EPISTEMOLOGY

LEVEL 3, PHI313 SEMESTER 2, 2012-13

TIMETABLING P.2

COURSE OUTLINE AND SEMESTER STRUCTURE P.3

LECTURE TIMETABLE P.4

HANDOUTS, SEMINARS AND COURSE ASSESSMENT P.5

ESSAYS P.6

READING LIST P.7

SEMINARS P.11

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EPISTEMOLOGY

LEVEL 3, PHI313 SEMESTER 2, 2012-13

LECTURES Tuesday 16:00, Hicks LT B Thursday 11:00, Hicks LT B LECTURE SLIDES / HANDOUTS Download from course website SEMINARS Thursday 13:00, Bartolomew, SR BLG05 COURSE WEBSITE Access via MUSE or MOLE SEMINAR READINGS From page 12 below COURSEWORK One essay from questions on page 6. Due date: 16:00, Thursday 9 May. COURSEWORK RETURN 23 May (or earlier) EXAMS Part pre-released only: see page 5. LONG ESSAY A long essay can be taken in place of an examination. Deadlines: Plan approval by 1600, Wednesday 17 April Essay deadline 1600, Wednesday 29 May LECTURER Paul Faulkner. E.: [email protected] T.: 0114 222 0576 Office hours: 1000-1200, Tuesday or by appointment.

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Outline of the Course

The aim of the course is to provide an introduction to more advanced epistemological texts and issues. The course thereby builds on the first year course Knowledge, Justification and Doubt and the second year course Theory of Knowledge, though neither course is a pre-requisite since the first three weeks, or six lectures, give a general introduction to epistemology. Thereafter each week focuses on an influential article in epistemology; the first lecture outlines the background to the article and second gives a detailed account of the article, and the week concludes with a seminar discussing the article and its place in epistemological theory. Proceeding in this way the course will cover such topics as scepticism, meta-epistemology, our entitlement to rely on our sources of knowledge, the apriori, analyticity, contextualism, disjunctivism, naturalised epistemology and testimony.

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Lecture Timetable

Week1 Lecture1 Knowledge and Certainty Lecture2 Foundations of Knowledge

Week2 Lecture3 Coherence Theories of Justification Lecture4 Scepticism of the External World

Week3 Lecture5 Causal Theories of Knowledge Lecture6 Internalist and Externalist Analyses of Knowledge

Week4 Lecture7 SCEPTICISM Lecture8 B.Stroud, “Understanding Human Knowledge in General”

Week5 Lecture9 EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY Lecture10 W.Alston, “Epistemic Circularity”

Week6 Lecture11 VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY Lecture12 E.Sosa, “Intellectual Virtue in Perspective”

Week7 Lecture13 CONTEXTUALISM Lecture14 D.Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge”

Week8 Lecture15 DISJUNCTIVISM Lecture16 J.McDowell, “Knowledge and the Internal”

Week9 Lecture17 APRIORITY AND ANALYTICITY Lecture18 P.Boghossian, “Analyticity Reconsidered”

Week10 Lecture19 EPISTEMIC ENTITLEMENT Lecture20 T.Burge, “Content Preservation”

Week11 Lecture21 TESTIMONY Lecture22 R.Moran, “Getting Told and Being Believed”

Week12 WRITING WEEK

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Handouts

The lecture slides are available for download from the course website after each lecture. This website is accessible via MOLE. These printouts constitute the course handouts. They are not, however, fully explanatory since they are not designed to be a substitute for the lectures. Merely reading these slides will not work as a substitute for attending lectures.

Seminars

The purpose of the seminars is to provide a forum for you to discuss the material of the course among your peers in a small group. You are required to prepare for each seminar by reading the assigned paper. Papers are at the end of this booklet.

There will be no student presentations. Instead, each seminar will involve small-group discussions of a set of questions about the paper (questions provided by me), followed by large-group discussions of these questions. If you fail to read the paper, therefore, you will be letting your fellow students down as well as yourself.

Seminars begin in week 3.

Course Assessment

Coursework: You must submit one essay. This must be from the list below. This list focuses of lectures 7 to 14. Essays must be 2500-4000 words long, and printed in pitch 12, double-spaced. The essay deadline is 1600, Thursday 9 May. Essay must be submitted both electronically and in paper form. Electronic submission is done via MOLE, paper submission is to the department office in Victoria Street. There are penalties for late essays; for details see the 3rd year booklet. And there are severe penalties for plagiarism; again, for details see the 3rd year booklet. Advisory tutorials are available, and recommended; these will be either in week 10, i.e. 29 April to 3 May, or you can email to arrange a prior time. I will mark and return the essays to you by 23 May. (I will do my best to get them back to you before the end of the teaching period though I may not manage this as the essays need to be moderated by a second marker).

Exam: The exam is two hours long and will involve answering two questions from a choice of questions. These questions will be divided into two sections (A and B) where one question must be answered from each section. Section A questions will only concern lectures 15 to 22 and will be pre-released on the last day of teaching, i.e. at 1700, 17 May, via MOLE. Section B questions will be unseen and might concern any lecture, i.e. 1 to 22.

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Long Essay: Assessment by coursework essay and examination can be replaced by assessment by long essay. In order to switch to a long essay, you need to have a long essay plan approved. The approved plan must then be submitted to the office by 1600, Wednesday 17 April. Failure to submit an approved plan by this deadline will be penalised. I can help with long essay plans and approve them during office hours, i.e. 1000-1200 Tuesday. Once approval is granted, advisory tutorials are also available, and recommended, for the long essay. These can be arranged on an individual basis. The long essay deadline is 1600, Wednesday 29 May.

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Essay Questions

1. Why, if at all, does the mere possibility of brain-in-vats threaten everyday perceptual knowledge?

2. Why is establishing the reliability of perception taken to be problematic? Is it so?

3. What is an intellectual virtue?

4. Does contextualism offer a good response to scepticism of the external world?

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READING LIST

The following reading lists offer a place to begin. Obviously, they are by no means exhaustive. For further reading a good resource is the Philosopher’s Index, which can be accessed, via MUSE, from: http://www.shef.ac.uk/library/cdfiles/philos.html

Two good collections, referred to through out as B&D and S&K respectively, are: Bernecker and Dretske, eds, Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. (OUP, ISBN:019875261X) Sosa and Kim, eds, Epistemology: An Anthology. (Blackwell, ISBN:0631197249) You might also want to look at: Neta and Pritchard eds, Arguing about Knowledge (Routledge, ISBN:9780415448390)

Lecture 1: Knowledge and Certainty Moore, “Certainty” in his Collected Papers. Reprinted in S&K. Welbourne, Knowledge, chs. 1-4. Dretske, “Conclusive Reasons”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1971. Reprinted in B&D. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge. Unger, “An Analysis of Factual Knowlegde”, Journal of Philosophy 1968.

Lecture 2: Foundations of Knowledge Dancy, Contemporary Epistemology, ch.4. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, chs. 1-3. Alston, “Two Types of Foundationalism”, Journal of Philosophy 1976. Price, “The Given” pp.1-2 of his Perception reprinted in B&D. Sosa, “The Foundations of Foundationalism”, Nous 1980. Lewis, Mind and the World Order.

Lecture 3: Coherence Theories of Justification Laurence Bonjour, “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”, American Philosophical Quarterly 1978. Dancy, Contemporary Epistemology, ch. 8 and 9. Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard University Press, 1985, Sosa, E. “The Raft and the Pyramid.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 5, 1980, pp. 3-25. Also in S&K. Leher and Cohen, “Justification, Truth and Coherence”, Synthese 55, (1983).

Lecture 4: Scepticism of the External World Descartes, Meditations 1 & 2. Williams, B. Descartes, ch.2. Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, ch.1. Reprinted in S&K. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism.

Lecture 5: Causal Theories of Knowledge

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Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis 1963. Reprinted in B&D and S&K. Shope, The Analysis of Knowing. Sturgeon, “The Gettier Problem”, Analysis 1993. Feit, “Infallibilism and Gettier’s Legacy”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2003. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing”, Journal of Philosophy 1967. Reprinted in B&D. Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?” in S&K. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, ch.3. Reprinted in S&K and Dancy ed. Perceptual Knowledge.

Lecture 6: Internalist and Externalist Analyses of Knowledge Feldman, “Reliability and Justification”, The Monist 1985. Alston, “An Internalist Externalism”, Synthese 1988. Alston, “How to think about Reliability”, Philosophical Topics 1995. Reprinted in S&K. Bonjour, “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge”, MidWest Studies in Philosophy vol.5. Reprinted in B&D. Bonjour, Epistemic justification : internalism vs. externalism, foundations vs. virtues. Foster, Ayer, pp.85-125. Foley, “What’s wrong with reliabilism?’, The Monist 1985. Reprinted in B&D. Steup & Sosa eds. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ch.9. Pritchard, “Some Recent Work in Epistemology”, Philosophical Quarterly 2004.

Lectures 7 & 8: SCEPTICISM Stroud, “Understanding Human Knowledge in General”. In Stroud ed. Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Stroud ed. Understanding Human Knowledge. Rosenberg, Thinking About Knowing, ch.1. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, ch.5. Williams, M. Unnatural Doubts. Clarke, “The Legacy of Skepticism”, Journal of Philosophy 1972. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. Wright, “Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon”, Mind 1991. Wright, “(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E.Moore and John McDowell”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2002. Stern, Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism. + See reading list lecture 4.

Lectures 9 & 10: EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY Alston, “Epistemic Circularity”. Van Cleve, “Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, amd the Cartesian Circle”, Philosophical Review 1979. Reprinted in S&K. Van Cleve, “Is Knowledge Easy—or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Alternative to Skepticism” in Luper ed The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Sosa, “Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles”, The Journal of Philosophy 1997. Sosa, “Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1994. Stroud, “Scepticism, ‘Externalism’ and the Goal of Epistemology”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1994.

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Zalabardo, “Externalism, Skepticism and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, Philosophical Review 2005. Vogel, “Reliabilism Leveled”, The Journal of Philosophy 2000. Cohen, “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2002.

Lectures 11 & 12 VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY Sosa “Intellectual Virtue in Perspective” Hookway, “How to be a Virtue Epistemologist”. In Zagzebski and DePaul (eds) Intellectual Virtue. Goldman, “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology” in Liaisons. Also in S&K. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind. Extract in S&K. Greco, “Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (1993), pp. 413-32. In S&K. Zagzebski and DePaul (eds) Intellectual Virtue.

Lectures 13 & 14: CONTEXTUALISM Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge”. DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”, Philosophical Review 1995. Reprinted in S&K. Cohen, “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier and the Lottery”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1998. Reprinted in S&K. Cohen, “Contextualism and Skepticisim” in Sosa & Villanueva eds. Skepticism, Philosophical Issues 2000. Sosa, “Skepticism and Contextualism”, in Sosa & Villanueva eds. Op. cit.. Feldman, “Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions”, Philosophical Studies 2001. Williamson, “Knowledge, Context and the Agent’s Point of View”, in Preyer & Peter eds. Contextualism in Philosophy. Steup & Sosa eds. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ch.2.

Lectures 15 & 16: DISJUNCTIVISM McDowell, “Knowledge and the Internal” McDowell, “Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge”, Proceedings of the British Academy 1982. Reprinted in McDowell ed. Meaning, Knowledge and Reality. McDowell, “Knowledge by Hearsay”, in McDowell ed. op. cit.. McDowell, Mind and World. Williamson, “Is Knowing a State of Mind?”, Mind 1995 Williamson, Knowledge and its limits. Snowdon, “Perception, Vision and Causation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1980-1.

Lectures 17 & 18: APRIORITY AND ANALYTICITY Boghossian, “Analyticity Reconsidered” Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, ch.4. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in his From a Logical Point of View. Quine, “Truth by Convention” in his The Ways of Paradox. Peacocke, “How are apriori truths possible?”, European Journal of Philosophy 1993. Field, “The Aprioricity of Logic”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1996. Laurence & Margolis, “Boghossian on Analyticity”, Analysis 2001. Harman, “Analyticity Regained?”, Nous 1996.

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Boghossian, “Knowledge of Logic” in Boghossian & Peacocke eds. New Essays on the Apriori. Hale & Wright, “Implicit Definition and the Apriori”, in Boghossian & Peacocke eds. op. cit..

Lectures 19 & 20: EPISTEMIC ENTITLEMENT Burge, “Content Preservation” Burge, “Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1996. Burge, “Perceptual Entitlement”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2003. Wright, “On Epistemic Entitlement: Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2004. Davies, “On Epistemic Entitlement: Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2004. Dretske, “Entitlement: Epistemic Rights without Epistemic Duties?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2000. Williams, M. “Dretske on Epistemic Entitlement”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2000. Williams, M. The Problems of Knowledge, ch.13.

Lectures 21 & 22: TESTIMONY Moran, “Getting Told and Being Believed”. Moran, “The Problems of Sincerity”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2005. Ross, “Why do we believe what we are told?”, Ratio 1986. Hinchman, “Telling as Inviting to Trust”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2005. Burge, “Content Preservation”, in COURSEPACK. McDowell, “Knowledge by Hearsay” in his Meaning, Knowledge and Reality. Fricker, E. “Telling and Trusting”, Mind 1995 Coady, Testimony: a philosophical study. Welbourne, “The Community of Knowledge”, Philosophical Quarterly 1981. Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding, ch.10 ‘Of Miracles’. Meeker, “Justification and the Social Nature of Knowledge”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2004.

11 SEMINARS

Each seminar centres on discussion of a paper. It is essential that you read the paper before the seminar. Additional reading on the topic would also be a help. The papers for each seminar follow this page, in the order in which we will discuss them.

The papers for seminar discussion are:

Week 3 S.Sturgeon, “The Gettier Problem” Week 4 B.Stroud, “Understanding Human Knowledge in General” Week 5 W.Alston, “Epistemic Circularity” Week 6 E.Sosa, “Intellectual Virtue in Perspective” Week 7 D.Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge” Week 8 J.McDowell, “Knowledge and the Internal” Week 9 P.Boghossian, “Analyticity Reconsidered” Week 10 T.Burge, “Content Preservation” Week 11 R.Moran, “Getting Told and Being Believed” Week 12 WRITING WEEK

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