The Antiwar Motivation of the Wilmot Proviso
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City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Dissertations and Theses City College of New York 2016 THE ANTIWAR MOTIVATION OF THE WILMOT PROVISO Michael McCarthy CUNY City College How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/577 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] THE ANTIWAR MOTIVATION OF THE WILMOT PROVISO Michael McCarthy Adviser: Adrienne Petty May 9, 2016 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts of the City College of the City University of New York CONTENTS Introduction 1 Section I. The Slave Power Thesis and Doughface Democrats 10 Section II. The Rise of Antislavery and the Birth of the Liberty Party 15 Section III. The Battle over Texas and the Election of 1844 20 Section IV. The Mexican War and the Antiwar Movement 30 Section V. The Example of New Hampshire 45 Section VI. The Reintroduction of the Proviso and the Debate in the House 49 Conclusion 53 Bibliography 55 i Introduction On the evening of Saturday, August 8, 1846, a sweltering night in which “newspaper fans and ice water were in great demand,” a first-term Democratic congressman from Pennsylvania took to the House floor to address his colleagues.1 Earlier that day, President James K. Polk had sent a message to Congress requesting two million dollars to be used to negotiate a peace settlement with Mexico, with whom the U.S. had been at war for several months. Since its inception, Polk had assured Congress and the nation that the war was strictly defensive and had denied that it was being waged in the interest of territorial expansion. The appropriation request, however, now made it clear that the administration desired to make the acquisition of Mexican land part of any potential peace agreement.2 The timing of the request was an opportunistic move on Polk’s part. By waiting until the last weekend of the congressional session, which was set to adjourn at noon on Monday, August 10, he had likely hoped to bypass any serious debate that might forestall his acquisition scheme. Things, however, did not go according to plan. After a two million dollar appropriation bill was drawn up, the debate in the House began. Several members addressed the proposed bill – including Hugh White, a Whig from New York who denounced the war as “unnecessary, uncalled for, and wholly unjustifiable” before calling on the “the other side of the House” to offer, as an act of good faith, an amendment prohibiting the extension of slavery – before David Wilmot was recognized by the Speaker.3 Wilmot began by reaffirming his support for the war as 1 New York Herald, August 11, 1846. 2 According to Eric Foner, “Polk recognized that a peace treaty ceding land to the United States would be unpopular in Mexico. He intended to use the two million dollars as payment to the Mexican government. This would enable it to retain the support of the Mexican army and, therefore, to stay in power. Foner, “The Wilmot Proviso Revisited,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Sept., 1969): 273. 3 Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 1213-1214. 1 necessary and proper and by denying that it was a war of conquest. He admitted, however, that it was now apparent that the President sought to acquire territory from Mexico, which Wilmot would not oppose as long as it was fairly attained by purchase or negotiation, and not by conquest. “But whatever territory might be acquired, he declared himself opposed, now and forever, to the extension of this ‘peculiar institution’ that belongs to the South.”4 Wilmot concluded by offering the following amendment, modelled on Jefferson’s Northwest Ordinance, which afterwards became known as the “Wilmot Proviso”: Provided, That as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the Republic of Mexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty which may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the Executive of the moneys herein appropriated, neither slavery not involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said territory, except for a crime, whereof the party shall first be duly convicted.5 The amended bill passed the House along strictly sectional lines, although it was subsequently killed in the Senate.6 While it drew little attention at the time, and though it never did manage to pass the Senate, the Wilmot Proviso had a tremendous impact on the course of American history. The controversy that followed its introduction unleashed a sectional struggle that ultimately lead to a civil war which nearly tore the Union apart. While historians have universally recognized the significance of the Proviso, they have focused almost exclusively on the political motivations behind its introduction and the political ramifications that followed, rather than on the essential role played by the American people in bringing it about. Although the handful of Van Buren Democrats 4 Ibid., 1214. 5 Ibid., 1217. 6 The bill was talked to death (inadvertently, he later claimed) by Whig John Davis of Massachusetts. 2 behind the Proviso were certainly motivated by political considerations, without popular pressure from large segments of the electorate, they would not have had the need to respond in the first place.7 For the truth is, in various sections of the Northeast and Midwest, the Mexican War was widely and vehemently opposed from the start, primarily because of its alleged association with the extension of slavery. For their part in supporting this decidedly unpopular war, the Proviso men faced the serious prospect of defeat in the upcoming elections of 1846. As members of the dominant party, these Democrats were bound to support the war, yet some gesture was required to assure their antiwar constituents that the war was not being waged to spread slavery; the Proviso was intended to do just that. The introduction of the Proviso, therefore, was in no small part the result of popular outrage and activism on the part of antislavery opponents of the war. By characterizing the Proviso as the product of self-serving politicians exclusively, historians have overlooked the agency and influence of thousands of antiwar activists who collectively forced these men to act. Although there may be general consensus among historians regarding its impact, there remains some controversy surrounding the origins of, and motivations behind, the Wilmot Proviso. In fact, historians even disagree about the original authorship of the amendment. For many years, historians accepted the version told by Congressman Jacob Brinkerhoff of Ohio, who insisted that he was the true author of the famous amendment. However, because of his own reputation as an antislavery man, Brinkerhoff claimed that he approached Wilmot, who had until then been a loyal supporter of the administration and had shown no sign of antislavery sympathies, to introduce the measure instead. Although Brinkerhoff had acted independently, after conferring with some Democratic 7 Van Buren Democrats, or Van Burenites, were northern followers of former President Martin Van Buren. 3 colleagues he discovered that several others had written amendments similar in character to his own.8 As Brinkerhoff later admitted, “I am entitled to no very great and no exclusive credit. My draft of the Proviso happened to be adopted as the best, and that is all.”9 Wilmot, on the other hand, claimed that he alone had conceived of the idea during the dinner recess, but admitted to afterwards consulting with several fellow Democrats who also favored such an amendment. Therefore, when the appropriation bill was introduced in the evening session, “several gentlemen collected together to agree upon the form and terms of the proposed [free-soil] amendment. After various drafts had been drawn and altered, the language in which the amendment was offered was finally agreed on.”10 Charles Buxton Going accepted this version of events in his 1924 biography of Wilmot, and even managed to track down the “original” Proviso submitted to the Speaker on August, 8, 1846 in Wilmot’s handwriting.11 Following this revelation, most historians have accepted Going’s conclusion that Wilmot, not Brinkerhoff, was the Proviso’s true author.12 8 Charles Eugene Hamlin, The Life and Times of Hannibal Hamlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1899), 155-57. In the Brinkerhoff account, this group included Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, John P. Hale of New Hampshire, Preston King, George Rathbun, Martin Grover, and Timothy Jenkins of New York, and Paul Dillingham of Vermont. Although, according to Foner, “Hale’s inclusion seems to be an error. He was not a member of the 29th Congress. Brinkerhoff was probably thinking of Hale’s role in the 28th Congress, when he opposed the annexation of Texas.” Foner, “Wilmot Proviso,” 262. 9 Quoted in Charles Buxton Going, David Wilmot, Free-Soiler: A Biography of the Great Advocate of the Wilmot Proviso. (Gloucester, Mass: P. Smith, 1966), 139. 10 Wilmot’s account comes from a speech he delivered in Albany, NY on October 29, 1847; published in The voice of New York! Proceedings of the Herkimer mass convention of Oct. 26, 1847, with the Speeches of the Hon. David Wilmot of Pa.; C.C. Cambreleng, John Van Buren, and others (Albany: Albany Atlas, 1847), 12. The members of the group mentioned by Wilmot included five of the same men listed by Brinkerhoff (Rathbun, King, Grover, Hamlin, and Brinkerhoff), as well as James Thompson of Pennsylvania. 11 Going, David Wilmot, 122-23.