International Phenomenological Society

Précis of Metaepistemology and Skepticism Metaepistemology and Skepticism by Richard Fumerton Review by: Richard Fumerton Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Dec., 1998), pp. 905-906 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653732 . Accessed: 19/02/2015 13:20

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This content downloaded from 129.215.4.106 on Thu, 19 Feb 2015 13:20:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LVIII,No. 4, December 1998

Precis of Metaepistemology and Skepticism*

RICHARD IFUMERTON University of Iowa

In the last two decades a great many philosophers have accepted a revolution- ary approach to the understanding of epistemic concepts, an approach that, if correct, should change the very way we think about the history and practice of epistemology. These philosophers seek to "naturalize" and "externalize" the concepts of epistemic justification, rationality, and knowledge and, in the course of doing so, they explicitly or implicitly suggest a new response to traditional skeptical concerns. If contemporary externalists are correct then most of the history of epistemology was radically misguided and confused. While the internalism/externalism debate in epistemology has moved to center stage, I believe that there remains enormous confusion concerning what precisely is fundamentally at issue between proponents of the respective views. Internalists are sometimes associated with the view that epistemic properties are to be identified with "internal states" of conscious beings. But internalism is also as often characterized as a view about the necessity of including "access" requirements in plausible accounts of justification or knowledge. A good part of my concern in this book is to define clearly the internalism/externalism controversy, or more precisely, the internal- ism/externalism controversies. I argue that "internal state" internalism is highly problematic as an attempt to characterize what is common to paradig- matic internalist epistemologies. I also argue that strong and weak global access requirements to conditions constituting justification are likely to gen- erate vicious conceptual regresses, implausibly strong requirements for justification, or requirements with no bite if one requires only potential access where the potentiality is logical or conceptual possibility. The heart of classical internalist accounts of justification, I go on to suggest, involves two theses. The first is a rejection of naturalistic accounts of fundamental epistemic concepts. The second is acceptance of a view I call inferential inter- nalism, the view that if one is justified in believing P on the basis of E one

Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995.

BOOK SYMPOSIUM 905

This content downloaded from 129.215.4.106 on Thu, 19 Feb 2015 13:20:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions must be justified in believing both E and that E confirms or makes probable P. One of my principal concerns in the book is to explore the implications of accepting various accounts of internalism and externalism for the way in which one should understand and respond to the traditional skeptical chal- lenges that over the years have so captured the imagination and attention of philosophers. Although understanding the connections between metaepiste- mological views (views about the correct analyses of epistemic concepts) and approaches to skepticism is my primary concern, I have my own axes to grind. I argue that there is a version of internalism that alone can understand epistemological questions in a way that makes their answers relevant to the kind of philosophical interest and curiosity that gives rise to the questions in the first place. Externalists may succeed in introducing interesting, clear, and perhaps, in some contexts, useful ways of understanding knowledge and justified belief. But we can accept this conclusion without conceding the philosophical relevance of these concepts. Convincing philosophers that their way of understanding concepts leaves them unable to ask questions they want to ask is an uphill battle. Paradigm internalists and externalists are firmly in their respective camps. The literature contains all sorts of counterexamples to externalist analyses of epistemic concepts that may succeed in convincing some but leave others unmoved. The lines are pretty clearly drawn by now. Both internalists and externalists know what their views commit them to saying and they are usually willing to say it. If we are going to convince anyone that there is something wrong with paradigm versions of externalism, I argue, it may require a more subtle argument that reveals unacceptable consequences of the views when it comes to the way in which we would have to engage traditional skepticism. Ironi- cally, I think the ease with which externalists can and should ignore skeptical challenges at all levels will eventually undermine for many the plausibility of the framework within which the externalist understands epistemological ques- tions. In short, externalists are committed to allowing the legitimacy of arguments whose question-begging character will be anathema to philoso- phers interested in answers to epistemological questions which will satisfy their philosophical curiosity. In the course of evaluating the consequences of my own views for skepti- cism, I argue that the alternatives for avoiding skepticism are stark. Although there is at least one dialectically attractive position that enables one to throw back the skeptical challenge, I have strong phenomenologically based reserva- tions about its ultimate intelligibility. I try to convince the reader, however, that once one understands the source of philosophical interest in epistemol- ogy, one should not find unacceptable or even surprising the plausibility of even fairly radical skepticism.

906 RICHARD FUMERTON

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