone his speech. although he received with understanding the voluntary suspension of the quarantine on The U Thant asked Castro not to men- viewpoint of the Prime Minister of Cuba. the part of the USA. tion in his speech the position of the gov- Then in the conversations U Thant and U Thant informed Castro about the ernment of Cuba regarding the [issue of] UN Castro touched on the issue about “the UN acceptance on the part of the Soviet Union inspection, to which he gladly agreed, say- presence” in the region of the Caribbean sea of such a voluntary commitment, and also ing that he would remove this paragraph during the period of the crisis. that the USA would have also agreed to sus- from the text he had already prepared. U Thant told Castro that in the inter- pend the quarantine for 2-3 weeks, on the U Thant asked com. Mikoyan, having ests of the government of Cuba and the Cu- condition that there would be a mechanism in mind the confidential character of his ban people themselves it would be useful to for checking if Soviet ships heading for conversations with Castro, not to raise this have in Havana UN representatives, and, if Cuba were not carrying arms. issue on his own initiative. Castro agrees, he was ready to leave 2 to 3 U Thant informed Castro also that the As Castro pointed out, in his speech of his officials to establish contacts and to Soviet Union had agreed that the Red Cross he planned to lay out the entire foreign follow-up on their dialogue. should deal with inspection of vessels out- policy of Cuba and in particularly to em- Castro responded that had the govern- side of the boundaries of the territorial wa- phasize the five points on the settlement of ment of Cuba agreed at the present moment ters of Cuba. He said that for the Red Cross the Cuban crisis he had advanced on 28 to the presence of UN representatives in it would have been more convenient to in- October. To this U Thant responded that in Cuba, it could have been interpreted by spect ships in the ports of arrival, and not in view of the deliberations on the Cuban is- people as consent to the presence of inspect- the open sea, if, of course, the government sue in the Security Council and his own ing groups of the United Nations. While of Cuba agreed to that. speech he could not do it. The Security saying so, he referred to American radio Castro said to this, that his government Council did not authorize him to discuss broadcasts which affirm on an hourly basis would not allow groups of the Red Cross to with the sides issues of permanent or long- that the U Thant mission had exactly the inspect Soviet ships on Cuban territory, but term character of settlement of the conflict inspection goals in mind. Under such terms if the USSR agreed to the inspection, then in the Caribbean sea. people might have misperceived such a step. the UN should start organizing this business To this Castro responded that a tempo- Castro asked U Thant not to insist on this on the open sea. rary resolution of immediate problems did proposal. Responding to the question of U Thant not resolve the Cuban issue as a whole. The He then declared that, if the Security about a possible time of convocation of a resolution of these immediate questions, in Council accepted some kind of formula to next session of the Security Council on the the opinion of the government of Cuba, had resolve the Cuban issue on a permanent ba- Cuban issue, Castro said that he would have to be linked to resolution of the longer-term sis, then he, Castro, would be glad to have preferred that the Council convene no problems. The Security Council had to dis- some kind of UN presence on the recipro- sooner than next Wednesday, i.e. after the cuss also and resolve the issue about a last- cal basis. However, this cannot be done in elections in the United States. ing peace in the area of the Caribbean sea. the present phase. Com. Mikoyan thanked U Thant for If the Security Council were preoccupied In conversations with Castro, U Thant interesting and useful information, stress- with resolution of only immediate problems, raised the question about the return to the ing that this would facilitate his talks with then similar problems would emerge in the USA on humanitarian grounds of an Ameri- Prime Minister Fidel Castro. foreseeable future again, and they could cre- can pilot who, according to press publica- He observed that the Americans were ate a situation similar to the current one. tions, had vanished without a trace in the now trying to focus all attention on the dis- Therefore the government of Cuba is con- area of Cuba. Castro told him that the USA mantling and withdrawal of missile equip- vinced that to ensure lasting and secure aircraft of the type U-2 had indeed violated ment, doing nothing on their part concern- peace in the whole world it is necessary that the aerial space over Cuba in violation of ing the guarantees of Cuba’s security. the Security Council should preoccupy it- international legislation and the UN Char- Therefore Castro is right when he self with the issue of ensuring lasting peace ter. It was shot down by the Cubans, the pi- speaks about the need to solve the Cuban in the Caribbean region. In case the Secu- lot died, since he could not bail out. Castro issue on a permanent basis. Now it is im- rity Council would be convened, Castro in- would have been ready to return the pilot, portant to move from general declarations tends to send to the UN Minister of Foreign and alive, but he is dead, therefore he is to concrete steps for cardinal solution of the Affairs Raul Roa so that he would present ready to return the body under auspices of entire issue on the basis of the letters of the viewpoint of his government on the en- the UN. (This information U Thant passed N.S. Khrushchev [and] Kennedy, and also tire Cuban issue. The delegation of Cuba to the Americans). the just and constructive proposals of Fidel would address the Security Council with a Castro also said that any further viola- Castro. Naturally, the Americans will object request to find a lasting and final solution tion of the aerial borders of Cuba would be to some proposals of Castro, but his pro- to this issue. The government of Cuba is dealt with in a similar way. posals face in the right direction. firmly convinced that such a solution can The next question that was discussed On the time of convening the Security be found only on the basis of 5 points ad- between U Thant and Castro was about a Council, com. Mikoyan remarked that we vanced on 28 October by Premier Castro. voluntary suspension by the Soviet Union understand the considerations of Fidel on U Thant told Castro that at that point of its supplies of weapons for Cuba for a this score. We also would like to say that he was not competent to discuss this issue, period of 2 to 3 weeks and the simultaneous since general principles of complete liqui- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 313 dation of the conflict has been adopted and in the UN even before his trip to Cuba and perhaps 10-15 days will be required. He declared by the interested sides, and also by they seemed interested. Some Latin Ameri- promised to raise this issue in the forthcom- the UN, since the acting Secretary General can delegates not only were interested in this ing conversation with McCloy. is taking active part in this, then, in our opin- idea but also let U Thant understand that U Thant said that he addresses the ion, the Security Council should be con- such a measure would be desirable. Americans every day with appeals to sus- vened at the moment when the current ne- The USA so far does not want to openly pend the blockade. And yesterday, having gotiations would approach the phase of an express its attitude towards this proposal of returned from Cuba, he did the same, mak- agreed-upon document finalizing this crisis. U Thant. Its reaction was reduced to the ar- ing the Americans aware that he was con- Until then convening of the Security Coun- gument that, well, since this arrangement vinced that the dismantling had begun and cil would hardly assist in this matter. concerns all the countries of Western hemi- was under way as it had been promised, and Com. Mikoyan voiced the idea that sphere, this issue should be discussed in the that it would be finished by the announced after the end of talks of the sides, some kind Organization of American States. date. of document might be passed for approval Com. Mikoyan asked U Thant about Com. Mikoyan thanked U Thant for his to the Security Council and on its basis and his opinion regarding a possible form of the useful and exhaustive information. They in following up on it the Council might take document stating the reached agreement. agreed that for the press they will announce a decision on subsequent practical steps. U Thant said that if the sides agree in about useful exchange of opinions and the Such a document might have the character general, then the goal will be reached friendly atmosphere of the conversation. of a protocol which would describe talks that through any such document in the form of At the end of the conversation U Thant would have taken place between the sides protocol, joint declaration, separate decla- said that if A.I. Mikoyan would come back with participation of U Thant on the basis ration of the sides, agreement and even in via New York, he (U Thant) would be glad of the letters of N.S. Khrushchev and the form of summing-up declaration of the to meet again and learn about the results of Kennedy, and also the declarations of Fidel chairman of the Security Council. the trip. He would like that time to be a more Castro, and that would inform about the Com. Mikoyan asked U Thant also to generous host than now and to invite A.I. achieved agreement that, thereby, would express his personal considerations on the Mikoyan for lunch and breakfast. have been sealed by the Security Council. time of convocation of the Security Coun- The conversation was recorded by [Mikoyan] said to U Thant that we cil. com. Zherebtsov V.N. learned with great interest about his initia- U Thant said that it should be done af- tive concerning the practicality of having ter the elections in the USA, but everything 2.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV observers in Cuba, in the USA, and in other depends on the sides’ agreement. If the sides countries neighboring Cuba for a duration come to agreement, the Council can be con- [Source: AVPRF; obtained by NHK, pro- of some period. He informed [U Thant] that vened at any time. vided to CWIHP, copy on file at National N.S. Khrushchev was delighted to see this Then U Thant passed his wish to thank Security Archive; translation by Vladislav initiative of U Thant and considered it to be the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba for his genu- M. Zubok (National Security Archive).] interesting and useful. It is good that Fidel ine and wholehearted cooperation during the Castro took it in a positive way. This pro- trip of U Thant. In particular, U Thant noted Telegram from Soviet envoy G. Zhukov posal contains in itself the principle of reci- that our Ambassador in Havana and the So- to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962 procity, and the USSR is ready to support viet officer informed him without delay such a proposal. It could be included into a about the time when dismantling of the mis- 2 November 1962 draft protocol. sile units began, about the time when work He asked U Thant if he had spoken to will be finished, and about the fact that ships Yesterday, on 1 November (before din- the Americans on this subject and if so what are commissioned for withdrawal of these ner with A.I. Mikoyan), McCloy invited me was their attitude toward this idea. units. In this regard U Thant asked as a mat- to his residence and said the following: U Thant said that in conversation with ter of personal interest about the time of ar- 1. The Americans express their grati- Soviet representatives he advanced several rival of ships to Cuba to pick up the men- tude for the fact that the American plane formulas for solution of the issue in its en- tioned materiel. making aerial photos of Cuba today was not tirety, and the problem of guarantees in par- Com. Mikoyan confirmed what our subjected to gunfire. The photos are still ticular. At one of these meetings with com. Ambassador in Havana had told U Thant being developed, but the Americans hope Zorin he indeed proposed that, provided the about the time-frame of dismantling. Con- that they will confirm the correctness of the agreement of the sides, the presence of the cerning the time-frame of withdrawal he statement made by the Soviet general in UN in the Western hemisphere, in the said that those ships that are now in Cuba Cuba, to the effect that the missile disman- flashpoints, would be useful. Were it to will not suffice. However, with regard to the tling process has already been started. prove acceptable, then, in the opinion of U continuing quarantine Soviet ships cannot 2. McCloy offered a detailed account Thant, such a measure would have facili- sail to Cuba. Therefore it is necessary to lift of how U Thant had informed him of his tated a settlement of the situation in the Car- the quarantine, so that Soviet ships could talks with Castro (the account coincides with ibbean region on the permanent basis. enter Cuban ports, unload their cargoes and what U Thant told our delegation). He said U Thant discussed this idea with heads load on them the dismantled units that he understood the difficulties arising of missions of Latin American [countries] [ustanovki]. If one does it in speedily, then from Castro’s refusal of ground-based in- 314 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

spections, and that now it was necessary to Stevenson, 2 November 1962 had not said it, but that the press gave an find new methods of monitoring that would erroneous interpretation of his speech. confirm that the dismantling and removal [...] We raised the question that it was Stevenson and McCloy confirmed that of the missiles had begun (in McCloy’s opin- necessary to write down in the form of a the USA are [is] ready to give a non-aggres- ion, the best solution would be aerial pho- protocol the important provisions that are sion guarantee to Cuba as it was mentioned tos along with a check on the ships remov- contained in the exchange of messages be- in Kennedy’s letter, if an inspection in some ing the cargoes from Cuba on the open sea. tween N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy tak- form confirms that the Soviet “offensive” McCloy underscored that this monitoring ing into account the statement by Fidel armament is really removed from Cuba. should be formal— without inquiring into Castro. The Americans by all means were Stevenson and McCloy affirmed that the details of the missiles, which are secret). evading discussion of this question and try- the encampments where the Cuban exiles 3. McCloy spoke a lot about the future ing to bring the whole matter to the organi- had been training for an invasion of Cuba prospects of an American-Soviet collabora- zation of control over the dismantling and were currently closed. tion which would open up as a result of the withdrawal from Cuba of the Soviet mis- 2. During the conversation we reso- settling of the Cuban crisis. In his view, it is siles. Nevertheless, in the course of con- lutely demanded the removal of the so- necessary in the first place to reach an agree- versation they were obliged to answer our called “quarantine,” underlining that its con- ment on the cessation of nuclear testing, questions relating to the settlement of the tinuation in no way can help to create a suit- which would make a huge impression on Cuban problem in general and disclosed able atmosphere for the solution of the Cu- public opinion. It would be good if this some of their positions that seem interest- ban problem and may only complicate the agreement could be signed by Kennedy and ing for further negotiations. To save space situation. In this regard we noted that the Khrushchev. Such a meeting would in this cable we omit our remarks during Soviet Union had complied with the request strengthen public faith that their personal the conversation. You may learn them from from U Thant for a temporary suspension contacts can be fruitful. the transcript of the conversation which is of armaments’ supplies to Cuba, but that the McCloy also believes it expedient to being sent separately. USA had not stopped their “quarantine” for conclude an agreement concerning a renun- 1. Though reluctantly, the Americans at least some time, as it had been suggested ciation of the military use of outer space, agreed with the need to fix in documents by U Thant. and to sign a treaty on at least one bilateral the corresponding commitments, including McCloy and Stevenson evaded a clear agreement concerning the colonizing of the non-aggression commitment against answer to the question of ending the “quar- outer space (for example, the launching of Cuba. In their opinion, these documents antine,” having limited themselves to a ref- a Soviet-American rocket aimed at Venus). must include: a statement by the Soviet erence that to the Soviet vessels going to McCloy also reiterated several ideas Union on the completion of the missiles’ Cuba would be applied the same procedure expressed earlier by Salinger and Thomp- evacuation; a USA statement saying they are as it was on October 25 regarding the tanker son (concerning in particular the issue of convinced of the withdrawal and giving cor- “Bucharest,” without an inspection on bases in Turkey—it may be possible, in his responding non-aggression guarantees to board, but with the help of a hailing-request view, to eliminate them in the course of “the Cuba; possibly also a statement by U Thant. by radio. first stage of disarmament”—by way of “re- The statement by the Soviet govern- It is illustrative that in response to our distribution”). ment must be the first. statement that in the event of dropping the 4. McCloy implied that he would play The texts of these statements will be practice of “quarantine” and giving our ves- the role of an unofficial intermediary in the coordinated in advance. sels the possibility to visit Cuba without any preparation of a meeting between Kennedy It is foreseen that a corresponding state- obstacles some 10-15 days will be needed and Khrushchev, which in his view could ment will be made by the Government of to dispatch [from Cuba] all the armaments take place within a few months, if resolu- Cuba. All these statements must be pre- called offensive by the Americans, McCloy tions of the issues enumerated above have sented to the Security Council. and Stevenson said that in their opinion it is been completed by that time. The unwillingness of the Americans to hardly possible from the technical stand- 5. McCloy asked us to pass on his sign a protocol, apparently, can be explained point to carry out the mentioned volume of warm greetings to N. S. Khrushchev and the in addition by the following thing: they do work in such a short period of time. Accord- members of his family, from himself and his not want to put their signature side by side ing to McCloy, at least a month would be own family. with the Cubans’. needed for that. The Americans underlined their readi- 3. There has been a detailed discussion 2.XI.62 G. ZHUKOV ness to include in their statement provisions of methods for control of the dismantling based on corresponding wording from and removal of missiles. [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, Kennedy’s messages regarding the issue of Apparently, feeling the weakness of provided to CWIHP, and on file at National non-aggression guarantees for Cuba. their position and taking into account ob- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- When we mentioned that in the Ameri- jections on the part of Fidel Castro to per- lation by John Henriksen.] can press there has appeared a statement by mit verification on Cuban territory, McCloy D. Rusk to the effect that Kennedy’s state- and Stevenson declared in the course of dis- A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU re 1 ment is not a non-aggression guarantee to cussion that the American side would be November 1962 Meeting with Cuba, Stevenson assured us that D. Rusk ready not to insist on verification methods COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 315 foreseen in the message to N.S. Khrushchev tend to do so not immediately, but some time and was ready to look for some new meth- later?” Soviet Record of 1 November 1962 ods that would in essence give the Ameri- Stevenson said that he was not able to Dinner Conversation between CPSU cans the possibility to be certain of the give an answer to that question insofar as it CC Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan implementation of our commitment to with- is part of the competence of the OAS [Or- and White House envoy John McCloy draw the weapons. ganization of American States]. But perhaps and U.S. Ambassador to the United To our specific question what new we can consider the possibility of organiz- Nations Adlai Stevenson methods was he referring to, McCloy said: ing corresponding regional arrangements, the USA could limit [itself] to the continua- giving the necessary confidence to the coun- Secret. Copy no. 24 tion of their flights which give them confi- tries of the Caribbean. I hope that steadily dence that there has not resumed in Cuba we will succeed in eliminating antagonism an installation of the dangerous for them between Cuba and its neighbors. RECORD OF CONVERSATION OF types of armaments. At the same time Stevenson made the com. A.I. MIKOYAN If Castro is against a ground verifica- observation that currently the “antagonism” WITH JOHN MCCLOY AND ADLAI tion, continued McCloy, another thing could between Cuba and its neighbors is instigated STEVENSON AT A DINNER IN THE be done - a transfer of the lists of armaments by “subversive actions in this region, per- SOVIET MISSION AT THE U.N. withdrawn from Cuba, when they would be haps undertaken mutually.” McCloy noted 1 November 1962 removed, and of the corresponding informa- that “Cuba is the breeding ground of infec- tion, which however would not disclose tion and Venezuela an example.” At the outset of the conversation A.I. Soviet technological secrets. We do know It was clear that in the immediate fu- Mikoyan poses a question about the lifting roughly how many missiles currently are ture the USA [is] not going to re-establish of the American blockade on the surround- situated in Cuba. In this case we could man- diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba. ings of Cuba for the period of negotiations, age without ground verification. We are 5. Stevenson and McCloy stated that as it was proposed by U Thant in his first glad, - said McCloy, - that today our plane the USA refuse[s] point-blank to discuss the missive to com. N.S. Khrushchev and to had not come under fire when it had been question of liquidating the American base President Kennedy on 24 October this year. flying over Cuba. As far as we know the at Guantanamo. A.I. Mikoyan says that the USSR ac- anti-aircraft missiles in Cuba are in the hands 6. In the course of the conversation cepted recommendation of the acting Gen- of your people, not the Cubans, although it’s McCloy attempted to broach the subject of eral Secretary of the U.N., and the United possible that there are some Cuban person- an eventual evacuation from Cuba of the States did not. On 24 October U Thant pro- nel. Soviet “ground-air” anti-aircraft missiles. posed that the Soviet Union would stop de- McCloy received a very firm response We have resolutely warded off this probing, livery of weapons to Cuba for the duration that the USA [has] no right to overfly Cuba declaring that such a question could not be of talks (2 to 3 weeks), and the United States and nobody can guarantee the security of raised and that we had sold these weapons during the same period would suspend the such illegal flights. to a number of countries, including the blockade. The Soviet Union fulfilled the rec- 4. We raised the question of normaliz- United Arab Republic and Indonesia. ommendations of U Thant, but the United ing relations between the USA [and] their McCloy made the observation that “they are States did not. Latin American allies, and Cuba. We also good machines against attacks from air- McCloy remarks that U Thant seeks to asked what is their attitude to U Thant’s plan space.” start as soon as possible to check up Soviet for a UN presence in the Caribbean. The 7. McCloy and Stevenson agreed that vessels sailing to Cuba, by the forces of the Americans flatly rejected any inspection of it would be good for Soviet and American International Red Cross. their territory whatsoever and declared: delegations to try to reach preliminary agree- Stevenson says that the United States “You will have to trust our word.” ments over the issues to be discussed by the hoped that by the end of next week observ- At the same time, Stevenson said that Security Council. ers of the International Red Cross would be the USA aspires to normalize the situation 8. McCloy and Stevenson expressed able to begin their work in Cuba. Here ap- in the Caribbean, but under the condition of satisfaction over the exchange of opinions parently some sort of misunderstanding Castro’s cooperation. We could in some and Stevenson underlined that the USSR and emerges. It was understood that the suspen- form elaborate mutual guarantees, accept- USA positions “are not so far from each sion of the “quarantine” would be condi- able to Castro and his neighbors. If Castro other.” Both of them were inquiring whether tioned on the simultaneous introduction of is afraid of them, they are afraid of him, too. I would stop on my way back [from Cuba]. inspection. I consider, said Stevenson, that after the I said in response that for the moment A.I. Mikoyan objects that no such un- Cuban crisis is settled the tension in this re- I had no plans to do so but if necessary I derstanding took place. gion would be lessened. assumed it would be possible. McCloy remarks that perhaps U Thant In this regard we put the question in did introduce the proposal mentioned by A.I. this way: 2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN Mikoyan, but the United States accepted not “Castro may ask me if the USA [is] his proposal, but the proposal of Chairman going to re-establish diplomatic and eco- [Source: AVPRF; trans. V. Zaemsky; copy Khrushchev in his letter to President nomic relations with Cuba? Maybe you in- on file at National Security Archive.] Kennedy. 316 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Stevenson says that in fact the issue missiles - trans.]. A.I.Mikoyan. It is correct that there is about immediate suspension of the “quar- A.I. Mikoyan. Those who can assemble sufficient amount of armament in Cuba, but antine” is purely academic. Soviet ships will fast, can also disassemble fast. Our military we already stopped sending it there. probably not reach Cuba until next week, are men of discipline, they punctually ful- McCloy. Yes, but we cannot risk, when and meanwhile he hopes that the inspection fill the order of N.S. Khrushchev. But there it may happen that some arms are being of the Red Cross will be already in force, are not enough ships around Cuba to carry withdrawn and other arms are being shipped and then, naturally, there will be no need away the equipment which is the subject of in. When the missile equipment will be for the “quarantine.” the understanding, so in addition other ships shipped off, the political atmosphere will A.I. Mikoyan reiterates that N.S. will be necessary. And your blockade stands ameliorate and it will be easier to agree. You Khrushchev accepted the proposal of U in their way to Cuba and, consequently, preferred U.N. inspections to an inspection Thant and the Americans did not accept it. hampers the withdrawal of missiles. In other of the Red Cross. We agreed to that. We are Stevenson. We believe that a certain words, the “quarantine” turns itself against interested in your ships reaching Cuba soon, understanding was achieved in the letters of your own interests. and we will not obstruct their way. N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. McCloy. We would gladly let your A.I. Mikoyan. Arms were not provided A.I. Mikoyan. This is correct. What ships pass in both directions, if they carry to Cuba to attack the United States, but as a was envisaged in the letters must be imple- all your missiles away. I would like to be on means of [sderzhivaiyuchego], mented and will be implemented. However, the ship that would transport the last mis- so that there was no aggression against had the United States adopted the same rea- siles from Cuba, added McCloy in jest. Cuba. But since in his answer to the letter sonable approach, permeated with good A.I. Mikoyan (in a jocular way). So lift of N.S. Khrushchev J. Kennedy gave the will, as was adopted by the Soviet Union, the “quarantine” and then everything will assurance that neither the United States, nor then they would have accepted the proposal be in order. Stevenson will become the one its Latin American allies would attack Cuba, of U Thant and would have lifted the block- he had used to be before he was nominated we declared our readiness to pull out some ade immediately. [to his position] in the UN. types of armaments from Cuba. McCloy. Would you make a stop on Stevenson. When do your ships arrive Stevenson. I do not think there is any the way back [from Cuba] in New York? in Cuba? disagreement on the issue that Soviet ships A.I. Mikoyan. I have no definite plans A.I. Mikoyan. But you have not yet should enter the ports of Cuba. It is only on this score, but I would not exclude such lifted the blockade. Our ships are now in that the “quarantine” should be preserved a stop-over. the open sea, about 4-5 days away from until the establishment of the Red Cross McCloy (in a jocular tone). But would Cuba. They should reach Cuba, disembark inspection. We are interested to see that there Castro let you out? their load, then load themselves and leave. will be no new shipments of arms, and we A.I. Mikoyan. He and I are special This would, of course, require a certain time, hope you will understand us. friends and will work it out somehow no less than 10-15 days. A.I. Mikoyan. We agreed with the pro- Stevenson. Perhaps you will bring him Stevenson. We could agree on a sched- posals of U Thant and declared that we along over here? ule. Next week one might agree on an in- would not bring armaments to Cuba pend- A.I. Mikoyan. You showed such a poor spection of the Red Cross; then the “quar- ing the talks. Those ships that are now at hospitality to him, that he can hardly be con- antine” might be lifted. sea carrying no weapons at all. I must say vinced to come to New York again. Such a A.I. Mikoyan. I would like to know if that Stevenson is a good diplomat: I am great power as the United States should be [the leadership of] the United States think[s] pushing him in one direction of the talk, but ashamed to mistreat such a small country. that we should work out an agreement that he veers off. When Stevenson had not yet been the USA would seal what has been said in the ex- Then for some time the conversation representative [in the United Nations - change of letters between Kennedy and was focused on the issues of protocol na- trans.], he had good understanding of ev- Khrushchev? Or you are interested only in ture. erything, but now apparently his official the dismantling and withdrawal of missiles? In the second half of the conversation position makes him speak and act in a dif- Would you think that we should agree on the discussion of business resumes. ferent way. other issues touched upon in the exchange A.I. Mikoyan. Yet I would like to pose Stevenson. We learn in government of missives, and confirm the achieved un- the following question. Would the USA gov- office, but we forget nothing. We immedi- derstanding in a written document? ernment think to come to an agreement ately accepted the proposal on inspection by Stevenson. First of all we want to reach where all that was said in the exchange of the Red Cross. I do not know how many understanding on the withdrawal of missile well-known letters would be fixed? I have Soviet ships are approaching Cuba, but I equipment from Cuba and we do not want in mind the kind of document that would would prefer that there will be more of them, to tolerate that until the establishment of formulate the settlement of the crisis. We so that they would sooner take away your inspection by the Red Cross there would be think it is preferable to work out such a docu- missiles. I must tell you that we were very an uncontrolled flow of armaments into ment. favorably impressed by the speed with Cuba. V.V. Kuznetsov. The need in working which Soviet officers dismantle the missiles. McCloy. There is already too much out such a document stems from the under- McCloy. I am struck by the speed of armament there. We cannot tolerate its build- standing achieved between the sides about assembling as well as disassembling [of the up. the settlement of the crisis. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 317

Stevenson. In our opinion, the sole sovereignty and territorial integrity of the spection would cover only its territory, if problem that confronts us - it is to work out Cuban Republic, observation of its territo- there were no analogous inspection cover- conditions for inspection that should be car- rial inviolability, non-interference into its ing the territory of the other side, on the basis ried out by representatives of the Red Circle. domestic affairs. Castro demands it, and you of reciprocity. This is relatively easy task. One could set apparently do not want to give such assur- I must emphasize that if the letter of J. up two check-points at the approaches to ances. Kennedy had not told of guarantees of non- Cuba’s ports, in the South and in the North, Castro puts forward also a demand to intervention against Cuba, we would not where two ships of the Red Cross could be liquidate the U.S. base in Guantanamo. Why have agreed to dismantle and withdraw mis- located. These might be ships of neutral are you refusing to discuss this issue? While sile equipment from Cuba. But now it comes countries or any other ships, perhaps even pressing your demands, you do not want to out as follows: we are withdrawing weap- sailing hospitals. On board there could be hear the legitimate demands of the other ons, and you are back-pedaling on your Red Cross inspectors who could check on side. Of course, this is an issue of Ameri- commitments. Castro does not have trust in ships going for Cuba, so that the character can-Cuban relations, but in any case this is- your word and he has a right [not to], since of this check-up would be via radio - inquir- sue must be discussed with Castro. the territory of Cuba has already been in- ing on the ship’s origins, where it goes and The exchange of letters between N.S. vaded. It would be a different matter if there with what cargo. Inspectors would not board Khrushchev and Kennedy - this is in essence would be an official document enforced, ships. I think that such [a form of] inspec- already an agreement. But by itself the ex- containing appropriate guarantees for Cuba tion should not create problems. We would change of letters cannot be considered as a and approved by the Security Castro. be glad to hear from you which ships, in final document. One must carry out nego- I would like to know your opinion your opinion, must be utilized for these tiations to work out such a final document about the guarantees. What can I tell Castro aims. I would like to repeat that one could on the basis of the exchange of letters, since when I meet him? We stem from the fact easily reach understanding on this issue. this issue has acquired a bilateral interna- that the letter from Kennedy already con- There is, however, one problem: mea- tional character. tains a basis for an agreement on granting sures to check the fulfillment of obligations We suggest to conduct negotiations on to Cuba the guarantees of non-intervention. on dismantling and withdrawal of missile this basis and believe that the United States, This is a bilateral problem and both sides equipment from Cuba. As I understood from the Soviet Union, and Cuba should sign a must resolve it and fix it in an agreement. U Thant, Castro did not agree to UN inspec- protocol, with participation of U Thant. Such McCloy. In our opinion, the most im- tions stipulated in the exchange of letters a protocol might fix all the basic premises portant [thing] is to withdraw appropriate between J. Kennedy and N.S. Khrushchev. contained in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev [offensive - trans.] types of armaments from We hope that you will discuss this issue once and J. Kennedy. Cuba as soon as possible. If it is not done, again in Havana. I repeat, we think that you should con- the situation will worsen very much. One McCloy. I must emphasize that we do sider the proposals advanced by Castro. can speak about the assurances of Kennedy not accept the 5 conditions of Castro as the They are legitimate ones. You should also concerning non-intervention against Cuba, conditions for fulfillment of what had been consider the issue of the base in but Castro must not set new conditions on said in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev. Guantanamo. I see that you disagree with withdrawal of missile equipment. Mean- Stevenson. The problem that concerns Castro’s demand, but it does not mean that while, Castro told U Thant that he would us most is that an inspection should be car- you should turn down any discussion of his not tolerate UN inspections. The Soviet ried out before you report to the Security demands. One cannot turn such a discussion Union and Cuba must agree between each Council about the completion of withdrawal down, when one wants to normalize the situ- other on what would be the form of inspec- of missile equipment. Naturally, there ation. tion. It is a matter of your relationship. We should be a check-up of how this undertak- I would touch on an interesting plan have only one interest: that the armaments ing is implemented. I think that such a advanced by U Thant; after an agreement on which we have achieved the understand- check-up need not be difficult to carry out. among the parties involved, which could be ing would be shipped away and that we In addition to that, of course, there is approved by the Security Council, one might would be convinced that they are really the issue of the form of USA assurance that agree on the presence of UN inspectors in shipped away. Cuba will not be subjected to invasion. This the area of the Caribbean Sea, including I do not think that there would be any also need not present any difficulties. Cuba, and on the South-East coast of the problems on the question of the access of McCloy. And to a certain extent this is United States and the neighboring Latin ships and on the withdrawal of missile an answer to the question previously posed American countries. These inspectors could equipment from Cuba. The main thing is to by Mr. Mikoyan. watch over implementation of the under- remove missile equipment. A.I. Mikoyan. You keep focusing all standing on mutual non-interference be- As to the question on granting the guar- attention only on the issue of withdrawal of tween the United States and Cuba. This is a antees of non-intervention to Cuba, if you armaments from Cuba and on inspection. very important proposal and its implemen- think that what the President said is not However, the first-order question is to grant tation would give a change to fully settle enough, one could talk about some kind of to Cuba guarantees of non-intervention the conflict. One should take into account appropriate commitment [obiazatelstve]. against it on the part of other countries of that Cuba is an independent state. It is im- You are posing a question about the the Western hemisphere, recognition of the possible to demand that some kind of in- possible presence of UN observers on USA 318 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

territory, so that there would be no invasion has the right of sovereignty and one must that the operation could be finalized in two of Cuba. I must say that if you keep insist- seek its agreement on any kind of inspec- statements: the Soviet Union could make ing on that, there will be additional compli- tion on Cuban territory. It put forward five announcement about the end of withdrawal cations. conditions, including the demand about liq- of the certain types of weapons from Cuba, A.I. Mikoyan. U Thant expressed this uidation of the American base in and the United States would make an an- idea. Guantanamo. However, beside the issue of nouncement that we made sure that these McCloy. No, he did not suggest it. I the base, there are four more points in weapons are withdrawn from Cuba. Earlier repeat: nothing will come out of it. Castro’s program, and these points are in full it was supposed that the appropriate check- A.I. Mikoyan. Today in conversation agreement with what Kennedy wrote in his up should be done by the forces of the UN, with me U Thant reiterated this idea and said letter to Khrushchev. Why don’t you want but after Castro’s refusal to let UN repre- that this issue should be discussed at the to accept them? sentatives into Cuba, the question emerged Organization of American States. Stevenson. There is only one issue about the method of inspection. Stevenson. We believe that the ex- between the Soviet Union and the USA: After the withdrawal of the certain change of letters between Kennedy and about full withdrawal from Cuba of certain types of weapons from Cuba will be con- Khrushchev contains concrete and clear for- types of armaments under conditions of in- firmed, the USA will declare the abolition mulas. I think that there is no need for any spection and in the presence of the under- of the “quarantine” and that it guarantees new understanding, except for resolution of standing that the supplies of this weaponry non-intervention of Cuba. I see no reason the issue about the inspection method. If we will not be resumed. Under these conditions for any other treaties and documents. If the fail to carry out ground inspection, let us the guarantees of Cuba’s security on the part Soviet side has some draft proposals, it is seek other means which would assure us that of the United States will be ensured. desirable to obtain them, and the American the armaments are withdrawn. Otherwise the Castro raised a number of other issues, side then will do the same thing. danger of conflict will be reborn. I hope that, but they have nothing to do with Soviet- A.I. Mikoyan. There is no time to con- when the atmosphere will clear up and the American relations. In our negotiations we sider this issue in detail. It seems to me we missile equipment will be withdrawn from should begin to consider the issues that are should think how to continue the talks. Cuba, it will be easier to agree on other is- within the realm of Soviet-American rela- V.V.Kuznetsov. If the American side sues. Kennedy has already given appropri- tions, in the framework of the understand- agrees, we will discuss this issue. ate assurances concerning non-intervention ing between Khrushchev and Kennedy. A.I.Mikoyan. On our side we prefer to against Cuba, and we can confirm it. A.I.Mikoyan. Speaking about the ex- have a protocol. We would like to say clearly that any change of letters between N.S. Khrushchev Stevenson. The Soviet Union can and discussion of the issue about liquidation of and J. Kennedy, you blow up only one as- must ensure the withdrawal of the certain our base in Guantanamo is out of question. pect and maintain silence on the other. You types of armaments and a verification that It was given up [ustuplena] to us by the gov- dodge such issues as lifting of the block- would satisfy the USA and Latin American ernment of Cuba on a legal basis, and the ade, granting the guarantees of indepen- countries. American people will under no circum- dence to Cuba. We believe that all this The question, however, emerges on stances renounce it. should be fixed [zafiksirovano] in the docu- what form of inspection is feasible under A.I.Mikoyan. But the government of ment where certain formulas should be re- current circumstances. Four days have al- Cuba puts forward this question, so it should iterated and specified. We believe that our ready elapsed, and there is no inspection in be discussed. negotiations should result in a document sight. Therefore, now we should discuss V.V.Kuznetsov. The government of registered in the United Nations and ap- possible forms of inspection. We do not Cuba has put this question even earlier. proved by the Security Council. Otherwise, want to constrain you by those formulas that McCloy. We will not concede on this. what is happening? The ink has not yet dried were advanced concerning international in- The position of Castro represents an obstacle up on the letter, but Rusk is already declar- spection. If Castro does not want such an on the way to fulfilling commitments for- ing that the United States has not guaran- inspection, one can think of different forms mulated in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev. teed the independence of Cuba. It was pub- of control. A.I.Mikoyan. Castro is not and will not lished in your newspapers, and I read about McCloy. We should look at what is be an obstacle to fulfillment of these com- it on my way to New York. acceptable and feasible, but in any case the mitments. The armaments we are talking Stevenson. Rusk said nothing to dis- inspection should be introduced. Therefore about is Soviet weaponry and it will be avow the guarantees that have been granted we should adapt ourselves to the new situa- evacuated. As for Castro, he has declared in Kennedy’s letter. The press gave a wrong tion. that he would assist the evacuation of these interpretation to his declaration. In the first order, of course, we should, armaments. A.I.Mikoyan. We are proposing to you as they say, remove the pistol from the ne- McCloy. But he has 145 thousand sol- to prepare jointly an appropriate document gotiating table, in other words to dismantle diers against 10 thousand Russians. He can and introduce it jointly to the Security Coun- and withdraw the missiles. obstruct the dismantling [of missiles-- cil, then there will be no other interpreta- Stevenson. I do not think that some trans.]. Moreover, I think he is already ob- tions. kind of protocol will be necessary, besides structing it. Stevenson. I would like to say a few the declarations that will be made in the A.I.Mikoyan. The government of Cuba words about the procedure. U Thant believes Security Council. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 319

A.I.Mikoyan. Normalization would be But we are glad that when today our plane these technical issues with you. I would like complete if the Soviet Union, the USA and flew over Cuba, it was not shot at. As far as to speak on another, more important ques- Cuba signed a joint document together with we know, the anti-aircraft missiles deployed tion. It is out of question that we agree with the UN Secretary General on the basis of in Cuba are not in the hands of the Cubans, you now on overflights of your plans over the exchange of letters between N.S. but in the hands of your people. Today we Cuba: it is sovereign Cuban territory. But if Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. In any case, intercepted radio-commands and conversa- the USA agreed to the inspection over the this issue cannot be resolved without Cuba. tions of the anti-aircraft units deployed in area of Miami, it would be a good thing. A decision in which Cuba is not a party will Cuba and that confirmed us again in our Then, possibly. the Cubans would agree to not be binding for her. Cuba must have guar- conclusion. I must say that we are glad that such inspection over their territory. One can- antees of non-intervention. these anti-aircraft missiles are in the hands not not carry out unilateral inspection - no I would like to know: do you have any of the Russians whose hands are not itching matter which, ground or aerial. The Cubans ideas about forms of control? If you have like the hands of the Cubans. would have full reason to be offended, if them - discuss them in the next few days In passing, I would like to say that al- you were granted the right of regular and with V.V. Kuznetsov. though we do not include anti-aircraft mis- permanent overflight over their territory, in Stevenson. As to the territorial integ- siles into the category of offensive weap- a unilateral way. rity of Cuba, the formulas in the letter of ons, we would very much like that you with- As for inspections which must ensure Kennedy are simple and clear: after certain draw these missiles as well. a verification of the dismantling and with- types of weapons will be removed from A.I.Mikoyan. As I see, your sense of drawal of our missiles, here we stand on the Cuba, the USA will make an announcement humor has completely disappeared. same position that was expressed in the let- about the guarantee against any kind of in- Stevenson. In your conversations in ters of N.S. Khrushchev. vasion of Cuba. Havana you could cite good arguments in Stevenson. As to ground inspection, it McCloy. As to the forms of verifica- favor of ground inspection: on one side, it was U Thant, not us, who came up with a tion, the ideal form in my mind would be would assure us that you are fulfilling your proposal about the presence of UN inspec- regular overflights by planes doing aerial obligations, on the other hand, Castro would tors during the dismantling and withdrawal photo-reconnaissance, and ground inspec- obtain confidence that no invasion of Cuba of the missiles. Incidentally, he had in mind tion. I hope that the Soviet Union would bear would take place: since U.N. observers permanent inspection till the end of disman- on Castro so that he will agree to the con- would be around. tling of the missiles. This would serve the duct of such inspection as was stipulated in A.I.Mikoyan. I believe that in the interests of both sides. I understand that the letter of N.S.Khrushchev. However, if course of today’s conversation we laid the Cuba is an independent country, but if it Castro refuses to accept such inspection, we ground for upcoming negotiations. I think agrees with this, then there would be no need should look for another form. The USA that we should not now go into detail. You to seek other forms of check-up. might continue overflights by its planes giv- should reflect on what we have spoken about A.I.Mikoyan. We agree to conduct ing us confidence that one does not resume here. We will prepare our drafts as well. It ground inspection, as the letter of N.S. in Cuba assembly of types of weapons that seems to me that until the election day it Khrushchev stated, but it is necessary to represent danger for us. But in this case we would be hard for you to take any decisions, have some kind of element of reciprocity would like to have assurances that our plans but, on the other hand, one should not pro- so that this understanding does not affect will not be downed. One could also consider crastinate with liquidation of the Cuban cri- the national feelings of the Cubans. This also yet another possibility. Could you pass to sis. flows from my conversation with U Thant. us the lists of armament that is being with- Stevenson. We could agree even tomor- I would like to know if McCloy and drawn from Cuba? We know approximately row in all details with a plan of inspection Stevenson consider today’s exchange of how many missiles you now have in Cuba. of ships by the forces of the Red Cross if opinion useful? If you could pass to us the lists of what you both sides approve of the proposal of U Stevenson. The conversation was use- will transport on your ships (of course, I Thant. We should not put off resolution of ful and I became persuaded that our posi- understand that these documents will not this issue. What flag would be on these two tions stay not too far apart. contain specifications of these armaments), inspection ships is of no significance to us. A.I.Mikoyan. There is misunderstand- then through comparison of this data with As to the oversight of the territory of ing [nedoponimaniie] as far as the issue of the data about the presence of armaments Cuba, if Castro refuses to agree on ground reciprocity of inspections is concerned. U in Cuba, that is in our disposal, we would inspection, we could limit ourselves to uni- Thant said that Castro is concerned with the follow the process of evacuation of arma- lateral conduct of aerial reconnaissance. For presence on the USA of camps where Cu- ments that are of danger for us. I believe this we would only need your assurance that ban emigres prepare themselves for inva- that this would be enough. In this case we our planes will not be shot at. sion similar to one that took place last year. would get on along ground inspection. McCloy. It seems that it would take not McCloy. I must assure you that these The system of passing of the lists of 10-15 days, but probably a month for re- camps no longer exist, they are closed ev- cargo removed from Cuba would not touch moval of your missiles. erywhere. on your security interests. As to overflights, A.I.Mikoyan. All these are [mere] de- A.I.Mikoyan. You mean that they do you, as we understand, cannot guarantee that tails. We brought with us military experts - not exist in Latin American countries as the Cubans would not shoot at our planes. a general and colonel, who could discuss all well? 320 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

McCloy. The camps are closed every- become more relaxed. satisfied with today’s exchange of opinions. where. Perhaps there is something some- A.I.Mikoyan. It is very important what I would be glad to meet you and follow up where, but in any case the USA does not you are saying. Castro might ask me: is the on this conversation, on your way back from support this business. USA going to restore diplomatic and eco- Cuba. A.I.Mikoyan. But you count Cuban nomic relations with Cuba or this question The conversation lasted for 3 hours 40 emigres among your own military forces? is not on the agenda? Perhaps you have in minutes. Those present were com. V.V. Kuz- McCloy. We are not training them for mind not to do it right away, but after some netsov, A.F. Dobrynin, M.A. Menshikov, invasion of Cuba. We allow volunteers of time? I would like to know what I can tell G.A. Zhukov; from the American side par- any nationality to be enlisted in our mili- Castro. ticipated J. McCloy, A. Stevenson, A. tary forces, even Russians can do it. In any Stevenson. You understand that I can- Akalovsky. case, I assure you that there are no more not answer this question. It is within the camps in the USA where Cuban emigres are competence of the Organization of Ameri- Note-takers: trained, prepared for invasion of Cuba. can States. We cannot conduct business with G.Zhukov However I would like to tell you Castro without its involvement. But one Yu.Vinogradov. frankly, that any inspection on USA terri- could think of certain regional arrangements tory is out of question. You have to trust in providing confidence to the countries of the [Source: AVP RF; obtained by NHK, pro- our word. Caribbean sea. I hope that we would be able vided to CWIHP, copy on file at National Stevenson. I want to say that the USA gradually to liquidate the antagonism be- Security Archive; translation by Vladislav is trying to normalize the situation in the tween Cuba and her neighbors. Now this M. Zubok (National Security Archive).] area of the Caribbean sea, but on condition antagonism is being heated by subversive of Castro’s cooperation. We might work out activities which, perhaps, reciprocate each Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to some form of mutual guarantees acceptable other in this region. Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign for Castro and his neighbors. If Castro is McCloy. I would say that Cuba is the Ministry, 2 November 1962 afraid of them, they, too, are afraid of him. I source of infection, and the recent events in believe that after the settlement of the Cu- Venezuela provide an example. But I would 2 November 1962 ban crisis the situation in this region will not like to dwell now on this issue. I am THE MIKOYAN-CASTRO in response to the publication in the mentary evidence from Cuban, Russian, TALKS, 4-5 NOVEMBER 1962: Bulletin in 1995 of lengthy Soviet and American sources, as well as a con- THE CUBAN VERSION records of the same conversations.1 The tinuation of the oral history process that materials were obtained from the Insti- has begun to involve senior Cuban of- [Editor’s Note: While a large, al- tute of History in Cuba by Prof. Philip ficials in international explorations of beit incomplete, complex of Russian Brenner (American University), who such key events as the Bay of Pigs and documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis provided them to CWIHP, and trans- Cuban Missile Crisis,2 is clearly a pre- has become available to researchers lated from Spanish by Carlos Osorio condition for a serious and comprehen- since 1991—as exemplified by the (National Security Archive). sive analysis. selction of translated materials in this While the Cuban documents them- Unfortunately, little information is and past Bulletins—documents on the selves do not offer any startling infor- available at present on the provenance events of the fall of 1962 are still only mation or insights not present in the far of the Cuban documents provided be- beginning to trickle out of Cuban ar- more detailed Soviet records of the low, including their precise archival lo- chives. The two documents below, same conversations—a quick compari- cation or who took the notes that are translated from Spanish, represent a rare son of the two versions of the identical presented; the Bulletin hopes to supply and encouraging sign (as does Piero conversations finds them broadly com- additional information, as well as fur- Gleijeses’ article on Cuban policy in patible—they are presented as a sym- ther evidence from Cuban archives Africa elsewhere in this issue) that pros- bol of what historians can hope will be should it emerge, in future issues.] pects for historical research in Cuban a thorough process of eventually recon- archives may improve. structing Soviet-Cuban relations on the [Translator’s Note: The transla- The Cuban records concern the basis of solid archival evidence from tions at times read awkwardly, for the tense conversations between Fidel both sides, which can then be compared Spanish documents themselves are oc- Castro (and other members of the Cu- and cross-checked. Given the amount casionally confusing, mixing tenses, ban leadership) and senior Soviet en- of passion and controversy that has sur- subjects and objects in the same phrase. voy Anastas I. Mikoyan on 4-5 Novem- rounded this question during the Cold Mikoyan, a Soviet national, appears to ber 1962, in the immediate aftermath War, and which continues to infuse be speaking a Castillian Spanish, as he of USSR Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s U.S.-Cuban relations (as Fidel Castro often uses the auxiliary “haber” for the acceptance on October 28 of U.S. Presi- remains in charge nearly four decades past tense. The note-taker is presumably dent John F. Kennedy’s demand that he after the revolution that brought him to a Cuban national, so he sometimes skips withdraw Soviet nuclear missiles from power), the availability of scholarly per- transcribing the past tense as was used Cuba. They were apparently released spectives and contemporaneous docu- continued on page 339 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 321

We will inform Fidel Castro of the con- information from our side, I said, should be Yesterday in the hour-long discussion tent of the documents [not further identified- discussed with our military specialists, who with McCloy and Stevenson, the positions -ed.]. He has entrusted me to convey a trans- arrived with me to aid Kuznetsov. of the parties on all issues connected with lation of the draft to President Dorticos, and McCloy reported with great satisfac- the Cuban conflict were explained, as well to reach an agreement with him on all points. tion that on 1 November their plane had as the American position in the form in Dorticos, having read through the flown over Cuba without being fired at, and which the Americans consider it necessary document, said that in principle the docu- had made photos. He attributed this to the to define it. ment serves the interests of Cuba, and that presence of Soviet specialists at the anti-air- We will be sending to you a short ex- it would be approved. craft missile installations. position of the most important points of the Separate remarks will be introduced I conclude that if our agreement with discussion within 2 or 3 hours, and today, 2 after the discussion of our proposals with Castro not to shoot down American planes November and 1:00 in the afternoon I will Fidel Castro and the other leaders, and also retains its force, then when they fly one or be flying to Cuba. Our comrades will com- after their talks with Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, two more times it will mean that inspections pose a detailed record of the conversation, which are slated for today. on the dismantling have been carried out. and will send it after I am gone. The con- There remains the issue of inspections on versation was important, and you should 2.XI.62 ALEKSEEV the removal of the dismantled weaponry, become familiarized with that detailed which could be resolved through means sug- record of it. [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, gested by McCloy. McCloy has declared that with the aim provided to CWIHP, and on file at National In view of this, Castro’s position, which of speeding up the removal of the missiles, Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- rejects the possibility of on-site inspections, before the fine-tuning of the observation lation by John Henriksen.] will cease to be an obstacle to settling with system by the Red Cross has been reached, the Americans the issue of monitoring the they agree to and are interested in allowing Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan in New dismantling and removal of the weaponry. Soviet vessels bound for Cuba entry into York to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962 I consider all this to be expedient. Cuban ports without inspection, by way of In my talks with Castro I will fully ex- a hail like the one that was given to the 2 November 1962 plain our position on the issue of monitor- tanker “Bucharest.” ing in accordance with Khrushchev’s mes- We are introducing a proposal to give From the following telegram you will sage, I will show him its correctness and instructions to all our vessels bound for learn the details of the important statement acceptability, from our point of view, for Cuba to proceed to their destinations. made by McCloy in the talks on monitoring Cuba. the dismantling of the “offensive weaponry.” In connection with the Americans’ pro- 2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN He declared that in view of Castro’s refusal posal laid out earlier, and taking into account to agree to a ground-based monitoring, the the Cubans’ arrogance, I consider it expedi- [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, Americans were willing not to insist [on ent not to insist or ensure that they reject provided to CWIHP, and on file at National that], knowing the forms and methods of their position on not allowing observers onto Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- monitoring put forth in Khrushchev’s mes- their territory to check on the dismantling lation by John Henriksen.] sage, [but] that it was necessary to find other and removal process, the position which methods for convincing the Americans that they have made clear to U Thant and have Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister the dismantling process had been completed published several times in the press. A. Gromyko to unidentified recipient, 2 and that everything had been removed. In truth, in Castro’s speech yesterday November 1962 In response to my question about this position was made to seem somewhat whether there was some concrete proposal more flexible. 2 November 1962 as to how this should be done, he said the I await instructions concerning this following: to allow them the possibility of matter in Havana. The head of the American delegation flights over Cuba for inspections from the at the negotiations in New York, McCloy, air, without ground-based monitoring; this 2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN has informed Comrade Kuznetsov on 31 was the first point. The second was that the October that Washington has decided that Soviets provide the Americans with infor- [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, until the Red Cross has begun its monitor- mation about how much of the weaponry provided to CWIHP, and on file at National ing of the vessels bound for Cuba, it would has been dismantled and removed, and Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- not carry out inspections on these vessels, when. The important part of this is not to lation by John Henriksen.] but to apply to them the same procedure that impart secret military information that re- was applied to the tanker “Bucharest.” Dur- veals the nature and capacities of this weap- Telegram from A.I Mikoyan in New ing this time the “quarantine” will be offi- onry. York to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962 cially continued. I rejected here the possibility of flights As is well known, the tanker over Cuba, since that would affect the sov- 2 November 1962 “Bucharest” passed through a region under ereignty of Cuba itself. The proposal about American “quarantine” without hindrance. 322 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Six Soviet vessels now on the open sea be- could be reduced to radio interrogations of carrying out of such inspections. In future yond the announced limits of the “quaran- passing ships, Narasimhan answered that in negotiations we should proceed from the tine” have received orders to proceed into many cases it will be precisely that, but that assumption that the Soviet Union will as- the Cuban ports, and at present they are now the International Red Cross observers should sume expenses only for the maintenance of on their way toward Cuba. have the right to carry out inspections (to Soviet vessels. As far as the maintenance of check documents, to inspect ship holds, and the International Red Cross vessels is con- A. G. so on), if such a necessity should arise. cerned, we will push for the USA or the UN Our representatives remarked that such bearing the burden of these expenses. (It is [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, a proposal from Narasimhan concerning the not out of the question that the International provided to CWIHP, and on file at National conferral to the International Red Cross Red Cross will itself pay the expenses for Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- groups of inspection rights contradicts the the upkeep of the groups.) lation by John Henriksen.] views expressed earlier by Stevenson. We On the issue of how long the inspec- will continue to insist that the inspections tion procedure by the International Red Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign be limited to interrogations by radio. Cross would be continued, Narasimhan said Minister V. V. Kuznetsov and Ambassa- The USA, Narasimhan continued, is that it should be carried out for a period of dor to the UN V.A. Zorin to USSR prepared to provide its own transportation three to four weeks. But it is possible that Foreign Ministry, 3 November 1962 for the International Red Cross inspectors. the duration could be shorter. Everything de- This may be ordinary transportation for the pends on how long the removal of weap- 3 November 1962 conveyance of troops, even though they onry from Cuba would continue. As soon would be unarmed and would contain on as all the weaponry is removed, the inspec- On 3 November Morozov, Mendel- board civilian passengers. tions, it seems, should cease. evich, and Timerbaev had a meeting with We told Narasimhan that the Soviet We emphasized that the inspections on Narasimhan and Loutfi (replacing U Thant) Union, as had already been declared to U vessels by the International Red Cross for the examination of technical issues con- Thant, had given its consent to the convey- should be of a short-term nature, as was nected with the sending of observers from ance of the International Red Cross observ- declared by U Thant in his provisional pro- the International Red Cross Committee to ers either by Soviet or by neutral vessels. posal concerning this issue, which was ap- ascertain that on the Soviet vessels bound Narasimhan responded that he knew about proved by the Soviet Union. In the future, for Cuba there is no weaponry considered this, but all the same considered it possible with regard to time limits we will proceed offensive by the USA. to inform the Soviet Union of this proposal with aim of imposing the shortest possible Narasimhan said that the the secretariat by the USA, which, Narasimhan said, works limits. We will aim for ceasing the inspec- of the UN in New York had not yet received towards the interests of a speedy organiza- tions immediately after the removal of the the definitive consent of the International tion of the inspections. The USA, in his dismantled installations, and the approval Red Cross to its participation in the organi- words, has no objections to the use of So- by the Security Council of corresponding zation of the monitoring. An answer from viet ships. Narasimhan asked us to explain, resolutions for the conclusive settlement of the Red Cross could be received today, 3 if possible by 5 November, how soon the the Cuban crisis. November. Soviet Union could prepare its ships for the If our approval of the conveyance of Narasimhan also laid out the thoughts International Red Cross observers. For his the International Red Cross representatives of the Americans, as he understood them, part, Narasimhan will make inquiries by this on Soviet ships is still valid, we ask that you regarding the Red Cross’s monitoring pro- time about the possibility of chartering neu- inform us immediately of which vessels in cedure. tral vessels located near Cuba. particular are being selected for this purpose, The USA considers it expedient to de- Narasimhan raised the issue of reim- and when they can arrive in the Caribbean ploy two vessels with observers from the bursing the costs of chartering the vessels Sea area. International Red Cross on the open sea near and constituting the International Red Cross Since the Cubans will evidently not the Cuban coast—one 8 to 10 miles off Ha- groups. In response to the question of how agree to admit the International Red Cross vana, and another in the strait between Cuba the USA imagines covering the costs asso- observers onto the territory of Cuba in or- and Haiti. The vessels should have radio ciated with the carrying out of inspections der to then admit them onto Soviet ships, contact with the UN. On each vessel there by the International Red Cross, Narasimhan we ask that you inform us what would the should be two groups of International Red said that it was proposing two possible vari- most appropriate port in the Caribbean Sea Cross observers. Each group should contain ants—either through the UN (that is, accord- area in which to take on board these Inter- eight observers. In this way, 32 observers ing to their pay scale), or to divide the costs national Red Cross observers. will be needed in all. equally between the USSR and the USA. The next meeting with Narasimhan is In response to our question about how Our representatives answered that the slated for the morning of 5 November. to manage such a large number of observ- USA had illegally imposed the so-called ers, especially when bearing in mind that “quarantine,” that they were now pushing 3.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV Stevenson in his talks with us on 1 Novem- for inspections on vessels bound for Cuba, V. ZORIN ber of this year had expressed his view that and that it was completely clear that it is the International Red Cross inspections they who should covers the expenses for the [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 323 provided to CWIHP, and on file at National rades wanted to add anything to this, Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- whether they had other remarks to make. Your thoughts on the statement that lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- O. Dorticos asked for an explanation Stevenson should make in connection with sity.] of why N.S. Khrushchev approved the pro- his letter and memorandum do not provoke posal made by Kennedy to declare that there any objections. Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to would be no attack on Cuba on the condi- In addition it is necessary for you to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign tion of the removal of Soviet missiles from say the following: Ministry, 4 November 196218 Cuba, even though the Cuban government Since when have the planes named by had not yet at this time expressed its own Stevenson [IL-28 bombers—ed.] become 4 November 1962 opinion on this proposal. offensive weaponry[?] After all, these planes C.R. Rodriguez put a question to Com- are of a type considered outmoded both in Today talks were conducted between rade Mikoyan— where does the Soviet lead- its altitude ceilings and in its speed. The A.I. Mikoyan and Comrades Fidel Castro, ership see the essence of victory, does it putting forth of such a demand constitutes O. Dorticos, R. Castro, E. Guevara, E. consist in military success or in diplomatic an intentional seeking out of issues that en- Aragonez, and C.R. Rodriguez, as well as success? We believed, Rodriguez noted, that courage discord and a continuation of the myself. we could not yet talk about victory, since tense state of our relations. Comrade Mikoyan conveyed warm, the guarantees from the USA were ephem- The planes mentioned by Stevenson fraternal greetings from the Presidium of the eral. are associated with coastal defense weap- CC CPSU and N.S. Khrushchev to the Cu- Then A.I. Mikoyan, developing argu- onry. Such a plane cannot appear in condi- ban leaders. He expressed a lofty apprecia- ments made in N.S. Khrushchev’s letters to tions of war over enemy territory, since it tion of the Cuban revolution, and support Fidel Castro, and also from the discussion does not possess the capacity for attaining for the rebuff to the interventionists; he of the issue in the Central Committee of the the necessary altitude and speed. It can ap- spoke about our support for Cuba; and he Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of- pear over such territory only with an air es- remarked that the Central Committee of the fered additional arguments with the aim of cort. Virtually any military expert would Communist Party of the Soviet Union was driving away any doubts from the minds of recognize that these planes cannot be placed delighted by the courage and fearlessness our Cuban comrades. He spoke moreover in the category of offensive weaponry at the displayed by the leaders of Cuba’s revolu- of the main points of his talks with U Thant, present time. tion in these perilous days, and the readi- McCloy, and Stevenson. If the USA honestly gave assurances ness of the Cuban people to hold firm. Then We will send a full record of the con- that it would not invade Cuba, then the pos- Comrade Mikoyan said that when the Cen- versation to Moscow via diplomatic mail. session of these planes by the Cubans should tral Committee learned of the misunder- Further information on certain new points not elicit any concern. standing arising in Cuba of several issues touched on in Mikoyan’s explanations will We understood the concerns of the and decisions made by us, they came to the be provided by separate telegram. Americans when talk began to turn to a defi- conclusion that it would be impossible to The talks lasted seven hours, more than nite sort of missile weaponry. Missiles are clarify these issues by way of mere corre- five hours of which were taken up by Com- indeed an uninterceptable and instanta- spondence. The Central Committee made rade Mikoyan’s explanations. Our Cuban neously effective sort of weapon. There is the decision to send Comrade Mikoyan to comrades listened with attentiveness to A.I. no reason to put outdated weaponry in the Cuba to clarify to our friends our position, Mikoyan, were interested in details, and offensive category. Such weaponry will and to inform them of issues that are of in- sustained the general feeling of cordiality have a defensive, auxiliary function. terest to them. Comrade Mikoyan remarked and trust. As far as photo reconnaissance and re- that he naturally did not have any intention We agreed to continue the talks in the connaissance in general are concerned, used of exerting pressure; his task was simply to same composition tomorrow, on 5 Novem- as they are by all countries, experience explain our position. ber, at 2:00 in the afternoon local time. shows that it does not always reflect the ac- Knowing our Cuban friends, A.I. tual situation. Mikoyan said, I am sure that they too will 4.XI.62 ALEKSEEV All this provides the grounds for con- agree with this. It could of course turn out cluding that the most important issues here such that even after the explanations there [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, must be talked about. We must mutually will be certain points on which our points provided to CWIHP, and on file at National fulfill the obligations assumed by all par- of view will remain different. Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- ties, and then the issue will be exhausted. Fidel Castro declared that he has al- lation by John Henriksen.] ready informed the Cuban comrades present A. Gromyko at the talks of the issues raised by him yes- Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister terday before Comrade Mikoyan, and made Gromyko to Deputy Foreign Minister [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, a short resume of these issues. Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN provided to CWIHP, and on file at National A.I. Mikoyan remarked that Fidel Zorin in New York, 4 November 1962 Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- Castro spoke yesterday in detail and with lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- sincerity, and asked whether the other com- 4 November 1962 sity.] 324 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Zorin in New York, 5 November 1962 mentioned bombers in this category, then Telegram (No.4448) from the Minister say the following: of the USSR Merchant Fleet to Captain You must adhere to the following po- In Cuba there are none of our bombers of Ship “Amata” via Soviet ambassador sition in your negotiations on the lifting of which could be put in the category of offen- in Havana (Alekseev), 5 November 1962 the blockade, elimination of tension, and sive weaponry. They do so with the IL-28 normalization of the situation in the Carib- bomber. But this machine is 15 years old. 5 November 1962 bean Sea. The American military figures surely know The negotiations are being conducted very well that this was the first Soviet plane I ask that you transmit information on with the aim of eliminating the tense situa- with a turboreactive engine. Fifteen years the location of the ship “Amata.” Your ship tion which has been threatening to explode ago they indeed were rather cutting-edge has been selected for use by the Organiza- into thermonuclear war. machines. But now technology has made so tion of the United Nations for the convey- The basis of these negotiations is the many steps ahead that we have not only re- ance of a group of representatives from the agreement reached through an exchange of moved these machines from the arsenal of International Red Cross consisting of 16 messages between Comrade N.S. our army, but have even refused to use them people. Your location, after you take this Khrushchev and President Kennedy. The as targets for the training of anti-aircraft group on board, should be near the port of essence of this agreement is as follows. units in the Soviet Union. These machines Havana, but beyond the 12-mile zone of The USA is giving assurances that no are soon going to be scrapped, and if we Cuba’s territorial waters. The vessel chosen invasion will be inflicted on Cuba, not only sold them to some country, it would only be for these operations should arrive in Havana on the part of the United States, but also on for using them as training machines for pi- on 6 November. If you have cargo in your the part of their allies— the other countries lot instruction, and to some extent as defen- holds leave it in the holds, since the deck of the Western hemisphere. The Soviet sive means— for the coastal defense of a should be free. Your ship’s number has al- Union for its part will remove from the Cuba territory with the escort of anti-aircraft ma- ready been communicated to the UN, as well the missile weaponry that the President of chines, and nothing more. These planes are as the fact that you will be operating at a the USA has called offensive, and will not so far from answering the currents needs for frequency of 500 kilohertz; beginning on 6 install such types of weaponry in Cuba speed and altitude that their use for other November they will be able to contact you again. purposes would mean sending people to from the UN radio station. On your arrival Such is the basis of the agreement, and certain death. We are sure that the Ameri- in Havana, immediately contact our envoy. we are adhering to it, because it is the only can military and USA intelligence under- Bring the vessel into complete order, tem- possible basis now for eliminating the tense stands this well. porarily move your equipment and crew into situation that has been created. The agree- Indicate that if the representatives of tighter quarters, and prepare room for the ment is the result of a compromise reached the USA insist on their demand concerning comfortable accommodation of the repre- through mutual concessions, and it satisfied the IL-28 planes, then by doing so they will sentatives of the Red Cross. It is assumed both parties. only put the USA in a position in which the that this group will be with you until 12 In accordance with this agreement the whole world will see that the United States November of this year. You will have to Soviets undertook on 28 October the dis- is not keeping its word, and is imposing come to an agreement with the head of this mantling of the missiles. The dismantling unacceptable conditions that create the pos- group concerning food-related matters. You was completed on 2 November, and the dis- sibility of a prolongation of the conflict. At should have ready for operation the ship’s mantled missiles have been transported to that time the whole world will understand motor boat, on which the representatives ports for shipping. As you have already been that this is precisely the purpose behind the will be able to travel out onto the arriving informed, these missiles will be removed imposition of such conditions. vessels. You should follow all the instruc- from Cuba on 7 or 8 or at the latest 10 No- In Stevenson’s letter of 3 November, tions of the group. Report on your carrying vember of this year. another issue is raised—it asserts that ac- out of these instructions, and keep us regu- Tell the Americans that if they wish to cording to the reports of American intelli- larly informed, through closed communica- raise other issues, then they will find many gence in Cuba, the assembling of IL-28 tion, of your operations. such issues on our side as well, issues which bombers is still going on. In response to this, really affect the vital interests of our coun- say that such assertions are an invention of BAKAEV try and which create concerns about our se- American intelligence, because it is impos- curity. But we are not raising any of these sible to see what is not there. Moreover, [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, issues at present, because they are too broad, American photos do not corroborate this. It provided to CWIHP, and on file at National and their resolution will take a great amount is clear that this false information is pursu- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- of time; moreover, these issues affect not ing the aim of avoiding a settlement of the lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- only our two states, but the large circle of conflict and a normalization of our relations, sity.] states, i. e. they belong to the category of and indeed a tightening of tensions. global problems. As far as other sorts of weaponry are Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister If the USA representatives say that concerned which the American representa- Gromyko to Deputy Foreign Minister President Kennedy, in his speech on 22 Oc- tives are now trying to put in the offensive Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN tober speaking about offensive weaponry, category, tell the Americans that it is neces- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 325 sary to rigorously proceed from the agree- tries around the Soviet Union. telegram immediately, I have not had time ment reached through the exchange of let- For this reason, if the parties talk about to submit it to the approval of Comrade ters, that it is necessary for the Americans what was mentioned in the course of the Mikoyan. The talks with Castro will take to hold to the statement of their own Presi- polemic, and it was indeed a polemic, and place on 5 November at 14:00 local time. dent. He said that he was against offensive if each side insists on having things its own weaponry, but in favor of the right of each way, then it will render impossible an agree- 5.XI.62 ALEKSEEV side to possess defensive weaponry. ment and the elimination of the tense situa- Say that in general we are not presently tion— in other words, we will return to the [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, authorized to carry on negotiations on points same incendiary situation that existed be- provided to CWIHP, and on file at National that directly concern the defense interests fore, and that was escaped with such diffi- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- of the Republic of Cuba. We have not been culty. lation by J. Henriksen.] authorized by Cuba to carry on such nego- For this reason it is necessary to show tiations. For this reason, if the Americans understanding and respect for the sover- Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister insist on this, it will only complicate the eignty of each state, and to recognize the Gromyko to Mikoyan and Alekseev in settlement. equal rights of all countries to self-defense. Havana, 5 November 1962 If the Americans take as their goal a return to an incendiary situation, it will 5.XI A. G. 5 November 1962 scarcely be in the interests of either the USA or the USSR, or in the interests of the world. [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, In response to the telegram from Com- We propose to choose reasonable positions, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National rade Alekseev. In the event that it is neces- and to proceed in the negotiations from the Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- sary, you should explain to Fidel Castro that agreement that has been reached. We have lation by John Henriksen.] the readiness to dismantle the installations already fulfilled our obligations, have dis- of the so-called “offensive weaponry” was mantled our missiles, have loaded them onto Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to first mentioned only in N.S. Khrushchev’s ships, and in the coming days, that is, not Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign message to Kennedy of 27 October. later than 10 November, all these materials Ministry, 5 November 1962 It is obvious that some misunderstand- will be removed from Cuba. The other side, ing could arise from the fact that Kennedy’s the United States, should also carry out its 5 November message to N.S. Khrushchev of 27 October obligations, and lift the blockade that has spoke (with reference to N.S. Khrushchev’s been called a “quarantine.” Let us formal- In connection with our explanations to message of 26 October) of the “removal” ize this in documents with the aim that each Fidel Castro of how the decisive moment of the weaponry from Cuba; but that was side affirm its statements in documents, that for us did not allow time for consultation his, Kennedy’s, interpretation of the issue. is, let us formalize this agreement on the with him on the issue of dismantling, he As N.S. Khrushchev’s message of 26 Octo- basis of which this dangerous moment in drew his own conclusions from the ex- ber makes clearly evident, it made abso- the history of our countries, which really change of messages betwen N.S. lutely no reference to an agreement about could erupt in a catastrophic thermonuclear Khrushchev and Kennedy, and doubts crept the “removal” of our weaponry from Cuba. war, can be eliminated. into his mind as to whether we had famil- Since N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy Say that we believe that the elimina- iarized him with all the letters. did not exchange any other messages or tion of this especially difficult situation, and In particular, he says that it follows statements in those days, besides the ones the formalization of this in documents, from Kennedy’s open message of 27 Octo- familiar to our Cuban friends, Fidel Castro’s would serve as a good beginning in the reso- ber that our decision regarding the disman- doubts about whether we might have given lution of issues that our states and indeed tling had been communicated to Kennedy our consent to the dismantling of the weap- the whole world faces. This is the issue of even before that date. onry and its removal from Cuba before 27 disarmament, the issue of the elimination Before 27 October, I passed on to October should disappear completely. of bases, the prohibition of thermonuclear Castro two confidential letters from N.S. arms testing, the signing of agreements on Khrushchev to President Kennedy: of 23 and A. G. non-agression between Warsaw Pact and 26 October. NATO countries. On the basis of the correspondence I [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK , Emphasize that if the USA intends to have come to the opinion that Kennedy did provided to CWIHP, and on file at National insist on discussing the issues it has raised, not yet have a basis in the message of 27 Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- because the President spoke about them and October for drawing the conclusion that we lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- because they allegedly also relate to the con- gave our consent for the dismantling before sity.] ditions of the agreement, then it is fitting to that date, and it is necessary somehow to remind them that N.S. Khrushchev also explain this to Castro. Comrade Mikoyan Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to raised other issues in his messages. Both we has entrusted me with the task of looking the USA Dobrynin to USSR Foreign and the Americans know that USA missile into the issue raised by Castro. Ministry, 5 November 1962 bases are distributed throughout many coun- In view of the necessity of sending this 326 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

5 November 1962 tine.” This, he said, was how Stevenson had we are not authorized to carry on the dis- “understood” V.V. Kuznetsov during their cussion of this sort of issue on behalf of Today the “Washington Post” pub- first meeting. Cuba. Let us rather fulfill the agreement lished an article by [columnist Joseph] Alsop I answered that this interpretation of reached in the exchange of messages be- under the title “The Soviet Plan for Decep- the Soviet position did not correspond to tween the government leaders of both coun- tion.” The article talks about Robert reality. A reference to the declaration can- tries, said I to R. Kennedy. Then the situa- Kennedy’s connection with [Georgi] not have for us the force of an obligation, tion around Cuba may be normalized. We Bolshakov19 (the latter was not named di- since it is a document publicized by the USA are keeping our promise, and hope that the rectly), and also declared in dramatic tones government in a highly unilateral fashion. USA too does not renege on its own prom- how that connection was used “for the de- It is well known that the Soviets have re- ises and impose unacceptable conditions that ception” of the President in the issue of the fused to recognize this document, and thus create the possibility of a continuation of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. It mentions in also the list of weaponry it contains, and to the conflict. particular Bolshakov’s reception by N. S. which R. Kennedy is referring. For the So- R. Kennedy limited himself to the re- Khrushchev in the summer of this year, and viet Union, only the written agreement mark that they were really seriously wor- the oral message for the President conveyed reached between N.S. Khrushchev and the ried by the possible consequences of the fir- through him. President has the force of law, and we will ing at American planes, and that he person- This and several other details are fulfill the terms of that agreement if the ally considered it necessary to say so. We known in Washington only by Robert Americans also fulfill their own obligations. then once again laid out for him our posi- Kennedy, whom Bolshakov met with after V.V. Kuznetsov also spoken about this tion with regard to the flights of American his return from vacation (the article also to Stevenson. And A.I. Mikoyan spoke about planes over Cuba. mentions this meeting). For this reason it is it to Stevenson and McCloy during his re- With this the talks were ended, since clearly obvious that the article was prepared cent talks with them, at which I was present R. Kennedy was hurrying to the White with the knowledge of, or even by orders myself. House to meet with the President. from, Robert Kennedy, who is a close friend, R. Kennedy did not go any further into as is the President, of Alsop. the details of the list itself, saying, however, 5.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN After his first meeting with Robert that besides the missiles being removed by Kennedy, immediately after his return from us, the Americans place great importance [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, vacation, Bolshakov no longer met with as well on the removal from Cuba of the provided to CWIHP, and on file at National him. Robert Kennedy promised him to set Soviet IL-28 bombers. “We are not insist- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- up a meeting with the President for passing ing on the recall of fighter planes, but bomb- lation by John Henriksen.] on to him the oral message, but yet did not ers with a significant radius of action are organize such a meeting. another matter entirely.” He refused to make Telegram from V.V. Kuznetsov to USSR any further statements on this subject, say- Foreign Ministry, 6 November 1962 5.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN ing only that he would immediately pass on N.S. Khrushchev’s letter to the President, First. On 5 November we met with U [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, who was supposed to be flying soon to the Thant. We informed him of the exchange of provided to CWIHP, and on file at National city of Boston, where he will vote in the views which had been taking place in re- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- USA congressional elections. cent days with the Americans. We informed lation by John Henriksen.] R. Kennedy answered that any addi- him in particular of our proposals, commu- tional demands, like the list of weaponry nicated yesterday to McCloy, regarding the Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to indicated above, render the lessening of the monitoring of the weaponry being removed the USA Dobrynin to USSR Foreign tensions arising around Cuba significantly from Cuba (the numerical data on the quan- Ministry, 5 November 1962 more difficult to attain, and could only seri- tity of launch pads and missiles which was ously complicate the situation. communicated to McCloy was not passed Having familiarized himself with the Before R. Kennedy’s departure, he ex- on to U Thant). We lingered in detail over text of N.S. Khrushchev’s confidential let- pressed concern about the Cubans’ firing at the fact that the USA is asking questions ter,20 Robert Kennedy said that he would American planes carrying out observational which can only complicate the resolution of pass it on to the President immediately. flights over Cuba on the dismantling of the the whole problem, such as, for example, Then, assuming a somewhat suprised Soviet missiles. Such gunfire can elicit their attempts the broaden their definition air, he tried to represent the affair as if the highly serious consequences, he added. of the weapons considered offensive by the Soviets, having given their consent in prin- R. Kennedy was told that the flights Americans (the IL-28 bombers, and so on). ciple to withdraw from Cuba the arms that by the American planes are a direct viola- We noted as well the USA refusal with re- the Americans call offensive, thereby alleg- tion of the sovereignty of Cuba, and that this gard to guarantees of the security of Cuba, edly came close to adopting the American whole issue should, in all fairness, be raised explaining meanwhile, on the basis of our point of view that had been laid out in the not by the Americans but by the Cubans. protocol draft, how we approximately imag- form of the list of weaponry mentioned by Every sovereign state has every legal right ine the USA obligations in this matter. We the American statement about the “quaran- to defend the inviolability of its borders. And noted the negative reaction of the USA rep- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 327 resentatives to U Thant’s proposal for a “UN a gradual removal through several trips ber he discussed the issue of the “UN pres- presence” in the area of the Caribbean Sea, would not arise. ence” with delegates from Venezuela and including on USA territory, as a measure Fourth. U Thant, emphasizing that he Chile, as well as with representatives from seeking to guarantee a lasting peace in this was speaking for himself personally and the United Arab Republic, and that their re- region. We emphasized that the stubborn would not contact the Americans with re- action was generally positive. refusal of the USA to lift the “quarantine” gard to this issue, asked whether it would Sixth. U Thant told us, evidently hav- does not at all contribute to the creation of a not be possible—unless, after we approve ing in mind information published in today’s positive atmosphere for the resolution of the the American proposal for monitoring com- American newspapers on a seemingly im- Cuban problem. municated yesterday by McCloy, the Ameri- minent meeting of the Security Council, that Second. U Thant asked a fine-tuning cans accept the agreement—to entrust the he considered it necessary and possible to question with regard to our information on monitoring to representatives of the Inter- convene the Council only after all issues the USA attempts to broaden their demands national Red Cross, the same ones who will have been resolved at the negotiations be- for the removal of our weaponry from Cuba. be conducting inspections, as is now pro- ing conducted now. He asked in whose hands—ours or the Cu- posed, on the Soviet vessels bound for Cuba. We fully agreed with U Thant’s point bans’—the IL-28 bombers can presently be We told U Thant that we would pro- of view, and emphasized the inexpediency found, as well as the torpedo cutters of the vide information on his proposal to Mos- and even undesirability of convening the Se- “Mosquito” class and the missiles on board cow, but that we supposed that the Soviet curity Council before the conclusion of the them, missiles of the “air-surface” class, and government had already introduced to the negotiations. missiles of the “surface-surface” class, of a Americans such liberal proposals on the in- Seventh. U Thant asked whether Com- small operational radius. spection process that they are offering the rade A.I. Mikoyan intended to stop for a time We answered U Thant that we cannot full possibility for settling the whole issue, in New York on his way back from Cuba, now provide information on this issue. U if the other side earnestly wants such a settle- and agreed that if so he would like to meet Thant asked us to make inquiries to Mos- ment. with Comrade Mikoyan to get information cow, and to give him an answer “for his own It appears to us that it is expedient to on the results of his negotiations with Fidel personal information.” seek an agreement on the basis of the con- Castro. We ask that you provide us with infor- sent we have already given to the American We answered that it was not yet clear mation on this issue. proposals on the inspection process. If it is to us whether Comrade Mikoyan would stop We assume that in examining this is- not possible to reach an agreement on this by New York on his way back from Cuba. sue it would be appropriate to bear in mind basis, examine U Thant’s proposal. In such that Fidel Castro, in his speech of 1 Novem- a case it may be possible, in our opinion, to 6.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV ber, declared not only that Cuba possessed agree that the International Red Cross rep- the “strategic weaponry” which now “the resentatives carry out inspections on vessels [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK , Soviet Union had decided to seize,” but also leaving Cuba with missiles in the same way provided to CWIHP, and on file at National that all other weaponry “is our property.” that it has been proposed that they conduct Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- Third. U Thant asked whether there inspections on the vessels bound for Cuba. lation by John Henriksen.] could be a disclosure, through first-hand Fifth. U Thant stated that at each meet- observation, of the missiles on the vessels ing with the Americans (his last meeting Telegram from Soviet envoys in New that will remove them from Cuba, or with them took place on 2 November) he York V.V. Kuznetsov and V.A. Zorin to whether instead they would be kept in con- has asked them questions about guarantees USSR Foreign Ministry, tainers. General Rikhye, who was present for Cuba’s security and about the lifting of 6 November 1962 at the talks, said, not waiting for our answer, the “quarantine,” and that he intends to con- that he had proposed that they be packed in tinue to do so. 6 November 1962 a way appropriate for long-distance over- U Thant reacted with great interest to TOP SECRET seas shipping, with a view for the preven- our information on the exchange of views tion of corrosion, but that they could be with the Americans on the subject of the On 5 November we had a meeting with viewed in their outline forms from beneath “UN presence” in the Caribbean Sea area. Stevenson and McCloy at the American ini- the packing. It was clear that this issue is important to tiative. The Americans came to the meeting U Thant was also interested in whether him, and that he wants to reach a positive with the clear intention of exerting pressure all the missiles would be removed by one settlement of it. He asked us in particular to get further concessions from the Soviets. trip of each of the ships used for this pur- whether we considered McCloy’s negative Throughout the duration of the whole dis- pose, or whether the ships would instead response with regard to UN posts on USA cussion, which lasted more than three hours, remove only a part of the missiles at once, territory to be “conclusive,” or whether it they tried to represent the affair as if the returning them to Soviet ports and then sail- was just an “initial reaction.” We said that it Soviets had still not displayed any willing- ing back to retrieve the rest. We said that all was difficult for us to make judgments on ness to fulfill the obligations stipulated in the missiles would be loaded onto the ships this, but that it seemed that it was only an the correspondence between Comrade N.S. and ready for shipping no later than 10 No- “initial reaction.” Khrushchev and President Kennedy, nota- vember, and that consequently the issue of U Thant informed us that on 2 Novem- bly with regard to IL-28 planes and nuclear 328 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

warheads and bombs. At the same time the ter this agreement, which is the result of intelligence reconnaissance and that, with Americans kept shying away from a discus- compromise and mutual concessions. On 28 regard to the IL-28 bombers, the American sion of the issues concerning the Americans’ October the dismantling of the missiles was intelligence information on the continuing fulfillment of their own obligations. The begun, this dismantling was completed on assembly in Cuba of these planes is incor- discussion at times became pointed, and this 2 November, and the dismantled missiles rect, McCloy asserted that in the photos was an effect created largely by Stevenson have been broughts to the ports for shipping, taken by an American reconnaissance plane and McCloy. and will be removed no later than 10 No- over the area where IL-28 planes were be- 1. More than half the discussion was vember. ing stored, it was obvious that there were devoted to an exchange of opinions on the We directed the attention of the Ameri- more of them in recent days, and that new issue of the IL-28 planes located in Cuba. cans to the fact that, if they want to raise containers of parts for these planes were Stevenson and McCloy stated that the agree- new issues, then we have many issues that being unpacked. In a half-joking tone ment between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev we will want to raise too, for example con- McCloy stated that once Soviet representa- and Kennedy stipulated the removal of all cerning the American military bases on for- tives had also denied even the American these planes from Cuba, and their return to eign territories, but that we are not doing intelligence photos of missile bases in Cuba. the Soviet Union. The essence of this because we do not want to complicate McCloy said that he himself had seen the Stevenson’s and McCloy’s argument on this the negotiations. photos of recent days in which IL-28 bomb- issue can be reduced to the following: We adduced concrete facts concerning ers were visible, and that he believed these Kennedy’s statement of 22 October and the IL-28 bombers, showing that this photos. his proclamation of 23 October placed jet bomber is a purely defensive weapon, long We answered McCloy and Stevenson bombers in the category of the so-called ago outmoded, and that it can be used only by saying that their formulation of the issue “offensive” Soviet weaponry in Cuba. for coastal defense when escorted by anti- of IL-28 bombers, which were outmoded Kennedy’s message of 27 October referred aircraft units. We said with regard to this and which have been removed from the ar- to the “offensive missile bases,” as well as that if the USA representatives insist on their senal of our army, is clearly aimed at com- to “all armament systems that can be used own demands concerning the IL-28 planes, plicating the whole affair, at slowing the for offensive purposes,” apparently includ- then in doing so they will only place the completion of the negotiation work, and at ing jet bombers in this category. Comrade USA in a position in which the whole world putting into doubt everything positive that N.S. Khrushchev indicated in his message will see that the United States are reneging had already been achieved at these negotia- of 28 October that the Soviet government on their promise, and imposing unaccept- tions. We returned to these opinions many had issued instructions to dismantle and re- able conditions that create the possibility of times in the course of the talks. Stevenson turn to the Soviet Union the arms that “you a continuation of the conflict. and McCloy stated that without resolving call offensive.” The Americans call both We said that Stevenson’s assertion in the issue of removing the IL-28 bombers missiles as well as jet bombers offensive his letter of 3 November, that according to from Cuba, it would be impossible to reach weaponry. the reports of American intelligence there any agreement. McCloy and Stevenson came back was evidence that IL-28 bombers are still At the end of this part of the talks, many times in the course of the talks to these being assembled in Cuba, is a fabrication Stevenson asked whether it should be un- arguments, interpreting them in such a way by American intelligence that clearly aims derstood that the Soviets are refusing to re- as to make it seem as though the Soviet to avoid the settlement of the conflict and move the IL-28 planes from Cuba. If so, he Union had committed itself to dismantle and the normalization of our relations, and that said, then our position in the negotiations return to the Soviet Union from Cuba not indeed tightens the tensions. If the United has reached “a very serious impasse.” We only missiles, but also bombers. States take as their goal a return to the in- repeated that these planes are not offensive, We explained our position in detail to cendiary situation of earlier, then this is and that the Soviets will proceed from this McCloy and Stevenson, in accordance with scarcely in the interests of the USA or the fact in their actions. Isn’t Mr. Stevenson al- your instructions. We emphasized in particu- USSR, or in the interests of peace. We pro- ready thinking of presenting us with an ul- lar that at the present time there is only one pose to select reasonable positions, and to timatum on this issue and blaming the So- basis for an agreement, the one established proceed in our negotiations from the agree- viets for the situation created at these nego- by the exchange of messages between Com- ment that has already been reached. tiations?, we asked in response. He imme- rades N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy. As far The Americans contested our views of diately said no, there was no ultimatum at as Soviet obligations are concerned, that the purely defensive character of the IL-28 all. agreement stipulates that the Soviet Union bombers. McCloy and Stevenson asserted Stevenson said that perhaps the Sovi- will remove from Cuba the missile weap- that “in Castro’s hands” these bombers could ets would think over this issue again, and onry that the President of the USA has called be offensive weapons, and that for the Latin that the next day or the day after that they “offensive,” and that it will never in the fu- American region they represent a threaten- could discuss it again. We said that we were ture supply such weaponry to Cuba. The ing weapon which the other Latin Ameri- willing to discuss any issue in these nego- USA in its turn committed itself not to in- can countries do not possess. tiations, but that as far as the issue of the vade Cuba, and not to allow any invasion In response to our statement, in accor- IL-28 bombers was concerned, it is the by the other states of the Western hemi- dance with your instructions, that one can- Americans who should think it over, since sphere. The Soviets are fulfilling to the let- not always rely on the facts produced by their position on it was complicating the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 329 negotiations. also informed Narasimhan today. In spite morning by a telegram from Washington. 2. Then Stevenson and McCloy asked of the fact that McCloy, in talks at his coun- In McCloy’s words, President Kennedy was one more question— about the nuclear war- try house yesterday, was still talking about counting on continued progress at the ne- heads on the missiles, and about nuclear the USA’s lack of objections to the use of gotiating table. And he added that they bombs. They asked how we proposed to give Soviet ships for the Red Cross inspections, hoped that the Soviets would make an at- the Americans the possibility of ascertain- he stated today that he had doubts about the tentive examination of the issues that had ing that our nuclear warheads and bombs acceptability for the USA government of our been put forth at today’s talks. had been removed from Cuba in conditions proposal to use the Soviet freight vessel In response to McCloy and Stevenson, in which ground-based inspection in Cuba “Amata” for carrying out this inspection by we said that we did not think that the ques- was impossible. We stated that the Ameri- the Red Cross representatives. tions referred to by Stevenson were open- cans’ formulation of still another issue could At this time McCloy asserted that, ended any longer. Those issues are perfectly only complicate the situation. We empha- since the Soviets had refused to approve the clear, and it is only the USA position that is sized that the Soviets would fulfill to the use of American ships for this purpose, the hindering forward movement. We appealed letter all the obligations, stipulated in Com- Americans could scarcely agree to the use to the Americans to operate in future nego- rade N.S. Khrushchev’s messages, for re- of a Soviet ship, and that it would be better tiations on the basis of the spirit of compro- turning from Cuba to the Soviet Union the to charter vessels from neutral states, such mise and the desire to guarantee the whole complex of weaponry that the Ameri- as Sweden, for example, for this purpose. strengthening of peace that was displayed cans have called “offensive.” McCloy stated Answering our questions, McCloy said that in the correspondence between N. S. in response to this that the USA did not want this still did not constitute a definitive re- Khrushchev and Kennedy, and to be guided to allow “nuclear warheads to be found in sponse from the Americans, and that he by precisely that spirit when attentively re- Castro’s hands,” and wanted to be sure that would inform his government of our pro- viewing the considerations we had ex- there was no such weaponry in Cuba. posal. pressed. McCloy said moreover that, since We expressed our surprise with regard We ask that you inform us on the issue ground-based inspection in Cuba was im- to such a change of the USA position on the of the warheads. possible, the Americans would want to be issue of using Soviet vessels for the Red allowed the same possibility for checking Cross inspections. McCloy was somewhat 6.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV on the removal from Cuba of the nuclear embarrassed by this, and repeated several V. ZORIN warheads that they had been allowed for times that yesterday, in talking about the checking on the removal of the missiles. likelihood of American approval for that [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK , “Tell us how many nuclear warheads you proposal, he had been expressing only his provided to CWIHP, and on file at National have in Cuba,” McCloy said, “and allow us own personal assumptions. Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- the possibility to ascertain that they have all 5. In the course of the talks, we tried lation by John Henriksen.] been loaded onto your vessels.” several times to lead the Americans toward We repeated that none of this was be- the issues of guarantees of Cuban security Telegram from Soviet envoy in New ing put forth by the Americans in order suc- and the lifting of the “quarantine.” McCloy York V. Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign cessfully to complete the negotiations, and and Stevenson did not enter into any real Ministry, 7 November 1962 that the Soviets would fully and precisely discussion of these issues, even less than fulfill their obligation to remove from Cuba they had before at the earlier meetings. On 6 November we had a meeting with the “offensive” missiles, along with every- 6. At the end of the talks, Stevenson the Americans, with the participation on thing associated with them. We have every said, as if summing things up, that for them their side of Stevenson, the Deputy Minis- right to expect a similarly sincere fulfillment there were still several questions, in his view, ter [Secretary] of Defense [Roswell] of the American’s obligations, instead of the which remained either undecided or open- Gilpatrick, and Ambassador [Charles] Yost advancement of more and more issues that ended; these included questions about the (Stevenson’s deputy). complicate and delay the resolution of this removal from Cuba of the IL-28 bombers, The Americans asked a series of ques- urgent problem. about the granting of the possibility for the tions connected with the procedure govern- 3. We have informed the Americans USA to be sure of the removal from Cuba ing the first-hand observation from their with regard to your instruction No. 2389 on of nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs, and ships of our ships’ removal of the missiles. the schedule of departures from Cuba of the about the search for vessels of neutral coun- They proposed the following procedure for ships carrying the missiles on 6 and 7 No- tries that would be acceptable to both par- that observation activity: vember. They have made no comment on ties for the Red Cross inspection of Soviet The American ships will come up close this information, and have asked no ques- ships bound for Cuba. to the Soviet vessels in order to see and pho- tions. McCloy told me that the day before he tograph the missiles being shipped. If con- 4. We informed Stevenson and McCloy had told President Kennedy by telephone ditions at sea do not permit their ships to of our progress with regard to the establish- about our talks at McCloy’s country house, approach so close to the Soviet vessels, then ing of inspections on the Soviet vessels that the President had given a positive evalu- unarmed helicopters will be sent from the bound for Cuba by representatives of the ation of the results of the talks, and that this American ships, and the photographing will International Red Cross, about which we evaluation had been confirmed the next be done from them. 330 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

In order to be convinced that it is pre- in agreement on the formulations that had cisely missiles that are being shipped out, From the Journal of V.V. Kuznetsov: been used to do so. It must be borne in mind rather than something else, the Americans Record of Conversation with the Cuban that the Cubans are a young nation, passion- are requesting that the covers or casings be Representative to the UN, C. Lechuga, ate in character. When the crisis began, the removed from certain missiles during the 7 November 1962 Cubans were full of determination to fight, observation. The desire was expressed that and for this reason when the events took a the missiles be shipped on the decks of the On 7 November 1962 a meeting took different turn, the feeling arose in them that ships. Gilpatrick emphasized that they did place with the permanent Cuban represen- they had experienced a failure. At the same not have in mind the sort of unveiling of the tative to the UN, Lechuga. time that this crisis represented a global missiles that would allow a disclosure of V. V. Kuznetsov informed him that in problem, for Cuba it was also her own prob- their technical characteristics. recent days we had been discussing with the lem, one which roused the whole nation, and The Americans emphasized that they Americans a series of problems deriving from that communal feeling came the fa- considered it important to become con- from the exchange of letters between the mous five points appearing in Fidel Castro’s vinced that the entire quantity of missiles Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the statement. Now, however, the Soviet gov- that they had been informed of was being USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, and President ernment can be sure that the uncertainty removed from Cuba. Kennedy, including the issue of assurances which arose in the first moments of the cri- The question was raised as to how and and guarantees that Cuba would not be at- sis has been dispelled, and that the Cuban where a meeting could be arranged between tacked by the USA or by the other countries nation is delighted by the firmness and the American ships with the Soviet vessels neighboring Cuba. peace-loving actions of the Soviet Union. carrying the missiles. The Americans pro- At the present stage of the discussion, Lechuga also said that he had had a posed that we inform them of the ship’s we have not yet gone so far as to work out meeting with the Red Cross representatives, numbers of all our vessels which are headed any documents or the details of the agree- who had raised the issue of their inspection out of Cuba bearing missiles, so that the ment. The Americans are now trying to find on the open sea of the vessels entering and captains of the American ships from which pretexts for avoiding definite and concrete sailing from Cuba. They made no mention the observations will be conducted can be statements. All in all, they have not been of the establishing of an inspection proce- able to make contact with the captains of displaying any spirit of cooperation at the dure in Cuban territory. Lechuga said that our ships, and arrange a meeting-place with negotiating table. he had answered the Red Cross representa- them without disturbing the itineraries of the In the American press there are fre- tives, in provisional fashion, that it did not Soviet vessels. We said that in that case it quent statements about how the USA has seem that the Cuban government would of- would be necessary for the captains of our apparently won a triumph in the Cuban cri- fer any objections to that, since the issue at vessels to have the ship’s numbers of the sis. But it is clear to anyone who is able so- hand did not concern Cuban territory, but American ships as well, in order to find out berly to assess the events that, thanks to the rather the open sea, and since this whole whether they should get in contact with firm and peaceful policies of the Soviet affair more directly concerns the USSR and those particular ships. Gilpatrick agreed, and Union and the peace-loving actions it has the USA. proposed that the ship’s numbers of the So- taken in the crisis period, what has really The Red Cross representatives said that viet and American vessels be exchanged. triumphed is the cause of peace, what has they intended to carry out their inspection The Americans also requested to be triumphed is reason. operations under the aegis of the UN, and informed of the departure schedules of the Now that the first stage is over and the to select the inspection personnel from the other ships carrying missiles out of Cuba missiles are being shipped out of Cuba, we citizenry of neutral countries rather than after 7 November. consider it necessary to take the following from those of the interested countries. We believe that the American propos- steps in the negotiations with the Americans, Lechuga stated that in the talks with als for carrying out an observation of the steps that should show whether or not the the Deputy Secretary General of the UN removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba are Americans really want to put an end to the Loutfi, the latter had told him that the pe- acceptable. In the event that they are ap- crisis and to prevent a repetition of this dan- riod of five days, proposed by the Soviet proved, we ask to be immediately informed gerous military situation. We intend to put Union as the maximum period in which the of the ship’s numbers of the Soviet vessels, before the Americans the issue of how they inspection of vessels could be conducted, and of the departure schedules of the ships will fulfill their obligations regarding the was insufficient, since within this period the carrying missiles out of Cuba after 7 No- guarantee against an attack on Cuba. Red Cross representatives would not even vember, unless all the missiles will have Lechuga said that Cuba supports the be able to prepare their ships or send them been removed by 6 or 7 November. Soviet Union’s peace-loving policies, and into the inspection zone. Loutfi also men- that the misunderstanding which had arisen tioned that the USA had raised the question 7.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV in Cuba after the first steps taken by the of the IL-28 bombers located in Cuba, and Soviet Union had now been completely that he was interested in whether these [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, eradicated. We knew, Lechuga said, that the bombers were manned by Soviet or Cuban provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Soviet government was defending the inter- pilots. Security Archive; translation by John ests of peace, we were in full agreement with V.V. Kuznetsov said that our position Henriksen.] the goals it was pursuing, but we were not with regard to the Red Cross inspections was COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 331 based on the correspondence between N.S. that we took in the crisis period shows that that we allow the possibility that the the pro- Khrushchev and Kennedy. We are generally definite positive results have been attained, tocol statement be not formally signed, but opposed to the carrying out of any inspec- that we have definite assurances of non- affirmed by special separate statements by tions at all. The Soviet Union agreed to the agression against Cuba, and that the issue the governments of the three countries—the possibility of using Red Cross observers for now is how the USA will fulfill its obliga- USSR, the USA, and Cuba. All these docu- the duration of a very short time only to give tions. It is impossible to forget that the whole ments in their collectivity will constitute an assurances that the missiles had been re- world is currently watching how the events agreement. moved from Cuba. Since the USA maintains connected with the Cuban crisis are unfold- As a last resort you may even go so far that the reason for the current crisis is the ing. as to propose that the document not be for- existence of missiles in Cuba, then it fol- mally called a protocol statement, but rather lows that with the removal of these missiles, [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK , a declaration, which would be affirmed by the reasons adduced by the USA for their provided to CWIHP, and on file at National special separate statements from the three actions against Cuba are also removed. Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- governments. In the negotiations with the UN Secre- lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- We will inform you of final instructions tary General, we said that it was clear that sity.] concerning the form of the document after we consider all the actions taken by the USA this issue has been submitted to the approval and leading to the current crisis to be un- Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister of our Cuban friends. Meanwhile, you and lawful. It is from precisely that same point A. Gromyko to A.I. Mikoyan via the the Cuban representative will introcuce it of view that we are now conducting nego- Soviet Embassy in Havana, as a protocol draft.” tiations. With the resolution of this problem, 10 November 1962 In the next meeting with our Cuban there should not be any infringement at all comrades, you should clarify their views on on the sovereignty of Cuba or its legal rights. First. Inform our Cuban friends that this proposal of ours. We request that you In response to the question as to Moscow agrees with their remarks on the inform us immediately of what you find out, whether vessels could now proceed unhin- Protocol draft on the elimination of tensions so that we can give corresponding instruc- dered to Cuba, Lechuga answered in the af- associated with Cuba. The text of the Pro- tions to Comrade Kuznetsov. firmative. tocol statement, including the remarks by With regard to the “IL-28” bombers, our Cuban comrades contained in it, has 10.XI A. G. V.V. Kuznetsov told Lechuga that the Ameri- been sent by us to Comrade Kuznetsov in cans had asked this question during the ne- New York for him to relay to the Cuban [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, gotiations with us, but that we had answered representative, the USA representatives, and provided to CWIHP, and on file at National that it goes beyond the negotiation param- U Thant. Security Archive; translation by John eters defined in N.S. Khrushchev’s and Second. We agree with the thoughts Henriksen.] Kennedy’s letters. you expressed to our Cuban comrades re- The Americans also raised the issue of garding the inexpediency of making a spe- Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the continuation of reconnaissance flights cial statement on the refusal of inspections the USA A. F. Dobrynin to USSR over Cuba, to which we responded that we in Cuban territory of the dismantling and Foreign Ministry, 12 November 1962 considered such flights to be a blatant vio- removal of “offensive weaponry.” We are lation of the sovereignty of Cuba, the norms also in agreement on your explanations con- Your instructions have been carried of international law, and the principles of cerning the Cubans’ second proposal—on out. Robert Kennedy has familiarized him- the UN Charter. The continuation of such the UN presence in the countries of the Car- self attentively with the content of N.S. flights would lead to a prolongation of ten- ibbean. Khrushchev’s confidential oral message to sions, and any measures taken by the Cu- We understand that our Cuban com- the President. When he got to the place that ban government in connection with this will rades have agreed with these ideas of yours. spoke of Nixon’s defeat in the elections,21 be justified, and all responsibility for any Third. With regard to the fact that he immediately grinned, saying: “Your consequences will lie on the shoulders of McCloy and Stevenson, in the talks with you chairman is a real master of colorful expres- the United States. in New York, referred to possible difficul- sion that expressed the true essence of the At the upcoming conference we intend ties they might have in signing the Protocol issue. Yes, we are quite satisfied with to exert pressure on them with regard to the statement, and that they expressed support Nixon’s defeat, and in general we are not guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba. for fixing the obligations that have been complaining about the results of the elec- And as far as the five points put forth in Fi- undertaken in the form of separate state- tion.” It was felt that this portion of the mes- del Castro’s statement are concerned, we ments, the following instructions are given sage was received with definite satisfaction. support them, including the point about to Comrade Kuznetsov: When Robert Kennedy had familiar- Guantanamo, and we are taking this into “If the Americans declare that the sign- ized himself with the whole message, he said account in the negotiations with the Ameri- ing of the protocol statement is difficult for that for the President, for domestic policy cans. them because of the fact that the USA and considerations, it was very important to re- In conclusion V.V. Kuznetsov said that Cuba are supposed to be signing the same ceive the Soviet Union’s firm agreement to an analysis of the events and of the steps document, then you may tell the Americans the removal of the IL-28 planes, especially 332 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

now that there were essentially no inspec- let us say, within 30 days. We ask that N.S. would be much better if Adenauer kept his tions being conducted in Cuba itself. The Khrushchev be informed of this whole pro- nose out of everyone else’s business, and if correspondence between N.S. Khrushchev posal. the USA government told him so directly and President Kennedy of 27 and 28 Octo- Robert Kennedy was told that the (here Robert Kennedy energetically nodded ber implied that an agreement between our President’s proposal would of course be his head in a gesture of agreement). I then countries had been reached. But we under- communicated to N.S. Khrushchev. As a said that in the proposal that he had ad- stand the difficulties in this area that have personal opinion, however, I noted that it vanced, the issue is once again raised of a now arisen because of Premier Fidel was unlikely that such an imminent date full elimination of all the tension that has Castro’s position, and we are not insisting could be acceptable to us, all the more so existed, that is, beyond the immediate lift- on this as an unalterable and fundamental since the fundamental USA obligations— ing of the blockade, the obligations of all condition. But the removal of the IL-28 guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba, the parties should be fixed in appropriate planes—in an atmosphere of growing criti- and other obligations—remain, as before, UN documents, and non-aggression against cism within the USA—is a matter of great unfulfilled; moreover, they themselves are Cuba and a strict observation of its sover- concern to the President. Let us reach an pushing everything later and later. And this eignty should be guaranteed; there would agreement, continued Robert Kennedy, on is happening in circumstances in which the also be UN posts established in the coun- the following points: that the Soviet Union Soviet government is sincerely fulfilling, tries of the Caribbean region as guarantees will remove its IL-28 planes by a definite and essentially has already fulfilled, its own against unexpected actions harming another date announced in advance, and that on that obligations for the removal of the missiles. state. same day the USA will officially lift its quar- It is now the Americans’ turn. Robert Kennedy said that he believed antine. All this may be announced immedi- Robert Kennedy said that the time- that an agreement could be reached on all ately. frame he had referred to—30 days—is not this points. It is important, from the point of I answered Robert Kennedy that his in any way definitive. That time-frame had view of American public opinion, to have proposal is entirely unacceptable for the been “given to him,” but he though that there some inspection conducted in Cuba, even Soviet side. I then demonstrated the was room for negotiation here as long as in the form of several UN posts. Castro will unacceptability of of this proposal by using the period was not too great, and as long as scarcely go for this unless a similar proce- the argument contained in N.S. N. S. Khrushchev generally found the dure is imposed on the other countries of Khrushchev’s oral message that had been President’s proposal acceptable. I want now the Caribbean basin. But is possible to re- passed on to him. In conclusion I expressed to make note of one more condition, Robert solve this too. Robert Kennedy mentioned, my certainty that conveying his proposal to Kennedy continued. After such an agree- as an alternative to this, the plan put forth Moscow would prove fruitless. ment has been reached, especially if it is not by Brazil, but then he immediately said that Thinking a moment, Robert Kennedy publicized, it would be important for us that, this aspect of the issue was being studied said that he would like to confer with his even if the end of the agreed-upon period by Stevenson, and that he, Robert Kennedy, brother the President, after which he would for the removal of the IL-28 planes has not could not go into details with regard to it. I again contact me later the same day. I yet been reached, at least some planes will can however repeat the firm assurances of agreed. have been disassembled by this time, or if the President not to invade Cuba. He autho- After an hour and a half (all this hap- they have just been taken out of containers, rized me once again to say this now. He was pened in the evening), Robert Kennedy that a portion of them be returned to their grateful to N.S. Khrushchev for the latter’s came to my residence. He said that now, containers. We need all of this, Robert clarification that the IL-28 planes are after speaking with the President, he could Kennedy remarked, so that we can satisfy manned by Soviet rather than Cuban pilots, formulate the American proposal in the fol- our domestic public opinion by reporting but nevertheless the issue of the removal of lowing way: that there has been some progress in the re- these planes remains a very important one N.S. Khrushchev and the President moval of the IL-28 planes. This is neces- for the President, and he asks that we con- would reach an essential agreement that the sary, since even [West German Chancellor sider his proposal. IL-28 planes would be removed by a defi- Konrad] Adenauer is starting now to criti- Further discussion came down to a re- nite date. After such an agreement has been cize us publicly for trusting the word of the iteration of the positions of the parties. Rob- reached, the USA would, as early as the next Soviet Union without inspections in Cuban ert Kennedy said in conclusion that he was day, lift any quarantine even before the re- territory—not to mention the Cuban emi- flying now to New York on personal busi- moval of the planes had been completed. gres in certain republics [states—ed.] who ness, and that he would be willing to meet The Americans would of course prefer that are making similar accusations. But the with me at any time. the date agreed upon for the removal of the President, Robert Kennedy emphasized, has When he left, he glimpsed a crowd of IL-28 planes be publicized. However, if the faith in N. S. Khrushchev’s word, and is dancing couples in the embassy’s parlor. Soviets have any objections to the public willing to lift the quarantine immediately if Realizing that this was a friendly welcome disclosure of that date, then the President the agreement mentioned above can be party arranged by the embassy community would not insist on it. For him a promise reached, even though we really do not have for the Bolshoi Theater troupe that had just from N.S. Khrushchev would be entirely any guarantees with regard to inspections arrived in Washington, he said that he would sufficient. As far as the date is concerned, it in Cuban territory. like to meet with the troupe. Mingling with would be good if the planes were removed, I answered Robert Kennedy that it and greeting almost all the members of the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 333 troupe, he delivered a welcome speech in IL-28 planes has been provoked by the sponse, which spoke, as did his preceding which he said that the President was pre- growing pressure that has been brought to message to the President, of how it seems paring to attend their premier the following bear on the President by representatives of that our countries must in the first place evening. At the end, he kissed Maya Congress, the press, and so on. It is impor- come back in their disarmament negotia- Plisetskaya when he found out that he and tant that this aspect be properly understood tions to the Soviet proposals that stipulated she had been born in the same year, month, in Moscow, since the President himself has posts in airports, in the major ports, at rail- and day, and said they would celebrate their great difficulties in dealing with this issue road hubs, and on motorways in order to birthdays in a week. None of this needs to (Robert Kennedy twice emphasized the “dif- guarantee for all countries of the world that be mentioned especially, but all in all the ficulties for the President”). no country can assemble troops and prepare behavior of Robert Kennedy, who is ordi- I carried on the discussion with Rob- for attack on or invasion of another coun- narily quite a reserved and glum man, re- ert Kennedy of these difficulties using the try. flects to some degree the calmer and more arguments advanced by N.S. Khrushchev’s Robert Kennedy corrected himself, normal mood in the White House after the response. It was especially emphasized that confirming that such a proposal was indeed tense days that shook Washington, even we have removed from Cuba the missiles to be found in N.S. Khrushchev’s responses. though this fact is concealed in various ways and warheads, in other words that we have By the way, the remark I made has no direct by American propaganda. fulfilled the obligations we assumed, while connection to the subject presently under the USA is not fulfilling its own obligations; discussion, the subject from which I di- 12.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN for this reason, in order to conduct assur- gressed, he continued. As far as I am aware, ance inspections after the missiles and war- there are no unsurmountable obstacles on [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, heads have been removed, the quarantine this point, although for us it seems a highly provided to CWIHP, and on file at National should have already been lifted by now, the complicated issue to organize UN posts in Security Archive; trans. J. Henriksen.] flights by American planes over the terri- the parts of the USA bordering the Carib- tory of Cuba should have already ceased, bean Sea, if that agreement with Cuba is Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to and the mutual obligations assumed by the indeed reached. However, just yesterday at the USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR parties should have been formalized in ap- a White House meeting I heard that far from Foreign Ministry, 14 November 1962 propriate documents under the auspices of all the countries of this area would agree to the UN. participate in such an agreement. Thus if you Having familiarized himself with our Robert Kennedy stated that the USA insist on all the countries of the Caribbean response, Robert Kennedy said that he government would not cease its flights over area, the whole affair might be delayed even would pass it on to the President today. Cuba in circumstances in which he had no longer. I am saying all this, Robert Kennedy Then, saying that he would like to express a other guarantees that the government of concluded, not in order to discuss the de- little of his own views provisionally, Rob- Cuba would carry out its end of the agree- tails of this issues—I do not know them ert Kennedy stated the following. ment. Mr. Mikoyan’s long stay in Cuba myself, since they are the responsibility of The President—he, Robert Kennedy, shows—or at least this conviction has been Stevenson and Kuznetsov—but rather to expects—will be disappointed by the answer created in us—that Premier Castro does not show that time is needed for all this, and when he receives it. The President’s pro- want to approve the agreement reached be- that it would scarcely be expedient or rea- posal was very simple: the USA would im- tween the President and the head of the So- sonable to wait for it before lifting the quar- mediately and officially lift the blockade in viet government on such guarantees. We antine and removing the IL-28 planes. The exchange for assurances—public or not— understand the circumstances that have been President has put forth a proposal that he that before some definite date the IL-28 created, but this does not relieve the diffi- believes serves the interests of both parties, planes would be removed. The President culties of our position, said Robert Kennedy. but that proposal is being rejected now by believes that this proposal of his serves the The issue of UN guarantees, in the form of the Soviets, which can lead only to an ex- interests of both countries, and opens the UN posts or something like them, would tension, or perhaps even a complication, of way towards a resolution of the remaining require a significant amount of time before the present situation which clearly does not aspects of the Cuban problem, creating a concrete approval of the agreement could satisfy us or, we believe, you. Both parties significantly less tense situation than the one be reached. Let us take for example the is- are equally uninterested in that. We hope that would arise if his proposal was ap- sue of UN posts in the area of the Carib- nonetheless that Chairman N.S. Khrushchev proved by the Soviets. The President intends bean basin. Here Robert Kennedy asked, will be able to approve the proposal put forth to fulfill his obligations, which were stipu- would the Soviet Union itself really agree by the President, who himself had great con- lated by the correspondence between the to some foreign posts on its own territory? fidence in it when he sent it to Khrushchev. heads of the two governments. But for this As far as we know, in every such case it has I told Robert Kennedy that the posi- there must be a certain time in which all the categorically rejected, and still rejects, the tion of the Soviet government has been details of the future agreement can be idea of observational posts within its bor- clearly laid out in today’s response by N.S. worked out. The President’s proposal re- ders. Khrushchev. The Soviet Union has fulfilled ferred to above could be carried out imme- Robert Kennedy was immediately told its obligations. Now it is simply the USA diately, without any delay. The insistence that evidently he had not been sufficiently government’s turn to do the same, so that of the USA government in this matter of the familiarized with N.S. Khrushchev’s re- the situation of tension that has been cre- 334 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

ated in the Caribbean Sea can be eased. For of Comrade Kuznetsov’s telegram (relayed there be simultaneous guarantees by them this it is necessary: to lift the quarantine by you separately), which says that the for non-aggression against Cuba, referred without delay, to cease all flights by USA Americans are insisting that their guaran- to in Kennedy’s messages of 27 and 28 Oc- planes over Cuba, and to fix the mutual ob- tees of non-aggression against Cuba be tober, and guarantees by us no longer to ligations deriving from the correspondence made simultaneously with the Soviet bring “offensive” weaponry into Cuba, you between the heads of both governments on Union’s promise not to bring any more “of- must proceed from the point that we are 27 and 28 October. If corresponding instruc- fensive” weaponry into Cuba, we have sent willing to make a guarantee not to bring into tions were given by the President to McCloy the following instructions to Comrade Cuba the sort of weapons that we agreed to and Stevenson on the issue of UN posts in Kuznetsov: remove from Cuba following the agreement the Caribbean Sea area and the parts of the In your memorandum you said that that reached by correspondence between the USA that border it— and the Soviet repre- the Americans are persistently pushing for heads of our two governments. In accor- sentatives already have such instructions— the simultaneous granting of USA guaran- dance with this, Article 8 of the draft Proto- and if they could reach an agreement, then tees for non-aggression against Cuba and of col may be supplemented with the follow- of course the issue of the time-frame for the Soviet guarantees not to bring “offensive” ing paragraph: removal of the IL-28 planes would not be weaponry into Cuba any longer. “At the same time the Soviet govern- any complex problem. From such a formulation of this issue ment states that it will not bring such weap- Since Robert Kennedy, who often re- on the part of the USA it can be deduced onry onto the territory of the Republic of fers to the President’s opinion, has been that they are trying to impose on the Soviet Cuba.” stubbornly continuing to assert the neces- Union and Cuba additional obligations This formulation, which refers to “such sity of first resolving the issue of the IL-28 which would basically mean that, besides weaponry,”does not give the Americans the planes’ removal, connecting the lifting of the the sorts of weaponry agreed upon by the chance to broadly and arbitrarily interpret quarantine with that removal, he was di- correspondence between Comrade N. S. the term “offensive” weaponry to include rectly asked, after mutually reiterating our Khrushchev and President Kennedy, Cuba other sorts of weaponry (including nuclear arguments to each other, whether this meant would be deprived of the right to possess arms) that the Americans might classify as that the President had already authorized any other sorts of weaponry that the USA offensive. him to give an answer, and that such an an- might call “offensive.” The acceptance of You must submit the position laid out swer should be communicated to Moscow? such obligations would discriminate against above to the approval of the UN delegate Robert Kennedy immediately an- Cuba, since in that case it would be singled from Cuba. In this we are proceeding from swered that the views he had been express- out from among the other countries of Latin the assumption that out point of view will ing, although based on the opinions of the America that do not bear such obligations. be acceptable for Cuba, since it derives from President, with whom he had just that This cannot be acceptable. the position jointly held by the Soviet Union evening discussed all these issues, are none- Another matter concerns the talk of and Cuba on this matter. theless exclusively his own, Robert concluding the agreement through the UN, Telegraph upon completion. Kennedy’s, personal thoughts, and that there for example by way of the approval of an would be an answer to N.S. Khrushchev’s appropriate UN resolution stipulating that A.G. address today from the President himself. the territory of all Latin American countries Robert Kennedy promised to provide infor- be declared a zone that is free from nuclear [Source: AVP RF, Moscow; copy obtained mation on that answer immediately. arms. Of course the design behind this is to by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at Towards the end, the conversation put Cuba on equal footing with the other National Security Archive, Washington, started to have a formalized and official air countries of Latin America; and also the D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, connected with the President’s invitation, USA, as far as Guantanamo and its other Harvard University.] passed on to me via Robert Kennedy, to visit bases in Latin America are concerned, would the White House on the following day along take onto its shoulders the obligation not to Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister with the Bolshoi Theater troupe. allow any provisioning of nuclear weapons A.A. Gromyko to A.I. Mikoyan, onto the territories of any Latin American 18 November 1962 14.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN country. This would establish an equitable basis for an agreement, and would be ac- I am transmitting instructions from the [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, ceptable. Authorities. provided to CWIHP, and on file at National With such a formulation of this issue, If our Cuban friends address you in Security Archive; translation by John there would be no discrimination with re- reference to their decision on firing at Henriksen.] gard to any participants in the agreement, American planes, then they should be told in this case with regard to Cuba; that is, the the following: Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister issue would be resolved differently than as In view of the fact that decision on fir- A. Gromyko to A.I. Mikoyan, proposed in the draft resolution put before ing at American planes was not submitted 15 November 1962 the UN General Assembly by Brazil, Bo- to our approval, we do not consider it pos- livia, and Chile. sible to take part in this. For this reason, we In connection with the last paragraph If the Americans continue to insist that have given instructions to our military men COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 335 not to open fire on American planes. The question is small, but delicate, and its Cable from Mikoyan to CC CPSU, resolution would be greeted with satisfac- A. GROMYKO 23 November 1962 tion. Then he touched on the major ques- [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, CC CPSU tions for which they had left the company - provided to CWIHP, and on file at National the significance of yesterday’s conversations Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- During yesterday’s conversation with with President Kennedy and the need for lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- Fidel Castro and others, when I spoke of the contacts between Khrushchev and Kennedy sity.] significance of the new success in liquidat- and mutual actions. ing the crisis and of the cancellation of both The President, said R. Kennedy, con- Memorandum from the Head of the our and the American measures of extraor- siders yesterday’s conversation extremely USSR Merchant Fleet to the CC CPSU, dinary preparedness, Fidel Castro said, that useful, promoting further mutual compre- 20 November 1962 they are, moreover, also preparing to carry hension between our governments and their out demobilization. heads. In this respect, this meeting can be I am reporting on the situation on the characterized as definite progress. Such is USSR-Cuban sea lanes. 23.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN the opinion of the president himself. At the present time, there are 20 dry- What is most important now?, contin- cargo ships and 4 oil-carriers on their way [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, ued R. Kennedy. The most important, even to Cuba from Soviet ports on the Baltic, the provided to CWIHP, and on file at National more important than the fates of my chil- Black Sea, and in the Far East, carrying in- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- dren and your grandchildren, although they, dustrial and agricultural equipment, automo- lation by David Wolff, CWIHP.] of course, are the nearest and dearest to us, biles, metal, grain, flour, conserves, sulfates, is the question of mutual understanding be- oil, gas, ammonia, and other loads. Besides A.I. Mikoyan, Memorandum of tween Chairman Khrushchev and President this, the tanker the “Tukmus” is nearing Conversation with Robert F. Kennedy, Kennedy. Indeed, it now decides the fate of Cuba, sailing out of the Canadian port of 30 November 1962 the world. One must admit that in the course Montreal with a cargo of animal fat. Four of the recent crisis, their personal relations of the vessels mentioned are passing through [...] On the evening of 30 November, and mutual trust underwent serious trials, the zone of the blockade imposed by the A.I. Mikoyan was present at a dinner in as a result of which, frankly speaking, dam- USA. The others will reach this zone be- honor of the American Secretary of the In- age was sustained. Therefore, it is very im- tween 20 and 30 November. terior [Stewart] Udall. The guests included portant to do everything to restore fully the There are 13 dry-cargo vessels and 7 R. Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of State trust on which so much depends. We our- tankers en route from Cuba to Soviet ports. [George] Ball, the chairman of the selves understand the need for this, for we They have all successfully passed through President’s Council of Economic Advisors must look ahead. We, concluded R. the blockade zone. [Walter] Heller, the chairman of the Board Kennedy, sincerely hope that the develop- The Soviet vessels bound for Cuba are of Directors of the “New York Times” ment of our relations can follow a happier being subjected to overhead flights by USA [Orville] Dryfoos, and the Soviet Ambas- course than in the past. Navy airplanes during their whole passage sador Dobrynin. A.I. Mikoyan replied to R. Kennedy across the Atlantic Ocean. Within the block- All the American guests were with their that he fully agrees with the idea of the im- ade zone these flights occur more frequently, wives, except for Robert Kennedy who portance for preserving peace and for the aerial photos are taken, American ships came with his eldest daughter, age 13. He basic improvement of relations between our come up close to them, inquiring what cargo has seven children in all. He said that his countries of good personal relations between is being carried and where, and then they wife, together with the other six [children], N.S. Khrushchev and president Kennedy, follow close behind the Soviet ships until who had the flu, had gone to Florida to bring their mutual understanding and trust of one they reach the territorial waters of Cuba. them up to [good] condition. another. As one of N.S. Khrushchev’s com- Demands concerning the stopping of the Before dinner, Robert Kennedy, after rades-in-arms [soratnik], said A.I. Mikoyan, ships or the carrying out of inspections by conversations of a protocol-like nature in the I can assure you that exactly these thoughts American naval ships are not forthcoming. presence of all, asked A.I. Mikoyan to step define his approach to his relations with the into another room, where one on one USA president. N.S. Khrushchev values the The Minister of the Merchant Fleet (Dobrynin) [they] first touched on the mat- personal quality of these relations. The So- (V. BAKAEV) ter of one Zaslavskii (a Soviet citizen), who viet government renders its due to the self- married an American tourist, but our court possession [otdaet dolzhnoe vyderzhke] ex- [Source: Center for the Storage of Contem- annulled the marriage. He [Kennedy] said hibited by the president in the most danger- porary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow; that he is embarrassed to present this matter ous moment, when the world stood at the copy provided to CWIHP by R. Pikhoia and officially, since it has no bearing on the re- edge of thermonuclear war, but by mutual on file at National Security Archive, Wash- lations between our governments. But for concessions and compromises, succeeded in ington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, the Minister of Justice [Attorney General] averting this war. Harvard University.] the resolution of this question is important. Moscow, continued A.I. Mikoyan, no- 336 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

ticed the positive role you, the president’s crease in tension between [our] countries Union. Udall’s conscientiousness [dobros- brother, played during the confidential ne- continues further and the political atmo- ovestnost’] was confirmed and he did not gotiations between the president and the sphere warms up, then this trip would not give in to this pressure and said what he head of the Soviet state. Of course, we un- only be interesting but useful for him. thought, that is, he repeated in the USA what derstand, that you did this, as did we, in the After our return to the other room, he had said in the Soviet Union. interests of one’s own country, one’s own Udall made the first toast to the leaders of A.I. Mikoyan transmitted greetings people. It was important, however, that you the two great nations - N.S. Khrushchev and from N.S. Khrushchev and offered a toast understood correctly, in the critical moment, J. Kennedy - “people of strength and peace.” to [Khrushchev’s] health. what those interests were. Let us now com- One theme of the toasts and remarks of the Ball underlined that the necessary con- plete the outlined resolution to the Cuban American representatives during the meal dition for greater trust between the USSR question, without complicating it with trivial was to express satisfaction over the fact that and USA was our renunciation of “the prac- formal cavils [melochnaia pridirka], or even our two countries have succeeded in avoid- tices [of] a closed society,” stating, in par- worse, some deviation from the agreement ing a clash in the Cuban crisis and [to sup- ticular, that this should be demonstrated on the final settlement of this question. In- port] the need to search for ways of avoid- concretely by the broadening of exchanges deed, if one speaks the truth, there’s not ing the repetition of similar crises in the fu- and in our agreement to the sale of bourgois much left to do; it is only necessary to put ture. Note the following pronouncements. newspapers on the streets of Moscow. in writing or to finalize, without excessive Udall emphasized the pleasant impres- Replying to Ball, A.I. Mikoyan said, procrastination that which the American side sions from his trip to the Soviet Union and that so long as the arms race continues, it is obligated itself to do during the exchange from his meeting with N.S. Khrushchev and impossible and unrealistic to demand the of messages between N.S. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders. He said that his feel- open society of which Ball spoke. You also the president. ings of sympathy for the Soviet people grew do not have an open society. You have more R. Kennedy noted that he agreed that stronger, and he said so despite criticism of advertising [reklam], but society is closed, little of essence remained to be done - in- these statements in the USA, still in Sep- but in its own way. When the arms race is deed, “it’s 90 percent done,” although there tember. He asked [me] to transmit his invi- eliminated and disarmament takes place, we are still difficulties that must be overcome. tation to visit the United States to the Chair- will then open many places in which the But he, R. Kennedy, did not intend to ana- man of the Council of Ministers, Comrade presence today of foreigners is forbidden. lyze these difficulties. They were the sub- Novikov, and to the Energy and Electrifica- Then we will have open exchanges and con- ject of detailed discussion in New York. He tion Minister, Comrade Neporozhnyi, not- tacts. only wanted to emphasize briefly that with ing in jest that he was ready to show “some Wishing to draw Heller, the Chairman which he began: the importance of further secrets,” as was done during his visit to the of the President’s Council of Economic developing mutual understanding between Soviet side. Advisers, into the conversation (he appears the president and N.S. Khrushchev. This will A.I. Mikoyan pronounced a toast to the pleasant, a relatively young professor, for determine to a large extent the success and host, Secretary Udall, his wife and children, the most part silent), A.I. Mikoyan asked solution of other questions that still await who were presented to A.I. Mikoyan by their Heller how he would explain the fact that, settlement. parents. Udall has 6 children. in particular, the USA has more steel pro- A.I. Mikoyan agreed with this. Return- A.I. Mikoyan joked that although ducing potential than the USSR, but the ing to his conversation with the president, Khrushchev’s acquaintance with Udall was USSR in the third quarter of this year pro- A.I. Mikoyan said, that although in its course brief, and Mikoyan’s acquaintance with duced more steel than the USA. “If you did there were a few sharp [ostryi] moments, Udall at the time even briefer, Udall imme- not need so much steel, why build so many on the whole he agrees with R. Kennedy’s diately won over Khrushchev and then factories and remove huge amounts of capi- evaluation of the conversation with the Mikoyan. Khrushchev said to Mikoyan: tal from circulation, including the living president. What a simpatico [simpatichnyi] and good work force [that has become] unemployed. To all appearances, this was reflected man is Mr. Udall! In general, what measures are you taking to in the ensuing conversation with Rusk, When I met him at dinner, said remove such disproportions and are they which took place in a business-like and Mikoyan, he made such an impression on removable at all in a free enterprise system?” friendly atmosphere, clearly, not without the me. There are some people, whom you know Heller avoided answering by changing influence of the president. R. Kennedy for years, but actually don’t know, and sud- the topic of conversation, not wishing to smiled, but he didn’t say anything. denly after decades you see the real face of enter an argument where he felt himself In concluding the conversation, R. the man. And there are also those, who after weak. A.I. Mikoyan in the context of the Kennedy asked [Mikoyan] to give greetings several hours, you can tell what kind of man dinner did not insist on an answer. to N.S. Khrushchev. In his turn A.I. Mikoyan they are. Udall belongs to this category. Heller promptly supported Mikoyan’s sent greetings to the president. When he returned to his homeland after vis- statement on the appropriateness of trans- Robert Kennedy showed interest in iting the Soviet Union he landed in an at- ferring power and means freed up by the visiting the Soviet Union and expressed this mosphere of anti-Soviet hysteria. The agents end of the arms race toward raising the stan- desire. of monopolies, the press and radio tried to dard of living of the people from underde- A.I. Mikoyan said that this was a good get anti-Soviet statements out of him, veloped countries and of the people of the idea and completely realizable. If the de- counter to those he had made in the Soviet states participating in the arms race. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 337

A.I. Mikoyan invited Heller to visit the circled over the vessel six times and then authority given to me by the Constitution Soviet Union. flew away. and the laws of the United States, hereby Those present asked Mikoyan if, in his 3. The ship “Krasnograd” left from the declare that at 23 hours 00 minutes Green- opinion, Castro is interested in normalizing port of Mariel on 6 December at 7:30, car- wich time on 20 November 1962, I re- relations and about Castro himself as the rying on board 15 IL-28 planes. scinded the powers given to the Defense ruler of Cuba. This vessels was also constantly sub- Department by Proclamation No. 3504 of A.I. Mikoyan in his statements about jected to overhead flights by American 23 October 1962, and cancelled the orders his trip to Cuba underlined Cuba’s intrest in planes whose numbers were recorded by us. it contained to the armed forces under my having the chance to build a [word illeg- One plane of the “Orion” class, number command.” ible] life in a peaceful setting, and the lack 5605-BF-505, and two planes of the “Nep- of any serious signs of readiness on the part tune” class, numbers LK-131499 and JP-22, The Embassy of the United States of of the USA to normalize [relations] with asked the captain how many IL-28 planes America Cuba. he was carrying. The captain answered that Dobrynin and Bubnov transcribed the there were 15 “IL-28” planes on board. Moscow, 10 December 1962 conversation. The flights over vessels carrying IL- Translated by Ju. Sokolikov 28’s continue. The vessels are proceeding [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, normally. [Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK provided to CWIHP, and on file at National All the planes, 42 units, have been re- (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, Security Archive; translated by David Wolff, moved. According to the Ministry of De- and on file at National Security Archive, CWIHP.] fense, a forty-third plane (an instructional Washington, D.C.; translation by John model) was wrongly registered, and had Henriksen, Harvard University.] Memorandum from the Head of the never been received by Cuba. USSR Merchant Fleet to the CC CPSU, EDITOR’S NOTES 7 December 1962 The Minister of the Merchant Fleet V. BAKAEV 1 Gromyko here evidently refers to Dorticos’ I am reporting on the removal of 42 speech to the U.N. General Assembly of 8 Octo- IL-28 planes from Cuba. [Source: Russian State Economic Archives, ber 1962. Dorticos stated: “Were the Untied States 1. The ship “Okhotsk,” carrying 12 IL- Moscow; copy provided to CWIHP by R. able to give us proof, by word and deed, that it 28 airplanes, left the port at Nuevita on 4 Pikhoia and on file at National Security would not carry out aggression against our coun- December at 23:00 Moscow time. Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by try, then, we declare solemnly before you here After the departure of the “Okhotsk” John Henriksen, Harvard University.] and now, our weapons would be unnecessary and from the port, American planes began fly- our army redundant.” New York Times, 9 Octo- ing back and forth over the ship, taking pho- Official note from the US embassy in ber 1962. tos. We recorded the identification numbers Moscow to USSR Foreign Ministry, 2 Kennedy had asked Congress to approve the of the planes. 10 December 1962 call-up of 150,000 reservists on 7 September On 6 December at 9:00, the USA war- 1962. ship number 943 appeared near the stern of Received by mail 3 Not further identified. the “Okhotsk,” and informed the captain of 10 December 1962 4 An obvious allusion to the failed attack on Cuba our vessel that it would be following the in April 1961 at the Bay of Pigs by CIA-supported “Okhotsk” all night, and asked that the boxes Translated from the English anti-Castro Cuban exiles. containing the IL-28 planes be opened for No. 478 5 The date of this conversation is not specified in photographing. The captain gave his con- the text, but Kennedy appears to be referring to sent, and towards dawn on 7 December the The Embassy of the United States of the meeting between Robert Kennedy and Soviet USA destroyer carried out an inspection of America is expressing its respect to the Min- Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin on the same the Soviet ship. ister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of So- day as the 4 September 1962 statement to under- 2. The “Kasimov” left the port of viet Socialist Republics, and has the honor line the President’s concerns about Soviet mili- Mariel at 14:45 on 5 December, carrying on of quoting from the Embassy’s note No. 348 tary aid to Cuba. board 15 IL-28 planes. of 24 October 1962. The Embassy has been 6 The Russian text is unclear as to whether it re- The “Kasimov” was also subjected to entrusted by its government hereby to bring fers to a “bar-man” (barkeeper) or a last name constant overhead flights by USA war to the attention of the Ministry the opera- such as “Berman,” “Barman,” or “Burman.” planes whose identification numbers we re- tional portion of the Proclamation, issued 7 Possibly a reference to journalist Robert J. corded. by the President of the United States of Donovan. A bomber of the “Neptune” class, with America on 21 November 1962, on the lift- 8 It is noteworthy that the Soviet message strongly the number 6-145922, asked us to open the ing of the quarantine announced on 23 Oc- implies that a U.S. invasion of Cuba would not packing of our deck cargo for photograph- tober 1962. trigger a military response from the USSR, but ing. This request was fulfilled by the cap- “I, John F. Kennedy, President of the only political condemnation. This hinted at a tain of the “Kasimov.” After this, the plane United States of America, acting with the brewing disagreement between Moscow and Ha- 338 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

vana, for Castro’s message to Khrushchev on 26 translation of which appears in an appendix to STATE DEPARTMENT, RUSSIAN October 1962—in which he called on the Soviet Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 481- ARCHIVES COOPERATE ON leader to authorize a “harsh and terrible” attack 482. KHRUSHCHEV-KENNEDY 16 on the United States should it invade Cuba— A reference to anti-U.S. protests held outside FRUS VOLUME clearly reflected the Cuban’s belief that Moscow the embassy in Moscow during the crisis. 17 was (or should be) willing to go to war on Cuba’s Evidently a reference to the U.S. Arms Con- In an unprecedented example of cooperation behalf. For an English translation of Castro’s let- trol and Disarmament Agency, which Kennedy between the State Department Historian’s Office ter, which first appeared in the Cuban newspaper created. and the Russian Foreign Ministry archives, a vol- 18 Granma in November 1990, see James G. Blight, For English translations of the Russian records ume of Foreign Relations of the United States, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the of conversations in Havana between Mikoyan and the official published record of U.S. foreign Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Castro and the Cuban leadership on 3-5 Novem- policy, has appeared with Russian archival docu- Collapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 481-482. ber 1962, see Vladislav Zubok, “`Dismayed by ments. 9 Presumably a reference to Khrushchev’s letters the Actions of the Soviet Union’: Mikoyan’s talks Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961- on that day to both Kennedy (accepting his pro- with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, No- 1963, Volume VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Ex- posal to resolve the crisis) and Castro (explain- vember 1962" (plus accompanying documents), changes (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government ing his decision); for the texts of both letters, see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 59, 89-92 and Printing Office, 1996), contains several Russian Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The 109, 159. documents among the correspondence, oral mes- 19 Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Until the missile crisis, Georgi Bolshakov, a sages, back-channel exchanges, and other records Archive Documents Reader (New York: The New Soviet official based at the USSR Embassy in concerning direct communications between U.S. Press, 1993), 226-229, 239. Washington, had been used as a back-channel go- President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader 10 A seccessionist rebel leader from Katanga beteen to deliver messages between Khrushchev Nikita S. Khrushchev, including exchanges be- (later Shaba) Province in the Congo (later Zaire) and the Kennedys, meeting frequently with Rob- tween the two concerning the Cuban Missile Cri- against whom the UN was considering the use of ert Kennedy. As the document indicates, this sis in Oct.-Nov. 1962 that were declassified by military force, which it later used to quash the channel ended after the Kennedys concluded that Russian authorities five years ago and published resistance. Bolshakov had been used to mislead them by in Spring 1992 in Problems of Communism. 11 For an English translation of the letter, which transmitting false reassurances in the summer and One newly-available document from the Rus- emerged publicly only three decades later when early autumn of 1962 that Khrushchev would not sian archives contained in the volume is a trans- it was released by Soviet officials, see Problems send offensive weapons to Cuba or take any dis- lation of a long (approximately 25 type-written of Communism—Special Edition (Spring 1992), ruptive action prior to the Congressional elections pages) 1 April 1963 “talking paper” from 60-62; also U.S. State Department, Foreign Re- in November. Instead, beginning with the mis- Khrushchev to Kennedy. Upon reading through lations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. VI: sile crisis, a new channel was set up between the message when it was presented to him by So- Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges (Washington, Robert Kennedy and Ambassador Dobrynin. viet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the 20 D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 189- For Khrushchev’s 4 November 1962 letter to president’s brother, Attorney General Robert F. 90. Kennedy, see Chang and Kornbluh, eds., The Kennedy, handed it back on the grounds that it 12 A reference to Kennedy’s agreement to with- Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, 264. was “so insulting and rude to the President and to 21 draw the approximately 5,000 U.S. troops sent to Nixon had been defeated by his Democratic the United States that I would neither accept it Thailand in May 1962 in response to an attack by rival in the California gubernatorial elections, nor transmit its message.” Robert Kennedy told the pro-communist Pathet Lao in Laos. upon which he announced his retirement from his brother that he had informed an “obviously Kennedy’s decision followed a private appeal in politics. The relevant passage in Khrushchev’s embarrassed” Dobrynin that a message of that Khrushchev’s name conveyed through Robert 12 November 1962 message read: “Now the elec- sort, if Khrushchev insisted on sending it, should Kennedy in mid-June by Bolshakov. See Memo- tions in your country, Mr. President, are over. You go through normal State Department channels randum from Attorney General Kennedy to made a statement that you were very pleased with rather than the confidential back-channel President’s Special Assistant for National Secu- the results of these elections. They, the elections, Dobrynin and Robert Kennedy had established rity Affairs (Bundy), 11 July 1962 (regarding indeed, were in your favor. The success does not during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Thus, no copy meetings apparently held on 18 and 19 June upset us either—though that is of course your of the communication reached the U.S. archives. 1962), in U.S. State Department, Foreign Rela- internal affair. You managed to pin your politi- FRUS editors called the cooperation with the tions of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XXIII: cal rival, Mr. Nixon, to the mat. This did not draw archives of an ex-Cold War adversary “without Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Government tears from our eyes either....” See James A. precedent in the history of the Foreign Relations Printing Office, 1994), 950. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisted series,” and expressed thanks to Igor V. Lebedev, 13 Igor D. Statsenko was the commander of a (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 290. Director of the Department of History and Soviet missile division deployed to western Cuba. Records, Russian Foreign Ministry. The 14 Alekseev evidently refers to Khrushchev’s let- Kennedy-Khrushchev volume (320 pp.), prepared ter to Castro dated 30 October 1962; an English by the Office of the Historian, Department of translation can be found in an appendix to Blight, State, is ISBN 0-16-04018-0 and can be ordered Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 485-488. from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Su- 15 Castro here refers to his message to perintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Khrushchev dated 26 October 1962, an English Washington, DC 20402-9328. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 339

MIKOYAN-CASTRO TALKS kind. We have given you 180 million roubles continued from page 320 CARLOS: Asks whether the victory men- in order to help you. This is a second phase by the Russian and transcribes the tioned by the Soviets has been attained. of help because before that there were com- meaning of the phrase into the simple mercial and credit agreements but these last past tense. Both documents are evi- MIKOYAN: Says he will respond to the deliveries have been in aid. dently transcriptions of memo notes questions, and asks to be excused for he will When Khrushchev visited Bulgaria [on taken during a speech and do not seem speak for a long time. He says he will start 14-20 May 1962—ed.] he expressed many to have been corrected. Their overall with the doubts expressed by Fidel in order things to us, he said “although I was in Bul- tone is colloquial. When the meaning to explain them. garia, I was always thinking of Cuba. I fear was clear enough, I changed the punc- He thinks that the main problem con- the yanquis will attack Cuba, directly or in- tuation and divided very long sentences sists in explaining why they have sent troops directly, and imagine of the effect on us of into shorter ones. I did not shorten the and strategic weapons. If this is not under- the defeat of the Cuban revolution. We can- phrases whose meaning was unclear. In stood, it is very difficult to understand the not allow this to happen. Although the plan this latter case, I tried to be as literal whole situation. He did not think we had is very risky for us, it is a big responsibility as possible; translating word by word. doubts about this. He said that “the fate of for it exposes us to a war. Cuba must be Editor’s and translator’s insertions ap- the Cuban revolution is a permanent preoc- saved[.] “They thought it over for three days pear in brackets, as opposed to paren- cupation of ours, especially since its social- and later all the members of the Central thetical phrases in the original docu- ist character was declared. When the impe- Committee expressed their opinions. We ment. The translation preserves some rialists were defeated in Giron [Beach at the have to think a lot about this action in order apparent errors in the originals regard- Bay of Pigs—ed.], we congratulated our- to save Cuba and not to provoke a nuclear ing parentheses and quotation marks, selves, but we also worried. The yanquis war. He ordered the military to develop the where the punctuation marks are not [Yankees, i.e., North Americans—ed.] did Plan and to consult with the Cubans. He told closed. In general, however, the sense a stupid thing but we knew they would con- us that the main condition was to carry out of both documents is understandable tinue harassing because Cuba is an example the Plan secretly. Our military told us that even to a reader who is unfamiliar with that they could not tolerate. Our assessment four months were needed for the prepara- the events.—Carlos Osorio (National was that they had two parallel plans; the first tions. We thought the enemy would learn Security Archive).] one consisted of the economic strangulation about it right in the middle of the plan and of Cuba in order to bring down the regime we anticipated what to do. We thought the Document I: without a military intervention. The second plan would not be carried out to the end, Cuban Record of Conversation, one consisted of an intervention organized but this was an advantage, for the troops Mikoyan and Cuban Leadership, by Latin American governments and their would already be in the Island. We foresaw Havana, 4 November 1962 support, as an alternative to the other plan. that, in order not to provoke a war, we could We consider the victory of the Cuban use the UNO [United Nations Organization] MEETING OF THE SECRETARIAT OF revolution as an enormous contribution to and the public opinion. We thought the Plan THE CRI WITH MIKOYAN AT THE Marxism-Leninism. Its defeat would be an would not provoke a war but a blockade NATIONAL PALACE, irreparable damage to Marxism and to other against weapons and fuel instead. How to SUNDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 1962. revolutionary movements in other countries. solve this - your lack of fuel? Considering Such a defeat would mean the preponder- the geographic situation of the Island, it has Preamble by Mikoyan: ance of imperialism over socialism in the been very difficult to avoid the blockade. If He says he has come to Cuba to dis- world. Such a defeat would mean a terrible you were closer we could have used our Air cuss their differences with the Cuban blow against the world revolution. It would Force and our Fleet, but we could not. The Companeros [comrades] and not to [discuss] break the correlation of forces. It is our duty yanquis do have bases surrounding us in what has been stated by the imperialists. to do everything possible to defend Cuba. Turkey and blocking the Black Sea. Given They trust us as much as they trust them- “Our comrades told us that the eco- the situation, we cannot strike back. selves. He is willing to discuss for as long nomic situation in Cuba had worsened due Okinawa is too far away too. The only pos- as it takes to solve the differences. The in- to the yanquis’ pressure and the enormous sibility was to cut the communications with terests of the Soviet Union are common to military expenses. This worried us for it West Berlin. In Berlin this is possible. ours in the defense of the principles of Marx- coincided with the plans of the yanquis. We We have not thought of building a So- ism-Leninism and in all the other interests. had a discussion about the economic decline viet Base on the Island to operate against and we have helped without you requesting the North Americans. In general, we con- FIDEL: Summarizes our differences in it. You are very modest in your requests and sider that the policy of bases is not a correct terms of the procedures used to deal with we try to help you. We decided to give you one. We only have bases in [East] Germany, this crisis. weapons for free and donated equipment for first because of the right we have as an in- 100,000 men. In addition, in our commer- vading country, and after that due to the DORTICOS: Asks whether Mikoyan con- cial negotiations, we have looked at all the Warsaw Treaty. (Stalin did have bases siders that they have obtained the guaran- possibilities and we have tried to provide abroad). In the past, we have had them in tees that president Kennedy offered. everything you needed without payments in Finland and in China too (Port Arthur) - 340 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

those bases we have abandoned. We only be raised only during the night. Evidently, viet weapons [to remain in Cuba], in addi- have troops in Hungary and Poland, to pro- this order was never carried out. Kennedy tion, declaring that they will not attack Cuba tect the troops in Germany and the commu- did not want to talk about the missiles until nor permit that it be attacked. In assessing nications with Austria. the end of the elections. But two Republi- the outcome, we have gained, because they We do not need bases to destroy the can Senators learned the news and they had will not attack Cuba and there will be no United States because we can attack with no alternative but to act. We did not know war. the missiles deployed in our territory. We what Kennedy would do and we worried In normal conditions, it would be natu- do not have a plan to conquer North about the preparations or maneuvers of Vieti ral that we send you a project [draft—ed.] America. The only thing we need to do is to - an operation named after Castro but back- for you to study and you could then publish launch a counter strike, but that will serve wards.4 When Kennedy talked about the it. But that can be done only in normal con- to destroy them without having to send in blockade, we did not have data showing ditions. An invasion was expected within the our troops. whether it was a maneuver or a preparation next 24 hours. When Fidel sent his cable, We have sent the troops and strategic for aggression. On the morning of the 28th there were only ten to twelve hours left. If a missiles only to protect the Island’s defense. we received the news confirming that it was cable was sent it had to been crypted, that It was a plan of containment [contension] an aggression. Although it was announced would take more than 10 to 12 hours. Con- so that the yanquis could not provoke an that the maneuvers were suspended due to sultations would have been appropriate, but explosion in Cuba. If the missiles are well a storm, the storm was over and the maneu- Cuba would not exist and the world would camouflaged and the yanquis do not know vers were not carried out. In the meantime, be enveloped in a war. After the attack, they where they are deployed, then they can help the concentration continued. Khrushchev would have never accepted a truce, due to to contain them. The military told us that has strongly criticized Kennedy’s words the warmongers of the Pentagon. Our atti- they could be well hidden in the palm for- about the blockade. They did not tude has produced difficulties, but in mak- ests of Cuba. The yanquis were not going approve of the kind of weapons that Cuba ing an overall evaluation, in spite of the psy- to locate them. They could not destroy them. should own and thus they organized a di- chological defects, we can see that the ad- During July and August, they did not find rect aggression. Their plan consisted of two vantages are undeniable. anything, it was not until October that they parts: using missiles with conventional loads have been found. We were surprised that to destroy the nuclear missiles and then land- Com[panero]. Dorticos asks: What Kennedy only made reference to technicians ing and destroying the resistance. guarantees offered by Kennedy have really and not to our troops. At first, it seems that In case of the latter, we would be forced been obtained? We consider that all agree- that is what he thought. Later we learned to respond because it is an attack against ments cannot be rejected in a nihilistic fash- that he knew more than he was saying, but Cuba and against us too - because our troops ion. Although agreements can be breached, he was not revealing it not to hinder the elec- were here and this was the unleashing of they are important for they are useful for a toral campaign. We let the yanquis know that the World War. We would destroy North certain period of time. we were going to solve the Berlin problem, America. They would inflict huge loses on In addition, a problem arose with the in order to distract their attention from the us; but they would make every effort to de- Turkey issue. [Mikoyan said:] Why did we other problem. We did not intend to act on stroy Cuba completely. All the measures we include the problem of Turkey and the Berlin. I can explain this later. took were taken to protect Cuba. What bases? We did not have in our plans to dis- It was known through diplomatic chan- would have been the result if the plan of the cuss Turkey; but while we were discussing nels that Kennedy did not want to make yanquis was carried out? Lose Cuba, inflict that issue, we received an article from [U.S. matters more serious and asked us not to enormous damages upon the Socialist coun- journalist Walter] Lip[p]man[n] saying that move on the issue of Berlin before the elec- tries with a nuclear war? While we were in the Russians will discuss that, [and] that is tions. We told him that we agreed to this. the midst of our discussions, we received a why we included it. The bases in Turkey are We would please him and we would solve cable from Fidel that coincided with other of no importance because in case of war they it later. We thought it was convenient to information in the same vein. After that, ten would be destroyed. There are also bases in please him. In addition, we had not thought to twelve hours were left. Given that such a England that could damage all the bases of bringing up this problem. When the North short time was left, we used diplomatic anywhere in the world. Americans learned about the transports to channels. Because when policy-makers Cuba, they also concentrated their campaign want to avoid a war, they have to use diplo- Fidel asks whether there were in fact on Berlin. Both sides had their principal in- matic means. It’s important to underscore two letters [from Khrushchev to Kennedy], terest in Cuba, but appeared as if concen- that Kennedy says now that he was not one that mentioned the issue of Turkey, trated on Berlin. In the middle of October, against the presence of troops here and that which was broadcast on Radio Moscow, and they [the North Americans—ed.] learned he accepts ground-to-air missiles. But once another in which the issue was not men- about it through Cuba, via the West Ger- known, the strategic weapons, were not use- tioned. [Mikoyan replied:] We sent two let- many information service who passed it to ful anymore...(paragraph missing) [notation ters, one on the 26th that was not published, the CIA,3 they first learned about the mis- in original—ed.] and another one on the 27th. The issue of siles. They took aerial pictures and located The withdrawal of the missiles, was a Turkey was not included at the beginning, them. Khrushchev ordered that the missiles concession on our part. But Kennedy also we included it later. But we can describe all be laid down during the day and that they makes a concession by permitting the So- that in more detail through a reviewing of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 341 the documents. We have had discussions going to hide them in the forest. We do not about it, for it is [Soviet Deputy Foreign about your question whether the dismantling want data pertaining to your military secrets; Minister V.V.] Kuznetsov who deals with of the base at Guantanamo is better. That but we need assurances that the missiles will this issue. would be better for Cuba, but from a mili- go. In this situation, Thant has played a tary point of view of the interest of Cuba, it We can provide the pictures of the dis- good role. You cannot ask more, given his is not possible. If we decided to withdraw mantled weapons and how they are loaded. situation, he even seems to have a little sym- all the weapons from Cuba, then we could Nor we will oppose that you observe the pathy for our position. While in Moscow, demand the withdrawal from Guantanamo, ships on the high seas, at a particular dis- we received a plan of guarantees. We Guantanamo has no importance in military tance. They (or you) will see something on thought this plan seemed interesting and terms. That would be more dangerous, and the decks. I did not tell them that, but that is useful for Cuba. that is important from a political perspec- our opinion and we will provide them with tive. Concerning the inspection: if we said the materials to convince them that we have Why: If the inspection of Cuba, the south- we reject any inspection, the enemy could withdrawn the missiles. So we will not con- ern coast of the U.S. and other countries in interpret that as an attempt to trick them. tradict your [Cuban] declaration, against the the Caribbean will be approved (Central All it is about is seeing the sites, where the inspection or the aerial verification. They America[)] because this way you deprive the weapons were and their shipping for a few feared that the Cubans would not allow us aggressor of the possibility to carry out its days. Cuba is in the hands of the Cubans. to withdraw the missiles, given that they goals. Of course, this can be circumvented, But because we were the owners of those have 140,000 and you only have 10,000 however. I have been interested in this vari- weapons... (paragraph missing). [notation in men. I did not talk about these numbers. He ant from another point of view. There is an original-ed.] We thought that you, after the said that the U-2 that was shot down here, OAS [Organization of American States], and consultations, you would accept the inspec- was shot at with Russian missiles and prob- it is the U.S. who profits from it instead of tion. But we never thought of deciding any- ably operated by Russians. Although they using the UN. But if this plan is approved, thing for you. Why did we think that we think there may be Cubans who are able to it is the UNO that will deal with this part of could accept a verification of the disman- operate those weapons. We kept on insist- the American Continent, this constitutes a tling by neutrals, without infringement of ing that they lift the quarantine immediately. blow to the Monroe Doctrine. U Thant said the Cuban sovereignty? It was understood I told them that if they wanted the missiles that the representatives from Latin Ameri- that no State would accept an infringement withdrawn faster, they should lift the block- can countries agree with this plan, the North of your sovereignty. In very particular cases, ade. Because the ships that are now in Cuba Americans avoid responding to it. I asked a State can... [ellipsis in document—ed.] its are not able to take those missiles out. [un- Mc Cloy and he said at the beginning (as acts, by agreement and not due to pressures derlined in original]. I told them they should did Stevenson) that the U Thant Plan does from abroad - the territory of the Embassy issue instructions so that the inspection of not exist. But afterward they discarded the within a sovereign State for example. When the ships be carried out without anybody U.S. inspection and they said they can give discussing the problem of Indochina and boarding the ships. It would rather be car- their word that in Latin America all the Vietnam in Geneva [in 1954], an agreement ried out in a symbolic manner, asking by camps [of anti-Castro Cuban exiles—ed.] was reached to create an International Con- radio, as it was done with the tanker are liquidated. I asked him if all were, and trol Commission. Bucharest. he avoided the question. They said that Cuba Stevenson said they will accept the pro- was a revolutionary infection, he said that ———— posals of U Thant. We reproached him that the Latin American countries fear Cuba. A he proposed not to bring weapons to Cuba formula can be searched in which Cuba will We spoke about the problem of dis- and to lift the blockade. We have complied abandon the clandestine work in exchange mantling with [U.S. negotiator John J.] with this and they continue. for their not attacking. McCloy in New York. He said that “given We have loses because the ships wait Fidel was right when he said that it’s that Cuba is opposed to the North Ameri- on the high seas. The losses are consider- easier for the USSR to maneuver and main- can inspection, he did not insist on this for- able, that is why we have allowed the con- tain a flexible policy than it is for Cuba, all mula - for them to verify that the weapons trol of the Red Cross. The Red Cross is bet- the more as the yanqui radio reaches Cuba will not be kept hidden in the forest. [no ter because it is not a political institution, easily. It is not just to say that we are more close quotation marks in original—ed.] nor a governmental institution. U Thant pro- liberal. The Cuban revolution cannot be lost. I talked to them about the aerial pho- posed two inspections, one at the shipping You have to maneuver to save the Revolu- tographic inspection, but I responded that harbors and another on the high seas. Not tion by being flexible. Cuba has the right to its air space. I told them wanting to hurt his feelings, we responded In retrospect the question that arises is that their planes have flown over Cuba and that we accept the inspection on the high whether it was a mistake to send the mis- they were convinced that the dismantling is seas and not at the shipping harbors. siles and then withdraw them from the Is- been carried out. They admitted that, but U Thant, when returning from Cuba, land. Our Central Committee says that this pointed that not everything is finished. We told me that you did not agree, although this is not a mistake. We consider that the mis- told them that this is nearly completed and verification is easier at the harbors. U Thant siles did their job by making Cuba the fo- he did not talk further about it. [McCloy is ready, he is choosing the personnel and cus of the world diplomacy. After they were said:] We have to be sure that they are not has already two ships. I do not know more captured in photos, they cannot accomplish 342 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

their role of containment. an unforeseen situation. Instead, they should tegic weapons. In Latin America no country has the be analyzed taking into account the set of The Soviet Government’s decision on power that Cuba has. No Latin American agreements we have reached - the weapons the 28, is based on the letter to Kennedy and bloc can defeat Cuba. were brought under those precepts. One of the response on the 27. The real basis for In order to understand on what victory them is the military agreement that was to the 28 decision lies within these two docu- rests, you may compare the situation of be published once all the weapons were ments. Kennedy’s letter on the 28 was an Cuba now and four months ago (in July). brought in and once the Elections were held agreement to the proposals Khrushchev sent The first advantage is that the North Ameri- in the United States. These agreements rep- on the 26 - in the sense that he [Krushchev] cans stopped talking about the Monroe Doc- resent a firm desire of the Soviet Union.5 was willing to resolve the issue of all the trine and before, the whole basis for their That is why this has to be analyzed weapons if the U.S. ceased the aggression. policy toward Latin America was that doc- under the light of what we intended to do The aggression was the only reason for the trine. and not under the light of what happened. military strengthening of Cuba. Before, they declared they would not If all the steps were carried out, we Once Kennedy accepted this proposal tolerate the existence of a Marxist-Leninist have no doubt that they would have served - which we did not know of - the conditions regime in Latin America, now they declare as a containment to the plans of the North were set to carry it out starting with a decla- that they will not attack Cuba. Before they Americans to attack our country. And the ration by the Soviets stating that their side did not tolerate a country from abroad in objectives of the Soviet Government and was on board and that they would proceed the Caribbean and now they know of the Cuba would have been attained. to discuss it with the Cuban Government. existence of Soviet specialists and do not At the same time, we knew that the I think that such a declaration, instead say a thing. deployment of missiles in Cuba had in sight of communicating an order to withdraw the Before, you could not have any action the defense of the Socialist Camp. They Strategic Weapons, would have decreased of the UN in favor of Cuba and now it is were important not only in military terms, the tension and would have allowed to carry working in that sense, all the peoples are but also from a psychological and political the discussions in better terms. mobilized. point of view. Besides serving the interests But this is a mere analysis of what hap- The prestige of the Socialist Camp has of Cuba, they served the interests of the pened, it does not matter now. What mat- grown because it defended peace. Although Socialist Camp as a whole, and we evidently ters now is simply to know what to do and the United States brought the world to the agreed with that. That is how we have un- how to attain the main goals that are to stop brink of a war, the USSR, by pacific means, derstood the step taken, and we also under- the aggression and to secure the peace at was able to save Cuba and the [world] peace. stand it was a step in the right direction. We the same time. If a true and effective peace Peace has been secured for several also agree with the need that a war be are attained in the near future, then - under years and Cuba must be consolidated for it avoided and we do not oppose that. In this the light of the recent events - we will be to continue building socialism and continue case, all the measures oriented to attain the able to judge better the steps taken. The fu- being the Light-house for Latin America. two objectives were undertaken. We are in ture outcome - for which we need to struggle The prestige of Cuba has grown as a absolute agreement with the goals sought - will either credit or discredit the value of consequence of these events. by the Soviet Union, the misunderstandings the acts of the present. It is evident that at- arise as a result of the way they were at- taining that outcome does not depend so ______****______tained. We also understand that the circum- much on us. We are very grateful for all the stances were compelling. They were not one explanations given and of the effort made Fidel asks whether he [Mikoyan] will hundred percent normal. for us to understand the things that occurred. speak about the Soviet policy in Berlin. In assessing how the events occurred, We know they happened in abnormal cir- Mikoyan agrees to do so in a later interview. we think they could have been dealt with cumstances. There is no question in our differently. For instance, one thing discussed minds about the respect of the Soviet Union is the impact that my letter had on the So- toward us, the respect of the Soviet Union Document II: viet Government’s decision of the [October] for our sovereignty, and, the help of the So- Mikoyan and Cuban leadership, 28th. And it is evident that my letter had viet Union. That is why what is important Havana, 5 November 1962 nothing to do with the course of the events - to discuss is what are the steps to take in the given the messages that were exchanged be- future. We want to reaffirm our trust in the CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE tween the Soviet and North American Gov- Soviet Union. SECRETARIAT AND MIKOYAN ON ernments on the 26 and 27. My letter’s only MONDAY, 5 NOVEMBER AT THREE goal was to inform the Soviet Government COMMENTS OF MIKOYAN (transcribed IN THE AFTERNOON. of the imminent attack, and it did not con- by Dorticos) tain any hesitation on our part. Furthermore, After hearing Mikoyan, Fidel says: we expressed that we did not expect an in- Carlos Rafael: It is my understanding that vasion. We expressed that the invasion was companero Mikoyan talked about the in- We consider that the intentions of the So- possible, but we understood that it was the spection of the Soviet ships as a Minimum viet Government cannot be determined only least probable variant. The most probable Minimorum. But that inspection would take by the analysis of what happened in face of event was an aerial attack to destroy the stra- place in a Cuban harbor. They could well COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 343 then request the inspection of other sites in tals in original-ed.] and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, Cuba - the forests for instance. They can the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New claim that the missiles could have been di- DORTICOS: What has been expressed by York: Pantheon, 1993), passim. Blight and the verted from their route between the base and companero Fidel does not require a later dis- Watson Institute, in cooperation with the National the ships. cussion among us, for we all agree on this Security Archive, a non-governmental research criteria (the companeros respond affirma- institute and declassified documents repository FIDEL: How would the inspection they pro- tively) based at George Washington University in Wash- pose take place? ington, D.C., are also involved in organizing oral MIKOYAN (Transcribed by Dorticos) history conferences on the Bay of Pigs events of Mikoyan: (transcribed by Dorticos) 1961, as well as efforts to obtain Cuban sources FIDEL: From our conversation yesterday, on such events as the U.S.-Cuban negotiations FIDEL: Couldn’t they do the same on the we had concluded that the Soviet Govern- on normalization of 1975 and Cuban interven- high seas? What is the difference? ment understood the reasons we had to re- tions in Africa in the 1970s. ject the inspection. That was a fundamental 3 The reference to the West German role in re- Mikoyan: (transcribed by Dorticos) issue. That should have been the common vealing the existence of the missiles to the U.S. ground to talk about common actions. If we administration is obscure, as no such link is FIDEL: Tell companero Mikoyan that I un- do not agree on this, it is difficult to talk present in most historical accounts of the Ameri- derstand very well the interest of keeping U about future plans. That is the fundamental can discovery. Soviet officials may have been Thant on our side, but for us, that is a criti- political issue. The North Americans per- inferring a West German role from the presence cal issue. It would have a disastrous effect sist in obtaining a political victory. The is- in Washington on October 16-17 of the Federal on our people. The North Americans say that sue of the inspection is to affront the Cuban Republic of Germany’s foreign minister, Dr. the inspection is inferred from the letter from Revolution. They know there are no mis- Gerhard Schroeder, for meetings with senior Khrushchev to Kennedy on the 28 (Fidel is siles. The verification on the high seas has American officials, though there is no indication making reference to the letter of Khrushchev the same effect as in the harbors. The only that he brought any intelligence data concerning on the 27 where he accepts the inspection difference is the humiliating imposition that Soviet missiles in Cuba. See, e.g., Dino A. of the Missiles Bases by officials of the the U.S. Government wants to carry out for Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of UNO Security Council, but making refer- political reasons. the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random ence to Cuba and Turkey agreeing to it). House, rev. ed. [1992?]), 206, 252. [note in original—ed.] MIKOYAN: (transcribed by Dorticos) 4 A reference to U.S. Marine exercises, code- Just because of this phrase of named PHIBRIGLEX-62, scheduled to begin on Khrushchev, they cannot take this as a con- [Source: Institute of History, Cuba, obtained 15 October 1962, practicing amphibious landings cession of the Soviet Union. Companero and provided by Philip Brenner (American of 7,500 Marines on the Caribbean island of Mikoyan says to hell with imperialists if University); translation from Spanish by Viecques to overthrow a mythical dictator known they demand more. But on the 23 we re- Carlos Osorio (National Security Archive).] as “Ortsac”—a fact which was leaked to the press ceived a letter [from Khrushchev] saying, in an obvious psychological warfare tactic. The to hell with the imperialists...(he reads para- EDITOR’S NOTES exercises themselves were also planned to mask graphs from the letter). Besides, on one oc- preparations for a possible U.S. Navy blockade casion we heard of the proposal of U Thant 1 See Vladislav M. Zubok, “`Dismayed by the of Cuba. See citations in James G. Hershberg, about the inspection in Cuba, the United Actions of the Soviet Union’: Mikoyan’s talks “Before `The Missiles of October’: Did Kennedy States, Guatemala, etc., we understand, that with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, No- Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?” in James concessions should be made, but we have vember 1962,” CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revis- already made too many. The [U.S.] airplanes 59, 89-92, and “Mikoyan’s Mission to Havana: ited (New York: St. Martin’s, 1992), 254-5, 275- are taking pictures because the Soviet Union Cuban-Soviet Negotiations, November 1962,” 6 (fns 87, 88). asked so. We have to find a way to provide ibid., 93-109, 159; for the November 4 conversa- 5 For the text of the draft agreement, translated evidence without inspection. WE DO NOT tion, see 94-101, and for the November 5 (after- from a copy in the Russian archives, see Gen. THINK OF ALLOWING THE INSPEC- noon) conversation, see 101-4. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, TION, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO EN- 2 Cuban officials took part in several oral history Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals DANGER WORLD PEACE, NOR THE conferences on the Cuban Missile Crisis which Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: edi- SOVIET FORCES THAT ARE IN CUBA. also involved former U.S. and Soviet tion q, inc., 1994), 185-8. WE WOULD RATHER FREE THE SO- policymakers, including a conference in Moscow VIET UNION OF THE COMMITMENTS in January 1989 and a gathering in Havana ex- FOR IMPORTANT IT HAS [MADE] WITH US AND RESIST actly three years later in which Fidel Castro played WITH OUR OWN FORCES WHATEVER an active role. The principal organizer of the con- SUBSCRIBER THE FUTURE BRINGS. WE HAVE NO ferences was James G. Blight, Thomas J. Watson RIGHT TO ENDANGER THE PEACE OF Institute of International Studies, Brown Univer- INFORMATION, THE WORLD, BUT WE HAVE THE sity. For more on Cuban participation in such RIGHT TO RESIST AGGRESSION. [capi- gatherings, see James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, SEE PAGE 421 344 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

BOBBY AND THE CRISIS channels), the Soviet envoy concluded the President, of Alsop.”5) continued from page 274 by recommending that he could meet Before stepping more deeply into again with Robert Kennedy to pass “in Bolshakov’s shoes with his October 27 shine through clearly, obviously also confidential form N.S. Khrushchev’s meeting with Robert Kennedy, representing that of his brother. “The thoughts on this matter, concerning not Dobrynin hinted at his view of the President felt himself deceived, and only the issues which R. Kennedy had president’s brother in a cable of Octo- deceived intentionally,” Dobrynin touched on, but a wider circle of issues ber 25 lumping him, along with Secre- quoted Robert Kennedy as saying, not- in light of the events which are going tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, ing that he had arrived at the Russian on now.” Dobrynin may have sensed National Security Adviser McGeorge Embassy in “in an obviously excited an opening in the fact that the previous Bundy, and “military men” as taking the condition” (although he later “cooled Soviet Embassy official who had served “most militant line” in discussions at the down a bit and spoke in calmer tones”). as Khrushchev’s back-channel to Rob- White House in favor of attacking Cuba, In general, while Dobrynin resolutely ert Kennedy and thence his brother, not only destroying the Soviet missile defended Moscow against Robert Georgi Bolshakov (ostensibly a press sites but also invading the island. (Sup- Kennedy’s accusations, the lengthy ac- attache, presumably an intelligence of- posedly taking a more moderate line, count of the meeting that he transmit- ficer), was evidently in acute disfavor the envoy reported, were Secretary of ted to the Foreign Ministry must cer- in the White House for having been State Dean Rusk and Treasury Secre- tainly have alerted the Kremlin leader- used to deliver a personal assurance tary Douglas C. Dillon.) While Robert ship to just how personally affronted the from the Soviet leader that only defen- Kennedy at the very outset of the crisis Kennedy brothers were, and to their sive weapons were being shipped to had made some belligerent statements apparent determination to confront So- Cuba. (And, in fact, Dobrynin would (even floating the idea of staging a viet ships heading for the blockade line report shortly after the crisis that a Jo- provocation at Guantanamo to justify around Cuba.4 seph Alsop column in the Washington U.S. military action6), and would later Quite aside from the substance of Post exposing Bolshakov’s role in de- join those harshly criticizing U.S. Am- the meeting, in terms of subsequent ceiving the president must have been bassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson developments it is worth noting instigated by Robert Kennedy, for it for suggesting the idea of giving up Dobrynin’s own astute bureaucratic re- contained details known “only” by him: American bases in Turkey and flex in promoting his own stature in the “For this reason it is clearly obvious that Guantanamo to convince the Soviets to negotiations—forging this new direct the article was prepared with the knowl- remove their missiles, for most of the path to the president via his brother edge of, or even by orders from, Rob- crisis he consistently, and at times pas- (side-stepping normal State Department ert Kennedy, who is a close friend, as is sionately, argued against precipitous military action: “Robert Kennedy was JFK LIBRARY RELEASES est single release of tape-recorded ma- a dove from the start,” wrote Arthur M. REMAINING TAPES FROM terials from the Kennedy Administra- Schlesinger, Jr., citing in particular the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS tion. In most cases, the Library released notes of the October 18 ExComm meet- only tapes rather than transcripts of the ing, which paraphrase RFK’s use of the The John F. Kennedy Library in Bos- discussions; however, a project is un- Pearl Harbor analogy: “...He thought it ton announced in October 1996 that it derway at Harvard University to pro- would be very, very difficult indeed for had completed the declassification of, duce transcripts of the tape recordings, the President if the decision were to be and was releasing, the remaining tapes after sound enhancement, leading to the for an air strike, with all the memory of of the White House “Excomm” (Execu- publication of a collection (entitled The Pearl Harbor and with all the implica- tive Committee) discussions that took Kennedy Tapes), to be co-edited by tions this would have for us in what- place in the Oval Office and Cabinet Profs. Ernest R. May and Philip ever world there would be afterward. Room during the Cuban Missile Crisis Zelikow. For 175 years we had not been that kind between 18 and 29 October 1962. In addition, the Library simulta- of country. A sneak attack was not in While extracts of ExComm discussions neously announced the release of our traditions. Thousands of Cubans on the first and last days of the crisis 20,000 declassified pages of Cuba-re- would be killed without warning, and a (16 and 27 October 1962) had been de- lated documents from the National Se- lot of Russians too....” Robert Kennedy classified and released in the mid-late curity Files of the Kennedy Adminis- advocated “action,” but also leaving 1980s, the bulk of the tapes had re- tration. For further information of all Moscow “some room for maneuver to mained inaccessible until now, although the above materials, contact Stephanie pull back from their overextended po- 7 some limited releases of other tape-re- Fawcett, Kennedy Library, Columbia sition in Cuba.” As of October 25, corded Excomm materials related to the Point, Boston, MA 02125; (617) 929- however, Dobrynin not only grouped crisis took place in 1994. 4500 (tel.); (617) 929-4538 (fax); Robert Kennedy with the hawks on the The newly-released tapes total 15 [email protected] (e-mail). ExComm, he judged that the president, hours and 19 minutes (27 minutes re- “vacillating right now” and “heeding mained classified), making it the larg- the [militant] group, particularly, his COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 345 brother,” might “undertake such an on paper, even in confidential corre- tions, with special reference to the de- adventurist step as an invasion of spondence between heads of state: feat of Kennedy’s erstwhile presiden- Cuba.” “Speaking in all candor, I myself, for tial rival, former Vice-President Rich- Dobrynin’s rather negative view of example, do not want to risk getting ard M. Nixon, in the California guber- Robert Kennedy—even in retrospect, involved in the transmission of this sort natorial contest.11 “When [Robert the jaunty Soviet diplomat recalled him of letter, since who knows where and Kennedy] got to the place that spoke of as as “far from being a sociable person when such letters can surface or be Nixon’s defeat in the elections,” and lack[ing] a proper senes of somehow published—not now, but in Dobrynin reported, “he immediately humor...[m]oreover, he was impulsive the future—and any changes in the grinned, saying: `Your chairman is a and excitable”8—make all the more re- course of events are possible. The ap- real master of colorful expression that markable the meeting of minds that pearance of such a document could expressed the true essence of the issue. managed to take place on the evening cause irreparable harm to my political Yes, we are quite satisfied with Nixon’s of October 27. It is not necessary to career in the future. This is why we re- defeat, and in general we are not com- dwell on that conversation given the quest that you take this letter back.” plaining about the results of the elec- scrutiny it has received (and the publi- (Sensing how crucial the matter was to tion.’ It was felt that this portion of the cation of Dobrynin’s record in a previ- the Americans, Dobrynin accepted the message was received with definite sat- ous Bulletin), other than to note that letter back, even without orders from isfaction.” Kennedy’s own contemporaneous draft Moscow.) As Kennedy was leaving the Em- memorandum of the meeting, printed Dobrynin’s cable lends contempo- bassy after a tough hour-and-a-half dis- below, offers additional evidence as to raneous corroboration to the assertion cussion, mostly consumed by haggling how sensitive the agreement on the in his 1995 memoirs that Robert over the U.S. demand that the Soviets Turkish Jupiters was considered. Even Kennedy, even in 1962, had linked his take their IL-28 bombers out of Cuba, in this “top secret” memo to Secretary actions in the missile crisis to his own of State Rusk, Kennedy appears to have political future in keeping secret the he glimpsed a crowd of dancing couples penciled out a sentence noting that “per arrangement on the Jupiters.10 (Of in the embassy’s parlor. Realizing that [Rusk’s] instructions” he had told course, after the assassination of his this was a friendly welcome party ar- Dobrynin that the Turkish missile issue brother in 1963, Robert F. Kennedy ranged by the embassy community for “could be resolved satisfactorily” in would indeed run for president, chal- the Bolshoi Theater troupe that had just “four or five months.” Instead, in a bla- lenging incumbent President Lyndon B. arrived in Washington, he said that he tant falsification of the historical record, Johnson (and then Vice-President would like to meet with the troupe. Min- the revised memo would leave unmodi- Hubert Humphrey) for the Democratic gling with and greeting almost all the fied the assertion that RFK had affirmed nomination in 1968, but he, too, would members of the troupe, he delivered a that it was “completely impossible for fall victim to an assassin, killed that welcome speech in which he said that NATO to take such a step under the June on the night of his victory in the the President was preparing to attend present threatening position of the So- California primary.) their premier the following evening. At viet Union” and “there could be no deal Several additional Dobrynin re- the end, he kissed Maya Plisetskaya of any kind” regarding the Jupiters. ports of conversations with Robert when he found out that he and she had Robert Kennedy’s abhorrence of Kennedy after the crisis appear in this been born in the same year, month, and the idea of leaving a written trace of the Bulletin, mostly dealing with disagree- day, and said they would celebrate their under-the-table “understanding” on the ments and details concerning the terms birthdays in a week. None of this needs Turkish missiles emerges even more of the final settlement: which Soviet to be mentioned especially, but all in all clearly from Dobrynin’s account, weapons would have to be withdrawn, the behavior of Robert Kennedy, who printed in this Bulletin, of his 30 Octo- the timetable for the lifting of the U.S. is ordinarily quite a reserved and glum ber 1962 meeting at which the Attor- blockade, disputes over inspection and man, reflects to some degree the calmer ney General insisted on handing back U.S. overlights, etc. But a few human and more normal mood in the White to Dobrynin a letter from Khrushchev touches also lighten the diplomatic dis- House after the tense days that shook to Kennedy which had explicitly af- course, and hint at the developing rap- Washington, even though this fact is firmed the private deal.9 Robert port between these two men who prob- concealed in various ways by American Kennedy, for his part, had no compunc- ably felt that they had had the fate of propaganda.12 tions about confirming, repeatedly, that the world in their hands. a private oral “understanding” existed A meeting at the Russian Embassy That an appreciation of the new between the Soviet and U.S. leaderships on the evening of November 12, for prominence of the president’s brother on the dismantling of the Jupiter mis- example, began with Dobrynin’s hand- extended to Dobrynin’s bosses in the siles in Turkey “within the period of ing over a confidential oral message Kremlin became evident in a private time indicated earlier,” i.e., 4-5 months. from Khrushchev to President Kennedy conversation between Robert Kennedy However, he added, such a sensitive that included a congratulatory note on and special Soviet envoy Anastas I. understanding could not be put down the results of the Congressional elec- Mikoyan, a veteran member of the 346 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

CPSU Central Committee, at a dinner both Kennedy brothers and be believing what he and Khrushchev party at the home of Interior Secretary Khrushchev—a prospect the Americans had said—that there were no long-range Stewart Udall on the evening of No- thought would last through a second missiles in Cuba. In any case I said that vember 30—an occasion one American Kennedy Administration—ended with this matter was far more serious than present described as a “strange, seem- the U.S. president’s assassination in the air space over Cuba and involved ingly unreal evening” as enemies who Dallas in November 1963 and peoples all over the world. had nearly engaged in thermonuclear Khrushchev’s toppling less than a year I said that he had better understand war only weeks war wiled away the later. the situation and he had better commu- hours in drinking, toasts, and (some- nicate that understanding to Mr. times forced) convivial conversation.13 ***** Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and he A wily diplomatic trouble-shooter since had misled us. The Soviet Union had the Stalin era, Mikoyan was passing Robert F. Kennedy, Memorandum secretly established missile bases in through Washington after three weeks for Dean Rusk on Meeting with Cuba while at the same time proclaim- of difficult negotiations in Cuba with Anatoly F. Dobrynin on ing, privately and publicly, that this Fidel Castro over the outcome of the 27 October 1962 would never be done. I said those mis- crisis and a day before the Udall affair sile bases had to go and they had to go had met with President Kennedy at the TOP SECRET right away. We had to have a commit- White House. Office of the Attorney General ment by at least tomorrow that those Before the meal was served (as Washington, D.C. bases would be removed. This was not Mikoyan related in a cable printed in October 30, 1962 an ultimatum, I said, but just a state- this Bulletin), Robert Kennedy invited ment of fact. He should understand that Mikoyan into a separate room for a tete- MEMORANDUM FOR THE if they did not remove those bases then a-tete in which he underlined the im- SECRETARY OF STATE FROM we would remove them. His country portance above all (“even more impor- THE ATTORNEY GENERAL might take retaliatory actions but he tant than the fates of my children and should understand that before this was your grandchildren”) of restoring per- At the request of Secretary Rusk, I over, while there might be dead Ameri- sonal trust between his brother and telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at cans there would also be dead Russians. Khrushchev. Mikoyan not only agreed approximately 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, He then asked me what offer we and assured Robert Kennedy that October 27th. I asked him if he would were making. I said a letter had just Khrushchev felt the same way, but said come to the Justice Department at a been transmitted to the Soviet Embassy that the Soviet government applauded quarter of eight. which stated in substance that the mis- the president’s “self-possession” and We met in my office. I told him sile bases should be dismantled and all willingness to compromise at “the most first that we understood that the work offensive weapons should be removed dangerous moment, when the world was continuing on the Soviet missile from Cuba. In return, if Cuba and stood at the edge of thermonuclear war.” bases in Cuba. Further, I explained to Castro and the Communists ended their Moscow, moreover, Mikoyan him that in the last two hours we had subversive activities in other Central added, had “noticed the positive role found that our planes flying over Cuba and Latin-American countries, we that you, the president’s brother, played had been fired upon and that one of our would agree to keep peace in the Car- during the confidential negotiations” U-2’s had been shot down and the pilot ibbean and not permit an invasion from between the U.S. and Soviet leaderships killed. I said these men were flying un- American soil. during the crisis. Robert Kennedy ex- armed planes. He then asked me about pressed an interest in visiting the USSR, I told him that this was an ex- Khrushchev’s other proposal dealing an idea which Mikoyan warmly en- tremely serious turn in events. We with the removal of the missiles from dorsed, especially should relations be- would have to make certain decisions Turkey. I replied that there could be no tween the two rivals improve after sur- within the next 12 or possibly 24 hours. quid pro quo — no deal of this kind viving (and resolving) the rough Cuban There was a very little time left. If the could be made. This was a matter that passage. Cubans were shooting at our planes, had to be considered by NATO and that Those relations did in fact improve then we were going to shoot back. This it was up to NATO to make the deci- somewhat in the succeeding months, could not help but bring on further in- sion. I said it was completely impos- leading to, among other events, John F. cidents and that he had better under- sible for NATO to take such a step un- Kennedy’s conciliatory American Uni- stand the full implications of this mat- der the present threatening position of versity speech in April 1963 and the ter. the Soviet Union. If some time elapsed signing of U.S.-Soviet pacts on a lim- He raised the point that the argu- — and per your instructions, I men- ited nuclear test ban and a hot line be- ment the Cubans were making was that tioned four or five months — I said I tween Washington and Moscow. But we were violating Cuban air space. I was sure that these matters could be the post-Cuban Missile Crisis opening replied that if we had not been violat- resolved satisfactorily. [crossed out by for a continued rapprochement between ing Cuban air space then we would still hand—ed.] COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 347

Per your instructions I repeated that Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 75, 77-80. indeed, were in your favor. The success does not there could be no deal of any kind and 4 Dobrynin’s cabled report (dated 24 October upset us either—though that is of course your that any steps toward easing tensions 1962) of the October 23 meeting with RFK can internal affair. You managed to pin your politi- in other parts of the world largely de- be found in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 71- cal rival, Mr. Nixon, to the mat. This did not draw pended on the Soviet Union and Mr. 73; see also Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, tears from our eyes either....” See James A. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and 65-66, and Schlesinger, Jr., Robert F. Kennedy Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisted taking it immediately. and His Times, 553-554, which cites RFK’s un- (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 290. I repeated to him that this matter published memorandum of the meeting. Neither 12 See Dobrynin cable of 12 November 1962, could not wait and that he had better of those accounts note RFK’s agitated state, which printed in this Bulletin, and also Schlesinger, contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a Dobrynin highlighted. Dobrynin’s cable clearly Robert F. Kennedy and His Times, 567-568. commitment from him by the next day served as a principal source for the account pub- 13 See Mikoyan report on the Udall dinner, 30 to withdraw the missile bases under lished in Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: November 1962, in this Bulletin; the American United Nations supervision for other- Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War account of the party is from George Ball, The Past wise, I said, there would be drastic con- Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), 81- Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: sequences. 82. Dobrynin notes that he deliberately did not Norton, 1982), 308-309. sugarcoat Robert Kennedy’s critical comments RFK: amn about the Kremlin leadership in order to get across the seriousness of the situation.] [Source: John F. Kennedy Library, Bos- 5 See Dobrynin cable of 5 November 1962 in this For the ton, MA; provided to CWIHP by Prof. Bulletin. Peter Roman, Duquesne University, 6 See transcript of 16 October 1962 ExComm Electronic Bulletin Pittsburgh, PA.] meeting, 6:30-7:55 p.m., John F. Kennedy Li- brary, Boston, MA. The transcript quotes RFK and more on the lat- 1 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir as wondering “...whether there is some other way est findings on Cold of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton, we can get involved in this through, uh, 1969; citations from Mentor/New American Li- Guantanamo Bay, or something, er, or whether War history from the brary paperback edition, 1969). Questions about there’s some ship that, you know, sink the Maine the book’s reliability deepened after another again or something.” communist archives, former Kennedy aide, speechwriter Theodore 7 See Schlesinger, Robert F. Kennedy and His Sorensen, acknowledged that, as an uncredited Times, 546, 548-49. come visit CWIHP’s editor of the manuscript, he taken it upon himself 8 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 82-83. to delete “explicit” references to the arrangement 9 See Dobrynin cable of 30 October 1962 printed site on the World he and Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin in this Bulletin. Although Robert Kennedy’s notes Wide Web: reached on the evening of 27 October 1962 re- for this meeting and a memorandum to Rusk have garding the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from been cited from the RFK papers by his biogra- Turkey as part of the settlement of the crisis. Also pher—see Schlesinger, Jr., Robert F. Kennedy and http://www.seas.gwu/nsarchive/cwihp problematic is the fact that Robert Kennedy’s Hist Times, 563-564—State Department histori- original diary, on which the book is based, has ans have been unable to locate a U.S. record of not been opened to researchers. Sorensen made this meeting: see U.S. Department of State, For- his confession upon being challenged by eign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1961- —and to learn about Dobrynin at a January 1989 oral history confer- 1963, Vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges ence on the crisis held in Moscow. See Barton J. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, the National Security Bernstein, “Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: 1996), source note on p. 189. The letter Robert Dealing with the Problems of the American Kennedy handed back, from Khrushchev to John Archive, the leading Jupiters in Turkey,” in James A. Nathan, ed., The F. Kennedy dated 28 October 1962, was first pub- user of the Freedom Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. lished in the Spring 1992 issue of Problems of Martin’s 1992), 55-129, esp. 56-57, 94-96, 125- Communism, 60-62, and also appears in FRUS, of Information Act to 126 fn 183. 1961-1963, Vol. VI, pp. 189—190. 2 The most detailed account of Robert F. 10 See Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 90-91. obtain the declassifi- Kennedy’s part in the missile crisis, and his life 11 Nixon had been defeated by his Democratic generally, can be found in Arthur M. Schlesinger, rival in the California gubernatorial elections, cation of American Jr., Robert F. Kennedy and His Times (Boston: upon which he announced his retirement from Houghton Mifflin, 1978; citations from Futura politics. The relevant passage in Khrushchev’s documents, visit: Publications paperback edition, 1979). 12 November 1962 message read: “Now the elec- 3 See Jim Hershberg, “Anatomy of a Controversy: tions in your country, Mr. President, are over. You http://www.seas.gwu/nsarchive Anatoly F. Dobrynin’s Meeting with Robert F. made a statement that you were very pleased with Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962,” CWIHP the results of these elections. They, the elections, 348 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN “Lessons” of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations

by Mark Kramer for the Soviet Union to handle on its been concerned well before the Cuban own, not a matter for the Warsaw Pact. missile crisis about the difficulty of re- The role of the Warsaw Pact in the Despite the near-irrelevance of the taining secure control over nuclear Cuban missile crisis was negligible. All Warsaw Pact during the crisis, the weapons and about the danger of unau- evidence suggests that the Soviet Union events of October 1962 did have im- thorized actions, the crisis put these neither consulted nor even informed its portant effects on the alliance, particu- risks into a whole new light.8 By un- East European allies about the installa- larly on the nuclear command-and-con- derscoring how easily control could be tion of medium-range and tactical trol arrangements that were established lost, the crisis inevitably bolstered nuclear missiles in Cuba before the de- in the mid-1960s. This article will draw Moscow’s determination to ensure strict ployment of the former was revealed by on recent disclosures from the East Ger- centralized command over all nuclear the U.S. government.1 Nor did the So- man, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hun- operations, including nuclear operations viet leadership consult its Warsaw Pact garian archives to show how the Cuban conducted by the Warsaw Pact. allies about the removal of the missiles. missile crisis influenced Warsaw Pact One of the most disconcerting les- Although the Pact declared a joint mili- nuclear operations. No definitive judg- sons of the Cuban missile crisis from tary alert on 23 October 1962 (the day ments about this matter are yet possible the Soviet perspective was the poten- after President John F. Kennedy’s tele- because the most crucial documents are tial for nuclear weapons to be misused vised revelation of the Soviet missile all in Moscow, and the archival situa- if the aims of local actors were not iden- deployments), the alert had no more tion in Russia is still highly unsatisfac- tical to Soviet goals. It is now known than a symbolic impact and was carried tory.7 Nevertheless, enough evidence that at the height of the crisis Fidel out solely at Moscow’s behest.2 The has emerged from East-Central Europe Castro sent a top-secret cable to Mos- joint alert was formally cancelled on 21 to permit several tentative conclusions. cow urging the Soviet Union to launch November 1962, the same day that the The article will begin by briefly re- a nuclear strike against the United States Soviet Union ended its own unilateral viewing the “lessons” that the Cuban if U.S. forces invaded Cuba.9 Castro alert (and a day after the U.S. naval missile crisis offered for Soviet nuclear apparently had been led to believe that blockade of Cuba was lifted).3 So pe- weapons deployments abroad. It will the Soviet Union would be willing to ripheral was the alliance to the Soviet then delineate the command-and-con- go to war—and risk its own destruc- Union’s handling of the crisis that it was trol arrangements that were set up in the tion—in defense of Cuba. Nikita not until long after the matter had been mid-1960s for Warsaw Pact nuclear Khrushchev’s response to Castro’s plea resolved that the Soviet Prime Minis- operations, and examine the East Eu- indicates that the Soviet leader had no ter, Anastas Mikoyan, bothered to in- ropean states’ unsuccessful efforts to intention of ordering the use of nuclear form the East European governments alter those arrangements. The article weapons, regardless of what happened about the Soviet Union’s motives for de- will conclude with some observations to Cuba.10 ploying and withdrawing the missiles.4 about the legacy of the Cuban missile For Khrushchev, this episode was The marginal significance of the crisis for Warsaw Pact nuclear opera- especially unnerving because he ini- Warsaw Pact during the Cuban missile tions, a legacy that endured until the tially had given serious consideration crisis hardly comes as a great surprise. Pact itself collapsed in 1990-91. to providing Castro with direct com- In 1962 the Pact was still little more mand over Soviet forces in Cuba, in- than a paper organization and had not “Lessons” from the Missile Crisis cluding the nuclear-capable Frog yet acquired a meaningful role in So- (“Luna”) missiles and Il-28 aircraft.11 viet military strategy.5 Moreover, the Several features of the Cuban mis- (Only the medium-range SS-4 and SS- crisis was far outside the European the- sile crisis were of direct relevance to 5 missiles would have been left under ater, and East European leaders had re- Soviet nuclear deployments in Eastern Moscow’s command.) As it turned out, sisted Soviet efforts to extend the Europe later on. The “lessons” that Khrushchev decided not to give Castro alliance’s purview beyond the conti- Soviet officials derived from the crisis any direct jurisdiction over Soviet tac- nent. Despite fears that the showdown were of course not the only factor (or tical nuclear forces; indeed, the draft over Cuba might spark a NATO-War- even the most important factor) shap- treaty on military cooperation between saw Pact confrontation in Berlin, the ing the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear com- the Soviet Union and Cuba, which was situation in Germany remained calm mand structure, but they seem to have due to take effect once the presence of throughout the crisis.6 Hence, the been of considerable influence, at least the Soviet missiles in Cuba was pub- standoff in the Caribbean was a matter implicitly. Although Soviet leaders had licly announced by Moscow and Ha- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 349 vana later that fall, would have left the cedural restrictions—at least for tacti- trol over all nuclear operations, was the “military units of the two states under cal missiles—even after he received the role that accidents played. The most the command of their respective gov- two telegrams that “categorically” for- conspicuous instance came on 27 Oc- ernments.”12 Even so, the Cuban bade him to order the issuance or use tober when an American U-2 reconnais- leader’s message on 26 October still of nuclear weapons without express au- sance aircraft was shot down over struck a raw nerve in Moscow.13 It was thorization. On 26 October he sent a Cuba.22 The rules of engagement for a vivid reminder of the dangers that cable to Moscow in which he apparently Soviet troops in Cuba did not permit the might have resulted if the Soviet Union mentioned that Castro wanted him to downing of American planes except had delegated any responsibility for prepare for a nuclear strike and that, as those carrying out an attack.23 When nuclear operations. a result, he had decided it was time to the U-2 was shot down, no one in Mos- A related lesson about the dangers move nuclear warheads closer to the cow was quite sure what had hap- posed by local actors pertained to the missiles (though without actually issu- pened—Khrushchev and most others role of the commander of Soviet forces ing them to the missile units). Pliev then mistakenly thought that Castro had or- in Cuba, Army-General Issa Pliev, who requested that his decision be approved dered Soviet troops to fire at the plane— was chosen for the post because of his and that he be given due authority to but everyone was certain that further long-standing and very close friendship order the preparation of tactical missiles incidents of this sort might cause the with both Khrushchev and the Soviet for launch if, as appeared imminent, crisis to spin out of control.24 The risks Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion U.S. troops invaded the island.18 So- posed by accidents would have been Malinovskii.14 At no time during the viet leaders immediately turned down especially great if the local commander crisis did Pliev have authority to order both of his requests and reemphasized (i.e., Pliev) had been given independent the use of either medium-range or tac- that no actions involving nuclear weap- authority to order the use of nuclear tical nuclear missiles, but it is now ons were to be undertaken without di- weapons. After all, Pliev and other of- known that several weeks before the rect authorization from Moscow.19 ficers based in Cuba, whose lives were crisis—in the late summer of 1962— Still, the very fact that Pliev sought directly at risk during the crisis, were Malinovskii had considered the possi- to have the restrictions lifted, and his naturally inclined to overreact to unin- bility of giving Pliev pre-delegated au- seeming willingness to use tactical tended “provocations” from the oppos- thority to order the use of tactical mis- nuclear weapons if necessary, provided ing side. To the extent that such over- siles against invading U.S. troops if a sobering indication of the risks en- reactions could not be avoided in fu- Pliev’s lines of communication with tailed in giving discretion to local com- ture crises, it was essential that the con- Moscow were severed and all other manders. The risks would have been sequences be minimized and that fur- means of defense against an invasion especially acute in this instance because ther escalation be prevented. Obvi- had proven insufficient. A written or- there were no technical safeguards on ously, it would be vastly more difficult der to this effect was prepared on 8 Sep- the nuclear weapons in Cuba to serve to regain any semblance of control if tember 1962, but in the end Malinovskii as a fallback in case Pliev (or someone local actors “accidentally” resorted to declined to sign it.15 Thus, at the time else) attempted to circumvent the pro- the use of nuclear weapons. of the crisis Pliev had no independent cedural safeguards.20 This is not to say Hence, the accidents that occurred authority to order the use of nuclear that it would have been easy for Pliev during the Cuban missile crisis under- weapons or even to order that nuclear to evade the procedural limits—to do scored the need for rigid safeguards, warheads, which were stored separately so he would have had to obtain coop- both procedural and technical, to pre- from the missiles, be released for pos- eration from troops all along the chain clude the use of Soviet nuclear weap- sible employment. The limitations on of command—but there was no techni- ons except in the most dire emergency. Pliev’s scope of action during the crisis cal barrier per se to unauthorized ac- This lesson, like the others that were reinforced by two cables transmit- tions. Khrushchev and his colleagues derived ted by Malinovskii on 22 and 25 Octo- Thus, one of the clear lessons of from the crisis, survived the change of ber, which “categorically” prohibited the crisis was the need not only to main- leadership in Moscow in October 1964. any use of nuclear weapons under any tain stringent procedural safeguards for Although Leonid Brezhnev altered circumstances without explicit autho- all Soviet nuclear forces, but also to many aspects of Khrushchev’s military rization from Moscow.16 equip those forces with elaborate tech- policies, he was just as determined as The strictures imposed by the So- nical devices that would prevent un- his predecessor to retain stringent po- viet leadership held up well during the authorized or accidental launches. This litical control over Soviet nuclear crisis, as the procedural safeguards for applied above all to nuclear weapons forces. nuclear operations proved sufficient to deployed abroad, where the lines of forestall any untoward incidents.17 For communication were more vulnerable Nuclear Operations and the most part, Khrushchev’s and to being severed or disrupted.21 the Warsaw Pact Malinovskii’s faith in Pliev was well- One further lesson from the Cuban founded. Nevertheless, it is clear that missile crisis, which reinforced the per- Nuclear weapons first became an Pliev wanted to ease some of the pro- ceived need for strict, centralized con- issue for the Warsaw Pact in mid-1958 350 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

when, allegedly in response to deploy- 1960s. Whenever Warsaw Pact exer- slovakia was concluded just after the ments by NATO, Khrushchev warned cises included combat techniques for Soviet Union had worked out a similar that the Pact would be “compelled by nuclear warfare (as they routinely did arrangement with Hungary.32 The So- force of circumstance to consider sta- from early 1962 on), the decision on viet-Hungarian agreement was signed tioning [tactical nuclear] missiles in the when to “go nuclear” was left entirely by Brezhnev and the Hungarian leader, German Democratic Republic, Poland, to the Soviet High Command and po- Janos Kadar, and was kept secret from and Czechoslovakia.”25 Shortly there- litical leadership.28 In every respect, almost all other Hungarian officials. after, the Czechoslovak, East German, then, the East European governments Much the same was true of an agree- and Polish armed forces began receiv- were denied any say in the use of the ment that the Soviet Union concluded ing nuclear-capable aircraft and surface- Pact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal. with Poland in early 1967.33 Only a to-surface missiles from the Soviet The exclusivity of Soviet com- few top Polish officials were permitted Union.26 The Bulgarian and Hungar- mand was reinforced by secret agree- to find out about the document. ian armies also soon obtained nuclear- ments that the Soviet Union concluded The Soviet agreements with all capable aircraft and missiles from Mos- in the early to mid-1960s with Czecho- four countries covered nuclear war- cow; and even the Romanian military slovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and heads slated for use on delivery vehicles was eventually supplied with nuclear- Poland regarding the storage of nuclear belonging to Soviet troops stationed in capable Frog-7 and Scud-B missiles. In warheads in those countries. Although those countries. Some of the warheads all cases, the deployment of these de- all the agreements were bilateral, they were also intended for weapons de- livery vehicles was well under way by were described as coming “within the ployed by the local armies, but in that the time of the Cuban missile crisis. framework of the Warsaw Pact.” The case the delivery vehicles would have The wartime command-and-con- first such agreements were signed with been transferred to direct Soviet com- trol arrangements for the new East Eu- East Germany and Czechoslovakia be- mand. Under the new agreements East ropean weapons were still in flux in fore the Cuban missile crisis. The So- European officials had no role in the use 1962, and a variety of options were un- viet-East German agreements, signed at of the Pact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal, nor der consideration. One such option had various intervals in the early 1960s, any control over the reinforced storage been alluded to in 1959 by the East covered some 16 storage sites, all of bunkers for nuclear warheads (or even German government, which announced which were controlled exclusively by the housing for elite units assigned to that it would “request its allies to place special troops assigned to the Group of guard the bunkers). A senior East Eu- [nuclear] missile weapons at its dis- Soviet Forces in Germany.29 The East ropean military official later confirmed posal” if the West German government German authorities had no say at all in that “the procedures for the defense and gained a role in NATO’s nuclear opera- the location or maintenance of these protection of these special-purpose stor- tions.27 At the time, Soviet officials facilities, not to mention the use of the age centers for nuclear warheads were had reacted warily to this proposal, but munitions stored there. such that no one from our side had per- had not dismissed it out of hand. Soviet agreements with Czechoslo- mission to enter, and even Soviet offi- Moscow’s stance changed, however, in vakia were somewhat more compli- cials who were not directly responsible the aftermath of the Cuban missile cri- cated because no Soviet troops had been for guarding and operating the build- sis. From then on, all wartime com- present on Czechoslovak territory since ings were not allowed in.”34 mand-and-control arrangements for al- the end of 1945. Two preliminary Thus, by the late 1960s the Soviet lied nuclear operations were made to fit agreements were signed in August 1961 and East European governments had a single pattern. The East European and February 1962 entitling the Soviet forged a nuclear command-and-control countries’ weapons were still officially Union to dispatch nuclear warheads structure for the Warsaw Pact that gave described as components of the “War- immediately to Czechoslovakia in the exclusive say to the Soviet Union. Even saw Pact’s joint nuclear forces” and event of an emergency.30 After the before the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet were used for simulated nuclear strikes Cuban missile crisis, those two agree- leaders had been inclined to move in during Pact exercises, but all nuclear ments were supplanted by a much more this direction, but the crisis greatly ac- warheads for the delivery systems re- far-reaching “Treaty Between the Gov- celerated the trend and effectively ruled mained under exclusive Soviet control, ernments of the USSR and CSSR on out anything less than complete control and the delivery vehicles themselves Measures to Increase the Combat in Moscow. would have come under direct Soviet Readiness of Missile Forces,” which command if they had ever been was signed by Malinovskii and his Intra-Pact Debate on Nuclear equipped with nuclear warheads during Czechoslovak counterpart, Army-Gen- “Sharing” a crisis. Moreover, the thousands of eral Bohumir Lomsky, in December tactical nuclear weapons deployed by 1965.31 The treaty provided for the The effects of the Cuban missile Soviet forces on East European terri- permanent stationing of Soviet nuclear crisis could also be felt, if only implic- tory were not subject to any sort of warheads at three sites in western itly, when the Soviet Union had to deal “dual-key” arrangement along the lines Czechoslovakia. with complaints from its allies about the that NATO established in the mid- This third agreement with Czecho- Warsaw Pact’s nuclear arrangements. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 351

The lack of East European input proved leagues, however, were averse to any week, a detailed Romanian proposal for unsatisfactory to several of the allied steps that would even marginally erode modifications to the alliance was leaked governments, who urged that they be the Soviet Union’s exclusive authority to the French Communist newspaper, given some kind of role in nuclear-re- to order nuclear strikes, and it soon be- L’Humanite; the document called for, lease authorization. Their concerns came clear during the meeting that So- among other things, an East European were prompted in part by changes in viet views on such matters would pre- role in any decisions involving the po- Soviet military doctrine in the mid- vail. As a result, the PCC communique tential use of nuclear weapons.44 Sub- 1960s, which seemed to open the way simply called for both German states to sequently, at the July 1966 session of for a nuclear or conventional war con- forswear nuclear weapons, proposed the the PCC in Bucharest, officials from fined to Europe. Under Khrushchev, creation of a nuclear-free zone in cen- Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hun- Soviet military doctrine had long been tral Europe, and advocated a freeze on gary renewed their bid for “greater predicated on the assumption that any all nuclear stockpiles.39 The implica- rights of co-determination in planning war in Europe would rapidly escalate tion was that arrangements within the and implementing common coalition to an all-out nuclear exchange between Warsaw Pact were best left unchanged. matters,” including (by implication) the the superpowers; but by the time That stance was reaffirmed over the use of nuclear weapons.45 Khrushchev was ousted in October next few months in a series of conspicu- As on previous occasions, how- 1964, Soviet military theorists had al- ous Soviet declarations that “the War- ever, the Soviet Union resisted what- ready begun to imply that a European saw Pact is dependent on the Soviet stra- ever pressure was exerted for the shar- conflict need not escalate to the level tegic missile forces” and that “the se- ing of nuclear-release authority. In Sep- of strategic nuclear war.35 Under curity of all socialist countries is reli- tember 1966, a few months after the Brezhnev, Soviet military analyses of ably guaranteed by the nuclear missile Bucharest conference, the Warsaw Pact limited warfare in Europe, including the strength of the Soviet Union.”40 (Ital- conducted huge “Vltava” exercises, selective use of tactical nuclear weap- ics added by the author.) The same which included simulated nuclear ons, grew far more explicit and elabo- message was conveyed later in the year strikes under exclusive Soviet con- rate.36 Although this doctrinal shift by the joint “October Storm” military trol.46 The same arrangement was pre- made sense from the Soviet perspective, exercises in East Germany, which fea- served in all subsequent Pact maneu- it stirred unease among East European tured simulated nuclear strikes autho- vers involving simulated nuclear ex- leaders, who feared that their countries rized solely by the USSR.41 In the changes. Thus, well before the signing might be used as tactical nuclear battle- meantime, the Soviet monopoly over of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty grounds without their having the slight- allied nuclear weapons procedures was put a symbolic end to the whole nuclear- est say in it. being reinforced by the series of agree- sharing debate, the Soviet Union had The issue became a source of con- ments signed with Czechoslovakia, East firmly established its exclusive, central- tention at the January 1965 meeting of Germany, Hungary, and Poland, as dis- ized control over the Warsaw Pact’s the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consulta- cussed above. The codification of ex- “joint” nuclear forces and operations. tive Committee (PCC), where the as- clusive Soviet control over nuclear sembled leaders discussed NATO’s weapons deployed in the other Warsaw The Lessons of the Crisis and plans to create a Multi-Lateral Force Pact countries all but eliminated any Allied Nuclear Arrangements (MLF) that would supposedly give West basis for the East European govern- Germany access to nuclear-armed mis- ments to seek a role in the alliance’s The legacy of the Cuban missile siles. The PCC warned that if an MLF nuclear command structure. crisis helped ensure that the intra-War- were formed and the West Germans Yet even after the Soviet Union saw Pact debate in the mid-1960s did were included, the Warsaw Pact would tried to put the matter to rest, contro- not bring about any change in the have to resort to “defensive measures versy persisted within the Warsaw Pact alliance’s nuclear command-and-con- and corresponding steps.”37 The na- about the allocation of responsibility for trol structure. Had it not been for the ture of these “corresponding steps” was tactical nuclear weapons. At a closed dangers that were so clearly revealed never specified, but Romanian and meeting of Pact leaders in East Berlin by the events of October 1962, Soviet Czechoslovak officials at the meeting in February 1966, Romania again leaders might have been willing to con- maintained that the obvious solution pressed for greater East European par- sider an arrangement for the Warsaw was for the Soviet Union to grant its ticipation in all aspects of allied mili- Pact similar to the “dual-key” system Warsaw Pact allies a direct say in the tary planning, and was again re- that NATO adopted. When Operation use of nuclear weapons stationed on buffed.42 A few months later, the “Anadyr” was first being planned in the East European soil.38 The Romanians Czechoslovak Defense Minister, Army- late spring of 1962, Khrushchev had were especially insistent on having re- General Bohumir Lomsky, publicly flirted with the idea of giving Fidel sponsibility shared for all Warsaw Pact declared that the East European states Castro broad command over Soviet tac- nuclear systems, including those de- should be given increased responsibil- tical nuclear weapons in Cuba as well ployed with the various Groups of So- ity for the full range of issues confront- as over all non-nuclear forces on the viet Forces. Brezhnev and his col- ing the Warsaw Pact.43 That same island. Ultimately, Khrushchev decided 352 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

not to share or delegate any responsi- same was true of Soviet tactical weap- tant about ordering the nuclear destruc- bility for the nuclear-capable weapons ons by the early to mid-1970s.47 Con- tion of a site in Western Europe, not based in Cuba, but the very fact that the cerns in Moscow about the physical least because the launch of nuclear issue was considered at all suggests that security of nuclear weapons were hardly weapons against West European targets if the Cuban missile crisis had not in- negligible before October 1962—in part might well have provoked retaliatory tervened, the Soviet Union might have because of the possibility that requisite strikes by NATO against East European been receptive to some form of nuclear procedures might not be followed—but sites. The problem would have been “sharing” with its East European allies. it was not until after the Cuban missile especially salient in the case of East Indeed, a “dual-key” arrangement for crisis that Soviet leaders fully appreci- German officials who would have been the Warsaw Pact, which would not have ated the magnitude of this risk. asked to go along with nuclear strikes provided any independent authority to The Cuban missile crisis also against targets in West Germany. Thus, the East European countries, could eas- heightened Soviet concerns about the even though Soviet officials could have ily have been justified as a response to particular dangers posed by crises. To developed a hedge against the risks that NATO’s policy and as a useful means be sure, Soviet leaders were hardly emerged during the Cuban missile cri- of strengthening allied cohesion. But complacent before October 1962 about sis, the safeguards needed for this pur- after October 1962, when Soviet lead- the need to maintain tight political con- pose would have been extremely bur- ers evidently drew a number of lessons trol over nuclear operations; indeed, the densome, depriving the Pact of the abil- about the risks of even sharing, much stringent centralization of nuclear com- ity to respond in a timely manner. From less delegating, nuclear authority, the mand was a consistent theme in Soviet the Soviet perspective, it made far more prospects of adopting a “dual-key” sys- military planning.48 Even so, it was sense to circumvent the problem en- tem for the Warsaw Pact essentially not until after the Cuban missile crisis— tirely by eschewing any form of shared vanished. and especially in light of the unexpected authority. Although Moscow’s willingness to interventions by Fidel Castro—that this It is ironic that the Cuban missile share control over the Warsaw Pact’s factor became a paramount reason to crisis, which barely involved the War- “joint” nuclear arsenal would have been deny any share of nuclear-release au- saw Pact at all, would have had such an sharply constrained even before Octo- thorization to the East European gov- important long-term effect on the alli- ber 1962 by the lack of permissive-ac- ernments. Although East European of- ance. It is also ironic that the actions of tion links (PALs) and other use-denial ficials could not have ordered the use a third party, Fidel Castro, posed one mechanisms on Soviet nuclear weap- of nuclear weapons on their own, they of the greatest dangers during an event ons, that factor alone would not have might have inadvertently (or deliber- that has traditionally been depicted as a been decisive if the Cuban missile cri- ately) taken steps in a crisis that would bilateral U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Not sis had not occurred. After all, when have caused NATO governments to be- only must the Cuban missile crisis be Soviet officials seriously contemplated lieve that a Warsaw Pact nuclear strike thought of as a “triangular” showdown; allotting partial nuclear authority to was forthcoming, regardless of what its repercussions can now be seen to Castro in 1962, that was long before actual Soviet intentions were. That, in have been at least as great for Soviet Soviet tactical weapons were equipped turn, might have triggered a preemptive allies, notably Cuba and Eastern Eu- with PALs. The physical separation of nuclear attack by NATO. Only by ex- rope, as for the Soviet Union itself. warheads from delivery vehicles, as had cluding the East European states alto- been planned for the missiles based in gether from the nuclear-release process 1 This statement is based on a perusal of docu- Cuba, was regarded at the time as a suf- could the Soviet Union avoid the unin- ments from the East German, Czechoslovak, and Polish archives. See, e.g., “Odvolanie opatreni v ficient (if cumbersome) barrier against tended escalation of a crisis. zavislosti s usnesenim VKO UV KSC, 25.10.62 unauthorized actions. That approach The risks posed by a “dual-key” (Karibska krize),” 25 October 1962 (Top Secret), had long been used for tactical weap- arrangement could have been mitigated in Vojensky Historicky Archiv (VHA) Praha, ons deployed by Soviet forces in East- if the Soviet Union had built in extra Fond (F.) Ministerstvo Narodni Obrany (MNO) CSSR, 1962, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabu ern Europe, and it would have been just procedural and technical safeguards, but cs. armady (GS/OS), 8/25. as efficacious if a “dual-key” system this in turn would have created opera- 2 “V shtabe Ob”edinennykh Vooruzhenykh Sil had been adopted—that is, if the East tional problems for Soviet troops who stran Varshavskogo Dogovora,” Pravda (Mos- European armies had been given con- might one day have been ordered to use cow), 23 October 1962, p. 1. For the effects of the alert from 27 October through 23 November, trol over the Pact’s nuclear-capable de- the weapons. If a future conflict had see the series of top-secret memoranda to the livery vehicles. After the Cuban mis- become so dire that Soviet leaders had CPSU CC Presidium from Soviet Defense Min- sile crisis, however, the option of rely- decided to authorize the employment of ister Rodion Malinovskii and the Chief of the ing solely on the physical separation of tactical nuclear weapons, they would Soviet General Staff, Mikhail Zakharov, 5 No- vember 1962, 17 November 1962, and 24 No- warheads and delivery vehicles was have wanted their orders to be carried vember 1962, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi deemed inadequate. In the latter half out as fast as possible, before the situa- Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, F. 89, Opis’ of the 1960s, the Soviet Union began tion on the battlefield had changed.49 (Op.) 28, Delo (D.) 14, Listy (Ll.) 1-8. 3 incorporating electronic use-denial fea- By contrast, East European political and “V shtabe Ob”edinennykh vooruzhenykh sil stran Varshavskogo Dogovora,” Krasnaya zvezda tures into its strategic missiles, and the military officials might have been hesi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 353

(Moscow), 22 November 1962, p. 1. L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Bos- ‘Anadyr’,” GSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 3753; repro- 4 See the account by the Hungarian charge ton: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), pp. 170-83, duced in Operation ANADYR, p. 183. For a dis- d’affaires in Washington, D.C. in October 1962 esp. pp. 177, 183; for an English translation of cussion of this matter and relevant citations, see (who later defected), Janos Radvanyi, Hungary the correspondence and an accompanying com- Mark Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, So- and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and mentary in Granma, see Appendix 2 of James G. viet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Realpolitik (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch (with Crisis,” Cold War International History Bulletin, 1972), p. 137. China, too, was not informed in the assistance of David Lewis), Cuba on the No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 40-46, esp. 42-3, 46. advance about either the placement or the with- Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet 16 “Trostnik — tovarishchu Pavlovu,” No. 4/389 drawal of the missiles in Cuba. This point was Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), pp. (Top Secret) from R. Malinovskii (Direktor), 22 noted by Chinese leaders during the bitter Sino- 474-91; the key letter, of Castro to Khrushchev October 1962, reproduced in Operation ANADYR, Soviet polemics in 1963. See, for example, the on 26 October 1962, is on pp. 481-2.] p. 181. See also Sergei Pavlenko, “Bezymyannye exchanges in “On the Statement of the Commu- 10 “Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S. motostrelki otpravlyalis’ na Kubu ‘stoyat’ nist Party of the USA,” Peking Review (Beijing), Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo nasmert’,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 29 De- 15 March 1963, pp. 11-13; “Otkrytoe pis’mo krizisa 1962 goda,” pp. 73-5. This point was re- cember 1994, p. 4. For further discussion and Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi emphasized to Castro by Prime Minister Mikoyan relevant citations, see Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza partiinym during their conversations in November 1962. Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the organizatsiyam i vsem kommunistam Sovetskogo See “Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana s prem’er- Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 45-6. Soyuza,” Pravda (Moscow), 14 July 1963, p.1; ministrom revolyutsionnogo pravitel’stva Kuby 17 In early 1994, General Anatolii Gribkov and “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese F. Kastro,” 12 November 1962 (Top Secret) and claimed that Pliev not only wanted to move sev- Government: A Comment on the Soviet “O besedakh A. I. Mikoyana s F. Kastro,” 20 eral nuclear warheads out of storage on 26 Octo- Government’s Statement of August 21,” Peking November 1962 (Top Secret), both published in ber 1962, but had actually issued orders to that Review (Beijing), 6 September 1963, pp. 7-11. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (Moscow), Nos. 11-12 effect without authorization from Moscow. See See also the article by M.Y. Prozumenschikov in (November-December 1992), pp. 143-7 and 147- Operation ANADYR, p. 63. Gribkov also elabo- this issue of the Bulletin. 50, respectively. See esp. p. 149. rated on this assertion in a seminar organized by 5 “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh 11 It should be noted, however, that a decision to the Cold War International History Project and vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po send 901-A4 nuclear warheads and 407-N6 held at the Woodrow Wilson International Cen- sovremennym predstavleniyam,” Report No. bombs to Cuba for the Frogs and Il-28s was not ter for Scholars on 5 April 1994. However, he 24762s (TOP SECRET) from Col.-General P. finalized until 8 September 1962, by which time produced no evidence to back up his assertion Ivashutin, chief of the Soviet General Staff’s Main Khrushchev may already have changed his mind that warheads were actually moved out, and in a Intelligence Directorate, to Marshal M. V. about the command-and-control arrangements. lengthy interview in Moscow on 29 September Zakharov, head of the General Staff Military See “Nachal’niku 12 glavnogo upravleniya 1994 he said he could not be certain that Pliev Academy, 28 August 1964, in Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony,” 8 September 1962 (Top had given such an order. Gribkov’s initial claim Ministerstva oborony (TsAMO), Delo (D.) 158, Secret), Memorandum from Defense Minister R. had already been contradicted by the Soviet of- esp. Listy (L.) 352-3, 411-2, 423, and 400. I am Malinovskii and Chief of the General Staff M. ficer who was in charge of the “central nuclear grateful to Matthew Evangelista for providing me Zakharov, in TsAMO, “Dokumenty po base” (i.e., the storage site for all nuclear war- with a copy of this document. meropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr’,” F. 16, Op. 3753. It is heads) in Cuba during the crisis, Colonel Nikolai 6 This point is stressed in the top-secret cables eminently possible that the nuclear-capable weap- Beloborodov, who testified in late 1992 that adduced in note 2 supra. ons would not have been equipped with nuclear “nuclear weapons could have been used only if 7 On the state of the Russian archives, see Mark warheads if they had been placed under Castro’s the missile officers had received orders via their Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: command. own chain-of-command from the General Staff, Progress and Pitfalls,” Cold War International 12 “Dogovor mezhdu pravitel’stvom Respubliki and only if we, the officers responsible for stor- History Bulletin, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 1, 14-37. Kuby i pravitel’stvom Soyuza Sovetskikh ing and operating warheads, had received our own 8 “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik o voennom special codes. At no point did I receive any sig- vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi oborone,” undated, nals to issue warheads for either the medium- sovremennym predstavleniyam,” pp. 332-3. Article 10. range missiles or the tactical weapons.” See 9 “Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S. 13 See Nikita S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya Lieut.-Colonel Anatolii Dokuchaev, “100- Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo (Moscow: typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. IV, dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz,” Krasnaya zvezda (Mos- krizisa 1962 goda,” Vestnik Ministerstva “Karibskii krizis,” esp. p. 12. I am grateful to cow), 6 November 1992, p. 2. Beloborodov re- inostrannykh del SSSR (Moscow), No. 24 (31 Khrushchev’s son, Sergei, for providing me with emphasized this point several times during an in- December 1990), pp. 67-80, esp. pp. 71-73. This a copy of the 3,600-page transcript of his father’s terview in Moscow on 28 September 1994: “No correspondence was first released in November memoirs. For an English translation of most of nuclear munitions of any type, whether for the 1990 by the Cuban, not Soviet, government. Fi- the account about the Cuban missile crisis, see medium-range or the tactical weapons, were ever del Castro was seeking to rebut a claim made in a Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, moved (byly dostavleny) out of storage during the portion of Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs that ap- trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter and crisis. Nor could they have been moved without peared in English for the first time in 1990. Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown my knowledge.” Beloborodov’s account was Khrushchev had recalled that Castro was urging and Company, 1990), pp. 170-83. endorsed by General Leonid Garbuz, the deputy him to launch a preemptive nuclear attack against 14 Maj.-General (ret.) V. Makarevskii, “O commander of Soviet forces in Cuba in 1962, in the United States, whereas Castro insisted (cor- prem’ere N. S. Khrushcheve, marshale G. K. an interview that same day in Moscow. rectly) that he had called for an all-out Soviet Zhukove i generale I. A. Plieve,” Mirovaya 18 The exact contents of Pliev’s telegram on the nuclear attack against the United States only if ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya (Mos- 26th are unknown, but the numbering of telegrams U.S. troops invaded Cuba. Soon after this corre- cow), Nos. 8-9 (August-September 1994), p. 197. that are available makes clear that he sent at least spondence was published in Spanish in the 23 Makarevskii served for many years under Pliev’s two that day, the second of which is the one in November 1990 issue of the Havana daily command. Pliev’s close friendship with question. (The first of his telegrams on the 26th, Granma (and in English in the weekly edition of Khrushchev and Malinovskii is overlooked in the which was declassified in October 1992, pertained Granma), the Soviet government realized it had jaundiced assessment offered by General Anatolii only to air defense operations against possible nothing to gain by keeping the Russian version Gribkov in Operation ANADYR: U.S. and So- U.S. air strikes.) The text of the Soviet secret any longer. Hence, the full correspondence viet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis leadership’s response to Pliev’s second cable is was published in the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), pp. 25-6. available (see next note), and, combined with ret- in-house journal, as cited here. [Ed. note: For 15 “Komanduyushchemu gruppoi sovetskikh rospective comments by ex-Soviet officials, it Khrushchev’s version, see Khrushchev Remem- voisk na o. Kuba,” 8 September 1962 (Top Se- suggests that Pliev referred to Castro’s efforts and bers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold cret), in TsAMO, “Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu requested authority to move the warheads (though 354 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

not yet authority for actual use). For greater de- Nuclear Proliferation, JPRS-TND-91-007, 20 45 “Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens tail about this issue, see Mark Kramer, “The Cu- May 1991, pp. 14-16. fuhrender Reprasentanten der Bruderstaaten des ban Missile Crisis and Nuclear Proliferation,” 33 “O przedsiewzieciu majacym na celu Warschauer Vertrages,” July 1966 (Top Secret), Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Autumn 1995), podwyzszenie gotowosci bojowej wojska,” 25 in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV 2/202/431. pp. 171-9. February 1967, in Centralne Archiwum 46 “Komplexny material: Cvicenie ‘VLTAVA’,” 19 “Trostnik — tovarishchu Pavlovu,” No. 76639 Wojskowe, Paczka 6, Tom 234. in VHA Praha, F. HPS, 1966, HPS 30/2; and (Top Secret), 27 October 1962, reproduced in 34 Interview with chief of the Czechoslovak Gen- “Vyhodnotenie cvicenia ‘VLTAVA’.” VHA Praha, Operation ANADYR, p. 182. See also Kramer, eral Staff, Major-General Karel Pezl, in Jan Bauer, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1966, OS/GS, 4/2. “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command “Jaderna munice: Asi tady byla,” Ceske a 47 Maksimov et al., eds., Raketnye voiska Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 46; moravskoslezske zemedelske noviny (Prague), 4 strategicheskogo naznacheniya, pp. 125-126. and Pavlenko, “Bezymyannye motostrelki July 1991, p. 1. 48 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 125-6. See also “Razvitie otpravlyalis’ na Kubu,” p. 4. 35 See, e.g., Col.-General I. Glebov, “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya 20 Marshal V. F. Tolubko, “Glavnaya raketnaya operativnogo iskusstva,” Krasnaya zvezda (Mos- raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym sila strany,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 19 No- cow), 2 April 1964, pp. 2-3; and Col.-General S. predstavleniyam,” pp. 325-34. vember 1963, p. 1. M. Shtemenko, “Sukhoputnye voiska v 49 See ibid., pp. 330-36 and passim. 21 See Khrushchev’s comments on this point in sovremennoi voine i ikh boevaya podgotovka,” Vospominaniya, Vol. IV, “Karibskii krizis,” p. 18. Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 3 January 1963, pp. Mark Kramer, a researcher based at the 22 Army-General Yu. P. Maksimov et al., eds., 2-3. See also Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii et al., Davis Center for Russian Studies (for- Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya: Voennaya strategiya, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenno-istoricheskii trud (Moscow: Nauka, Voenizdat, 1963), pp. 373-4. This theme is also merly the Russian Research Center) at 1992), pp. 109-10. Detailed first-hand accounts evident in “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v Harvard University, is a frequent con- by high-ranking Soviet air defense personnel who usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po tributor to the CWIHP Bulletin. The took part in the shootdown are available in “Voina sovremennym predstavleniyam,” passim. above article was originally presented ozhidalas’ s rassvetom,” Krasnaya zvezda (Mos- 36 See, e.g., Col.-General N. Lomov, “Vliyanie cow), 13 May 1993, p. 2. Sovetskoi voennoi doktriny na razvitie voennogo as a paper at a conference on the Cu- 23 The rules of engagement are spelled out briefly iskusstva,” Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil (Mos- ban Missile Crisis in Moscow in Sep- in the cable from Malinovskii to Pliev, as cited in cow), No. 21 (November 1965), pp. 16-24. tember 1994. It supersedes an earlier 37 Dokuchaev, “100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz,” p. 2. Cited in “Rech’ tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva,” version which appeared in CWIHP Bul- More elaborate rules are specified in documents Pravda (Moscow), 25 September 1965, p. 2 (em- now stored in the Russian General Staff archive; phasis added). letin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 59, 110, 112- see “Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr’,” in 38 “Stenografische Niederschrift der Konferenz 115, 160, and, due to technical produc- GSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 3753, D. 1, Korebka 3573. der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien die tion errors, contained errors in the plac- 24 Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. IV, Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages,” January 1965 ing and numbering of footnotes. The “Karibskii krizis,” pp. 17-8. (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und 25 “Vystuplenie glavy Sovetskoi delegatsii Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv Bulletin reprints the article, with apolo- Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. (SAPMDB), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der gies to readers and the author (and Khrushcheva na Soveshchanii Politicheskogo SED, J IV, 2/202/130. slight revisions by the latter), in this is- 39 Konsul’tativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchast- “O zasedanii Politicheskogo konsul’tativnogo sue. nikov Varshavskogo Dogovora 24 maya 1958 komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo goda,” Pravda (Moscow), 27 May 1958, p. 3. Dogovora o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi 26 Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Power in Europe, 1945- pomoshchi,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 21 1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University January 1965, p. 1. See also Colonel V. F. Press, 1970), pp. 150-1, 487-9. Samoilenko, Osnova boevogo soyuza: 27 “Was ist der westdeutsche Militarismus?” Internatsionalizm kak faktor oboronnoi moshchi (East Berlin), 26 January sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva (Moscow: 1959, pp. 1-2. See also “Wortlaut der Rede Walter Voenizdat, 1981), p. 259. Ulbrichts auf dem XXI. Parteitag der KPdSU,” 40 See, e.g., Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskii, Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 30 January “Moguchii strazh bezopasnosti narodov,” 1959, p. 1. Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 13 May 1965, p. 3; 28 Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Marshal A. A. Grechko, “Nadezhnyi shchit mira Militarische Planungen des Warschauer Paktes i bezopasnosti narodov,” Kommunist in Zentraleuropa: Eine Studie, February 1992, vooruzhenykh sil (Moscow), No. 9 (May 1965), p. 5. [Ed. note: For an English translation of the p. 13; and Marshal A. A. Grechko, “Boevoi soyuz report, see Mark Kramer, trans. and annot., “War- bratskikh narodov,” Pravda (Moscow), 13 May saw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: 1965, p. 1. Revelations From the East German Archives,” 41 “Informacna sprava o vysledkach cvicenia CWIHP Bulletin 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 1, 13-19.] ‘Oktobrova Burka’,” 16-22 October 1965 (Top 29 Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (Potsdam), VA- Secret), in VHA Praha, F. Hlavna Politicka Sprava Strausberg/29555/Box 155. (HPS), 1965, HPS 1/2. 42 30 “Dohoda CSSR-ZSSR o vzajemnych “Konferenz der kommunistischen und dodavkach vyzbroje a voj. techniky v rr. 1963- Arbeiterparteien die Staaten des Warschauer 1965,” in VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1960- Vertrages: Stenografische Niederschrift,” Feb- 1962, OS/GS, 26/2. ruary 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV 31 “Dogovor mezhdu pravitel’stvami SSSR i 27/208/85. 43 ChSSR o merakh povysheniya boegotovnosti “Oplot mira i sotsializma,” Krasnaya zvezda raketnykh voisk,” 15 December 1965, in VHA (Moscow), 14 May 1966, p. 5. Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1960-1962, OS/GS, 44 “La Roumanie n’a formule aucune demande 2/16. en ce qui concerne le Pacte de Varsovie: Mise au 32 See the reports on “Hungary: USSR Nuclear Point du ministere des Affaires etrangeres a Weapons Formerly Stored in Country,” translated Bucarest,” L’Humanite (Paris), 19 May 1966, p. in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 3. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 355

New Evidence on 1953, 1956 Crises: CONFERENCES IN BUDAPEST, POTSDAM SPOTLIGHT COLD WAR FLASHPOINTS

In the autumn of 1996, the Cold War 29 September 1996, and was hosted by mation in U.S.-Soviet relations. International History Project and the the Institute for the History of the 1956 The Budapest and Potsdam confer- National Security Archive, along with Hungarian Revolution and the Hungar- ences, like others in the “Flashpoints” European partner institutions, co-spon- ian Academy of Sciences. The interna- series, offered a venue for dozens of sored and jointly organized two major tional symposium on “The Crisis Year American, Russian, Central-East Euro- international scholarly conferences at 1953 and The Cold War in Europe” con- pean, and other scholars to present new which scholars presented and debated vened in Potsdam, Germany, on 10-12 evidence from Western and Eastern ar- new evidence from both Eastern and November 1996, and was hosted by the chives, and in some cases for former Western archives and sources concern- Center for Contemporary History Re- participants in the events to recall their ing two major Cold War episodes in search (Zentrum fur Zeithistorische experiences. Key topics covered at Europe: the 1953 East German Upris- Forschung). Budapest included the Polish upheav- ing (and the post-Stalin succession Both conferences grew out of the als, which immediately preceded the struggle in Moscow), and the 1956 Pol- “Cold War Flashpoints” Project of the Hungary invasion; Soviet policy toward ish and Hungarian crises. National Security Archive, a non-gov- The conference, “Hungary and the ernmental research institute and declas- MORE ON THE MALIN NOTES World, 1956: The New Archival Evi- sified documents repository based at dence,” took place in Budapest on 26- George Washington University. Previ- The publication in this issue of the ous activities of the Project, undertaken CWIHP Bulletin of the full translation of the THE SOVIET UNION AND THE by the Archive in close cooperation with Malin Notes on the 1956 Polish and Hun- HUNGARIAN CRISIS OF 1956: CWIHP and Czech and Polish partners, THE DOCUMENTARY ANTHOLOGY garian Crises marks their first complete ap- included the holding of a major inter- pearance in English. However, versions of national conference in Prague in April A group of Russian and Hungarian schol- them were published in 1996 in Russian and 1994 on new evidence on the 1968 ars and archivists has cooperated to prepare Hungarian by the Russian scholar and the Soviet invasion for publication a Russian-language anthol- Vyacheslav Sereda and the Hungarian of Czechoslovakia and a scholarly ogy of archival documents—many of them scholar Janos M. Rainer: in a two-part se- never previously published—on Soviet workshop in Warsaw in August 1995 on ries presented by Vyacheslav Sereda in Nos. policy and the events in Hungary in 1956. new sources on the 1980-81 Polish Cri- 2 and 3 (1996) of the Russian journal The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis sis, as well as meetings with scholars Istoricheski Arkhiv [Historical Archives], of 1956: The Documentary Collection is in Bucharest and Sofia in October 1996 and in a book entitled Dontes a Kremlben, scheduled for publication in 1997. Among on possibilities for collaborative re- 1956: A szovjet partelnokseg vitai the Russian academic and archival institu- search in Romanian and Bulgarian ar- tions collaborating to produce the volume Magyarorszagrol [Crisis in the Kremlin, chives on Cold War topics. are the Institute for Slavonic and Balkan 1956: The Debates of the Soviet Party Pre- Future meetings are also scheduled. Studies (Russian Academy of Sciences) and sidium on Hungary] (Budapest: 1956-os In June 1997, the “Flashpoints” Project the Institute of History (Russian Academy Intezet, 1996), published by the Institute for of Sciences); the Archive of Foreign Policy, plans to hold an oral history conference the History of the 1956 Hungarian revolu- Russian Federation; the Archive of the Presi- in Poland on the 1980-81 crisis, gath- tion. In addition, two important analyses of dent, Russian Federation; and the Center for ering key participants, scholars, and the notes have appeared in English: Janos the Storage of Contemporary Documenta- sources from Poland, Russia, the United M. Rainer’s two-part series, “The Road to tion. Co-editors include: V.Y. Afiani, B. States, and elsewhere, and the Project Budapest, 1956: New Documentation of the Zhelizki, T. Islamov, S. Melchin, I. is also working with various scholars, Morozov, V. Sereda, A. Stykalin, I. Vash, I. Kremlin’s Decision To Intervene,” in The archives, and scholarly institutions and Vida, E. Dorken, T. Haidu. Financial sup- Hungarian Quarterly 37:142 (Summer projects toward the holding of a series port for the publication was provded by the 1996), 24-41, and 37:143 (Autumn 1996), of meetings to present new evidence on National Security Archive and the Cold War 16-31; and Mark Kramer, “New Light Shed International History Project and East Eu- the End of the Cold War, including the on 1956 Soviet Decision to Invade Hun- ropean Program of the Woodrow Wilson 1989 revolutions in Europe, the collapse gary,” Transition 2:23 (15 November 1996), Center. For ordering and publication infor- of the Soviet Union, and the transfor- mation, please contact the editors. 35-40. 356 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

both crises; the impact of the invasion Kramer of Harvard University; it ap- and an editorial in The New York Times, on Eastern Europe; the Western re- pears immediately following this ar- as well as pieces in The Washington sponse; China’s shifting position on the ticle. Post and numerous European publica- crises; and Radio Free Europe’s contro- In Potsdam, sessions examined the tions. , who deliv- versial role. A number of participants origins and consequences of the June ered the concluding remarks for the con- in the uprising itself spoke either as 1953 East German uprising; the “Beria ference, wrote up his reflections in the panelists or as members of the audience, Affair” and post-Stalin succession 14 November 1996 edition of The New and several witnesses to the revolution struggle in Moscow; Soviet policy to- York Review of Books. led a “walking tour of revolutionary ward Germany before and after June 17; The , for its Budapest” to scenes of the street battles Stalin’s death and East Central Europe; part, resulted in an Associated Press 40 years earlier. and the West’s position and actions in report, carried in many major newspa- Among the most noteworthy find- 1953. Both conferences ended with pers, on newly declassified U.S. docu- ings of the Hungary Conference were roundtables on the long-term signifi- ments obtained by the National Secu- presentations and analyses of notes cance of the abortive revolts of 1953 rity Archive on the Eisenhower from Soviet Presidium meetings in fall and 1956, particularly for the 1989 col- Administration’s reactions to the events, 1956 taken by V.N. Malin, head of the lapse of communism in Eastern Europe including a 29 June 1953 report ap- CPSU General Department. These and for contemporary Germany and proved by the National Security Coun- notes constitute the only known con- Hungary. cil (NSC 158) which, among other ac- temporaneous record of the key sessions Both conferences generated consid- tions, declared that one official policy of late October and early November at erable public as well as scholarly atten- objective was to “Encourage elimina- which Kremlin leaders went back and tion. As might be expected, local inter- tion of key puppet officials.” forth over whether to pull out from est in the Budapest gathering, coming CWIHP is pleased to note the efforts Hungary or reintroduce new troops. A on the eve of the revolution’s 40th an- of major contributors to the success of comprehensive analysis of the signifi- niversary, was intense. The main hall both conferences: Christian F. Oster- cance of the Malin Notes and other re- of the elegant Academy of Sciences mann, a scholar based at the National cent evidence on Soviet policy toward building on the banks of the Danube Security Archive and the new Associ- the 1956 Poland and Hungary crises, was filled on the conference’s opening ate Director of CWIHP; the Director of along with a translation and annotation day, and Hungarian media coverage the 1956 Institute, Dr. Gyorgy Litvan, of the Malin Notes themselves, has been throughout was extensive. Overseas and its Research Director, Csaba Bekes; prepared for the Bulletin by Mark interest was evidenced by three articles at the ZZF in Potsdam, Director Prof. Dr. Christoph Klessman, and Anke OSTERMANN WINS GERMAN STUDIES AWARD Wappler; at the National Security FOR ARTICLE ON 1953 EAST GERMAN UPRISING Archive, Malcolm Byrne, Pete Voth, and Vlad Zubok; and at the Wilson Cen- The Cold War International History Project is pleased to note that Christian F. Ostermann, ter, Jim Hershberg and Michele Carus- a doctoral candidate at Hamburg University currently based at the National Security Archive Christian. Many scholars assisted in in Washington, D.C. (and CWIHP’s new Associate Director), has received an award from obtaining key documents and in other the German Studies Association for best article published in German Studies Review in ways for the conferences. Principal fi- History and the Social Sciences for the period 1994-1996. Drawing on newly-opened East nancial supporters for both meetings German sources as well as declassified U.S. government documents obtained by the au- included the Open Society Institute; the thor through the Freedom of Information Act, the article—”‘Keeping the Pot Simmering’: John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur The United States and the East German Uprising of 1953,” which appeared in German Foundation; and the Smith Richardson Studies Review, vol. XIX, no. 1, February 1996, pp. 61-89—was originally published, in Foundation. Additional support for the slightly different form, in December 1994 as Working Paper No. 11 of the Cold War Inter- Budapest meeting came from the Com- national History Project; the author had presented an earlier draft at CWIHP’s conference mittee for Research on Contemporary on “New Evidence on the Cold War in Germany” at the University of Essen in June 1994. History, Hungarian Academy of Sci- The award is supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher ences; Europa Institute, Institute of His- Akademischer Austausch Dienst). The award citation notes that Ostermann’s article “con- tory, Central European University, and tributes signifantly to our understanding of a crucial moment in the Cold War. On the basis Open Society Archives, all in Budapest; of thorough research in recently opened archival sources of the former German Demo- and the Stalin Era Research and Ar- cratic Republic and the United States, Ostermann subjects conventional ideological inter- chives Project, University of Toronto; pretations to sustained and critical scrutiny. His analysis of complicated episodes, for additional backers of the Potsdam sym- example, the American food program, sheds light on the development of Cold War poli- posium included the Stiftung Volks- cies as a whole. Ostermann’s clear prose, deliberate form of expression, and balanced wagenwerk (Hannover) and the judgments on highly controversial issues are qualities that make this an article of outstand- Bradenburg Center for Political Educa- ing scholarly merit.” tion (Potsdam). Since one key purpose of the “Cold COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 357

War Flashpoints” Project is to gather National Security Archive, 1996). Ostermann at the National Security new archival materials from all sides of These briefing books, in turn, accel- Archive in Washington, D.C., tel.: (202) the events, the conference organizers erated the process toward the ultimate 994-7000, fax: (202) 994-7005, or by prepared “briefing books” of recently preparation and publication by the con- e-mail: [email protected]; declassified U.S., Russian, and Euro- ference organizers of edited volumes of on the Budapest Conference, informa- pean documents for both conferences: papers and documents emerging from tion can also be obtained from Csaba Christian F. Ostermann, ed., The Post- both the Potsdam and Budapest meet- Bekes at the 1956 Institute in Budapest: Stalin Succession Struggle and the 17 ings. In addition, the Cold War Inter- (36-1) 322-5228; e-mail: June 1953 Uprising in East Germany: national History Project, which has pre- [email protected]. More information The Hidden History—Declassified viously published East-bloc documents on the programs and papers for the Documents from U.S., Russian, and on all of the major “Flashpoint” crises, Budapest and Potsdam meetings is also Other European Archives (Washington, plans to publish selected materials from available via the National Security D.C.: CWIHP/National Security both the Potsdam and Budapest gather- Archive/CWIHP home page on the Archive); and Csaba Bekes, Malcolm ings in forthcoming Bulletins, Working World Wide Web at http:// Byrne, and Christian F. Ostermann, ed. Papers, and in electronic form. www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive and comp., The Hidden History of Hun- For more information on the gary 1956: A Compendium of Declas- Budapest or Potsdam meetings, contact —Malcolm Byrne, Jim Hershberg, and sified Documents (Washington, D.C.: Malcolm Byrne or Christian F. Christian F. Ostermann

TOGLIATTI ON NAGY, of the President of the Russian Federa- have been fully supported. These groups 30 OCTOBER 1956: tion (APRF) in Moscow. It was first pub- firmly insist that the entire leadership of MISSING CABLE FOUND lished in the Italian newspaper La Stampa our Party be replaced, and they believe on 11 September 1996, and presented by [Italian trade union leader Giuseppe] Di In the midst of the deliberations on 31 Prof. Federigo Argentieri (Centro Studi Vittorio should become the new Party October 1956 leading to a decision to in- di Politica Internazionale Studi leader. They are based on a declaration vade Hungary to crush the revolution and sull’Europa Centro-Orientale, Rome) to of Di Vittorio that did not correspond to the government led by Imre Nagy, the the conference on “Hungary and the the Party line and was not approved by Communist Party of the Soviet Union World, 1956” in Budapest, 26-29 Septem- us. We are going to fight against these Central Committee (CPSU CC) Pre- ber 1996, organized by the National Se- two opposing positions and the Party will sidium approved a secret message to Ital- curity Archive, the Institute for the His- not give up the battle. ian Communist Party Secretary Palmiro tory of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Although I assure you that Hungarian Togliatti. Clearly responding to an ear- and the Cold War International History events have developed in a way that ren- lier communication, the Soviet leadership Project. der our clarifying action in the Party very expressed agreement with Togliatti that Togliatti’s cable, translated from the difficult, it also makes it difficult to ob- events in Hungary was heading in a “re- Italian original by Doc and Claudia Rossi, tain consensus in favour of the leadership. actionary” direction and that Imre Nagy appears below: When we defined the revolt as counter- was “occupying a two-faced position” and revolutionary, we had to face the fact that “falling more and more under the influ- Hungarian events have created a heavy our position was different from that of the ence of the reactionary forces. This cable, situation inside the Italian labor move- Hungarian Party and of the Hungarian a revealing indication of the hardening ment, and in our Party, too. Government, and now it is the same Hun- stand being taken inside the Soviet lead- The gap between [Secretary General of garian Government that is celebrating the ership at this critical juncture, was declas- the Italian Socialist Party Pietro] Nenni insurrection. I think this is wrong. My sified by Russian authorities in 1992 in and ourselves that seemed to be closing opinion is that the Hungarian Govern- conjunction with President Yeltsin’s visit after our initiatives is now rudely and sud- ment—whether Imre Nagy remains its to Hungary and presentation of a collec- denly acute. Nenni’s position on Polish leader or not—is going irreversibly in a tion of documents on the 1956 events; an events coincides with that of the Social reactionary direction. I would like to English translation of the message to Democrats. In our Party, one can see two know if you are of the same opinion or if Togliatti appeared in the CWIHP Bulle- polarized and inappropriate positions. On you are more optimistic. I would like to tin 5 (Spring 1995), p. 33. one extreme there are those who declare add that among the leaders of our Party However, only recently has the earlier that the responsibility for what happened there are worries that Polish and Hungar- communication from the Italian CP leader in Hungary is due to the abandoning of ian events could damage the unity of the to the Soviets giving the negative assess- Stalinist methodology. At the other ex- leadership of your Party Presidium, as was ment of Nagy emerged; although schol- treme are those groups who are accusing defined by the 20th [CPSU] Congress. ars had been unable to locate it in the ar- the Party leadership of not taking a posi- We are all thinking if this occurs, the chives of the Italian Communist Party, a tion in favour of the insurrection in consequences could be very serious for copy of Togliatti’s message, dated 30 Budapest and who claim that the insur- the entire movement. October 1956, was located in the Archive rection was justly motivated and should 358 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN SPECIAL FEATURE: NEW EVIDENCE ON SOVIET DECISION-MAKING AND THE 1956 POLISH AND HUNGARIAN CRISES by Mark Kramer The overlapping crises in Hungary political thinking” in the Soviet Union missions of the Warsaw Pact.4 The and Poland in the autumn of 1956 posed under Mikhail Gorbachev led to sweep- same theme was expressed the follow- a severe challenge for the leaders of the ing reassessments of postwar Soviet ties ing year in a Soviet book about the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). Af- with Eastern Europe. As early as 1987, “Military Policy of the CPSU,” which ter a tense standoff with Poland, the an unofficial reappraisal began in Mos- received admiring reviews in Soviet CPSU Presidium (as the Politburo was cow of the Soviet-led invasion of military journals and newspapers.5 then called) decided to refrain from Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Ini- When political reforms began to military intervention and to seek a po- tially, these reassessments of the 1968 sweep through Hungary and Poland in litical compromise. The crisis in Hun- crisis did not have Gorbachev’s overt late 1988 and 1989, signs of unease gary was far less easily defused. For a endorsement, but the process gained an soon cropped up in Soviet military writ- brief moment it appeared that Hungary official stamp in late 1989 once Com- ings. In September 1989, a prominent might be able to break away from the munism had dissolved in Eastern Eu- article by one of the top Soviet com- Communist bloc, but the Soviet Army rope. Soon after the “” manders in Hungary in October-No- put an end to all such hopes. Soviet engulfed Czechoslovakia in November vember 1956, Army-General Pyotr troops crushed the Hungarian revolu- 1989, the five states that took part in Lashchenko, offered extravagant praise tion, and a degree of order returned to the 1968 invasion—the Soviet Union, for the Soviet invasion.6 Very few ar- the Soviet camp. Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and ticles devoted solely to the Hungarian Newly released documents from Bulgaria—issued a collective statement crisis had ever appeared in Soviet mili- Russia and Eastern Europe shed valu- denouncing the invasion and repudiat- tary journals (particularly after “normal- able light on the events of 1956, per- ing the Brezhnev Doctrine. In addition, ization” began in Hungary in the late mitting a much clearer and more nu- the Soviet Union released its own dec- 1950s), so there was no doubt that the anced understanding of Soviet reac- laration of regret over the “erroneous” publication of Lashchenko’s analysis tions. This article will begin by discuss- decision to intervene in 1968.1 had been carefully timed. Several ing the way official versions of the 1956 Curiously, though, Gorbachev was months before the article went to press, invasion changed—and formerly secret much less willing to proceed with a re- Imre Pozsgay and other top officials in documents became available—during evaluation of the Soviet invasion of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party the late Soviet period and after the So- Hungary in November 1956. Not until had publicly declared that the events of viet Union disintegrated. It will then October 1991, two months after the 1956 were a “popular uprising against highlight some of the most important aborted coup in Moscow had severely an oligarchical regime that was humili- findings from new archival sources and weakened the Soviet regime, did ating the nation.”7 By contrast, memoirs. The article relies especially Gorbachev finally provide an official Lashchenko still insisted that the events heavily on the so-called Malin notes, apology for the 1956 invasion.2 Until of 1956 were merely a “counterrevolu- which are provided in annotated trans- that time, official judgments about So- tionary rebellion that was actively sup- lation below, and on new materials from viet actions in 1956 had been left pri- ported by the most reactionary forces Eastern Europe. Both the article and marily to Soviet military officers, who of international imperialism.” This the documents will show that far-reach- routinely glorified the invasion of Hun- harsh assessment was clearly intended ing modifications are needed in exist- gary as an example of “the international to help prevent the political changes in ing Western accounts of the 1956 cri- defense of socialist gains” and of “trans- Hungary from endangering the raison ses. forming socialist internationalism into d’etre of Soviet military deployments action.”3 A senior officer on the So- in Eastern Europe. OFFICIAL REASSESSMENTS viet General Staff argued in 1987 that Unease within the Soviet military BEFORE AND AFTER 1991 the “suppression of counterrevolution- regarding the 1956 invasion continued ary rebellion,” as in Hungary in 1956, even after the upheavals of late 1989. The advent of glasnost and “new should still be among the chief military In contrast to the official Soviet state- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 359 ment condemning the 1968 invasion of leased, most of which are now avail- Politburo archive (which is now under Czechoslovakia, no such statement was able in Fond 89 (the declassified col- Yeltsin’s direct control), were all sup- issued about the intervention in Hun- lection) of the Center for Storage of posed to be declassified by the end of gary. Although numerous Soviet offi- Contemporary Documentation in Mos- 1996, but regrettably only the ones per- cials, such as deputy foreign minister cow, the former archive of the CPSU taining to the Hungarian and Polish cri- Anatolii Kovalev, later denounced the Central Committee. As valuable as ses of 1956 have been released so far.13 invasion of Hungary, the Soviet High these initial items were, they provided The initial batch of Malin notes were Command apparently blocked efforts to only a few tantalizing details about So- provided to a Russian historian, release a statement about 1956 compa- viet decision-making in 1956. Some Vyacheslav Sereda, and to researchers rable to the one about 1968. Moreover, aspects of Soviet decision-making had at the 1956 Institute in Budapest, who in August 1990, the same journal that been revealed in memoirs by Nikita had exclusive access to the materials had published Lashchenko’s 1989 ar- Khrushchev and other former officials, until the spring of 1996, when the full ticle featured another essay, by a Hun- but in the absence of primary documen- set were published in Hungarian trans- garian lieutenant-colonel, that was even tation it was difficult to know how ac- lation.14 Since then, other scholars— more scathing in its assessment of the curate the memoirs were.12 both Russians and foreigners—have “counterrevolution” of 1956; the Fortunately, that gap in the histori- been permitted to study the original journal’s editors highly recommended cal record has now been at least partly documents. Malin’s notes about the the article to their readers. Although closed. In mid-1995, the Russian ar- Hungarian crisis were published in Rus- senior officials on the CPSU Central chival service finally released the sian in the summer and fall of 1996, and Committee staff were secretly ordered “Malin notes” from the October-No- the notes about the October 1956 crisis in November 1990 to begin studying vember 1956 crisis. Verbatim tran- in Poland were published in Moscow archival materials from 1956 and pre- scripts of CPSU Presidium meetings at the end of 1996.15 (The portions paring an assessment for the CPSU were not kept in the 1950s, but Vladimir about Poland had already appeared in leadership, this effort was intended Malin, the head of the CPSU CC Gen- the Hungarian translation.) mainly to find ways of deflecting pres- eral Department during the entire For an understanding of Soviet sure from the Hungarian government, Khrushchev period, took extensive policy during the crises in Hungary and and no public Soviet statements re- notes of all Presidium meetings. His Poland, the Malin notes are by far the sulted.8 Even when the last Soviet handwritten notes, stored in the former most valuable items that have surfaced. troops were pulled out of Hungary in Although other important documents June 1991, Gorbachev still declined to THE MALIN NOTES: about the events of 1956 may eventu- condemn the 1956 intervention. AN ELECTRONIC SYMPOSIUM ally be released from the Russian Presi- The Soviet leader’s belated apol- dential Archive, the former KGB ar- ogy in October 1991 was soon over- Readers interested in further analy- chives, and the Russian military ar- taken by the collapse of the Soviet re- ses and commentary on the notes by V. chives, the Malin notes are enough to gime. The new government in Russia Malin on Kremlin decision-making on shed extremely interesting light on So- under President Boris Yeltsin proved far the 1956 Polish and Hungarian crises viet decision-making during the crisis. more willing to reevaluate and condemn can find them on the Internet: the Cold Moreover, the Malin notes can be controversial episodes in Soviet rela- War International History Project and supplemented with a vast number of tions with Eastern Europe. As a result, the National Security Archive, U.S. co- recently declassified materials from the a large quantity of Soviet documenta- sponsors and organizers of the Septem- East European archives as well as new tion about the 1956 Hungarian crisis and ber 1996 Budapest Conference on first-hand accounts. Of the East Euro- Moscow’s response has recently be- “Hungary and the World, 1956: The pean documents, an especially notewor- come available. Yeltsin turned over a New Archival Evidence,” plan to thy item is the handwritten Czech notes preliminary collection of declassified present commentaries on the signifi- from a Soviet Presidium meeting on 24 materials to the Hungarian government October 1956, as the crisis in Hungary cance of the Malin Notes, as well as 16 in November 1992, which are now other materials on the 1956 events, via was getting under way. Of the new stored at the Institute for the Study of CWIHP’s website on the Archive’s memoirs, perhaps the most valuable is the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in home page on the World Wide Web: an account published in serial form in Budapest. These documents were all http://www.nsarchive.com. late 1993 and early 1994 by a high-rank- published in Hungarian translation in ing Soviet military officer, Evgenii 9 Commentators will include Russian 1993 as a two-volume collection. A and Hungarian scholars such as Malashenko, who helped command the few of the items had appeared earlier operation in Hungary in 1956.17 To- 10 Vladislav Zubok, Janos Rainer, in the original Russian, and in 1993 Vyacheslav Sereda, and Vitaly Afiani. gether, all these materials permit a much most of the others were published in Articles on China’s position on the 1956 better understanding of why and how Russian with detailed annotations in a the Soviet Union responded with mili- 11 crises in Eastern Europe by Chen Jian three-part series. Subsequently, a few and L.W. Gluchowski will also be avail- tary force in one case but not in the additional Soviet documents were re- able. other. 360 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

reimposed. At a CPSU Presidium meet- Vyacheslav Molotov, , NEW FINDINGS ing shortly after the riots, Khrushchev , and Anastas claimed that the violence had been pro- Mikoyan, accompanied by the com- One of the intriguing things about voked by the “subversive activities of mander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, the new evidence is that it tends to bear the imperialists” and was aimed at “fo- Marshal Ivan Konev, and 11 other high- out much of Khrushchev’s brief ac- menting disunity” with the Soviet bloc ranking Soviet military officers, paid a counts of the Hungarian and Polish cri- and “destroying [the socialist countries] surprise visit to Warsaw. In a hastily ses. Khrushchev’s reminiscences were one by one.”19 These assertions ech- arranged meeting with Gomulka and tendentious (as most memoirs are) and oed the public commentaries that So- other Polish leaders, the CPSU del- he was confused about a number of viet leaders issued right after the riots.20 egates expressed anxiety about upcom- points, but overall his account, includ- The measures adopted by Polish ing personnel changes in the PZPR and ing many of the details, holds up re- officials to alleviate public discontent urged the Poles to strengthen their po- markably well. At the same time, the and prevent further disorders had only litical, economic, and military ties with new documentation provides insight a limited and transitory effect. By the the Soviet Union.22 Gomulka, for his about many items that Khrushchev late summer and early fall of 1956 a new part, sought clarification of the status failed to discuss, and it also allows nu- crisis was gathering pace, which soon of Soviet troops in Poland and de- merous mistakes in the record to be set led to a tense standoff with the Soviet manded that the Soviet Union pledge right. Although it is impossible in a Union.21 In early October, one of the not to interfere in Poland’s internal af- brief article to provide a comprehensive most prominent victims of the Stalinist fairs. Although he reaffirmed his in- review of the latest findings, it is worth purges in Poland in the late 1940s and tention of staying in the Warsaw Pact, highlighting several points that cast new early 1950s, Wladyslaw Gomulka, tri- he emphasized that Poland “will not light not only on the events of 1956, but umphantly regained his membership in permit its independence to be taken on the whole nature of Soviet-East Eu- the Polish United Workers’ Party away.”23 Gomulka also renewed his ropean relations. (PZPR) and was on the verge of re- call for the withdrawal of all or most of claiming his position as party leader. the Soviet Union’s 50 “advisers” in Soviet Responses to the Polish Crisis The Soviet authorities feared that if Poland, and again insisted that Gomulka took control in Warsaw, he Rokossowski and other top Soviet of- New evidence from the Russian would remove the most orthodox (and ficers be removed from the Polish army. and East-Central European archives pro-Soviet) members of the Polish lead- The Soviet delegation responded by helps explain why the Soviet Union ership and steer Poland along an inde- accusing the Poles of seeking to get rid decided to accept a peaceful solution in pendent course in foreign policy. So- of “old, trustworthy revolutionaries who Poland but not in Hungary. Poland was viet concerns were heightened by are loyal to the cause of socialism” and the initial focus of Soviet concerns. A Gomulka’s demand that Soviet military of “turning toward the West against the series of events starting in June 1956 officers serving in the Polish army, in- Soviet Union.”24 had provoked unease in Moscow about cluding Marshal Konstantin During these tense exchanges, growing instability and rebellion. The Rokossowski, the Polish-born Soviet Gomulka was suddenly informed by Poznan riots, on 28-29 June, came as a officer who had been installed as Pol- one of his aides that Soviet tank and particular shock. Workers from the ish defense minister and commander- infantry units were advancing toward ZISPO locomotive factory and other in-chief in November 1949, be with- Warsaw. This large-scale mobilization heavy industrial plants in Poznan staged drawn. This demand came after the of Soviet troops, though intended as a a large protest rally on 28 June, which PZPR Politburo had already (in Sep- form of coercive diplomacy rather than soon turned violent. The Polish army tember 1956) requested the pull-out of to provoke an immediate confrontation, and security forces managed to subdue all Soviet state security (KGB) “advis- gave the crisis a new edge. the protests, but the two days of clashes ers” from Poland. Rokossowski and dozens of other So- left 53 dead and many hundreds To compel Gomulka and his col- viet commanders (and their Polish al- wounded. It is now known that some leagues to back down, Soviet leaders lies) who were still entrenched in the Polish officers tried to resist the deci- applied both military and political pres- Polish officer corps were able to keep sion to open fire, but their opposition sure. On 19 October, as the 8th Ple- the Polish army from preparing to de- proved futile because the security forces num of the PZPR Central Committee fend Gomulka against incoming Soviet were willing to carry out the orders and was about to convene to elect Gomulka forces.25 Rokossowski’s influence, because Soviet commanders (and their as party leader and remove however, did not extend to many of the Polish allies) still dominated the Polish Rokossowski from the PZPR Politburo, Polish troops from the Internal Secu- military establishment.18 Soviet lead- Khrushchev ordered Soviet army units rity Corps (KBW) and other combat ers were taken aback by the events in in northern and western Poland to ad- personnel under the aegis of the Polish Poznan, fearing that the unrest would vance slowly toward Warsaw. Shortly Internal Affairs Ministry (MSW), who flare up again and spread elsewhere thereafter, a delegation of top Soviet were fully willing to fight on behalf of unless strict ideological controls were officials, including Khrushchev, the new Polish regime. These units took COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 361 up strategic positions all around War- By this point they knew that the PZPR day in Poznan, Lublin, Lodz, saw and called in reinforcements as Central Committee had reconvened Bydgoszcz, Kielce, and elsewhere. In Soviet columns were reported to be early on the 20th and had elected the meantime, joint meetings of work- moving in.26 In this game of political- Gomulka first secretary and dropped ers and students were being held all military brinkmanship, a clash seemed Rokossowski and several neo-Stalinist around Poland, culminating in a vast to be looming between the KBW troops officials from the PZPR Politburo. rally in Warsaw on 24 October attended and Soviet forces, and an even more Khrushchev made no attempt to con- by some 500,000 people. Although explosive situation emerged within the ceal his disappointment, arguing that these events were intended mainly as a Polish military establishment, pitting “there’s only one way out—by putting display of unified national support for KBW units against troops from the an end to what is in Poland.” He indi- the new Polish leadership in the face of National Defense Ministry under cated that the situation would get much external pressure, some of the speak- Rokossowski’s command. Thus, for a worse if Rokossowski were not permit- ers, particularly at a rally in Wroclaw brief while, Poland appeared to be on ted to stay as Poland’s defense minis- on the 23rd, expressed open hostility the verge of civil war as well as a con- ter. Khrushchev lay a good deal of the toward the Soviet Union. flict with the Soviet Union. blame for the crisis on the Soviet am- As tensions mounted on 20 and 21 The latent danger of a clash be- bassador in Poland, Panteleimon October, Soviet leaders reexamined a tween Soviet forces and the KBW—a Ponomarenko, who, according to variety of economic sanctions and mili- danger that loomed large even though Khrushchev, had been “grossly mis- tary options, but again they found that neither side wanted a direct confronta- taken in his assessment of [Edward] none of these options seemed the least tion—spurred Khrushchev and Ochab and Gomulka.” (Khrushchev bit attractive. At a meeting on the 21st, Gomulka to make a renewed effort to declined to mention that he himself— the CPSU Presidium unanimously de- find a peaceful solution. After being and the rest of the Soviet leadership— cided to “refrain from military interven- informed about the troop movements, had “grossly” misjudged the situation tion” and to “display patience” for the the Polish leader requested that the So- in Poland over the previous few time being.33 The rationale for this viet units be pulled back; and months.31) decision remained just as compelling in Khrushchev, after some hesitation, The Presidium adopted subsequent days, as Khrushchev em- complied with the request, ordering Khrushchev’s suggestion that a meet- phasized to his colleagues and to other Konev to halt all troop movements.27 ing be held soon in Moscow with lead- East European leaders during an ex- Although Khrushchev assured ing representatives from Czechoslova- panded Presidium meeting on the Gomulka that the deployments had sim- kia, Hungary, Romania, East Germany, evening of 24 October: “Finding a rea- ply been in preparation for upcoming and Bulgaria. Khrushchev also pro- son for an armed conflict [with Poland] military exercises, the intended message posed that they consider sending a few now would be very easy, but finding a was plain enough, especially in light of senior officials to China “for informa- way to put an end to such a conflict later other recent developments. The exist- tional purposes.” In the meantime, the on would be very hard.”34 The stand- ence of Soviet “plans to protect the most Presidium resolved to “think carefully” off on 19 October had demonstrated to important state facilities” in Poland, about additional measures, including the Soviet leadership that most of the including military garrisons and lines new military exercises and the forma- Polish troops who were not under of communication, had been deliber- tion of a “provisional revolutionary Rokossowski’s command, especially in ately leaked to Polish officials earlier committee” that would displace the KBW, were ready to put up stiff re- in the day; and Soviet naval vessels had Gomulka. In addition, Khrushchev au- sistance against outside intervention. begun holding conspicuous maneuvers thorized a new campaign in the press, Khrushchev and his colleagues also in waters near Gdansk, keeping the Pol- building on an editorial in the 20 Octo- seem to have feared that Polish leaders ish Navy at bay.28 Despite these vari- ber issue of Pravda, which had accused would begin distributing firearms to ous forms of pressure, the Polish au- the Polish media of waging a “filthy “workers’ militia” units who could help thorities stood their ground, and the anti-Soviet campaign” and of trying to defend the capital. (Gomulka later meeting ended without any firm agree- “undermine socialism in Poland.”32 claimed that arms were in fact dissemi- ment. The official communique merely These charges, and subsequent accusa- nated, but the evidence generally does indicated that talks had taken place and tions, prompted vigorous rebuttals from not bear out these assertions.35 The that Polish leaders would be visiting Polish commentators. important thing, however, is that Soviet Moscow sometime “in the near fu- Strains between Poland and the officials assumed that Gomulka would ture.”29 In most respects, then, the ne- Soviet Union remained high over the proceed with this step.) gotiations proved less than satisfactory next few days as tens of thousands of Khrushchev’s reluctance to pursue from the Soviet standpoint. Poles took part in pro-Gomulka rallies a military solution under such unfavor- Shortly after the Soviet delegates in Gdansk, Szczecin, and other cities on able circumstances induced him to seek returned to Moscow on 20 October, they 22 October. Even larger demonstra- a modus vivendi with Gomulka whereby briefed the other members of the CPSU tions, each involving up to 100,000 Poland would have greater leeway to Presidium on the results of the trip.30 people, were organized the following follow its own “road to socialism.” 362 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Gomulka reciprocated by again assur- of the Soviet Presidium, especially might well have ensued. The contrast ing Khrushchev that Poland would re- Vyacheslav Molotov and Kliment with Hungary was telling. Early on, main a loyal ally and member of the Voroshilov, had strongly opposed the Soviet leaders may have hoped that they Warsaw Pact. The Polish leader dem- leeway granted to the Poles, but by the could rely on Imre Nagy to do in Hun- onstrated the credibility of his promises time the Presidium met on 21 October, gary what Gomulka had done in Poland, by ordering Polish officers to cease con- as noted above, all members agreed that but the Soviet Presidium soon con- sidering the prospect of a complete it was best to eschew military interven- cluded that there was “no comparison withdrawal of the Soviet Northern tion and to “display patience,” at least with Poland” and that “Nagy is in fact Group of Forces from Poland.36 (On for a while.39 Nor were any major turning against us.”44 21 October, as the crisis with Moscow signs of dissent evident at the Presidium began to abate, a number of Polish com- meeting on 23 October.40 Participants The Onset of the Hungarian Crisis manders, led by General Waclaw in the meeting emphasized the “funda- Komar of the Internal Army and Gen- mental difference” between the situa- Social pressures had been building eral Wlodzimierz Mus of the KBW, had tion in Poland and the emerging crisis in Hungary since the spring of 1955, thought it was the right moment to press in Hungary. Gomulka’s speech on 24 when the reformist prime minister Imre for a total Soviet withdrawal, and they October and his follow-up discussions Nagy was dislodged by the old-line started drafting plans to that effect. with Khrushchev further convinced the Stalinist leader Matyas Rakosi, who had Gomulka put an immediate end to their Soviet leader that Poland would remain been forced to cede that post to Nagy activities.) Gomulka also adopted a far a loyal member of the “socialist com- in mid-1953. The earlier transfer of more conciliatory line in public, as re- monwealth” and Warsaw Pact.41 power from Rakosi to Nagy, and the flected in his keynote speech at the rally This did not mean that all tensions shift back to Rakosi, were both effected in Warsaw on 24 October.37 The Pol- with Poland were instantly dissipated. under Moscow’s auspices. In June 1953 ish leader not only called for stronger In addition to continued bickering over the Soviet authorities, led by Georgii political and military ties with the So- Rokossowski’s status, Khrushchev re- Malenkov and Lavrentii Beria, had viet Union and condemned those who mained concerned about the “unaccept- summoned Rakosi and other Hungar- were trying to steer Poland away from able” views espoused by certain PZPR ian officials to Moscow for a secret the Warsaw Pact, but also urged his fel- officials, including some who allegedly meeting. During three days of talks, low Poles to return to their daily work wanted to assert territorial claims Malenkov and his colleagues stressed and to refrain from holding any addi- against the USSR.42 Soviet leaders that they were “deeply appalled” by tional rallies or demonstrations. also were disturbed by reports that an Rakosi’s “high-handed and domineer- Over the next few days, Soviet influential PZPR Secretary, Wladyslaw ing style” in office, which had led to leaders became annoyed when Matwin, had given a speech in Poznan countless “mistakes and crimes” and Gomulka insisted that Rokossowski be on 10 November in which he con- had “driven [Hungary] to the brink of a removed from the national defense min- demned recent “abnormalities in Pol- catastrophe.”45 They ordered Rakosi istry (as well as from the PZPR Polit- ish-Soviet relations” that had “raised to relinquish his prime ministerial du- buro), a demand that perplexed even doubts about the sovereignty of our ties to Nagy. Although Rakosi was al- Chinese officials, who overall were country.”43 Nevertheless, these fric- lowed to remain First Secretary of the staunchly supportive of Gomulka.38 tions did not detract from the basic as- Hungarian Workers’ Party (HWP), the Had the crisis in Hungary not intervened surances that Gomulka had provided to office of prime minister at the time was on 23 October, Soviet leaders might Khrushchev. By late October and early seen as more important than the top well have been inclined to take a firmer November 1956 the two sides had party position. stand against Rokossowski’s dismissal reached a broad accommodation that By early 1955, however, the politi- from the ministry. But by the time was able to withstand occasional dis- cal calculus in both Moscow and Gomulka began pressing this demand ruptions. Budapest had changed. The First Sec- on 26 October, the deteriorating situa- Gomulka’s determination to pre- retary of the CPSU, Khrushchev, had tion in Hungary gave Khrushchev a serve a Communist system in Poland gradually eclipsed prime minister strong incentive to prevent renewed dif- and to remain within the Warsaw Pact Malenkov, enabling the CPSU to regain ficulties with Poland. Having been re- had a strong bearing on Soviet policy its predominant status in Soviet politics. assured that Gomulka would keep Po- during the Hungarian revolution. The Khrushchev sought to reinforce his vic- land in the Warsaw Pact and retain So- outcome of the Polish crisis demon- tory by prodding the East European viet troops on Polish soil, Khrushchev strated that some Soviet flexibility countries to halt their New Courses (i.e., reluctantly acquiesced in Rokos- would continue and that a return to full- the reforms they had adopted when sowski’s ouster. In mid-November, fledged was not in the offing, Malenkov was the top figure in Mos- Rokossowski was recalled to Moscow, but it also set a precedent of what would cow) and to give renewed emphasis to where he was appointed a deputy de- be tolerated. Had Gomulka not been the “leading role” of their Communist fense minister. willing to keep Poland firmly within the parties. This political reconfiguration Early in the crisis, some members Soviet bloc, a military confrontation came at the same time that Soviet lead- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 363 ers were concerned (or claimed to be Party leadership, in its current form, is knowledged that it had been a “great concerned) that Nagy’s policies were not doing what is needed in Hungary to mistake” to “rely on that idiot Rakosi,” giving impetus to “rightist deviation- carry out the decisions of the XX CPSU but in the first half of 1956 no one on ists” and “opportunists” in Hungary Congress because some of the old mem- the Soviet Presidium seriously ques- bers of the [Hungarian] Politburo are who were seeking to realign their coun- tioned the policy.51 putting up resistance against these de- try with Yugoslavia or the West. As a cisions and the younger comrades are The assurance of strong, visible result, in March 1955 the CPSU Pre- too inexperienced to proceed with the support from Moscow (and from sidium again summoned top Hungarian required work. This impression is do- Andropov) enabled Rakosi to counter officials, including Nagy and Rakosi, ing great damage to the authority of the his rivals within the HWP by depicting to Moscow for secret talks; and a high- [Hungarian] Politburo in the eyes of the their criticism as “directed also against level Soviet delegation then traveled to party aktiv and a large segment of the the Soviet comrades.”52 Ordinarily, 47 Hungary to oversee the reversal of workers. this might have been enough to keep Nagy’s New Course and the elevation Rakosi in power for another several of Rakosi’s protege, Andras Hegedus, Andropov urged the Soviet Presidium years, but two unforeseen events in late to the post of prime minister. This to give greater support and assistance June 1956 changed the political balance “friendly interference in [Hungary’s] to Rakosi to prevent the anti-Rakosi of forces in Hungary. The first devel- internal affairs,” according to a senior forces from extracting further “major opment, on 27 June, was a highly pub- CPSU Presidium member, Kliment concessions to rightist and demagogic licized meeting of the Petofi Circle, 48 Voroshilov, provided “a model for our elements.” which featured sweeping criticisms of relations with all the People’s Democ- This cable stirred apprehension in the regime’s policies, condemnations of racies.”46 Moscow, and the CPSU Presidium de- Rakosi for his role in the Stalinist re- Nevertheless, these fluctuations cided in early May to send one of its pressions of the late 1940s and early were bound to spark social unrest in members, Mikhail Suslov, to Budapest 1950s, and renewed calls for “full free- Hungary. The appointment of Nagy as for discussions with Andropov and with dom of the press.” In response, Rakosi 49 prime minister in 1953 had helped stave leaders of the HWP. It took several persuaded the HWP Central Leadership off further disorders of the sort that oc- weeks, however, before Suslov actually to adopt a resolution on 30 June that curred in Csepel, Ozd, and Diosgyor in left for Budapest. Despite the growing banned the Petofi Circle and explicitly the spring of 1953; but the reascendance turbulence in Hungary, high-level atten- denounced “anti-party elements” and of Rakosi in 1955-56 brought all those tion in Moscow was distracted by other the “anti-party views” of “a certain earlier grievances back to the surface. matters. When Suslov finally arrived group which has formed around Imre In the past, Rakosi had been able to rely in Budapest on 7 June, his weeklong Nagy.”53 The HWP Central Leader- on mass repression to stifle popular dis- visit did little to help the situation. In ship also reprimanded HWP members content, but by 1956 his options were contrast to Andropov’s more alarming who had shown “insufficient vigilance” far more limited because of the post- reports, Suslov assured the CPSU Pre- against “hostile, demagogic attacks,” Stalin “thaw” and de-Stalinization cam- sidium that there was no real disaffec- rescinded the party membership of two paign that Khrushchev had launched at tion in Hungary with the HWP leader- prominent writers (Tibor Dery and the 20th Soviet Party Congress. Those ship. The opposition to Rakosi, he ar- Tibor Tardos) who had “espoused bour- developments created greater leeway gued, was confined to the HWP Cen- geois and counterrevolutionary views,” for the expression of pent-up grievances tral Committee (formally known as the criticized the HWP newspaper Szabad in Hungary; and they also helped trans- Central Leadership), where a group sup- Nep for its “misleading and unprin- form the Petofi Circle, an entity set up porting Imre Nagy had joined forces cipled” coverage of the meeting, and by Rakosi in March 1956 as a debating with “politically immature and unprin- prohibited any further gatherings of 50 forum for Party youth, into a prominent cipled officials.” Suslov claimed that opposition forces. organ of the anti-Rakosi opposition. In the problem could be eliminated if “real This resolution was adopted only late April 1956, the Soviet ambassador Hungarian cadres” were “promoted hours after another event occurred that in Budapest, Yurii Andropov, informed more vigorously” to diminish the had profound implications for Hungary: the CPSU Presidium about the “far- “hugely abnormal” representation of the outbreak of riots in Poznan, Poland reaching impact” of the Soviet Party “Jewish comrades” in the HWP Cen- on 28-29 June. Many Hungarians, par- Congress on the public mood in Hun- tral Leadership. He took a number of ticularly university students, intellectu- gary and about the Hungarian regime’s steps to bolster Rakosi’s position and als, and a substantial number of HWP lackluster response: to forestall any potential challenges to members, came to see the Petofi Circle Rakosi at a crucial plenum of the HWP meeting and the Poznan riots as indica- Through demagoguery and provoca- Central Leadership scheduled for mid- tions that neo-Stalinist regimes through- tions, the right-wing opportunists and July. Suslov’s strong backing for out the Soviet bloc were suddenly vul- hostile elements have managed to cre- Rakosi at this point was in line with the nerable. Rakosi hoped to dispel any ate an impression [among ordinary Hun- views of the entire CPSU Presidium. impression of weakness by returning to garians] that the Hungarian Workers’ Later on, Khrushchev privately ac- his earlier policy of “stern measures” 364 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

against “hostile” and “anti-socialist” ation is fully understandable.” The ing ferment in Hungarian society. Upon forces. This marked a reversal of his ambassador expressed misgivings of his his arrival in Budapest on 13 July, approach over the previous few months, own about the “indecisiveness, feeble Mikoyan met with Rakosi and three when he had grudgingly put up with a actions, and inadequate vigilance of the other senior Hungarian officials (Erno limited thaw in the wake of the 20th Hungarian comrades in the struggle Gero, Andras Hegedus, and Bela Veg). CPSU Congress. At a meeting of the against hostile influences within the These preliminary talks convinced Budapest party aktiv on 18 May, Rakosi party and among workers,” and he rec- Mikoyan that the situation would im- had even reluctantly acknowledged his ommended that the CPSU leadership prove only if Rakosi stepped down. part in the “unjust repressions” of the issue a clear-cut endorsement of the Having been authorized by the CPSU Stalin era. These concessions, limited HWP resolution of 30 June “as well as Presidium to do whatever was neces- though they were, raised public expec- of all the measures needed to strengthen sary to “restore unity in the HWP lead- tations in Hungary; but the increased the [Hungarian] party’s unity and to in- ership,” Mikoyan bluntly informed defiance of the Petofi Circle and the ri- tensify the struggle against hostile Rakosi that it would be best if someone ots in Poznan spurred Rakosi to try to forces.” else took over as HWP First Secre- reassert an “iron hand.” Within the Andropov’s cable served as the tary.61 Rakosi had been hoping to gain HWP, however, this move was far from basis for a CPSU Presidium meeting on Soviet backing for his proposal to universally welcomed. A large number 12 July 1956, which focused on the lat- “smash the Nagy conspiracy” once and of officials, especially in the HWP Cen- est events in both Hungary and Poland. for all—a proposal that envisaged the tral Leadership, concluded that the real Malin’s notes from the meeting show arrest of Nagy and several hundred problem in Hungary was not the oppo- that Khrushchev and his colleagues still other “conspirators,” as well as a sition forces or the Petofi Circle, but did not want to come to grips with the broader crackdown—and thus he was Rakosi himself. underlying sources of political unrest in stunned by Mikoyan’s recommenda- The mounting disaffection with Hungary.55 To be sure, the events in tion. Nevertheless, Rakosi had little Rakosi was duly noted by Andropov in Poznan had provoked “alarm [in Mos- choice but to accept the Soviet “advice.” a cable to the CPSU Presidium on 9 cow] about the fate of Hungary” as well Mikoyan then turned to the question of July.54 Andropov reported that “hos- as of Poland: “After the lessons of a successor. He proposed Erno Gero as tile elements and the intra-HWP oppo- Poznan we wouldn’t want something a replacement for Rakosi, but Gero ini- sition have embarked on an open and similar to happen in Hungary.”56 So- tially claimed that it would be better if intensive struggle” against Rakosi. He viet leaders went so far as to character- a “Hungarian official” (i.e., a non-Jew) emphasized that some prominent oppo- ize the discussions of the Petofi Circle took over. These demurrals were not sition figures had begun calling for an on 27 June as “an ideological Poznan, entirely sincere, as Mikoyan soon real- “independent national policy” and a without the gunshots.”57 Nevertheless, ized, and the matter was settled over the “national Communist movement,” they displayed little understanding of next few days at two emergency ses- which would “permit the Hungarians to the pressures that had given rise to such sions of the HWP Politburo. Mikoyan resolve their own affairs independently, incidents. Khrushchev attributed the took part in the first session on 13 July ‘rather than on the basis of Soviet in- recent turmoil in Hungary (and Poland) and was kept closely informed about the terference.’” Andropov also noted that exclusively to “the subversive activities second, on 16 July.62 As he had pro- Gero saw “few ways, unfortunately, to of the imperialists,” who, he claimed, posed, the HWP Politburo endorsed overcome the situation that has “want to foment disunity” within the Gero as the new First Secretary. The emerged.” Although Gero believed that socialist camp and “destroy the social- transition to a post-Rakosi regime was the HWP Central Leadership plenum on ist countries one by one.”58 The Pre- formally approved by the HWP Central 18 July might “restore solid unity” at sidium ordered that a lengthy editorial Leadership plenum on 18 July, in which the top levels of the party, he was con- be published in Pravda reaffirming Mikoyan played a crucial role.63 cerned that “severe complications could Moscow’s “internationalist solidarity Mikoyan’s efforts to promote emerge unexpectedly” at the plenum. In with efforts to rebuff the enemy.”59 greater political stability in Hungary this connection, Andropov reported that The appearance of this article on 16 July came at the same time that a group of the former head of state security in was intended as a warning that the high-ranking Soviet officers were vis- Hungary, Gabor Peter, had written a let- CPSU leadership would “not permit the iting Hungary to inspect Soviet forces ter from prison accusing Rakosi of di- dissolution of the unity of the socialist based there (the so-called Special rect personal complicity in the Rajk camp under the pretext of respect for Corps).64 The officers, led by General trial. Andropov warned that “if this let- national particularities or the extension Mikhail Malinin, a first deputy chief of ter is read out at the plenum, Cde. of democracy.”60 the Soviet General Staff, discovered that Rakosi’s plight will be enormously ag- The Soviet Presidium also desig- the command staff of the Special Corps gravated.” Andropov underscored nated one of its members, Anastas had not yet worked out a secret plan to Gero’s hope of receiving “concrete ad- Mikoyan, to visit Hungary for a first- prepare for large-scale internal distur- vice from the CPSU CC,” and he added hand assessment of the disarray within bances in Hungary. (In the wake of the that “Cde. Gero’s alarm about the situ- the Hungarian leadership and the grow- 1953 East German uprising, the com- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 365 manders of all Soviet forces in Eastern privately acknowledged that he was still ing internal tensions, but he failed to Europe had been ordered by the CPSU finding it “enormously difficult to fos- anticipate what a profound effect the leadership to devise appropriate plans ter unity within the party’s leadership” ceremony would have. As soon as Gero for anti-riot and counterinsurgency op- and to overcome “sharp disagreements returned to Hungary, he realized the erations.) When this omission was re- about certain fundamental issues.”67 implications of what he had done. On ported to Soviet defense minister Mar- The lack of “a unified position among 12 October, he confided to Andropov shal Georgii Zhukov, he ordered that the the members of the Politburo,” Gero that “the reburial of Rajk’s remains has requisite documents be compiled imme- believed, was exacerbating the “danger- dealt a massive blow to the party lead- diately. The visiting Soviet generals ous and unstable situation in the coun- ership, whose authority was not all that helped the commander of Soviet forces try as a whole.” high to begin with.”70 Gero also con- in Hungary, General Lashchenko, put Gero’s awareness of these prob- ceded that the ceremony was likely to together a “Plan of Operations for the lems makes it especially difficult to provoke “even greater insolence” on the Special Corps to Restore Public Order understand why he was willing to be part of opposition forces, who will now on the Territory of Hungary,” which was absent from Hungary over the next sev- “openly demand the return of Imre signed on 20 July.65 This plan, eral weeks. During most of September Nagy to the Politburo.” codenamed “Volna” (Wave), envisaged and the first week of October, he was Gero’s misgivings proved well- the use of tens of thousands of Soviet on vacation in the Soviet Union (mainly founded. A rapid sequence of events in troops at very short notice (within three in the Crimea). According to Andropov, the second and third weeks of October to six hours) to “uphold and restore “Gero openly acknowledged, when he gave rise to a full-fledged crisis. The public order” in Hungary. The plan re- was setting off on his trip, that he was HWP Politburo had tried to curb popu- quired a special signal (known as not at all sure whether ‘things would lar ferment by readmitting Imre Nagy “Kompas”) to be put into effect, but the be okay’ while he was gone.”68 When into the party on 13 October, but that formulation of “Volna” at this stage in- Gero finally returned to Budapest in step, if anything, merely emboldened dicates that Soviet leaders wanted a re- October, he met again with Andropov the regime’s opponents. To make mat- liable fall-back option in case their at- and told him that “unfortunately, now ters worse, Gero decided once again to tempts to bolster political stability in that I’m back in Hungary, I can see that travel abroad at a critical moment. Hungary did not pan out. the situation in the country has become From 15 to 22 October he was in Yugo- The growing reservations in Mos- much worse and more turbulent than I slavia. Although the main purpose of cow about Hungary’s political future had imagined while I was in the his trip was to hold negotiations with turned out to be far more justified than USSR.”69 Problems within the HWP, Tito and other senior officials, he ex- Soviet leaders had hoped. Although the according to Gero, had “gravely dete- tended his stay to take a vacation on the ouster of Rakosi eliminated the most riorated,” and “acute discontent [had] Yugoslav coast. While he was away, exigent problem in Hungary, it was spread throughout the country.” the situation in Hungary grew ever more hardly sufficient to put more than a tem- Even Gero’s efforts to allay public turbulent, spurred on in part by the con- porary check on the growth of social unrest were widely construed as little current events in Poland. discontent. Gero was widely perceived more than admissions of weakness. On The surge of discontent in Hungary to be of the same mold as Rakosi. Nor 6 October, while Gero was still in Mos- reached the breaking point on 23 Octo- was the situation helped any by the cow, the remains of Laszlo Rajk and ber (just hours after Gero had returned “comradely advice” that Gero received three other high-ranking victims of the from Yugoslavia), when a huge dem- from his Soviet counterparts when he Stalinist purges were reinterred in onstration was organized in downtown took office: Budapest as a crowd of several hundred Budapest by students from a local thousand looked on. Rajk had been sen- polytechnical university who wanted to The relaxation of international tensions tenced to death on trumped-up charges express approval of the recent develop- and the slogan of coexistence [as pro- in October 1949 and was then posthu- ments in Poland and to demand similar claimed at the 20th CPSU Congress] do mously rehabilitated in March 1956, changes in their own country.71 The not presuppose but, on the contrary, ex- despite Rakosi’s initial objections. HWP authorities initially tried to pre- clude ideological concessions and any accommodation to hostile views. That When Rakosi announced the rehabili- vent the demonstration, but their efforts is why you must eliminate all factors tation on 28 March, he made no men- proved futile, as several hundred thou- responsible for the collapse of party tion of his own culpability and tried to sand people gathered in the capital. conduct in Hungary, restore discipline gloss over the whole affair; but Gero After a preliminary march to the statue among CC members and the party’s was not as closely identified with the of Josef Bem (a hero from the Polish rank-and-file, and launch a fierce Rajk trial, and therefore was willing to revolution of 1830 and the Hungarian struggle on the ideological front.66 permit the reburial. Gero viewed the revolution of 1848), the demonstrators measure as a convenient way to ingra- split into several large groups and These suggestions were of little rel- tiate himself with Tito (whom he had moved to key points in the city, where evance to the turbulent political scene met in the Crimea at the beginning of they voiced demands for “national in- in Hungary. By early September, Gero October) as well as a means of defus- dependence and democracy.” A huge 366 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

statue of Stalin in the center of Budapest sation is hard to explain. By that point unanimity, an unprecedented step for was torn down. Similar rallies were he had already transmitted an appeal for such an important matter. The Pre- held in other Hungarian cities, where urgent military assistance to the mili- sidium also decided to send Mikoyan thousands of protesters called on the tary attache at the Soviet embassy, so it and Suslov to Budapest along with the government to resign. Faced by this is unclear why he would not want to KGB chief, Ivan Serov, to provide on- growing wave of unrest, Gero desper- raise the matter directly with the-scene reports, following up on the ately tried to regain control of the situ- Khrushchev. Gero’s behavior in the two tasks they had accomplished in Hungary ation, but the protests continued to months prior to the revolution, when he earlier in the year (see above). In the mount. chose to be out of the country at critical meantime, Khrushchev authorized So- Gero’s plight was made immeasur- moments, was odd in itself; but his re- viet defense minister Zhukov to “rede- ably worse later in the evening when action on 23 October seems even more ploy Soviet units into Budapest to as- Hungarian state security (AVH) forces, peculiar. sist Hungarian troops and state security acting without authorization, opened Despite this strange twist, informa- forces in the restoration of public or- fire on unarmed demonstrators outside tion about the rebellion quickly made der.”76 Khrushchev’s directive was the main radio station in Budapest who its way to Moscow. When the Soviet promptly transmitted to Lashchenko by were seeking to enter the building to attache received Gero’s request, he im- the chief of the Soviet General Staff, broadcast their demands. The shootings mediately passed it on to Andropov, Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, who speci- precipitated a chaotic rebellion, which who telephoned the commander of So- fied that the bulk of the Soviet troops was much too large for the Hungarian viet troops in Hungary, General in Hungary were to be used in “estab- state security organs to handle on their Lashchenko. Lashchenko responded lishing control over the most important own. Soviet “advisers” and military that he could not comply with the re- sites in the capital and in restoring or- commanders in Hungary had been try- quest without explicit authorization der,” while others were to “seal off ing since early October to convince from political leaders. Andropov then Hungary’s border with Austria.”77 Hungarian officials that stringent secu- cabled Gero’s appeal directly to Mos- Having finally received due autho- rity precautions were needed to cope cow, which prompted Khrushchev to rization, Lashchenko was able to set to with growing unrest; but, as one of the contact Gero by phone for the second work almost immediately. The troops top Soviet officers later reported, “the time that evening. Khrushchev urged under his command had been prepar- leaders of the [Hungarian] party and Gero to send a written request for help ing since late July to undertake large- members of the [Hungarian] govern- to the CPSU Presidium, but the Soviet scale operations aimed at “upholding ment did not adopt the measures called leader soon realized, after the brief con- and restoring public order” in Hungary for by the urgency of the situation. versation ended, that events in Budapest (see above). In accordance with the Many of them were simply incapable were moving too fast for him to wait “Volna” plan, Soviet forces in Hungary of evaluating the state of things realis- until he received a formal Hungarian had been placed on increased alert in tically.”72 As a result, the violent up- request (which, incidentally, did not mid-October, and were brought to full heavals on the evening of 23 October arrive until five days later).74 A Soviet combat alert on 19-21 October at the quickly overwhelmed the Hungarian Presidium meeting had already been behest of the Soviet General Staff.78 police and security forces and caused scheduled for the 23rd to discuss other Hence, when the mobilization orders widespread panic and near-paralysis matters, and Khrushchev abruptly arrived from Moscow on the night of among senior Hungarian officials. changed the agenda to focus on the situ- the 23rd, the response on the ground ation in Hungary. was swift, despite dense fog that ham- The Intial Soviet Intervention in The newly declassified notes from pered troop movements. By the early Hungary the 23 October meeting show that the morning hours of the 24th, thousands CPSU Presidium could not reach a of soldiers from the USSR’s two mecha- Until very recently, nothing was unanimous decision on whether to send nized divisions in Hungary (the Special known about decision-making in Mos- in troops.75 Khrushchev and all but one Corps) had entered Budapest, where cow on the evening of 23 October 1956, of the other participants strongly sup- they established a command center at when the first reports came in about the ported the introduction of Soviet forces, the main building of the Hungarian Hungarian revolution. Some gaps in the but a key Presidium member, Anastas National Defense Ministry. They were story persist, but a reasonable account Mikoyan, opposed the decision, argu- soon joined by thousands of additional can be pieced together on the basis of ing that “the Hungarians themselves Soviet troops from a mechanized divi- new sources, including the Malin will restore order on their own. We sion based in Romania and two divi- notes.73 It is now known that despite should try political measures, and only sions (one mechanized, one rifle) from the growing turmoil in Budapest, Gero then send in troops.” Despite the pro- the Transcarpathian Military District in did not even mention what was going intervention consensus among all the Ukraine.79 The combined inter- on when he spoke by phone with other participants, Mikoyan held firm ventionary forces were placed under the Khrushchev on the evening of the 23rd. in his opposition. The Presidium there- command of General Malinin, who Gero’s evasiveness during that conver- fore had to adopt its decision without maintained constant liaison with an COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 367

“emergency operational group” of some cow, which was not decisively resolved reproached Voroshilov for his remarks, 80 high-ranking officers from the So- until June 1957, had a strong effect on and they urged that the Presidium fo- viet General Staff and the main staffs Soviet policy toward Hungary. As the cus on what to do next, rather than sim- of the Soviet ground and air forces. All Hungarian crisis escalated, splits within ply engaging in recriminations. An told, some 31,500 Soviet troops, 1,130 the Soviet leadership came to the sur- uneasy lull thus ensued. Later that tanks and self-propelled artillery, 380 face. Mikoyan and Suslov, who were evening, when Suslov returned tempo- armored personnel carriers, 185 air de- both close to Khrushchev, had been rarily from Budapest to give a detailed fense guns, and numerous other weap- sending a flurry of emergency cables briefing to the Presidium, Voroshilov ons were redeployed at short notice to and reports back to Moscow from the and Molotov refrained from any explicit Budapest and other major cities as well time they arrived in Budapest on 24 criticisms. as along the Austrian-Hungarian border. October.83 These messages were dis- The emergence of pronounced rifts Two Soviet fighter divisions, totaling cussed at length by the other members within the Soviet leadership, at a time 159 planes, were ordered to perform of the CPSU Presidium. At a session when the Presidium needed to reach a close air-support missions for the on the evening of 26 October, numer- unified position, clearly hindered ground forces; and two Soviet bomber ous members of the Presidium voiced Moscow’s response to the crisis. One divisions, with a total of 122 aircraft, complaints about Mikoyan, arguing that of the reasons that Soviet officials wa- were placed on full alert at airfields in he “is acting improperly and is pushing vered so much during the crucial days Hungary and the Transcarpathian Mili- us toward capitulation.”84 The hardline of 30-31 October (see below) is that tary District. opponents of Khrushchev—notably they were aware of the domestic politi- For the task at hand, however, this Vyacheslav Molotov, Kliment cal repercussions of their actions. massive array of firepower was largely Voroshilov, and Lazar Kaganovich— irrelevant. The intervention of the So- clearly were hoping to use these criti- Zig-Zags in Decision-Making viet Army proved almost wholly inef- cisms against Khrushchev himself. fectual and even counterproductive. Khrushchev responded by defending his The Malin notes reveal that as the Gero himself acknowledged, in a phone colleague: “Mikoyan is acting just as situation in Hungary deteriorated in late conversation with Soviet leaders on 24 he said he would. Cde. Mikoyan sup- October, the CPSU Presidium had great October, that “the arrival of Soviet ported a position of non-intervention” difficulty in deciding how to respond. troops into the city has had a negative on 23 October. Although Khrushchev On 28 October, senior Hungarian offi- effect on the mood of the residents.”80 strongly disagreed with Mikoyan’s non- cials began insisting that all Soviet Soviet armored vehicles and artillery interventionist stance, he was not about troops would have to be withdrawn were sent into the clogged streets of to let the verbal attacks go unanswered. from Hungary, a demand that caused Budapest without adequate infantry At the next session of the Pre- alarm in Moscow. At a lengthy meet- protection, and thus became easy tar- sidium on 28 October, Molotov and ing of the Presidium on 28 October, all gets for youths wielding grenades and Voroshilov stepped up their cam- the participants agreed that “we must Molotov cocktails. Although Hungar- paign.85 Voroshilov charged that not withdraw troops” and must instead ian soldiers were supposed to operate Mikoyan and Suslov were “poorly in- “act decisively against the centers of alongside Soviet units, troops from the formed” and were “unable to carry out resistance.”86 They voiced dismay that Hungarian state security forces, police, [their] work properly.” Molotov alleged “Nagy is speaking against us,” and they and army proved incapable of offering that Mikoyan and Suslov were provid- expected that Nagy’s call for the with- necessary support, and some defected ing “calm reassurances” while “the situ- drawal of Soviet troops would soon be to the side of the rebels.81 As a result, ation deteriorates and is gradually mov- followed by “a demand for [Soviet] ca- the fighting merely escalated. By mid- ing toward capitulation.” Other offi- pitulation.” The Hungarian govern- afternoon on the 24th, at least 25 pro- cials, including Zhukov and Georgii ment’s announcement on 28 October testers had been killed and more than Malenkov, defended Mikoyan and that the recent events had been a “na- 200 had been wounded. The mounting Suslov, arguing that “we shouldn’t lay tional-democratic uprising” rather than violence, as Mikoyan and Suslov re- blame for the situation on our com- a “counterrevolution” sparked particu- ported back to Moscow, “caused further rades” and that it was “unfair to con- lar consternation among Soviet Pre- panic among senior Hungarian officials, demn [Mikoyan] right now.” These ar- sidium members, who insisted that “we many of whom fled into underground guments, however, failed to deter cannot and will not retreat.” bunkers that were unsuitable for any Voroshilov from voicing even harsher At the same time, Khrushchev and work.”82 complaints: “The American secret ser- his colleagues recognized that Soviet vices are more active in Hungary than options were limited by the sheer pace Early Rifts Within the Soviet Lead- Cdes. Suslov and Mikoyan are. We sent of events, which had already resulted ership [Suslov and Mikoyan] there for noth- in the deaths of hundreds of Soviet sol- ing.” Khrushchev and numerous other diers and Hungarian civilians. The cur- The Malin notes confirm that the officials, including Nikolai Bulganin rent Hungarian leaders, Nagy and Janos post-Stalin succession struggle in Mos- (who initially was critical of Mikoyan), Kadar, were being challenged by more 368 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

radical elements in Hungary, who for its continued troop presence in the force and that the Hungarian army prob- wanted to overthrow the existing re- Warsaw Pact countries (other than East ably was not up to the task: gime. Although Soviet leaders were Germany), leaving open the possibility determined to adhere to a “firm line” of a partial or total withdrawal. Most The political situation in the country, and put an end to Nagy’s and Kadar’s of the Presidium members seemed to rather than improving, is getting worse. “flip-flops,” they reluctantly agreed that view the declaration as a viable way of . . . The peaceful liquidation of the re- they had little choice but to support the “extracting us from an onerous posi- maining centers [of resistance] can ef- fectively be excluded. We will try to current government and to be prepared tion” and of “putting an end to the 90 liquidate them using the armed forces to withdraw troops from Budapest bloodshed.” Any hopes they may of the Hungarians. But there is a great (though not from Hungary as a whole). have had, however, were quickly danger in this: The Hungarian army has By 30 October, however, the mood dashed. Had the declaration been is- adopted a “wait-and-see” position. Our within the Soviet Presidium had taken sued several months earlier, it might military advisers say that the attitude of a surprising turn. All the members, in- have prevented all the subsequent tur- Hungarian officers and generals toward cluding Molotov and Voroshilov, had moil, but by the time the statement was Soviet officers has deteriorated in recent reached a consensus—ephemeral broadcast over Hungarian radio on 30 days, and that there is no longer the trust though it may have been—that the So- October, events in Hungary had already which existed earlier. It may well be that if Hungarian units are used against viet Union should forgo large-scale eluded Soviet control. Moscow’s ver- 87 the uprising, they will go over to the side military intervention in Hungary. bal promises were no longer sufficient of the insurgents, and it will then be Marshal Zhukov conceded that the So- to contain either the wave of popular necessary for the Soviet armed forces viet Union had to be ready, if necessary, unrest or the actions of Nagy’s govern- to resume military operations.91 to withdraw all Soviet troops from Hun- ment. Although the declaration caused gary, viewing this as “a lesson for us in a stir in most of the East-bloc countries, Subsequent messages from Mikoyan the military-political sphere.” Others its effect in Hungary was limited. Many and Suslov were gloomier still, in part reluctantly concurred. Khrushchev and of the insurgents were determined to because they sensed that their worst his colleagues were well aware that the achieve their goals immediately, rather fears were coming true. Within hours situation in Hungary had continued to than settling for ill-defined negotiations after their initial message on the 30th, deteriorate, and had taken on distinctly that, once under way, would be subject they learned that an angry mob had anti-Soviet overtones. Even so, they to delay or derailment. launched a bloody attack on the unanimously agreed to adopt what Nevertheless, even if Soviet hopes Budapest party committee’s headquar- Khrushchev described as “the peaceful about the declaration were misplaced, ters in Republic Square. The grisly re- path—the path of troop withdrawals the decision to forgo intervention was prisals that some of the attackers car- and negotiations”—rather than “the still remarkable at this late stage. It ried out against disarmed AVH troops military path, the path of occupa- suggests that for a brief while—a very came as a shock not only to Mikoyan tion.”88 brief while—the Soviet Presidium ac- and Suslov, but to most Hungarians (in- This decision seems to have been tually may have been willing to accept cluding many rebel leaders, who predicated on an unrealistic expectation the collapse of Communism in Hun- strongly criticized the actions and ap- of what could be achieved by the So- gary. pealed for calm). The attack caused viet government’s “Declaration on the The unanimity of the Presidium’s even greater alarm in Moscow, where Principles of Development and Further decision to eschew military force be- scenes of the violence were being fea- Strengthening of Friendship and Coop- lied the inherent fragility of that posi- tured on newsreels when the CPSU Pre- eration Between the USSR and Other tion, especially after Khrushchev and sidium met on 31 October. Equally dis- Socialist Countries,” issued on 30 Oc- his colleagues realized that the 30 Oc- concerting was the very fact that the tober.89 A draft of the statement, pre- tober declaration would not have the mob had been able to seize the build- pared by high-ranking CPSU Central desired effect. Ominous reports from ing. Three Hungarian army tanks, Committee officials, was reviewed at Hungary, including cables and secure which had been sent to help the defend- length and edited by the CPSU Pre- phone messages from Mikoyan and ers of the site, ended up defecting to the sidium just before it was released. The Suslov that were much more pessimis- insurgents, just as Mikoyan and Suslov declaration acknowledged that Soviet- tic than their previous dispatches, con- had feared. The siege in Republic East European relations had been tinued to flow in. Earlier in the crisis, Square proved to be an isolated case plagued by “egregious mistakes” in the Mikoyan and Suslov had hoped that (and actually helped stabilize the situa- past, and that Moscow had committed they could induce Nagy to restore or- tion a good deal by spurring both the rampant “violations of the principle of der and achieve a satisfactory political government and the rebels into seeking equality in relations between socialist solution, but by the end of October they a peaceful settlement), but amid the countries.” It pledged that in the future had markedly changed their tone. In a general turmoil in Budapest at the time, the Soviet Union would scrupulously phone message to Moscow on 30 Oc- it initially seemed—at least from “observe the full sovereignty of each tober, they warned that the uprising Moscow’s perspective—to portend the socialist state” and reexamine the basis could be ended only through the use of “deterioration” that Mikoyan and COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 369

Suslov had been predicting. stances was bound to spur a reassess- Israeli troops moved into Egyptian ter- Concerns about the internal situa- ment of Moscow’s non-interventionist ritory, an action that was broadly coor- tion in Hungary were reinforced by the stance. Khrushchev later recalled that dinated with France and Great Britain. latest news about international devel- he regretted the 30 October decision On 30 October the French and British opments, particularly the start of French almost as soon as the Presidium adopted governments sent an ultimatum to and British military operations in the it.95 At short notice on 31 October, he Nasser — which the Egyptian leader Middle East and the increasing signs convened another emergency meeting promptly rejected — and early the next that unrest in Hungary was spilling over of the Presidium to reconsider the whole day they joined the Israeli incursions by into other Warsaw Pact countries. Each matter.96 The notes from the meeting launching air raids against Egyptian cit- of these factors is important enough to reveal that Khrushchev was not the only ies and imposing a naval blockade.98 warrant a separate discussion below. one who had misgivings about the pre- Western analysts have long speculated Not only were the Suez Crisis and the vious day’s decision. With one excep- about the role of the Suez Crisis in So- fears of a spillover crucial in their own tion, all the participants strongly en- viet decision-making vis-a-vis Hungary, right; they also magnified the impor- dorsed Khrushchev’s view that “we but until recently there was no real way tance of Hungary’s status in the War- must revise our assessment and must to know. The new evidence, particu- saw Pact. The prospect of an “imperi- not withdraw our troops from Hungary larly the Malin notes, does not resolve alist” victory in the Middle East and of and Budapest. We must take the initia- all the ambiguities, but it does shed a growing ferment within the bloc made tive in restoring order in Hungary.” The good deal of light on the matter. it all the more essential to keep Hun- only dissenting voice was Maksim On the whole, the Malin notes and gary within the Soviet camp; but on this Saburov, who argued that “after other new materials indicate that the score, too, there seemed increasing yesterday’s session this discussion is all Suez Crisis gave Soviet leaders a pow- grounds for pessimism. By late Octo- pointless. [Full-scale intervention] will erful incentive to resolve the situation ber it was clear that momentum for merely vindicate NATO.” His asser- in Hungary as soon and as decisively Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw tions were disputed by Molotov and as possible. For one thing, the pro- Pact was rapidly building. One of the numerous others, who insisted (not en- longed diplomatic wrangling over Suez members of Nagy’s new “inner cabi- tirely convincingly) that the previous induced the Soviet Presidium to be wary net,” Bela Kovacs, explicitly called for day’s decision had been “only a com- of becoming embroiled in lengthy po- a “neutral Hungary” and the end of promise.” After further persuasion, litical disputes the way the French and Hungary’s “ties to military blocs” in a Saburov finally came around to support the British had. Khrushchev raised this speech he delivered on 30 October.92 the interventionist position. point at the Presidium’s meeting on 28 That same day, Nagy himself endorsed With that, the Presidium unani- October, the day before military action the goal of leaving the Warsaw Pact, and mously approved the full-scale use of began in the Middle East: “The English he opened talks about the matter (and military force “to help the working class and French are in a real mess about the withdrawal of all Soviet in Hungary rebuff the counterrevolu- [zavarivayut kashu] in Egypt. We troops from Hungary) with Mikoyan tion.”97 This action brought an end to shouldn’t get caught in the same com- and Suslov, who promptly informed the long period of indecision and wa- pany.”99 By this, he evidently meant their colleagues in Moscow about the vering in Soviet policy. that if the Presidium allowed the Hun- discussions.93 It seems likely that Even so, the reversal on 31 Octo- garian crisis to drag on indefinitely, Nagy’s expressed desire to renounce ber should not detract from the impor- things would only get worse and the Hungarian membership in the Warsaw tance of the consensus on the 30th. The Soviet Union would be left facing the Pact was one of the factors that induced Malin notes suggest there was a chance, same intractable dilemma that the the CPSU Presidium on 31 October to if only a very slender one, that the French and British were encountering reverse its decision of the previous day. events of 1989 could actually have oc- in Suez. To be sure, Nagy had spoken many curred 33 years earlier. The start of fighting in the Middle times in earlier years (especially after East on 29-31 October, which left he was abruptly removed from power The Effect of the Suez Crisis Moscow’s political ally Egypt in a pre- in 1955) about the desirability of Hun- carious state, caused even greater com- garian neutrality, but his decision to On 26 July 1956 the new Egyptian plications for Soviet leaders. They raise the issue with Mikoyan and Suslov leader, Gamel Abdel Nasser, announced worried that a failure to act decisively at this delicate stage must have come that he was nationalizing the Suez Ca- in Hungary would compound the dam- as a jolt in Moscow.94 Once Soviet nal Company. Over the next few age to Soviet foreign policy. This fear leaders were confronted by the stark months the British, French, and U.S. was particularly acute after the French prospect of Hungary’s departure from governments tried to persuade (and then and British launched their military op- the Warsaw Pact, they realized how compel) Nasser to reverse his decision, erations in the early morning hours of much their influence in Hungary had but these diplomatic efforts were of no 31 October. When the Soviet Presidium waned. avail. In late October, Israel began met later that day to reach a final deci- The confluence of all these circum- mobilizing its army, and on the 29th sion about Hungary, reports were al- 370 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

ready flooding into Moscow about the out at the time, provide a “favorable fic.105 The Romanian authorities also spectacular “successes” that the French, moment” for the Soviet Union to un- established rigorous, comprehensive British, and Israeli forces were suppos- dertake a large-scale military operation screening of mail and publications ar- edly achieving. It soon turned out that in Hungary.102 The French and Brit- riving from and going to Hungary. As their joint military efforts got bogged ish governments, he noted on 2 Novem- a further precaution, the RWP Politburo down (for want of U.S. support) and a ber, “are bogged down in Suez, and we ordered the state security forces stalemate ensued, but Khrushchev and are stuck in Hungary.”103 (Securitate) to reinforce their defenses his colleagues could not have foreseen The invasion of Hungary undoubt- around key buildings, including trans- that when they met on 31 October be- edly would have been approved even if port stations, communications and cause they automatically assumed—in there had been no Suez Crisis, but So- broadcasting facilities, university com- a classic case of misperception—that viet fears of “imperialist” successes in plexes, and Communist party and gov- the United States would back the allied the Middle East and the sudden emer- ernment offices. Leaves and furloughs incursions. Khrushchev himself ex- gence of a divisive row within NATO for soldiers and state security troops pressed the dominant sentiment at the clearly expedited Moscow’s decision. were cancelled.106 Over the next few Presidium meeting: days, Romanian leaders also took steps Fears of a Spillover to alleviate economic grievances and If we depart from Hungary, it will give boost living standards, but overall a great boost to the Americans, English, New evidence confirms that Soviet Romania’s efforts to prevent a spillover and French—the imperialists. They will leaders feared the Hungarian revolution from Hungary were geared predomi- perceive it as weakness on our part and might spread into other East European nantly toward increased vigilance and will go onto the offensive. We would countries and possibly into the USSR preparations for a large-scale crack- then be exposing the weakness of our 107 positions. Our party will not accept it itself, causing the whole Communist down. if we do this. To Egypt [the imperial- bloc to unravel. Warnings to that effect Despite these precautions, the Ro- ists] will then add Hungary.100 had been pouring in throughout the cri- manian authorities were soon con- sis from the Soviet embassy in fronted by renewed “agitation and dem- Khrushchev’s subsequent comments Budapest, from KGB representatives in onstrations by student groups and hos- about Suez, especially at a Presidium Hungary, and from three former Hun- tile elements” in many parts of the coun- meeting on 4 November, show that he garian leaders (Rakosi, Andras try, especially Transylvania and believed the decision to intervene in Hegedus, and Istvan Bata) who had fled Bucharest.108 Officials who were dis- Hungary would help, rather than hurt, to Moscow after being ousted. Con- patched to Cluj reported scenes of Moscow’s policy vis-a-vis Suez. The cerns that the Hungarian revolution “mass confusion and unrest.”109 An distraction posed by Hungary, he im- would spill into other Warsaw Pact unofficial student movement, formed at plied, had prevented an effective re- countries were heightened by a series Bolyai University on 25 October, at- sponse in the Middle East. Now that a of intelligence reports from neighbor- tracted hundreds of members and firm decision to suppress the uprising ing Romania and Czechoslovakia. gained support from much of the fac- had been adopted, the Soviet Union Khrushchev later recalled he had ulty, including many who belonged to would be able to “take a more active learned from KGB sources that “the the RWP. Romanian officials in the area part in the assistance to Egypt.”101 residents of the border areas in Hungary emphasized that “party members of In another respect as well, Soviet had begun seeking contacts with [resi- Hungarian origin” were especially policy in Hungary was linked—if only dents in] the border areas of Czecho- likely to succumb to “hostile” elements, inadvertently—to the Suez Crisis. The slovakia and Romania to gain direct and that ethnic Hungarian students sudden conflict diverted international backing from them.”104 Archival ma- throughout Transylvania were “singing attention from Poland and Hungary to terials fully bear out his recollections. Horthyite and chauvinistic songs.”110 the Middle East. Because the United From Romania, Soviet leaders re- Most worrisome of all were reports that States refused to support the Israeli and ceived word that students in Bucharest young people in Baia Mare and Carei French-British military operations, the and in a large number of Transylvanian were “intent on joining the Hungarian crisis generated a deep split among the cities (Cluj, Tirgu Mures, Timisoara, army,” and that Romanian army troops Western powers at the very moment Baia Mare, and Oradea, among others) and security forces in the border region when they needed to show unity in re- were holding demonstrations in support were being swayed by the demonstra- sponse to the events in Hungary. The of the Hungarian revolution, and that tors’ “tendentious” and “inimical” pro- intra-NATO rift engendered by the Suez disturbances were spreading around the paganda.111 To combat the growing Crisis was not a critical factor in country. As early as 24 October, the unrest, the RWP Politburo on 30 Octo- Moscow’s response to the Hungarian Politburo of the Romanian Workers’ ber set up a “general command staff,” uprising—after all, the rift was not yet Party (RWP) felt the need to impose consisting of four senior Politburo fully evident when the Soviet Presidium emergency security measures and visa members (Emil Bodnaras, Nicolae met for its fateful session on 31 Octo- regulations along the border with Hun- Ceausescu, Alexandru Draghici, and ber—but it did, as Khrushchev pointed gary, effectively sealing it off to all traf- Leontin Salajan), who were given ex- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 371 traordinary powers, including the right revolution broke out, apprehension in year of the Petofi Circle in Hungary. to issue shoot-to-kill orders and to de- East Berlin rapidly increased. A top They feared that the use of repressive clare a state of emergency.112 The East German official, Otto Grotewohl, measures might not be enough to restore command staff was successful in its warned that “the events in Hungary and tight discipline, just as Rakosi’s and task, but the very fact that this sort of Poland show that the enemy looks for Gero’s efforts had failed in Hungary.124 measure was needed was a disconcert- weak spots in the socialist camp, seek- These concerns seemed to gain cre- ing reminder to Soviet leaders that the ing to break it apart.”119 He and other dence when protests cropped up both events in Hungary, if left unchecked, East German leaders were acutely before and after 4 November at higher could prove contagious. aware that the GDR itself was one of educational institutions in the USSR, Equally disturbing reports flowed these “weak spots.” Soviet officials, including Moscow State University into Moscow from Czechoslovakia too, were worried that developments in (MGU). State Security (KGB) troops about student demonstrations in Hungary could undermine their position were dispatched to MGU to arrest stu- Bratislava and other cities amidst grow- in East Germany, which by this point dents and faculty who had staged ral- ing “hostility and mistrust toward the was closely tied to Ulbricht. Soviet for- lies “denouncing the Soviet military Soviet Union.”113 The Czechoslovak eign minister Dmitrii Shepilov warned intervention” and had put up “anti-So- authorities denied most of these reports, that certain elements in East Germany viet slogans and posters.”125 The KGB but they acknowledged that the events might exploit the crisis to launch a cam- also cracked down harshly on demon- in Hungary were having “deleterious paign against the “Ulbricht clique.”120 strations in Yaroslavl and other cities psychological effects” and creating a Quite apart from the threat of a where students organized demonstra- “hostile, anti-socialist mood” among spillover into Eastern Europe, Soviet tions and carried banners demanding the some of the Czechoslovak troops who leaders were aware of serious problems withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hun- had been sent to reinforce the 560-km in the USSR itself. The inception of gary.126 These incidents underlined the border with Hungary.114 Senior de-Stalinization had spawned numerous concerns that had prompted the CPSU Czechoslovak military officials warned instances of public disorder and unrest. Presidium’s decision on 4 November to that the confusion might even “tempt Mass disturbances erupted in Tbilisi and “purge all higher educational institu- the counterrevolutionary forces [in other Georgian cities in early March tions of unsavory elements.”127 To de- Hungary] to penetrate into our country 1956, as students, workers, and intel- ter further protests, the authorities or- and stir up a rebellion in Slovak terri- lectuals joined together to protest the dered the arrests of other presumed dis- tory,” especially in the southern areas growing criticism of “our great leader sidents in late 1956 and 1957, but some inhabited mainly by ethnic Hungar- Stalin.”121 These demonstrations senior party officials wanted to under- ians.115 They also warned that the dan- marked the first time that “anti-Soviet take much more drastic action, launch- ger would increase “if Soviet and Hun- activities” had occurred in Georgia ing a crackdown reminiscent of the garian units are withdrawn” from north- since Communist rule was established, Stalin era.128 Their proposals were ern Hungary, since “it is unlikely that and Soviet leaders responded by impos- never formally adopted, but the distur- [Czechoslovakia’s] existing combat ing martial law.122 Very different chal- bances in 1956 were enough for Soviet forces will be enough to prevent incur- lenges arose elsewhere in the Soviet leaders to feel that the invasion of Hun- sions by counterrevolutionary Union, where intellectuals and some gary had narrowly averted a much groups.”116 The risk of a spillover into other groups took advantage of the op- worse spillover into the USSR. Czechoslovakia was explicitly cited by portunity to voice long-suppressed A number of Western analysts, Soviet leaders when they approved a grievances. Criticism of Stalin and of such as Charles Gati, had long sus- full-scale invasion: “If we don’t em- the “cult of personality” opened the way pected that concerns about a spillover bark on a decisive path, things in for broader complaints about the nature from Hungary were one of the major Czechoslovakia will collapse.”117 It of the Soviet regime itself. Soviet lead- factors in Soviet decision-making dur- is unclear whether the actual danger was ers tried to regain control of the de- ing the 1956 crisis.129 The new evi- as great as they feared, but the impor- Stalinization campaign by issuing a dence has amply corroborated that view. tant thing at the time was the percep- decree that specified what was permis- tion in both Moscow and Prague that a sible and what was not, but this docu- Mikoyan’s Continued Objections failure to act would have ominous con- ment failed to put an end to dissidents’ sequences. activities.123 Thus, when the revolu- The pro-intervention consensus on The growing concerns about a tion began in Hungary, Khrushchev and 31 October was formed without the par- spillover were shared in East European his colleagues were concerned that in- ticipation of Mikoyan and Suslov, who countries further away from Hungary, tellectuals in the Soviet Union might try were still in Budapest. When the two notably East Germany. Initially, the to provoke similar disturbances at officials returned to Moscow on the East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, home. The Soviet authorities saw dis- evening of the 31st to present their con- mainly feared that the return of Nagy turbing parallels between the burgeon- clusions, they discovered that the mat- might presage a similar turn of events ing dissidents’ movement in the Soviet ter had already been settled without in the GDR.118 Once the Hungarian Union and the activities earlier in the them. Suslov evidently agreed with the 372 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

decision, but Mikoyan was dismayed by troops was unanimous.133 Technically, indicate that even though Kadar had it, opposing it just as strongly as he had this assertion was correct because the been willing to travel surreptitiously to resisted the original decision on 23 Oc- participants in the 31 October meeting Moscow at a critical moment, he did not tober. Mikoyan pleaded with Khrush- did indeed approve the decision unani- favor large-scale Soviet military inter- chev to call another meeting of the mously. What Mikoyan failed to point vention in Hungary. Nor did he arrive CPSU Presidium to reconsider the mat- out is that if he had been present, the in Moscow intent on becoming the head ter, but Khrushchev refused. Accord- decision would not have been unani- of a new, post-invasion government. At ing to Khrushchev’s memoirs—which mous, just as he dissented from the the session on 2 November, Kadar seem eminently plausible on this original decision to send in troops on warned that “the use of military force point—Mikoyan even threatened to the night of 23-24 October. In spite of will be destructive and lead to blood- commit suicide if Khrushchev did not this subsequent backtracking, shed.” Such an outcome, he added, reconvene the Presidium.130 Khrush- Mikoyan’s position in October-Novem- would “erode the authority of the so- chev responded that it would be the ber 1956 was in fact both courageous cialist countries” and cause “the morale “height of stupidity” to behave so “ir- and consistent. of the Communists [in Hungary] to be rationally,” and he set off to take care reduced to zero.”135 The next day, of the final political and military prepa- Janos Kadar’s Trip to Moscow Kadar’s tone had changed somewhat, rations for the invasion. Had it not taken though not drastically. He highlighted the CPSU Presidium so long and been It had previously been known that the existing government’s failure to pre- so politically costly to reach a final de- Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich were vent the “killing of Communists,” and cision about Hungary, Khrushchev spirited to Moscow aboard a Soviet said he “agreed with [Soviet officials]” might have been willing to comply with military aircraft on the evening of 1 that “you cannot surrender a socialist Mikoyan’s request; but Khrushchev November, and were brought back with country to counterrevolution.” Kadar explained to Mikoyan that he was loath Soviet troops after 4 November to be also asserted that “the correct course of to “resume fruitless discussions” and installed as the prime minister and action [in Hungary] is to form a revo- “destroy our whole plan” now that “ev- deputy prime minister of a “Provisional lutionary government.” But even then, erything has been decided and a time- Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ he implied that a Soviet invasion would table has finally been laid out.”131 Government.” Nothing was known, only make things worse—”The with- Despite these explanations, however, about what Kadar was doing drawal of Soviet troops from Hungary Mikoyan remained deeply upset by the in Moscow on 2 and 3 November. Al- will be of great significance”—and decision, as he indicated at the Pre- most all Western accounts of the Hun- warned that “the [revolutionary] gov- sidium meeting on 1 November (when garian crisis have assumed that Kadar ernment must not be puppetlike; there Khrushchev had already headed off to was duplicitous and supportive of So- must be a [popular] base for its activi- Brest to inform the Polish leadership of viet military intervention from the out- ties and support among workers.”136 the decision).132 Mikoyan insisted that set. The Malin notes provide a more In this respect, his views differed “the use of force now will not help any- complex picture, offering the first solid sharply from those of Bata, who insisted thing,” and that “we should enter into evidence of Kadar’s and Munnich’s that “order must be restored through a negotiations instead.” Although he roles in the establishment of a post-in- ” imposed by the agreed that “we cannot let Hungary es- vasion regime. Soviet Army.137 cape from our camp,” he argued that it Both Kadar and Munnich took part It is also interesting that even on was still possible to wait 10-15 days to in sessions of the CPSU Presidium on the 3rd, Kadar did not portray the re- see how the situation would unfold: “If 2 and 3 November, though Kadar did cent events in Hungary in a uniformly things stabilize by then, we can decide most of the talking.134 (On the 2nd negative light. Although he claimed whether to pull out our troops.” The they were joined by another Hungarian that “Nagy’s policy has counterrevolu- other participants disagreed with official, Istvan Bata, one of four senior tionary aspects” and that “hour by hour Mikoyan, but he held his ground, argu- figures who had been transported to the situation [in Hungary] is moving ing that an invasion was “inappropriate Moscow several days earlier, on the rightward,” he urged the Soviet leader- in the current circumstances.” In pub- evening of 28 October. On the 3rd, they ship to recognize that the uprising had lic, however, Mikoyan did not display were joined by Imre Horvath, who took stemmed from genuine popular discon- any qualms. The first time that detailed notes of the session.) On 2 tent and that “the HWP has been com- Mikoyan’s objections were revealed November, Khrushchev and Malenkov promised in the eyes of the overwhelm- was in Khrushchev’s memoirs, and the were still away conferring with the lead- ing masses.” He argued that “the en- Malin notes fully bear out Khrushchev’s ers of other Warsaw Pact countries and tire nation took part in the movement” account. with Tito, but the rest of the Presidium to “get rid of the Rakosi clique.”138 Interestingly enough, in later years members met at length with Kadar and Kadar’s perspective at this time was far Mikoyan tried to gloss over his anti-in- Munnich. On 3 November, Khrushchev more nuanced and insightful than the terventionist stance in October 1956, and Malenkov joined in as well. rigid formulas adopted by his govern- arguing that the decision to send in The notes from the two sessions ment in December 1956, which char- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 373 acterized the whole uprising as no more the Presidium meeting, Khrushchev had It turned out, however, that the than a “counterrevolution” instigated spoken by phone with Gomulka, and the talks with Liu Shaoqi were much less and supported by the West. two men had arranged to meet the next onerous than expected. After One other surprising aspect of day (1 November) in Brest, along the Khrushchev explained why the Soviet Kadar’s remarks is that he made little Soviet-Polish border. The Presidium leadership had reversed its position, the effort to gloss over his own actions or designated Malenkov and Molotov to Chinese delegates condoned the change to downplay the negative influence of accompany Khrushchev to Brest. The and promised to go over the matter care- Soviet policy. He gave a detailed ac- Presidium also authorized Khrushchev fully with Mao. Even before the del- count of the meetings of the Hungarian and Malenkov to hold negotiations with egation returned to China, Mao’s own “inner cabinet” on 1 November, noting Tito so they could try to gain at least view of the situation was gradually that he “was a supporter of the view that tacit support from the Yugoslav leader. changing as a result of intelligence re- no sorts of steps should be taken with- In addition, the Presidium approved ports and diplomatic cables flowing into out having spoken with Andropov.” Khrushchev’s suggestion that they “in- Beijing. It is unclear precisely when This position, however, did not really form the Chinese comrades, the Czechs, Mao shifted unambiguously in favor of distinguish Kadar from Nagy, who him- the Romanians, and the Bulgarians” the invasion, but the last-minute con- self had summoned Andropov to the about the upcoming invasion.140 sultations at Vnukovo Airport may well evening session for urgent consultations When the Presidium meeting ad- have been decisive in allowing the So- about Soviet troop movements.139 journed, Khrushchev first contacted Liu viet Union to gain strong Chinese back- Moreover, Kadar acknowledged that Shaoqi and other senior Chinese offi- ing.143 when the consultations were over, he cials who had been in Moscow for con- With that task accomplished, joined the other members of Nagy’s sultations since 23 October. The mem- Khrushchev and Malenkov were able cabinet in voting for the declaration of bers of the Chinese delegation, who had to set off a few hours later for their rapid neutrality, the appeal to the United Na- kept in close touch with Mao Zedong series of top-secret meetings with lead- tions, and the resolution demanding an during their visit, were getting set to ers of the other Warsaw Pact coun- immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops return to Beijing on the 31st. tries.144 At the first such meeting, in from Hungary. On both the 2nd and Khrushchev wanted to inform them Brest, Khrushchev and Malenkov were 3rd of November, Kadar spoke harshly immediately about the new decision, joined by Molotov for talks with a Pol- about past Soviet “mistakes” in Hun- rather than having them find out about ish delegation consisting of Gomulka, gary, and was far more critical about it second-hand back in China. The en- Jozef Cyrankiewicz, and Edward Rakosi than about Nagy. His comments tire CPSU Presidium traveled to Ochab. This meeting was regarded as on this topic were echoed by Munnich, Vnukovo Airport on the 31st to meet particularly sensitive and unpredictable who argued that the fundamental with the departing Chinese officials and because the political situation in Poland “source of anti-Soviet sentiments” in smooth over any ruffled feathers.141 was still so turbulent. The three Soviet Hungary was the population’s “cer- Khrushchev was concerned that Liu negotiators hoped to defuse most of tainty that the [Communist] regime ex- Shaoqi might be upset when he learned Gomulka’s objections, but their efforts ists and is preserved only through the about the sudden change in Soviet in this regard were largely unsuccess- support of the USSR.” policy. During consultations with the ful. Although the Polish leader agreed None of this is to imply that Soviet leadership over the previous that the “counterrevolution” in Hungary Kadar’s stance in early November was week, Liu Shaoqi had consistently ex- had to be suppressed, he strongly ob- greatly beneficial to Hungary. Kadar pressed Mao’s view that the “working jected to the use of Soviet military force. was hardly naive, and the fact that he class of Hungary” must be permitted to Khrushchev soon realized that he would was willing to come to Moscow sug- “regain control of the situation and put not be able to convince Gomulka that gests that he advocated more forceful down the uprising on its own,” without direct intervention was necessary, and Soviet action. Nevertheless, the Malin further Soviet interference. As late as the Soviet leader was not even sure by notes do not bear out the notion that 30 October, the Chinese delegates had the end of the meeting whether Kadar was a quisling from the very start. called for Soviet relations with all other Gomulka would refrain from publicly He took on that function after 4 Novem- socialist states, including Hungary, to criticizing the action.145 ber, but it was not the role he wanted or be based on the five principles of Khrushchev’s concerns were not envisaged when he arrived in Moscow. Pancha Shila: mutual respect for sov- entirely unfounded. Shortly after ereignty and territorial integrity; non- Gomulka and his colleagues returned to The Invasion aggression; non-interference in internal Warsaw, they convened an emergency affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and session of the PZPR Politburo, which The CPSU Presidium’s abrupt shift peaceful coexistence.142 The Soviet “expressed opposition to the USSR’s in favor of all-out intervention on 31 decision on 30 October seemed to be in armed intervention in Hungary.”146 October, after more than a week of vac- full conformity with these principles, The Polish Politburo also endorsed the illation, left many political and military but the volte-face on 31 October raised publication of a statement affirming that tasks to be carried out. Shortly before doubts about Chinese reactions. the crisis should be resolved “by the 374 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Hungarian people alone and not by for- to combat “imperialist intrigues” and garian government would collapse, and eign intervention.” This statement ap- “preserve the system of people’s de- the Soviet intervention would not ap- peared (in slightly modified form) in the mocracy in Hungary.”151 pear to be directed against a specific PZPR newspaper Trybuna Ludu the fol- On 2 November, Khrushchev and leader.154 It turned out that Tito was lowing day.147 Moreover, on 2 No- Malenkov flew to Yugoslavia, where unable or unwilling to fulfill his prom- vember, Gomulka publicly offered War- they met with Tito at his villa on the ise—a failure that caused great irrita- saw as a forum for Soviet-Hungarian Adriatic island of Brioni from 7 p.m. tion in Moscow later on—but negotiations, which he (and Imre Nagy) until 5 a.m. the following day.152 Khrushchev did not foresee that when hoped would “lead to the settlement of When the two Soviet leaders were en he left Brioni.155 Even if he had fore- problems in bilateral relations.”148 route to Brioni, they were apprehen- seen it, the very fact that Tito was so When Gomulka’s last-ditch efforts sive—particularly after the recent ses- firmly supportive of the upcoming in- proved futile and the invasion began as sion in Brest with Gomulka—that Tito, vasion was enough for Khrushchev to scheduled on 4 November, the Polish too, would strongly oppose the Soviet regard the talks as a “pleasant sur- leader briefly considered voicing his ob- decision; but their concerns proved to prise.”156 jections openly. After further thought, be unwarranted. During the ten hours On the morning of 3 November, however, Gomulka decided that he of talks, Khrushchev declined to pro- Khrushchev and Malenkov returned to should maintain a discreet public stance vide Tito with a precise timetable for Moscow having largely accomplished to avoid undue antagonism with Mos- the invasion, but he made clear that their task of overcoming any reserva- cow.149 At his behest, the PZPR Po- Soviet troops would soon be interven- tions that allied Communist states (with litburo instructed the Polish envoy at the ing in Hungary to “defend socialism” the exception of Poland) might have United Nations to vote against a U.S.- and “halt the killing of honest Commu- about the impending military action. sponsored resolution condemning the nists.” The Yugoslav leader, for his part, Khrushchev had ample reason to be Soviet invasion.150 Gomulka re- left no doubt that he agreed with the pleased when he briefly presented the mained distinctly uneasy about the Soviet decision, if only because it was results of the talks at a CPSU Presidium whole matter, but he kept his reserva- the sole remaining way to “crush the meeting later that day.157 tions out of public view. To that extent, counterrevolution” and “prevent the The military side of the invasion the Soviet consultations with Polish restoration of capitalism in Hungary.” proceeded just as rapidly as the politi- officials in Brest on 1 November were Tito’s earlier support for Nagy had es- cal consultations. On 1 November, a qualified success. Had Gomulka not sentially disappeared by this point.153 Marshal Konev was appointed the su- been informed at all about the invasion When the question came up of who preme commander of Soviet forces in beforehand, he might well have been should be brought in to replace Nagy, Hungary. That same day, tens of thou- inclined to adopt a much less accom- Khrushchev mentioned that Janos sands of Soviet troops, who had sup- modating position when Soviet troops Kadar and Ferenc Munnich were the posedly been withdrawing from Hun- moved in. leading candidates, with a decided pref- gary, instead received orders to move The Soviet consultations after the erence for the latter. Tito and other back into Budapest to quell the upris- Brest meeting went far more smoothly. Yugoslav officials at the talks (Edvard ing. They were reinforced by many tens Molotov returned to Moscow on the 1st Kardelj, Aleksander Rankovic, and the of thousands of additional Soviet troops so that he could inform the other mem- Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, who had been congregating in Roma- bers of the CPSU Presidium about Veljko Micunovic) argued that it would nia and the Transcarpathian Military Gomulka’s reaction. In the meantime, be better to go with Kadar because of District, along Hungary’s southern and Khrushchev and Malenkov traveled to his credentials as a prisoner during the eastern borders.158 Some consider- Bucharest, where they spoke with top Stalin-era purges, and the Soviet lead- ation was given to having Romanian Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Bulgar- ers readily agreed. Tito also urged and Bulgarian soldiers take part along- ian officials. Not surprisingly, the del- Khrushchev and Malenkov to be sure side the Soviet forces and to having egations from all three East European that the new “Provisional Workers’ and Czechoslovak troops move in simulta- countries vehemently endorsed the So- Peasants’ Government” would con- neously from the north.159 Romanian viet decision. The Czechoslovak leader, demn the Rakosi era and adopt reforms and Bulgarian leaders had told Antonin Novotny, and the Romanian needed to win popular support. Khrushchev that “they wanted to have leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, reem- Khrushchev assented to these propos- their own military units participate in phasized the concerns they had been als (except for Tito’s suggestion that the . . . the struggle against the Hungarian expressing over the past several days newly-formed workers’ councils in counterrevolution,” and the Czechoslo- about the growing spillover from the Hungary be preserved), and in return vak Politburo likewise expressed its revolution. They were joined by the Tito pledged to use his special contacts “readiness not only to support interven- Bulgarian leader, , in ar- with Geza Losonczy (a close aide to tion, but also to take an active part in guing that “it is essential to adopt ev- Nagy) to try to persuade Nagy to step it.”160 In the end, however, ery appropriate measure, including mili- down immediately, before Soviet troops Khrushchev and his colleagues decided tary intervention, as soon as possible” entered. That way, the existing Hun- that the invasion should be carried out COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 375 exclusively by Soviet troops. Although Pact and its declaration of neutrality ber, a final signal was given for Opera- one might have thought that Marshal with an appeal to the UN General As- tion “Whirlwind” (Vikhr’—the code- Konev, as commander-in-chief of the sembly.163 Any hopes of receiving out- name of the invasion) to commence. Warsaw Pact, would have preferred a side support, however, were quickly The fighting in Budapest and many joint operation with the East European dashed. The United States expressly other cities on 4, 5, and 6 November armies, he in fact was among those who prohibited NATO forces from taking was intense, and even in a small town recommended that the task be left to the any actions that might be deemed at all like Dunapetele the defenders managed Soviet Union alone. provocative.164 Once it was clear that to hold out for four days despite being To ensure that mistakes made dur- the “imperialist” armies would not be hopelessly outnumbered.169 Eventu- ing the initial Soviet intervention in late intervening, Konev and his subordinates ally, though, Soviet forces crushed the October would not be repeated, Konev were able to concentrate their planning resistance and installed a pro-Soviet met with General Lashchenko and other and resources on Budapest and other government under Kadar and Munnich. Soviet officers who had been in Hun- cities where the revolution was at its Officials in Moscow were able to main- gary from the outset.161 For a variety height. tain direct contact with the new Hun- of reasons, as one of Lashchenko’s aides The West’s failure to intervene left garian government via Leonid Brezh- later explained, the Soviet Union’s Nagy’s government in a hopeless situ- nev and Anastas Mikoyan, who had chances of success were much greater ation. Although Hungarian army units been sent to Budapest on 3 November during the second intervention: had been fighting mainly on the side of for precisely that reason.170 Some lim- the rebels since 28 October (when a ited fighting continued in Hungary un- In November our combat operations ceasefire was declared and a National til 11 November, especially in areas well took place under more auspicious cir- Guard was formed), the military over- outside Budapest (notably in Pecs, cumstances than at the end of October. all could no longer function as a cohe- where some 200 fighters held out until Budapest was already under martial law; sive whole.165 In early November, the 14th), but the revolution was effec- armed groups were less successful in Hungarian defense minister Pal Maleter tively over by the 8th. Marshal Konev carrying out sudden attacks; and our troops controlled the situation on the began preparing as best he could to de- had promised Khrushchev on 31 Octo- city streets. We also had a lot more fend against a Soviet attack, but in the ber that it would take Soviet troops three forces and equipment at our disposal absence of Western military support to four days to “destroy the counterrevo- than in October. In addition, our troops Nagy was reluctant to order large-scale lutionary forces and restore order in were no longer hampered by contradic- armed resistance, for fear of precipitat- Hungary,” and his forecast was largely tory directives issued by the Hungarian ing mass bloodshed without any possi- borne out.171 government (whether and when to open bility of victory.166 Among other fire, etc.), which had seriously impeded things, Nagy was well aware that the Further Rifts Within the Soviet Lead- our troops’ actions and resulted in need- Soviet Union had systematically pen- ership less casualties. . . . The considerable experience acquired by our units in Oc- etrated the Hungarian military establish- tober also contributed to the greater suc- ment from the late 1940s on. He feared Even after the final decision to in- cess of our subsequent operations.162 that dozens of Soviet agents who were tervene on a massive scale was adopted still entrenched in the Hungarian officer on 31 October, the leadership struggle In addition to helping out with the final corps and national defense ministry, as continued to buffet Soviet deliberations military plans, Lashchenko retained a well as a “field staff for Soviet troops about Hungary. This was evident not key command role in Budapest. Re- in Budapest that operated in direct con- only at the Presidium meeting on 1 sponsibility for operations elsewhere in tact with the Hungarians” from the out- November, when Mikoyan (having just Hungary was assigned to General set of the crisis, would prevent most of returned to Moscow) tried to undo the Mikhail Kazakov and General Mikhail the Hungarian army from being used to decision to invade, but also at the meet- Malinin, both of whom had played a key support the government.167 As a re- ings held during the first few days of part in the earlier intervention. sult, the majority of Hungarian troops the invasion, on 4-6 November.172 One of Kazakov’s first tasks was remained confined to their barracks on Molotov and Kaganovich disagreed to ensure that enough Soviet troops 4 November and were systematically with the others about the best way to were deployed along the border with disarmed by Soviet forces that reentered handle the post-invasion regime in Hun- Austria to forestall any prospect of Budapest.168 Although some middle- gary. Initially, Molotov had wanted the Western intervention. Soviet leaders and lower-ranking Hungarian officers, former prime minister Andras Hegedus, decided to err on the side of caution in conscripts, and reservists, under the who had escaped to Moscow on 28 this regard, not least because Nagy and leadership of General Bela Kiraly, took October, to be made the head of a new his colleagues had made a last-ditch at- up arms in a last-ditch defense of the “Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ tempt on 1 November to obtain mili- uprising, their efforts could not make Government.” Such a step, Molotov tary support from either the United Na- up for the inaction of most Hungarian claimed, would simply amount to the tions or NATO by combining Hungary’s soldiers. reinstatement of Hegedus’s government formal withdrawal from the Warsaw Early in the morning of 4 Novem- as the legitimate authority in Hungary. 376 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

(Hegedus had been prime minister in had “ignored the impact of [the Soviet underscored the extent of popular op- the government that immediately pre- Union’s] actions on other socialist coun- position both to the Communist regime ceded Nagy’s return to power in Octo- tries”—charges that were not entirely and to the Soviet role in Eastern Eu- ber 1956.) Molotov averred that Janos without merit.174 Khrushchev man- rope.177 Two years of intensive “nor- Kadar was still a furtive supporter of aged to deflect those allegations and to malization,” including wholesale Nagy and should not be given any top oust his opponents, but the events in purges, arrests, deportations, and execu- post. Although Molotov eventually both Hungary and Poland in 1956 had tions, culminating in the executions (by backed down on this issue, he contin- highlighted the risks of allowing de- hanging) of Nagy and Pal Maleter in ued to insist that it was improper for Stalinization in Eastern Europe to move June 1958, were carried out to elimi- Kadar’s new government to condemn too fast. Although Khrushchev ce- nate the most active opposition to the “Rakosi-Gero clique” and to give a mented his status as the top leader in Kadar’s regime. By the time the pro- new name to the revived Hungarian 1957, he pursued a much more cautious cess was completed, more than 100,000 Communist party. These differences policy in Eastern Europe from then on. people had been arrested, 35,000 had produced a number of acerbic ex- been tried for “counterrevolutionary changes with Khrushchev and other Consequences and Costs acts,” nearly 26,000 had been sentenced Presidium members. On 4 November, to prison, and as many as 600 had been Khrushchev declared that he “simply By reestablishing military control executed.178 Similarly, in Poland the cannot understand Cde. Molotov; he over Hungary and by exposing—more Poznan riots and the mass protest ral- always comes up with the most perni- dramatically than in 1953—the empti- lies that preceded and accompanied cious [vredneishie] ideas.” Molotov ness of the “roll-back” and “liberation” Gomulka’s return to power were indica- responded by telling Khrushchev that rhetoric in the West, the Soviet inva- tive of widespread disaffection with the he “should keep quiet and stop being sion in November 1956 stemmed any extant political system. That discontent so overbearing.”173 further loss of Soviet power in Eastern merely festered in subsequent years, as The exchanges became even more Europe. Shortly after the invasion, Gomulka gradually abandoned the re- acrimonious at the session on 6 Novem- Khrushchev acknowledged that U.S.- formist mantle and reverted to an or- ber, where Molotov brought a flood of Soviet relations were likely to deterio- thodox Communist approach. Ironi- criticism upon himself by declaring his rate for a considerable time, but he in- cally, it was Kadar, not Gomulka, who “vehement objection” to Khrushchev’s dicated that he was ready to pay that ended up pursuing a more relaxed po- ideas about the regime that Janos Kadar price because the Soviet Union “had litical and economic line once he had was establishing in Hungary. Maksim proved to the West that [it is] strong and consolidated his hold on power; and as Saburov accused Molotov and resolute” while “the West is weak and a result, Hungary experienced no fur- Kaganovich of being “rigid and dog- divided.”175 U.S. officials, for their ther instances of violent upheaval and matic,” and Mikoyan insisted that “Cde. part, were even more aware than they mass disorder. By contrast, Gomulka’s Molotov is completely ignoring the con- had been in 1953 of how limited their eschewal of genuine reform left Poland crete situation and is dragging us back- options were in Eastern Europe. Senior as politically unstable as ever by the ward.” Averki Aristov noted that “Cdes. members of the Eisenhower adminis- time he was forced out in December Molotov and Kaganovich were always tration conceded that the most they 1970. transfixed by Stalin’s cult, and they are could do in the future was “to encour- The events of 1956 also made So- still transfixed by it.” Severest of all age peaceful evolutionary changes” in viet leaders aware of the urgent need were the criticisms that Khrushchev the region, and they warned that the for improved economic conditions in himself expressed, accusing Molotov United States must avoid conveying any Eastern Europe, insofar as the unrest in and Kaganovich of wanting to indulge impression “either directly or by impli- both Poland and Hungary—and in East in “screeching and face-slapping.” He cation . . . that American military help Germany three years earlier—had expressed particular disdain for will be forthcoming” to anti-Commu- stemmed, at least initially, from eco- Kaganovich, asking him “when are you nist forces.176 Any lingering U.S. nomic discontent. The danger of allow- finally going to mend your ways and hopes of directly challenging Moscow’s ing “basic economic and social prob- stop all this toadying [to Molotov]?” sphere of influence in Eastern Europe lems to go unresolved” was one of the In June 1957, when the leadership thus effectively ended. main lessons that Khrushchev empha- struggle reached its peak, the Hungar- Despite these obvious benefits for sized to his colleagues from the very ian crisis resurfaced. One of the accu- Soviet policy, the revolts in both Poland start: “Ideological work alone will be sations leveled by Molotov and other and Hungary in 1956 had demonstrated of no avail if we do not ensure that liv- members of the “Anti-Party Group” serious weaknesses in the region that ing standards rise. It is no accident that against Khrushchev was what they de- would continue to endanger Soviet con- Hungary and Poland are the countries scribed as his mismanagement of intra- trol. The bloodiness of the three-day in which unrest has occurred.”179 bloc affairs. Molotov argued that conflict in Hungary, in which roughly Khrushchev also concluded that the rec- Khrushchev had committed “dangerous 22,000 Hungarians and nearly 2,300 tification of “certain inequalities in our zigzags” vis-a-vis Eastern Europe and Soviet soldiers died or were wounded, economic relations with the fraternal COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 377 countries” would be “crucial to the pro- nificant increase in hostile statements cess of normalization” in both Poland about the Soviet Union” in key South [If we had failed to take action], there and Hungary.180 Although Kadar was Asian countries, including India, Paki- are people in the Soviet Union who eventually able to redress some of the stan, Burma, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), would say that as long as Stalin was in command, everyone obeyed and there most acute economic grievances in and Indonesia.182 Tugarinov noted that were no great shocks, but now that Hungary through the adoption of a New the governments in these countries, and [these new bastards] have come to Economic Mechanism in 1968 and even many leftist commentators there, power, Russia has suffered the defeat other reforms in subsequent years, his were publicly “drawing an analogy be- and loss of Hungary.183 retention of state ownership and cen- tween the English-French-Israeli ag- tralized economic management gression in Egypt and the participation This point was further highlighted by thwarted any hope of genuine prosper- of Soviet troops in the suppression of the acrimonious exchanges during the ity. This was even more the case in the counterrevolutionary uprising in CPSU Presidium meetings in early Poland, where, despite some leeway Hungary.” The report cited an official November (see the previous section) granted for private activity (especially protest from the Indian government in and by the accusations which the Anti- in agriculture, retail trade, and light in- mid-December which declared that “the Party Group lodged against Khrushchev dustry), the economic policies under events in Hungary have shattered the in June 1957, as cited above. Ulti- Gomulka and his successors spawned beliefs of millions who had begun to mately, Khrushchev was able to over- periodic outbreaks of widespread pub- look upon the USSR as the defender of come the political fallout from the two lic unrest. No matter how often the peace and of the rights of the weakest crises, but the events of 1956 clearly Polish authorities claimed that they people.” What was even more disturb- took their toll on the process of de- would pursue drastic economic im- ing, according to Tugarinov, was the Stalinization in Eastern Europe. Even provements, they always proved unwill- “increased prestige that the United though Khrushchev suspected that the ing to accept the political price that such States had derived from recent events Warsaw Pact countries would remain improvements would have necessitated. in Hungary and the Near East.” While vulnerable to recurrent crises unless the From a purely military standpoint, Asian officials were condemning Soviet indigenous regimes became more “vi- the invasion in November 1956 “aggression” in Hungary as “a direct able” and the Soviet Union forged a achieved its immediate goals, but in the violation of the spirit and letter of the more equitable relationship, he was de- longer term it exacted significant costs. declaration,” they termined to proceed far more cautiously When the revolution was crushed by were making “extremely favorable” ref- in the future.184 Repressive leaders in Soviet troops, the morale and fighting erences to the “U.S. position in both Eastern Europe, such as Walter Ulbricht elan of the Hungarian armed forces Hungary and Suez.” Tugarinov re- in East Germany, Gheorghe Gheorghiu- were bound to dissolve as well. The ported that some Indian officials had Dej in Romania, Todor Zhivkov in Bul- remains of the Hungarian army were even begun insisting that “it makes garia, and Antonin Novotny in Czecho- regarded by Soviet commanders (and sense for India to reorient its foreign slovakia, were able to win even stron- by Kadar) as politically and militarily policy more closely toward the United ger backing from Khrushchev because unreliable. More than 8,000 officers, States.” This raised the “distinct possi- they convinced him that their presence including a large number who had at- bility,” in Tugarinov’s view, that “there was the only safeguard against “unex- tended Soviet military colleges and will be a major improvement in Indo- pected developments” of the sort that academies, were forced out of the Hun- American relations, with a detrimental occurred in Hungary and Poland. When garian armed forces in late 1956 and impact on India’s relations with the faced with a tradeoff between the “vi- 181 1957. The country’s army thus es- USSR.” Although the adverse effects ability” of the East European regimes sentially disintegrated and had to be re- of the 1956 invasion on Soviet-Third and the “cohesion” of the built almost from scratch, leaving a gap World relations proved, for the most after 1956, Khrushchev consistently in Warsaw Pact military planning and part, to be relatively ephemeral, the sup- chose to emphasize cohesion, thus fore- combat preparations for many years pression of the uprising did cause at stalling any real movement toward a thereafter. least temporary disruption in more durable political order.185 From a diplomatic standpoint as Khrushchev’s strategy vis-a-vis the well, the invasion entailed significant Non-Aligned Movement. * * * * costs, at least in the short term. The Finally, the fact that an invasion large-scale use of force in Hungary had been necessary at all underscored This brief review of some of the alienated numerous Third World coun- the dangers of Moscow’s incoherent latest findings about the 1956 crises tries that had been sedulously courted and drifting policy in Eastern Europe leaves numerous topics unaddressed, by the Soviet Union. A top-secret following Stalin’s death. Khrushchev but it should be enough to indicate that memorandum prepared in December was well aware of the potential for re- the new archival evidence does not just 1956 by Igor Tugarinov, a senior offi- criminations, as he indicated during his confirm what everyone knew all along. cial at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, ac- conversation with Tito in early Novem- More often than not, the new evidence knowledged that there had been a “sig- ber: undercuts long-established views and 378 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

reveals unknown events. Disagree- torous revisionists” in Hungary who had claimed meetings dealing with Khrushchev’s secret speech ments about how to interpret the past that the events of 1956 were a “popular uprising” at the 20th CPSU Congress, but these notes have will persist even if all the archives are and who in 1989-90 were carrying out a second not been made more widely available. See V. P. someday open, but the new documen- “counterrevolution.” The article was unstinting Naumov, “K istorii sekretnogo doklada N. S. tation is enabling scholars to achieve a in its denunciation of the “traitors” led by Imre Khrushcheva na XX s”ezde KPSS,” Novaya i far more accurate and complete under- Nagy and of the “new counterrevolutionaries in noveishaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 4 (July-Au- standing not only of specific episodes our midst today who regard themselves as the gust 1996), pp. 147-168; Vladimir Naumov, (e.g., the Soviet Union’s responses to heirs of 1956.” The chief editor of the Soviet “‘Utverdit’ dokladchikom tovarishcha,’” the Polish and Hungarian crises) but of journal, Major-General Viktor Filatov, endorsed Moskovskie Novosti, No. 5 (4-11 February 1996), the entire course of the Cold War. the Hungarian author’s arguments and warmly p. 34; and Aleksei Bogomolov, “K 40-letiyu XX recommended the article to his readers. Filatov s”ezda: Taina zakrytogo doklada,” Sovershenno 1 “Zayavlenie rukovoditelei Bolgarii, Vengrii, added that “upon reading the article, one cannot sekretno (Moscow), No. 1 (1996), pp. 3-4. GDR, Pol’shi, i Sovetskogo Soyuza” and help but notice features of that [earlier] counter- 14 Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Rainer, eds., “Zayavlenie Sovetskogo Soyuza,” both in Pravda revolutionary period that are similar to the Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet partelnokseg (Moscow), 5 December 1989, p. 2. changes occurring in the East European countries vitai Magyarorszagrol (Budapest: 1956-os 2 F. Luk’yanov, “Vengriya privetsvuet zayavlenie at the present time.” Intezet, 1996). Moskvy,” Izvestiya (Moscow), 24 October 1991, 9 Jelcin-dosszie Szoviet dokumentumok 1956 rol. 15 The notes about Hungary appeared in two parts p. 4. Budapest: Dohany, 1993); and Hianyzo Lapok: under the title “Kak reshalis’ ‘voprosy Vengrii’: 3 See, e.g., Army-General A.D. Lizichev, 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP Rabochie zapisi zasedanii Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, “Oktyabr’ i Leninskoe uchenie o zashchite KP Leveltarabol (Budapest: Zenit Konyvek, iyul’-noyabr’ 1956 g.,” Istoricheskii arkhiv (Mos- revolyutsii,” Kommunist (Moscow), No. 3 (Feb- 1993). cow), Nos. 2 and 3 (1996), pp. 73-104 and 87- ruary 1987), p. 96; Admiral A. I. Sorokin, ed., 10 “O sobytiyakh 1956 goda v Vengrii,” 121, respectively. The notes about Poland ap- Sovetskie vooruzhenye sily na strazhe mira i Diplomaticheskii vestnik (Moscow), Nos. 19-20 peared in Issue No. 5 of the same journal. sotsializma (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p. 254; V. (15-31 October 1992), pp. 52-56. 16 See the assessment of this meeting and the V. Semin, ed., Voenno-politicheskoe 11 “Vengriya, aprel’-oktyabr’ 1956 goda: annotated translation of the Czech notes by Mark sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran (Mos- Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, A. I. Mikoyana i Kramer, “Hungary and Poland, 1956: cow: Nauka, 1988), esp. pp. 127-141, 181-220; M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta”; “Vengriya, Khrushchev’s CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on and the interview with Army-General V. N. Lobov oktyabr’-noyabr’ 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva TsK East European Crises, 24 October 1956,” Cold in “I tol’ko pravda ko dvoru,” Izvestiya (Mos- KPSS”; and “Vengriya, noyabr’ 1956-avgust 1957 War International History Project Bulletin, Issue cow), 8 May 1989, pp. 1, 3. g.,” all in Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow), Nos. 4, No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 50-56. The Czech 4 Colonel I.A. Klimov, “KPSS ob ukreplenii 5, and 6 (1993), pp. 103-142, 132-160, and 131- document, “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. edinstva i boevogo sotrudnichestva vooruzhenykh 144, respectively. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad’arsku,” 25 sil sotsialisticheskikh stran,” Voenno-istoricheskii 12 See, in particular, the segment of Khrushchev’s October 1956, in Statni Ustredni Archiv (Praha), zhurnal (Moscow), No. 5 (May 1987), p. 80. memoirs published in “Memuary Nikity Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru Komunisticke Strany 5 V.F. Khalipov, Voennaya politika KPSS (Mos- Sergeevicha Khrushcheva,” Voprosy istorii (Mos- Ceskoslovenska (Arch. UV KSC), Fond (F.) 07/ cow: Voenizdat, 1988), esp. pp. 256-257. cow), No. 4 (1995), pp. 68-84. Another extremely 16 — A. Novotny, Svazek (Sv.) 3, was compiled 6 Army-General P. I. Lashchenko, “Vengriya, useful account is available in the memoir by the by Jan Svoboda, a senior aide to the then-leader 1956 god,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Mos- former Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko of Czechoslovakia, Antonin Novotny, who at- cow), No. 9 (September 1989), pp. 42-50. Micunovic, Moscow Diary, trans. by David Floyd tended the CPSU Presidium meeting. 7 Budapest Domestic Service, 28 January 1989. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980). Because 17 Lieut.-General E. I. Malashenko, “Osobyi 8 “TsK KPSS: Ob izuchenii arkhivov TsK KPSS, of his fluency in Russian and close ties with Tito, korpus v ogne Budapeshta,” Voenno-istoricheskii kasayushchikhsya sobytii 1956 g. v Vengrii,” Micunovic regularly had direct contacts with zhurnal (Moscow), Nos. 10, 11, and 12 (Octo- Report No. 06/2-513 (Secret), from R. Fedorov Khrushchev and other senior figures. Less reli- ber, November, and December 1993) and No. 1 and P. Laptev, deputy heads of the CPSU CC able, but potentially illuminating (if used with (January 1994), pp. 22-30; 44-51, 33-37, and 30- International Department and CPSU CC General caution), are the relevant portions of the memoir 36, respectively. Department, respectively, 23 November 1990, in by the police chief in Budapest during the revo- 18 See the analysis and valuable collection of Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii lution, Sandor Kopacsi, Au nom de la classe declassified documents in Edward Jan Nalepa, (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis’ (Op.) 11, ouvriere (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1979), Pacyfikacja zbuntowanego miasta: Wojsko Delo (D.) 23, List (L.) 1. The memorandum which is also available in English translation un- Polskie w Czerwca 1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle warned that the “new Hungarian authorities” were der the same title (In the Name of the Working dokumentow wojskowych (Warsaw: “clearly intending to use this question [i.e., the Class). Kopasci ended up siding with the insur- Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1992). For broader over- 1956 invasion] as a means of pressure against us.” gents and was arrested in November 1956. He views of the crisis, see Jan Ptasinski, Wydarzenia For the article praising the invasion, see Lieut.- was sentenced to life imprisonment in June 1958, poznanskie czerwiec 1956 (Warsaw: Krajowa Colonel Jozsef Forigy, “O kontrrevolyutsii v but was granted amnesty in 1963. In 1974 he Agencja Wydawnicze, 1986); Jaroslaw Vengrii 1956 goda,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal was permitted to emigrate to Canada. Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz, eds., (Moscow), No. 8 (August 1990), pp. 39-46. This 13 A few well-connected Russians have had privi- Poznanski Czerwiec 1956 (Poznan: article was explicitly intended to counter the “trai- leged access to Malin’s notes from the Presidium Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1990); and Maciej COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 379

Roman Bombicki, Poznan ‘56 (Poznan: Lawica, 25 At the time, there were still 79 Soviet officers, komunizmu (Warsaw: BGW, 1990), p. 119. 1992). including 28 generals, serving in the Polish army. 36 Mus, “Czy grozila interwencja zbrojna?” p. 19 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK See Edward Jan Nalepa, Oficerowie Radziecky w 14. KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.,” 12 July 1956 (Top Wojsku Polskim w latach 1943-1968: Studium 37 “Przemowienie towarzysza Wladyslawa Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D.1005, Ll. 2- historyczno-wojskowe (Warsaw: Wojskowy Gomulki,” Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 25 October 2ob. Instytut Historyczny, 1992), p. 43. For a valu- 1956, p. 1, which appeared under the banner head- 20 “Pol’skii narod kleimit organizatorov able discussion of the military confrontation, see line “Ponad 300 tysiecy warszawiakow na provokatsii,” Pravda (Moscow), 1 July 1956, p. “Wojskowe aspekty pazdziernika 1956 r.,” Polska spotkaniu z nowym kierownictwem partii.” 6. Zbrojna (Warsaw), 18-20 October 1991, p. 3. 38 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK 21 The best overview of the events in Poland in 26 This account is based on documents recently KPSS, 26 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 26 October 1956 1956 is Pawel Machcewicz, Polski rok 1956 (War- declassified at the Internal Military Service (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, saw: Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1993). Leszek Archive (Archiwum Wojskowej Sluzby L. 53. Gluchowski has done excellent work on the So- Wewnetrznej, or AWSW) and the Central Mili- 39 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK viet-Polish crisis; see, for example, his “Poland, tary Archive (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, or KPSS, 21 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 2. 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the ‘Polish Oc- CAW) in Warsaw, which were provided to the 40 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK tober’,” Cold War International History Project author by Leszek Gluchowski. See, in particu- KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 23 October 1956 Bulletin, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 38-49. lar, the two reports compiled by Major Witold (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, See also Jerzy Poksinski, “Wojsko Polskie w 1956 Osinski, deputy chief of the 2nd Section of the Ll. 4-4ob. r. — problemy polityczne (1) i (2),” Wojsko i KBW’s Military Counterintelligence Directorate, 41 Compare Khrushchev’s account in “Memuary Wychowanie (Warsaw), Nos. 1-2 (1992), pp. 40- in AWSW, sygn. 2859/20/K and CAW, sygn. Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva” with Molotov’s 78; and Robert Los, Pazdziernik 1956 roku w 1812/92/8. See also the invaluable first-hand less favorable reminiscences in Feliks Chuev, ed., perspektywie stosunkow polsko-radzieckich, account by Wlodzimierz Mus, the KBW com- Sto sorok besed s Molotovym (Moscow: Terra, Ph.D. Diss., University of Lodz, 1993. For a mander at the time, “Spor generalow o 1991), p. 113. sample of other perspectives on the 1956 Polish Pazdziernik 1956: Czy grozila interwencja 42 Khrushchev’s comments, as recorded in crisis, see Zbyslaw Rykowski and Wieslaw zbrojna?” Polityka (Warsaw), No. 42 (20 Octo- Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 139. Wladyka, Polska proba Pazdziernik ‘56 (Krakow: ber 1990), p. 14. 43 “Telefonogramma po VCh,” 15 November Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989), pp. 232-234; 27 “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheve v 1956 (Top Secret), from I. Maslennikov of the Sprawozdanie z prac Komisii KC PZPR Varshave,” L. 4. Soviet embassy in Warsaw, in AVPRF, F. powolanej dla wyjasnienia przyczyn i przebiegu 28 Comments by Stefan Staszewski, former Referentura po Pol’she, Op. 38, Por. 20, Pap. 127, konfliktow spolecznuch w dziejach Polski PZPR CC Secretary, in Teresa Toranska, ed., Oni D. 178, Ll. 32-33. Ludowej, special issue of Nowe Drogi (Warsaw), (London: Aneks, 1985), p. 148. 44 Quotations are from “Rabochaya zapis’ September 1983, see esp. pp. 21-32; Benon 29 “Komunikat o naradach Biura Politycznego zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 23 oktyabrya Dymek, ed., Pazdziernik 1956: Szkice KC PZPR i delegacji KC KPZR w Warszawie,” 1956 g.,” L. 4; and “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya historyczne (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 20 October 1956, p. 1. Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Spolecznych, 1989); Bogdan Hillebrandt, ed., 30 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK 28 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Ideowopolityczne kontrowersje i konflikty lat KPSS, 20 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 20 October 1956 Op. 12, D. 1005, L. 58. 1956-1970 (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, 45 For the full transcript of these sessions, see Spolecznych, 1986); Grzegorz Matuszak, Kryzysy Ll. 49-50. “Jegyzokonyv a Szovjet es a Magyar part-es spoleczno-polityczne w procesie budowy 31 This was evident, for example, when Ochab allami vezetok targyalasairol,” 13-16 June 1953 socjalizmu w Polsce Ludowej (Warsaw: stopped in Moscow in September 1956 on his way (Top Secret), in Magyar Orszagos Leveltar, 276, Akademia Nauk Spolecznych PZPR, 1986); and back from Beijing. See “Priem Posla Pol’skoi F. 102/65, oe. The document was declassified in Antoni Czubinski, “Kryzys polityczny 1956 roku Narodnoi Respubliki v SSSR tov. V. 1991 and published the following year in the Hun- w Polsce,” in Antoni Czubinski, ed., Kryzysy Levikovskogo, 10 sentyabrya 1956 g.,” 11 Sep- garian journal Multunk. A preliminary translation spoleczno-polityczne w Polsce Ludowej (Warsaw: tember 1956 (Secret), memorandum from N. by Monika Borbely was included in Christian F. Instytut Podstawowych Problemow Marksizmu- Patolichev, Soviet deputy foreign minister, in Ostermann, ed., The Post-Stalin Succession Leninizmu, 1983), pp. 80-114. Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii Struggle and the 17 June Uprising in East Ger- 22 “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v (AVPRF), F. Referentura po Pol’she, Op. 38, Por. many: The Hidden History, a compendium of Varshave,” No. 233 (Special Dossier — Strictly 9, Papka, 126, D. 031, L. 1. documents prepared by the Cold War International Secret), notes by A. Mikoyan, 19-20 October 32 “Antisovetskaya kampaniya v pol’skoi presse,” History Project (CWIHP) and the National Secu- 1956, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii Pravda (Moscow), 20 October 1956, p. 1. rity Archive for a November 1996 international (APRF), F. 3, Op. 65, D. 2, Ll. 1-14. Further 33 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK conference (hosted by the Center for Contempo- details about this meeting are contained in KPSS, 21 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 21 October 1956 rary History Research in Potsdam) on “The Cri- “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956,” (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, sis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe.” Ll. 1-4. L. 2. 46 “Plenum TsK KPSS — XIX Sozyv: 23 Ibid. 34 “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna Stenogramma chetyrnadtsatogo zasedaniya 12 24 Ibid. and “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v 1956,” L. 8. iyulya 1955 g. (utrennego),” July 1955 (Top Se- Varshave,” L. 4. 35 Jacek Kuron, Wiara i wina: Do i od cret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 176, L. 143. 380 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

47 “Shifrtelegramma,” Special Nos. 316-319/No. (Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, in APRF, a particularly rich source, as are some of the 16595 (Strictly Secret), from Yu.V. Andropov to F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 186-190. monographs sponsored by the Institute of His- the CPSU Presidium and CPSU Secretariat, 30 62 “Zapis’ vystuplenii na zasedaniya Politbyuro tory at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Re- April 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 1, L. 2. TsR VPT, 13 iyulya 1956 g.,” 17 July 1956 (Se- assessments of the 1956 crises, based on newly 48 Ibid., L. 5. cret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, in APRF, F. declassified materials and new memoirs, were 49 “Vypiska iz protokola zasedaniya Prezidiuma 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 191-205; and “TsK KPSS,” presented at a landmark international “Conference TsK KPSS ot 3 maya 1956 g.,” No. P13/XXIII 16 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent), Osobaya on Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Ar- (Strictly Secret), 3 May 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. Papka, APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 183-185. chival Evidence,” which was organized in 64, D. 483, L. 133. See also “Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Budapest on 26-29 September 1996 by the Na- 50 “Telefonogramma iz Budapeshta v TsK Yanoshem Kadarom, 14 iyulya 1956 g.,” 17 July tional Security Archive, the CWIHP, and the In- KPSS,” 13 June 1956 (Top Secret), from M. A. 1956 (Top Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, stitute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Suslov to the CSPU Presidium and Secretariat, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 206-215. Revolution. in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 146-149. 63 “TsK KPSS,” 18 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — 72 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne 51 “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva s kitaiskimi Urgent), Osobaya papka, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, Budapeshta” (Part 1), pp. 24-25. tovarishchami 2 oktyabrya 1959 g. v Pekine,” 2 D. 483, Ll. 225-236. On the eve of the plenum, 73 Other key sources are “Zprava o jednani na October 1959 (Top Secret/Special Dossier), in Mikoyan also held talks with key members of the UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956,” Ll. 8-14; Malashenko, APRF, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 331, L. 12. For other HWP Central Leadership to ensure that Gero’s “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta” (Part 1), pp. disparaging remarks by Khrushchev about candidacy would be supported. 22-30; and “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum from Rakosi, see Micunovic, Moscow Diary, pp. 135- 64 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Soviet minister of de- 136, 140. Budapeshta” (Part 1), pp. 23-24. fense, and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief of 52 See Janos Kadar’s remarks to this effect in 65 “Plan deistvii Osobogo korpusa po the Soviet General Staff, 24 October 1956 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK vosstanovleniyu obshchestvennogo poryadka na (Strictly Secret — Special Dossier) to the CPSU KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 3 November 1956 territorii Vengrii,” 20 July 1956 (Strictly Secret), Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 85- (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, as recorded in Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva 87. Ll. 31-33ob. oborony (TsAMO), F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, Ll. 74 The written request, dated 24 October 1956 53 The resolution was broadcast on Hungarian 130-131. and signed by then-prime minister Andras domestic radio on 30 June and published in 66 “TsK KPSS” (cited in Note 63 supra), L. 231. Hegedus, was transmitted by Andropov in a ci- Szabad Nep the following day. For an English 67 “Zapis’ besedy s Erno Gere, 2 sentyabrya 1956 phered telegram on 28 October. See translation, see Paul E. Zinner, ed., National Com- g.,” 27 September 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, “Shifrtelegramma” (Strictly Secret — Urgent), 28 munism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: F. 5, Op. 28, D. 394, Ll. 254-256. October 1956, from Yu. V. Andropov, in AVPRF, A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland 68 Ibid., L. 256. F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, L. 12. [Ed. note: For an and Hungary, February-November 1956 (New 69 “Shifrtelegramma,” 12 October 1956 (Strictly English translation, see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 328- Secret — Urgent — Special Dossier), from Yu. 1995), p. 30.] 331. V. Andropov to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF, 75 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK 54 “Shifrtelegramma,” from Yu. V. Andropov to F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 64-75. KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 4-4ob. the CPSU Presidium and Secretariat, 9 July 1956 70 Ibid., L. 71. 76 “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna (Special Dossier — Strictly Secret), in APRF, F. 71 Countless books and articles about the Hun- 1956,” L. 9. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 151-162. All quotations in garian revolution have been published since 1956. 77 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne this paragraph are from Andropov’s cable. For a vivid and well-researched account of the Budapeshta” (Part 1), p. 27. 55 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK events of 23-24 October, see Bill Lomax, Hun- 78 The preliminary directives are recorded in KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.,” Ll. 2-2ob. gary 1956 (London: Allison & Busby, 1976), esp. TsAMO, F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, Ll. 130-131. 56 “TsK KPSS,” 18 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — pp. 106-123. For other useful perspectives, see 79 “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum from Marshal Urgent), Osobaya papka, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Na- Georgii Zhukov, Soviet minister of defense, and D. 483, L. 231. tionalism versus Communism (Cambridge, MA: Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief of the Soviet 57 Ibid., L. 232. Harvard University Press, 1961); Paul General Staff, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret— 58 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Special Dossier) to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF, KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.,” L. 2. Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford: F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 85-87. This memoran- 59 “Vypiska iz Protokola No. 28 zasedaniya Stanford University Press, 1961); Charles Gati, dum lays out in detail the complexion and assign- Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 12 iyulya 1956 g.,” 12 Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, NC: Duke ments of the Soviet ground and air forces. July 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. University Press, 1986); and Paul E. Zinner, Revo- 80 “Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta,” Cable from 14, D. 41, Ll. 1-2. lution in Hungary (New York: Columbia Uni- A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Pre- 60 “Rastut i krepnut mezhdunarodnye sily mira, versity Press, 1962). Until recently, reliable Hun- sidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in demokratii i sotsializma,” Pravda (Moscow), 16 garian-language accounts were relatively few in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 2. [Ed. July 1956, pp. 2-3. number, but that has changed dramatically since note: For an English translation, see CWIHP Bul- 61 “Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Matyashem Communism ended. The large number of publi- letin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 22-23, 29.] Rakoshi, Andrashem Hegedushem, Erne Gere i cations put out in Budapest by the Institute for 81 The Soviet defense ministry’s complete list of Beloi Vegom, 13 iyulya 1956 g.,” 17 July 1956 the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution are Hungarian army units that defected to the insur- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 381 gents was recently declassified at the main Rus- szembe Mikojannal es Szuszloval,” Igazsag Khrushcheva,” p. 73. sian military archive, TsAMO, F. 32, Op. 701291, (Budapest), 1 November 1956, p. 1. 105 “Protocol No. 54 al sedintei Biroului Politic D. 17, Ll. 33-48. 94 The theme of Hungarian neutrality was em- al CC al PMR din 24 oct. 1956,” 24 October 1956 82 “Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta,” Cable from phasized in several of Nagy’s essays in On Com- (Top Secret), in Arhiva Comitetului Central al A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Pre- munism: In Defense of the New Course (Lon- Partidului Comunist Roman (Arh. CCPCR), sidium, 25 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in don: Thames and Hudson, 1957). The Soviet Bucharest, F. Biroul Politic, Dosar (Do.) 354/56, AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 8. Union’s backing for Rakosi against Nagy in ff. 1-5. This document is included in the valu- 83 Important samples of these messages, declas- March-April 1955 was clearly one of the factors able new collection edited by Corneliu Mihai sified in 1992, are available in “Vengriya, that prompted Nagy to consider the prospect of Lungu and Mihai Retegan, 1956 Explozia: oktyabr’-noyabr’ 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva TsK neutrality. Perceptii romane, iugoslave si sovietice asupra KPSS,” Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow), No. 5 95 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha evenimentelor din Polonia si Ungaria (Bucharest: (1993), pp. 132-141. Khrushcheva,” pp. 73-74. Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1996). 84 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK 96 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK 106 Ibid. KPSS, 26 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 62-62ob. KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 15-18ob. 107 “Protocol No. 55 al sedintei Biroului Politic 85 Citations here are from “Rabochaya zapis’ 97 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya al CC al PMR din 26 oct. 1956,” 26 October 1956 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.: (Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. Biroul Politic, 1956 g.,” Ll. 54-63. O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/VI (Strictly Do. 355/56, ff. 1-5. 86 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK Secret), 31 October 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, 108 “Protocol Nr. 58 al sedintei Biroului Politic KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956,” 28 October 1956 (Top D. 484, L. 41. al CC al PMR din 30 oct. 1956,” 30 October 1956 Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 98 For a detailed survey of the crisis as recorded (Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. Biroul Politic, 54-63. in declassified U.S. documents, see U.S. Depart- Do. 358/56, ff. 3-5. 87 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ment of State, Foreign Relations of the United 109 “Stenograma conferintei organizatiei KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 30 October 1956 States, 1955-1957, Vol. XVI: Suez Crisis, July regionale al CC al PMR,” 23 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, 26-December 31, 1956 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. (Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. 85, Do. 84/56, Ll. 6-14. Government Printing Office, 1990). Ff. 1-8. This report is not included in the Lungu/ 88 Ibid., L. 14. 99 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK Retegan volume. I am grateful to Mihai Retegan 89 “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 61. for providing me with a copy of the document. dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva 100 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma 110 Ibid. mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 31 October 111 Ibid. See also Constantin Botoran, “National stranami,” Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. Interest in Romanian Politics During the Cold p. 1. For the CPSU Presidium decision to issue 1006, Ll. 15-18ob. If Khrushchev had been privy War” (Bucharest: Institute for Military Theory the declaration, see “Vypiska iz Protokola No. 49 to secret U.S. deliberations, he would have real- and History, Romanian Ministry of Defense, zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 30 ized that the United States had no intention of March 1994), pp. 7-8. oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. directly supporting the French-British-Israeli op- 112 “Protocol Nr. 58 al sedintei Biroului Politic P49/1 (Strictly Secret), 30 October 1956, in APRF, eration, either militarily or diplomatically. See, al CC al PMR din 30 oct. 1956,” ff. 3-5. F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 25-30. for example, “Memorandum of a Conference with 113 “Stenograficky zapis ze zasedani UV KSC,” 90 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK the President, White House, Washington, 30 Oc- 5-6 December 1956 (Top Secret), in SUA, Arch. KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 9, 10. tober 1956, 10:06-10:55 am,” in FRUS, 1955-57, UV KSC, F. 07, Sv. 14, Archivna jednotka (A.j.) 91 “TsK KPSS,” High-Frequency Transmission, Vol. XVI, pp. 851-855. 14. 30 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 101 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma 114 “Zabezpeceni klidu na uzemi CSR a statnich 89, Op. 45, D. 12, L. 2. TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 34. On this hranic s Mad’arskem,” Report from Col.-General 92 Kovacs’s remarks, at a meeting of the Inde- same point, Sandor Kopasci recounts a very in- Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak pendent Smallholders Party in Pecs, were reported triguing comment that Ivan Serov, the head of General Staff, and Lieut.-General Jaroslav in the first issue of the revived party newspaper the Soviet KGB, allegedly made when he was Dockal, chief of operations, 29 October 1956 (Top Kis Ujsag (Budapest), 1 November 1956, p. 2. arresting Kopasci just after the invasion: “Suez Secret), in Vojensky historicky archiv (VHA) 93 See the first-hand comments by Gyorgy G. caught us [in Moscow] by surprise. We were com- Praha, Fond Ministra narodni obrany (MNO) Heltai, the Hungarian deputy foreign minister pelled to resort to military measures in the Danube CSR, 1956, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabu under Nagy’s government, “International As- Basin because of that area’s strategic importance cs. armady (GS/OS), 2/8-39b. pects,” in Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jonas, The to any operations we might conduct in the Near 115 Ibid., p. 5. Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Retrospect, East East.” See Kopasci, Au nom de la classe ouvriere, 116 “Souhrn hlaseni operacniho dustojnika European Monograph No. XL (Boulder, Col.: p. 201. If Kopasci recorded Serov’s statement Generalniho stabu cs. armady,” Notes from Col.- East European Quarterly, 1978), esp. pp. 52-53. accurately, and if—assuming the statement is ac- General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czecho- The negotiations are also briefly recounted in curate—Serov was being sincere, this passage slovak General Staff, to the KSC Central Com- Tibor Meray, Thirteen Days That Shook the Krem- sheds valuable light on Khrushchev’s remarks. mittee (Top Secret), 27 October 1956, in VHA lin: Imre Nagy and the Hungarian Revolution, 102 Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 136. Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8-49b. trans. by Howard L. Katzander (London: Thames 103 Ibid. 117 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma and Hudson, 1959), pp. 163-165; and “Szemtol- 104 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha TsK KPSS, 1 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 1 November 382 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 131 Ibid. pp. 132 and 138, which fully bear out 1006, L. 22. 132 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma Khrushchev’s version. Unfortunately, all Chinese 118 Wilfried Otto, ed., “Ernst Wollweber: Aus TsK KPSS, 1 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 1 November archives that might shed greater light on China’s Erinnerungen — Ein Portraet Walter Ulbrichts,” 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. role in the 1956 events are still closed. For an Beitraege zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 1006, Ll. 19-22. assessment based on Chinese-language evidence (Berlin), No. 3 (1990), pp. 365-367. 133 See, for example, Mikoyan’s comments dur- that has surfaced to date—largely memoirs 119 Speech by Grotewohl to the CC plenum of ing the secret proceedings of the June 1957 CPSU (whose reliability is questionable) and published the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), 13 CC plenum (which removed the Anti-Party compilations of documents selected and edited November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien Group), in “Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun’ 1957 goda: by Chinese authorities—see Chen Jian, “Beijing und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Stenograficheskii otchet,” No. P2500 (Strictly and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956,” presented at Zentrales Parteiarchiv (Berlin), DY 30/IV 2/1/ Secret), 22-29 June 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. the “Conference on Hungary and the World, 166, p. 247. 1, D. 259, Ll. 27ob-28ob. 1956.” Chen Jian and other scholars are seeking 120 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma 134 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma additional evidence on this matter, and their find- TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 35ob. For TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 2 November ings will appear in future CWIHP publications. illuminating analyses of the impact of the 1956 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 144 First-hand accounts of the meetings are avail- events on the East German authorities, see Hope 1006, Ll. 23-29; and “Rabochaya zapis’ able in Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity M. Harrison, “The Effect of the 1956 Hungarian zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya Sergeevicha Khrushcheva,” pp. 75-77, which Uprising on the East German Leadership,” and 1956 g.,” 3 November 1956 (Top Secret), in have been well corroborated by other sources, Christian F. Ostermann, “East Germany and the TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 31-33ob. including Khrushchev’s observations at the time, Hungarian Revolution, 1956,” both presented at 135 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma as recorded in Micunovic, Moscow Diary, pp. the “Conference on Hungary and the World, TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 24ob. 135, 138-139. Newly declassified documents 1956.” 136 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma pertaining to the meetings are cited below. 121 For a detailed, top-secret account of the dis- TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 32. 145 See “Zapis’ telefonogrammy,” c. 1 Novem- orders, see “Zakrytoe pis’mo,” 12 March 1956 137 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma ber 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L. (Top Secret), from S. Statnikov, Tbilisi correspon- TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 29. 66. dent for Trud, to the CPSU Central Committee, 138 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma 146 “Protokol Nr. 135 posiedzenia Biura in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 140, Ll. 53-67. TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 31-33. Politycznego w dn. 1.XI.1956 r.,” 1 November 122 “Prikaz No. 14 Nachal’nika Tbilisskogo 139 In addition to Kadar’s account in “Rabochaya 1956 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Akt Nowych garnizona,” from Major-General Gladkov, com- zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 (AAN), Warsaw, Archiwum Komitetu mander of the Tbilisi garrison, 9 March 1956, in noyabrya 1956 g.,” see the cable sent to Moscow Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 140, L. 68. by Andropov on 1 November— Rabotniczej (Arch. KC PZPR), Paczka (Pa.) 15, 123 “O kul’te lichnosti i preodolenii ego ”Shifrtelegramma,” 1 November 1956 (Strictly Tom (T.) 58, Dokument (Dok.) 134. This proto- posledstvii,” in KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll. col is included in the valuable collection of de- resheniyakh s”ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, 17-19—which provides valuable corroboration of classified Polish documents edited by Janos 8th ed. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978), Vol. 7, p. Kadar’s remarks. Tischler, Rewolucja wegierska 1956 w polskich 212. 140 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma dokumentach, Dokumenty do dziejow PRL No. 124 For a cogent analysis of this matter based on TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 15-18ob. 8 (Warsaw: Instytut Studiow Politycznych, newly declassified materials, see M. R. Zezina, 141 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha 1995). “Shokovaya terapiya: Ot 1953-go k 1956 godu,” Khrushcheva,” pp. 74-75. 147 “Odezwa Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Otechestvennaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 2 142 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma Zjednoczonej Partii Rabotniczej do klasy (1995), esp. pp. 129-133. TsK KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” in TsKhSD, robotniczej, do narodu polskiego,” Trybuna Ludu 125 See the first-hand account by the former KGB F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 6-14. The principles of (Warsaw), 2 November 1956, p. 1. deputy director, Filipp Bobkov, KGB i vlast’ Pancha Shila were endorsed in a joint statement 148 “Rozmowy radziecko-wegierskie,” Trybuna (Moscow: Veteran MP, 1995), pp. 144-145. by Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and In- Ludu (Warsaw), 3 November 1956, p. 1. 126 “TsK KPSS: Informatsiya,” 7 November dian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New 149 Gomulka’s conflicting thoughts about the 1956 (Top Secret), from regional KGB stations Delhi on 28 June 1954. The five principles were matter can be seen in “Stenogram Krajowej to the CPSU Presidium, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, intended to “guide relations between the two Narady Aktywu Partyjnego odbutego w dn. 4 D. 141, L. 67. countries” as well as “relations with other coun- listopada 1956 r.: Wystapenia W. Gomulki,” 4 127 “Rabochaya zapis’zasedaniya Prezidiuma tries in Asia and in other parts of the world.” For November 1956 (Top Secret), in AAN, Arch. KC TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 4 November the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar PZPR, 237/V-241. 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China’s 150 “Protokol Nr. 136 posiedzenia Biura 1006, L. 36ob. Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949- Politycznego w dniu 4 listopada 1956 r.,” 4 No- 128 Bobkov, KGB i vlast’, p. 145. On the new 1962) (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. vember 1956 (Top Secret), in AAN, Arch. KC arrests, see Zezina, “Shokovaya terapiya,” p. 130. 7-8. PZPR, Pa. 15, T. 58, Dok. 135. 129 Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, p. 153. 143 In addition to Khrushchev’s account of the 151 “Usneseni 151 schuze politickeho byra UV 130 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha airport meeting, see the contemporary observa- KSC k bodu 1: Udalosti v Mad’arsku,” 2 No- Khrushcheva,” p. 76. tions recorded by Micunovic in Moscow Diary, vember 1956 (Top Secret), in SUA Praha, Arch. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 383

UV KSC, F. 02/2—Politicke byro UV KSC 1954- Kommunistov Yugoslavii,” L. 4. Mezinarodni oddeleni UV KSC 1954-1962, Sv. 1962, Sv. 120, A.j. 151. 155 For Tito’s explanation of why the promise 110, Ar. Jed. 371. For a thorough survey of the 152 Khrushchev’s account of this meeting tallies could not be fulfilled, see “Pis’mo Tsentral’nogo role of the Hungarian army in 1956, see Imre well with the much more detailed first-hand ac- Komiteta Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii ot 7 Okvath, “Magyar tisztikar a hideghaboru count in Micunovic, Moscow Diary, pp. 131-141. fevralya 1957 goda Tsentral’nomu Komitetu idoszakaban, 1945-1956,” Uj Honvedsegi szemle Micunovic’s account is based on notes he com- Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza,” (Budapest), No. 1 (1994), pp. 14-27, which is piled right after the negotiations, but unfortunately Ll. 17-18. based on documents from the 1956 collection those notes have not yet turned up in the Yugoslav 156 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha (1956-os Gyujtemeny) of the Military History archives. (Another document in the former Khrushcheva,” p. 75. Archives of the Hungarian National Defense Yugoslav Central Committee archive refers to the 157 See Imre Horvath’s handwritten summary (in Ministry (Hadtortenelmi Leveltar, Honvedelmi notes, so it is possible that they still exist some- Hungarian) of Khrushchev’s remarks, in Magyar Miniszterium). A recent volume by Miklos where; but the location has not yet been pin- Orszagos Leveltar, XIX J-1-K Horvath Imre Horvath, 1956 katonai kronologiaja (Budapest: pointed.) Newly declassified correspondence be- kulugyminiszter iratai, 55, doboz. For some rea- Magyar Honvedseg Oktatasi es Kulturalis tween Tito and Khrushchev in early 1957, now son, Malin did not record Khrushchev’s speech Anyagellato Kozpont, 1993), also draws on these stored in the former CPSU Central Committee in the notes from the full session (“Rabochaya documents. For a useful first-hand account, see archive, bears out Khrushchev’s and Micunovic’s zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3 Bela Kiraly, “Hungary’s Army: Its Part in the memoirs very well, but it also shows that the noyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 31-33ob. Revolt,” East Europe, Vol. 7, No. 6 (June 1958), memoirs omit a few key details, which are men- 158 A detailed first-hand account of the military pp. 3-16. Kiraly, as commander of Hungarian tioned below. See “Pis’mo Tsentral’nogo operations can be found in Malashenko, “Osobyi troops in Budapest at the time, led the armed re- Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo korpus v ogne Budapeshta” (Part 3), pp. 33-37 sistance against the invasion. Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 goda Tsentral’nomu and (Part 4), pp. 30-36. 166 On the preparations by Maleter, see Miklos Komitetu Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii/ 159 See, e.g., “Zprava o opatrenich k zesileni Horvath, Pal Maleter (Budapest: Osiris/ Pis’mo Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Soyuza bojove pohotovosti vojsk,” Report from Col.- Szazadveg/1956-os Intezet, 1995), esp. pp. 223- Kommunistov Yugoslavii ot 7 fevralya 1957 goda General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czecho- 228. Tsentral’nomu Komitetu Kommunisticheskoi slovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General Evzen 167 “Stav Mad’arske lidove armady a priciny Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza,” No. P295 (Top Se- Chlad, chief of the Main Logistical Directorate, jejiho rozkladu,” Ll. 4-5. The quoted phrase is cret), February 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, to the MNO Collegium (Top Secret), 31 October from “Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta,” Cable D. 83, Ll. 1-12 and D. 84, Ll. 1-18. John Lampe, 1956, in VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS 2/8- from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU the director of the East European Program at the 49b. See also “Rozkaz k provedeni vojenskych Presidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in Woodrow Wilson International Center for Schol- opatreni na hranicich s Mad’arskem,” from Col.- AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 2. ars, reported at the “Conference on Hungary and General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czecho- 168 On the disarming operations, see the World, 1956,” that he had recently obtained slovak General Staff, to the 2nd Military District “Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po an official summary of the Brioni meeting from in Trencin (Strictly Secret), 28 October 1956, in sostoyaniyu na 21.00 4 noyabrya 1956 goda,” a colleague who had found it in the papers of VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8-2b. Report No. 31613 (Top Secret), from Soviet de- Tito’s biographer, the late Vladimir Dedijer, 160 “Usneseni 151 schuze politickeho byra UV fense minister G. Zhukov to the CPSU Presidium, among materials evidently intended for a fourth, KSC k bodu 1,” pt. 1. and “Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po never-completed volume. An English translation 161 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne sostoyaniyu na 9.00 5 noyabrya 1956 goda,” Re- of this Yugoslav record of the Brioni talks, with Budapeshte” (Part 3), p. 33. port No. 31614 (Top Secret), from Soviet defense Lampe’s commentary, is slated for publication in 162 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne minister G. Zhukov to the CPSU Presidium, both the next issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. Budapeshta” (Part 4), pp. 32-33. in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 102 and 103- 153 For a very useful collection of newly declas- 163 Nagy’s cable to UN Secretary-General Dag 104, respectively. See also Malashenko, “Osobyi sified materials tracing Yugoslav-Hungarian re- Hammarskjold can be found in UN Doc. A/3251. korpus v ogne Budapeshta” (Part 3), pp. 34, 37. lations in late October and early November 1956, The appeal and declaration of neutrality were 169 “Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po see Jozsef Kiss, Zoltan Ripp, and Istvan Vida, broadcast on Budapest radio on the evening of 1 sostoyaniyu na 21.00 6 noyabrya 1956 goda,” eds., Magyar-Jugoszlav Kapcsolatok 1956: November. According to Kadar’s detailed expla- Report No. 31618 (Top Secret), from Soviet de- Dokumentumok (Budapest: MTA Jelenkor-kutato nation at a CPSU Presidium meeting on 2 No- fense minister G. K. Zhukov to the CPSU Pre- Bizottsag, 1995), esp. pp. 125 ff. vember, Zoltan Tildy was the one who came up sidium, in AVPRF, F. 0536, Op. 1, P. 5, D. 65, L. 154 Until recently, this arrangement had not been with the idea of a declaration of neutrality. All 63. Among the other cities in which Soviet troops disclosed, apart from a few vague references in the members of the Hungarian cabinet ultimately encountered fierce resistance were Budaorsi, Micunovic’s memoirs (Moscow Diary, pp. 137- voted in favor of it. See “Rabochaya zapis’ Csepel, Jaszberenyi, Kaposvar, Kecskemet, 138). The first direct revelation of the deal came zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya Kobanya, Komlo, Mezokovesd, Miskolc, Obuda, in the early 1990s when the top-secret correspon- 1956 g.,” Ll. 23-29. Pecs, Soroksar, Szolnok, Szombathely, Thokoly, dence between Tito and Khrushchev from early 164 Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 156. Ulloi, and Veszprem. 1957 was declassified. See “Pis’mo 165 “Stav Mad’arske lidove armady a priciny 170 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi jejiho rozkladu,” Report compiled by KSC CC TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 30. Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 Department No. 14 for the KSC CC Politburo, 9 171 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha goda Tsentral’nomu Komitetu Soyuza April 1957, in SUA, Arch. UV KSC, F. 100/3 — Khrushcheva,” pp. 77-78. 384 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

172 Quotations here and in the following para- ing a few days before the Central Committee ple- “Sobytiya v Vengrii 1956 g.,” in Col.-General G. graph are from “Rabochaya zapis’zasedaniya num. A. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti snyat: Poteri Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 175 Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 156. vooruzhenykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh 34-36ob; and “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya 176 “Memorandum from the Director of Central deistviyakh i voennykh konfliktakh: Statist- Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 6 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 6 Intelligence to the President,” 20 November 1956 icheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Voenizdat, November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, (Secret), in U.S. Department of State, Foreign 1993), p. 397. The number of Soviet deaths was Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 41-45ob. This bickering was Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. 720, the number of Soviet wounded was 1,540. first described by Khruschev in his memoirs XXV: Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. The number of Hungarian deaths was 2,502, and (“Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva,” Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 473, 475. the number of Hungarian wounded was 19,226. pp. 77-78), and a few additional details (not men- This FRUS volume contains a large number of 178 Attila Szakolczai, “A forradalmat koveto tioned in Malin’s notes) came to light in the re- documents essential for understanding the U.S. megtorlas soran kivegzettekrol,” in Evkonyv, Vol. cently declassified transcript of the June 1957 government’s response to the events in Poland 3 (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1994), pp. 237- CPSU Central Committee plenum (“Plenum TsK and Hungary in 1956, although many other ma- 256. Szakolczai provides a considerably lower KPSS, iyun’ 1957 goda,” Ll. 27ob-28ob). The terials have since been declassified through the figure (229) for the number of executions. The Malin notes confirm and add a great deal to these Freedom of Information Act. A collection of figure of 600 comes from Maria Ormos, “A earlier sources. newly declassified materials is available to re- konszolidacio problemai 1956 es 1958 kozott,” 173 The Russian phrase that Molotov used searchers at the National Security Archive in the Tarsadalmi Szemle, Vol. 44, Nos. 8-9 (1989), pp. (odernut’ nado, chtoby ne komandoval) is slightly Gelman Library of the George Washington Uni- 48-65. See also Janos Balassa et al., eds., awkward in the original, but it can be roughly versity in Washington, D.C. Halottaink, 2 vols. (Budapest: Katalizator, 1989). translated as it is here. 177 Data on Hungarian and Soviet casualties 179 “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 174 See “Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun’ 1957 goda,” come, respectively, from Peter Gosztonyi, “Az 1956,” L. 12. Ll. 2, 25. The charge of “dangerous zigzags” was 1956-os forradalom szamokban,” Nepszabadsag 180 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha leveled by Molotov at a CPSU Presidium meet- (Budapest), 3 November 1990, p. 3; and Khrushcheva,” p. 81. 181 Testimony of former national defense minis- ter Lajos Czinege in Magyar Orszaggyules, A Honvedelmi Bizottsag 1989 oktoberi ulesszakan FUNDS SOUGHT TO PROCESS $50,000 to finance critical research, in- letrhozott vizsgalobizottsag 1989 december 11-i, RADIO FREE EUROPE TAPES volving processing of the tapes that 1990 januar 3-i, 1990 januar 15-i, 1990 februar ON 1956 HUNGARIAN EVENTS were previously believed lost and/or 6-i ulese jegyzokonyvenek nyilt reszlete, 5 vols. missing, and acquisition of additional (1994), Vol. 1, p. 261. For forty years, various politicians, materials from other foreign radios and 182 “Tov. Orlovu A.L.,” Memorandum No. 1869/ historians, and public figures have de- archives. The sources and the profes- 2 (Top Secret), 28 December 1956, transmitting bated the existence of Radio Free sional contacts are already established. a report prepared by I. Tugarinov, deputy head of Europe’s tapes of broadcasts made dur- Processing the collection and the Foreign Ministry’s Information Committee, ing the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. complementing it with additional in AVPRF, F. Referentura po Vengrii, Op.36, In the summer of 1995, Mr. Gyorgy broadcast and recorded materials, will Por.9, Pap.47a, D.110, Ll.11-18. An English Vamos, Director of Documentation for create a basis for a meaningful and ob- translation of this document, as well as an insight- Hungarian National Radio, and Judy jective analysis of the American and ful commentary by James Hershberg, can be Katona, M.A., A.B.D., researcher and Western policies of the time. All mate- found in the Cold War International History Bul- journalist, found the recordings in Ger- rials, of course, would be made freely, letin, Issue No.4 (Fall 1994), pp.61-64. 183 many—over 500 hours of tape, which equally, and openly available to re- Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 134. 184 reveal what was broadcast and raise searchers. Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha serious questions concernig policy and In the future, in a second phase of Khrushcheva,” pp. 80-82. 185 intent. the research, a major English language The notion of a tradeoff between “cohesion” These holdings constitute a unique source document can be published with and “viability” is well presented in James F. and invaluable record for the study of content analysis of the broadcasts, foot- Brown, Relations Between the Soviet Union and Hungarian history, the role of the United notes, and detailed references. Its East European Allies: A Survey, R-1742-PR States and American radio in the 1956 In the first phase of the implemen- (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975). Hungarian Revolution, and in general, tation of the project, money would be the role of U.S. media abroad in pro- spent on researchers’ stipends, transla- Mark Kramer, a scholar based at the Davis moting ideology, and internal divergen- tions, acquisition of materials, transcrip- Center for Russian Studies at Harvard Uni- cies which led broadcasters to convey tion, duplications, and travel. versity, is a frequent contributor to the messages about American intentions For further information, contact Judy CWIHP Bulletin. which were at odds with the actual in- Katona at (703) 913-5824 (telephone) tentions of top policy makers during this or [email protected] (e-mail). tense period of the Cold War. We are seeking support of US COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 385

THE “MALIN NOTES” ON THE CRISES IN HUNGARY AND POLAND, 1956 Translated and Annotated by Mark Kramer

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE:

The translated items below are in chronological order. They include Vladimir Malin’s notes of CPSU Presidium meetings that dealt with the events in Hungary and Poland in 1956. The notes are supplemented by several other newly released documents that shed direct light on portions of the notes. Most of the documents, including Malin’s notes, were translated from Russian, but two documents (both from the Hungarian National Archive) were translated from Hungarian. Extensive annotations have been included because of the idiosyncratic style of the notes and the large number of references (to events, individuals, etc.) that may not be familiar to most readers. Rather than putting in separate annotations to identify specific persons, I have compiled an identification list of all individuals mentioned in the notes. This list and a list of abbreviations precede the notes and should be consulted whenever unfamiliar names or abbreviations turn up. As best as possible, the flavor and style of the original have been preserved in the English translation, but in a few cases I have expanded Russian and Hungarian abbreviations and acronyms to avoid confusion. For example, there is no equivalent in English for the Russian abbreviation “m.b.,” short for mozhet byt’, meaning “perhaps” or “maybe.” Hence, in this particular instance the English word has been written out in full. In most cases, the translation seeks to replicate abbreviations and acronyms, but they have been used only when it does not cause confusion. The English translation is not identical to the published Hungarian and Russian compilations of the Malin notes. Both of these earlier publications contain several errors, including a few that substantially alter the meaning of the original. The fact that mistakes cropped up is mainly a reflection of how difficult it is to work with the handwritten originals, which, aside from problems of legibility, are occasionally out of sequence in the archival folders. In some cases the mispagination is easy to correct, but in a few instances the reordering of pages necessitates very close textual analysis. I have corrected all these mistakes in the English translation, and have included details about the corrections in the annotations. --Mark Kramer

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS tary History Archive), Budapest INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED HWP = Hungarian Workers’ Party IN THE MALIN NOTES APRF = Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi HSWP = Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party Federatsii (Archive of the President of the KGB = Committee for State Security Three points are worth mentioning Russian Federation), Moscow KSC = Komunisticka strana Ceskos- about this list: AVH = Allam-Vedelmi Hatosag (State Se- lovenska (Czechoslovak Communist Party) First, unless otherwise indicated, the curity Authority; name of Hungarian secret MVD = Ministry of Internal Affairs positions listed for each person are those police agency after 1949) PKK = Political Consultative Committee of held during the 1956 crises. AVO = Allam-Vedelmi Osztaly (State Secu- the Warsaw Pact Second, the entries for some Hungar- rity Department; name of Hungarian secret PZPR = Polska Zjednoczona Partia ian Communist party officials include as police agency until 1949) Robotnicza (Polish United Workers’ Party) many as three titles for the party. The Com- AVPRF = Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi SUA = Statni ustredni archiv (Central State munist party in Hungary was called the Federatsii (Archive of Foreign Policy, Rus- Archive), Prague Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar sian Federation), Moscow TsAMO = Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva Kommunista Part) until June 1948, when it CC = Central Committee oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Central compelled the Hungarian Social Democratic Cde. = Comrade Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Rus- Party (Magyar Szocial-Demokrata Part) to CPC = Communist Party of China sian Federation) merge with it. The combined party was re- CPSU = Communist Party of the Soviet TsKhSD = Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi named the Hungarian Workers’ Party Union Dokumentatsii (Center for the Storage of (Magyar Dolgozok Partja). The Hungar- GS/OS = General Staff/Operational Direc- Contemporary Documentation), Moscow ian Workers’ Party was dissolved at the end torate UV = Central Committee (of the KSC) of October 1956, and a new Hungarian So- HCP = Hungarian Communist Party VHA = Vojensky historicky archiv (Military- cialist Workers’ Party (Magyar Szocialista HL/HM = Hadtortenelmi Leveltar, Historical Archive), Prague Munkaspart) was formed on 1 November Honvedelmi Miniszterium (Hungarian Mili- 1956. The acronyms HCP, HWP, and 386 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

HSWP will be used in the listings to refer to November 1956; member of the HSWP Pro- from the HWP in mid-July 1956; arrested the successive incarnations of the Hungar- visional Executive Committee; senior Hun- on 12 October 1956; sentenced to 16 years ian Communist party. garian state official until 1984 imprisonment in February 1957; amnestied Third, two Hungarian officials who BATA, Istvan: Hungarian minister of in 1961 played contrasting roles in 1956 were both national defense until 24 October 1956; fled FIRYUBIN, Nikolai: Soviet ambas- named Istvan Kovacs. The identifications to the Soviet Union on 28 October 1956 sador in Yugoslavia and the translator’s annotations should pre- BEREI, Andor: head of the Hungar- GERO, Erno: First Secretary of the vent any confusion about which was which. ian state planning bureau from 1954 to 1956; HWP from 18 July 1956 to 25 October 1956; fled to the Soviet Union with his wife, fled to the Soviet Union on 28 October 1956 CPSU CC PRESIDIUM Erszebet Andics (see above), in late Octo- GHEORGHIU-DEJ, Gheorghe: First ber 1956 Secretary of the Romanian Workers’ Party FULL MEMBERS: Nikolai BOLDOCZKI, Janos: Hungarian am- GOMULKA, Wladyslaw: First Sec- BULGANIN (prime minister), Kliment bassador in Moscow retary of the Polish United Workers’ Party VOROSHILOV (chairman of the Pre- CHERNUKHA, Vladimir: deputy (PZPR) from 20 October 1956 to Decem- sidium of the Supreme Soviet), Lazar’ head of the General Department of the ber 1970 KAGANOVICH (first deputy prime min- CPSU Central Committee GROMYKO, Andrei: Soviet first ister), Aleksei KIRICHENKO (First Sec- CYRANKIEWICZ, Jozef: Polish deputy foreign minister retary of the Ukrainian Communist Party), prime minister GRYAZNOV, Feodosii: counselor at Georgii MALENKOV (deputy prime min- DOBI, Istvan: president of Hungary the Soviet embassy in Yugoslavia ister), Anastas MIKOYAN, Vyacheslav (a largely figurehead post) HEGEDUS, Andras: Hungarian MOLOTOV (foreign minister until June DOGEI, Imre: appointed minister of prime minister from April 1955 to 24 Octo- 1956), Mikhail PERVUKHIN, Maksim agriculture in the Provisional Workers’ and ber 1956; first deputy prime minister from SABUROV (first deputy prime minister), Peasants’s Government formed on 4 No- 24 to 27 October 1956; fled to Soviet Union Mikhail SUSLOV (CPSU CC Secretary), vember 1956 on 28 October 1956 and Nikita KHRUSHCHEV (CPSU CC DONATH, Ferenc: well-known HIDAS, Istvan: member of the HWP First Secretary). economist; leading supporter of Imre Nagy; Politburo from June 1953 to 26 October appointed a Secretary of the HWP on 23-24 1956; deputy prime minister from 1954 to CANDIDATE MEMBERS: Leonid October 1956; appointed a member of the 26 October 1956 BREZHNEV (CPSU CC Secretary), HSWP Executive Committee on 1 Novem- HORTHY, Admiral Nicolas de: final Georgii ZHUKOV (defense minister), ber 1956; took refuge in the Yugoslav em- commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungar- Nurotdin MUKHITDINOV, Ekaterina bassy on 4 November 1956; arrested by ian Navy; authoritarian leader (with the title FURTSEVA (CPSU CC Secretary), Nikolai Soviet troops on 22 November 1956 and of Regent) in Hungary during the interwar SHVERNIK (chairman of CPSU Party transferred to Romania; sentenced to 12 period and most of World War II (1920- Control Committee), and Dmitrii SHEP- years imprisonment in June 1958; amnestied 1944) ILOV (foreign minister after June 1956). in 1960 HORVATH, Imre: Hungarian foreign DUDAS, Jozsef: engineer; one of the minister from 30 July 1956 to 2 November CPSU CC SECRETARIES NOT ON most radical leaders of the Budapest rebel 1956; foreign minister in Provisional Work- THE CPSU CC PRESIDIUM forces after 23 October 1956; took part in ers’ and Peasants’ Government formed by the armed resistance against the Soviet in- Janos Kadar on 4 November 1956 Averki ARISTOV, Nikolai BEL- vasion; arrested by Soviet troops on 21 No- KADAR, Janos: victim of Stalin-era YAEV, and Pyotr POSPELOV. vember 1956; executed in January 1957 purges; member of HWP Politburo after 18 DULLES, John Foster: U.S. Secre- July 1956; elected HWP First Secretary on OTHERS MENTIONED tary of State 25 October 1956; chairman of HWP Pre- IN THE NOTES EGRI, Gyula: HWP Secretary from sidium from 28 October 1956 until the for- 1955 to 1956; fled to the Soviet Union at mation of the HSWP on 1 November; mem- ANDICS, Erzsebet: chief historian for the beginning of November 1956; returned ber of the HSWP Executive Committee from the HWP until the autumn of 1956; fled to to Hungary in April 1957 1 November; state minister in Imre Nagy’s the Soviet Union with her husband, Andor EISENHOWER, Dwight: U.S. Presi- government from 1 to 4 November 1956; Berei (see below), in late October 1956 dent formed a “Provisional Workers’ and Peas- ANDROPOV, Yurii: Soviet ambassa- ELYUTIN, Vyacheslav: Soviet min- ants’ Government” on 4 November 1956; dor in Hungary ister of higher education top leader in Hungary until 1988 APRO, Antal: member of the HCP/ EPISHEV, Aleksei: Soviet ambassa- KARDELJ, Edvard: vice-president of HWP Politburo from 1946 to 1951 and 1953 dor in Romania Yugoslavia; top aide to Tito to 1956; Hungarian deputy prime minister FARKAS, Mihaly: Hungarian minis- KIRALY, General Bela: released from from November 1953 to 3 November 1956; ter of national defense from 1948 to 1953; prison in September 1956; appointed head member of the HWP Presidium from 28 notorious organizer of mass repression in of the police and armed forces of the Revo- October 1956; minister of industry after 4 Hungary during the Rakosi era; expelled lutionary Committee for Public Order on 30 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 387

October 1956; appointed to the Revolution- the insurgents after the 1956 revolution be- NAGY, Imre: Hungarian prime min- ary Defense Committee on 31 October 1956; gan; appointed to Revolutionary Defense ister from July 1953 to March 1955 and from appointed commander of the National Guard Committee and a first deputy minister of na- 24 October 1956 to 4 November 1956; on 3 November 1956; one of the leaders of tional defense on 31 October 1956; ap- sought refuge in Yugoslav embassy on 4 No- the armed resistance to the Soviet invasion pointed national defense minister on 3 No- vember 1956; arrested by Soviet troops on KISS, Karoly: member of the HWP vember 1956 and promoted to the rank of 22 November 1956 and transferred to Ro- Presidium from 28 October 1956; member major-general; arrested on the evening of 3 mania; executed by hanging in June 1958 of the HSWP Provisional Executive Com- November by Soviet KGB troops; executed NOVOTNY, Antonin: First Secretary mittee after 4 November 1956; member of by hanging along with Imre Nagy in June of Czechoslovak Communist Party the HSWP Politburo from 1957 to 1962 1958 OCHAB, Edward: First Secretary of KONEV, Marshal Ivan: commander- MALIN, Vladimir: head of the Gen- the PZPR from March 1956 to 20 October in-chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed eral Department of the CPSU Central Com- 1956 Forces; appointed on 1 November as over- mittee PIROS, Lajos: Hungarian minister of all commander of Soviet troops that invaded MALININ, General Mikhail: first internal affairs from 1954 to 27 October Hungary on 4 November deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff; 1956; fled to the Soviet Union on 28 Octo- KOSSA, Istvan: finance minister in commanded Soviet forces during the initial ber 1956 the Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Gov- intervention in Hungary on 23 October PONOMARENKO, Panteleimon: ernment formed by Janos Kadar on 4 No- MALNASAN, Aurel: Romanian Soviet ambassador in Poland vember 1956 deputy foreign minister PONOMAREV, Boris: head of the KOVACS, Bela: Secretary General of MAO Zedong: Chairman of the Chi- CPSU CC Department for Ties with For- the Independent Smallholders Party until nese Communist Party eign Communist Parties February 1947; imprisoned in the Soviet MAROSAN, Gyorgy: victim of POPOVIC, Koca: Yugoslav foreign Union from February 1947 until the autumn Stalin-era purges; rehabilitated in 1956; minister of 1955; member of Imre Nagy’s cabinet member of the HWP Politburo from July to RAJK, Laszlo: top Hungarian Com- from 27 October 1956 (and a state minister October 1956; state minister in the Provi- munist official; sentenced to death on from 3 to 4 November 1956) sional Workers’ and Peasants’ Government trumped-up charges in October 1949; post- KOVACS, General Istvan: senior formed by Janos Kadar on 4 November 1956 humously rehabilitated in March 1956; re- Hungarian army official; appointed chief of MICUNOVIC, Veljko: Yugoslav am- buried in October 1956 the Hungarian General Staff; arrested by So- bassador in Moscow RAKOSI, Matyas: HWP First Secre- viet KGB troops on 3 November; sentenced MILOVANOV, Milenko: employee tary from June 1948 to July 1956; served to six years imprisonment in 1958; at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest; killed simultaneously as Hungarian prime minis- amnestied in 1960 by stray Soviet tankfire on 5 November 1956 ter from 1952 to June 1953; fled to the So- KOVACS, Istvan: senior official in MINDSZENTY, Cardinal Jozsef: Pri- viet Union on 26 July 1956, where he spent HCP/HWP from 1945 on; member of the mate of the Hungarian Catholic Church; im- the rest of his life HWP Politburo from March 1955; HWP prisoned from 1948 to July 1955; under RANKOVIC, Aleksander: Yugoslav Secretary from November 1955; first sec- house arrest from July 1955 until 30 Octo- minister of internal affairs; party secretary retary of the Budapest party committee from ber 1956, when he was freed by Hungarian responsible for cadres; second most power- July 1954 to 29 October 1956; fled to the soldiers; took refuge in the U.S. embassy ful figure in Yugoslavia and widely regarded Soviet Union on 31 October 1956 on 4 November 1956 and remained there at the time as the heir apparent to Tito LIU Shaoqi: Secretary of the Chinese until 1971, when he was allowed to leave ROKOSSOWSKI, Marshal Konstan- Communist Party Central Committee; for Austria tin: Soviet officer serving as Polish national deputy chairman of the Chinese Commu- MUNNICH, Ferenc: Hungarian am- defense minister, December 1949 to No- nist Party bassador in the Soviet Union from Septem- vember 1956; removed from PZPR Polit- LOSONCZY, Geza: victim of Stalin- ber 1954 to July 1956; Hungarian ambassa- buro on 20 October 1956; recalled to the era purges; rehabilitated in 1954; candidate dor in Yugoslavia from July 1956 to 25 Oc- Soviet Union in mid-November 1956 member of the HWP Politburo from 23 Oc- tober 1956; member of the HWP Presidium RONAI, Sandor: former Social tober 1956; state minister in Imre Nagy’s from 28 to 31 October 1956; minister of in- Democrat; member of HWP Politburo until cabinet from 30 October 1956; member of ternal affairs from 27 October 1956; deputy June 1953; appointed minister of commerce the HSWP Executive Committee from 1 to head of the Provisional Workers’ and Peas- in Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Gov- 4 November 1956; took refuge in Yugoslav ants’ Government formed by Janos Kadar ernment formed by Janos Kadar on 4 No- embassy on 4 November; arrested on 22 on 4 November 1956 vember 1956; chairman of the Hungarian November and transferred to Romania; im- NAGY, Ferenc: leader of the Indepen- State Assembly (parliament) from 1952 to prisoned in Hungary in April 1957; died in dent Smallholders Party from 1945 to mid- 1962 prison in December 1957 under mysterious 1947 and Hungarian prime minister from SEROV, Ivan: chairman of the KGB circumstances February 1946 to June 1947; emigrated to SOBOLEV, Arkadii: Soviet perma- MALETER, Pal: colonel in the Hun- the United States after the Communists nent representative at the United Nations garian People’s Army who took the side of forced him to resign from his posts SZANTO, Zoltan: member of the 388 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

HWP Politburo from 24 October 1956 (and THE MALIN NOTES of the HWP Presidium from 28 October); 1. There’s only one way out—put an end member of the HSWP Executive Commit- DOCUMENT No. 1 to what is in Poland. tee from 1 to 4 November 1956; took ref- If Rokossowski is kept, we won’t have to press things for a while.12 uge along with Imre Nagy in the Yugoslav Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 9 and 12 July Maneuvers. embassy on 4 November 1956; arrested by 1956 Prepare a document. Soviet troops when he left the embassy on (Re: Point IV of Protocol No. 28)1 Form a committee.13 18 November 1956; transferred to Roma- 2. The ambassador, Cde. Ponomarenko, nia along with Imre Nagy and other former Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, was grossly mistaken in his assessment of officials five days later; permitted to return Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Ochab and Gomulka.14 to Hungary in 1958 Pervukhin, Khrushchev, Shepilov, Belyaev, 3. We should invite to Moscow represen- TILDY, Zoltan: one of the leaders of Pospelov, Brezhnev, Zhukov tatives from the Communist parties of the Independent Smallholders Party until Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the 2 GDR, and Bulgaria.15 Perhaps we should August 1948; under house arrest from Au- Ciph. Teleg. No. . . . from Budapest (Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Zhukov, send CC officials to China for informational gust 1948 to April 1956; a state minister in Ponomarev)3 purposes.16 Imre Nagy’s government from 27 October 4. Send information. Take notice of in- 1956 to 4 November 1956; arrested in May We should call Cde. Mikoyan so that he’ll formation. Think through the questions that 1957 and sentenced to six years in prison in go take a vacation on Lake Balaton.4 have been raised. June 1958; amnestied in 1960 TITO, Josip Broz: General Secretary An article should be prepared in our press II. On Hungary. of the Yugoslav League of Communists; about internationalist solidarity to rebuff the president of Yugoslavia enemy. We need to think it over, perhaps send Cde. Mikoyan.17 TOGLIATTI, Palmiro: General Sec- The subversive activities of the imperial- ists—in Poznan and Hungary. They want Cdes. Mikoyan and Zhukov must consider retary of the Italian Communist Party to weaken internationalist ties; and in the recalling soldiers to their units.18 ULBRICHT, Walter: General Secre- name of independence of paths, they want tary of the (East) German Socialist Unity to foment disunity and destroy [the social- Cde. Mikoyan is to draft information for Party (SED) ist countries] one by one. the fraternal parties.19 VAS, Zoltan: top-ranking official in To Cdes. Pospelov, Shepilov, and Pono- the HCP and HWP from 1945 on; served as marev.5 Pull out the KGB advisers chairman of the Government Commission on Consumer Supplies during the 1956 revo- Perhaps the Italian cdes. could publish [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 49-50, compiled by V. N. Malin] lution; took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy something in the press. Perhaps Cde. Togliatti will write an article.6 on 4 November 1956; arrested when he left DOCUMENT No. 3 the embassy on 18 November 1956; trans- On the Rajk affair7—there must be an eas- ferred along with Nagy and other former ing of the situation Working Notes from the Session of the officials to Romania five days later; allowed Rakosi8 CPSU CC Presidium on 21 October 1956 to return to Hungary at the end of 1958 (Malenkov, Khrushchev, Voroshilov).9 VEG, Bela: HWP Secretary from On the Situation in Poland20 1953 to October 1956 Cde. Mikoyan should confer with Kovacs, (Molotov, Serov, Zhukov, Mikoyan, 10 ZORIN, Valerian: Soviet deputy for- and he should speak firmly. Pervukhin, Saburov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Suslov, Furtseva, Malenkov) eign minister [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 2-2ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.] Cde. Khrushchev: Taking account of the circumstances, we DOCUMENT No. 2 should refrain from military intervention. We need to display patience. (Everyone Working Notes from the Session of the agrees with this.) CPSU CC Presidium on 20 October 1956 [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, un- Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Kaganovich, numbered page. Compiled by V. N. Malin.] Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, DOCUMENT No. 4 Zhukov, Shepilov, Furtseva, Pospelov, Serov. Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 23 October 1956 I. Briefing from the CPSU Delegation about the Trip to Warsaw.11 Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Kaganovich, (Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Kaganovich, Konev, Zhukov) Khrushchev, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 389

Furtseva, Shepilov Mikoyan how to act. [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. On the Situation in Budapest and Over- 4-4ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.] Cde. Kaganovich—the real correlation of all in Hungary21 forces is such that it does not support the (Cdes. Zhukov, Bulganin, Khrushchev) DOCUMENT No. 5 conclusions of Cde. Mikoyan. We must adopt a firm position. Information of Cde. Zhukov. Working Notes from the Session of the A Military-Revol. Com’tee must be set A demonstration by 100 thous. in Budapest CPSU CC Presidium on 26 October 1956 up.35 The radio station is on fire.22 In Debrecen the obkom [provincial party Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Cde. Malenkov—we sent in troops, and the committee—trans.] and MVD [Ministry of Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Saburov, adversary began to recover. Internal Affairs—trans.] buildings were oc- Brezhnev, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Shvernik, We should tell Cde. Mikoyan that he must cupied. Furtseva, Pospelov, Yudin. firmly press Nagy to restore order. From the CPC CC—Cdes. Liu Shaoqi,25 Cde. Khrushchev speaks in favor of send- Cde. Zhukov—Cde. Mikoyan is acting ing troops to Budapest.23 Exchange of Opinions about the Situation improperly, he’s pushing us toward capitu- in Poland and Hungary lation. Cde. Bulganin believes Cde. Khrushchev’s We must insist on a firm position. proposal to send troops is justified. The point about Rokossowski is the central question.26 Cde. Shepilov—the step was extreme, but Cde. Mikoyan: Without Nagy they can’t (Cde. Liu Shaoqi). correct. get control of the movement, and it’s also Gomulka is taking this to extremes. Real power is with the troops. cheaper for us. Expresses doubt about the To make further concessions would be re- sending of troops. What are we losing? The Continuation of the session of 26/X at 8:00 garded as weakness. Hungarians themselves will restore order on p.m.27 their own. We should try political measures, Review of the information from Cdes. Cde. Furtseva—Cde. Mikoyan, apparently, and only then send troops. Mikoyan and Suslov.28 is mistaken about Nagy. They released 1,000 who had been arrested.36 Cde. Molotov—With Nagy left on his own, Cdes. Shepilov, Brezhnev, and Furtseva are Hungary is coming apart. Favors the send- to study it. Cde. Khrushchev—Mikoyan is acting as ing of troops. he said he would. Hungarian party workers (126 cdes.) are Cde. Mikoyan supported a position of non- Cde. Kaganovich—The government is be- studying at the Higher Party School.29 intervention, but our troops are there. ing overthrown. There’s no comparison We should provide information to them. with Poland. Favors the sending of troops. Instruct them, carry out work. We mustn’t A new stage—we don’t agree with the gov- turn them against the Directory and CC, but ernment. Cde. Pervukhin—Troops must be sent. should say there are vacillations within the CC.30 We should send reinforcements—Molotov, Cde. Zhukov—There is indeed a difference Convene a meeting with them with partici- Zhukov, Malenkov. with Poland. Troops must be sent. One of pation of the Hungarian ambassador and the members of the CC Presidium should military officers (in the school), and then Contact should be established with both travel there. Martial law should be declared send them back there (to Hungary). Hegedus and the others.37 in the country, and a curfew introduced. Hold a meeting with the students and in- form them (at the colleges) perhaps with the We must write an appeal to our troops. Cde. Suslov—The situation in Poland is ambassador present.31 different. Troops must be sent. Perform the work. Prepare a flight. Reinforce the troops. Cde. Saburov—Troops must be sent to Three copies Cdes. Molotov, Zhukov, and Malenkov are uphold order. for Cdes. Brezhnev, to fly off.38 Shepilov, Cde. Shepilov—Favors the sending of Furtseva.32 Later we can say definitively. troops On the Situation in Hungary33 Regarding Cde. Mikoyan’s trip to Austria— Cde. Kirichenko—Favors the sending of it should be deferred.39 troops. Cdes. Malinin and Serov should be Cde. Bulganin—Cde. Mikoyan is maintain- dispatched to Budapest. ing an improper and ill-defined position, and [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. is not helping the Hungarian leaders put an 53-53ob, 62-62ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.] Cde. Khrushchev—We should recruit end to their flip-flops. Nagy for political action. But until then we A firm line must be maintained.34 DOCUMENT No. 6 shouldn’t make a chairman of the govern- ment. Cde. Molotov—endorses Cde. Bulganin’s Working Notes from the Session of the Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov are to fly to view. CPSU CC Presidium on 28 October Budapest.24 We must set certain limits and instruct Cde. 195640 390 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

This pertains now to the composition of the Nagy said that if you act he will relinquish Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin, government and to the Directory. his powers. Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Saburov, They are excluding Hegedus, and this means Then the coalition will collapse.49 Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shvernik, they’re no longer showing regard for us. Shepilov, Furtseva, Pospelov, Zorin The bare minimum is the question of friend- There is no firm leadership there, neither in ship with the USSR and the assistance of the party nor in the government. On the Situation in Hungary our troops. (Khrushchev) Cde. Mikoyan is reassuring them. The uprising has spread into the provinces. If they don’t agree, we must consider what The [Hungarian] troops might go over to the Cde. Khrushchev—the matter is becom- will happen with the troops. side of the insurgents.50 ing more complicated. We can’t persist on account of Hegedus. They’re planning a demonstration.41 Cde. Kaganovich—a counterrevolution is Two options. Kadar is leaning toward holding negotia- under way. The gov’t takes action, and we help. tions with the centers of resistance. Indecisiveness of the Hungarian Commu- This might soon be completed, or Nagy will nists. turn against us. We must set Sobolev right at the UN.42 Kadar should make certain concessions to He will demand a ceasefire and the with- The workers are supporting the uprising the workers and peasants and thereby neu- drawal of troops, followed by capitulation. (therefore they want to reclassify it as some- tralize the movement. thing other than a “counterrevolutionary Decisive action is needed against the cen- What might the alternatives be? uprising”). ters of resistance; we cannot retreat. 1) The formation of a Committee, which Cde. Zhukov provides information. Cde. Bulganin—the HWP is acting takes power into its hands (this is the worst They would refrain from stamping out one ambivalently. alternative), when we . . .51 of the centers of resistance.43 Kadar kept lurching. The main thing is to 2) This gov’t is retained, and officials from An order was given not to permit a demon- demand greater decisiveness from Kadar. the gov’t are sent into the provinces. stration. A platform is needed. We must act as follows—summon Mikoyan Perhaps our Appeal to the population and They’re dismantling the railroad tracks in a to the phone and say: The HWP Politburo to workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia number of localities. must act decisively; otherwise, we will take should be prepared, or else we’re just shoot- In Debrecen power has passed to our action without you. Perhaps will have to ing. troops.44 appoint the gov’t directly.47 3) Would it not be appropriate if the Chi- nese, Bulgarians, Poles, Czechs, and Cde. Khrushchev provides information. Cde. Malenkov—we shouldn’t lay blame Yugoslavs appealed to the Hungarians? The situation is complicated. for the situation on our comrades. They’re 4) Decisively suppress the armed forces of Cde. Suslov is to fly back to Moscow. firmly carrying out a line aimed at suppress- the insurgents. A Directory has not been declared. ing the uprising. Nagy from the government They propose that Hegedus be removed so he can put forth a program [sic—trans.]. Cdes. Brezhnev, Pospelov, Shepilov, and from the Directory (4 in favor, and 6 Furtseva are to prepare documents. against).45 Cde. Zhukov—regarding Cde. Mikoyan’s The plenum is going on now.46 role, it’s unfair to condemn him right now. It is agreed: the fraternal parties should ap- The situation has unfolded quite differently peal to the Hungarians. Cde. Voroshilov—they are poorly in- compared to when we decided to send in formed. troops. Do we support the present government once Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov are behaving We must display political flexibility. the declaration is issued?52 calmly, but are poorly informed. We must organize the CC for more flexible Yes, support it. There is no alternative. We’re in a bad situation. We must devise actions. our own line and get a group of Hungarians We must organize armed workers’ brigades. Cde. Bulganin: . . .53 to embrace it. Our troops must be kept in full readiness. Cde. Mikoyan is not able to carry out this The main center of resistance must be sup- Cde. Voroshilov: We acted correctly when work. pressed.48 we sent in troops. We should be in no hurry What we intended to do (to send a group of to pull them out. comrades) must now be done. Cde. Saburov—agrees with Cde. Zhukov. American secret services are more active We should not withdraw troops—we must They must take up their positions at large there than Cdes. Suslov and Mikoyan are. act decisively. enterprises. A group of comrades should go there. Ar- Nagy is a liquidator. A program is needed. range to form a gov’t and then withdraw the troops. We sent you there for nothing.54 Cde. Molotov—things are going badly. Cde. Khrushchev—we will have a lot to (Cdes. Khrushchev and Kaganovich object.) The situation has deteriorated, and it is answer for. gradually moving toward capitulation. We must reckon with the facts. Cde. Bulganin: We acted properly when Nagy is actually speaking against us. Will we have a gov’t that is with us, or will we sent in troops, but I can’t agree with the Our cdes. are behaving diffidently. there be a gov’t that is not with us and will assessment offered by Cde. Voroshilov. We It is agreed up to what limit we will permit request the withdrawal of troops? should endorse the actions taken by Cdes. concessions. What then? Mikoyan and Suslov. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 391

In Budapest, we should pull troops off the An appeal from the fraternal parties.64 We must draw the right conclusion: In streets in certain regions. A ciphered cable to Yugoslavia.65 Budapest there are forces that want to get Perhaps we should release a statement from rid of Nagy’s and Kadar’s government. We the military command. Cde. Pospelov is to be included in prepara- should adopt a position of support for the With regard to the assessment of Cdes. tions of the report for 6.XI.56 current government. Mikoyan and Suslov, it’s inappropriate to Otherwise we’ll have to undertake an occu- say the things that Cde. Voroshilov did. If there is to be a leaflet from the military pation. command, let . . .66 This will drag us into a dubious venture. Cde. Saburov: We must support this gov’t. The authority of the gov’t must be increased Hegedus Cde. Kaganovich: Regarding the sending in the eyes of the people. Gero of troops, we acted properly in sending We shouldn’t protest their assessments of Piros them. events, and we shouldn’t protest about the them to Bulgaria.67 There is no reason to attack Mikoyan and withdrawal of troops, albeit not an immedi- Suslov. ate withdrawal. On the Situation in Hungary68 They acted properly. It’s unfair to lay the (Cde. Suslov) blame on them. Cde. Khrushchev: Agrees with the cdes. If we don’t offer support, there’ll be an oc- We must support this gov’t. Cde. Suslov: The situation is complicated. cupation of the country. We must devise our tactics. On 23 Oct. our troops entered.69 That will take us far afield. We must speak with Kadar and Nagy: We On 25 Oct. only one pocket of resistance We should do what is needed to support the support you; the declaration—you evidently was left; we found out about it on 26 Oct. It gov’t. are not able to do more.57 was in the “Corvin” cinema, a group headed Changes shouldn’t be made in the declara- We will declare a ceasefire. by a colonel from the Horthyite army.70 tion regarding the withdrawal of troops.55 We are ready to withdraw troops from Single gunshots are heard (often). So that they speak about friendship. Budapest. They’re beating officers. The question is how to strengthen the party. We must make this conditional on a 3,000 wounded, 350 dead (Hungarians). We don’t need to send additional people ceasefire by the centers of resistance. Our losses are 600 dead. there. The popular view of our troops now is bad Cde. Molotov: Second, we must look after (and has gotten worse). The reason is the Malenkov:56 The actions that were taken the Hungarian Communists.58 dispersal of the demonstration on 24 Oct. were correct. 56.71 Shooting began. 70 ordinary citi- There is no point at all in condemning Cdes. Cde. Bulganin—the regime of people’s zens were killed. Many flags were hung up Mikoyan and Suslov. democracy in the country has collapsed. on the sidewalk. We should support the new gov’t. The HWP leadership no longer exists. We should keep troops there with the ap- Power has been gained by . . .59 Workers are leaving their enterprises. proval of the gov’t. Cde. Kaganovich—we’re not talking here Councils are being formed (spontaneously) Cde. Malenkov: So many people were in- about concessions, but about a war for the at enterprises (around various cities).72 volved there that there’ll have to be a guar- people. There is an anti-Soviet trend in the demon- antee of an amnesty. The declaration must be adopted.60 strations. A troop withdrawal from Budapest. Cde. Molotov: We acted properly when we How can we regain control of the situation? sent in troops. The initial messages from Cde. Voroshilov: If only a group could be The establishment of a relatively strong Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov were reassuring formed there, we could leave our troops in gov’t. about their view of the government. place. The influence of the party on the masses is There’s no one to rely on. Our line is not to protest the inclusion of weak. Otherwise there’s war. several democrats in the gov’t. With regard to the new government, we Yesterday a government was formed. should support it. Cde. Khrushchev—I support the declara- But regarding friendship with the USSR, tion. On the morning of 28 Oct., at 5:00, Kadar they’re talking about the withdrawal of Politically this is beneficial for us.61 arrived and pointed out that the trade unions troops. We must act cautiously. The English and French are in a real mess had demanded a reassessment of the insur- in Egypt. We shouldn’t get caught in the gents, reclassifying the events as a national- Cde. Zhukov: We must support the new same company.62 democratic uprising.73 gov’t. But we must not foster illusions. They want to classify it according to the The question of a troop withdrawal from We are saving face. example of the Poznan events. Hungary—this question must be considered Kadar reported that he had succeeded in by the entire socialist camp. Fundamentally, the declaration must be agreeing with the trade unions to eliminate The authority of the HWP CC must be adopted. the formula of a national-democratic move- raised. But adopt it with corrections.63 ment and about the organs of state security. We should appeal to the fraternal parties so that they, in turn, will issue appeals to the Life in the city must be put right. In his address, Nagy inserted a point about Hungarians. the withdrawal of Soviet troops. 392 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

They’re also insisting on a ceasefire. On our appeal to the Hungarians—we should prepare it. Cde. Zhukov—With regard to troops in the Our line now: this time the gov’t is recom- A declaration should be prepared. GDR and in Poland, the question is more mending a ceasefire, and the military com- serious. mand is devising an order for the withdrawal Cde. Molotov—Today an appeal must be It must be considered at the Consultative of troops from Budapest.74 written to the Hungarian people so that they Council.84 promptly enter into negotiations about the The Consultative Council is to be convened. Nagy and Szanto raised the question of re- withdrawal of troops. moving Hegedus from the Directory.75 There is the Warsaw Pact. To persist further—it is unclear what will This must be considered with other coun- come of this. There’s no need to hold elections. tries. A quick decision, the main thing is to de- On the view of the Chinese comrades—they clare it today. [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. suggest that relations with the countries of 54-63, compiled by V. N. Malin.] the socialist camp be built on the principles Cde. Furtseva—We should adopt a general of Pancha Shila.83 declaration, not an appeal to the Hungarians. DOCUMENT No. 7 Not a cumbersome declaration. Relations along interstate lines are on one Working Notes from the Session of the basis and interparty relations on another. The second thing is important for the inter- CPSU CC Presidium on 30 October nal situation. 195676 Cde. Voroshilov: We must look ahead. (Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)77 Declarations must be composed so that we We must search for other modes of relations aren’t placed into an onerous position. We with the countries of people’s democracy. Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, must criticize ourselves—but justly. Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Brezhnev, About meetings with leaders of the people’s Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Cde. Kaganovich—Pancha Shila, but I democracies (concerning relations). Pospelov don’t think they should propose that we build our relations on the principles of We should convene a CC plenum (for in- On the Situation in Hungary Pancha Shila. formational purposes).85 Two documents—an appeal to the Hungar- Information from Cdes. Mikoyan and Serov ians and a Declaration. Cde. Saburov: Agrees about the need for a is read aloud.78 In this document we don’t need to provide Declaration and withdrawal of troops. self-criticism. At the XX Congress we did the correct thing, Cde. Zhukov provides information about There’s a difference between party and state but then did not keep control of the un- the concentration of mil.-transport aircraft relations. leashed initiative of the masses. in the Vienna region.79 It’s impossible to lead against the will of Nagy is playing a double game (in Malinin’s Cde. Shepilov—The course of events re- the people. opinion). veals the crisis in our relations with the We failed to stand for genuine Leninist prin- Cde. Konev is to be sent to Budapest.80 countries of people’s democracy. ciples of leadership. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. We might end up lagging behind events. On Discussions with the Chinese com- The underlying reasons must be revealed. Agrees with Cde. Furtseva. The ministers rades.81 The foundations remain unshakable. are asking; so are members of the CC.86 (Khrushchev) Eliminate the elements of diktat, not giving play in this situation to a number of mea- With regard to Romania—they owe us 5 We should adopt a declaration today on the sures to be considered in our relations. billion rubles for property created by the withdrawal of troops from the countries of The declaration is the first step. people.87 people’s democracy (and consider these There is no need for an appeal to the Hun- We must reexamine our relations. matters at a session of the Warsaw Pact), garians. Relations must be built on an equal basis. taking account of the views of the countries On the armed forces: We support the prin- in which our troops are based. ciples of non-interference. Cde. Khrushchev: We are unanimous. With the agreement of the government of As a first step we will issue a Declaration. The entire CPC CC Politburo supports this Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops. position. We’ll have to keep up a struggle with na- Cde. Khrushchev—informs the others tional-Communism for a long time. about his conversation with Cde. Mikoyan. One document for the Hungarians, and an- other for the participants of the Warsaw Pact. Cde. Zhukov—Agrees with what Cde. Kadar is behaving well. Shepilov has said. 5 of the 6 are firmly hanging in there.88 On Rokossowski—I said to Gomulka that The main thing is to decide in Hungary. A struggle is going on inside the [HWP— this matter is for you (the Poles) to decide.82 Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. trans.] Presidium about the withdrawal of We should withdraw troops from Budapest, troops. Cde. Bulganin—The Chinese cdes. have an and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as incorrect impression of our relations with a whole. The minister of defense will issue a direc- the countries of people’s democracy. This is a lesson for us in the military-politi- tive about the suppression of insurgents in cal sphere. the cinema, using the armed forces. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 393

(Malinin, apparently, became nervous and Transmitted via high frequency to Cdes. left the session.) Mikoyan and Suslov. Cde. Khrushchev sets forth the various considerations. Officers from the state security (Hungarian) Information from Cde. Yudin on Nego- We should reexamine our assessment and are with our troops.89 tiations with the Chinese Comrades. should not withdraw our troops from Hun- gary and Budapest.100 We should take the Consideration of the Draft Declaration What’s the situation: Will Hungary leave initative in restoring order in Hungary. If (Shepilov, Molotov, Bulganin) our camp? Who is Nagy? Can he be we depart from Hungary, it will give a great trusted? About the advisers. boost to the Americans, English, and Cde. Bulganin—we should say in what French—the imperialists. connection the question of a Declaration Those taking part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, They will perceive it as weakness on our arose. Kaganovich, Molotov, Saburov, part and will go onto the offensive. Page 2, Par. 2, don’t soften the self-criticism. Khrushchev, Zhukov, Brezhnev, Shepilov, We would then be exposing the weakness Mistakes were committed. Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov, Yudin. Chi- of our positions. Much use should be made of “Leninist prin- nese comrades. Our party will not accept it if we do this. ciples.” To Egypt they will then add Hungary.101 On the Situation in Hungary We have no other choice. Cde. Khrushchev—expresses agreement. (Cde. Khrushchev, If this point of view is supported and en- We should say we are guided by Leninist Cde. Liu Shaoqi) dorsed, let’s consider what we should do. principles. Page 2, Par. 5—we should say we are mak- Cde. Liu Shaoqi indicates on behalf of the Agreed: Cdes. Zhukov, Bulganin, Molo- ing a statement, not an explanation. CPC CC that troops must remain in Hun- tov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Saburov102 Page 3—we should speak about economic gary and in Budapest.94 equity, make it the main thing. We should say we tried to meet them half- We should say that no troops are stationed Cde. Khrushchev—there are two paths. way, but there is not now any government. in the majority of countries. A military path—one of occupation. What line are we now adopting? We should say that on the territory of the A peaceful path—the withdrawal of troops, Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian states the negotiations. We should create a Provisional Revol. Gov’t stationing of troops is done with the con- (headed by Kadar).103 sent of their governments and in the inter- Cde. Molotov—the political situation has Best of all—a deputy. ests of these gov’ts and peoples.90 taken clearer shape. An anti-revol. gov’t has Munnich—as premier and min. of defense been formed, a transitional gov’t.95 We and internal affairs.104 We should express our view of the govern- should issue the Declaration and explain our ment of Hungary. position. We should clarify our relationship This government—we should invite them Measures to support them. with the new gov’t. We are entering into to negotiations about the withdrawal of About support for the party and HWP CC negotiations about the withdrawal of troops. troops and resolve the matter. and for the gov’t. We should refer specifi- If Nagy agrees, bring him in as dep. pre- cally to Nagy and Kadar. Nagy—the prime minister. mier.105 Kadar—a state minister. Cde. Kaganovich, Cde. Molotov, Cde. Tildy Zoltan— “ Munnich is appealing to us with a request Zhukov: We should mention the Potsdam Kovacs Bela— for assistance. We are lending assistance agreement and the treaties with every coun- Losonczy—a Communist and a supporter and restoring order. try.91 of Nagy96 We should negotiate with Tito. We should inform the Chinese comrades, the Cde. Zhukov—We should express sympa- [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. Czechs, the Romanians, and the Bulgar- thy with the people. We should call for an 6-14, compiled by V. N. Malin.] ians.106 end to the bloodshed. There will be no large-scale war. DOCUMENT No. 8 Page 2, Par. 2: We should say the XX Con- Cde. Saburov—after yesterday’s session gress condemned the disregard for principles Working Notes from the Session of the this discussion is all pointless. of equality. CPSU CC Presidium on 31 October It will vindicate NATO. 195697 Cde. Zhukov—we should speak about eco- (Re: Point VI of Protocol No. 49)98 Cde. Molotov—yesterday was only a com- nomics. Information about Discussions with promise decision. Restructuring was thwarted after the XX Gomulka Congress. Regarding the Situation in Poland and Cdes. Zhukov, Voroshilov, Bulganin: We (Cde. Khrushchev) Hungary99 should reject the view that we are reexam- We are turning to the member-states of the (Khrushchev) ining our position. Warsaw Pact to consider the question of our advisers.92 We are ready to withdraw them. A meeting with Cde. Gomulka (in the Brest Cde. Furtseva—What further should be region) was proposed. done? Further editing.93 We showed patience, but now things have On Hungary gone too far. We must act to ensure that 394 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

victory goes to our side. The demand for the withdrawal of troops Notes of a Telephone Message from F. N. became universal. Cde. Pospelov—we should use the argu- Gryaznov, a Counselor at the USSR Em- Anti-Soviet sentiments have intensified. ment that we will not let socialism in Hun- bassy in Yugoslavia, on 31 October 1956 (Cde. Mikoyan) gary be strangled. In current circumstances it is better now to The message was transmitted through support the existing gov’t. Cde. Shvernik—Cde. Khrushchev’s pro- Kardelj. Right now, the use of force will not help posal is correct. anything. Cde. Tito is at Brioni. Kardelj reported We should enter into negotiations. For 10- Cde. Molotov—we should not defer the that Tito is prepared to meet with Cdes. 15 days. creation of organs in localities. We should Khrushchev and Malenkov on 1 November. If the regime slips away, we’ll need to de- act simultaneously in the center and in the However, because the doctors have forbid- cide what to do. We simply cannot allow localities. den him to leave his current premises in view Hungary to be removed from our camp. of his illness, Tito requests that our delega- Cde. Zhukov is instructed to work out a plan tion, if possible, come to Brioni. We shouldn’t quarrel right now with the and report on it.107 As Kardelj further said, it would be de- army. sirable if the aircraft carrying the delega- If the situation stabilizes, we should decide Shepilov, Brezhnev, Furtseva, and Pospelov tion arrived at the airport in Pula at roughly at that point whether we’ll withdraw the are to handle the propaganda side.108 5:00 p.m. Belgrade time so they can leave troops. from the airport for Brioni with the approach We should wait another 10-15 days and sup- An appeal to the people from the military of darkness. port this government. command or the government. Instructions about the flight path and If the situation stabilizes, everything will An appeal to the people from the Prov. the landing in Pula will be given in due change for the better. Revol. Gov’t. course. 109 An order from Cde. Konev. Kardelj requested that we let him know Cde. Suslov: The unstable polit. situation. the time of departure for the aircraft and the The danger of a bourgeois restoration has We should send a group to the region of Cde. time of arrival in Pula. reached its peak. Konev’s headquarters.110 The situation will be clarified in the next Cde. Rakosi—favors Munnich (as pre- [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. few days. mier)111 64-65, compiled by V. N. Malin.] Cde. Hegedus— “ Events are developing wildly, but without Cde. Gero— “ DOCUMENT No. 10 the control of the party. A schism in the HWP—the intra-party 116 Apro112 Notes of a Telephone Message struggle has spilled out onto the streets. Kadar I don’t believe that Nagy organized the up- Kiss Karoly113 There was a certain common under- rising, but his name is being used. Boldoczki standing. The position is what we expected. Horvath This is an internal affair. There should not If we back this gov’t—there is no guaran- be interference. tee. On Negotiations with Tito (Cdes. Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin) Reaction is rearing its head. Only by means of an occupation can we 8-10% at elections. have a government that supports us. Draft a telegram to Tito about the meet- Arm the workers, let them keep the ing.114 weapons. Cde. Serov—the demonstrations were me- To Brest: Khrushchev, Molotov, Malen- ticulously prepared. Nagy was connected kov.115 [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L. with the rebels. To Yugoslavia: Khrushchev, Malenkov. 66, compiled by V. N. Malin.] We must take decisive measures. To discuss with you the situation that has DOCUMENT NO. 11 We must occupy the country. emerged in Hungary. What is your view of it? If you agree, our delegation will visit Working Notes from the Session of the Cde. Bulganin—provides information incognito from CPSU CC Presidium on 1 November 1956 about the decision taken on 31-X-56 and 117 1. XI in the evening to (Re: Point I of Protocol No. 50) about the discussions with the Chinese com- 2. XI in the morning your time. rades.119 Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin, Confirm the telegram to the Soviet ambas- Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Suslov, Cde. Bulganin: The international situation sador in Belgrade. Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shvernik, Furtseva, has changed.120 118 Pospelov, Konev, Serov If we don’t take measures—we will lose [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. Hungary. 15-18ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.] On the Situation in Hungary. (Cdes. Mikoyan) Cde. Konev—Budapest is in the hands of DOCUMENT No. 9 the rebels. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 395

Anarchy is spreading; reaction is triumph- they’re seeking the ouster of the Rakosi ing. On the main question. clique. The decision: occupation. Cde. Shepilov: There were two paths: to They fought for the withdrawal of troops Cde. Kaganovich: The discussion was reckon with the mass nature of the move- and for the order of people’s democracy.133 complicated.121 ment and not to intervene; or second, the The Chinese said we should not withdraw military path; it turned out there was a third Mass demonstrations are taking place on the troops. path: both that we intervened and that reac- periphery; Objectively—a sharp reactionary move- tion triumphed. these didn’t include any goal—to destroy ment. the order of people’s democracy; many de- The party doesn’t exist. The current situation: a counterrev. putsch mands about democratization, and social We can’t wait long. has been carried out, and the state order has demands. The reactionary forces are attacking, and we changed; the main trend is anti-Soviet; the are attacking.122 chief orientation of forces is being orches- I personally took part in one meeting (of the trated from outside. conference), and no one wanted counter- Cde. Furtseva—reactions to the Declara- If we don’t embark on a decisive path, things revolution. tion. in Czechoslovakia will collapse.128 Are worried that we’re giving away Hun- We must establish order by the use of force. But when we spoke with the leaders of the gary.123 armed groups, inside these groups—armed Cde. Mikoyan: If Hungary becomes a base groups of a counterrevolutionary nature Cde. Zhukov—there is no basis for recon- for imperialism, that’s a different matter. have emerged. sidering the decision of 31-X-56. What we’re talking about here is the cur- I don’t agree with Cde. Mikoyan that we rent situation. I have to say that everyone demanded the must support the current gov’t. We should not tolerate a pedantic approach. withdrawal of Soviet troops. Our actions must be decisive. There are still 3 days to think it over; there’ll We didn’t clarify how the counterrevolution- Remove all the unsavory elements. be advice from the comrades. aries managed to disseminate this counter- Disarm the counterrevolution. The tactic: to maintain contacts with revolutionary propaganda. them.129 Delay the parliamentary delegation to The strike is a demand for the withdrawal France. Cdes. Suslov, Brezhnev, + Hungarian com- of troops: we’ll starve in the process, but To the ambassador in Budapest—send the rades— the troops must be withdrawn. families.124 to prepare measures (on which cadres to rely Reconsider sending a parliamentary delega- and what we will do). Yesterday there was a conference. tion to Thailand. [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. They were speaking about the Declaration Cde. Bulganin—everything is being done 19-22, compiled by V. N. Malin.] of the Soviet government and the Declara- in the spirit of the decision of 31 X. tion of neutrality.134 DOCUMENT No. 12 Cde. Zhukov: Everything will be restored Stated that we will go back to work. to order. Working Notes from the Session of the But Soviet troops were being redeployed, We are acting on the basis of the Declara- CPSU CC Presidium on 2 November and the news quickly spread. tion—the redeployments will bring order. 1956, with Participation by J. Kadar, F. Munnich, and I. Bata130 The government will not be considered to Cde. Suslov—now the situation has become have any authority because of the coalition clearer. Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, nature of the government. Separate out the honest ones.125 Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Molotov, Saburov, All forces are seeking the restoration of their Suslov, Brezhnev. Cdes. Munnich, Kadar, parties. Each group wants to take power Zhukov, Suslov, Konev, Serov, Brezhnev and Bata into its own hands. This undermines the (the plan of measures).126 authority of the government even further. Exchange of Opinions about the Situation The Soc.-Democrats are especially distinc- Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin, in Hungary tive in this regard. Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, An assessment.131 In the inner cabinet the Soc.-Dems. were Furtseva, Pospelov, Konev, Serov The intelligentsia is taking the lead; given one spot. But they haven’t named a the oppositionists are supporters of Nagy; candidate; they don’t want to act in solidar- On the Situation in Hungary the armed groups are headed by ity with Nagy.135 (Mikoyan) party figures, including Nagy’s policy has counterrev. aspects to it. Dudas, an engineer.132 The soldiers freed Cardinal Mindszenty.136 About our embassy in Hungary. When the uprising ended, they spoke with (Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Zhukov, the rebels; The Austrians support a fascist organization Shepilov) these were workers, the leaders of the group; (in West Germany—a Hungarian organiza- they arrived at the coalition government; tion) 35 thous. people (Horthyites). So far, to keep the embassy.127 they didn’t want this; 396 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

The weak link is the HWP; it has ceased to moving into Szolnok. My point of view is: if the Soc.-Dems. and exist: some have been killed (workers), This was at noon. The government has been the Smallholders party are going to operate some were saved. thrown into a nervous state. on the basis of their old progams, they will They summoned Andropov. He responded: be deceitful. The leaders of 1/3 of the obkoms are taking the withdrawal of wounded soldiers. part in revolutionary committees (for the re- The people believe in nationalism and re- gion and province). Nagy was convinced that a strike against gard it as their affair.143 Local bodies have been destroyed. Budapest is being prepared. Tildy requested If the Communists declare that they support that Hungarian tanks approach the parlia- nationalism, the authority of the other par- On 1 Nov. at noon—the point of view in the ment. ties will stop increasing. government is that it’s necessary to hold discussions with the Soviet gov’t and to have In the army—a Rev. Council, The looming danger—the counterrevolution the troops withdrawn by a certain time. Maleter, Kovacs,141 and Kiraly are not sub- wouldn’t embolden these coalition parties. But this isn’t accurate.137 ordinate to the gov’t. The coalition parties don’t want counterrev. They don’t want bad ministers. My view is that there’s another path. Tildy and other cdes. are afraid of Ferenc The armed forces could be deployed to sup- Nagy.138 The whole gov’t was inclined to the view port Hungary. Those in the emigre community: they’re that if the troops move toward Budapest, the But then there will be skirmishes. afraid of them. city must be defended. The use of military force will be destruc- Tildy is afraid of Kovacs, but he’s better than In this atmosphere the idea of neutrality tive and lead to bloodshed. Tildy and is a smart man. arose. What will happen then? The morale of the The initiator of it was Zoltan Tildy. Communists will be reduced to zero. Kovacs gave a speech in Pecs:139 we are Everyone supported it. The socialist countries will suffer losses. creating a Smallholders party, but we can’t I was a supporter of the view that no sorts Is there a guarantee that such circumstances struggle on the basis of the old program. of steps should be taken without having spo- will not arise in other countries? He is against the return of the landowners ken with Andropov. and capitalists. The counterrev. forces are not meager. The whole cabinet, other than Kadar, de- But this is a matter of struggle. But they aren’t putting forth demands that clared that the Sov. gov’t is deceiving the If order is restored by force, the authority are popular in the nation. Hungarian gov’t. of the socialist countries will be eroded. They deferred it for two hours. Hour by hour the situation is moving right- The Sov. gov’t’s explanation didn’t satisfy Munnich: ward. them. They told Andropov that they’ll be A gloomy situation. taking this step.142 Why did this situation arise? 2 questions: When Andropov left, they took their step The isolation of the leaders from the masses. 1) the gov’t’s decision about neutrality, about neutrality and decided to issue an ap- Certainty that the regime exists and is pre- 2) the party. peal to the UN. served only through the support of the If these are just maneuvers, they’ll withdraw USSR.144 How did the decision about neutrality the question from the UN. This is the source of anti-Soviet sentiments emerge? When Andropov left, Kadar voted for neu- (facts: soccer, radio broadcasts).145 trality, too. In Hungary: total chaos. The strong impression is that there’s an or- The renaming of the party: the Hungarian What would be the result if the troops are ganized departure of troops. Socialist Workers’ Party (a name used back withdrawn—this would respond to the sen- The Declaration—a good impression and a in 1925). timent of the masses. reassuring gesture. The HWP has been compromised in the But the masses are very stirred-up and are view of the overwhelming masses. Counterrev. elements are receiving rein- reacting harshly. The peak of the HWP’s authority was in forcement, and their actions are not being There were movements of Sov. troops, 1948 (the alliance with the Soc.-Dems.). stopped. which alarmed the gov’t and masses.140 The Rajk affair shattered its authority. We have no more forces left. The gov’t is doing one thing, and the troops another. About the future. On the military nature of the events. Anti-Soviet sentiments are being spread by They reported that Soviet troops had crossed Yesterday I voted for these two decisions of counterrev. elements. the border in transport vehicles. Hungarian the government. formations are entrenched. Cde. Kadar—a concrete request: What should be done—to shoot or not to If they will withdraw Soviet troops in the preserve the party cadres. shoot? near future (within two-three They summoned Andropov. Andropov said months)—the decision on the withdrawal of Cde. Bata: that these are railroad workers. troops is the important thing—our party and The question is pointedly raised about the Hungarians at the border sent back tele- other parties would be able to fight against withdrawal of Soviet troops. grams saying that these definitely are not the counterrev. Everything all of them are doing will lead railroad workers. But I’m not sure this will be successful. to a confrontation of Soviet and Hungarian Then they reported that Soviet tanks are There’s no unity within the coalition. troops. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 397

I was a witness when a Hungarian unit sador to transmit to Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej his But among others there are many orderly opened fire on Soviet troops. request for advice on what to do. people. The Soviets didn’t respond. Further such 3-4 individuals monopolized relations be- restraint couldn’t be expected from even the This request to the ambassador has tween Hungary and the USSR. most disciplined army. been transmitted to Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej. This is the source of many mistakes. Whether deliberately or not, the gov’t is lay- ing the groundwork for a confrontation of Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej responded to the Rakosi would say “this is the view of the Soviet and Hungarian troops. ambassador—in a message to be conveyed Soviet cdes.,” and that would put an end to Order must be restored through a military to Imre Nagy—that he received his appeal the debate. dictatorship. and stated, by way of reassurance, that for Change the policy of the government. the life of the Hungarian working class and On the exclusion of Nagy from the party: of the Hungarian Republic it is never too Rakosi said that the Soviet cdes. share his [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. late, and I am sending Cde. Malnasan to view. 23-29, compiled by V. N. Malin.] you.153 Cde. Kadar—the decisions of the XX Con- DOCUMENT No. 13 The response has not yet been sent to gress were heartily welcomed.158 Budapest. Working Notes from the Session of the To criticize Rakosi means speaking out CPSU CC Presidium on 2 November 1956 3/XI/56 against the Soviet cdes. (Re: point IV of Protocol No. 50)146 An LI-2 aircraft (a single one) will fly The congratulatory telegram in Rakosi’s On the Plan for Measures Concerning out of Bucharest at 10:20 Bucharest time name (caused confusion).159 Hungary147 for a trip into Budapest city airport. On (Zhukov, Serov, Konev, Molotov, Mikoyan, board the aircraft is Malnasan.154 For 12 years: the Soviet comrades were Kaganovich, Bulganin, Voroshilov) calm with Rakosi at the head and then Gero [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. (they didn’t raise objections to them). 1) to speak about the threat of fascism 67-69, compiled by V. N. Malin.] posed by the Horthyites;148 What now? the threat to our homeland, DOCUMENT No. 15 On Nagy’s behavior. they want to use it as a base against They’re killing Communists. our country; Working Notes from the Session of the The counterrev. are killing them, and pre- the workers and peasants support CPSU CC Presidium on 3 November mier Nagy provides a cover. us. 1956, with Participation by J. Kadar, F. Adopt it with amendments. Munnich, and I. Horvath The government lacks the forces to put an end to it. 2) send Cdes. Mikoyan and Brezhnev149 Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin, (decide on 3 XI 56). Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, What must be done? Kirichenko, Saburov, Suslov, Brezhnev, Surrendering a socialist country to Approve the plan.150 Pospelov155 counterrev. is impossible. I agree with you. [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. On the Preparation of Documents for Use The correct course of action is to form a rev. 30, compiled by V. N. Malin.] in Hungary government. (Khrushchev, Mikoyan) DOCUMENT No. 14 I’d like to dwell on one point: The documents are poorly prepared. the whole nation is taking part in the move- Notes of a Secure Phone Call from the Cdes. Suslov, Mikoyan, and Shepilov are ment. USSR Ambassador in Romania, A. A. to prepare the documents.156 The nation does not want to liquidate the Epishev151 peop.-dem. order. On the Composition of the Hungarian 3/XI/56 Gov’t The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hun- (Mikoyan)157 gary has great significance. Bucharest, Cde. Epishev152 We are being strengthened in our military Cde. Mikoyan: At the head of the gov’t is relationship, and are becoming weaker in A message. Kadar. the political. National sentiments are offended (form, Late in the evening of 2 Nov. after a Kadar—it is worth speaking about mis- title). discussion with the Soviet ambassador, Imre takes, but for a long while there was no time. Nagy summoned the Romanian ambassador About one matter—why in the summer they Cde. Kadar: and told him that he, Imre Nagy, has re- chose Gero as secretary. This government must not be puppetlike, ceived verified information that Soviet The Soviet comrades always helped, but there must be a base for its activities and troops are entering the country. there was one mistake: only 3-4 support among workers. Hungarian cdes. enjoyed the full trust of the There must be an answer to the question of In this connection, he asks the ambas- Soviet cdes.: Rakosi, Gero, Farkas. what sort of relationship we must have with 398 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the USSR. choice. We cannot regard I. Nagy as a Com- might be dangerous.170 munist. Dulles needs someone just like I. We must convince them that they should Cde. Munnich: Nagy. We uphold the Declaration. But with refrain from this reference Believes that Cde. Kadar’s assessment and I. Nagy that’s impossible! to the Rakosi-Gero clique. conclusions are correct. Eng. + Fr. Egypt.165 We consulted with other parties. Malen., Khr. Poland. Kadar is calling (1 XI) for a condemnation Cde. Kadar—the center of counterrev. is We can’t be observers on the sidelines. of Stalinism.171 in the city of Gyor.160 Yug., Rankovic, Kardelj, Micunovic, the If we declare Nagy’s gov’t counterrev., all ambassador in Mosc. + Malenk., Khrush. The title of Hungarian Workers’ Party parties will fall under this rubric. Alarm! should be retained. The government does not want to struggle Revol. government. The traitors want to use We should come to agreement with them against the counterrev. Kadar as a screen. If I. Nagy is not forced and prevent them from shifting to Yugoslav into retirement, he’ll be working for the en- positions. The position: emy. on the basis of defending the peop.-dem. Cde. Molotov—reinforce the military vic- order, socialist gains, and friendship with —Munnich — Apro | Hidas tory through political means. the USSR and with other socialist countries deputy, —Ronai | Berei and cooperation with all peaceloving coun- internal affairs, Kiss | Andics Cde. Khrushchev—I don’t understand tries. defense —Marosan Cde. Molotov. He comes up with the most —Kadar as chairman Kovacs pernicious ideas. At the head of the gov’t is Kadar. —Kossa at finance Egri Veg Cde. Molotov—you should keep quiet and To send: Malenkov, Mikoyan, Brezhnev.161 They want to isolate Kadar stop being so overbearing. To fly off: (at 2:00-3:00) at 7:00 to 8:00 in —Dogei the morning. Miskolc |—> Budapest Cde. Bulganin—we should condemn the Szolnok | incorrect line of Rakosi-Gero. [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 31-33ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.] [Source: Magyar Orszagos Leveltar, XIX J- Cde. Khrushchev:The declaration is good 1-K Horvath Imre kulugyminiszter iratai, —we must act honorably. DOCUMENT No. 16 55, doboz.] Cde. Shepilov—during the editing they Imre Horvath’s Notes of Khrushchev’s DOCUMENT No. 17 added the phrase “the clique of Rakosi and Speech at the 3 November Session162 Gero.” Working Notes from the Session of the We are giving them legal opportunities to Khrush., Bulg., Vorosh., Malen., Molot., CPSU CC Presidium on 4 November 1956 denigrate the entire 12-year period of the Kagan., Mikoyan, Brezhnev (Re: Protocol No. 51) HWP’s work.

Khrush.: Organized counterrev. Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Cde. Shepilov—is it really necessary to dis- Events are without letup. Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, parage cadres? From the north. Pervukhin, Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev, Tomorrow it will be the “clique of Mistakes of Rakosi, Gero, + others Zhukov, Shepilov, Furtseva, Pospelov. Ulbricht.”172 Miskolc!163 We are doing a lot, but not everything! On the Operations and Situation in Hun- Cde. Saburov—if they themselves don’t This is no justification for the fact that gary166 comprehend their mistakes, we will deal at there are no Hungarian leaders! length with the matter. Rakosi was paralyzed, but we didn’t actively Cde. Kaganovich’s ciphered cable from speak out. We were too late in requesting Cde. Malinin Reward the military personnel. that he be replaced. at Cde. Khrushchev Take care of the families of those who per- It’s my fault and Mikoyan’s that we pro- (4 XI).167 ished.173 posed Gero rather than Kadar.164 We gave 1) Bring back Cdes. Mikoyan and Brezhnev. in to Gero. Rak. and Gero are honorable and 2) Provide assistance to Hungary.168 V. On Purging the Higher Educational committed Communists. But they did many 3) More actively take part in the assistance Institutions of Unsavory Elements stupid things. to Egypt.169 (Cdes. Zhukov, Khrushchev, Furtseva, Rak. is hardline, and Gero hapless. Think through a number of measures (per- Pervukhin, Voroshilov) They criticized I. Nagy and regarded him haps a demonstration at the English em- as an opportunist, but he is also a traitor. bassy). Furtseva, Pospelov, Shepilov, and Elyutin The exclusion of I. Nagy from the party was More widely in the newspapers. are to come up with recommendations for a mistake and a reflection of Rak.’s stupid- purging the higher educational institutions ity. We would have arrested I. Nagy. We Cde. Molotov—think about Hungary. of unsavory elements.174 were for admitting him back into the party. Exert influence on Kadar so that Hungary Some of the rebels are not enemies! They does not go the route of Yugoslavia. They IV. On the Response to Cde. Kardelj and were antagonized by the mistakes of the made changes in the Declaration—they now the Telegram About Imre Nagy leadership. We welcome your (Kad.’s) condemn the Rakosi-Gero clique—and this COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 399

Affirm the text of the response.175 Cde. Malenkov—without harsh criticism of On Instructions to the Soviet Ambassa- Cde. Mikoyan—overall it should be Rakosi we won’t be able to strengthen the dor in Hungary adopted. [Hungarian] leadership. They’re setting forth their own program. A On the Raising of the Question at the Gen. Cde. Molotov—in whose name is the docu- CC plenum should not be convened (since Assembly’s Session on Hungary ment being issued (from the CC)? The com- Nagy is also a member of the CC).182 position of the CC is still unknown. It is Cde. Kadar is to say that he will withdraw unclear what entity is supporting democra- Cde. Zhukov—we must decisively support the question from the UN.176 tization if there is still a CC of the HWP. In Cde. Kadar. Otherwise they won’t under- actuality, the dissolution of the party is be- stand us. Rakosi conducted an inapprop. [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. ing proposed. policy, which must be condemned. 34-36ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.] A new party will be created on an unknown basis. Where will it lead? Cde. Saburov—I support Cde. Mikoyan. DOCUMENT No. 18 In April 1956 there was an appeal from the Cde. Molotov—we must not forget that a Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC. We sent greetings to the HWP change of names is a change of character. CPSU CC Presidium on 5 November 1956 CC (we acknowledged their services).180 What’s going on is the creation of a new (Re: Point VIII of Protocol No. 52) Yugoslavia. We are responsible for Hungary They’re talking about acknowledgment of (without Stalin). On the Party in Hungary177 Marxism-Leninism, but in reality everything I vehemently object. (Khrushchev, Zhukov, Molotov) can be acknowledged. Cde. Furtseva—raises the question: where Today this question need not be considered. So far we have concurred in not resolving were the leaders? The old name (HWP) will not be suitable. the question of the renaming of the party. The people fully support them. The name must be in accord with Marxist- We should not use the expression “the Len. content. Rakosi clique.”181 Cde. Brezhnev: The Declaration is appro- priate. It’s pointless to theorize about it. Cde. Zhukov—consult with secretaries of Cde. Suslov—the draft of the appeal is cor- the provincial party committees. rect—no one is talking about the dissolu- Cde. Saburov: Cdes. Molotov and tion of the HWP. The party’s basic prin- Kaganovich are simplistically and dogmati- Cde. Molotov—it would be important to ciples are being preserved. cally approaching the question. preserve the old name of the HWP. We must support it. On the “clique”—the The party will be better. issue is not the name, but the mistakes that Cde. Voroshilov—through the CC we were made. The Hungarian comrades again Cde. Mikoyan—Cde. Molotov is com- should hold a conference of the party aktiv will have suspicions; let’s dispel them. pletely ignoring the concrete situation— and consult about the name of the party. Cde. Molotov is dragging us backward. Cde. Kaganovich: This is a step forward. Speak about Nagy. Cde. Malenkov—we don’t need to consider Having discreet influence on Kadar. Over- it right now. all it should be adopted. Cde. Voroshilov—Cde. Molotov’s state- We should try to suggest not changing the ments are fundamentally correct. Cde. Kaganovich—consider it organiza- name of the party. We should suggest they But in this case it’s impossible to adopt. tionally, in essence. speak about friendship with the USSR. We should suggest they decline mentioning both Cde. Aristov—we must endorse and sup- [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. the name and the Rakosi clique. port Cde. Kadar. The statements by Cdes. 40-40ob. Compiled by V. N. Malin.] Molotov and Kaganovich—they clung to the Cde. Bulganin—The Declaration is fine. cult of Stalin, and they’re still clinging to it. DOCUMENT No. 19 Cde. Mikoyan’s changes are correct.As for the statements by Cdes. Molotov and Cde. Shvernik—Cde. Molotov is incorrect. Working Notes from the Session of the Kaganovich: no one is talking about the How can we not say something if Rakosi CPSU CC Presidium on 6 November 1956 dissolution of the HWP. That’s a mislead- caused a great deal of harm? (Re: Protocol No. 53) ing argument. There is no principled basis for Cde. Cde. Shepilov—the document is appropri- Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Malenkov, Molotov to couch the matter that way. ate. Say—a condemnation of Nagy. On the Mikoyan, Molotov, Kaganovich, Pervukhin, “clique”: we will leave a stain on the so- Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, On friendship with the USSR, we shouldn’t cialist past. Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, mention it. Leave it as they propose (spo- Aristov, Belyaev, Pospelov178 ken about friendship). Cde. Khrushchev—a good draft. We should make changes. Indicate which I. On the Appeal of the Provisional CC Cde. Pervukhin—a proper document. group is presenting it. If the CC is convened, of the Hungarian Socialist (Workers’) The HWP CC collapsed. It’s not true that if it should be said then that we have faith in Party179 we call something a “clique,” we’re con- Kadar.183 For Cde. Molotov this is logical demning the whole party. (Cde. Molotov doesn’t come out and say it, (The text is read aloud by Cde. Malenkov.) but he’s thinking of bringing back both 400 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Hegedus and Rakosi). Presidium, shortly after his arrival in Budapest TRANSLATOR’S NOTES on 13 July, that the situation in Hungary would Rakosi caused enormous damage, and for never improve so long as Rakosi remained the leader of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HWP). this he must be held accountable. 1 Protocol No. 28 was the formal protocol drafted Acting on behalf of the Soviet Presidium, He must be excluded from the party.184 for this session, which is now stored in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii Mikoyan engineered the dismissal of Rakosi from the HWP leadership and all other posts, a step Cde. Khrushchev: (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 3, Opis’ (Op.) 14, Delo (D.) 41, Listy (Ll.) 1-2. The session was that Rakosi’s colleagues welcomed, but had not dared to pursue on their own in the absence of a Cde. Kaganovich, when will you mend your held on both 9 and 12 July 1956, but the item ways and stop all your toadying? Holding covered here (Point IV) was discussed solely on direct Soviet initiative. The new information from to some sort of hardened position. What the 12th. Mikoyan caused the CPSU leadership to send a Cde. Molotov and Kaganovich are propos- 2 This refers to a ciphered telegram from the new cable to Togliatti on 13 July (“Shifr- ing is the line of screeching and face-slap- Soviet ambassador in Hungary, Yu. V. Andropov, telegramma,” 13 July 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 14, D. 43/2, L. 2) urging him to be aware, in any on 9 July 1956. The lengthy telegram, stored in ping. Speak about Nagy. About Losonczy interviews he might give about Hungary, that and Donath. Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 151-162, recounts a dis- Rakosi would not be in power much longer. cussion that Andropov had with the Hungarian Moscow’s willingness to rely on Togliatti is some- Cdes. Mikoyan, Suslov, and Brezhnev are leader, Erno Gero, three days earlier. Gero had what surprising because a recent interview with Togliatti, published in the Italian Communist daily to transmit our changes and requests in a spoken about the disarray within the Hungarian tactful manner. leadership and the growing ferment in Hungar- L’Unita on 17 June 1956, had provoked dismay ian society. in certain quarters of the HWP leadership. The II. Ciph. Tel. No. . . . from . . . . 3 Here and elsewhere in Malin’s notes, the list- Soviet ambassador in Budapest, Yurii Andropov, 185 ing of surnames in parentheses after the title of a had noted these misgivings in an important cable (Zhukov, Shepilov) he sent to the CPSU Presidium on 9 July. See session means that these individuals spoke, in the “Shifrtelegramma,” from Yu. V. Andropov, 9 July Affirm as an unfortunate event.186 sequence indicated, about the given topic. The formal protocol for this session, as cited in Note 1956 (Strictly Secret—Special Dossier), in APRF, 1 supra, reveals that Molotov, Kaganovich, and F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 151-162. Andropov had [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. Bulganin also spoke about the subject. recommended that newspapers in East Germany and Czechoslovakia be asked to publish articles 41-45ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.] 4 Mikoyan arrived in Budapest the following day (13 July) and was there until 21 July. The most in support of Rakosi, but he made no such rec- ommendation about L’Unita. DOCUMENT No. 20 important of the ciphered telegrams, secure phone 7 messages, and reports that he and Andropov sent Laszlo Rajk was one of the leaders of the HWP back from Budapest during this time were declas- until 1949, when he fell victim to the Stalinist Working Notes from the Session of the purges. In October 1949 he was sentenced to CPSU CC Presidium on 27 November sified in 1992 and published in “Vengriya, aprel’- oktyabr’ 1956 goda: Informatsiya Yu. V. death on trumped-up charges, a case that Rakosi 1956 helped mastermind. Following Stalin’s death, 187 Andropova, A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova iz (Re: Protocol No. 60) Budapeshta,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, No. 4 (1993), rehabilitations of the “unjustly repressed” began pp. 110-128. Lake Balaton, the largest lake in in all the East-bloc countries, albeit at varying rates. This process moved rather slowly in Hun- I. From Bucharest. Central Europe, is a popular Hungarian vacation (Khr., Vorosh., Kagan., Mik., Mol., Perv., site that was also favored by party and govern- gary and did not initially extend to Rajk and his associates, but calls for the rehabilitation of Rajk Bulg., Sab., Zhuk., Grom.) ment leaders. 5 This means that preparation of a lead editorial steadily increased. After Rakosi staged a come- for Pravda was entrusted to Pospelov, Shepilov, back in March-April 1955, he tried, for obvious It’s not advisable.188 reasons, to deflect the growing pressure for Rajk’s and Ponomarev. (The formal protocol for the We should inform Dej that this is not to our session, as cited in Note 1 supra, explicitly stated: rehabilitation. In early 1956, however, the pro- advantage, and is not to the advantage of “Instruct Cdes. Pospelov, Shepilov, and cess of rehabilitation in Hungary gained greater Hungary. Ponomarev to prepare, on the basis of the ex- momentum because of the limited “thaw” inspired change of opinions at the CPSU CC Presidium by the 20th Soviet Party Congress. On 28 March 1956, Rakosi finally gave in and announced the Cde. Bulg. is to negotiate with Cde. Dej.189 session, an article for publication in the press about the internationalist solidarity of workers in formal rehabilitation of Rajk, though his an- the countries of people’s democracy and about nouncement (published in Szabad Nep on 29 Zhukov—we should state our view of the March) contained no admission of personal re- position of the Yugoslavs. the intrigues of imperialists who are carrying out their subversive work to weaken ties among the sponsibility for the case. On 18 May, Rakosi did acknowledge a degree of personal culpability for countries of the socialist camp.”) The article, pub- Khr.—we don’t need to enter into corre- lished on 16 July, denounced the “intrigues of the repressions of 1949-1952 (though not for the spondence with Tito about Imre Nagy; that’s imperialist agents” who were seeking to exploit Rajk case), but this was not enough to curb po- a matter for Hungary to handle. It was a the ferment in Eastern Europe after the 20th CPSU litical unrest in Hungary. Rakosi was dismissed from his posts as HWP First Secretary and an mistake for our officer to go into the bus.190 Congress. It claimed that members of the Petofi HWP Politburo member by the HWP Central Circle in Hungary had “fallen under the influence Leadership (i.e., Central Committee) on 18 July II.191 of imperialist circles” and were “disseminating their anti-party views under the guise of a dis- 1956. (At Mikoyan’s behest, the dismissal had cussion club.” been arranged by the HWP Politburo on 13 July Instructions to: 6 Togliatti was indeed contacted by the Hungar- and was then formally endorsed by a plenum of the HWP Central Leadership five days later.) The Foreign Ministry ian newspaper Szabad Nep, at Moscow’s behest, KGB, and on 12 July 1956 about the possibility of giving Subsequently, Rakosi was stripped of all his other On the discrediting of Imre.192 an interview to explain the “significance of pro- posts. On 26 July 1956, Rakosi fled to the Soviet Union, where he spent the remaining 25 years of Konev letarian internationalism” and how to “strengthen the positions of the popular-democratic order in his life in exile. Back in Hungary, Rajk and three other high-level victims of the purge trials in 1949 [Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. Hungary.” Before the interview could be con- ducted, however, Mikoyan informed the CPSU (Gyorgy Palffy, Tibor Szonyi, and Andras Szalai) 52, compiled by V. N. Chernukha.] were reinterred in formal ceremonies on 6 Octo- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 401 ber 1956, an event that contributed to the grow- Instytut Historyczny, 1992). Here and elsewhere call Soviet troops from their agricultural work was ing social unrest in Hungary. in Malin’s notes, Rokossowski’s surname is mis- part of the “Volna” plan, which placed Soviet 8 This passage in Malin’s notes is ambiguous be- spelled as “Rokkosowski.” The spelling has been forces on increased alert in mid-October and cause Rakosi’s surname, like other foreign sur- corrected in the translation. brought them to full combat alert by 20-21 Octo- names that end in vowels other than “a,” does 13 It is not entirely clear from these brief points ber at the behest of the Soviet General Staff. The not decline in Russian. Most likely, Khrushchev what the Soviet Presidium was intending to do. full plan was due to be put into effect when a was saying that “we must alleviate Rakosi’s situ- Most evidence suggests, however, that they signal known as “Kompas” was received. ation.” It is possible, however, that Khrushchev planned to hold new military exercises in Poland 19 No such informational report had actually been was saying that “Rakosi must alleviate the situa- and to form a “provisional revolutionary commit- prepared by 21 October, when a meeting of East- tion,” which would imply the need for Rakosi to tee” of pro-Soviet Polish officials, who would bloc leaders was hastily arranged. But by the time step down. Unfortunately, there is no way to de- then be installed in place of Gomulka. This is the meeting was held on 24 October, the start of termine which of these two, very different inter- roughly what occurred with Hungary in early No- the uprising in Hungary on 23 October forced pretations is correct. The Hungarian edition of vember, when a “revolutionary workers’ and peas- Khrushchev to cover the events in Hungary in the Malin notes fails to take account of this am- ants’ government” was formed in Moscow, with some detail. See Kramer, “Hungary and Poland, biguity. See Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich at its head. 1956,” pp. 1, 50-56. Rainer, eds., Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet Kadar’s government was installed when Soviet 20 Unfortunately, only a small fragment of this partelnokseg vitai Magyarorszagrol (Budapest: troops moved in on 4 November. session has been found. It is possible that miss- 1956-os Intezet, 1996), p. 19. Sereda and Rainer 14 Khrushchev declined to mention that he him- ing pages will turn up in other parts of the Malin opt for the former interpretation (“we must alle- self—and the rest of the Soviet leadership— had collection, but for now the brief (but important) viate Rakosi’s situation”) without even consider- “grossly” misjudged the situation in Poland over section below is all that is available. ing the latter. the previous few months. This was evident, for 21 The formal protocol for this session (Protocol 9 Here and elsewhere in Malin’s notes, the inclu- example, when Ochab stopped in Moscow in Sep- No. 48) did not list the Hungarian question among sion of surnames in parentheses after a statement tember 1956 on his way back from Beijing. See the twelve other matters considered here. The or proposal means that these individuals sup- “Priem Posla Pol’skoi Narodnoi Respubliki v most likely reason is that Mikoyan was opposed ported the statement or proposal. SSSR tov. V. Levikovskogo, 10 sentyabrya 1956 to the use of Soviet troops in Hungary, preferring 10 The formal protocol for this session (see cita- g.,” 11 September 1956 (Secret), memorandum instead to rely on political mediation (see below). tion in Note 1 supra) contained the following from N. Patolichev, Soviet deputy foreign minis- The Presidium therefore had to adopt its decision point on this matter: “Instruct Cde. Mikoyan to ter, in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi without unanimity, an unprecedented step for such travel to Hungary for discussions with the lead- Federatsii (AVPRF), F. Referentura po Pol’she, an important matter. As a result, no decree on ership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party.” The ref- Op. 38, Por. 9, Papka, 126, D. 031, L. 1. this issue was included as an extract in the for- erence here is to Istvan Kovacs, a top Hungarian 15 This session of the CPSU CC Presidium was mal protocol. Communist official who fled to Moscow at the held on 24 October. See the assessment of the 22 In fact, the radio station was not on fire, but end of October 1956, not to Bela Kovacs, the meeting and translation of handwritten Czech heavy smoke from several nearby cars that had former Secretary General of the Independent notes by Mark Kramer, “Hungary and Poland, been set alight had created the impression that Smallholders’ Party. Soviet leaders knew that 1956: Khrushchev’s CPSU CC Presidium Meet- the building, too, was burning. Zhukov’s refer- Istvan Kovacs had long been dissatisfied with ing on East European Crises, 24 October 1956,” ence to the storming of the radio building indi- Rakosi’s performance. See “Telefonogramma v Cold War International History Project Bulletin, cates that this CPSU Presidium meeting must TsK KPSS,” from M. A. Suslov to the CPSU Pre- Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 50-56. have taken place shortly after 10 p.m. Moscow sidium and Secretariat, 13 June 1956 (Top Se- 16 As it turned out, Khrushchev phoned Mao, and time. The storming of the building was sparked cret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 6, D. 483, Ll. 146-149. the Chinese leader decided to send a high-level mainly by the broadcast of a hardline speech by 11 On 19 October 1956, the day before this Pre- delegation to Moscow for consultations. The Erno Gero at precisely 10 p.m. Moscow time (8 sidium meeting, Khrushchev led a top-level So- delegation, led by Liu Shaoqi, arrived on 23 Oc- p.m. Budapest time). It is clear that the CPSU viet delegation on an unannounced visit to War- tober and stayed until the 31st. Presidium meeting was over by around 11 p.m. saw. The Soviet delegates held tense negotiations 17 Not until three days later would the uprising (Moscow time), when orders were transmitted by with the Polish leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, in in Hungary begin, but Andropov’s telegrams from Zhukov for the mobilization of five Soviet divi- an effort to prevent the removal of Marshal Budapest on 12 and 14 October had kept the sions. See “TsK KPSS,” memorandum from Konstantin Rokossowski and other officials from CPSU leadership apprised of the rapidly mount- Zhukov and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief the Politburo of the Polish United Workers’ Party ing crisis within the HWP and Hungarian soci- of the Soviet General Staff, to the CPSU Pre- (PZPR). The Soviet delegates were unsuccess- ety. The two telegrams were declassified in 1992 sidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret—Spe- ful in their task, despite exerting strong military and published in “Vengriya, aprel’-oktyabr’ 1956 cial Dossier), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. and political pressure on Gomulka. For a fuller g.,” pp. 110-128. 85-87. Hence, the meeting must have been held account of the meeting, see the notes by one of 18 The reference here is to the large number of between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. It is remarkable the participants, Anastas Mikoyan, in “Zapis’ Soviet officers who were busy at the time help- that, for a session convened at such short notice, besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Varshave,” October ing out with the harvest. Although the uprising so many Presidium members were able to attend. 1956, No. 233 (Strictly Secret—Special Dossier), in Hungary had not yet begun, Soviet troops in Although a meeting had already been scheduled in APRF, Osobaya papka, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 2, Ll. that country had been preparing since mid-July to discuss other matters, it was abruptly moved 1-14. to undertake large-scale operations aimed at “up- up to take account of the situation in Hungary. 23 12 Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, a Polish- holding and restoring public order.” A full “Plan Khrushchev is referring here to the requests born officer who had lived most of his life in the of Operations for the Special Corps to Restore for military intervention he had received from Soviet Union and was a marshal in the Soviet Public Order on the Territory of Hungary,” which Erno Gero. The request came initially via Yurii army, was installed as defense minister and com- received the codename “Volna” (Wave), was ap- Andropov (who transmitted Gero’s appeal to mander-in-chief in Poland in December 1949. He proved on 20 July 1956 by General Pyotr Moscow and followed up with an emergency also was a full member of the PZPR Politburo. Lashchenko. See “Plan deistvii Osobogo korpusa phone call) and then was repeated during a phone He was one of hundreds of high-ranking Soviet po vosstanovleniyu obshchestvennogo poryadka call that Khrushchev placed to Gero. A written officers who were brought into the Polish army na territorii Vengrii,” in Tsentral’nyi arkhiv appeal from then-prime minister Andras Hegedus, in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Not surpris- Ministerstva oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii supposedly delivered on the night of 23-24 Octo- ingly, their presence caused widespread resent- (TsAMO), F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, Ll. 130-131. ber 1956, was transmitted by Andropov in a ci- ment. For a detailed account of this phenomenon, See also the account by Lieut.-General E. I. phered telegram on 28 October. See see Edward Jan Nalepa, Oficerowie Radziecky w Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta” “Shifrtelegramma” (Strictly Secret—Urgent), 28 Wojsku Polskim w latach 1943-1968: Studium (Part 1), Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No 10 October 1956, in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. historyczno-wojskowe (Warsaw: Wojskowy (October 1993), pp. 24-25. The proposal to re- 5, L. 12. 402 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

24 Mikoyan, Suslov, Malinin, and Serov arrived Central Committee. minister. The posters called for a demonstration somewhat late in Budapest because inclement 31 The reference here is to young people from in support of Kovacs, who was in Pecs at the time weather forced Mikoyan’s and Suslov’s plane to Hungary studying in the Soviet Union, who would recovering from nine years of imprisonment in be diverted to an airport 90 kilometers north of not have been included in the 126 mentioned the Soviet Union (between 1947 and 1955). When the capital. A Soviet armored personnel carrier, above. Kovacs was contacted by the Hungarian presi- accompanied by tanks, brought the four into 32 This annotation was in the bottom left-hand dent, Istvan Dobi, on 27 October over the phone, Budapest, where they promptly began sending margin of Malin’s notes. It refers to copies of the he tentatively agreed to serve as agriculture min- reports back to Moscow. See “Shifrtelegramma” messages from Mikoyan and Suslov. ister in Nagy’s reorganized government. But from Mikoyan and Suslov to the CPSU Pre- 33 According to Khrushchev’s remarks above, the Kovacs did not actually participate in any gov- sidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in session on 26 October was to be reconvened at 8 ernment deliberations until he returned to AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll. 1-7. A ret- p.m. to consider the latest information from Budapest on 1 November, by which time the situ- rospective account of Mikoyan’s and Suslov’s ar- Mikoyan and Suslov. The double-sided page of ation had changed a great deal. [Ed. note: An rival in Budapest, by , who handwritten notes pertaining to the continuation English translation of the Mikoyan-Suslov report was a senior aide to Andropov in 1956 and who of the session, which is provided here, was out of of 27 October 1956 cited above appears in later followed in Andropov’s footsteps at the sequence in File 1005. In the earlier published CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 29-30, from KGB, claims that Mikoyan’s and Suslov’s plane versions of Malin’s notes (the Hungarian transla- a copy of the document in TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. was diverted northward because it came under tion and the original Russian), this fragment is 45, Dok. 9. However, it contains a mistransla- fire and was struck by a machine gun. Kryuchkov incorrectly placed at the end of the 28 October tion of the passage referring to the posters which also asserts that Mikoyan and the others had to session. Close analysis of the text reveals that had gone up in Budapest declaring Nagy a traitor walk for more than two hours to reach the em- the fragment must have come before, not after, and supporting Bela Kovacs. The mistranslated bassy. See Vladimir Kryuchkov, Lichnoe delo, 2 the portions on the 28th. The fact that the 26 portion notes that placards had appeared in vols. (Moscow: Olimp, 1996), vol. 1, p. 58. There October session was due to be reconvened sug- Budapest at night, “in which Nagy was declared is no evidence whatsoever to back up gests that this is precisely what the fragment cov- the chairman and Bela Kovacs was recommended Kryuchkov’s assertions. On the contrary, ers, rather than being part of a separate meeting as premier,” and that a demonstration was planned Mikoyan’s and Suslov’s contemporaneous report on the 27th. (There is no evidence that the Pre- “in their honor.” It should have read that Nagy seems far more reliable than Kryuchkov’s ten- sidium met on the 27th to discuss the situation in was called “a traitor” and that the demonstration dentious memoir. Hungary.) was called on “his” (Bela Kovacs’) behalf. The 25 The notes provide no further names of mem- 34 Bulganin is complaining about the long tele- Bulletin regrets the error.] 42 bers of the Chinese delegation, who were in Mos- grams and secure phone messages that Mikoyan An emergency session of the UN Security cow for consultations between 23 and 31 Octo- and Suslova had been sending to Moscow on 25 Council was convened on 28 October in the mid- ber. The delegation, headed by Liu Shaoqi, in- and 26 October. See Note 28 supra. See also afternoon (New York time) to discuss the situa- cluded the CPC General Secretary, Deng “Shifrtelegramma,” 25 October 1956 (Strictly tion in Hungary. The Soviet Foreign Ministry Xiaoping, as well as three lower-ranking officials: Secret—Special Attention), in AVPRF, F. 059a, originally had instructed Arkadii Sobolev, the Wang Jiaxing, Hu Qiaomu, and Shi Zhe. Soviet Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll. 8-11. Soviet representative at the Security Council, to leaders conferred with them several times about 35 On 30 October a Revolutionary Military Coun- depict the events in Hungary as being inspired the events in Poland and Hungary. cil was set up within the Hungarian army, but it solely by fascist, anti-democratic elements. See 26 By this point, Rokossowski already had been was not the type of body that Kaganovich had in “Shifrtelegramma,” 27 October 1956 (Strictly removed from the PZPR CC Politburo. The only mind. He was referring to an armed organization Secret—Special Dossier), in AVPRF, F. 0536, Op. remaining question was whether he would be kept that would suppress the uprising, whereas the 1, P. 5, D. 65, Ll. 24-28. Khrushchev’s statement as Polish national defense minister. Revolutionary Military Council did just the op- here suggests that the Presidium must issue new 27 For the continuation of the session, see the posite, expressing strong support for the resistance instructions to Sobolev, ordering him to take ac- portion below and the explanation in Note 33 in- and demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops count of the latest developments in Hungary. 43 fra. from Hungary. Zhukov is referring here to the strongest cen- 28 On 26 October, Mikoyan and Suslov sent four 36 Actually, of those who had been detained since ter of resistance in the densely populated region emergency messages via secure telephone to the the start of the uprising, more than 8,000 had been around the Corvin film theater in downtown CPSU Presidium. See the longest and most im- released by this time. Budapest. Counterinsurgency operations against portant of these messages, “Telefonogramma,” 26 37 Khrushchev evidently means that they should this area were supposed to commence on the October 1956 (Top Secret—Deliver Immedi- confer with the recently ousted prime minister morning of 28 October, but Nagy cancelled those ately), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 123- Andras Hegedus and other Hungarian officials plans because of the risk of heavy civilian casu- 129. who had been removed from high-level party and alties. 29 44 The reference here is slightly awry. The num- state positions after 23 October. For an illuminating account of events in ber given in parentheses (126) refers to the total 38 This trip never occurred, presumably because Debrecen, where anti-Gero demonstrations pre- number of Hungarians studying in Moscow, in- of time constraints as events in Hungary gath- ceded those in Budapest on 23 October, see Tibor cluding party workers, military officers, state se- ered pace. A. Filep, A debreceni forradalom, 1956 oktober: curity officials, and others. See “Zapis’ besedy s 39 Mikoyan had planned to travel to Austria at Tizenket nap kronikaja (Debrecen: poslom Vengerskoi Narodnoi Respubliki tov. the very end of October 1956, but his trip ended Mozgaskorlatozottak Egyesulete, 1990). 45 Yanoshem Boldotskim, 26 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” up being postponed until April 1957. Here and elsewhere in Malin’s notes, Cable No. 597/AR (Secret) from A. A. Gromyko, 40 Some of the pages from this session were out Hegedus’s surname is mistakenly rendered as Soviet deputy foreign minister, to the CPSU Pre- of sequence in the original file. The order has Hedegus. The spelling has been corrected in the sidium, 26 October 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, been corrected in the translation. translation. 46 D. 484, Ll. 116-117. Malin’s notes imply that 41 Hundreds of demonstrations and meetings had Mikoyan and Suslov were taking part in this the figure includes only HWP officials studying been taking place in Hungary since 23 October, HWP Central Committee plenum, which ad- at the Higher Party School. even after a curfew was imposed. Evidently, journed around 5:30 p.m. Budapest time. The 30 A “Directory,” which served as the highest Khrushchev is referring here to a warning he re- HWP Central Committee endorsed the program HWP organ, had been created by this point under ceived on 27 October in an emergency message of Nagy’s new government and conferred su- Soviet auspices, but its existence had not yet been from Mikoyan and Suslov (APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, preme power on a new HWP Presidium consist- officially announced. The existence of the Di- D. 484, Ll. 131-134). The message noted that ing of Janos Kadar (as chair), Antal Apro, Ferenc rectory was acknowledged for the first time on posters had gone up in Budapest declaring Imre Munnich, Imre Nagy, Zoltan Szanto, and Karoly 28 October (three days after it had been set up), Nagy a traitor and demanding that Bela Kovacs, Kiss. See the CC resolution in Szabad Nep when it was renamed the HWP Presidium and the former General Secretary of the Independent (Budapest), 29 October 1956, p. 1. 47 was formally granted supreme power by the HWP Smallholders Party, be instated as the new prime This sentence fragment is highly ambiguous COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 403

in Russian. The final word in the fragment, trans- restoration of the Kossuth emblem as the national launching air raids against Egyptian cities and lated here as “directly,” is samim, which literally emblem, and the immediate withdrawal of So- imposing a naval blockade. means “by itself” or “by himself.” The anteced- viet troops from Budapest as well as subsequent 63 Here again, Khrushchev is referring to pro- ent might be either the HWP Politburo or negotiations on a full withdrawal from Hungary. posed corrections in the draft Hungarian state- Mikoyan, or perhaps something or someone else. The statement also rejected previous character- ment. It is doubtful there was enough time for The ambiguity cannot be fully conveyed in En- izations of the uprising as a “counterrevolution,” most such changes to be included. glish (which has separate words for “itself” and saying that the events were representative of a 64 In line with this decision, the CPSU Presidium “himself”), but the translation tries to do so as “broad national-democratic movement” that was sent a message to Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz ex- best as possible. seeking to achieve “national independence and pressing support for Nagy’s new government and 48 Here again, Zhukov is referring to the center sovereignty” for Hungary. Unfortunately, the for the statement Nagy issued on 28 October. The of resistance around the Corvin cinema. draft of this declaration that the CPSU CC Pre- Polish authorities followed up with an appeal to 49 Khrushchev is referring here to the coalition sidium was presumably considering at this meet- the HWP and the Hungarian people, published in government that was formed (or actually reorga- ing has not yet been located by scholars. the PZPR daily Trybuna Ludu on 29 October, nized) on 27 October. This government included, 53 Nothing follows Bulganin’s name in the origi- which expressed “shock,” “pain,” and “deep dis- on an informal basis, representatives of parties nal. quiet” at “the tragic news coming from [Hun- from the pre-Communist era: Bela Kovacs, the 54 Most likely, the “you” (Vas ) in this sentence gary]” and called for “an end to the bloodshed, former General Secretary of the Smallholders should have been “them” (ikh), referring to destruction, and fratricidal struggle.” Party; Zoltan Tildy, the former leader of the Mikoyan and Suslov, the former of whom was 65 As a result of this decision, the CPSU Pre- Smallholders Party; and Ferenc Erdei, the former still in Hungary. If so, Voroshilov was saying sidium dispatched a cable to Tito that was very leader of the National Peasant Party. Not until that their mission in Hungary had been worth- similar to the cable sent to the Polish leadership. 30 October, however, did Nagy announce the for- less. It is also remotely possible that Voroshilov On 29 October the Yugoslav authorities published mal restoration of a multi-party state, with full was claiming that Mikoyan himself had said these a message to the HWP, in the main Belgrade daily participation by the Smallholders, the National sorts of things about the Soviet troops who were Politika, urging “an end to the fratricidal struggle” Peasant Party (renamed the Petofi Party on 1 sent to Budapest on the night of 23-24 October. and warning that “further bloodshed would only November), and the Social Democratic Party as Whatever the case may be, it is clear that harm the interests of the Hungarian working well as the Communists. (Other non-Commu- Voroshilov was expressing strong disapproval of people and socialism, and would only promote nist parties soon sprang up as well, including the Mikoyan’s performance in Budapest. the aims of reactionaries and bureaucratic defor- Hungarian Independence Party, the People’s 55 Kaganovich and other speakers are referring mation.” Democratic Party, the Catholic People’s Party, and to possible changes in the Hungarian 66 This sentence is incomplete in the original. the Catholic National Association.) government’s draft statement, which was broad- 67 This is what appears in the original. Perhaps 50 Scattered defections of Hungarian troops to cast in final form at 5:20 p.m. on 28 October (see initially there was some consideration given to the insurgents had begun on the first day of the Note 52 supra). bringing these three officials to Bulgaria. As 56 uprising, but Khrushchev was concerned that the Malenkov’s surname appears here without the things actually worked out, however, the three whole army would switch sides. In later years, standard title “Cde.” The full designation “Cde. men and their families, as well as the former de- official Soviet accounts of the 1956 uprising ac- Malenkov” appears a few lines further down in a fense minister Istvan Bata and his family, were knowledged that “during the most trying days,” continuation of Malenkov’s remarks. spirited to Moscow in a Soviet military aircraft a substantial number of “soldiers and officers 57 This clearly refers to the Hungarian statement on the evening of 28 October. Hegedus and Piros from the Hungarian People’s Army” had joined of 28 October (see Note 52 supra), not to the remained in Moscow until September 1958, and the insurgents in fighting “against Soviet soldiers Soviet declaration of 30 October. At this point, Gero stayed there until 1960. Only Rakosi was who had been called in to help.” See P. A. Zhilin, Khrushchev and the others had seen the Hungar- never able to return to Hungary. For an intrigu- ed., Stroitel’stvo armii evropeiskikh stran ian statement only in draft form. ing article about Rakosi’s many years of exile in sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva, 1949-1980 58 Most likely, Molotov is referring here to the USSR, drawing on recently declassified (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), p. 93. Formerly secret Rakosi, who was already in Moscow, and other sources, see V.L. Musatov, “Istoriya odnoi documents in the main Russian military archive hard-line HWP officials who were about to be ssylki:‘Zhitie’ Matiasa Rakoshi v SSSR (1956- (TsAMO, F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 17, Ll. 33-48) spirited to the Soviet Union. See below. 1971 gg.),” Kentavr (Moscow), No. 6 (Novem- include the Soviet defense ministry’s complete 59 This sentence is incomplete in the original. ber-December 1993), pp. 72-81. list of Hungarian army units that took the side of 60 Kaganovich is referring to the draft Hungar- 68 Judging from some of the statements below the insurgents. Many other valuable documents ian statement of 28 October, not to the declara- (e.g., “yesterday a government was formed”) and about the role of the Hungarian army are now tion adopted by the Soviet authorities on 30 Oc- from Suslov’s presence (after he had flown back available in the 1956 Collection (1956-os tober (which was considered at the Presidium from Hungary), this portion of the meeting must Gyujtemeny) of the Hungarian Military History meeting that day; see Document No. 7 infra). have taken place either late in the evening on 28 Archive, Hadtortenelmi Leveltar, Honvedelmi 61 Khrushchev is probably referring here to the October or early in the morning on 29 October. Miniszterium (HL/HM). For a useful volume benefits they hoped to gain for Soviet-Hungarian In either case, the CPSU Presidium members drawing on these documents, see Miklos Horvath, relations, and in international opinion generally, would already have heard about the statement that 1956 katonai kronologiaja (Budapest: Magyar by announcing a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Nagy broadcast over the radio on 28 October. Honvedseg Oktatasi es Kulturalis Anyagellato Soviet troops from Budapest. 69 The chronology is slightly awry here. The Kozpont, 1993). For an equally valuable survey 62 Khrushchev is referring to the political, not decision to send in Soviet troops was adopted on of the Hungarian army’s role in 1956 based on military, problems that the French and British gov- the evening of 23 October (see above), but the archival sources, see Imre Okvath, “Magyar ernments had been encountering. At this point, troops did not actually arrive until the early morn- tisztikar a hideghaboru idoszakaban, 1945-1956,” military action in Suez was imminent, but had ing hours of 24 October. Uj Honvedsegi szemle (Budapest), No. 1 (1994), not yet begun. On 26 July 1956 the new Egyp- 70 The area around the Corvin cinema, on the pp. 14-27. See also Bela Kiraly, “Hungary’s tian leader, Gamel Abdel Nasser, had national- corner of Jozsef Boulevard in downtown Pest Army: Its Part in the Revolt,” East Europe, Vol. ized the Suez Canal Company. He stuck by that (Budapest’s 8th District), was the site of intense 7, No. 6 (June 1958), pp. 3-16. decision despite coming under vigorous diplo- fighting that led to many casualties, both Soviet 51 This sentence is incomplete in the original. matic pressure from Great Britain, France, and and Hungarian. For a useful account, see Bill 52 This refers to the new Hungarian government’s the United States. On 27 and 28 October, Israel Lomax, Hungary 1956 (London: Allison and declaration on 28 October, which Nagy would mobilized its army for an operation that was Busby, 1976), pp. 118-119, 126-127. On 26 Oc- read over the radio at 5:20 p.m. that same after- broadly coordinated with France and Great Brit- tober the fighters in the Corvin district elected noon. Among other things, the declaration called ain. On 29 October, Israeli troops moved rapidly Gergely Pongracz as their leader. Suslov presum- for the dissolution of the state security organs, into Egyptian territory. The French and British ably is referring to Pal Maleter when he mentions amnesties for those involved in the uprising, the joined the Israeli incursions on 31 October by “a colonel from the Horthyite army.” Early on 404 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

the morning of 24 October, Maleter had been or- ments: one that arrived on the morning of 30 the Soviet Union, where he was appointed a dered by the then-defense minister Istvan Bata to October, and two that arrived late at night on 29 deputy defense minister. Evidently, Khrushchev move with five tanks against the insurgents in October. The item that arrived on the morning of had spoken with Gomulka by phone that morn- Budapest’s 8th and 9th Districts, providing relief 30 October was a secure, high-frequency tele- ing. for the Kilian Barracks in the 9th District. When phone message from Mikoyan and Suslov, which 83 The five principles of Pancha Shila—(1) mu- Maleter and his tank unit arrived on the scene, gave a bleak portrayal of the latest events. See tual respect for sovereignty and territorial integ- they decided to support the rebels’ cause instead. “TsK KPSS,” 30 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), rity, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in Maleter then assumed command of insurgent in TsKhSD, F.89, Op.45, D.12, Ll.1-3. Of the internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, forces in the Kilian barracks. two documents that arrived late at night on the and (5) peaceful coexistence—were endorsed in 71 The original reads the 24th, but this incident 29th, one was a ciphered telegram from Mikoyan a joint statement by Chinese prime minister Zhou actually occurred on the 25th. A peaceful dem- and Suslov reporting that they had attended a ses- Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru onstration of some 25,000 people was held on 25 sion of the HWP Presidium earlier that evening. in New Delhi on 28 June 1954. The principles October outside the Parliament Building (where They also commented on the takeover of the were intended to “guide relations between the two Nagy’s office was located, though Nagy was not Szabad Nep building by a group of unarmed stu- countries” as well as “relations with other coun- inside). The precise sequence of events cannot dents and writers. Mikoyan and Suslov asserted tries in Asia and in other parts of the world.” For be conclusively determined, but most evidence that the Hungarian “comrades have failed to win the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar suggests that Hungarian state security (AVH) over the masses,” and that “the anti-Communist and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China’s forces suddenly opened fire on the unarmed elements are behaving impudently.” In addition, Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949- crowd, with additional shots being fired by So- they expressed concern about what would hap- 1962) (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. viet tanks deployed around the building. Roughly pen to former agents of the Hungarian State Se- 7-8. 200 people were killed and many more were in- curity (AVH) forces in the wake of Nagy’s deci- 84 Zhukov is referring here to the Political Con- jured. As news of the incident spread around sion to disband the AVH. See “Shifrtelegramma: sultative Committee (PKK) of the recently-cre- Budapest, the reported scale of the bloodshed TsK KPSS,” 29 October 1956 (Strictly Secret- ated Warsaw Treaty Organization. The PKK con- quickly became exaggerated and most of the Urgent), from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, in vened only seven times between 1955 and 1966, blame for the deaths was attributed—erroneously, AVPRF, F.059a, Op.4, P.6, D.5, Ll.13-14. The despite its statutory requirement to meet at least it seems—to the Soviet tanks. No Soviet or Hun- other document that arrived late on the 29th was twice a year. garian officials were held accountable for the a situation report from Ivan Serov, dated 29 Oc- 85 During major international crises in the post- deaths, but Suslov’s statement indicates that tober, which Mikoyan and Suslov ordered to be Stalin period, the Soviet Presidium/Politburo oc- CPSU leaders were aware that their own troops transmitted to Moscow via secure telephone. casionally would convene a Central Committee were believed to be culpable. Serov’s report gave an updated overview of the plenum to give the CC members a sense of in- 72 The last few parenthetical words of this sen- insurgency and expressed deep concern about the volvement in decision-making and to ensure that tence are ambiguous in Russian. A word has been likely repercussions from the dissolution of the the leadership’s policies would be firmly obeyed omitted here for the sake of clarity in English, AVH. See “Telefonogramma,” 29 October 1956, at lower levels. with no effect at all on the substance of the phrase. from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, relaying I. 86 Saburov is referring here to Furtseva’s sug- Suslov is referring to the formation of workers’ Serov’s memorandum, in APRF, F.3, Op.64, gestion that a CPSU CC plenum be convened for councils, which had begun taking shape sponta- D.484, Ll.158-161. informational purposes. neously on 26 October in Csepel and other in- 79 British military transport aircraft were flying 87 This presumably refers to Soviet property dustrial areas. The government formally con- into the Vienna airport with supplies of humani- transferred to Romania during World War II, doned the establishment of workers’ councils in tarian aid, which were then being conveyed to rather than to Romania’s war reparations, which instructions released on the evening of 26 Octo- Budapest. It is unclear whether Zhukov knew by 1956 were no longer of great magnitude. ber, which were then published in major Budapest why these planes were concentrated there. It is 88 Khrushchev is referring here to the six-mem- newspapers the following day. possible that he believed the aircraft were ferry- ber HWP Presidium. The only holdout was Nagy. 73 As noted above, this is precisely what the Hun- ing in military supplies or were preparing for a 89 The State Security Department (Allam-Vedelmi garian government’s statement on 28 October did. military operation. Osztaly, or AVO), which was reorganized in 1949 It described the recent events as a “national-demo- 80 As commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, and renamed the State Security Authority (Allam- cratic uprising” and condemned those who had Marshal Ivan Konev assumed direct command Vedelmi Hatosag, or AVH), was reincorporated depicted the situation as a “counterrevolution.” of Soviet military operations in Hungary in No- into the Hungarian Internal Affairs Ministry in 74 Nagy issued an order for a “general and im- vember 1956. In a telephone message on the the autumn of 1953. Formally, the agency was mediate ceasefire” before his radio address on 28 morning of 30 October (see Note 78 supra), given back its old name of AVO, but it was still October. Hungarian army units were ordered to Mikoyan and Suslov had urged that Konev be almost always known as the AVH. One of the “fire only if attacked.” dispatched to Hungary “immediately” as a pre- earliest and most vigorous demands of the pro- 75 Hegedus was excluded from the six-member cautionary step. One of Konev’s top aides dur- testers in October 1956 was for the dissolution of HWP Presidium that was formed on 28 October, ing the invasion was General Mikhail Malinin, a the AVH. On 28 October, Nagy promised to ful- and he was then spirited to Moscow aboard a first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, who fill this demand, and the Hungarian government Soviet military aircraft on the evening of 28 Oc- commanded Soviet troops during the initial in- approved the dissolution of the state security or- tober. tervention on 23 October. As indicated in the gans the following day. Because the AVH had 76 As with the previous session, the pages in the previous line, Soviet leaders frequently consulted been instrumental in carrying out repression and original file were slightly out of sequence. The Malinin in the leadup to the invasion. terror in the late 1940s and 1950s, some state se- order has been corrected in the translation. 81 The “Chinese comrades” with whom curity agents became the targets of lynchings and 77 Protocol No. 49 encompasses both this ses- Khrushchev had discussions were the members other violent reprisals during the 1956 uprising. sion and the session on the following day (see of the delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi (see Note Hungarian state security officers would have Document No. 8) under the rubric “On the Situa- 25 supra). Liu Shaoqi was in direct touch with joined up with Soviet troops mainly to seek pro- tion in Hungary” (O polozhenii v Vengrii). Point Mao Zedong several times during the delegation’s tection, not to assist in counterinsurgency opera- 1 (from 30 October) covers the Soviet declara- stay in Moscow, and thus he was able to keep tions. On this matter, see the documents trans- tion on ties with socialist countries, whereas Point Khrushchev apprised of the Chinese leader’s mitted by Suslov and Mikoyan on 29 October, 6 (from 31 October) covers the decision to in- views of the situation in Poland and Hungary. cited in Note 78 supra. vade. The relevant extracts from Protocol No. 82 Rokossowski had been removed from the Pol- 90 It is interesting that, when referring to Soviet 49 are now stored in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, ish Politburo on 19 October. On 13 November troops deployed in Eastern Europe, Khrushchev Ll. 25-30 and APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41, he was replaced as Polish national defense min- does not mention the Soviet troops in East Ger- respectively. ister by a Polish officer, Marshal Marian many, implying that they were not necessarily 78 Presumably, the reference here is to three docu- Spychalski. Rokossowski was then recalled to there “with the consent of the [East German] gov- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 405 ernment and in the interests of the [East German] new “inner cabinet.” Anna Kethly’s name is not of “success” than later events warranted. government and people.” listed here because she had not yet been ap- 102 The inclusion of Saburov’s name in this list 91 The final Declaration noted that “Soviet units pointed. (Nagy mentioned in his speech on 30 is odd, as will become clear in his remarks be- are in the Hungarian and Romanian republics in October that “a person to be nominated by the low. Initially, he was disinclined to reverse the accordance with the Warsaw Treaty and govern- Social Democratic Party” would be in the inner Presidium’s non-interventionist stance of the pre- mental agreements. Soviet military units are in cabinet, and Kethly later turned out to be that vious day. the Polish republic on the basis of the Potsdam person.) It is unclear why Malin did not list 103 It is unclear at what point Soviet officials four-power agreement and the Warsaw Treaty.” Ferenc Erdei’s name here. approached Kadar about becoming the head of a The Declaration then claimed that “Soviet mili- 97 The pages for this session were in reverse or- provisional government. Kadar’s statements at tary units are not in the other people’s democra- der in the archival file. They have been put into the CPSU Presidium meeting on 2 November (see cies,” omitting any mention of the hundreds of correct order in the translation. Document No. 12 infra) suggest that he was not thousands of Soviet troops in East Germany. 98 In the formal protocol of this session (cited in yet aware he had been chosen to perform this 92 Khrushchev presumably is referring here to Note 77 supra), Point VI was given the title of function. both the military advisers and the state security “On the Situation in Hungary” (O polozhenii v 104 On the evening of 1 November, the day after (KGB) advisers. Vengrii), the same as the previous segment. this Presidium meeting, Kadar and Munnich were 93 When this editing was completed, the Pre- Malin’s working notes do not provide a list of secretly flown to Moscow aboard a Soviet mili- sidium formally adopted Resolution No. P49/1 participants, but the following list is given in the tary aircraft. They were brought back to Hun- (“Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya formal protocol: Khrushchev, Zhukov, Bulganin, gary when Soviet troops launched Operation Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Saburov. “Whirlwind” three days later. polozhenii v Vengrii,” 30 October 1956, in APRF, It is also clear from Malin’s notes that Furtseva, 105 It is extraordinary that even as Khrushchev F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30) stating that it would Pospelov, and Shvernik took part at certain points. was calling for a full-scale invasion, he was still “approve the text, with changes made at the CPSU 99 These “discussions with Gomulka” were con- apparently willing to consider including Nagy in CC Presidium session, of a Declaration by the ducted by Khrushchev over the telephone. The the soon-to-be-formed Revolutionary Workers’ Government of the USSR on the foundations of two leaders agreed that Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Peasants’ Government. development and the further strengthening of and Molotov would meet the next day (1 Novem- 106 It is interesting that Soviet leaders were con- friendship and cooperation between the Soviet ber) in Brest with Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz. cerned most of all about informing the Poles. As Union and the other socialist countries.” The reso- The formal protocol of the session (cited in Note indicated above, a meeting with the Polish lead- lution ordered that the “text of the Declaration be 77 supra) notes that “in accordance with the ex- ership had already been set up for the following broadcast on radio on 30 October and published change of opinions at the CPSU Presidium ses- day in Brest. Informing the leaders of these other in the press on 31 October 1956.” For the pub- sion, Cdes. Khrushchev, Molotov, and Malenkov countries was important, but not as high a prior- lished text, see “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh are empowered to hold negotiations with repre- ity. Soviet Presidium members informed the vis- razvitiya i dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sentatives of the PZPR CC.” iting Chinese delegation about the decision on 31 100 sotrudnichestva mezhdu SSSR i drugimi In a speech at a mass rally in front of the October, just before the Chinese officials flew sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” Pravda (Moscow), Parliament Building on 31 October, Nagy de- back to Beijing. After the meetings in Brest on 1 31 October 1956, p. 1. clared that his government had already “opened November, Khrushchev and Malenkov continued 94 It is unclear precisely when the Chinese negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops on to Bucharest, where they met with Romanian, changed their position from non-interventionist from the country and for the renunciation of our Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak leaders. The two to pro-intervention. The statement recorded here, obligations under the Warsaw Treaty.” Clearly, Soviet officials then traveled to Brioni to confer if correctly transcribed, would suggest that the he was referring to the negotiations he had been with Tito on 2-3 November. Khrushchev and change occurred before the final Soviet decision holding that morning with Mikoyan and Suslov, Malenkov returned to Moscow on the morning on 31 October, but almost all other evidence who had generally seemed receptive to Nagy’s of the 3rd. 107 (including subsequent Presidium meetings re- demands. These negotiations are briefly re- The formal protocol for this session (cited in corded by Malin) suggests that it came after, not counted in Tibor Meray, Thirteen Days That Note 77 supra) states that “taking account of the before, the Soviet decision. In any case, if the Shook the Kremlin: Imre Nagy and the Hungar- exchange of opinions at the CPSU CC Presidium change did occur before, it did not have any dis- ian Revolution, trans. by Howard L. Katzander session, Cde. Zhukov is instructed to devise an cernible effect on the Soviet decision at this meet- (London: Thames and Hudson, 1959), pp. 163- appropriate plan of measures connected with the ing to eschew intervention. 165. See also the first-hand comments by Gyorgy events in Hungary, and to report on them to the 95 Molotov is referring here to major develop- G. Heltai, the Hungarian deputy foreign minister CPSU CC.” 108 ments in Hungary. On 30 October, at 2:30 p.m. under Nagy’s government, “International As- The formal protocol from this session (cited Budapest time, Nagy announced the formal res- pects,” in Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jonas, The in Note 77 supra) notes that “Cdes. Shepilov, toration of a multi-party state and the establish- Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Retrospect, East Brezhnev, Furtseva, and Pospelov are instructed, ment of an “inner cabinet” of the national gov- European Monograph No. XL (Boulder, Col.: on the basis of the exchange of opinions at the ernment. The new cabinet consisted of Nagy, East European Quarterly, 1978), esp. pp. 52-53. CPSU Presidium session, to prepare all neces- Zoltan Tildy, Bela Kovacs, Ferenc Erdei, Janos It is conceivable that Nagy’s expressed desire to sary documents and submit them for the consid- Kadar, Geza Losonczy, and Anna Kethly (from renounce Hungarian membership in the Warsaw eration of the CPSU CC.” Among the key docu- the Social Democratic Party). That same day, a Pact, which was promptly transmitted to Mos- ments they prepared over the next few days were: “revolutionary national defense council” of the cow by telephone, was one of the factors that led an “Appeal of the Hungarian Revolutionary Hungarian armed forces was set up, which sup- to Khrushchev’s change of heart at this session. Workers’ and Peasants’ Government to the Hun- ported the demands of “the revolutionary coun- Although Nagy had spoken in earlier years (es- garian People,” which Kadar announced when he cils of the working youth and intellectuals,” and pecially after he was ousted by Rakosi in 1955) was installed in power on 4 November; an “Ap- called for the “immediate withdrawal of Soviet about the desirability of neutrality for Hungary, peal by the Command of Soviet Troops in Hun- troops from Budapest and their withdrawal from his decision to raise the matter with Mikoyan and gary to the Hungarian People and the Officers the entire territory of Hungary within the short- Suslov at this critical moment must have come and Men of the Hungarian Army,” which was est possible time.” The new Council also prom- as a jolt to Soviet leaders. broadcast in translation over Hungarian radio and 101 ised to disarm all agents from Hungary’s dis- Early on the morning of 31 October, the distributed via leaflets at the outset of the inva- banded state security forces (AVH), who had been French and British launched bombing raids sion; and Order No. 1 issued by Marshal Konev notorious agents of repression during the Stalin against Egyptian cities and imposed a naval block- (the supreme commander of the invasion) to all era. A Revolutionary Armed Forces Committee ade against Egypt, thus aiding Israeli’s ground Soviet officers just before the start of Operation also was formed on 31 October, and it was em- incursions. By the time the Presidium met on the “Whirlwind.” The English-language texts of the powered by the government to create a new army. 31st, reports of the French and British operations first two items and other “propaganda documents” 96 These are five of the seven members of Nagy’s were pouring in, conveying a greater impression prepared in Moscow can be found in Paul E. 406 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Zinner, ed., National Communism and Popular ring to here, but he probably had in mind one or fresh infomation directly from the center of events Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Docu- more of several developments: Hungary’s with- . . . but [by late October] attempts to strike up a ments on Events in Poland and Hungary, Febru- drawal from the Warsaw Pact and demand for the conversation often caused me to have to flee, since ary-November 1956 (New York: Columbia Uni- removal of all Soviet troops from Hungary; the they could tell by my accent that I was a Russian. versity Press, 1956), pp. 473-481. commencement of French and British military The fulfillment of official instructions, which 109 For the final text of this order, see “Prikaz operations against Egypt (see Note 101 supra); entailed visits to appropriate buildings and agen- Glavnokomanduyushchego Ob”edinennymi China’s sudden decision to support rather than cies, also was a difficult matter, both in some- vooruzhennymi silami No. 1, 4 noyabrya 1956 oppose Soviet military intervention in Hungary; how getting there and in then returning to the em- goda,” reproduced in Lieut.-General E. I. new intelligence about the West’s position vis-a- bassy while holding on to the needed documents. Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta” vis Hungary; and the warnings coming in from This did not pass off without a number of serious (Part 3), Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), neighboring East European countries, particularly incidents.” No. 12 (December 1993), p. 86. Czechoslovakia (see below) and Romania. 128 It is unclear precisely what Shelepin is refer- 121 110 It is unclear what “group,” if any, was actu- Kaganovich uses a word here, obsuzhdenie, ring to here, but this seems to be an indication of ally sent. Presumably, the reference here is to a that is normally translated as “discussion,” but it Moscow’s growing concerns about a spillover into group of Presidium members. could also mean “deliberations” in this context. the rest of Eastern Europe. Urgent warnings to 111 The three former Hungarian officials listed Presumably, he is referring to the meeting that this effect had been pouring in from the Czecho- here—Rakosi, Hegedus, and Gero—had fled to Soviet leaders had on 31 October with the Chi- slovak authorities since late October. See, for the Soviet Union within the past few days. No nese delegation after the CPSU Presidium ap- example, “Stenograficky zapis ze zasedani UV doubt, Khrushchev had solicited their views be- proved a full-scale invasion of Hungary. KSC,” 5-6 December 1956 (Top Secret), in SUA, forehand about the proper course to pursue in 122 This is how the sentence reads in the text. Arch. UV KSC, F. 07, Sv. 14, Archivna jednotka Hungary. It is also possible that the three were Presumably, Malin meant to say that “we are not (A.j.) 14; “Zabezpeceni klidu na uzemi CSR a asked to take part in this phase of the CPSU Pre- attacking.” statnich hranic s Mad’arskem,” Report from Col.- 123 sidium meeting, and that they offered their views It is unclear precisely who was “worried that General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czecho- directly. we’re giving away Hungary.” Furtseva may have slovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General Jaroslav 112 The five Hungarian officials listed here were been referring to one of several groups: ortho- Dockal, chief of operations, 29 October 1956 (Top among those who were slated to take part in a dox Hungarian Communists who had sought ref- Secret), in Vojensky historicky archiv (VHA) forthcoming “provisional revolutionary govern- uge in Moscow; neighboring East European (es- Praha, Fond Ministra narodni obrany (MNO) ment.” The first three were still in Budapest pecially Czechoslovak and Romanian) leaders; CSR, 1956, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabu (though Kadar was spirited out the next evening), Chinese officials; members of the CPSU Central cs. armady (GS/OS), 2/8-39b; and “Souhrn Boldoczki was in Moscow (in his ambassadorial Committee and the heads of union-republic Com- hlaseni operacniho dustojnika Generalniho stabu post), and Horvath, the foreign minister in Nagy’s munist parties and of regional and local CPSU cs. armady,” Notes from Col.-General Vaclav government, was on his way to a UN General As- organizations; and employees of the Soviet em- Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General sembly session, but was delayed in Prague. bassy in Budpaest. By this point in the crisis, all Staff, to the KSC Central Committee (Top Se- 113 Kiss’s name is incorrectly rendered in Malin’s of these groups had expressed concerns very simi- cret), 27 October 1956, in VHA, F. MNO, 1956, notes as Kisskar. lar to the ones that Furtseva mentions. GS/OS, 2/8-49b. 114 The formal protocol for this session (cited in 124 Presumably this refers to the decision at the 129 Mikoyan’s references here to “comrades” and Note 77 supra) “affirms the text of the telegram end of October to evacuate the families of Soviet “them” are to Nagy’s government. His mention to the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade for Cde. embassy employees to the USSR. For a brief of “three days” in the line above indicates that Tito.” A copy of the telegram is attached to the account of the evacuation, see the highly tenden- the timetable for the invasion (code-named protocol, which further notes that “if the answer tious but occasionally useful memoir by Vladimir “Whirlwind”) had already been set. Mikoyan was [from the Yugoslav side] is positive, Cdes. Kryuchkov, Lichnoe delo, vol. 1, p. 57. hoping that some last-ditch attempt could still be Khrushchev and Malenkov are authorized to hold 125 Presumably, Suslov is referring to the plan made to head off the military operation. 130 negotiations with Cde. Tito.” For the Yugoslav to bring Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich to No formal protocol for this session has been response to the Soviet telegram, see Document Moscow. found (unlike the other session on 2 November No. 9 infra. 126 The formal protocol for the session, “Vypiska recorded in Document No. 13 infra). 115 See Document No. 10 infra. iz protokola No. 50 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK 131 These initial comments are not attributed to 116 This telephone message is unattributed and ot 2 noyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” anyone in Malin’s notes, but it is clear that the undated. Presumably, the message came from in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 58, states that speaker was Kadar. The notes of Kadar’s remarks Molotov just before he returned to Moscow from “taking account of the exchange of views at the contain a few third-person references to himself, Brest on 1 November. It had been arranged be- CC Presidium, Cdes. Zhukov, Suslov, Konev, but this is because Malin sometimes jotted down forehand that while Khrushchev and Malenkov Serov, and Brezhnev are to work out the neces- the speaker’s name rather than using the pronoun would continue on to meet with other East Euro- sary measures in connection with the events in “I.” pean leaders, Molotov would return to Moscow Hungary and report their proposals to the CPSU 132 Jozsef Dudas, a former Budapest city offi- and brief the CPSU Presidium on Gomulka’s po- CC.” cial who had been imprisoned during most of the sition. 127 A passage from Kryuchkov’s memoir Communist period, was one of the most radical 117 Protocol No. 50 (in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. (Lichnoe delo, vol. 1, pp. 57-58) sheds light on leaders of the October-November uprising. He 484, L. 58) contains directives from the sessions what may have been discussed here: “At the end was in charge of the rebel forces headquartered on both 1 and 2 November (see Note 146 infra). of October and beginning of November . . . the in the Szabad Nep building. Dudas and other rebel 118 On the evening of 31 October-1 November, situation around Soviet buildings [in Budapest] leaders insisted that Nagy must meet the protest- Mikoyan and Suslov returned to Moscow, pre- deteriorated significantly; the embassy was un- ers’ demands. Dudas was detained by Hungar- sumably accompanied by Serov. This was the der siege, and any attempt to exit the building ian police on 1 November. After Soviet troops first Presidium meeting in which Mikoyan had was fraught with danger. The diplomats long ago intervened on 4 November, he took a leading part taken part since 23 October. In Khrushchev’s had essentially shifted over to a barracks-type op- in the military resistance. He was arrested by absence, Bulganin presided over this session. eration, spending the night in their offices and Soviet troops on 21 November and was executed 119 Other than Mikoyan and Suslov, who were only rarely—once our troops had returned [to two months later. His name is incorrectly ren- still in Budapest, all the Presidium members took Budapest]—taking a half-hour ride home one by dered as “Dusak” in Malin’s notes; the spelling part in the 31 October decision and the subse- one in armored personnel carriers to see their is corrected in the translation. quent discussions with the Chinese delegation. families, who were holed up in living quarters 133 Kadar is referring here to negotiations that Hence, Bulganin provided this information for the several blocks from the embassy. . . . Ordinarily, he, Munnich, and others had held in the parlia- benefit of Mikoyan and Suslov. knowledge of Hungarian allowed me to engage ment with one of the insurgent groups headed by 120 It is not entirely clear what Bulganin is refer- in conversations with Hungarians and to receive Istvan Angyal. Angyal was not as radical as most COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 407

of the other rebel leaders, but he was insistent on Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 6, Ll. this telegram from Soviet ambassador Aleksei the need for far-reaching changes. Angyal was 17-19. Epishev, but the content leaves little doubt that executed in November 1958. See Laszlo Eorsi, 143 The word used here for “nationalism” is the Romanian embassy in Budapest was relying ed., “Angyal Istvan sajat kezu vallomasai, 1956 natsionalizatsiya, which normally means “nation- at the time on the Soviet embassies in Budapest december,” Multunk (Budapest), Vol. 40, No. 4 alization” (i.e., the assertion of state control over and Bucharest to relay information. (1995), pp. 133-182. property), but Kadar seems to have in mind the 152 Aleksei Alekseevich Epishev had been a com- 134 The references here are to the Soviet decla- notion of reasserting Hungarian national control missar in the Soviet army during World War II. ration of 30 October and to the declaration of neu- over Hungary’s internal affairs, rather than leav- After the war he served in a number of regional trality adopted by the Hungarian government on ing important matters under Soviet control. party posts, and from 1955 until 1962 he was the the evening of 1 November. Nagy announced 144 This again is a telling indication that East Soviet ambassador to Romania and then Yugo- the declaration in a nationwide radio address. European and Soviet leaders were fully aware of slavia. In 1962 he was given the military rank of 135 On 3 November, Anna Kethly was named as the popular resentment caused by Soviet prepon- army-general and appointed the head of the So- the Social Democratic representative in the gov- derance in Eastern Europe. viet Army’s Main Political Directorate, a post he ernment. See Note 96 supra. 145 Presumably, Munnich is referring to nation- retained until his death in 1985. 136 On 31 October the Hungarian government alistic slogans that had been shouted during So- 153 The surname of Aurel Malnasan (who was announced that, on the previous evening, Cardi- viet-Hungarian soccer matches and to the influ- then a deputy foreign minister in Romania) is cor- nal Jozsef Mindszenty had been freed from house ence of Radio Free Europe and other Western rectly spelled in the original Malin notes, but for arrest in Felsopeteny. He had been detained there broadcasts. The Hungarian scholar Janos M. some reason the published versions of the notes for some 15 months after his release from prison. Rainer adds the following explanation for the ref- (in both Hungarian and Russian) mistakenly ren- As the Primate of the Hungarian Catholic Church, erence to “soccer”: “It was widely believed at der Malnasan’s surname as Malnasanu. The edi- Mindszenty had been sentenced to life imprison- the time that the celebrated Hungarian [soccer] tors of the published versions erroneously claim ment during an anti-religious campaign in Feb- team of the period, the `Golden Team’, which won that Malin’s notes misspelled the name. 154 ruary 1949. Mindszenty’s statements in the au- against nearly every country it played, was not On 2 November in Bucharest, Khrushchev tumn of 1956 were restrained, but clearly sup- allowed to beat the Soviet Union for political rea- and Malenkov briefed the Romanian leader, portive of the revolution. When Soviet troops sons. (Their matches usually ended in a draw.) Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, and his Czechoslovak intervened on 4 November, he sought refuge in In actual fact, the first Hungarian win against the and Bulgarian counterparts about the forthcom- the U.S. legation in Budapest. Subsequently, Soviet team took place some weeks before the ing invasion. On the eve of the invasion, Kadar’s government prohibited Mindszenty from revolution.” See Janos M. Rainer, “The Road to Malnasan held lengthy talks with Nagy. performing clerical duties of any sort from the Budapest, 1956: New Documentation of the Gheorghiu-Dej’s motivation in sending Malnasan legation. Kremlin’s Decision To Intervene,” pt. 2, in The to Budapest must have been to keep Nagy occu- 137 It is unclear precisely what Kadar was say- Hungarian Quarterly Vol. 37, No. 143 (Autumn pied and to prevent him from taking any steps to ing here. (Malin inadvertently may have omitted 1996), p. 31 n. 28; readers interested in follow- counter the imminent military operation. For brief some comments just before this line.) At the ing the exploits of a fictionalized Hungarian bas- reports by Malnasan on the talks, see the newly noontime meeting, the Hungarian government ketball team of this era are advised to read Tibor declassified cables from the Romanian Foreign reached no final decision on whether to demand Fischer’s novel, Under the Frog (Penguin: Lon- Ministry archive in Corneliu Mihai Lungu and the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops and don, 1993). Mihai Retegan, cds., 1956 Explozia: Perceptii whether to issue the declaration of neutrality. 146 The protocol in question is “Vypiska iz romane, iugoslave si sovietice asupra Those decisions were not approved until the protokola No. 50 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot evenimentelor din Polonia si Unguria (Bucharest: evening session, as Kadar explains below. 2 noyabrya 1956 g.: O meropriyatiyakh v svyazi Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1996), pp. 181- 138 Ferenc Nagy, one of the former leaders of s sobytiyami v Vengrii,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, 182. the Independent Smallholders’ Party who had D. 484, L. 58. It reads simply: “To approve the 155 For some reason, Malin did not list been living in exile in the United States, came to plan for measures concerning the events in Hun- Khrushchev’s name among the participants. Also Vienna in late October to display solidarity with gary.”) not listed here are Janos Kadar, Ferenc Munnich, the insurgents. On 31 October, however, the 147 On 1 November, in accordance with Proto- and Imre Horvath, who took part in the segment Austrian authorities forced him to leave the coun- col No. P50/I (“Vypiska iz protokola No. 50 on the formation of a new Hungarian government. try on the grounds that his presence might be zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 1 noyabrya 1956 This portion of the meeting began at 8:45 p.m., deemed incompatible with Austria’s neutral sta- g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. with Khrushchev and Malenkov in attendance tus. 64, D. 484, L. 47), five Soviet officials (Zhukov, after their return from Brioni. 139 Bela Kovacs had been recuperating in Pecs Suslov, Konev, Serov, and Brezhnev) had been 156 The reference here is to documents issued from his nine years of imprisonment. The instructed to “work out the necessary measures by the Kadar government after it was installed in government’s evening session on 1 November concerning the events in Hungary and present power. was the first activity in which he took part in them to the CPSU CC.” This session allowed 157A Hungarian scholar, Janos Rainer, recently Budapest. them to complete the task. found a document in the Hungarian National 140 On the alarm generated by the Soviet troop 148 All four phrases in this point were incorpo- Archive that sheds important light on this part of movements, see Andropov’s ciphered telegrams rated (with modifications) into Order No. 1 is- the CPSU Presidium’s deliberations. Notes taken from 30 October, 1 November, and 2 November sued by Marshal Konev in the name of the War- by Imre Horvath, one of the Hungarian officials in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll. 15-16, saw Pact Joint Command (see Note 109 supra). who were present, reveal that Khrushchev offered 149 17-19, and 20-22, respectively. Those sent to Hungary (at varying intervals) an opening statement here, which for some rea- 141 The name “Kovacs” here refers to General included Suslov, Averki Aristov, Serov, and son was not transcribed by Malin. The notes Istvan Kovacs, not Bela Kovacs. General Kovacs Zhukov. Horvath took of Khrushchev’s speech are trans- had become chief of the Hungarian General Staff 150 The text of the plan has not yet been released lated below (see Document No. 16) as a supple- on 31 October and was also a member of the from the former Soviet archives, but the direc- ment to the Malin notes, but they may be worth Revolutionary Defense Committee. He was ar- tive here presumably refers to the military (as reading at this point before finishing Malin’s ren- rested on 3 November along with the other mem- opposed to political and propaganda) steps needed dition of the meeting. Although Horvath’s notes bers of the Hungarian delegation that were nego- to fulfill the decision of 31 October. On the same were written hurriedly in mixed Hungarian and tiating the withdrawal of Soviet troops. He was day of this meeting, Marshal Konev arrived at Russian, they provide a good flavor of what not released from prison until 1960. his command post in Szolnok and ordered the Khrushchev said. 142 Andropov’s own account of his attendance reinforced Special Corps in Hungary to be ready 158 at the inner cabinet’s evening session, which tal- for full-scale combat operations by the following A secret report from the Soviet ambassador lies very well with Kadar’s version, is in day. in Hungary, Yurii Andropov, in May 1956 was “Shifrtelegramma,” 1 November 1956 (Strictly 151 No source is specified for the information in much less positive, alleging that “the work of the 408 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Hungarian press in illuminating the results of the Osobaya Papka; and “TsK KPSS,” 18 July 1956 on 1 November, which was published in XX CPSU Congress has been totally inadequate.” (Strictly Secret — Urgent), Osobaya papka, both Nepszabad the following day. See “I. O. Zaveduyushchego Evropeiskim in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 183-185 and 172This in fact is precisely what Ulbricht him- Otdelom MID SSSR tov. Levychkinu K. D.,” 225-236, respectively. self feared; see the detailed account by the chief Cable No. 141 (Secret) from Yu. Andropov, 2 May 165The nature of this statement is unclear (to say of the East German State Security forces in 1956, 1956, in AVPRF, F. Referentura o Vengrii, Op. the least), but the mention of these countries at a Ernst Wollweber, in Wilfriede Otto, ed., “Ernst 36, Por. 15, Papka 48, D. 178, Ll. 22-33. time of escalating hostilities is another interest- Wollweber: Aus Erinnerungen — Ein Portrait 159This refers to a telegram published in major ing indication of the role of the Suez Crisis in Walter Ulbrichts,” Beitrage zur Geschichte der Soviet and Hungarian newspapers on 6 April Soviet thinking about events in Hungary. Arbeiterbewegung, No. 3 (1990), esp. pp. 361- 1956, shortly after the 20th Party Congress. The 166This topic was not included in the formal pro- 378. For more on the impact of the 1956 crises telegram, sent by Khrushchev (as party leader) tocol for the session (“Protokol No. 51 zasedaniya on the East German communist leadership, see and Bulganin (as prime minister) to their Hun- Prezidiuma TsK KPSS,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, the papers presented by Hope M. Harrison and garian counterparts, Rakosi and Hegedus, marked D. 484, Ll. 60-61). Christian F. Ostermann at the “Conference on the 11th anniversary of the liberation of Hungary 167Most likely, there is a mistake or omission in Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archi- from Nazi occupation. Malin’s text. These phrases, as given in the origi- val Evidence,” which took place in Budapest on 160The local authorities in Gyor, including the nal, do not make sense. 25-29 September 1996 and was organized by the security forces, had been supportive of the revo- 168The reference here is to financial, not mili- Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian lution from the outset. See Gyor-Sopron megyeiek tary, assistance. A Soviet economic aid package Revolution, the National Security Archive, and emlekeznek az 1956-os forradalomra (Budapest: for Hungary was approved on 5 November and the Cold War International History Project. Cop- Zrinyi, 1991). announced the following day. ies of the papers, both of which draw extensively 161Judging from Malenkov’s presence at Pre- 169These points about the Suez Crisis are intrigu- on the archives of the former Socialist Unity Party sidium sessions on 4 and 5 November, only ing in light of what happened the following day of Germany (SED), are available from the con- Mikoyan and Brezhnev actually traveled to (5 November). During the first several days of ference organizers. Budapest. the Suez Crisis, Moscow’s response was limited 173Saburov is referring to the families of Soviet 162See Note 157 supra. This document, located to verbal protestations through the media and at troops who were killed, not to the much larger by Janos Rainer, was published in Hungary in the UN. On 5 November, the day before a number of Hungarians who died in the fighting. 1996. See Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. ceasefire was arranged, Soviet prime minister 174This illustrates how concerned CPSU lead- Rainer, eds., Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A Szovjet Nikolai Bulganin sent letters to the U.S., French, ers were that the crisis was spilling over into the Partelnokseg Vitai Magyarorszagrol (Budapest: British, and Israeli governments. His letter to Soviet Union. Both before and after 4 Novem- 1956-os Intezet, 1996), pp. 92-93. The document President Eisenhower warned that “if this war is ber, unrest and protests occurred at a number of is in Hungarian interspersed with a few Russian not halted, it will be fraught with danger and might higher educational institutions in the USSR, in- phrases and names. Horvath’s notes show that escalate into a third world war.” Bulganin pro- cluding Moscow State University (MGU). At the deliberations about this matter began at 8:45 posed that the United States and Soviet Union MGU, “protests against Soviet military interven- p.m. (see Note 155 supra). move jointly to “crush the aggressors,” an action tion” were accompanied by “anti-Soviet slogans 163These three lines appeared in the far left col- he justified on the grounds that the two super- and posters.” Both students and faculty took part umn of Horvath’s notes. powers had “all modern types of arms, including in the actions. The KGB quickly moved in and 164This statement is a candid acknowledgment nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and bear par- restored order, but the crackdown was not as vig- of the extent to which the Soviet Union still con- ticular responsibility for stopping the war.” Not orous and sweeping as some CPSU officials trolled leadership politics and successions in East- surprisingly, Eisenhower immediately rejected wanted. See the first-hand account by the long- ern Europe after Stalin’s death. Khrushchev’s ref- Bulganin’s proposal. Bulganin’s letters to France, time deputy director of the KGB, Filipp Bobkov, erence to Mikoyan concerns the steps that Great Britain, and Israel were far more minatory, KGB i vlast’ (Moscow: Veteran MP, 1995), pp. Mikoyan took when he was in Budapest from 13 including thinly-veiled threats to use missiles if 144-145. Bobkov claims that Pyotr Pospelov and to 21 July 1956 (see Document No. 1 supra). necessary to prevent Egypt’s destruction. The some other senior party officials, as well as a During a preliminary meeting with Rakosi, Erno letters to France and Britain contained identical number of high-ranking personnel in the KGB, Gero, Andras Hegedus, and Bela Veg, Mikoyan passages: “In what position would [Britain and wanted to launch “mass repressions” to deter any took the initiative in bringing about Rakosi’s dis- France] have found themselves if they had been further unrest, but their proposals were never for- missal. (The other Hungarian officials had long attacked by more powerful states possessing all mally adopted. Subsequently, a commission wanted to proceed with this step, but were un- types of modern weapons of destruction? These headed by Brezhnev issued secret orders and willing to act until the Soviet authorities them- more powerful states, instead of sending naval or guidelines to all party organizations to tighten selves told Rakosi he would have to go.) Mikoyan air forces to the shores of [Britain or France], political controls. then participated in a crucial meeting of the HWP could use other means, such as missile technol- 175On 4 November, the Soviet ambassador in Yu- Politburo on 13 July, which voted to remove ogy.” Bulganin’s letter to Israel declared that “Is- goslavia, Nikolai Firyubin, sent a telegram to Rakosi from his posts as HWP First Secretary and rael is playing with the fate of peace and the fate Moscow with information provided by Kardelj a member of the HWP Politburo. At Mikoyan’s of its own people in a criminal and irresponsible (at Tito’s behest) about the refuge granted to Imre behest, the HWP Politburo also chose Gero as manner.” This policy, Bulganin warned, “is rais- Nagy and his aides in the Yugoslav embassy. The the new party leader. See “Zapis’ besedy A. I. ing doubts about the very existence of Israel as a response, as approved by the CPSU Presidium, Mikoyana s Matyashem Rakoshi, Andrashem state. We expect that the Government of Israel called on the Yugoslav authorities to turn over Hegedushem, Erne Gere i Beloi Begom, 13 iyulya will come to its senses before it is too late and the Hungarian officials to Soviet troops. See 1956 g.,” 17 July 1956 (Secret), compiled by Yu. will halt its military operations against Egypt.” “Vypiska iz protokola No. P51/IV zasedaniya V. Andropov; “Zapis’ vystuplenii na zasedaniya For the texts of the letters and other Soviet state- Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 4 Politbyuro TsR VPT, 13 iyulya 1956 g.,” 13 July ments during the crisis, see D. T. Shepilov, ed., November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in APRF, F. 3, 1956 (Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov; and Suetskii krizis (Moscow: Politizdat, 1956). Al- Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 103-104. “Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Yanoshem though the letters represented a much more force- 176Nagy had appealed to UN Secretary-General Kadarom, 14 iyulya 1956 g.,” 17 July 1956 (Top ful and conspicuous Soviet stance against the al- Dag Hammerskjold on 1 November asking for Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, all in lied incursions, they came so belatedly that they support of Hungary’s sovereignty and indepen- APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 186-190, 191- had only a minor impact at best on efforts to dence. The UN Security Council began consid- 205, and 206-215, respectively. In ciphered tele- achieve a ceasefire. ering the matter on 3 November. On 4 Novem- grams on 16 and 18 July, Mikoyan explained in 170This passage refers to the appeal to the na- ber, the UN Security Council took up the ques- detail why he ended up supporting Gero to be- tion that Kadar’s government issued when it was tion of Soviet military intervention in Hungary, come the new HWP First Secretary. See “TsK installed in power on 4 November. and the UN General Assembly voted to condemn KPSS,” 16 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent), 171Molotov is referring to Kadar’s radio address the Soviet invasion. On 5 November, the CPSU COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 409 newspaper Pravda featured a letter purportedly bassador in Yugoslavia, Nikolai Firyubin, trans- taken to prevent further “unfortunate incidents.” sent by Kadar and Imre Horvath to Dag mitting a formal protest by the Yugoslav govern- 187These notes were compiled by Malin’s deputy, Hammarskjold. The letter claimed that Nagy’s ment about the death of Milenko Milovanov, a Vladimir Naumovich Chernukha, not by Malin submission of the Hungarian question to the UN Yugoslav embassy employee in Budapest who himself. Hence, they are somewhat sketchier than had been illegal, and requested that all consider- was struck by shots fired from a Soviet tank. The other notes from this period. No list of partici- ation of the issue cease. Yugoslav foreign minister, Koca Popovic, accused pants in the session is given, but the formal pro- 177This brief session produced few results. The the Soviet tank of having deliberately opened fire tocol for the session (“Vypiska iz Protokola No. formal protocol for the session (in TsKhSD, F. 3, on the embassy even though the compound was 60 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 27 Op. 14, D. 73, L. 4) simply reads: “Defer con- clearly marked and “the Soviet government had noyabrya 1956 g.,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, sideration of the matter.” been informed by the Yugoslav side of who, other L. 181) indicates that, in addition to those listed 178Voroshilov’s name is not listed among the par- than Yugoslav diplomatic personnel, is in the here, the participants included Brezhnev, ticipants, but the notes below indicate that he ac- Yugoslav embassy compound in Budapest.” See Shvernik, Furtseva, Belyaev, and Pospelov. The tively took part. “Shifrtelegramma,” 5 November 1956 (Strictly protocol does not mention Andrei Gromyko. 179Other documents recently declassified by the Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 143- 188The Presidium is discussing a telegram that Russian government shed light on what occurred 144. To reinforce Popovic’s complaint, a similar was sent on 26 November by V. F. Nikolaev, an at this meeting. On 5 November an official from protest was delivered by the Yugoslav ambassa- official at the Soviet embassy in Bucharest. The the CPSU CC international department, Vladimir dor in Budapest, Dalibor Soldatic, to the Soviet telegram indicated that the Romanian leader, Baikov, who had been sent to Budapest the pre- ambassador in Budapest, Yurii Andropov. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej intended to seek top- vious day to maintain liaison with Kadar, sent a Soldatic requested that the Soviet military unit level negotiations with Yugoslavia as soon as secure, high-frequency message back to Moscow alongside the Yugoslav embassy be pulled back. possible to alleviate the dispute that Yugoslavia along with the draft text of a statement prepared Andropov relayed this message by telephone to was having with the Soviet Union and Hungary by Kadar. Baikov’s message reads as follows: the Soviet deputy foreign minister Valerian Zorin, about the fate of Imre Nagy. During negotiations “At the request of Cde. Kadar, I am conveying warning that “the demand for the withdrawal of with the Yugoslavs, Kadar’s government had the translation from Hungarian of an Appeal by the Soviet military unit from the building of the given assurances of safety for Nagy and his aides the Provisional Central Committee of the Hun- mission is of a suspicious nature.” See if they left the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. garian Socialist Workers’ Party ‘To Hungarian “Telefonogramma,” 5 November 1956, in APRF, When Nagy’s group went outside on 22 Novem- Communists! To Loyal Members of the Hungar- F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 130. These messages ber, they were immediately arrested by Soviet ian Workers’ Party!’ Cde. Kadar requested that I were discussed at the Presidium meeting not only military personnel. Soon thereafter, they were transmit the views and observations of the So- by Zhukov and Shepilov (as indicated by Malin), transported as prisoners to Romania. A senior viet comrades regarding the text of the Appeal but also by Khrushchev, who presented the draft aide to Gheorghiu-Dej, Emil Bodnaras, told by 10:00 a.m. on 6 November.” (See “Po VCh,” of a cable intended for the Yugoslav government. Nikolaev that the Romanians “hadn’t expected APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 132.) The draft Subsequently, the cable was transmitted via that the Yugoslavs would raise a fuss about the went to Mikoyan, who prepared a number of Firyubin to Popovic. transfer of Imre Nagy and his group to Romania. changes and suggestions before the Presidium 186The formal protocol for this session (“Vypiska However, as you know, they presented a note of meeting began. The most significant change was iz Protokola No. 53 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK protest to the Soviet and Hungarian governments. the addition of a reference to the “treacherous” KPSS ot 6 noyabrya 1956 g.,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. It’s possible that this question might be raised at activities of a “group of Imre Nagy, Losonczy, 64, D. 485, L. 141) indicates that the Presidium the UN, etc. We believe that we must be ready and Donath” after the condemnation of the “affirmed the draft response to the Yugoslavs in for different speeches and discussions regarding “Rakosi clique.” (See the marked-up draft in connection with the unfortunate case of an em- Imre Nagy. But first of all we believe it is neces- APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 136.) Kadar in- ployee at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest.” sary to discuss this matter with the Yugoslavs.” corporated this change, though he dropped the The telegram, signed by foreign minister Dmitrii See “Shifrtelegramma,” 26 November 1956 mention of Ferenc Donath, referring simply to Shepilov, was sent to the Yugoslav foreign min- (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, the “Nagy-Losonczy group,” which he claimed ister, Koca Popovic, via the Yugoslav ambassa- Ll. 13-14. had committed “treason” and inspired the “coun- dor in Budapest, Veljko Micunovic. It stated that 189The formal protocol for this session (“Vypiska terrevolution.” Other proposed changes also were the Soviet military commander in Hungary had iz Protokola No. 60 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK included. The final text was released as a leaflet been ordered to make a careful study of how the KPSS,” 27 November 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. in Hungary on 6 November. It was published in incident happened. The telegram also conveyed 64, D. 488, L. 177) stated that “on the basis of the Szolnok newspaper Szabad Nep on 7 Novem- the Soviet government’s “deep condolences” re- the exchange of opinions at the session of the ber and in Russian translation in the CPSU daily garding the death of Milenko Milovanov, and CPSU CC Presidium, Cde. Bulganin is instructed Pravda that same day. On 8 November it was promised assistance in transporting Milanov’s to hold negotiations with Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej.” published in Nepszabadsag. This was the first body to Yugoslavia. The telegram said that the Later that day, Bulganin had a telephone conver- major programmatic statement by Kadar’s gov- Soviet military government would take “all nec- sation with Gheorghiu-Dej, which he promptly ernment. essary measures” to safeguard the Yugoslav em- recounted in writing for the other members of the 180This is the same telegram that Kadar men- bassy in Budapest, and in a follow-on conversa- CPSU Presidium: “I told Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej tioned earlier. See Note 159 supra. tion with Micunovic, Shepilov indicated that the that, in our opinion, a meeting at the highest level 181The draft statement pledged that the HSWP Soviet military command would comply with the with the Yugoslav leadership about Imre Nagy would “make a decisive break with the harmful Yugoslav request to “pull back the military unit and his group will not produce a good solution, policy and criminal methods of the Rakosi clique, next to the [Yugoslav] embassy compound.” See since the Yugoslavs have a set position on this which shook the faith of the broad popular masses “O besede s poslom Yugoslavii v SSSR matter, and such a meeting might complicate the in our party.” This was preserved in the final text Michunovichem,” No. 486 (Secret), from D. T. situation. The Yugoslavs might demand a meet- along with other condemnations of “past mis- Shepilov to the CPSU Presidium, 7 November ing with Imre Nagy and the others, which would takes.” 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 29, Ll. 1-3. hardly be worthwhile. . . . Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej 182Malenkov obviously is referring to a CC ple- The investigation into the incident was completed asked that I let the CPSU CC Presidium know num of the HWP, not of the CPSU. by mid-day on 7 November. It concluded that that they are working via plenipotentiaries with 183Again, the reference is to a CC plenum of the the Soviet tank had come under fire from a house Imre Nagy and his group. They have set out to HWP, not of the CPSU. alongside the Yugoslav embassy. When the tank persuade Imre Nagy and his group to issue a state- 184From exile in Moscow, Rakosi had made over- responded by firing back, one of the shots had ment in which they would acknowledge their tures about his possible readmission into the Hun- strayed into the embassy, killing Milovanov. It criminal actions and indicate that the only cor- garian Communist party. is unclear whether this version of events is more rect course at present is to support and consoli- 185The topic discussed here was a telegram re- accurate than the original Yugoslav account, but date the Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ ceived on 5 November 1956 from the Soviet am- whatever the case may have been, steps were Government of Kadar, and to strengthen the re- 410 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

gime of people’s democracy. In this way, said directly subordinate to Soviet leader J.V. Gheorghiu-Dej, we want to test Imre Nagy.” See RESEARCH NOTES: Stalin. It functioned for almost eight “Informatsiya,” 27 November 1956 (Top Secret), years until it was abolished in accor- in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, Ll. 16-17. THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR 190This refers to the manner in which Imre Nagy dance with a CC CPSU Presidium and his aides were arrested. A bus had been DECLASSIFICATION PROJECT: Resolution of 26 June 1953—the same brought alongside the Yugoslav embassy, suppos- SETTING UP THE A-BOMB tumultuous meeting at which Beria was edly to transport the officials and their families EFFORT, 1946 to their apartments. It turned out that the bus was arrested. Thus, the Special Committee’s merely part of an elaborate plot devised by Ivan activities covered a most important, for- Serov and other senior KGB officials to lure Nagy by G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov, mative period of the Soviet atomic from the embassy. A Soviet military officer was A. S. Stepanov project, that is, the establishment and sitting in the bus, and others quickly approached. growth of the USSR atomic-energy in- Two Yugoslav diplomats who were accompany- On 16 July 1945, the USA con- ing the Hungarians were forced out of the bus, dustry, the development and testing of and the remaining passengers were placed under ducted the world’s first test of an atomic the first Soviet atomic bomb (in 1949) arrest, contrary to the assurances that Kadar’s bomb, and on 6 and 9 August 1945, it and early improved atomic bomb de- government had given to the Yugoslavs. This used the new weapon on Hiroshima and signs, and the development and virtual episode is recounted in detail in the note of pro- Nagasaki. The world faced the fact of test that Yugoslav foreign minister Koca Popovic completion of the first Soviet hydrogen sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on the USA’s monopolistic possession of bomb (RDS-6), which was first tested 24 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. the new, unprecedently powerful de- in August 1953. 5, Ll. 19-26. See also “Telefonogramma,” Se- vice. The atomic bombardments of the Considering and resolving all the cure High-Frequency Transmission, from Japanese cities, some believed, also Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov, 23 November most basic issues which arose in the 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, Ll. 95-96. constituted a demonstration by course of the early Soviet atomic 191 No title for this section is given, but the for- America’s leaders of their readiness to project, the Special Committee was mal protocol for the session (No. 60, as cited in employ these weapons later on as well. empowered to supervise Note 187 supra) indicates that Point II dealt with The events of 1945 forced the So- “Questions of Hungary.” According to the Pro- tocol, “the USSR Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and viet leadership to undertake emergency all work on the use of atomic energy of the USSR Ministry of Defense [were] instructed measures to speed up the creation of the uranium:- the development of scientific to prepare materials about Imre Nagy and his USSR’s own nuclear weapons. It was research in this sphere;- the broad use group in accordance with the exchange of opin- clear that solving the problem of mak- ions at the CPSU CC Presidium’s session.” of geological surveys and the establish- 192Nagy’s surname is omitted in this line of ing the atomic bomb as soon as pos- ment of a resource base for the USSR Malin’s notes. sible would require mobilization of all to obtain uranium...;- the organization the country’s resources, which had been of industry to process uranium and to Mark Kramer, a scholar based at the Davis entirely directed to securing the victory produce special equipment and materi- Center for Russian Studies at Harvard Uni- over fascist Germany and its allies. als connected with the use of atomic en- versity, is a frequent contributor to the Focusing all the country’s forces on ergy; and the construction of atomic CWIHP Bulletin. the solution of this complex problem energy facilities, and the development called above all for the establishment and production of an atomic bomb.1 of a new state management body en- dowed with appropriate power. Such a The Special Committee’s decisions body, which was entrusted with practi- either were of unilaterally decisive char- cally unlimited authority, was the Spe- acter or were made to support draft reso- cial Committee, headed by L. P. Beria lutions and directions of the USSR Gov- (a member of State Defense Commit- ernment previously submitted to Stalin tee and Vice Chairman of the USSR for approval. Throughout the lifetime Council of People’s Commissars) and of the Special Committee, more than was founded by the USSR State De- 140 sittings were held. The approxi- fense Committee’s Resolution No. mate volume of the Special GOKO-9887 of 20 August 1945. The Committee’s protocols is 1000 type- Committee was founded under the State written pages. The complete work of the Defense Committee, but after the State Special Committee fills about 1700 Defense Committee was abolished in dossiers containing more than 300,000 September 1945, the Special Commit- typewritten pages. These materials are tee functioned as a body of USSR Coun- currently stored in the Archive of the cil of People’s Commissars (and after President, Russian Federation (APRF). March 1946 as a body of the USSR These materials, documenting Council of Ministers). events from 1943 to 1953, constitute an In reality, the Special Committee invaluable treasure of early Soviet was an independent state control body atomic project history. 410 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

gime of people’s democracy. In this way, said directly subordinate to Soviet leader J.V. Gheorghiu-Dej, we want to test Imre Nagy.” See RESEARCH NOTES: Stalin. It functioned for almost eight “Informatsiya,” 27 November 1956 (Top Secret), years until it was abolished in accor- in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, Ll. 16-17. THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR 190This refers to the manner in which Imre Nagy dance with a CC CPSU Presidium and his aides were arrested. A bus had been DECLASSIFICATION PROJECT: Resolution of 26 June 1953—the same brought alongside the Yugoslav embassy, suppos- SETTING UP THE A-BOMB tumultuous meeting at which Beria was edly to transport the officials and their families EFFORT, 1946 to their apartments. It turned out that the bus was arrested. Thus, the Special Committee’s merely part of an elaborate plot devised by Ivan activities covered a most important, for- Serov and other senior KGB officials to lure Nagy by G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov, mative period of the Soviet atomic from the embassy. A Soviet military officer was A. S. Stepanov project, that is, the establishment and sitting in the bus, and others quickly approached. growth of the USSR atomic-energy in- Two Yugoslav diplomats who were accompany- On 16 July 1945, the USA con- ing the Hungarians were forced out of the bus, dustry, the development and testing of and the remaining passengers were placed under ducted the world’s first test of an atomic the first Soviet atomic bomb (in 1949) arrest, contrary to the assurances that Kadar’s bomb, and on 6 and 9 August 1945, it and early improved atomic bomb de- government had given to the Yugoslavs. This used the new weapon on Hiroshima and signs, and the development and virtual episode is recounted in detail in the note of pro- Nagasaki. The world faced the fact of test that Yugoslav foreign minister Koca Popovic completion of the first Soviet hydrogen sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on the USA’s monopolistic possession of bomb (RDS-6), which was first tested 24 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. the new, unprecedently powerful de- in August 1953. 5, Ll. 19-26. See also “Telefonogramma,” Se- vice. The atomic bombardments of the Considering and resolving all the cure High-Frequency Transmission, from Japanese cities, some believed, also Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov, 23 November most basic issues which arose in the 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, Ll. 95-96. constituted a demonstration by course of the early Soviet atomic 191 No title for this section is given, but the for- America’s leaders of their readiness to project, the Special Committee was mal protocol for the session (No. 60, as cited in employ these weapons later on as well. empowered to supervise Note 187 supra) indicates that Point II dealt with The events of 1945 forced the So- “Questions of Hungary.” According to the Pro- tocol, “the USSR Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and viet leadership to undertake emergency all work on the use of atomic energy of the USSR Ministry of Defense [were] instructed measures to speed up the creation of the uranium:- the development of scientific to prepare materials about Imre Nagy and his USSR’s own nuclear weapons. It was research in this sphere;- the broad use group in accordance with the exchange of opin- clear that solving the problem of mak- ions at the CPSU CC Presidium’s session.” of geological surveys and the establish- 192Nagy’s surname is omitted in this line of ing the atomic bomb as soon as pos- ment of a resource base for the USSR Malin’s notes. sible would require mobilization of all to obtain uranium...;- the organization the country’s resources, which had been of industry to process uranium and to Mark Kramer, a scholar based at the Davis entirely directed to securing the victory produce special equipment and materi- Center for Russian Studies at Harvard Uni- over fascist Germany and its allies. als connected with the use of atomic en- versity, is a frequent contributor to the Focusing all the country’s forces on ergy; and the construction of atomic CWIHP Bulletin. the solution of this complex problem energy facilities, and the development called above all for the establishment and production of an atomic bomb.1 of a new state management body en- dowed with appropriate power. Such a The Special Committee’s decisions body, which was entrusted with practi- either were of unilaterally decisive char- cally unlimited authority, was the Spe- acter or were made to support draft reso- cial Committee, headed by L. P. Beria lutions and directions of the USSR Gov- (a member of State Defense Commit- ernment previously submitted to Stalin tee and Vice Chairman of the USSR for approval. Throughout the lifetime Council of People’s Commissars) and of the Special Committee, more than was founded by the USSR State De- 140 sittings were held. The approxi- fense Committee’s Resolution No. mate volume of the Special GOKO-9887 of 20 August 1945. The Committee’s protocols is 1000 type- Committee was founded under the State written pages. The complete work of the Defense Committee, but after the State Special Committee fills about 1700 Defense Committee was abolished in dossiers containing more than 300,000 September 1945, the Special Commit- typewritten pages. These materials are tee functioned as a body of USSR Coun- currently stored in the Archive of the cil of People’s Commissars (and after President, Russian Federation (APRF). March 1946 as a body of the USSR These materials, documenting Council of Ministers). events from 1943 to 1953, constitute an In reality, the Special Committee invaluable treasure of early Soviet was an independent state control body atomic project history. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 411

Some particular items in the Spe- Minatom), the Russian archives, the August 1996 the Russian Federation cial Committee’s documentary collec- Academy of Sciences, Ministry of De- Government decided to approve some tions deserve special mention. Besides fense, Federal Security Service, Foreign funding for preparing the compilations. the Committee’s meeting protocols, Intelligence Service, and State Technol- Though the funding amount is not large, these are protocols and related materi- ogy Commission of Russia. this decision will allow us to assure a als of meetings of the Technical (Sci- Since its establishment, the Work- more effective continuation of the entific and Technical) and Engineering ing Group has carried out a great commission’s activities. By now the and Technical Councils which were ac- amount of work. It has specified sub- commission has reviewed the protocols tive in 1945-1946 within the Special jects of the collection sections and de- of the Special Committee’s meetings Committee and then within the First cided to focus initial efforts on two ba- and basic resolutions and orders by Main Directorate of the USSR Council sic areas to complete the compilation and USSR of Ministers; resolutions and orders of sections as quickly as possible: Government from 1943 to 1948. the USSR Council of People’s Commis- Anticipating the publication of the sars Council of Ministers on the atomic -on the history of the development of the historical documents pertaining to the issues; correspondence with First Main first atomic bomb and improved atomic Soviet atomic project history in the Directorate organizations and enter- bomb designs (during the period through compilation, we present below the full prises and other Ministries and agen- 1954) in the USSR; texts of the two most important govern- cies; and important documents of the -on Soviet efforts to develop the hydro- mental resolutions of 1946 from the First Main Directorate. Among the gen bomb (during the period through APRF: USSR Council of Ministers Special Committee’s materials are 1954). (CM) Resolution No. 805-327 of 9 April unique documents signed by Stalin and 1946 (“Issues of USSR Academy of Beria, and manuscripts by leading sci- The compilation section devoted to Sciences Laboratory No.2”), and USSR entists and administrators in the Soviet documents pertaining to the early pe- Council of Ministers Resolution No. atomic project, including its leader, riod of works on the Soviet atomic 1286-525 of 21 June 1946 (“On the Plan physicist I. V. Kurchatov. project (1942-1945) is being prepared of the Works for Design Bureau No.11 For more than 40 years since the for publication. of USSR Academy of Sciences Labo- Special Committee’s abolishment, its To prepare the compilation, docu- ratory No.2”). The latter resolution is documents have been practically inac- ments are being studied and selected in published with annexes No.1 and No.4 cessible for research. But an important various Russian archives. In addition (annexes No. 2 and 3, of a narrow eco- step toward the opening of these mate- to the Archive of the President, Russian nomic character, are omitted). rials, as well as relevant documents of Federation (APRF), great attention is USSR CM Resolution No. 805-327 other agencies, was taken on 17 Febru- paid to the archives of R. F. Minatom of 9 April 1946 is a historic act which ary 1995 with the issuance of Russian and Russian Federal Nuclear Center— established Design Bureau No.11 (KB- Federation Presidential Decree No.160, All-Russian Scientific Research Insti- 11), the Soviet analog of the secret war- “On the Preparation and Publication of tute of Experimental Physics (RFNC- time American nuclear weapons labo- an Official Compilation of Archival VNIIEF). Valuable materials are also ratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico. Documents Pertaining to the History of located in the files of the Russia For- (Design Bureau No. 11 later became the Development of Nuclear Weapons eign Intelligence Service which has in- RFNC-VNIIEF.) USSR CM Resolu- in the USSR.”2 To produce an objec- dicated its readiness to present a large tion No. 1286-525 of 21 June 1946 tive account of domestic atomic-energy amount of intelligence materials for the specified the early missions of KB-11, industry growth and USSR nuclear commission. i.e. development of atomic bombs, weapons development, this Decree pro- In its activities the commission in- which were referred to in the resolution vides for the preparation and publica- tends to be guided by the principle of as “jet engines S,” in two versions, S-1 tion of archival documents pertaining maximum possible openness. The ba- and S-2 (abbreviated as RDS-1 and to the history of nuclear weapons de- sic restriction remains only the provi- RDS-2). RDS-1 meant the analog of velopment in the USSR up to 1954. To sions of the 1968 Nuclear Weapons the first U.S. plutonium-239 implosion fulfill the decree’s requirements, to Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bars type atomic bomb tested on 16 July study and compile the archival docu- the disclosure of information which 1945 in New Mexico (and of the U.S. ments and develop proposals for their would facilitate the spread of nuclear atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki declassification, in accordance with weapons. These provisions hamper the on 9 August 1945). This bomb was suc- Russian Federation Government’s Di- commission’s work as most documents cessfully tested in the USSR on 29 Au- rection No. 728-r of 24 May 1995, a are of a technical character and contain gust 1949. RDS-2 signified the analog Working Group chaired by Russian data whose review for publication re- of the uranium-235 gun type bomb ex- Deputy Federation Minister for Atomic quires thorough analysis. ploded over Hiroshima on 6 August Energy, was set up. The Working Group Another difficulty is that thus far 1945. This bomb passed a design veri- included representatives of the Minis- there is no special funding for the fication in the USSR, but was not tested. try of Atomic Energy (L.D. Ryabev, commission’s activities. However, in Later the abbreviation RDS-2 was used 412 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

to denote the improved plutonium-239 sponded to the maximum capabilities KB-11 construction and arrangement of implosion type atomic bomb tested in of that time. works. 1951. During the period through 1954 The 21 June 1946 resolution set The measures taken for KB-11’s the USSR verified and tested three more stringent control over the KB-11 works. creation and development, alongside the types of improved atomic bombs: RDS- I. V. Kurchatov, the scientific leader of huge complex of the measures to cre- 3, RDS-4, and RDS-5. The documents the Soviet atomic project, and P.M. ate an interconnected network of reflecting the development of the RDS- Zernov and Yu. B. Khariton, leaders of atomic-energy industry scientific re- 1, RDS-2, RDS-3, RDS-4 and RDS-5 KB-11, had to report to the Special search institutes and enterprises, al- atomic bombs that will constitute the Committee on the progress of KB-11 lowed the USSR to solve the historic first part of the compilation being pre- works on a monthly basis. problem of domestic nuclear weapons pared by the commission. The second The annexes to the 21 June 1946 development within a short time period. part will be composed of documents re- resolution contain detailed description Naturally, even a multi-volume flecting the Soviet work on the hydro- of the measures on preparation, arrange- compilation cannot contain all signifi- gen bomb, whose first version (referred ment, and support of the KB-11 works. cant historical documents reflecting the to as RDS-6s) was successfully tested According to Annex No.1, for KB-11 immense work on the USSR atomic on 12 August 1953. construction in the Mordovia State re- project, which was indeed a major ex- Returning to the USSR CM reso- serve zone and Gorky (now Nizhni ploit of Soviet science and industry. The lution of 21 June 1946, readers should Novgorod) region a territory of roughly document sets, such as a complete col- note the extremely short duration of the 100 square kilometers was taken from lection of protocols of the Special Com- work phases set by that resolution. Thus the settlement of Sarov. KB-11 was mittee, and of the Technical and Engi- the technical task orders for the RDS-1 transferred to Plant No. 550 in Sarov neering and Technical Councils of the and RDS-2 designs had to be developed which heretofore belonged to Ministry Special Committee, voluminous reports by 1 July 1946, the main unit designs of Agricultural Machine Engineering. about the work of the First Main Direc- by 1 July 1947. The work on the de- The plant’s buildings and equipment torate from 1945 to 1946 signed by B. sign development had to be conducted became the base of the KB-11 produc- L. Vannikov, A. P. Zavenyagin and I. V. in parallel with the establishment of tion zone. When the USSR CM Reso- Kurchatov, compilation of atomic intel- special laboratories at KB-11 and ar- lutions of 9 April and 21 June 1946 were ligence materials, etc. are worthy of rangement of the works of these labo- adopted, the settlement of Sarov disap- special attention and might be published ratories (the first phase laboratories had peared from all geographic maps pub- individually. The obvious interest of to start functions in the period from lished in the USSR. Russia and the international public in September to December 1946, the sec- The KB-11 laboratory received such historical materials allows us to ond phase laboratories in the period special dispensations and privileges of expect that eventually the problem of from January to June 1947). many varieties. It was permitted to con- financial support of such publications The short duration and arrange- struct new buildings and facilities with- can find a positive resolution. ment of the parallel works became pos- out previously approved projects and sible thanks to availability in the USSR estimated costs and make payments for Document I: USSR Council of Minis- of intelligence materials about the de- the works according to actual expendi- ters Resolution of 9 April 1946 Estab- signs of the U.S. atomic bombs “Fat tures. Special attention was paid to so- lishing Design Bureau No. 11 Man” and “Little Boy,” prototypes of cial issues. KB-11 workers received RDS-1 and RDS-2, Soviet atomic high wages, and enhanced food-stuff Top Secret bombs, which the leaders of the USSR norms given in Annex No.4* (note that (Special dossier) atomic project decided in 1946 should the ration card system existed in the USSR Council of Ministers be copied as closely as possible from USSR up until the end of 1947), and Order No. 805-327ss/op of 9 April 1946. the American designs. reserved high-quality residences. A li- Kremlin, Moscow It should be emphasized that the brary was created which automatically availability of the intelligence materi- received copies of important literature Issues of Laboratory No.2 als could not substitute for independent on physics, chemistry, mathematics and experimental, theoretical, and design fiction published in the USSR, and spe- 1. Reorganize Sector No. 6 of USSR verification of the Soviet atomic bombs cial allocations of additional funding in Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 to which were being prepared for testing. foreign currency to obtain foreign books Design Bureau of USSR Academy of Sci- Owing to the extraordinary responsibil- and journals. Aircraft were allotted to ences Laboratory No.2 for jet engine [atomic ity of the leaders of and participants in KB-11, permitting regular aerial trans- weapon] design development and prototype the Soviet atomic project, RDS-1 was port links with Moscow. manufacture. tested only after thorough confirmation Under the hard post-war condi- 2. Hereupon refer to the above Design of the available information and a full tions, including severe shortages of re- Bureau as Design Bureau No. 11 (KB-11) cycle of experimental, theoretical, and sources, a great amount of materials and of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory design studies whose level corre- necessary equipment was directed for No. 2. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 413

3. Designate: Federation (APRF), Fond 3, Opis 47, Delo fueling stated in item 1a in versions S-1 and C[omra]de Zernov P.M., Transport 29, Listy 105-106]. S-2, 5 copies for each version, and submit Machine Building Deputy Minister, as KB- them for testing by 1 September 1947. 11 Chief with release from his current Min- Document II: USSR Council of 3. That the following proposals of istry duties; Ministers Resolution of 21 June 1946 on Cdes. Kurchatov, Khariton, Vannikov, Professor Khariton Yu. B. as KB-11 Development of Soviet Atomic Weapons Pervukhin, and Zernov to conduct the fol- Chief Designer on jet engine prototype de- lowing preparatory works for RDS versions signing and manufacture. Keep in cipher S-1 and S-2 according to the task orders of 4. Adopt the proposal by Commission Top Secret KB-11, at Ministry of Agricultural Machine composed of Vannikov, Yakovlev, (Special dossier) Building NII-6, NII-504, KB-47, USSR Zavenyagin, Goremykin, Meshik and USSR Council of Ministers Resolution Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2, Khariton on location of KB-11 on the base No. 1286-525ss/op of 21 June 1946. Ministry of Armaments KB-88, Ministry of of Ministry of Agricultural Machine Build- Kremlin, Moscow Transport Machine Building Kirov Plant KB ing Plant No. 550 and adjoining territory. (Chelyabinsk) and USSR Academy of Sci- 5. Assume the following as necessary: On the plan of promoting the works of ences Institute of Chemical Physics be ac- a) involve USSR Academy of Sciences Design Bureau No. 11 (KB-11) of cepted: Institute of Chemical Physics (Director Aca- USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory a) at the Ministry of Agricultural Ma- demician Semenov N. N.) in computations No.2 chine Building Research Institute No. 6 on orders by Laboratory No. 2 (Academi- (leader of the works Cde. Zakoshchikov, cian Kurchatov) relating to designing of jet USSR Council of Ministers ORDERS: NII-6 chief): engines, measurements of needed constants, Accept the following proposals submit- - development of synchronous spark and preparation and conduct of principal jet ted by Cdes.Kurchatov, Khariton, Vannikov, plug operation principles and design—by 1 engine tests; Pervukhin, and Zernov on the Orders for October 1946; b) arrange at USSR Academy of Sci- Design Bureau No. 11 of USSR Academy - refinement of diesel fuel compound ences Institute of Chemical Physics devel- of Sciences and the plan of promoting the charge elements—by 1 October 1946; opment of theoretical issues for nuclear ex- works of the above Bureau: - development basing on small-scale plosion and combustion and their applica- 1. That Design Bureau No. 11 (Messrs. models of a technique for studying maxi- tion in engineering. Khariton, Zernov) be charged with: mum compression of fuel mixture—by 1 In this connection transfer all main a) development of two versions of “Jet January 1947; forces of USSR Academy of Sciences In- engine [atomic bomb] S” (“RDS” in abbre- - study basing on small-scale models stitute of Chemical Physics to accomplish- viated form) under the scientific leadership of the compression rate—by 1 January 1947; ment of the above tasks. of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory - development of the power supply sys- 6. Charge the First Main Directorate No.2 (Academician Kurchatov):with heavy tem—by 1 March 1947. of USSR Council of Ministers (Mr. fuel utilization (version S-1) and with light b) at the Ministry of Agricultural Ma- Vannikov) with [responsibility for] material fuel utilization (version S-2); chine Building Research Institute N0.504 and technical support of KB-11 and USSR b) submission of the first verified and (leader of the works Cde. Rassushin, Chief Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical manufactured S-1 and S-2 versions of RDS, Designer): Physics. 1 copy of each version, to state tests in sta- - development of the automatic height 7. Entrust Mr. Vannikov with consid- tionary conditions: for the version S-1 by 1 controller—by 1 January 1947; eration and solution in conjunction with Mr. January 1948, for the version S-2 by 1 June - development of the spark plug power Zernov of all the issues relating to adjust- 1948; supply system—by 1 October 1946; ment of Plant No. 550 for KB-11. c) submission of the first verified and c) at the Ministry of Agricultural Ma- 8. Entrust Messrs. Vannikov (convo- manufactured S-1 and S-2 aerial design ver- chine Building Design Bureau No.47 (leader cation), Zernov, Kurchatov, Khariton, sions of RDS, 1 copy of each version, to of the works Cde. Kulakov, Chief Designer): Semenov, Pervukhin, Ustinov, and state flight tests: for the version S-1 by 1 - development of the RDS fairing and Zavenyagin with consideration of Academi- March 1948, for the version S-2 by 1 Janu- fastening case—by 1 October 1946; cian Semenov’s proposals on the measures ary 1949. d) at the Ministry of Transport Machine to support the works with which the Insti- 2. That to secure accomplishment of Building Kirov Plant Design, Chelyabinsk tute of Chemical Physics is charged and the tasks stated in item 1, entrust Design Bu- (leader of the works Cde. Dukhov, Chief De- within 5 days to develop and submit the draft reau No. 11 (Cdes. Khariton and Zernov) to signer): decision on this issue. be empowered to carry out the following - development of the diesel fuel com- works: a) development of the tactical and pound charge, fueling technique and auto- Stamp: USSR Council of Ministers General technical task orders for versions S-1 and mated system devices—by 1 October 1946; Office Management of USSR Council of S-2 of the RDS design by 1 July 1946; b) e) at USSR Academy of Sciences Ministers Affairs. development of the design of the main RDS Laboratory No. 2 (leader of the works Aca- units in versions S-1 and S-2 by 1 July 1947; demician Kurchatov): [Source: Archive of the President, Russian c) manufacture of RDS prototypes without - development of the power supply sys- 414 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tem—by 1 March 1947; 88 in conformity with Annexes Nos. 1 and torate No. 880 and that he be relieved of - refinement of the timing issues as 2. other work for Ministry of Military and applied to the version S-2—by 1 January 6. That Messrs. Kurchatov, Zernov and Navy Building. 1947; Khariton be entrusted with monthly report- 4. That GSPI-11 of the First Main Di- f) at the Ministry of Armaments Plant ing about the progress of works of Design rectorate of USSR Council of Ministers No. 38 Design Bureau (leader of the works Bureau No. 11 to the Special Committee of carry out the design operations on building Cde. Kostin, Chief Designer): USSR Council of Ministers. for Design Bureau No. 11. - development of the “gun” design— 5. That the USSR Ministry of Internal by 1 January 1947; Stamp: USSR Council of Ministers General Affairs be empowered to occupy the area - refinement of the timing issues—by Office Management of USSR Council of up to 100 square kilometers for Building Di- 1 January 1947; Ministers Affairs.. rectorate No. 880 in the Mordovia State re- g) at USSR Academy of Sciences In- serve and up to 10 square kilometers of land stitute of Chemical Physics Special Sector [annexes:] south of the Balykovo village, Gorky region. (the leader of the works Academician That Cde. Rodionov, Chairman of Semenov): Top Secret RSFSR Council of Ministers, by agreement - carrying out the theoretical and com- (Special dossier) with Cdes. Zernov and Komarovsky, be en- putational works on the task orders of USSR USSR Council of Ministers Resolution trusted with determination of the alienation Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2. No. 1286-525ss of 21 June 1946. borders of the above lands within ten days. That Ministers: of Agricultural Ma- Kremlin, Moscow 6. That USSR Minister of Internal Af- chine Building Cde. Vannikov, of Arma- fairs be empowered to carry out the con- ments Cde. Ustinov, of Transport Machine Annex No. 1 struction and assembly operations for Build- Building Cde. Malyshev, Director of USSR ing No. 880 without approved project and Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Measures estimated costs. Payment due should be Physics Academician Semenov, [and] Chief on preparation and arrangement of KB-11 made on the basis of actual expenditures. of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory works 7. That Plant No. 550 be transferred to No. 2 Academician Kurchatov be empow- the First Main Directorate of the USSR ered to accomplish the works listed in item USSR Council of Ministers ORDERS: Council of Ministers from the Ministry of 3 within the stated dates and monthly re- 1. That USSR Ministry of Internal Af- Agricultural Machine Building under State- port about the progress of works to the Spe- fairs (Cdes. Kruglov and Komarovsky) be ment of assets and liabilities as of 1 May cial Committee of USSR Council of Minis- empowered to carry out the construction and 1946. ters. assembling operations for Design Bureau 8. That Cdes. Abakumov (convoca- 4. That Design Bureau No. 11 be au- No. 11 and that be USSR Ministry of Inter- tion), Kruglov, Vannikov, and Zernov be thorized to establish the following labora- nal Affairs be empowered to complete by obligated to develop within 2 weeks and tories within the Design Bureau (on the base forces of Glavpromstroy the construction approve the safeguard and security system of Plant No. 550 of the First Main Director- and assembling operations of the first se- for facility No. 550. ate of USSR Council of Ministers): ries by 1 October 1946 and of the second That their direction be reported to Spe- -primarily: Laboratory No. 1 (for fuel), series (all of the operations) by 1 May 1947. cial Committee. Laboratory No. 2 (X-ray metering), Labo- That USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs 9. That Cdes. Vannikov, Kurchatov, ratory No. 3 (for studying strains), Labora- (Cde. Kruglov) be authorized to establish and Zernov be obligated to approve KB-11 tory No. 4 (for studying performance); Building Directorate No. 880 within the staff. -secondarily: Laboratory No. 5 (for Glavpromstroy system to accomplish the That Cdes. Vannikov, Kurchatov, physics), Laboratory No. 6 (for plugs), above task. Zernov, and Komarovsky be charged with Laboratory No. 7 (for metallurgy and treat- 2. That the first series building amount submission of the amount of construction ment), Laboratory No. 8 (for studying physi- for Design Bureau No. 11 proposed by Cdes. and schedule of the construction and assem- cal and mechanical properties of fuel), Labo- Vannikov, Pervukhin, Kurchatov, bly operations of the first phase for KB-11 ratory No. 9 (for quality control of initial Zavenyagin, Khariton, and Zernov, a total for 1946: no later than on 15 August 1946 materials), Laboratory No. 10 (for preven- of 30 million rubles, and the list of building to be approved by USSR Council of Minis- tion of accidents). over the facilities, according to Annex No. ters. That the dates be fixed for spreading 3, be approved and that Cdes. Zernov and 10. That KB-11 be released from re- the works of the primary laboratories from Komarovsky be empowered to approve the cording the staff in financial agencies. September to December 1946 and the sec- priorities for building and restoration of the That a total of 25 million rubles of ad- ondary laboratories from January to June first phase facilities within the above list. vance allocations be approved for KB-11 for 1947. 3. That Cde. Volkov V.V. be placed in quarters II and III, 1946 for preparatory and 5. That the measures be approved on charge of Deputy Chief of Design Bureau building operations, materials, equipment preparation and organization of the works No. 11 of USSR Academy of Sciences Labo- and economy expenditures, including 200 of KB-11 and measures for USSR Ministry ratory No. 2 in building and Chief of USSR thousand rubles as the person-free fund and of Internal Affairs Building Directorate No. Ministry of Internal Affairs Building Direc- 100 thousand rubles for special expendi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 415 tures. to approve estimated costs and actual ex- nexes Nos. 5 and 6 to secure spreading the That the USSR Ministry of Finance penditures for KB-11; first phase works of KB-11; (Mr. Zernov) be charged with allocation of c) authorize Chief of the First Main b) allocation of needed materials and the above funds to the First Main Director- Directorate of the USSR Council of Minis- equipment additionally to KB-11 in June- ate of the USSR Council of Ministers. ters and Chief of KB-11 to have a group of July 1946 from the First Main Directorate 11. That the wages, salaries, and all workers up to 5 persons at the First Main resources. types of food-stuffs and goods provision Directorate of the USSR Council of Minis- 21. That Cde. Akopov, Minister of Au- established for USSR Academy of Sciences ters for preparation of requests and realiza- tomobile Industry, be charged with shipment Laboratory No. 2 be extended to KB-11. tion of KB-11 material supply funds. of 25 motor vehicles in June 1946 in accor- 12. That the following be determined: 16. That KB-11 (Cde. Zernov) be em- dance with the distribution list of Cde. a) salary rates for the workers as- powered to arrange their library at Design Zernov P.M. from the Mobilization Reserve signed to work at facility No. 550 should be bureau which should be later on referred to of the First Main Directorate of the USSR increased during their stay at facility No. 550 as Library No. 11. Council of Ministers provided for the Mo- from 75 to 100% and the persons perform- In order to provide this: bilization Reserve pursuant to Order of the ing multiple tasks of KB-11 should be paid a) charge RSFSR OGIZ (Cde. Yudin) USSR Council of Ministers of 23 March additional salary amounting from 50 to 75% with inclusion of Library No. 11 into the 1946 No. 3881-rs, including: of relevant salary established for workers list for receiving of an obligatory paid copy 8 motor vehicles ZIS-58 motor ve- of KB-11 of Laboratory No. 2; of literature on physics, chemistry, math- hicles GAZ-AA2 motor vehicles GAZ-517 b) all leading, scientific, engineer- ematics, and fiction; motor vehicles GAZ-67 and ing, technical, administrative and economic b) charge Committee on Cultural and in July 1946 8 motor vehicles at the workers of facility No. 550 should be pro- Educational Establishments Affairs of expense of the funds “for special expendi- vided on site with three meals a day in norms USSR Council of Ministers (Mr. Zuyev) tures” for the First Main Directorate of the according to Annex No. 4 and ration accord- with allocation by 1 August 1946 of litera- USSR Council of Ministers, including: ing to the letter “A” limit for leading and ture from the State Stock for Library No. 11 2 motor vehicles ZIS-52 motor ve- scientific workers and to the letter “B” limit composed of up to 5000 books on physics, hicles ZIS-421 motor vehicle “sanitary” for other workers. chemistry, engineering, and mathematics 3 motor vehicles M-11-73. 13. That the USSR Ministry of Trade and organization of a movable technical and 22. That the First Main Directorate of (Cde. Lyubimov) be charged with: fiction library by request of Mr. Zernov; the USSR Council of Ministers be empow- a) allocation by request of Cde. Zernov c) allocate 5000 dollars additionally for ered to have additional fuel expenditures of all needed foodstuffs for arrangement of years 1946-1947 to the First Main Direc- beginning from June 1946: limit-free for three meals a day for all leading, scientific, torate of USSR Council of Ministers for sub- three cars; for 12 M-11-73 make cars 800 engineering-technical, and administrative- scription of books, journals, and magazines liters each; for four cars 600 liters each; and technical workers of facility No. 550 in for Library No. 11. for four cars 400 liters each, of these three norms according to Annex No.4 and ration 17. That Cdes. Kuznetsov A. A. (con- limit-free cars, four cars 800 liters each and of letter “A” for leading and scientific work- vocation), Vannikov, Zernov be entrusted three cars 600 liters each should be at dis- ers, of letter “B” for other workers; with selection of staff for Design Bureau No. posal of Cde. Zernov P.M. b) allocation to facility No. 550 begin- 11 within one month. 23. That the USSR Ministry of Inter- ning from June 1946 of 50 food-stuffs lim- 18. That in July 1946 by direction of nal Affairs (Cde. Kruglov) be obligated to its 300 rubles each monthly and 50 goods the First Main Directorate of the USSR establish telephone communication “HF” limits 750 each quarterly in addition to those Council of Ministers equipment, instru- with Building No. 860 and KB-11. allocated for scientific workers. ments and devices according to Annex No. 24. That the USSR Ministry of Textile 14. That 50 personal payments up to 5 be allocated and shipped, the delivery be- Industry (Cde. Sedin) be obligated to deliver 3000 rubles for KB-11 be established. ing in the order established by Resolution the following by the distribution list of Cde. 15. That the following mechanism of of USSR Council of Ministers of 9 April Zernov P.M. in July 1946: 1.2 thousand provision and funding of KB-11 of USSR 1946 No. 806-328ss. meters of strips of carpet, 1000 meters of Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 be 19. That materials and equipment to the silk cloth; 1000 meters of chevron; 150 established: First Main Directorate of the USSR Coun- meters of woolen cloth at the expense of the a) all KB-11 provision and funding cil of Ministers, according to Annex No. 6, funds of the First Main Directorate of USSR should be through the First Main Director- be allocated at the expense of the First Main Council of Ministers for quarter III, 1946. ate of the USSR Council of Ministers by Directorate Mobilization Reserve provided 25. That Main Directorate of Civil Air requests of Cde. Zernov; for pursuant to USSR Council of Ministers Fleet (Mr. Astakhov) be obligated to allot b) funding of all KB-11 works should Order of 23 March 1946 No. 3881-rs. the aircraft SI-47 and two aircraft PO-2 to be through the First Main Directorate of the 20. That Chief of the First Main Di- Cde. Zernov P.M. to make missions by di- USSR Council of Ministers. The financial rectorate of USSR Council of Ministers rection of Zernov P.M. accounting for KB-1 should be submitted (Cde. Vannikov) be charged with: 26. That Ministry of Transport (Cde. only personally to Chief of the First Main a) forwarding the equipment, instru- Kovalev) be obligated to allot one special Directorate. The same person is authorized ments, materials and devices stated in An- car to USSR Academy of Sciences Labora- 416 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tory No. 2 with the right of coupling to fast, KHRUSHCHEV’S 1960 TROOP Politburo) proposing the radical and passenger and other trains by requests of CUT: NEW RUSSIAN EVIDENCE unilateral disarmament measures which Cde. Zernov; the allotment duration should would become visible to the world the be agreed upon by Cde. Zernov. by Vladislav M. Zubok following month. At the time, the So- 27. That the USSR Ministry of Forest viet leader was riding a crest of domes- Industry (Mr. Saltykov) be obligated to fill On 12 January 1960, the First Sec- tic and international authority achieved the order for furniture at the expense of the retary of the Central Committee of the as a result of his widely-hailed trip to market fund for the First Main Directorate Communist Party of the Soviet Union the United States and summit with U.S. of the USSR Council of Ministers by the and Chairman of the USSR Council of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in specification and distribution list of Cde. Ministers, Nikita S. Khrushchev, an- September 1959. Even a testy meeting Zernov P.M. in quarters II and III, 1946, the nounced the most radical reduction in with Mao Zedong and the leadership of sum total amounting to 800 thousand rubles, the level of Soviet military troops since the Chinese Communist Party in including 400 thousand rubles for individual 1924: the army was to be reduced by Beijing in early October, which indi- suites, with delivery amount being 100 thou- one-third in three years; several cated a wider than ever split between sand rubles in the 2nd quarter and 700 thou- branches of military aviation and navy the leaderships of the two communist sand rubles in the 3d quarter. were to be drastically cut or even alto- giants, could not dampen Khrushchev’s 28. That for the workers of Design gether abolished; and instead, the stra- optimism and desire to capitalize on Bureau No. 11 and Building No. 880 the tegic missile forces were to become the what he saw as his political momentum. dwelling space occupied by them and their backbone of the armed forces. The disarmament initiative was a families by the time of their going to work Analysts and scholars have long hallmark’s of Khrushchev authority: as at Building No. 880 and KB-11 of USSR agreed that, unlike previous cuts de- the unchallenged leader of the CPSU Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 be signed to impress the West with the (since his victory over the “anti-party” reserved for them. Soviets’ “peace-loving” nature, this faction in June 1957), he was deter- 29. That the USSR Ministry of Foreign move was principally Khrushchev’s mined to redefine in breathtaking fash- Trade (Cde. Mikoyan) be obligated to search radical attempt to replace the concept ion the parameters of Soviet security for the possibility to deliver one precision of a huge land army, which was in the doctrine and military make-up. drilling machine No. 3 or No. 4 (for KB- foundation of the Soviet military build- The memorandum, found the 11), irrespective of its primary purpose, as up, with a technological force to ensure supplementary file to the December a part of previous orders to the First Main means of “retaliation.” At the core of 1959 CC CPSU Plenum, is clearly a Directorate of the USSR Council of Minis- this idea was Khrushchev’s desire to draft, bearing all the traces of improvi- ters in 1946. save resources for large-scale social and sation; probably Khrushchev dictated economic programs. But only recently the text during a holiday on the Black Stamp: I. Stalin, Chairman of USSR have documents emerged to show how Sea; some corrections and insertions are Council of Ministers. this remarkable initiative was born. typed into it, and the phraseology in the Protocol Division Ya. Chadayev, Man- In autumn 1995, the Moscow Russian original is often awkward and ager of USSR Council of Office Ministers archive containing the post-1952 unpolished, replete with colloquial Affairs. records of the CC CPSU, the Storage “Khrushchevisms.” What is unusual is Center for Contemporary Documenta- the absence of a “final” version, which [Source: APRF, F. 3, Op. 47, D. 29, Ll. 169- tion (TsKhSD), released transcripts of apparently did not exist, perhaps be- 178.] CC CPSU Plenums for the period 1941- cause Khrushchev did not want bureau- 1966 as well as supplementary mate- cratic agencies, including the Ministry [* Annex 4 of the USSR Council of rial, often analogous to “special files” of Defense and the KGB, to elaborate Ministers Resolution of 21 June 1946 [osobaya papki], batches of highly im- or modify his arguments. He must have is not printed due to space limitations, portant secret documents describing the intended to keep it as it was: exclusively but is available from CWIHP—ed.] rationale and preparations for crucial his personal initiative. Was this a case Politburo decisions. (CC CPSU Ple- of the late authoritarian Khrushchev 1 The full text of the State Defense Committee nums and related materials for the pe- paying lip service to “party democracy,” resolution on the establishment of the Special riod 1967-1991 have also reportedly but actually taking no heed of his col- Committee is published in Cold War International been declassified by the Russian declas- leagues and party-state structures? History Project Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), sification commission, but as of late Rather, in this case the 269-70. 1996 they had not yet been opened for was enlightened: Khrushchev knew that 2 For an English translation of this decree, see scholarly research at TsKhSD.) his proposal had to be imposed from the CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 57. One document discovered in this top and passed quickly, otherwise it newly-available collection at TsKhSD, would be resisted and bog down. and printed below, was Khrushchev’s The documents reproduced below secret memorandum of 8 December illuminate the process by which 1959 to the CC CPSU Presidium (i.e., Khrushchev’s proposal became official COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 417

Soviet policy. On 14 December 1959, the Cold War would be decided by the two years”). This perception, inciden- six days after his memorandum was outcome of economic competition be- tally, was disastrously unrealistic and drafted, it was approved by the Pre- tween the United States and Soviet contradicted Khrushchev’s avowed sidium; four days later, on December Union. With the great optimism char- concern with the future of demobilized 18, a conference of the military elite acteristic of the times, he explained to officers. What also catches the eye is convened to work out practical mea- the Politburo members that if the West Khrushchev’s groping for a way to sures to implement the proposal; and did not reciprocate to Soviet cuts, so marry somehow the idea of rapid de- eight days after that, on December 26, much worse for it, since the burden of ployment with territorial forces, but the Plenum rubber-stamped it. Despite military budgets would drag its econo- without creating what one might call Khrushchev’s strong position, he could mies down. And the romantic today a “rapid deployment force.” He not help worrying about the political Khrushchev firmly believed that once was careful to avoid the worrisome fallout of such a radical revamping, “workers, but also peasants, petit bour- prospect of entrusting the country’s se- which constituted a de facto replacing geois elements,” saw the USSR’s de- curity to an elite highly mobile force, a of the Soviet military machine; hence termination to disarm, they would shed potential carrier of “Bonapartism.” the memorandum’s rather long and (for their anti-Soviet fears and move “to The great disarmament initiative Khrushchev) elaborate argument. It is neutral positions, and then would de- was as bold as it was ill-conceived: It interesting that Khrushchev regarded velop sympathies toward our country.” was not part of comprehensive military his initiative as a direct follow-up to his Thus, Khrushchev repeated the disar- reform. Khrushchev sacrificed quality proposal on General and Complete Dis- mament dictum of the Soviet diplomacy for quantity, eager to ram down the armament which he made to the U.N. of the 1920s and early 1930s, but, un- throat of the reluctant military his en- General Assembly on 18 September like his predecessors, did not intend to thusiasm for strategic missiles and de- 1959. He presented his initiative to his use it merely as a smoke-screen for termination to have a “no-frills” land colleagues as a means to boost the level Soviet build-up, but, on the contrary, as army. There is still no available record of discussion at the specially-appointed a rationale for a unilateral build-down. of the conference with top military of- United Nations “Committee of Ten” The point where Khrushchev’s ficials on December 18; but the signs countries, set up to study disarmament imagination reached record-breaking of sharp disagreement and even protest questions, which was scheduled to start heights was in plotting an army of the were visible. Around that time its deliberations in February 1960. future. On one hand he was primarily Khrushchev and Defense Minister The memorandum reveals moved by his conviction that the con- Rodion Malinovsky authorized a dis- Khrushchev as a convert of the nuclear struction of communism would require cussion in the new top secret publica- revolution; he was convinced that no maximum military demobilization. He tion Military Thought on a new mili- power could threaten a Soviet Union was attracted by the reforms of the tary doctrine, with obvious intention to armed with nuclear missiles. In the 1920s carried out by Mikhail Frunze, let off steam. The amount of steam was same breath the Soviet leader poses as when more of the Red Army conscripts to be great indeed: in the period of sev- an exuberant romantic and bluffer, this would be trained not in “the cadre eral months after Khrushchev’s an- time not before the outside world, but army” but in territorial militia forma- nouncement of the cuts, 250,000 Soviet in front of his own, much less informed tions; this, in his mind, could keep officers were forced into premature re- colleagues. Most important, he boldly young manpower in local economies tirement, many without adequate com- but falsely claims that “we are in an instead of diverting it to unproductive pensation, housing, or retraining. (For excellent position with [regard to] mis- military drills. He even spoke of keep- more on the tensions between sile-building” and that the USSR has ing officers simultaneously in military Khrushchev and the Soviet military already set in motion assembly lines schools and industrial jobs! caused by such actions, see the forth- capable of serial production of “an as- On the other hand, Khrushchev had coming CWIHP Working Paper by sortment of rockets to serve any mili- no patience with or respect for the pro- Matthew A. Evangelista.) tary purpose.” In fact, as was known to fessional military. He lacked experience The military were not the only the tiny group of military and missile with military reform, but specifics did group “ambushed” by Khrushchev’s designers who reported directly to not bother him. Like many crucial turns initiative. So were the party and state Khrushchev as the head of the Defense in Soviet foreign policy in 1958-62, this elites, many of whom later recalled this Council, the production of interconti- disarmament initiative sprung full- episode as “a hare-brained scheme” of nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) had blown from his mind. This is made clear Nikita Sergeevich. Also Khrushchev did not yet begun and there were only four by his own admission that he still not bother to ask for advice from other unwieldy R-7s on a launching pad near needed to discuss the proposal with the members of the Warsaw Treaty Orga- Plesetsk in northern Russia. The first Defense Ministry and General Staff, nization: even the leadership of the test of the next-generation ICBM of the including how deep the proposed cuts GDR, the strategically vital country Yangel firm was still nine months away. should be (“perhaps a million or a mil- whose existence totally depended on the At the core of Khrushchev’s rea- lion and half”) and how quickly they support of Soviet troops, was caught by soning was his belief that from then on should be carried out (“no more than surprise by Khrushchev’s disarmament 418 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

move and East German leader Walter [and] our proposal in the United Nations and when we start discussing it, - we will Ulbricht had to ask Soviet representa- Organization on general disarmament was repeat - therefore I do not enumerate [them] tives what its implications would be for well received in the world and cannot be in the note, but I can lay out in more detail, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. simply rejected and neglected even by the when we begin discussion. A resurgence of tensions with the reactionary circles of various countries. We now have a broad range of rockets West would doom Khrushchev’s dalli- Even those who do not want a reduction of and in such quantity that can virtually shat- ance with disarmament. Perhaps sur- tension, much less disarmament, even they ter the world. One may ask - shall we have prisingly, his proposals outlived the cannot oppose [it] openly in view of such a this terrible armament - atomic, rocket ar- flare-up with the Eisenhower Adminis- mood of broad circles of the public and de- mament, and shall we have such a big army, tration surrounding the Soviet downing sire for detente and reduction of armaments; which we have [today]? This does not make of an U.S. U-2 spy plane and the col- they would probably use procrastination to sense. Our assumption is that we do not seek lapse of the East-West summit in Paris find some arguments in order to turn this war and we do not prepare for offensive in May 1960. But they fell victim to an down, or in order to delay or disrupt deci- [war], but we prepare defense. If one ac- another Khrushchev initiative: his de- sion-making on our proposals. cepts this assumption, as we do, our army termination to change the status of West I believe that we today should take should be capable of defending the country, Berlin and achieve a German settlement advantage of this opportunity [konyunktura], of repelling enemies that might try to attack favorable to the Kremlin through an which we created in our favor, not to feel our Motherland or our allies, when we have ultimatum to the West. The renewal of satisfied by our conquests, which we won, these powerful armaments, such as rockets. the Berlin Crisis in June 1961 (after by positive recognition and our sound in- But that is what they are for. What country Khrushchev told President John F. ternational position, and our leading role and or group of countries in Europe would dare Kennedy in Vienna that Moscow in- initiative, which we retain consistently for to attack us, when we can virtually erase tended to sign within six months a treaty several years. these countries from the face of the Earth with East Germany, thereby blocking I would think that we should now un- by our atomic and hydrogen weapons and Western access to West Berlin) led to a dertake a further reduction of armaments in by launching our rockets to every point of spiral of mutual hostility and our country, even without conditions of reci- the globe? mobilizational measures in Washington procity on the part of other states, and a con- Therefore, if we now fail to take steps and Moscow. On July 25, Kennedy an- siderable reduction of personnel of the toward reduction of armed forces, and trans- nounced a call-up of U.S. reservists in armed forces. I think that one could cut by fer this all, as it is already the case, for deci- his response to Khrushchev’s belliger- perhaps a million or a million and half - one sion-making in the Committee of Ten, while ence. The next month the Soviet Chair- still must discuss it, study it with the Minis- having advantageous and active positions on man made it clear that the reductions try of Defense. I believe that such a consid- our side, that would mean reducing our pos- of Soviet army would be “suspended.” erable reduction would not undermine our sibilities. Because our proposals would then That ended his quixotic disarmament defense capabilities. Yet, if one comes for- be transferred to the labyrinths of the Com- initiative, and, for almost three decades, ward with such a decision and implements mittee, there will be much talk, speeches, the chance, however ephemeral, for the it - this would have a large positive influ- and pompous verbiage, exercises in glorifi- USSR to leave behind the mammoth ence on the international situation and our cation, and this would scale down our ini- land army it had inherited from the Sec- prestige would grow enormously in the eyes tiative in this question. ond World War. of all nations. This would be an irresistible If we, for instance, pass now a deci- blow at the enemies of peace, and war-mon- sion to cut our armed forces by a million or Document 1: Khrushchev Memo to CC gers, and advocates of the Cold War. a million and a half, and would put forth CPSU Presidium, 8 December 1959 Why do I believe today that this would appropriate arguments, it would be a con- be feasible and not dangerous? My decision siderable step forward. I believe that the P. 2909 is based, first, on the fact that we have now conditions are quite ripe for us to speak reached a good position in the development about it. Indeed, we already spoke about it: TO MEMBERS OF THE of the economy of the Soviet Union; sec- in my report, that I made, and in our other CC CPSU PRESIDIUM ond, we are in an excellent position with declarations. We have already said many TO ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE [regard to] missile-building; indeed, we times that our ideological debates with capi- CC CPSU PRESIDIUM have an assortment of rockets to serve any talism will be resolved not through war, but military purpose, from long-range to close- through economic competition. Therefore I would like to express some thoughts combat range, “ground-to-ground” rockets our proposals and measures on further re- on our further steps in the struggle for re- as well as “air-to-ground” and “air-to-air” duction of our armed forces would allow us duction of international tension and on the ones, atomic submarines and so on, and also to further pressure our opponents - the im- resolution of the issues of reduction of ar- in terms of the [explosive] yield we have a perialist countries. Some comrades might maments and of disarmament. good variety. Besides, we worked out object that we would cut armaments, while The Soviet Union today has seized [naladili] the serial production of these rock- the enemy would not. But it is debatable if good positions on the international arena. ets. I will not enumerate in this note all these the enemy would be doing the right thing. The trip to the United States of America rockets - those who are in charge, they know, If we cut and say that we cut because our COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 419 hydrogen and rocket armament enable us to advantages. Therefore, if we fail to do this, people in the army, one should accommo- maintain defense capabilities at the neces- then speaking in economic terms, it would date them: officers, military officials (sol- sary level, because we do not want war, mean failing to make a full use of the pow- diers are easy to accommodate), so that they therefore we want to cut the army, because erful capital our socialist policy and our so- would be all set and accommodated. And we do not get ready for attack, the Soviet cialist economy have accumulated. For our then we would see in which direction it goes, Union has never sought conquests, nor have economy is prospering, developing fast. Our because we are not cutting at once: it would socialist countries - then why we need such science has advanced to such an extent that take a year, year and a half, two (but no more a huge army? To maintain this huge army it has given us advantages in creating means than two years). It would be logical. If we would mean to reduce our economic poten- to defend our country. And there are not only introduced a proposal at the session of the tial. We have a chance to reduce the army. discoveries of science, but skillfully imple- [U.N.] General Assembly about general and And if our enemies do not follow our ex- mented scientific discoveries for practical complete disarmament in 4 years, then a ample - one should not consider it as if it needs. partial, unilateral disarmament we might would cause us some damage. On the con- I think that it would not make sense carry out within two years or less. This trary, the countries which would maintain now to have atomic and hydrogen bombs, would also be logical and convincing. And big armies, in the situation which emerges rockets, and to maintain at the same time a besides, it would not be dangerous. in socialist countries (i.e., their economic large army. Presenting for deliberation of the Pre- potential and, more importantly, powerful In addition, one should keep in mind sidium these proposals that I have thor- thermonuclear and rocket armament in their that since we possess modern armaments of oughly thought through, I hope that we will possession), these armies would, so to say, the strongest kind, against which so far there discuss them well at the Presidium and will be sucking from their budgets, depleting is no defense, and [since] we maintain the weigh all arguments for and against. Per- national economies, and if one takes this in largest army in the world, this indeed scares haps I cannot foresee everything. But it the light of struggle between communism our enemies, and it scares even honest seems to me that these proposals of mine, if and capitalism, they [i.e., the imperialist people among those who otherwise would we implement them, would not cause any countries] would to a certain extent be our welcome a fair disarmament, but who are damage to our country and would not “ally,” since they would devour their bud- afraid that perhaps this is just our tactical threaten our defense capabilities vis-a-vis gets, reduce the economic development of move. Their argument is the following: the the enemy forces, but would rather enhance these countries, thereby contributing to the Soviet Union introduced a proposal for a our international prestige and strengthen our increasing advantages of our system. new reduction of armed forces, but does not country. I gave much thought to this issue, and make these reductions within its own terri- I have some details in these proposals, decided before my arrival to Moscow to tory. This might scare off some honest but I do not outline them in the note. When send such a note, so that the members and people, among those who seek disarmament; we begin discussing them, I will explain my alternate members of the CC Presidium and the reactionary forces, who resist the arguments in more detail than [I do] in this could read it, and, when I arrive, discuss it. reduction of international tension, these ag- note. For instance, while reducing armed If the comrades agree with me, then one gressive and militarist forces would of forces, at a certain time, to a certain degree, could adopt necessary proposals. In my course use it for their ends. perhaps one should move to a territorial sys- opinion, one could do the following: to con- If, however, we carry out a further re- tem (militia formations). In other words, vene a session of the Supreme Soviet, for duction of our armed forces, then such a step there would be regiments and divisions built instance, the session could be convened at would encourage those forces in bourgeois on a territorial principle (with citizens re- the end of January or in February (one countries, those liberal bourgeois, capital- cruited to serve in them without leaving their should select a time, but not delay) before ist circles who seek to improve the interna- industries). Of course, one should have an the Committee of Ten starts, which is con- tional situation, to live by the principles of appropriate cadre of officers for such regi- vened for February to discuss our propos- peaceful coexistence. This would ments and units, armament must be stored als. So we should convene a session of the strengthen them and weaken the arguments somewhere in warehouses. We must have Supreme Soviet before this Committee starts of aggressive, militarist circles, who take transport aviation, because in case of emer- its work, to approve a rapporteur, to report advantage of our might and intimidate other gency one must transfer these regiments to the Supreme Soviet, to summon argu- countries. quickly from one place to another. For in- ments and to take the decision, to accept an How we could do it and all the details stance, if one has to transfer several divi- appeal that would say that, regardless of the - for this one should already exchange opin- sions to Germany, we must do it practically reaction of other countries to our appeal, ions; we will give instructions to the Minis- in a few days. Armament for these territo- whether they would follow our example or ter of Defense, to the General Staff so that rial divisions must be stored in a suitably not, we would abide by the decision of the they prepare [a proposal] in a concrete way. reasonable variety near the sites of deploy- Supreme Soviet. Such a reduction, such a reduction ment of these formations. And these divi- I am confident that this would be a very (considerable) would be better extended sions, for instance from Moscow, Leningrad, powerful, fantastic [potryasaiuxchii] step. over a year, year and half, or two. Thus dur- Kiev, Kharkov, would get together right Moreover, this step would not in any way ing this time we would take a decision, away, on alert, to a gathering point, would cause damage to our defenses, but would would gradually start to reduce the army, board planes and leave. give us major political, moral, and economic because, while cutting such a number of And there are other considerations we 420 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

should take into account so that the defense people for military schools who will work, military councils of military districts for dis- capabilities of our country would not dimin- will train cadres without denying them to cussion of practical measures in the army, ish, but increase. The burden of maintain- industrial economy, and will prepare officer related to the proposals com. Khrushchev ing armies would be smaller, and the politi- cadres for all branches of the military. These N.S. outlined in [his] note to the CC Pre- cal position domestically, as well as inter- commanders will be of the kind that will be sidium. nationally, would grow stronger, since we even closer to the people, will be free of the To entrust the chairmanship of the con- would free the resources that are sapped by so-called caste spirit that is emerging as a ference to com. Khrushchev N.S. the maintenance of a huge army and arma- result of better material supply for students ment. And we would conquer even more of military schools. SECRETARY OF CC [ground] in our favorable position in the On the other hand, it would make sense 4-ak international arena in the struggle for peace, and the costs would be less expensive. the prestige of our country would grow even These are the questions that I would Document 3: CC CPSU Plenum further. And all this would promote our consider necessary to offer for deliberation protocol, 26 December 1959 Marxist-Leninist ideas, our teaching, our at the CC Presidium. struggle for peace, because not only work- Proletarians of all countries, unite! ers, but also peasants, petit bourgeois ele- N. KHRUSHCHEV Communist Party of the Soviet Union. ments would become more sympathetic to CENTRAL COMMITTEE us with every new year. Their sympathies 8 December 1959 would grow. They would move first from Top Secret fear to neutral positions, and then would Document 2: CC CPSU Presidium # Pl. 15 Special Dossier develop sympathies toward our country. decision, 14 December 1959 This I take to be natural, and we should work Excerpt from protocol no. 15 of meeting to achieve it. Proletarians of all countries, unite! of Plenum CC of 26 December 1959 When I am saying that one perhaps Communist Party of the Soviet Union. should have not only a cadre army, but also CENTRAL COMMITTEE About the measures of the Soviet Govern- in part territorial, militia forces, in doing so ment aimed at the reduction of international we essentially, to some extent, repeat what #P253/P Top Secret tension. Lenin did after the October [1917] revolu- tion, but in a different situation and some- To com. Khrushchev. To approve the measures aimed at the what in another way, since back then we had reduction of international tension, outlined no other option, we had no army; and today Excerpt from protocol no. 253 of meeting in the note of com. Khrushchev N.S. of 8 we have both resources and armaments, we of the CC Presidium of 14 December 1959 December 1959 and in his report to the CC have an army. And we cannot be left with- Plenum. out an army and we do not want to be. But About further steps in the struggle for re- we should build this army in such a way, duction of international tension. SECRETARY OF CC that it would be reasonable, without exces- 4 nk sive frills [bez izlishestv], so that it would 1. To approve the proposals laid out in be combat-ready and meet the needs of na- the note of com. Khrushchev N.S. to the CC [Source: Center for the Storage of Contem- tional defense. Presidium about the unilateral implementa- porary Documentation (TsKhSD), f. 2, op. Of course, we would have to revise the tion by the Soviet Union of measures di- 1, d. 416, ll. 1-11; translation by Vladislav system of military schools: their profile and rected at the reduction of international ten- M. Zubok (National Security Archive).] number. Perhaps, if we switch to a new sys- sion. tem, we should also establish such military The question about the unilateral Vladislav M. Zubok, a research fellow schools where officers would be trained implementation of measures directed at the at the National Security Archive, is co- without leaving their jobs in industries. This reduction of international tension, should be author (with Constantine V. Pleshakov) is also of great importance. put on the agenda of a session of the Su- of Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From All these measures will undoubtedly preme Soviet of the USSR. Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: take the burden off the national budget. We 2. To commission the Ministry of De- Harvard University Press, 1996) and a have big opportunities for implementation fense (com. [Rodion] Malinovsky) to intro- frequent contributor to the CWIHP of the proposals I have outlined on a unilat- duce concrete proposals on this issue for Bulletin. eral reduction of our armed forces. deliberation of the CC CPSU, while taking A couple of words about our military into account the exchange of opinions that schools. When we created our multiple mili- took place at the meeting of the CC Pre- tary schools, we did not have a sufficient sidium. number of trained people in our country. 3. To convene in the CC CPSU on 18 Today all young people have education, and December this year a conference of com- therefore it is possible to enlist enough manders, chiefs of staffs, and members of