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Home , Appeasement, August 1939, Konrad Henlein, March 1939, Neville Chamberlain, Peace conference

Appeasement of the worst kind of craven weakness, if not cowardice, in the face of aggression. Even PAUL W. DOERR dictionary definitions have been influenced Acadia University, Canada by such perceptions. For example, Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary typically is a diplomatic strategy by defined appeasement as an effort “to buy off whichastateattemptstoconciliateapoten- (an aggressor) by concessions, usually at the tial aggressor or rival by making concessions sacrifice of principles.” Dictionary definitions through negotiations. Appeasement was a prior to 1945 carried no such moral judg- little-known and seldom commented upon ments. In mitigation to such harsh judgments, policy before the . It will, rightly or some historians have argued that appease- wrongly, probably always be associated with ment was “massively overdetermined” to such British prime minister ’s an extent that the British government had no diplomacyindealingwithAdolfHitlerand viable alternatives to the Nazi challenge in . Chamberlain’s policy culmi- the 1930s (Schroeder 1976: 223–43). nated in the Conference of Septem- ber 1938, often cited as the supreme example ORIGINS OF APPEASEMENT of appeasement. It should not be associated exclusively with Chamberlain and Britain, There is no consensus on the origins of however, as other states practiced appease- appeasement as a policy and there has been ment in the face of the threat from Nazi no etymological study of the word. In his Germany. France participated in the Munich book The Roots of Appeasement,publishedin Conference while the USSR signed the noto- 1966, historian argued that rious Nazi–Soviet Pact of . In appeasement could be traced back to the addition, states practiced appeasement well failure of the international system to pre- before the advent of the Third Reich, and it vent the outbreak of in 1914. “Educated has arguably figured in since 1945, people in all walks of life, and of all political especiallyduringtheColdWar. beliefs,” according to Gilbert, thought the Generally speaking, appeasement has a war was accidental, and that neither Germany dismally poor reputation. This holds true for norBritainweretoblameexclusivelyforit. members of the informed public who think So “appeasement was created by a lack of about such issues in Western democracies, confidence in the British case, and a resolve plus individuals in the media, politicians, and never again to drift or fall unwittingly into many historians. No politician wants to be war” (Gilbert 1966: 9). By contrast, in a 1976 accused of conducting a foreign policy article, historian located the that can be characterized as “appease- origins of appeasement as far back as the ment.” Accusing a political rival of being 1860s. Kennedy argued that, beginning in an “appeaser” is a supreme political insult. 1865 British diplomacy focused on nego- Chamberlain has been ridiculed in televi- tiating settlements to resolve international sion shows as varied as Seinfeld and Monty disputes.TheBritishalsofavored“thecon- Python. Appeasement conjures up images ceptofthe‘ConcertofEurope’(asopposed

The Encyclopedia of Diplomacy. Edited by Gordon Martel. © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2018 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781118885154.dipl0336 2 APPEASEMENT to the Bismarckian concept of power-blocs) minister resorted to … ” (Kennedy 1976: 200). By the late nine- appeasementtomitigatewhathefearedwere teenth century, the British Empire suffered overly harsh terms of the postwar from “imperial over-stretch” with defense of Versailles. Lloyd George’s Fontainbleau commitments around the globe that were Memorandum, written during the tense increasingly difficult to meet. The empire’s negotiations of the Paris Conference export–import economy needed peace and in 1919, sought to provide a more generous stability to function properly. At home settlement to Germany. His efforts proved demands for domestic reform, including unsuccessful. Similarly, on , 1919, C. new social programs that had to be financed P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, at the expense of the defense budget, were called for a lenient . For Scott, “the escalating. All these factors motivated British fundamental question is whether we desire a statesmen to pursue a foreign policy that peace of appeasement or a peace of violence” avoided confrontation. “Appeasing” poten- (Gilbert 1966: 54). Lloyd George’s successors tial rivals became the logical foreign policy. as prime minister, especially Ramsay Mac- Those involved in the events of the late 1930s Donald and , likewise used took a less historical approach and placed appeasement to resolve disputes with Ger- the origins of appeasement to a later date. many. Concessions were made to Germany , British on the reparations burden in 1924 and 1929 from 1935 to 1938, recalled using the word andadmissiontotheLeagueofNationsin appeasement in speeches or Foreign Office 1926. Some observers would point to events documents “occasionally” by 1936 (Eden in Asia as marking the beginning of appease- 1962: 324). By contrast the Foreign Office, ment. In 1931 the Japanese conquered the which began serious internal debates on how ChineseregionofManchuria.Theinabilityof to handle Hitler in 1934, eschewed use of the the to formulate a response word and instead preferred the term “general toablatantactofaggressioncanbeviewed settlement,” as did Chamberlain. asthebeginningofadownwardspiralin the 1930s. The league was not yet crippled though, as it was still seen as a primarily EARLY APPEASEMENT PRIOR TO 1933 European organization. The rise of Adolf The British followed a policy of appeasement Hitler to power in 1933 lent renewed urgency vis-à-vis the United States in the late nine- to appeasement policies. teenth century, giving way in disputes over Panama, Venezuela, and Alaska, rather than APPEASEMENT FROM 1933 TO 1937 risk alienating Washington. Efforts to appease Germany prior to 1914 can be found as well. Hitler’s first round of challenges to the Ver- The British frequently tried to cool down sailles order began in the early months of the naval race by proposing compromises to 1935. In rapid succession in March of that theGermans.ThefailedvisitoftheBritish year the Germans announced the existence war minister, Lord Haldane, to Germany in of an air force (the ),reintroduced 1912 has been seen as a foretaste of things and expanded the German army to come in the 1930s (Kennedy 1976: 202). to a strength of thirty-five divisions. All these The British made colonial concessions to steps took place days before the visit of the France and Russia in the period from 1904 British foreign secretary, Sir John Simon, to to 1907. Following the war, British prime . The British, along with the French, APPEASEMENT 3 were left without an adequate response. Pub- , in which Britain, France, and lic support for a war with Germany at this ItalywarnedHitlertostayoutofAustria. time was minimal, as demonstrated later The attack on , however, now meant that year by the results of the Peace Ballot. therealpossibilityofItalianisolationanda Sponsored by the League of Nations Union, defection to Hitler’s camp. For his part Hitler a powerful pro-league lobby group, over 11.6 saw Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia as a million British voters turned out to “vote” for means to distract Italian interest away from league principles and opposition to British Austria. He went so far as to order a shipment rearmament. could of Mauser rifles to be sent to the Ethiopians to be easily rationalized as appropriate for any stiffen their resistance and embroil Mussolini sovereign state, and a revision of the overly on distant battlefields. The British believed punitive terms of the Versailles treaty. The they could defeat Italy if it came to war, but response of the British government was to only at the cost of weakening the attempttomanagethechallengeofGerman in the case of future conflict with , and, rearmament through compromise and nego- especially,Germany.Again,acompromise tiation. The upshot was the Anglo-German negotiation was attempted. The Hoare–Laval Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935. Under the Plan, named after the foreign ministers terms of the agreement the Germans were responsible (Samuel Hoare of Britain and allowedtobuildafleetupto35percentthe of France), would have given tonnageoftheRoyalNavyandasubmarine Italy effective control over Ethiopia while fleetequaltothatofBritain’s.Theagreement preserving the fiction of Ethiopian indepen- promised to head off a resumption of a naval dence. The plan was stillborn when it was race with Germany, easing pressure on the leaked to the press and public outrage forced British economy, while allowing the British Hoare’s resignation. Mussolini’s armies went to focus on the emerging Japanese threat in on to conquer and annex Ethiopia by the the Pacific. following spring. Another serious challenge emerged when The Crisis of Italy invaded Ethiopia, a member of the brought Germany back into the limelight. league, on October 3, 1935. The league The called for the branded Italy an aggressor and some sanc- Rhineland to be occupied by Allied troops tions were eventually imposed. However, for fifteen years. In 1926 the German gov- both London and Paris were appalled at ernment promised to leave the Rhineland the prospect of war with Italy over Ethiopia demilitarized if French troops evacuated the in defense of league principles. Britain and territory early. French troops accordingly left France had hoped that they could lure Italy in 1932. On , 1936, German troops into an anti-German coalition, as they had marched into the Rhineland, uncertain of in the First World War. In a failed the response to be expected from London Austrian Nazi coup prompted Mussolini to and Paris. As it turned out, Hitler need not sendItaliantroopstotheAustrianborder.At have worried, as nothing more than formal the time Mussolini regarded an independent protests materialized. The lack of a readily Austria as essential to Italian security in available mobile strike-force, anti-war sen- .TheBritishandFrenchwereableto timent, a governmental crisis in Paris, and use Austria as a wedge between Hitler and thefactthattheGermanmovetookplace Mussolini. They had some success in courting on the weekend all contributed to British Mussolini with the so-called Stresa front of and French passivity. But more seriously, no 4 APPEASEMENT one by this stage wanted to fight Germany to launching a full-scale invasion there in 1937. maintain the discredited Treaty of Versailles. A hostile Japan could imperil British posses- The German action could be rationalized sions in the Pacific including the as an act of national self-determination. of Australia and New Zealand and possibly The Rhineland was indisputably German even the Indian subcontinent. Second, a territory, so remilitarizing it was viewed as hostile Italy threatened the fragile British acceptable. lifeline through the Mediterranean, including Italy’s breach with Britain and France Malta and Suez. If the British were not on accelerated in with the outbreak of good terms with whomever won the Spanish the . Mussolini and Hitler Civil War, Gibraltar would be in danger. The rushed aid and assistance, including Italian most serious threat, of course was posed by troops and German aircraft, to their fascist Germany. It is no exaggeration to say that colleague in Spain, . On fear of resurgent German power was the key November 1, 1936, Mussolini proclaimed the driver of appeasement. Rome–Berlin Axis around which, he claimed, The empire itself posed significant dis- theworldwouldinfuturerevolve.Tothe tractions. In the the British increasing exasperation of many in Britain faced nationalist unrest in Ireland, , on the Left, the British government decided India, and Palestine. The British faced a par- its prime objective was to try to contain the ticularly serious uprising in Palestine from conflicttoSpain.SomeinLondon(andParis the local Arab population in 1936–39. Even also)fearedthatFrancemightbedragged the Dominions seemed restive and anxious into the Spanish Civil War, or succumb to civil war itself. The result was a series of to avoid a European conflict. Non-Intervention declarations issued by Domestic constraints fueled appeasement. twenty-six states including Britain, the USSR, Anti-war sentiment in Britain, as has been Italy, and Germany, even though the latter noted, was running high and it was by no two had already defied and continued to means clear that any British government ignore the principle of non-intervention. could muster support for a rearmament pro- Only the USSR came to the aid of the Span- gram. The British economy had been hard ish Republic, which was finally defeated by hit by the Depression and unemployment Franco in . continued at record levels well into the 1930s. The economic orthodoxy of the day prohib- ited deficit spending. As the 1930s continued, ACTIVE APPEASEMENT AND investment declined, a balance of payments CHAMBERLAIN problem emerged, and a worldwide move Chamberlain was appointed prime minister to protectionism damaged British trade. It on May 28, 1937. His name is associated with was widely felt that a rearmament program the most active phase of appeasement. Given would cripple the British economy, often the consistency of British responses to Hitler’s referred to as the “fourth arm of defense.” challenges over the period from 1933 to 1937, Later in the 1930s, as rearmament finally it might be worth considering the structural ramped up, bottlenecks in production and factors behind appeasement in more detail. shortages of skilled labor emerged and sig- First, Britain faced three potential enemies nificantly hampered the process. Finally, in the 1930s at widely separated theaters inter-service rivalries further complicated around the globe. Japan threatened , rearmament as each branch of the armed APPEASEMENT 5 forces could make compelling arguments for the harsh peace imposed upon Carthage by funding. Rome). Revising the treaty and coming to a Whatofpotentialalliesandtheroleof just settlement seemed desirable. The events diplomacy? The United States, the single of 1914 cast a shadow, as many commentators most crucial potential ally for Britain, was believed that Britain had not made its position in a state of profound that was clear to Germany and thus allowed the two brokenonlybytheattackonPearlHarborin states to blunder into war. Negotiation would 1941. The was widely mistrusted avoid such a calamity in the future. Negoti- after years of Comintern anti-British propa- ation was believed to hold a good chance of ganda and attempts to subvert the British success, as it was felt the Germans were led Empire.TheSovietUnionhadresumedRus- by rational statesmen. Hitler had encouraged sia’sroleasatraditionalrivalofBritain’sin such perceptions by often denouncing Mein Central Asia, but was now fortified with a Kampf as a product of youthful radicalism. potent revolutionary ideology. France was Perhapsmoredelusionalwasthebeliefthat seen as an unstable state bent on policing the “moderates” in the Nazi hierarchy, such as Versailles treaty and likely to drag Britain into the banker Hjalmar Schacht, would restrain entangling alliances in Europe. The British Hitler. Hitler evidently wanted to right the viewed France as a country in economic and wrongs of Versailles by bringing all Germans political disarray with critical defense weak- into the boundaries of a single German state. nesses and resentful over the Anglo-German Such a goal accorded with former US presi- NavalAgreement.TheLeagueofNationswas dent Woodrow Wilson’s doctrine of national fatally discredited after the Ethiopian War. self-determination, a highly desirable liberal Horror at the prospect of another Euro- principle. pean war was understandably widespread The manner in which many of the above in Britain in the 1930s. New weapons such factors came together can be seen in the as tanks, poison gas, and air power, it was conclusiontoachiefsofstaffmemorandum felt,wouldmakethenextwarfarworsethan in . “We cannot foresee when thelast.Airpowerandbomberswerepar- our defense forces will be strong enough ticularly feared. In 1932 Baldwin famously to safeguard our trade, territory and vital declared in the House of Commons that “the interests against Germany, Italy and Japan will always get through” (Middlemas simultaneously. We cannot therefore exagger- and Barnes 1969: 735). This reflected the ate the importance, from the point of view of fear, popularized in a number of bestselling Imperial Defence, of any political or interna- novels, that in the next war clouds of enemy tional action that can be taken to reduce the would appear in the skies over cities number of our potential enemies and to gain like London, inflicting mass casualties and the support of potential allies” (Doerr 1998: breaking civilian morale. If the bombers 209). The course of British foreign policy over dropped poison gas, the situation would the next year is understandable in light of the be catastrophic. The potential of radar and warning from the chiefs. new designs of as an effective Chamberlain of course sympathized with defense were not apparent until 1939. the above assumptions and brought his own Finally, a strong moral argument for considerations to office as well. He shared appeasement surfaced. The Treaty of Ver- the horror of war that grew out of the Great sailles was seen as having been too harsh and War, thought the league was a nice idea but vindictive, too “Carthaginian” (referencing impracticable, and had little faith in either 6 APPEASEMENT the United States or the USSR. In 1939 he EmpireandaftertheFirstWorldWarwas steadfastly opposed possible alliance with giventothenewstateofCzechoslovakiaasa the USSR, on the grounds that such a deal strategic barrier against Germany. The hilly wouldscupperanychanceofasettlement and forested terrain of the region had been with Germany. Alliances, he thought, would fortified by the in the years leading only convince Germany that it was being up to 1938. The political vehicle of the Sude- encircled by hostile powers and therefore ten Germans was the Sudeten , recreate the situation that led to war in 1914. whose leader, , had been He expressed concerns about the state of the instructed by Hitler to keep raising demands British economy. As a former chancellor, the and to any peaceful settlement. Hitler prime minister was keenly interested in the wanted to use the Sudeten dispute to pro- financial costs of rearmament. Chamberlain’s voke a war that would destroy the Czech preferred method of dealing with Germany state. was the only real func- was to sit down with Hitler, run down his list tioning democracy in Central Europe, an of grievances one by one, and check them off ally of France and a child of the Versailles with a pencil. It was an updated version of settlement. the Concert of Europe, and one he put into Given the structural constraints under practice at Munich in . which Britain operated, Chamberlain’s pol- Hitler brought considerable pressure to icy was predictable. War was unthinkable. bear on Austria in early 1938. Austria was a Instead,negotiationshadtobeopenedthat German-speaking state and Hitler demanded wouldsettlethedisputeandavoidawar that it should be made part of Germany, as that could not save Czech independence. the doctrine of national self-determination Isolated in central Europe, the British and would suggest. Italy was the only state that FrenchcouldoffernoassistancetotheCzech could have defended Austria, but Mussolini state. The neighboring states of Poland and had already abandoned Austria to Hitler Hungary had their own claims on Czech ter- in early 1937 in search of greater rewards ritory.TheUSSRhadnocontiguousborders elsewhere under German tutelage. When with Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain sent Lord Austrian chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg Runciman on a mission to in August was summoned to meet with Hitler on of 1938 where he informed the Czechs that February 12, 1938, he found himself isolated they could expect no help from Paris internationally and without hope. Neither and London. Chamberlain paid a visit to Britain nor France had ever promised to fight Hitler at on , for Austrian independence. German troops to seek a face-to-face solution. He visited marched into Austria on , 1936. Of Hitler again at Godesberg on September course, the German with Austria 22. But a peaceful solution seemed to evade in could be rationalized as an act Chamberlain as Hitler kept raising new of national self-determination, righting the demands. War seemed imminent by the end wrongs of Versailles. of September. Astonishingly Hitler reversed Pressure now built on Czechoslovakia course on and announced a over the state of . The willingness to negotiate based on a proposal Sudetenland had never been part of Germany from Mussolini. The result was the Munich butitwaspopulatedbyabout3.5million Conference of –30, 1938, with German-speaking citizens. The territory Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini, and French hadbeenpartoftheoldAustro-Hungarian premier Édouard Daladier in attendance. APPEASEMENT 7

The conference agreed that the Sudetenland entered the war united and convinced that it would be turned over to the Germans accord- haddoneeverythingpossibletoavoidwar. ing to a schedule that Hitler subsequently Appeasement was bankrupted as a policy ignored. The Czechs accepted the deal as they and remains discredited. Many countries had no alternative. At the conclusion of the have used appeasement since 1939, most conference Chamberlain obtained Hitler’s notably in the context of the , and signature on a short written statement that on both sides. The strategic arms limitations read,inpart:“Weregardtheagreement talks could be considered a prime example. signed last night and the Anglo-German However, no politician today would ever use Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire thewordexcepttodiscreditanopponent. of our two peoples never to go to war with SEE ALSO: Anschluss (1938); Chamberlain, one another again” (Feiling 1947: 381). The Neville (1869–1940); Churchill, Winston reference to the Anglo-German Naval Agree- (1874–1965); Colonial Appeasement ment of 1935 was significant and illustrated (1935–38); Eden, Anthony (1897–1977); the continuity of British policy. Halifax, Lord (1881–1959); Hitler, Adolf The winter of 1938–39 was marked by (1889–1945); Munich and the Czechoslovak continuing tension in Europe, a series of war Crisis (1938); Rhineland Crisis (1936); Treaty scares and the of , of Versailles (1919); Vansittart, Robert 1938. On , 1939, Hitler ordered (1881–1957) German troops to occupy and , while was set up as a REFERENCES nominally independent state. Czechoslovakia Doerr, P. (1998) British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939. was erased from the map of Europe and Manchester: Manchester University Press. Eden, A. (1962) The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dic- Hitler set his sights on Poland. The dissolu- tators. London: Cassell. tion of Czechoslovakia marked the end of Feiling, K. (1947) The Life of Neville Chamberlain. appeasement as a policy. What happened London: Macmillan. to Czechoslovakia could not be excused as Gilbert, M. (1966) The Roots of Appeasement.New an act of national self-determination. Public York: Plume. opinion in Britain turned decisively against Kennedy, P.(1976) “The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865–1939.” British appeasement. Better intelligence on German Journal of International Studies 2 (3): 195–215. war-making potential and improved British Middlemas, K., and J. Barnes (1969) Baldwin: A air defenses aided the transition to a firmer Biography. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. policy.TheBritishandFrenchnowadopted Schroeder, P. (1976) “Munich and the British Tra- , issuing a guarantee of Poland’s dition.” The Historical Journal 19: 223–43. territorial integrity on , a guarantee that led Britain and France to declare war SUGGESTED READINGS on Germany the following September when Boyce, R., and J. Maiolo (Eds.) (2003) The Origins of Hitler ordered his forces to attack Poland. World War II: The Debate Continues.NewYork: If it is possible to speak of any benefits of Palgrave Macmillan. appeasement, some historians might point Charmley, J. (1989) Chamberlain and the Lost Peace. London: Hodder and Stoughton. tothefactthatChamberlain’spolicyatleast Dilks, D. (Ed.) (1972) The Diaries of Sir Alexander allowed the British crucial time in which Cadogan, 1938–1949.NewYork:Putnam’s. to rearm, although that was never a stated Finney, P. (Ed.) (1997) The Origins of the Second aim of the British government. Britain also World War.NewYork:Arnold. 8 APPEASEMENT

Johnson, G. (Ed.) (2005) The Foreign Office and Roberts, A. (1991) The Holy Fox: A Biography of British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. Lord Halifax. London: Weidenfeld and Nicol- London: Routledge. son. Kennedy, P. (1981) The Realities Behind the Diplo- Schroeder, P. (1976) “Munich and the British Tra- macy:BackgroundInfluencesonBritishExternal dition.” The Historical Journal 19: 223–43. Policy, 1865–1980. London: Fontana. Self, R. (2006) Neville Chamberlain: A Biography. Martel, G. (1999) The Origins of the Second World Aldershot: Ashgate. War Reconsidered: AJP Taylor and the Second Stedman, A. D. (2011) Alternatives to Appeasement: World War.NewYork:Routledge. Neville Chamberlain and Hitler’s Germany.Lon- McDonough, F. (1998) Neville Chamberlain, don: Tauris. Appeasement and the British Road to War. Steiner, Z. (2011) The Triumph of the Dark: Euro- Manchester: Manchester University Press. pean International History 1933–1939.Oxford: Mommsen, W., and L. Kettenacker (Eds.) (1983) Oxford University Press. The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appease- Watt, D. C. (1989) HowWarCame:TheImmedi- ment. London: George Allen and Unwin. ateOriginsoftheSecondWorldWar. London: Neville, P. (2000) Appeasing Hitler: The Diplomacy Heinemann. of Sir Nevile Henderson, 1937–39.NewYork: Weinberg, G. (1980) TheForeignPolicyofHitler’s Palgrave Macmillan. Germany: Starting World War II, 1937–1939. Parker, R. (1993) Chamberlain and Appeasement: Chicago: University of Chicago Press. British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War. London: Macmillan. Post, G. (1993) Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934–1937.Ithaca,NY: Cornell University Press.