High Treason: Essays on the History of the Red Army 1918-1938, Volume I
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FINAL REPORT T O NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEANRESEARC H TITLE : HIGH TREASON : ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF TH E RED ARMY 1918-193 8 VOLUME I AUTHOR : VITALY RAPOPOR T YURI ALEXEE V CONTRACTOR : CENTER FOR PLANNING AND RESEARCH, INC . R . K . LAURINO, PROJECT DIRECTO R PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : VLADIMIR TREML, CHIEF EDITO R BRUCE ADAMS, TRANSLATOR-EDITO R COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 526- 3 The work leading to this report was supported in whole or i n part from funds provided by the National Council for Sovie t and East European Research . I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I July 5, 198 4 SUMMARY OF THE BOOK "HIGH TREASON " High Treason : Essays on the History of the Red Army, 1918-1938, by Vitaly Rapoport and Yuri Alexeev, is a newly translated monograph of two dissident Sovie t authors writing in Moscow in the 1970's. The hock carries the reader through th e period of the Civil War, the turbulent Party struggles of the twenties, the purges of th e military forces in the thirties, and the tragic consequences of purges in the early par t of the war with Hitler. The Western reader will find more than a recitation of Soviet history, much o f which has been previously published in the West . This is a book written with anger an d remorse, powerfully condemning Stalin and the Soviet party system under Stalin. In particular, it accuses Stalin and his henchmen of the betrayal of the Soviet Fatherland and the Red Army. Western historians are familiar with many events and developments described i n the book, but the reliability of original sources of this knowledge is not uniform . Some events have been well researched, documented, and analyzed while others have bee n only roughly sketched out in sources of varying reliability and in different monographs . In particular, there is no single history of the early days of the Red Army published in the West. In this respect, Rapoport and Alexeev's book is invaluable as it bring s together the early history in a single well-integrated narrative . The bock also brings to light new facts and offers new interpretations of known developments, such as Stalin's role in the Polish campaign, early purges of Soviet military academics and theoreticians, and the role played by Stalin's cronies from Civil War days. The book also offers numerous fascinating anecdotes--most of them unverifiable but credible . The book is invaluable in yet another respect as it was wholly researched an d written in Moscow and thus represents the knowledge and understanding of history an d attitudes toward Party policies on the part of some intellectuals . We do know ho w effective Soviet censorship is in suppressing the knowledge of certain historical developments and in distorting and rewriting of others, and it is, therefore, fascinatin g to learn that the efforts of the censor have not been fully successful . The identity and background of the authors is intriguing . The authorship is ascribed to Vitaly N . Rapoport and Yuri Alexeev . Rapoport, a professional engineer with a military history background, recently immigrated to the United States. The name Yuri Alexeev is said to be a pseudonym for a professional military historian still living i n the Soviet Union. According to Rapoport, Alexeev had access to classified Sovie t military archives which would account for the large number of other source document s used in the book . Whatever the conditions surrounding the development of the book, the author s clearly believe in the necessity of bringing their message to the Soviet people regardless of the personal costs. Their actual statement of objectives is: "to reach conclusions vital to us (Soviets), to our children and to our grandchildren" . Throughout the book , the authors make clear that these "conclusions" relate to the evils of unrestrained power in the hands of a leader or political party and the necessity of the people, th e elite, the military, and other groups to act as restraints on the exercise of power by th e Party and its leadership. 1 The book does differ from most dissident literature by focusing on the damage inflicted by Stalin on the Red Army. The many historical sketches of military leaders of the period and the detailed discussions of military strategy indicate that the authors are directing their book to an audience of professional military people and others wit h an interest in military history. The book is very sympathetic to the Red Army militar y professionals and hostile to the political party and the political generals of the period . Professional military leaders making contributions to the strategy, operations , organization, and training of the Red Army are generally treated as heroes an d partriots. The complicity of many of these officers in repressive measures of the Party against the people is generally passed over without comment (as in the case of Tukhachevskii) . However, high-ranking officers close to Stalin are generally treate d with disdain. The authors leave no doubt about their belief that the Army leaders o f the period could have and should have taken action to resist Stalin's purge of th e officer corps . The implication is clear that current Army leaders should be alert t o prevent similar occurrences . The mechanisms ' by which political dictatorship arise are first illustrated in th e book by reviewing the steps by which Stalin gained complete sovereignty over th e Russian Communist Party . The authors portray Stalin as an "exceptional politica l strategist" and by implication show the weakness of the party system by which th e leaders in the 1920's were trying to govern the country . Stalin first combined with Zinov'ev and Kamenev to weaken Trotskii's politica l position. Within three years he formed a coalition with the other major group (headed by Bukharin) to destroy the political power of Zinov'ev, Kamenev, and Trotskii . Within another two years (1929) Stalin "redirected his fire" at the Bukharin group and at th e 16th Party Congress (1930) arranged the "political liquidation" of Bukharin and othe r opposition leaders (Rykov, Tomskii, and others) . In these conflicts the power of the Red Army to influence events was carefully neutralized, first by Zinov'ev and later by Stalin and supporting political factions . High command was first transferred from Trotskii to Frunze . After the death (the authors claim murder) of Frunze, the high command was passed to Voroshilov, a politica l creature of Stalin with a checkered military career in the Civil War. Voroshilov' s appointment was accompanied by major shifts in military commands that would hav e hindered coordinated action by the Army during the critical Party congress . Thus, while principal professional military leaders, such as Tukhachevskii. were not pleased with these events, they did nothing . "The Army still did not suspect what awaite d it . Through all of the Party upheaval, Stalin had not forgotten the Army -a potentia l center of power that could endanger his mastery of the State . He moved carefully against the top military leaders, suggesting some concern that resistance by the Re d Army was still possible . The military leaders were separated from their forces o n various pretenses and then arrested : Tukhachevskii was in the city of Samara t o assume a new command, Iakir was in transit to Moscow to attend a special session of the Military Council, and so on. 1 The proceedings leading up to the destruction of the eight accused military leader s are subject to considerable question. The authors indicate that a closed trial took place where the accused were judged by their peers . Some Western scholars believ e that no such trial occurred. And yet, the authors' development of the subject , including verbatim testimony, offers new evidence of a trial. Also the rationale offered 2 for this form of trial appears reasonable. The authors suggest that Stalin, in order to avoid any future political liabilities, wanted "the Army to judge the Army". The credibility of the trial is further strengthened by the observation that "in the survivin g typed report of the trial, 'noes' (of the accused) were corrected in ink to 'yeses" . After conviction and execution of the accused there followed a general slaughter of military officers from the top down to company grade. The authors provide a list o f top-ranking officers showing that of the top 899 top-ranking officers, 643 were arrested and 583 perished . The official total of military officers purged in this period is given at 20,000 to 25,000. The authors also indicate that other sources put th e number at 100,000, including both military and political officers . The list of names of high-ranking officers purged during this period should be invaluable. Little information on these officers is to be found in published Soviet reference books, especially 1 information about the manner of death. The authors attempt to answer perhaps the most significant question relating t o these events : Why did not the accused leaders (both political and military) resist more effectively the repressions of Stalin? For the political leaders, the authors sugges t that they were so closely identified with the Bolshevik party and its bloody rule afte r the Civil War that they basically "had no path back to the people" . The Army leaders were in a stronger position. They had command of military forces, and as the authors suggest, the Army could win any conflict with the polic e forces. And yet they made no effort at rebellion against the Party .