"Appeasement" In: the Encyclopedia of Diplomacy

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Appeasement of the worst kind of craven weakness, if not cowardice, in the face of aggression. Even PAUL W. DOERR dictionary definitions have been influenced Acadia University, Canada by such perceptions. For example, Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary typically Appeasement is a diplomatic strategy by defined appeasement as an effort “to buy off whichastateattemptstoconciliateapoten- (an aggressor) by concessions, usually at the tial aggressor or rival by making concessions sacrifice of principles.” Dictionary definitions through negotiations. Appeasement was a prior to 1945 carried no such moral judg- little-known and seldom commented upon ments. In mitigation to such harsh judgments, policy before the 1930s. It will, rightly or some historians have argued that appease- wrongly, probably always be associated with ment was “massively overdetermined” to such British prime minister Neville Chamberlain’s an extent that the British government had no diplomacyindealingwithAdolfHitlerand viable alternatives to the Nazi challenge in Nazi Germany. Chamberlain’s policy culmi- the 1930s (Schroeder 1976: 223–43). nated in the Munich Conference of Septem- ber 1938, often cited as the supreme example ORIGINS OF APPEASEMENT of appeasement. It should not be associated exclusively with Chamberlain and Britain, There is no consensus on the origins of however, as other states practiced appease- appeasement as a policy and there has been ment in the face of the threat from Nazi no etymological study of the word. In his Germany. France participated in the Munich book The Roots of Appeasement,publishedin Conference while the USSR signed the noto- 1966, historian Martin Gilbert argued that rious Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939. In appeasement could be traced back to the addition, states practiced appeasement well failure of the international system to pre- before the advent of the Third Reich, and it vent the outbreak of war in 1914. “Educated has arguably figured in diplomacy since 1945, people in all walks of life, and of all political especiallyduringtheColdWar. beliefs,” according to Gilbert, thought the Generally speaking, appeasement has a war was accidental, and that neither Germany dismally poor reputation. This holds true for norBritainweretoblameexclusivelyforit. members of the informed public who think So “appeasement was created by a lack of about such issues in Western democracies, confidence in the British case, and a resolve plus individuals in the media, politicians, and never again to drift or fall unwittingly into many historians. No politician wants to be war” (Gilbert 1966: 9). By contrast, in a 1976 accused of conducting a foreign policy article, historian Paul Kennedy located the that can be characterized as “appease- origins of appeasement as far back as the ment.” Accusing a political rival of being 1860s. Kennedy argued that, beginning in an “appeaser” is a supreme political insult. 1865 British diplomacy focused on nego- Chamberlain has been ridiculed in televi- tiating settlements to resolve international sion shows as varied as Seinfeld and Monty disputes.TheBritishalsofavored“thecon- Python. Appeasement conjures up images ceptofthe‘ConcertofEurope’(asopposed The Encyclopedia of Diplomacy. Edited by Gordon Martel. © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2018 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781118885154.dipl0336 2 APPEASEMENT to the Bismarckian concept of power-blocs) minister David Lloyd George resorted to … ” (Kennedy 1976: 200). By the late nine- appeasementtomitigatewhathefearedwere teenth century, the British Empire suffered overly harsh terms of the postwar Treaty from “imperial over-stretch” with defense of Versailles. Lloyd George’s Fontainbleau commitments around the globe that were Memorandum, written during the tense increasingly difficult to meet. The empire’s negotiations of the Paris Peace Conference export–import economy needed peace and in 1919, sought to provide a more generous stability to function properly. At home settlement to Germany. His efforts proved demands for domestic reform, including unsuccessful. Similarly, on May 10, 1919, C. new social programs that had to be financed P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, at the expense of the defense budget, were called for a lenient peace treaty. For Scott, “the escalating. All these factors motivated British fundamental question is whether we desire a statesmen to pursue a foreign policy that peace of appeasement or a peace of violence” avoided confrontation. “Appeasing” poten- (Gilbert 1966: 54). Lloyd George’s successors tial rivals became the logical foreign policy. as prime minister, especially Ramsay Mac- Those involved in the events of the late 1930s Donald and Stanley Baldwin, likewise used took a less historical approach and placed appeasement to resolve disputes with Ger- the origins of appeasement to a later date. many. Concessions were made to Germany Anthony Eden, British foreign secretary on the reparations burden in 1924 and 1929 from 1935 to 1938, recalled using the word andadmissiontotheLeagueofNationsin appeasement in speeches or Foreign Office 1926. Some observers would point to events documents “occasionally” by 1936 (Eden in Asia as marking the beginning of appease- 1962: 324). By contrast the Foreign Office, ment. In 1931 the Japanese conquered the which began serious internal debates on how ChineseregionofManchuria.Theinabilityof to handle Hitler in 1934, eschewed use of the the League of Nations to formulate a response word and instead preferred the term “general toablatantactofaggressioncanbeviewed settlement,” as did Chamberlain. asthebeginningofadownwardspiralin the 1930s. The league was not yet crippled though, as it was still seen as a primarily EARLY APPEASEMENT PRIOR TO 1933 European organization. The rise of Adolf The British followed a policy of appeasement Hitler to power in 1933 lent renewed urgency vis-à-vis the United States in the late nine- to appeasement policies. teenth century, giving way in disputes over Panama, Venezuela, and Alaska, rather than APPEASEMENT FROM 1933 TO 1937 risk alienating Washington. Efforts to appease Germany prior to 1914 can be found as well. Hitler’s first round of challenges to the Ver- The British frequently tried to cool down sailles order began in the early months of the naval race by proposing compromises to 1935. In rapid succession in March of that theGermans.ThefailedvisitoftheBritish year the Germans announced the existence war minister, Lord Haldane, to Germany in of an air force (the Luftwaffe),reintroduced 1912 has been seen as a foretaste of things conscription and expanded the German army to come in the 1930s (Kennedy 1976: 202). to a strength of thirty-five divisions. All these The British made colonial concessions to steps took place days before the visit of the France and Russia in the period from 1904 British foreign secretary, Sir John Simon, to to 1907. Following the war, British prime Berlin. The British, along with the French, APPEASEMENT 3 were left without an adequate response. Pub- April 1935, in which Britain, France, and lic support for a war with Germany at this ItalywarnedHitlertostayoutofAustria. time was minimal, as demonstrated later The attack on Ethiopia, however, now meant that year by the results of the Peace Ballot. therealpossibilityofItalianisolationanda Sponsored by the League of Nations Union, defection to Hitler’s camp. For his part Hitler a powerful pro-league lobby group, over 11.6 saw Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia as a million British voters turned out to “vote” for means to distract Italian interest away from league principles and opposition to British Austria. He went so far as to order a shipment rearmament. German rearmament could of Mauser rifles to be sent to the Ethiopians to be easily rationalized as appropriate for any stiffen their resistance and embroil Mussolini sovereign state, and a revision of the overly on distant battlefields. The British believed punitive terms of the Versailles treaty. The they could defeat Italy if it came to war, but response of the British government was to only at the cost of weakening the Royal Navy attempttomanagethechallengeofGerman in the case of future conflict with Japan, and, rearmament through compromise and nego- especially,Germany.Again,acompromise tiation. The upshot was the Anglo-German negotiation was attempted. The Hoare–Laval Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935. Under the Plan, named after the foreign ministers terms of the agreement the Germans were responsible (Samuel Hoare of Britain and allowedtobuildafleetupto35percentthe Pierre Laval of France), would have given tonnageoftheRoyalNavyandasubmarine Italy effective control over Ethiopia while fleetequaltothatofBritain’s.Theagreement preserving the fiction of Ethiopian indepen- promised to head off a resumption of a naval dence. The plan was stillborn when it was race with Germany, easing pressure on the leaked to the press and public outrage forced British economy, while allowing the British Hoare’s resignation. Mussolini’s armies went to focus on the emerging Japanese threat in on to conquer and annex Ethiopia by the the Pacific. following spring. Another serious challenge emerged when The Rhineland Crisis of March 1936 Italy invaded Ethiopia, a member of the brought Germany back into the limelight. league, on October 3, 1935. The league The Treaty of Versailles called for the branded Italy an aggressor and some sanc- Rhineland to be occupied by Allied troops tions were eventually imposed. However, for fifteen
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