DOCSLIB.ORG

Armed Forces of Georgian Democratic Republic in 1918–1921

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Armed Forces of Georgian Democratic Republic in 1918–1921 George Anchabadze Armed Forces of Georgian Democratic Republic .. DOI: http://doi.org/10.22364/luzv.5.06 Armed Forces of Georgian Democratic Republic in 1918–1921 Gruzijas Demokrātiskās Republikas bruņotie spēki 1918.–1921. gadā George Anchabadze, Doctor of History Sciences, Full professor Ilia State University, School of Arts and Sciences Kakutsa Cholokashvili Ave 3/5, Tbilisi 0162, Georgia E-mail: [email protected] The article is dedicated to the armed forces of the Georgian Democratic Republic (1918–1921). It shows the history of their creation and development, the composition and structure of the troops, as well as provides a brief insight into the combat path. It also shows the contradictions that existed between the socialist leadership of the country and a significant part of the officer corps, caused by ideological differences. The result of these contradictions were two forms of the armed organization of Georgia – the regular army and the People’s Guard, which caused discord in the armed forces. This circumstance, among other reasons, contributed to the military defeat of Georgia in the clash with Soviet Russia (1921). Keywords: Transcaucasia in 1918–1921, Georgian Democratic Republic, regular army of Georgia, the People’s Guard, The Soviet-Georgian War of 1921. Raksts veltīts Gruzijas Demokrātiskās Republikas bruņotajiem spēkiem 1918.–1921. gadā, tajā atspoguļota to izveidošanas un attīstības vēsture, kā arī karaspēka sastāvs un struktūra, bez tam īsumā raksturotas kaujas operācijas. Parādītas arī pretrunas, kas pastāvēja starp valsts sociālistisko vadību un lielu daļu virsnieku korpusa un kas izraisīja ideoloģiskas atšķirības. Šo pretrunu rezultāts bija divas Gruzijas bruņoto spēku organizatoriskās formas – regulārā armija un Tautas gvarde –, starp kurām pastāvēja nesaskaņas. Šī situācija arī veicināja Gruzijas sakāvi karā ar padomju Krieviju (1921). Atslēgvārdi: Aizkaukāzs (1918–1921), Gruzijas Demokrātiskā Republika, Gruzijas regulārā armija, tautas gvarde, padomju Krievijas un Gruzijas karš (1921). After the Bolsheviks took over power in Russia in October of 1917, the Transcaucasian political organizations not affiliated to the Bolshevik forces, such as Georgian Social-Democrats – the Mensheviks, Azerbaijani Musavats, Armenian Dashnaks, etc., refused to recognise the new rule and as early as in November organised 100 LATVIJAS UNIVERSITĀTES ŽURNĀLS. VĒSTURE 2018/5 a coalition government named the Tran- 2) politicians frequently interfered with ap- s caucasian Commissariat, with Evgeni pointments – they would lobby offi cers on Gegechkori of the Social-Democrats as its the basis of political inclinations, rather than chairman, based in Tiflis (Tbilisi). professional skill and quality; 3) the recruits This marked the moment when Trans- were mainly picked from those previously caucasia began to break away from Russia, serving at the front, who had been infected although right up to April of 1918 it was by Bolshevik ideas; 4) military morale was officially accepted to view the region weak – there were frequent disturbances, as the integral part of Russia and to regard with the highest authority not always recog- the formation of its domestic government nized; soldiers would attend political rallies as a temporary measure to remain in place or wander around the city, revelling and at- until the legitimate government would re- tending to their own affairs.1 store its rule in the country. It became ever clearer that such tur- moil was making it impossible to gather a force that would be capable of fight- I ing. The veteran army should have to be urgently dismissed and young servicemen Against the backdrop of World War I, drafted. However, that was easier said the main problem the Transcaucasian Com- than done: the military registration and missariat faced was the Caucasian-Russian- recruitment had been toppled, orders and Turkish – front, and the half a million commands were either not carried out or Russian Caucasian army, which, exhausted executed carelessly. The only exception from the lingering war and won over from was the students, i.e. volunteers that were the command by the Bolshevik propaganda, 16 to 20 years of age, who had responded was fast deteriorating and losing its effec- to the patriotic activist propaganda. “If tiveness. Soldiers would abandon the front you had only seen the youth bearing the huge in units, and leaving the heavy artillery be- burden”, writes General Mazniashvili,2 “all hind, set off for the rear to get home as soon the enthusiasm with which they submitted to as possible. The threat of a Turkish inva- military discipline!”3 sion of the Caucasus was getting real. This Alongside the official military orga- is why the security picture demanded an nization, the major political parties of urgent formation of national armed forces Tran s caucasia also started to form their to occupy the sites deserted by the Russian own armed units. Thus, for example, military. The Transcaucasian government Georgian social democrats or Mensheviks decided to create Georgian, Armenian, organized a workers’ Red Guard, which Muslim and Russian corps. The initiative they used to occupy the district gun-depot was carried out by the military commis- in Tiflis on December 12, 1917 (by Julian sariats acting under the respective national Calendar), disarming its pro-Bolshevik councils, who had brought together various guard. The operation prevented an at- political parties and societies. tempted Bolshevik coup d’état in Tiflis at However, the process did not run as the end of the year. When Lenin learned smoothly as contemplated. According to of the Menshevik takeover of the armoury the professional military commanders of that contained a lot of weapons, ammuni- the time, there were several factors that tion and other military equipment, he was hindered creation of the Georgian corps: quite outspoken in his disappointment and 1) weaponry and ammunition were scarce; reproach of Caucasian Bolsheviks.4 George Anchabadze. Armed Forces of Georgian Democratic Republic .. 101 The Red Guard was under the com- By early 1918, the Russian army on mand of the Tiflis Council of Workers’ and the Caucasian front had been replaced Soldiers’ Deputies, with Georgian Menshe- by Georgian and Armenian units. These viks as a majority and Noe Jordania as the forces, which were mainly constituted Council’s chairman. General Kvinitadze,5 by a conglomerate of volunteer brigades, who was generally critical of the partisan spread along the front in smaller groups guards, describes the events of the years covering key sites. According to General 1917 and 1918 in his memoirs, as follows: Odishelidze,7 the commander of the Caucasian front at the time, “the corps were “Do them justice, throughout the domes- composed of regiments of about 200–300 sol- tic life of the Republic, the Guard actually diers each, and you could easily refer to made a big difference. Apart from their im- them as disorderly gangs and by no means as mediate role to look out for the successes of regiments”.8 While the Turkish troops they the revolution, they more than once acted faced did not hold any numerical superior- to maintain order in the country, nipping in ity, they [the Turkish side] had much bet- the bud any action against the order both ter organizational capacity and discipline. amongst the public and sometimes even in Musavats usually avoided a direct engage- some units of the army being formed at the ment with the Turks and explained such time, where the corps, having been inherited behaviour with religious views. They were from the Russian army, was poisoned by much more concerned by the Soviet regime Bolshevism.”6 in Baku (i.e. the Baku commune). Failing to secure Caucasian troops for the settle- ment of the Baku problem, Azerbaijani politicians finally declared they would find II “other forces” to aid them, quite clearly re- ferring to the Turks.9 The process of disintegration of the The ceasefire on the Caucasian scene standing Russian army was also precipitate was broken in February 1918, when the on the Western – Russian-German front. Ottoman command used the violence al- Hence, the Soviet government was forced legedly deployed by Armenian military to agree to separatist negotiations with the forces against the Muslim part of the popu- central powers. On December 2, 1917 (by lation to launch an offensive.10 General Julian calendar), both sides signed a cea- Odishelidze tried to respond using flexible sefire in Brest-Litovsk, opening doors for resistance and even ceded part of the land the peace talks that began on December 9 to shorten the frontline. But what with the of the same year. In compliance with the disorder and disorganization on the front, Brest process, on December 5 the two sides as well as with the instability within the signed a further ceasefire for the Caucasi- Transcaucasian region, the resistance was an front, which then ran along the Black weak and lacking in a centralized effort. In Sea, to Gümüşhane, Erzincan, Mus, Lake February of the same year, the Ottomans Van and further to the Persian border. seized Erzincan, followed by Trabzon However, the Transcaucasian government and Erzurum in March and Batumi and refused to join the Brest-Litovsk talks and Kars in April. Zurab Avalov (Avalishvili), did not recognize the terms of the peace a Georgian diplomat, lawyer and his to- treaty concerning the concessions of land rian, describes the process, as follows: in Transcaucasia. “the Caucasian front started to collapse as a 102 LATVIJAS UNIVERSITĀTES ŽURNĀLS. VĒSTURE 2018/5 dilapidated building”.11 General Kvinitadze extensive popularity in the country, with refrains from delving deep and com- Noe Jordania as the Head of the Cabinet ments briefly: “The reasons were the same from July 1918. as previously destroyed the Russian army, The representatives of German military later moving on to the armies of the countries circle offered the Georgians assistance in where the revolution had taken place.”12 organizing the country’s national armed forces, but were met with discontent from the Socialist government.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • National Report of Georgia (MOP7)
    Report on the implementation of AEWA for the period 2015-2017 The format for reports on the implementation of the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds (AEWA) for the period 2015-2017 was approved at the 12th meeting of the Standing Committee (31 January – 01 February 2017, Paris, France). This format has been constructed following the AEWA Action Plan, the AEWA Strategic Plan 2009-2018 and resolutions of the Meeting of the Parties (MOP). In accordance with article V(c) of the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, each Party shall prepare to each ordinary session of the MOP a National Report on its implementation of the Agreement and submit that report to the Agreement Secretariat. By Resolution 6.14 of the MOP the deadline for submission of National Reports to the 7th session of the Meeting of the Parties (MOP7) was set at 180 days before the beginning of MOP7, which is scheduled to take place on 4 – 8 December 2018 in South Africa; therefore the deadline for submission of National Reports is Wednesday 7 June 2018. The AEWA National Reports 2015-2017 will be compiled and submitted through the CMS Family Online National Reporting System, which is an online reporting tool for the whole CMS Family. The CMS Family Online Reporting System was developed by the UNEP-World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC) in close collaboration with and under the guidance of the UNEP/AEWA Secretariat. To contact the UNEP/AEWA Secretariat please send your inquiries to: [email protected] 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Two Basic Points in Georgian-German Relations
    Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University Institute for European Studies Two Basic Points in Georgian-German Relations Giorgi Meskhi Student of Master’s Program in European Studies Supervisor: Professor Sergi Kapanadze Tbilisi 8 July 2011 1 Table of Contents I Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………3 II Preliminary Guidelines and Methodological Explanations …………………..6 III The Declaration of Independence ...................................................................11 1 Preliminary Period ...............................................................................................11 2 Independence as ‘the only way out’ ....................................................................16 3 After Independence............................................................................................ .21 IV The Restoration of Independence ...................................................................28 1 Way towards the Restoration of Independence....................................................28 2 Reunification of Germany ....................................................................................32 3 Between Independence and Reunification ..........................................................35 V Theoretical explanations …………………………………………………………...39 1 Political Realism is the Answer ………………………………………………………39 2 Political Realism is not always the Answer …………………………………………42 3 General Theoretical Explanations …………………………………………………...43 VI Conclusions ………………………………………………………………………….46 Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………………..48
    [Show full text]
  • PRO GEORGIA JOURNAL of KARTVELOLOGICAL STUDIES N O 27 — 2017 2
    1 PRO GEORGIA JOURNAL OF KARTVELOLOGICAL STUDIES N o 27 — 2017 2 E DITOR- IN-CHIEF David KOLBAIA S ECRETARY Sophia J V A N I A EDITORIAL C OMMITTEE Jan M A L I C K I, Wojciech M A T E R S K I, Henryk P A P R O C K I I NTERNATIONAL A DVISORY B OARD Zaza A L E K S I D Z E, Professor, National Center of Manuscripts, Tbilisi Alejandro B A R R A L – I G L E S I A S, Professor Emeritus, Cathedral Museum Santiago de Compostela Jan B R A U N (†), Professor Emeritus, University of Warsaw Andrzej F U R I E R, Professor, Universitet of Szczecin Metropolitan A N D R E W (G V A Z A V A) of Gori and Ateni Eparchy Gocha J A P A R I D Z E, Professor, Tbilisi State University Stanis³aw L I S Z E W S K I, Professor, University of Lodz Mariam L O R T K I P A N I D Z E, Professor Emerita, Tbilisi State University Guram L O R T K I P A N I D Z E, Professor Emeritus, Tbilisi State University Marek M ¥ D Z I K (†), Professor, Maria Curie-Sk³odowska University, Lublin Tamila M G A L O B L I S H V I L I, Professor, National Centre of Manuscripts, Tbilisi Lech M R Ó Z, Professor, University of Warsaw Bernard OUTTIER, Professor, University of Geneve Andrzej P I S O W I C Z, Professor, Jagiellonian University, Cracow Annegret P L O N T K E - L U E N I N G, Professor, Friedrich Schiller University, Jena Tadeusz Ś W I Ę T O C H O W S K I (†), Professor, Columbia University, New York Sophia V A S H A L O M I D Z E, Professor, Martin-Luther-Univerity, Halle-Wittenberg Andrzej W O Ź N I A K, Professor, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw 3 PRO GEORGIA JOURNAL OF KARTVELOLOGICAL STUDIES No 27 — 2017 (Published since 1991) CENTRE FOR EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES FACULTY OF ORIENTAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW WARSAW 2017 4 Cover: St.
    [Show full text]
  • The Caucasus Globalization
    Volume 8 Issue 3-4 2014 1 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES OF THE CAUCASUS THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Volume 8 Issue 3-4 2014 CA&CC Press® SWEDEN 2 Volume 8 Issue 3-4 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION FOUNDED AND PUBLISHED BY INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES OF THE CAUCASUS Registration number: M-770 Ministry of Justice of Azerbaijan Republic PUBLISHING HOUSE CA&CC Press® Sweden Registration number: 556699-5964 Registration number of the journal: 1218 Editorial Council Eldar Chairman of the Editorial Council (Baku) ISMAILOV Tel/fax: (994 – 12) 497 12 22 E-mail: [email protected] Kenan Executive Secretary (Baku) ALLAHVERDIEV Tel: (994 – 12) 561 70 54 E-mail: [email protected] Azer represents the journal in Russia (Moscow) SAFAROV Tel: (7 – 495) 937 77 27 E-mail: [email protected] Nodar represents the journal in Georgia (Tbilisi) KHADURI Tel: (995 – 32) 99 59 67 E-mail: [email protected] Ayca represents the journal in Turkey (Ankara) ERGUN Tel: (+90 – 312) 210 59 96 E-mail: [email protected] Editorial Board Nazim Editor-in-Chief (Azerbaijan) MUZAFFARLI Tel: (994 – 12) 598 27 53 (Ext. 25) (IMANOV) E-mail: [email protected] Vladimer Deputy Editor-in-Chief (Georgia) PAPAVA Tel: (995 – 32) 24 35 55 E-mail: [email protected] Akif Deputy Editor-in-Chief (Azerbaijan) ABDULLAEV Tel: (994 – 12) 561 70 54 E-mail: [email protected] Volume 8 IssueMembers 3-4 2014 of Editorial Board: 3 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Zaza D.Sc. (History), Professor, Corresponding member of the Georgian National Academy of ALEKSIDZE Sciences, head of the scientific department of the Korneli Kekelidze Institute of Manuscripts (Georgia) Mustafa AYDIN Rector of Kadir Has University (Turkey) Irina BABICH D.Sc.
    [Show full text]
  • The Forgotten Fronts the First World War Battlefield Guide: World War Battlefield First the the Forgotten Fronts Forgotten The
    Ed 1 Nov 2016 1 Nov Ed The First World War Battlefield Guide: Volume 2 The Forgotten Fronts The First Battlefield War World Guide: The Forgotten Fronts Creative Media Design ADR005472 Edition 1 November 2016 THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS | i The First World War Battlefield Guide: Volume 2 The British Army Campaign Guide to the Forgotten Fronts of the First World War 1st Edition November 2016 Acknowledgement The publisher wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the following organisations in providing text, images, multimedia links and sketch maps for this volume: Defence Geographic Centre, Imperial War Museum, Army Historical Branch, Air Historical Branch, Army Records Society,National Portrait Gallery, Tank Museum, National Army Museum, Royal Green Jackets Museum,Shepard Trust, Royal Australian Navy, Australian Defence, Royal Artillery Historical Trust, National Archive, Canadian War Museum, National Archives of Canada, The Times, RAF Museum, Wikimedia Commons, USAF, US Library of Congress. The Cover Images Front Cover: (1) Wounded soldier of the 10th Battalion, Black Watch being carried out of a communication trench on the ‘Birdcage’ Line near Salonika, February 1916 © IWM; (2) The advance through Palestine and the Battle of Megiddo: A sergeant directs orders whilst standing on one of the wooden saddles of the Camel Transport Corps © IWM (3) Soldiers of the Royal Army Service Corps outside a Field Ambulance Station. © IWM Inside Front Cover: Helles Memorial, Gallipoli © Barbara Taylor Back Cover: ‘Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red’ at the Tower of London © Julia Gavin ii | THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS | iii ISBN: 978-1-874346-46-3 First published in November 2016 by Creative Media Designs, Army Headquarters, Andover.
    [Show full text]
  • Manpower Problems of the Russian Armed Forces
    Conflict Studies Research Centre D62 Manpower Problems of The Russian Armed Forces M J Orr Introduction On 15 January Lt Gen Vasiliy Smirnov, deputy head of the main organization- mobilization directorate of the Russian general staff, announced the preliminary results of the autumn 2001 conscription period. "The plan of the autumn call-up as laid down in the Russian Federation's President's decree No. 148 has been carried out. Between October and December 2001 more than 194,000 Russian citizens, aged from 18 to 27, were sent to the army and fleet … (T)he quality of the conscript contingent is getting worse. Out of every 100 potential conscripts last year the military commissariats were only able to draft 12 young men; the remainder had legal reasons for being excused military service. Today in Russia every third potential conscript proves unfit for service on health grounds … more than 50% of the conscripts sent to the forces have health limitations on their fitness for service."1 Such statements emerge from the organization-mobilization department twice a year, as a sort of ritual bringing the conscription campaign to a close. Each time the decreed quantity of recruits has been found and each time their quality has declined. Within these standardized announcements there is no suggestion that the whole system for recruiting the Russian armed forces is steadily collapsing. Last autumn, however, there were indications that, at long last, the Russian government has accepted that the system must be changed. Programmes to phase out conscription are being considered although it is not clear that the general staff has accepted that a professional army is desirable or practical.
    [Show full text]
  • THE LAND WARFARE PAPERS Perestroika and Soviet Military
    THE LAND WARFARE PAPERS No.5 OCTOBER 1990 Perestroika and Soviet Military Personnel By Robert B. Davis A National Security Affairs Paper Published on Occasion by THE INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY Arlington, Virginia PERESTROIKA AND SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL by Robert B. Davis THE INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AN AUSA INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER In 1988 the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) established within its existing organization a new entity known as the Institute of Land Warfare. Its purpose is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of the editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an AUSA Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper, but does suggest that AUSA believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues. LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. S, OCTOBER 1990 Perestroika and Soviet Military Personnel by Robert B. Davis Mr. Robert B. Davis is a research psychologist with the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center in Charlottesville, Virginia. Mr. Davis received his undergraduate degree from Arkansas College and his advanced degree from Troy State University, Alabama.
    [Show full text]
  • Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921) by Dr
    UDC 9 (479.22) 34 Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921) by Dr. Levan Z. Urushadze (Tbilisi, Georgia) ISBN 99940-0-539-1 The Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG. “Sakartvelos Demokratiuli Respublika” in Georgian) was the first modern establishment of a Republic of Georgia in 1918 - 1921. The DRG was established after the collapse of the Russian Tsarist Empire that began with the Russian Revolution of 1917. Its established borders were with Russia in the north, and the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the south. It had a total land area of roughly 107,600 km2 (by comparison, the total area of today's Georgia is 69,700 km2), and a population of 2.5 million. As today, its capital was Tbilisi and its state language - Georgian. THE NATIONAL FLAG AND COAT OF ARMS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA A Trans-Caucasian house of representatives convened on February 10, 1918, establishing the Trans-Caucasian Democratic Federative Republic, which existed from February, 1918 until May, 1918. The Trans-Caucasian Democratic Federative Republic was managed by the Trans-Caucasian Commissariat chaired by representatives of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. On May 26, 1918 this Federation was abolished and Georgia declared its independence. Politics In February 1917, in Tbilisi the first meeting was organised concerning the future of Georgia. The main organizer of this event was an outstanding Georgian scientist and public benefactor, Professor Mikheil (Mikhako) Tsereteli (one of the leaders of the Committee
    [Show full text]
  • Democratizing Communist Militaries
    Democratizing Communist Militaries Democratizing Communist Militaries The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces Marybeth Peterson Ulrich Ann Arbor To Mark, Erin, and Benjamin Copyright © by the University of Michigan 1999 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America V∞ Printed on acid-free paper 2002 2001 2000 1999 4 3 2 1 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher. A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson. Democratizing Communist militaries : the cases of the Czech and Russian armed forces / Marybeth Peterson Ulrich. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-472-10969-3 (acid-free paper) 1. Civil-military relations—Russia (Federation) 2. Civil-military relations—Former Soviet republics. 3. Civil-military relations—Czech Republic. 4. Russia (Federation)—Armed Forces—Political activity. 5. Former Soviet republics—Armed Forces—Political activity. 6. Czech Republic—Armed Forces—Political activity. 7. Military assistance, American—Russia (Federation) 8. Military assistance, American—Former Soviet republics. 9. Military assistance, American—Czech Republic. I. Title. JN6520.C58 U45 1999 3229.5909437109049—dc21 99-6461 CIP Contents List of Tables vii Acknowledgments ix List of Abbreviations xi Introduction 1 Chapter 1. A Theory of Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Postcommunist States 5 Chapter 2. A Survey of Overall U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Who Were the “Greens”? Rumor and Collective Identity in the Russian Civil War
    Who Were the “Greens”? Rumor and Collective Identity in the Russian Civil War ERIK C. LANDIS In the volost center of Kostino-Otdelets, located near the southern border of Borisoglebsk uezd in Tambov province, there occurred what was identified as a “deserters’ revolt” in May 1919. While no one was killed, a group of known deserters from the local community raided the offices of the volost soviet, destroying many documents relating to the previous months’ attempts at military conscription, and stealing the small number of firearms and rubles held by the soviet administration and the volost Communist party cell. The provincial revolutionary tribunal investigated the affair soon after the events, for while there was an obvious threat of violence, no such escalation occurred, and the affair was left to civilian institutions to handle. The chairman of the volost soviet, A. M. Lysikov, began his account of the event on May 18, when he met with members of the community following a morning church service in order to explain the recent decrees and directives of the provincial and central governments.1 In the course of this discussion, he raised the fact that the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense in Moscow had declared a seven-day amnesty for all those young men who had failed to appear for mobilization to the Red Army, particularly those who had been born in 1892 and 1893, and had been subject to the most recent age-group mobilization.2 It was at this moment that one of the young men in the village approached him to ask if it was possible to ring the church bell and call for an open meeting of deserters in the volost, at which they could collectively agree whether to appear for mobilization.
    [Show full text]
  • Uzbek: War, Friendship of the Peoples, and the Creation of Soviet Uzbekistan, 1941-1945
    Making Ivan-Uzbek: War, Friendship of the Peoples, and the Creation of Soviet Uzbekistan, 1941-1945 By Charles David Shaw A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Yuri Slezkine, Chair Professor Victoria Frede-Montemayor Professor Victoria E. Bonnell Summer 2015 Abstract Making Ivan-Uzbek: War, Friendship of the Peoples, and the Creation of Soviet Uzbekistan, 1941-1945 by Charles David Shaw Doctor of Philosophy in History University of California, Berkeley Professor Yuri Slezkine, Chair This dissertation addresses the impact of World War II on Uzbek society and contends that the war era should be seen as seen as equally transformative to the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s for Soviet Central Asia. It argues that via the processes of military service, labor mobilization, and the evacuation of Soviet elites and common citizens that Uzbeks joined the broader “Soviet people” or sovetskii narod and overcame the prejudices of being “formerly backward” in Marxist ideology. The dissertation argues that the army was a flexible institution that both catered to national cultural (including Islamic ritual) and linguistic difference but also offered avenues for assimilation to become Ivan-Uzbeks, part of a Russian-speaking, pan-Soviet community of victors. Yet as the war wound down the reemergence of tradition and violence against women made clear the limits of this integration. The dissertation contends that the war shaped the contours of Central Asian society that endured through 1991 and created the basis for thinking of the “Soviet people” as a nation in the 1950s and 1960s.
    [Show full text]
  • We Face a Fatal Threat...” 1920
    RUSSIA’S EXPANSION IN THE CAUCASUS AND GEORGIA “We Face a Fatal Threat...” 1920 Archil Chachkhiani 1920 “We Face a Fatal Threat...” nalyzing the military-political situation in the Georgian historiography is permeated with the opinion that the First Republic of Georgia at the end of 1920 and full-scale military intervention launched by the Bolsheviks in the portraying its certain developments is one of the lower part of the Borchalo uyezd on the morning of February 12, most pressing issues in Georgia’s contemporary 1921, was a surprise to the Georgian state. As if the identity of history. The military-political relations between the enemy, the composition and number of its armed forces, the Democratic Republic of Georgia and Bolshevik the primary and auxiliary directions of the strike, the plans A Russia as well as the results stemming from it are of combat operations, etc., had not been fully identified. We exceptionally interesting. In this context, several find such opinions mainly in memoir literature (G. Kvinitadze, questions ought to be answered – did the Georgian state G. Mazniashvili, Sh. Maghlakelidze, Ak. Kvitaishvili, Al. possess information about the possible military campaign Chkheidze, V. Tevzadze, R. Gabashvili, and others). Such an by Bolshevik Russia? How adequately did the Georgian approach to the issue is somewhat understandable, as the government and military circles perceive the degree of foreign aforementioned authors did not have access to the top secret threats, and was the country preparing for the impending war military documents designed to strengthen the state's defense with Bolshevik Russia? capabilities. Yet, memoir literature cannot be attributed as an 1 RUSSIA’S EXPANSION IN THE CAUCASUS AND GEORGIA “We Face a Fatal Threat...” 1920 infallible first source.
    [Show full text]