6 North and : Old conflicts and new fears

Alan Parastaev

Erman village in the high mountains of South Ossetia PHOTO: PETER NASMYTH

Summary The main source of weapons in South Ossetia during the conflict with Georgian forces in the early 1990s was Chechnya, but towards the end of the conflict arms were also obtained from Russian troops in North Ossetia. Following the end of the conflict in 1992, the unrecognised Republic of South Ossetia began to construct its own security structures. The government has made some attempts to control SALW proliferation and collect weapons from the population, as has the OSCE, though these programmes have had limited success. In North Ossetia it was much easier to acquire weapons from Russian military sources than in the South. North Ossetia fought a short war against the Ingush in 1992, and though relations between the two are now stable, North Ossetia is still very sensitive to events elsewhere in the North Caucasus. Recently, however, the increase in Russian military activity in the region has acted as a stabilising factor. Unofficial estimates of the amount of SALW in North Ossetia range between 20,000 and 50,000. 2 THE CAUCASUS: ARMED AND DIVIDED · NORTH AND SOUTH OSSETIA

The years of The events at the end of the 1980s ushered in by perestroika – the move by the leader- conflict ship of the CPSU towards the democratisation of society – had an immediate impact on the social and political situation in South Ossetia and as a whole. In both and the South Ossetian capital Tskhinval national movements sprang to life which would in time evolve into political parties and associations. In the initial period Ossetian and Georgian national-democratic forces were in frequent contact. This was natural, for despite all their differences, both sides understood that they had a common enemy and a common goal. The enemy was the system, Bolshevism; the goal was the building of a democratic society. One example was the co-operation between the South Ossetian popular front Adamon Nykhas and a Georgian movement, the Ilya Chavchavadze Society. After the rise of Zviad Gamsakhurdia to power in Tbilisi, however, the Georgian national-democratic movement adopted a more nationalistic agenda. Georgian moves in 1989 to force South Ossetia to use Georgian (rather than Russian) as the language for official records spurred the separatist movement. On 10 November 1989 the Soviet of Peoples’ Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast voted to upgrade the autonomous oblast (region) into an autonomous republic within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Deputies called on the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR to accept this decision, but it rejected the proposal, branding it unconstitutional. On 23 November 1989 Gamsakhurdia and other Georgian nationalists planned a mass demonstration in Tskhinval. Leaders of the Georgian SSR, led by the first Secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, Givi Gumbaridze, played prominent roles in this event. An estimated 30,000 to 40,000 demonstrators in more than 400 buses and cars set off for Tskhinval from Tbilisi and other areas in Georgia. Georgian officials and the Georgian media presented the march as an attempt to hold a peaceful meeting in Tskhinval. However, among the marchers were several hundred armed people, including some with automatic weapons, many of them members of the paramilitary wings of nationalist political parties. On the approach to Tskhinval, on the Gori-Tskhinval road, several dozen Ossetians formed a human chain and successfully stopped the column of demonstrators. Within hours, local Ossetians mounted blockades on all other roads into Tskhinval. Over the next few weeks virtually the whole Ossetian male population of the town took turns to man the road- blocks. Not having succeeded in entering Tskhinval, Georgian armed demonstrators surrounded the town, encircling the South Ossetian blockades and closing off access. Ossetian travellers were taken hostage, maltreated and insulted. Six were killed and more than 400 maimed and wounded. In November 1990 figures from the nationalist parties and movements came to power in Georgia, which was still at the time the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, and therefore part of the USSR. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Georgian Helsinki Group and head of the Round Table–Free Georgia association, was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR. In contravention of the law, despite the fact that the term of office of the Soviet of Peoples’ Deputies of South Ossetia had expired, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia failed to announce new elections for it. The Soviet of Peoples’ Deputies of South Ossetia decided to go ahead unilaterally and hold elections on 9 December 1990. In response to this the Georgian leadership and press unleashed another round of anti-Ossetian hysteria. The elections and their results were declared illegal in advance. Nevertheless, the elections went ahead on the appointed date, witnessed by many observers from other republics of the USSR who reported that they proceeded without violations and adhered strictly to the law. On 10 December 1990 the Georgian Supreme Soviet unanimously decided to abolish the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. SAFERWORLD ARMS & SECURITY PROGRAMME 3

The first serious exchange of fire using automatic weapons took place in 11 December 1990. A local policeman was killed during an attempt to stop a car carrying men armed with automatic weapons on one of Tskhinval’s central streets. A machine-gun was then fired from a minibus following this car, which belonged to one of the South Ossetian armed groups. As a result, two of the car’s passengers died on the spot and two were injured. Documents found on the survivors linked them to the Georgian power structures (one of the injured subsequently took up a senior post in the Georgian armed forces). This incident served as a pretext for the introduction of a state of emergency and curfew in Tskhinval and Java district, despite the fact that there was no legal basis for doing so. The curfew and other measures to maintain order were enforced by a battal- ion of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) of the USSR, made up mostly of Russian servicemen. The battalion’s commander assured the South Ossetian population that it would not allow the use of force either from official or unofficial structures in Georgia. However, on the night of 5–6 January 1991 the Georgian leadership – without notifying the South Ossetian authorities – brought subdivisions of the police and of the Georgian National Guard into Tskhinval, as well as members of various nationalist armed formations. That same night the battalion of the USSR MOI secretly abandoned its base in Tskhinval. According to Georgian policemen captured by the South Ossetians, the police detachments were made up of officers from all over Georgia; furthermore, they were joined at the rendezvous (the stadium in Gori) by representatives of the informal armed units (neformaly), often re-clothed in police uniform. On their arrival the Georgian paramilitaries began searches, arrests, murders, looting, setting fire to homes and other criminal acts. All this happened with the encouragement of the Georgian leadership and the tacit approval of the Soviet authorities, forcing the Ossetian side to take measures to defend themselves. Fighting broke out between Ossetian and Georgian forces and, after two weeks of fighting, the Ossetians managed to drive the out of Tskhinval. Georgian forces then began punitive actions against rural areas of South Ossetia, whilst maintaining their attempt to take Tskhinval by force. This period of blockade could be named the second stage of the armed conflict. After the period of pickets and blockades, virtually the whole Ossetian population of Tskhinval rose up to defend the town, while the Georgian population were forced by activists of the Georgian national movement to leave the town before the planned ‘liberation’ of the Ossetian population. By the start of spring 1991 the intensity of the fighting had waned and summer passed virtually without armed clashes. The main ‘peace-keeping’ factor in this period was the powerful earthquake in South Ossetia in May 1991. This natural disaster distracted people from fighting, but not for long. In September there was renewed shelling of Tskhinval, and Ossetians again found it impossible to pass through the Georgian- populated villages in South Ossetia. However towards winter the intensity of the fight- ing fell once again, this time because of the armed coup in Georgia, which resulted in the ousting of Gamsakhurdia and the coming to power of Eduard Shevardnadze. It is interesting to note that the organisers of the coup turned to several South Ossetian field commanders for help, but the Council of Commanders decided not to get involved in this intra-Georgian conflict. It was in spring 1992 that the most intense and bloody final stage of the armed conflict began. Fighting continued until 14 July 1992, when mixed Russian-Georgian-South Ossetian peace-keeping forces were introduced into the conflict zone. On 24 June 1992 a four-sided Russian-Georgian-Ossetian (North and South Ossetia) Agreement on the Principles of Regulating the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict (the Dagomys Agreement) was signed in the southern Russian town of Sochi. 4 THE CAUCASUS: ARMED AND DIVIDED · NORTH AND SOUTH OSSETIA

Small arms in Prior to the conflict it was considered normal to keep weapons at home, but this can be South Ossetia attributed to the heritage of history and had no practical implication. Using weapons to settle scores or in street fights was seen as inappropriate, even as a display of Initial armament cowardice. The only legal way of obtaining or keeping weapons in South Ossetia until the collapse of the USSR was through the Union of Hunters which, after following the relevant procedures, issued licences to own weapons. Weapons were obtained through special shops and cost from 100 roubles upwards, which was equal to the average monthly wage. In most cases these were smooth-bore hunting rifles and sometimes small- calibre rifles. It remained difficult to get a licence to obtain a hunting pass, as this required a positive recommendation from the party organisation and no black marks on one’s record.The arms that most closely resembled military weapons–SKS 7.62 mm and Mosin carbines of the same calibre – were extremely rare; on the whole they were owned by the party elite and senior officials in the ‘power ministries’. The quantity of unregistered weapons in South Ossetia, indeed in the whole of the USSR, was small, mainly being held by members of the Soviet elite who had no fear of punishment for possessing such arsenals. These people were not active in the national movement, either during or after the conflict, although the majority supported the Ossetian cause (evidenced by the fact that their weapons were often transferred to fighters on the Ossetian side). Sometimes such weapons were even confiscated from their owners by force. In the initial period of the confrontation (summer 1989) the Georgian MOI – whose orders were then still being respected by the South Ossetian police – carried out the confiscation and removal from South Ossetia of all registered hunting weapons. Up to 1,500 guns were confiscated in South Ossetia. A similar move was carried out in Georgia. However, in Kvareli and Gori (close to South Ossetia) only 140 guns were confiscated, as was proudly reported by Tbilisi police officials on Georgian television. South Ossetia’s law-enforcement agencies were armed only with pistols at the time, while all military weapons, which were stored in the arsenal of the internal affairs division (approximately 40 Kalashnikovs and two or three light machine-guns) were taken away. However, even employees of the South Ossetian internal affairs organs armed with pistols did not take part in the defence of the town, though nor did they act against the Ossetian population. During this period of confusion, indecision para- lysed the South Ossetian power structures. This meant that the only arms on the South Ossetian side actually mobilised for the conflict were unregistered hunting guns and rifles, as well as weapons belonging to criminal elements, mainly pistols and revolvers. Within days of the capture of Tskhinval by Georgian forces, Ossetian groups managed to take back a large part of the town, although the administrative centre of the town, the post office and the MOI building remained in the hands of Georgian armed formations for two more weeks. In this period the Ossetians had about 30 automatic weapons – various kinds of Kalashnikov. It was only then that the Ossetians gained and started to use the first captured weapons: 15 sawn-off Kalashnikovs were seized from police units by Tskhinval youngsters; an Ossetian fighter burst onto a bus carry- ing a unit of Georgian policemen and, threatening them with a , seized more than 20 Makarov pistols. Many Georgian policemen, suspicious of the Georgian authorities’ aims, crossed over to the territory controlled by the Ossetian side and surrendered their weapons, asking that they be given civilian clothing. Up to 3,000 rural Ossetians from the Java region came to the aid of their fellow Ossetians in Tskhinval, armed only with hunting weapons and – much more rarely – with carbines (7.62 mm Mosin-system rifles). Street battles, which lasted more than SAFERWORLD ARMS & SECURITY PROGRAMME 5

three weeks, saw the active use of automatic weapons, as well as home-made mines, which blew up two armoured patrol cars of the Georgian police. It is worth describing what the press of the time called the ‘first use of an air-to-surface missile during street fighting’. The helicopter regiment stationed near Tskhinval had unguided air-to-surface missiles. Throughout the war in Afghanistan (1979–89) the regiment’s helicopters had flown over military installations in Afghanistan and, according to some sources, the regiment had also taken part in the war in Angola. As a result of such active combat roles, the regiment had a large quantity of ammunition that was not accounted for, mostly these air-to-surface missiles. South Ossetian armed groups captured several dozen such missiles. Using ‘targets’ sawn out of standard helicopter drums which they managed to get from the same regiment, craftsmen – who had just turned their hand to making weaponry – succeeded in constructing something vaguely resembling a light anti-tank grenade-launcher, or bazooka, launched from the shoulder. The first salvos were fired on the day after Georgian policemen and neformaly invaded Tskhinval, in the course of an exchange of fire on one of the town’s central streets. The effect of these missiles was shocking. The first missile passed through a bus full of policemen and, although it exploded some distance from the town, caused panic and the subsequent retreat of the Georgian forces.

Weapons procurement The Ossetian successes in defending the town and expelling the Georgian forces first from the centre, then from the whole town, came despite the Georgian qualitative and quantitative superiority in weaponry. For the Ossetians, obtaining weapons basically came down to money, whether for their direct purchase, for bribing people who had access to arsenals or even for organised seizures. Such acquisitions were financed in various ways, mostly from private savings, donations or levying a ‘tax’ for military requirements on the population. Several sources of weapons during that period can be identified: Purchase of weapons from military units (at the start of the 1990s discipline fell sharply in the military and the sale of property, including weaponry, became widespread). Often, weapons were sold and then an attack was staged on servicemen or bases to cover these sales up. The supply of weapons and, above all, ammunition, by Ossetian servicemen (officers and warrant officers) from units located in South Ossetia and the surrounding regions of Georgia. Purchase of weapons through criminal channels from organised criminal groups in Russia (for example, some of the weapons captured from Nazi forces during the Second World War defence of Stalingrad were purchased from representatives of groups who poach sturgeon in the Volga). Home-made production (for example, primitive mortars, grenade launchers, anti- tank weapons, , incendiary devices and mines) Acquisition of dual-use equipment normally used for civilian purposes (armoured troop carriers and tanks without turrets were developed from vehicles normally used in agriculture and artillery from equipment used to combat hail and avalanches). Captured weapons. This includes about 40 cases in which Georgian servicemen voluntarily handed over their weapons in exchange for civilian clothing and free passage to Russia. The main source of weapons in the North Caucasus at that time was Chechnya, which had declared its independence. The Russian authorities had left large arsenals of weapons there which the new Chechen authorities could not control. The South Caucasus, in particular and , was also awash with arms left by the 6 THE CAUCASUS: ARMED AND DIVIDED · NORTH AND SOUTH OSSETIA

Soviet Army, though its delivery from the South Caucasus was problematic. The only possible supply route was by air, via the North Ossetian capital Vladikavkaz or other airports in the North Caucasus. Some small scale movement of weapons took place with the involvement of various military units, mostly subordinate to the units of the Georgian MOI located in Tskhinval which were charged with maintaining law and order. Weapons confiscated as a result of weapon searches among the population were subsequently sold to the highest bidder, irrespective of ethnic affiliation, before the weapons were put into more secure storage. The helicopter regiment stationed near Tskhinval did not have large quantities of firearms at its disposal.Virtually the whole arsenal of firearms was held by the sub- division that stood guard over the base. Apart from the air-to-surface missiles, South Ossetian fighters managed to modify and adapt other weapons (ie SALW and a whole range of military helicopter guns). In winter 1991, 15 rapid-fire four-barrelled 7.62- calibre machine-guns and 10 automatic mortars (aviation prototype AGS-Plamya) were captured from the helicopter regiment’s stores. These automatic mortars, after simple modifications, could be used as infantry weapons, but the rapid-fire machine- guns were more difficult to adapt; problems arose with their most distinctive feature: they fired too rapidly. South Ossetian forces could not obtain enough ammunition for such voracious forms of weapons as the multi-barrel rapid-fire machine-guns. During this time the Tskhinval factory Elektrovibromashina and other producers in the town started making weapons (the hand-made production of various types of weapons had already begun). They used spare guns and other parts from the various types of weaponry that had fallen into the hands of South Ossetian armed formations. The most successful products were the following: Grenade launchers were made from part of a 30 mm cannon taken from military aircraft using AGS-Plamya as ammunition. This kind of weapon was relatively widespread among NATO forces. The same 30 mm aircraft cannon was also used to make an anti-tank weapon. The gun was small and light, had wheels attached for transport purposes and fired single shots. There was also a home-made 12 mm anti-tank gun. It was a rather amateur copy of a World War II weapon used by the Soviet Army against Nazi armoured vehicles. However attempts to manufacture the anti-tank RPG-7 were largely unsuccessful. Portable mortars and shells were also constructed. By the time the street battles took place something resembling a tank had been constructed out of a caterpillar-tracked timber lorry. Armed with hand-held 7.62 mm machine-guns, it played a mainly psychological role. There was also success in making the missing breech-blocks for 100 mm anti-aircraft guns used to manage avalanches on the Transcaucasian Highway that passes through South Ossetia. However a severe lack of shells meant that these weapons did not play a significant role in military operations. By spring 1992, for the first time since the outbreak of the conflict, South Ossetian state structures began to purchase weapons. A senior official in the South Ossetian govern- ment who participated directly in this process later reported that weapons originating in Chechnya were brought from Ingushetia. The Chechen leaders had aimed to have armed allies among the Ingush. Ironically, the same weapons that were bought by South Ossetian fighters in Ingushetia were used in autumn 1992 by the Ossetian side in the course of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia. In total, according to this official, 600 automatic weapons were purchased, together with sub-machine-guns and hand-held Kalashnikovs, up to 20 anti-tank mortars and several dozen single-use Mukha grenade-launchers. These were distributed among the South Ossetian defence forces. The OMON (special police unit) was the most heavily SAFERWORLD ARMS & SECURITY PROGRAMME 7

armed, the number of fighters having reached 200 when armed clashes broke out in April 1992. The basic problem for the South Ossetian formations was not the quantitative, but the qualitative superiority of weapons on the Georgian side. During Gamsakhurdia’s rule, military operations by Georgian forces were conducted on the whole using firearms, large-calibre machine-guns and anti-hail weapons used in agriculture. With the collapse of the USSR, Georgia obtained real independence and acquired virtually all the property of the Transcaucasian Military District (ZakVO) based in Georgia. When in March 1992, four months after Shevardnadze came to power in Tbilisi, Georgian forces renewed their shelling of South Ossetia and Tskhinval itself, this time it was on a qualitatively different level. T-72 tanks, 120 mm howitzers and 110 mm mortars, the most lethal weapon in urban areas, were deployed around the perimeter of the town. This upgrade in weaponry available to the Georgian forces stemmed directly from Georgian-Russian relations and Russia’s transfer to Georgia of some of the ZakVO’s arms. At the same time the Georgian forces removed most of the weapons from the sapper regiment that was located in Tskhinval. When the base was captured by a South Ossetian armed group, no more than 50 units of SALW and an insignificant quantity of ammunition were found in the emptied arsenals. This was apparently all that the Georgians had been unable to remove. Weapons were eventually procured from the Russian troops in North Ossetia. In June 1992, Ossetian refugees from South Ossetia and the internal regions of Georgia held rallies on the streets of Vladikavkaz. After one such rally the primitively armed demonstrators marched on the military garrison nine kilometres from Vladikavkaz, on the road to Rostov, and encircled it. They demanded SALW from the military. Eventually several dozen trucks with ammunition and firearms were handed over along with twelve 120 mm mobile howitzers. The freshly-acquired arms reached Tskhinval the following day. The seizure raised expectations on the South Ossetian side. The implications were two-fold. Firstly, for the first time in the whole conflict the South Ossetians acquired weaponry good enough to allow them to stand up to the Georgian forces and to pose a realistic threat to populated areas on Georgian-held territory. Secondly, a precedent was set for the destabilisation of the situation in North Ossetia, ie within the Russia Federation itself. The Russian authorities, until then only verbally condemning Georgian aggression in South Ossetia, immediately reacted, initiating a meeting between the leaders of Georgia and South Ossetia. Both these factors forced the Georgian leadership to enter into negotiations with the Ossetians. Neither the first, nor the second, presidents of Georgia had agreed to official meetings with the South Ossetians before June 1992. The meetings with the leadership of North Ossetia led only to a further escalation of the conflict. Because it retained the Soviet habits typical of party bureaucrats, the North Ossetian leadership was convinced that up to the last minute that the USSR would be re-established and Soviet power restored and, accordingly, did not have its own position with regard to the question of South Ossetia’s constitutional status. Meetings with the Georgian leader- ship ended in magnificent dinners. A stronger early response from the North Ossetians could have influenced the course of the conflict and helped to avoid unnecessary casualties on both sides. The North Ossetians had potential leverage over the Georgians, because the only functioning road that connected Georgia directly with Russia at that time passed through North Ossetia. The same was true of gas and electricity lines. The North Ossetians could have put more pressure on the Georgians to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. If we attempt a short résumé of the above, several conclusions are offered: The proliferation of a large quantity of weapons in a region where state structures and the process of state building are undeveloped is likely to lead to a flare-up of armed conflict. 8 THE CAUCASUS: ARMED AND DIVIDED · NORTH AND SOUTH OSSETIA

When a conflict is developing and one side has an advantage over the other in weapons, this will in most cases lead to a sharp deterioration in security and the start of military action, since the restraining factor of parity is absent. The course of armed conflict is directly linked to the balance of arms between the sides. In this case the end of the armed stage of the conflict was to a large extent brought about by the South Ossetians’ acquisition of heavy weaponry.

Formation of Three factors made people take the conflict more seriously and re-think their future: armed the first casualties of the conflict; the inability of the South Ossetian authorities (still structures looking to Tbilisi and Moscow to in some way influence the process and give orders) to protect the civilian population; and the inaction of the central government in Moscow. These factors inevitably led South Ossetian activists to believe that they had no one to From ‘picket’ war to rely upon except themselves. armed structures Three basic types can be distinguished in the subsequent formation of armed groups. The first of these could be called neighbourhood groups, formed in the various districts of the town. The most stable of these groups were those organised around ‘pickets’, in the bordering districts of the town and in Ossetian-populated villages close to Georgian-populated villages. This is because members of such groups created militarised structures to maintain watch on the ‘pickets’ from the start of the conflict. These required the observance of basic subordination and discipline.

The second might be called occupational groups, ie people belonging to the same profession or occupation. There were groups made up of artists, sportsmen, Komsomol (Communist Youth League) leaders and veterans from the war in Afghanistan. A group of police officers from the Tskhinval internal affairs division who refused to take orders from Tbilisi also organised a group, which later became the backbone of the most combat-ready structure, the South Ossetian OMON (Special Police Detachment). Criminal elements also joined the South Ossetian fighters, since they had weapons and a good level of organisation derived from their operations in peacetime. Criminals participated to a greater or lesser extent in virtually all of the groups. However, purely criminal ‘groups’ were not apparent either at that stage or later. The events described here happened during a period in which the market was uncontrolled and anarchic, and businessmen were forced to operate according to somewhat criminal business practices. This, above all, meant owning weapons or even keeping bodyguards. It was difficult to draw a clear boundary between simple criminals and a nascent class of businessmen, and between them and the armed groups of South Ossetia.

The third predominant principle in the formation of groups was leadership-driven, ie set up around a charismatic leader, around whom his friends and advisers rallied, forming the leading backbone of a future ‘group’. There were two influential groups, who were the first to be properly armed even at the first stage of the conflict and were noted for their discipline. One of the groups retained its original composition until the end of the conflict and didn’t take in any new members. By contrast, the commander of the second group sought to increase the quantity of fighters and to attract respected lone fighters as much as possible. This group soon began to play a significant role in the political scene in the Caucasus. Even after the tragic death of its leader, his group kept his name and its structure, and even now maintains contact and meets regularly. When it became clear to everyone that armed conflict was inevitable, the Nyvs move- ment was organised. Its most active members were representatives of those involved in the black market and young businessmen. Representatives of this movement had information from the Georgian power structures and understood the full extent of the dangerous implications of the Georgian leadership’s support for extremist-orientated SAFERWORLD ARMS & SECURITY PROGRAMME 9

forces and their power divisions. This movement was prepared to fight back against any attacks from the Georgian side and even announced that it had enough arms to provide adequate defence. Nyvs did indeed have several machine-guns and several dozen carbines at its disposal. However, its leaders, having taken on themselves the task of defending South Ossetia and having thereby calmed the population, did not reckon on the scale of the coming conflict. Most likely, the close links between participants of this group and police officers from Georgia that still existed played a part in their mis- calculation. Individuals in the Georgian power structures widely believed that conflict was inevitable, but not on the scale that later occurred. When in winter 1991 Tskhinval was occupied by several thousand Georgian police officers together with the informal armed groups, Nyvs was unable to provide serious resistance. Nyvs nevertheless represented the first attempt to create a South Ossetian armed organisation, and an umbrella-body to co-ordinate the Ossetian armed response in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict of 1989–92.

Establishment of the In 1992 the formation of state structures of the sovereign Republic of South Ossetia new power structures began, including that of the official armed forces, the prototype of the future Ministry of Defence (MOD). The first subdivisions of the National Guard were formed out of the two largest detachments. The MOI also sprang into action again, this time under the control of the authorities of the Republic of South Ossetia. The first attempts were made by police officers to battle against crime and the spreading criminal chaos and the OMON was created. At this time attempts were already being made to register the weapons in various hands and to bring the unco-ordinated detachments under a unified command. One method to achieve this was the unification of as many groups as possible under the command of the South Ossetian state structures that already existed. The first attempt was unsuccessful, because the wrong structure was chosen: the then leadership thought it should be the Tskhinval OMON, failing to take into account the population’s traditional hostility to and suspicion of the police service. As a result those young people who went to serve in the OMON, as a rule, did not belong to any armed group and did not have their own weapons. The participants of the groups that did exist, for the most part, refused to submit to police leadership. The North Ossetians also rendered help. In May 1992, despite the active resistance of the North Ossetian authorities, a subdivision of the popular militia of North Ossetia that existed at that time came to the aid of the besieged Tskhinval. The subdivision numbered 300 people, who were armed with Kalashnikovs.

Military involvement There were two cases where a significant number of combatants from South Ossetia outside South Ossetia were mobilised for military actions beyond the borders of South Ossetia. In November 1992, after the outbreak of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in North Ossetia, about 250 men, mostly members of armed groups, subdivisions of the MOD and the South Ossetian MOI, arrived in North Ossetia. Detachments from South Ossetia were armed with their personal SALW and used ammunition they had brought with them. Military operations lasted three days. On the fourth day a ceasefire agreement was reached and Russian MOI and MOD troops were brought in. The presence of South Ossetian fighters showed that, despite the fact that there had been Ossetian-Ingush clashes causing victims during Soviet times as well, there were almost no weapons in North Ossetia, ie there had been no mass purchase of arms after the collapse of the USSR. The second was the participation of fighters from South Ossetia in the volunteer detachments of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC) in the -Georgia conflict. Officially, South Ossetia twice sent volunteers to 10 THE CAUCASUS: ARMED AND DIVIDED · NORTH AND SOUTH OSSETIA

Abkhazia, but only in the first instance did the volunteers bring their own weapons. This detachment spent the autumn and winter of 1992–93 in Abkhazia, when a severe shortage of weapons led to significant losses for the Abkhaz. The presence of South Ossetian volunteers, the only CMPC representatives who had experience of military operations, played a significant role in changing the course of military operations in favour of the Abkhaz side. At this period the volunteer detachments reached Abkhazia via mountain paths, through the passes of the main Caucasus mountain range. The second division, fighting in Abkhazia in summer 1993, was armed on arrival in the combat zone.

SALW in the With the end of military actions in June 1992 a period began which, although not decade of ‘peaceful’, has at any rate seen the absence of war. This period has now lasted for ten ‘peace’ – years. 1992 to the The first years after the end of the fighting in South Ossetia provide a clear example present of the tragic consequences of a large quantity of SALW remaining in the hands of the population at a time when state power was weak and underdeveloped.

Creation of security As with every conflict, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict created a whole cast of ‘new forces heroes’, who had distinguished themselves in the course of the war as leaders of various groups. Peace offered them the option of a transition to state service with either the preservation of links to the armed structures or the transfer to more peaceful activity. A third option, unfortunately, was often criminality. This process, as in the majority of other cases, happened painfully in South Ossetia, and was complicated by the inaction of the state leaders. The ‘war’ between the Tskhinval OMON and one of the armed groups is indicative. In the course of the fight against crime, including former members of the armed groups who had turned to a criminal way of life, OMON chose to liquidate the most active members of criminal groups without observing any legal norms. South Ossetia’s leaders could not prevent this disastrous practice. Nor could they restrain the OMON men, who had taken it upon themselves to take vengeance on anyone related to one of the groups after its members had killed an OMON commander. As a result about 40 people were killed without trial or investigation. Society, which only recently had come together during the conflict, fragmented again. Such draconian methods of suppressing crime were unsuccessful, against the expectations of the OMON. The consequences of these events can be felt in South Ossetia to the present day. Another example of the transition to civilian life by Ossetians who had fought against the Georgians was with the creation of the MOD of South Ossetia, which was formed by bringing together several armed detachments to make a single ministry. This struc- ture succeeded in the short post-war period in developing governance mechanisms and structured armed forces. In turn, from 1992 to the present date, it was headed by the most respected figures among those who had fought during the conflict. There was not one professional officer among them, although several former Soviet Army officers served in the ranks of the South Ossetian armed forces. The MOD succeeded in avoid- ing being drawn into politics, despite numerous attempts by some politicians to attract their support. When in December 2001 various MOD leaders spoke up for the loser of the election, the former president Lyudvig Chibirov, there was no support from among the armed forces personnel. The MOI performed a different function, especially its most organised subdivision – the OMON. Having originally engaged in a merciless struggle against crime, with time the OMON became a support mechanism for the regime of President Chibirov, who SAFERWORLD ARMS & SECURITY PROGRAMME 11

had held power for over eight years. The OMON provided security for the ruling elite rather than ordinary citizens. Before the autumn 2001 elections, the authorities attempted to create another special subdivision, ie a KGB spetsnaz. This was popularly interpreted as yet another structure to provide support to the government and seriously harmed the government’s popularity. These efforts did not prevent Chibirov from losing in the first round of elections.

Possession of SALW The Ministry for States of Emergency and Defence (MSED) was formed among official armed immediately after conflict ended in 1992 out of the National Guard and the better- structures in South organised ‘self-defence units.’ The MSED has SALW arsenals left over from the conflict Ossetia of 1989–92 at its disposal, as well as weapons obtained in recent years. These mostly consist of Kalashnikovs of various modifications, and Dragunov sniper rifles, anti-tank weapons, RPG-7s, SPGs (mounted anti-tank grenade launchers) and various models of guided anti-tank missiles. There are also air defence systems which consist of anti- aircraft rockets and rapid-fire systems in the weaponry. Concrete figures concerning SALW are secret. The MSED is not involved in the production of SALW,with the exception of repairs, refits and the modification of certain types of weapons. In February 2002, the South Ossetian Military Commissariat conducted an assessment of its reservists and issued mobilisation guidelines, which indicated where each reservist should report to in the event of mobilisation and from where he should obtain his weapon.

The Ministry of the Interior was founded in spring 1991. Its officers are issued with Makarov pistols. Special subdivisions, ie OMON, are equipped with 5.45-calibre Kalashnikovs, including sawn-off weapons.

The Anti-Terrorist Group is a special subdivision for combating internal and external terrorist activities was recently created. It is armed with Kalashnikovs, Dragunov sniper rifles and other special equipment designed for anti-terrorist operations.

Since June 1992 a three-sided Peace-keeping Force has been maintaining peace and order in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. In accordance with the June 1992 Dagomys accords, they consist of three motorised infantry divisions from Russia, Georgia and North Ossetia-Alania. These forces are led by a united headquarters under the command of a senior military commander – as a rule, a Russian Army general. The Ossetian and Russian battalions are equipped with weapons in accordance with the regulations of the Charter. SALW were also held by a private security firm called Biyard, which operated in South Ossetia from 1998 onwards. Its main task was to escort freight and transport travelling through the republic. There is some evidence to suggest that it was under KGB control. Since the leadership change in South Ossetia the firm has ceased operations, and its work is now carried out by state agencies. The storage and carrying of SALW is governed by the ‘Law on Weapons’, which was reviewed in August 2000. The law regulates the storage and handling of SALW by civilians in peacetime, and was written on the basis of the corresponding law of the Russian Federation. There are a number of differences to the Russian law, however, including one allowing reservists who are registered with the MSED and the MOI, and whose weapons have been properly checked, to store weapons at home. 12 THE CAUCASUS: ARMED AND DIVIDED · NORTH AND SOUTH OSSETIA

Arms control measures Attempts were made by the state to bring SALW in the hands of the general population under control, and these efforts continue to this day. In November 1994 the govern- ment approved regulations for keeping SALW which envisaged the compulsory regis- tration and testing of weapons. The first attempt, although not a complete failure, was unsuccessful. As a consequence similar actions were undertaken several times by the government, but did not succeed in forcing a significant number of those possessing SALW to register. Nor in South Ossetia did they succeed in creating a system for keep- ing personal weapons for reservists in special premises, as was done in Abkhazia and Karabakh. There were several reasons for this, of which these are the most significant: The first attempts at mass registration were undertaken by organs of the interior ministry, which at that time did not enjoy trust or authority among the combatants. Unlike in the Karabakh and Abkhaz conflicts, the state did not play a decisive role in organising armed resistance in the course of the war in 1989–92. From the point of view of the combatants, the state’s demand that they should register the weapons they had not supplied seemed unfair to people who had defended their land without any particular help from this government. In its negotiations with Georgia from 1993 to 2002, the government had, in the opinion of most Ossetian fighters, offered too many concessions. In 1996 the MOD of South Ossetia began buying SALW from the population. From the soldiers’ point of view this was an extremely positive step for the sake of defence capabilities. At that time a large quantity of SALW was sold and sent outside South Ossetia, since at a time of high unemployment the sale of personal weapons was for many people the only way of getting money in desperate conditions. Unlike similar actions later, where weapons were bought up from the population under the aegis of the OSCE, in this case the seller knew that his weapon would remain in South Ossetia and be used for its defence if necessary, and would not be destroyed. This protected him against possible accusations of being unpatriotic.

SALW today There have been no recorded cases of illegal armed formations still active in South Ossetia in recent years. However while this is so, those involved in the armed groups created in 1989–92 keep in touch, and as has been demonstrated above, at times when the political situation deteriorates they are ready to assemble and act together. In autumn 2001, at the time of the crisis caused by President Chibirov’s defeat at the polls, up to a hundred members of armed groups assembled on the outskirts of Tskhinval. Research suggests that the arms market in South Ossetia has been brisker since autumn 2001. For the first time in five or six years the demand for full-length auto- matic weapons exceeds the demand for sawn-off models and pistols, which up till now have been the most popular. Most likely this is the population’s reaction to the rising tension in the political and security spheres within South Ossetia (the elections and the resultant change of leadership), as well as in the Caucasus as a whole and globally (the events in the Kodori and Pankisi Gorges, the US army contingent in Georgia, the ‘War on Terrorism’). In April 2002 a group of ex-combatants published a statement in the South Ossetian press and on a number of internet sites expressing their fears about the plans of the Georgian leadership to mobilise NATO servicemen in anti-terrorist operations in Georgia. They argued that, using the excuse of the war against terrorism, certain figures in the Georgian leadership might attempt to resolve the outstanding problem of Georgia’s ‘territorial integrity’. The presence of new armed forces in the Caucasus has huge potential to destroy the equilibrium achieved after the ending of large-scale military operations in Abkhazia, Karabakh and South Ossetia. SAFERWORLD ARMS & SECURITY PROGRAMME 13

During the post-war period various political forces in Russia, Georgia and the West have presented the Transcaucasian Highway (which runs through South Ossetia and is controlled by the customs, border guard, and other state structures of South Ossetia) as being a route for the intensive trafficking of SALW.It cannot be denied that some weapons are indeed transported along this road. However, in all the post-war years neither the South Ossetian, Russian nor Georgian special services have succeeded in seizing any significant quantities of SALW on this road. In summer 2001, a car was stopped on the road into Tskhinval carrying four inhabi- tants of the Chechen Republic. The car’s passengers then opened fire, a policeman and a civilian were killed and one hostage was taken. No evidence that the Chechens were involved in arms trafficking has yet been published. Despite this, press articles about the Pankisi Gorge often hint that weapons in or from the gorge are obtained with the help of South Ossetia. In autumn 2001, a contingent of the Joint Peace-keeping Forces, together with an OSCE mission in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone, led a drive to buy up and destroy SALW and ammunition. According to peace-keepers some 1,300 units of SALW were destroyed. In May 2002, a joint Georgian-Ossetian Centre for the co-ordination of law enforce- ment activity in the conflict zone was created under the aegis of the OSCE. One of the Centre’s tasks is to prevent the circulation of illegal weapons. One method has been the collection of SALW from the population in return for a reward. Public figures in South Ossetia, including those who had fought against the Georgians in 1989–92, disapproved of this programme. Their basic grievance was:‘In collecting weapons, can you guarantee the security of the civilian population in the event of a renewed escalation of the conflict?’ Thus, despite a ten-year truce, many South Ossetians still view SALW in the hands of the population as being the most effective way of ensuring security and defending South Ossetia against an outside enemy. Recently, however, the OSCE programme has seen a number of changes for the better. The programme is now conducted under the slogan ‘weapons for development.’ Rather than simply exchanging weapons for money, the programme now gives vital equipment and runs projects to improve the local infrastructure, and this is undoubt- edly more effective. The author has frequently been asked by local residents about the conditions for handing weapons in who expressed a desire to participate. This is clearly a positive sign, yet it also suggests that the local population is not well enough informed about the programme. Most of what is handed in is ammunition – unexploded shells, outdated mines – and weapons that were beyond the standard period of usage, ie items that could not really be used if there was a resumption of conflict. This in no way undermines the import- ance of the programme, since in peacetime it is just these weapons that are the most dangerous, most often cause accidents and are most often used in domestic violence. The collection of weapons with the help of international missions is undoubtedly an effective method against the uncontrolled use of SALW,however under no circum- stances is it a ‘panacea’. The author’s experience of talking to people who surrender their weapons shows that this is done chiefly by those in desperate need of money. Twice the author was asked about surrendering weapons by young people who were clearly addicted to drugs. A typical inhabitant of South Ossetia who is not burdened with heavy financial problems is not going to give up his Kalashnikov for pacifist reasons at the present time. The story of how young schoolchildren from one of Tskhinval’s schools came to surrender grenades for an anti-tank grenade-launcher might at best raise a smile. However to prevent the uncontrolled use of weapons, changes in the economic and social well-being of South Ossetians are needed, most clearly expressed in the formula advanced by the leader of the all-Ossetian movement People’s Initiative 250:‘one more job, one less machine-gun.’ 14 THE CAUCASUS: ARMED AND DIVIDED · NORTH AND SOUTH OSSETIA

SALW in North The situation concerning SALW proliferation in North Ossetia can be divided into Ossetia-Alania two periods – the pre-war period (up to the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in 1992) and the post-war period (after 1992). Until 1992 the population, relying on the state power Conflict and sources of structures to ensure its security, was relatively passive about obtaining weapons, arms despite the traditional emotional attachment of the Caucasian mountain peoples to guns. There was always a significant quantity of both smooth-bore and rifled firearms in circulation in the Caucasus. Although both could be obtained at the market in neighbouring Nazran (which would become the capital of the Republic of Ingushetia), there were few illegally stored weapons and those that were kept were mainly pistols and revolvers. SALW were kept in MOD stores, such as those of the 19th division or the strategic bomber base. Officials from the MOI, KGB and the procuracy were issued with weapons, and the security services and the nature reserve guards had rifles. Smooth- bore weapons issued to members of the Union of Hunters and Fishers were also kept under control. At the end of the 1980s the political and criminal situation in the country and the region began to deteriorate. The services charged with keeping order could not cope with the worsening situation and citizens attempted to provide their own security. The first gas cylinders appeared, and then gas pistols as well, adapted to use real bullets. Local production of firearms also began, though the quality was low. Such clandestine production took place in the factories of the North Ossetian capital Ordzhonikidze (soon renamed Vladikavkaz). In the course of the conflict in late 1992, attempts were made to produce SALW illicitly in the Prigorodny district. Mortars confiscated from one factory were shown in the press. However, only small quantities were made in this way. Moreover, illegally-obtained weapons cost about the same and were of incomparably better quality. Weapons were also imported from other regions;‘black hunters’ acquired German and Soviet weapons from the Second World War from areas that had seen wartime action. MOI employees were attacked in order to capture their weapons. In this period there was also a noticeable surge in the numbers of those wishing to become hunters. Officially registered weapons of members of the Union of Hunters and Fishers were also used. These weapons were mostly for detachments on guard in their towns and covering Vladikavkaz. Another channel for filling the arsenals was the adaptation of training weapons from military training schools and ROSTO (the Russian Defence Sport-Technical Organisation, then called DOSAAF).Yet even after repair, such home-made weapons were not much use for long and soon ended up as scrap. At present there are virtually none in the hands of the population or on the ‘market’. There were no massive seizures or raids on the stores of the MOD, MOI and other security agencies. Calls of ‘let’s go to the army stores!’ (meaning the 19th division) were heard in mass rallies, but nothing followed these words. The local regiment originally received orders to remain at the garrison and therefore initially did not take part in the conflict. It is impossible to confirm or deny rumours that officers sympathetic to the Ossetians handed over their weapons on the understanding that they would be returned. All of these channels were extremely insignificant in comparison with the legal channels, ie weapons acquired from the stores of the MOI and MOD (hence, for example, T-55 tanks fell into the hands of the popular militia). Even before the events of autumn 1992 the population of the Prigorodny district had obtained rifles. Dozens of weapons were sent to the village of Chermen alone. Armed groups were formed by people who had served in the elite units of the Soviet Army. A national guard was formed from of the popular militia. All these large units, SAFERWORLD ARMS & SECURITY PROGRAMME 15

although irregular, were armed on a legal basis by the North Ossetian authorities. It can be assumed that thousands of units of firearms and grenade-launchers were returned to storage bases.Yet, given that these formations were created outside legal norms, it is difficult to confirm that this is so. In this period SALW entered North Ossetia from outside, partially from factories producing firearms in the South Caucasus. But it should be noted that these were brought by volunteers to whom the weapons belonged personally and virtually all weapons were taken back. However the main flow came from Chechnya, where the army stores had already been raided, and which had also become a transit route where flows of illegal weapons could be gathered together and sent to their onward destina- tions.Volunteers who fought in Abkhazia also returned with weapons. A little later, having lost their ‘war’ with the authorities, a significant number of criminals returned to North Ossetia. It was at this time that the sale of weapons from army stores began. A story ran in the press about a group of servicemen who had stolen about a hundred firearms from a training school store. The demand for SALW formed a clearly structured market, with its channels of supply and acquisition.

The situation today Weapons can be acquired in North Ossetia both on the legal and the black markets. The legal acquisition of SALW is regulated by Federal laws. There are eight shops in North Ossetia (all of them in Vladikavkaz) selling arms and ammunition. Anyone possessing a hunting certificate may obtain a licence to acquire smooth-bore weapons, and then rifles. For those with the right connections, the relatively long period before rifles can be obtained can be shortened. Another way of acquiring officially registered arms is through the possession of a document from a private security agency. There are more than ten in the region, employing more than 500 people armed with Makarov pistols and AKS Kalashnikovs. The MOI is recorded as having gas pistols which can fire real bullets when modified. According to unofficial estimates by MOI employees, SALW in the republic are fairly homogeneous: more than 90 percent are Russian made, about 5 percent foreign and 5 percent home-made. There is a wide range of foreign models – from Italian Berettas to Israeli Uzis. The predominance of Russian weapons is easy to explain: they are both reliable and affordable. If there is competition it is only in the types of ammunition – 7.62 or 5.45. The odd one out here is the Stechkin pistol, which costs five times the price of a Makarov. The mainstays of the black market are Kalashnikovs, Tokarev and Makarov pistols, and grenades. The black market is in a period of depression at the moment, thanks to several factors. Between 1994 and 1996, when a lot of money came into North Ossetia from vodka sales, weapons were obtained not only for personal security, but also as an investment. At present, with the deterioration in the black economy, people have put these weapons up for sale. Moreover, this market is sensitive to the political situation in the North Caucasus. Any deterioration on North Ossetia’s eastern border with Ingushetia (and beyond that in Chechnya) leads to a surge in demand. A huge factor was and still is the situation in Chechnya, linked not only to the taking of hostages and the black economy, but also to the uncertainty created by the very existence of the Chechen republic. However, Ossetian-Ingush relations are now stable: official delegations are being exchanged and Ingush can again travel to Vladikavkaz, though return of Ingush forcibly displaced during the Prigorodny conflict has ceased, and those that have returned are not in fact integrating into North Ossetian society. This situation suits the population of North Ossetia, who believe that in this way the problem of security will be solved. 16 THE CAUCASUS: ARMED AND DIVIDED · NORTH AND SOUTH OSSETIA

The entry of Russian Federal troops into Chechnya has similarly calmed North Ossetian concerns: the fear of armed Chechen formations has disappeared and there has been a decline in the hostage trade, with which Chechens were always associated in the public’s mind.1 With the decline in the black market, criminal groups scaled back their activity. Their income fell, and they were no longer in a position to compete with state institutions. There was a momentous reaction to this – people started going out in the evening, something unthinkable a few years earlier. This alone led to a fall in demand for weapons, since security or, more precisely, the sense of personal security grew among the population and now SALW supply significantly exceeds demand. SALW comes onto the market from sources within the country, since to import weapons requires making an official order, and this is done not via Tbilisi but via Moscow. The overwhelming majority of SALW comes from the 58th army, mostly from units that are leaving or arriving in Chechnya. In combat conditions it is impos- sible to know exactly how many bullets were used or how often a grenade-launcher was fired, and it is similarly impossible to say how many weapons were confiscated from the Chechens in the course of operations so it was difficult to keep a track of SALW.Certainly everything is for sale: from bullets to sniper rifles, sold by everyone from rank and file soldiers to the most senior officers. The only question is how much they can sell. This has not been officially confirmed, since only a few contract soldiers have been brought to trial for attempting to take captured weapons out of the conflict zone. SALW are stored in secret caches, but never far away so that they are available if needed for self-defence.Virtually every day the press reports examples of discoveries of such weapons.‘…in the household of Vladikavkaz resident Vadim K. an F1 grenade and a fuse was discovered, along with 340 bullets for automatic fire… a Makarov pistol was discovered in his car,’ one such report ran. Because of its compact size, a pistol costs about the same as a sub-machine-gun. Sniper rifles and grenade-launchers are considered unusual and there is no demand for them (for example, at the height of combat in Chechnya a Mukha grenade-launcher could be acquired for only five dollars). It is impossible to estimate the quantity of weapons hidden in North Ossetia. In one television broadcast, President Aleksandr Dzasokhov spoke of ‘huge quantities’. Representatives of the MOI and the FSB refused to comment on any figures. Off the record, they cite figures from 20,000 to 50,000 smooth-bore weapons and rifles in the hands of the population. The situation is slowly stabilising. The MOI, FSB and border guard stores are by and large reliably guarded. Legal weapons belonging to hunters, private security agencies and the internal security forces are under proper control. With the end of the ‘active phase of military operations in Chechnya’ army stores are also being brought under control. The decline in the socio-economic situation of the population has led to weapons no longer being brought in, but actually taken out of the region, which is also linked to the exodus of criminals. It is also noticeable that the traditional firing of all types of weapon at New Year has tailed off,having reached its peak in the mid-1990s.

Conclusion It is hard to predict how the SALW situation will develop. It is unknown how strict and consistent the authorities’ position will be. Nor how the political situation in the Caucasus will develop, especially in South Ossetia, Chechnya and Ingushetia. Nor, most importantly, how secure the inhabitants will feel. Here, unfortunately, there are more questions than answers.

1 according to incomplete figures from the MOI, from 1994–8 a total of 479 people were abducted, while in 2000 this had fallen to just 24 SAFERWORLD ARMS & SECURITY PROGRAMME 17

At present, North Ossetia seems to have little influence over the SALW situation in South Ossetia. This is largely because it is much cheaper and easier to buy weapons in Georgia itself than in North Ossetia. This ready availability of weapons in Georgia is suggested by the constant reports in the Russian press that weapons from Georgia find their way into Chechen hands. Furthermore, it would be very difficult to transport any serious quantity of weapons through Russian customs and border posts – it is simply too risky, as the checks are fairly thorough, and Russia has a good network of informers. In fact, there are plenty of weapons available in South Ossetia, both legally through more than ten weapons shops, and illegally. In North Ossetia’s case, the proximity to Chechnya is enough to guarantee supplies. The SALW situations in North and South Ossetia are only likely to have much influence on each other if conflict was to re-ignite either between South Ossetia and Georgia or between North Ossetia and Ingushetia.

About the author Alan Parastaev entered the History and Philology Department of the South Ossetian Pedagogical Institute in 1986. From 1987 to 1989 he served in the USSR Armed Forces. In 1992 he graduated from the Pedagogical Department. Between 1994 and 1997 he held various positions at the Ministry of External Relations of the Republic of South Ossetia. In 1997 he was co-founder of the NGO Centre for Sociological and Political Research, later renamed the South Ossetian Centre for Humanitarian Initiatives and Research (CHIR), which he now heads. The main aims of the organisation are to encourage the development of civil society and humanitarian work, and support the peaceful resolution of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. He has participated in a number of research projects, including monitoring work for the Caucasus NGO Forum.

Saferworld's research project on arms and security in the Caucasus This chapter is part of a wider Saferworld report, entitled The Caucasus: Armed and Divided – Small arms and light weapons proliferation and humanitarian consequences in the Caucasus, which collects together case studies from local experts on the situation in their particular geographical region. The report focuses on the conflicts in the region, the relationship between conflict and levels of arms possession, and the effects of small arms proliferation since the break-up of the . It also includes a chapter on Russia’s policy towards the small arms issues in the Caucasus. To obtain a copy of the complete report, please contact Saferworld at: [email protected] or visit www.saferworld.org.uk