ThirdW orldQu arterly,V ol20,No1,pp113±127,1999

Theheritageofwarandstatecollapse inSomalia andSomaliland: local-leveleffects, external interventionsandreconstruction

ISMAILIAHMED®INALDHERBOLDGREEN

If youw anttod ismantlea hedge, Removeonethornbushat a time. Somalip roverb

ABSTRACT Somaliaa ndS omalilandareb othin habitedb asicallyb ySomalisÐ withsm allOrom ominoritiesin b oth,an dalargeSwahilimin orityin th elatter. Bothhavem ultipleclans,su b-clans,lin eagea ndb loodgroupsandinb othIslam iscentraltosocialvalues.S omaliah adnohistoryo fastablestatebeforeIta lian ruleb utSomalilanddid(H aud-Hargeisa-Berbera-Arabiatra deaxiscen tred). TheUnitedR epublico fSomalia(rejec tedin the referen dumb ySomaliland) passedfro mpoliticalinstabilityto tw odecadeso fSaidB arre’sincreasingly centraliseda ndrep ressived ictatorshipw hichw agedw aragainstth eNorth-west (Somaliland)andNorth-east(B osaso)aswella sagainstE thiopia.Thedictator- shipco llapsedin 1 991basicallyb ecauseof th e1987±91S omalilandLiberation war.T heeconomieso fSomalia/Somalilandturnon p astoralproduction,co m- mercea ndremittances.T heseh avereco veredin p artin S omaliaan dfullyin Somaliland.However,o nlyafractiono ftheBarrereg imesd issolutionofservice deliveryanduserfrien dlyla wandorderca picityh asbeenm adegoodin Somalilandandvirtuallym orein S omalia.USA/UNinterventiondidlim it starvationandÐforatimeÐopen vio lence.T hatwasata highcostin ® nances, inth ereputationofpeacekeepingandtoS omalis.U NOSOMansweredp olitical andcivilqu estionsbeforeh avinganyrealgraspo fcivil,po liticalandeconomic realities.Th epricew astoentren chw arlordsandmiliti asandto m arginalise `peacelords’ (eldersa ndmerchants).So maliland,neveroccu piedby U NOSOM, hasengagedin a serieso flarge,lo ngp eaceco nferencesof eld ersfro mallparts ofitsterrito rylea dingtoa realiffra gilen ational/territorialidentityw ith personalsecurityin m osta reas,a nelectedpresidentandtw ohousepa rliament, auserfrien dlyp olicefo rcea ndcourtsystem a ndthebeginningsofa restored professionalcivilservice .

Ismail IAhmedand ReginaldHerbold Green are bothat theInstitut eforDevelopmentStudies, Sussex University, BrightonB N1 9RE,UK.

0143-6597/99/010113-13 $7.00 Ó 1999 Third World Quarterly 113 ISMAILIAHMED®INALDHERBOLDGREEN

Earlypo liticalhistoryan dsocialstructure Forcenturiesn omadicp astoralismp rovideda livelihoodtoth eSomalip eoplein theHorno fAfrica.B eforethecolonialp artitionoftheSomali`terri tories’in th e middleo fthe19thcen tury,thehistoryo ftheregionh adb eend ominatedb y massivemigrationofS omalisin toareas o riginallyin habitedb yother popula- tions.B ysuccessfullycaptu ringlarg epartsof A byssiniau nder theg uidanceo f AhmedG ran(1 506±43),Somaliclan sjoinedto realise a commoncausefo rthe ®rst time.B utthesubsequentevaporationofthenewlyex pandedstate an dits highlandco nquestsÐwh ichreache dwithin5 0mileso fpresent-dayA ddis AbabaÐfo reshadowedth eimplausibilityo fastrongstate en duringwithinth e realitieso fSomalinatio nalidentity.T here isevidenceth attheearliestcity -states scatteredalo ngtheE asternS omalish ores emergedwith distin ctSw ahiliA rab in¯ uences. TheSomaliso cialan dpoliticalstructureconsists,lo osely,o fclanfam iliesan d clanswhichsu bdivideintosu b-clans,p rimarylineag es,an d`dia-paying’groups. Thedia-payinggroup( Jilib/Bah)isth emoststab leun itw itha membershipo f groupso ffamiliesran gingfromafew hundredto m ore thana thousand.The members ofeach d ia-payinggrouphaveanin formalco ntractualag reementto support oneanother andtosh are payments.T heterm ` dia-paying’impliesth at familiesw ithinth egrouphaveacollectiveresponsibilityfo rsettlingacts committedby ,orag ainst,th eirm embers. Membershipin a cland oesn ot automaticallyg iveonecertai nrightsan dobligations,rath er theyare negotiated andagreedin u nwrittenco ntracts.Thegroupsrarelyh avesingle`trad itional leaders’,optinginsteadfo racouncilo felders whohavecollectiveresponsibil- ities.T hroughoutth ecolonialad ministration,elders were appointedan dpaidto actas th elegitimaterep resentativeso ftheirresp ectiveg roups. Thed ia-payingg roupsalsofu nctionasm utualaid g roupsduringperiodsof emergency.Members haveanob ligationbothto h elptho sew hoare undergoing severeh ardshipd uringcrisesand to ob servetraditionalw ealth-sharingmecha- nisms.In tim eso fcrisis,each m ember isex pectedto ob serveanapp ropriate codeofconduct.T hism anifestsitself in activ itiessu chas m ixedh erding,loan sharing, Xoola Goyn (givinganim als),an dalmsgiving.Suchcop ingstrategies can,uptoa point,effect ivelylim itin dividualrisk sandfacili taterehab ilitation after periodsofcrises.

Understandingso cialdivisionsand state collapse Amajorityo fthem ore recentexaminationsoftheSomalip oliticalcrisisare basedo nfallaciesan dsimplisticg eneralisationsofthe sup posedu niquenesso f theSomalipeo pleas a culturallyho mogenousentity. 1 Theyoften ten dtofall intoa reductionisttrap ,ignoringtheintricaciesof S omalip oliticalreality,w hile engagingina one-dimensionalex plorationof`con¯ictb asedo nclanship’.The classicalarg umentisth atall S omalipeo pleb elongtoo neethnicg roup,speak thesamelanguage,fo llowthe sam ereligionandshare th esameculture and tradition.However,a closer examinationo fthisasserti onshowsthatit is inaccurateand m isleading.AccordingtoM ukhtar,it is a mythin ventedb y

114 THEHERITAGEOFWARANDSTATECOLLAPSEINSOMALIAANDSOMALILAND outsiders. Somaliso cietyh asalway sbeendiv idedin ton omadicpasto ralistsin thenorthan dsouthernag ro-pastoralists`w hichh avedistinctivelyd ifferent cultural,lin guistic,and so cialstru ctures’. 2 Theimportanceo flivestockin relationto subsistenceag ricultureisregionallyv ariable;w ithru ralh ouseholdsin thesouthdep endingonagriculture andnortherners relyingm oreo nremittances andlivestock.Indeed,peopleinh abitingth einter-riverineregionssp eaka differentlanguage,k nownas Mai Mai,acombinationofco lloquiallo cal dialects,Sw ahilian dSomali.T hroughoutthecolonialperio d,therealso g rew up distinctterrit orial,lin guistican dadministrativetraditionsin th eoriginalterrit o- ries.T heirof® cial lan guagesw ere Frenchin D jibouti,A mharicin E thiopia, Englishin S omaliland,ItalianinSo maliaan dSwahilian dEnglishin th e NFD (NorthwestFro ntierD istrict).Moreover,so meterritorialb oundariesalso ro ughly correspondedto clan b oundaries. Concentratingex clusivelyo nclansandlineagestru ctures,manyobservers haveelevatedclansh ipto the m ostd ominantfactorinth eanalysiso fthecurrent crisis.3 Understandingclan an dlineageinth econtemporary Somalipo litics, whilen ecessary,is n otsuf® cienttoun locktheir social an dpoliticalorganisation. Elaboratech artsillu stratingclangen ealogy,su perimposedo ver acronymsofthe manyfactions,litter the litera ture onSomalisociet y.Thesech artsh avebecome ano perationallex iconformanyagencies,im periouslyd isplayedin v irtually everyreg ional NGO orUNof® ce.In deed,v isitors oftenu seth emas `ro admaps’. Understandingstateco llapsein S omaliareq uireslo okingbeyondclanismand ongoingfactio nalin trigue,w hichis a symptomofstateco llapserath er thanits cause. Thequestionofthecompatibilityof theSomaliciv ilsocietystruct urewithth e postcolonial(cen tralised)state h asrecen tlyfeatu redin so meanalyseso fthe Somalistate co llapse. 4 It isarg uedth atinstit utionalstru ctures thatinco rporated conceptsen tirelyalien to th eexistingSomaliin stitutionswere imposedu nder colonialru le.A saresult,adiscrepancyem ergedb etweenthe h ighlyd ecen- tralisedp astoralstru ctures andthehighlycen traln ature ofthepostcolonialstate. Itisn otsimplya coincidenceth atthestrongestop positionto thecentralisedstate hasco mefrom thenorth,wherea pastoralm odeo fproductionisstill p redomi- nant.T hisincompatibilityw asin tensi®ed b ythetransfer ofpower andauthority frompastoralgro upstocen tralisedandu rban-basedp oliticalstructures. Asa result,p astoralismw as`treat edless as a distinctw ayof life an dmoreas an economicresou rce tobe tap ped’. 5 Others disagreewithth isapproachof analysis,d escribingitas `historical’an d notparticularlyreleva nttocurren tproblems,as it assu mesthat th esocial structure oftheSomaliso cietyrem ainedin tactfo llowingitsinteg rationintoth e worldeco nomy. 6 Theyargu ethatth e`contemporary’commercialisationof pastoralismtran sformedso cietyas early as th e1920s,an dthattrad itional structures havech angedeven m ore dramaticallysin cein dependence. Seriouseconomicm ismanagementhasalso p layeda keyro leand h asb een oneoftheinstrumentalcau seso fstateco llapse. 7 Sinceab andoningtheexper- imentofScienti®c Socialismin 1 980,thegovernmentlackeda coherent developmentstrategy.Its macroeconomicp olicyw asd escribedas `errat ic, inconsistent,andoftenm ovedfro moneset o fobjectivesto an other,th ereby

115 ISMAILIAHMED®INALDHERBOLDGREEN confusingth edomesticm arket’. 8 In1 990theexternald ebtwas$U S1.9b illion, whichw aseq uivalentto3 60%of GDP,excluding`fro zend ebt’to som eeastern Europecountries. 9 Thep ublicsector crisis orig inatedfro mmassiveexpenditure ondefenceand secu rityservic es. Thereg imewasalso h ighlysu ccessfulino btainingmilitarysupport.So malia waso neofthemostheav ilym ilitarisedstates in A frica ando neofthetop recipientso fUSandSo vietm ilitaryaidd uringtheColdW ar. 10 Moreover,m ore than8 0%ofrefugeeaid ,whichin 1 986together witho ther non-militaryaid 11 accountedfo r25%of GNP,wasd ivertedto th earmy.

Originsof th econ¯ict Ahastyu nion Arootcauseo fthecrisiscan b etracedto the rap idu nionofthetwoSomali territoriesto fo rm the`United’Somalistate in 1 960.Soonafter independence, theSomalilanders becamedisillusionedw ithth ewayth eunionw aspro ceeding andindeedv oted`N o’inth euni®cation refere ndum. 12 Inth einteresto f preservinga`union’,Somalilandinitially(wh ileb rie¯y independent) accepted conditionsdemandedb ysouthernlead ers. Mogadishubecamethecapitalan dthe baseo fthenewlycreate dSomalip arliament.S outhernSo malisalso h eldall majorpostsin th enew government,an damajorityofseats in th eparliament. Insp iteo ftheincreasingdiscontent,sou thernof® cials ado ptedm easures aimed aten forcingrapidin tegration,serv ingtofu rther alienateth eirn orthernco unter- parts. Theg overnment’sdevelopmentprogrammesalso failed to tackle th eserious problemsofunderdevelopmentandsocioeconomicstrati® catio ninth enorth, problemsinheritedfro mthecolonialad ministration.Despiteth eintegrationof thetwoadministrativesystems,latent co rruptionh asbeen attrib utedto th e residualItalia nin¯u ence(th e`Italianfacto r’)inth epublicsecto r. However, northerners were nottheon lygroupdisillusionedw ithth eunion.TheRehanwein fromtheinter-riverineregion,whohadan eq ualn umbero fseatsw ithth etwo other majorclanfam iliesof H awiyeandDarodinth esouthb efore uni®catio n, becamemarginalised. 13

Militaryco upin1 969andsocialistp olicies Theconstitutionof1960guaranteedno tonlyth eunityo ftwoS omaliterrit ories butalsod emocracyan daforumthatsan ctionedm ultipartyismwithg uarantees to de jure freedomofexpression.Signi®can tpoliticaldifferencesen courageda proliferationofparties`to th epointwhere Somaliah adm ore partiesp er capita thanan yother democraticcountryex ceptIsrael’. 14 Inthe co untry’slastm ulti- partyelecti ons,h eldin M arch1 969,more than6 0partiesco ntested.Littleciv il governanceo rservicedeliveryexiste d.It wasagain stth isb ackgroundthat th e successfulcoup,whichb roughtBarre topo wer in1 969,tookplace. Takinghisplace am ongAfrica’s `BigM en’,Barre immediatelysu spended thecountry’sconstitutionandbannedall fo rmsofp oliticalandprofessional

116 THEHERITAGEOFWARANDSTATECOLLAPSEINSOMALIAANDSOMALILAND association.`Promisingtocure all o fthecountry’sills’,healsodecree dinth e followingyear theadoptionofScienti®c Socialism,anid eologythatw as(h e claimed)`fullyco mpatiblewith Islam andth erealityofthenomadicsociet y’. 15 Under theslogano f`socialismunites,trib alismd ivides’,clanand kin shipties were of® ciallyban nedan dthenew governmentpromisedto roo toutan y reference,v erbalo rwritten,to clan ship.Inan effo rt tolim itth etraditionof bloodmoneypay mentsb etweengro ups,th eregimeintroducedthe d eathsen - tencefo rthoseco nvictedo fhomicide. Sweepingpoliticalandlegalchan gesw ere alsoin troducedin th e®rst few years ofthecoup.Thesein cludedth eestablishmentofarepressivesecurity apparatusacco untableto B arre himself.T oconsolidatep ower heestablisheda formidablepropagandamachine.`C ountlessp osters,p oems,so ngsofpraise,an d speechesp roclaimedh issublimeroleastheª fatherºo fanationwhoseª motherº wasth eRevolution.’ 16 Theleadership’spoliticalpropagandamachineryw as particularlyeffect iveinm isleadingtheoutsideworld.Someobservers tookits spinserio usly,co nfusingrh etoricw ithrealit y. Inthe ® rst few years mostsecto rs ofth eeconomywere broughtunder governmentownership.Awaveofnationalisation( qarameyn)ofall m edium- sizeb usiness,in cludingbanks,scho ols,in surance® rms,im ports,and w holesale tradestartedinth eearly1 970s.M anynewstate- ownedag encies,m aintaining absolutem onopolies,w erecreate dasa foundationfor asocialisteconomy. Privatetrad ers were prohibitedby law fro mimporting,storing,purchasingo r distributingfooditems.It becameincreasinglyclear th atno madsandagro- pastoralists,includingwealthyn omadsandfarmers whoownedlarg eherds,w ere tob etreatedas lumpenproletariat ratherthancap italists.B utinsp iteo ferecting cooperativesfo rruralco mmunities,th egovernmentfoundn omadslargely uncooperative.

1974±75:`prolonged’famine(AbaartiiD abadheer) ThesocialistexperimentÐan dperhapsmore crucially,thep oliticalhostilityto an`o pposition’areaÐ tu rnedth e1974±75droughtintoa majorfamineinth e north,resu ltingino ver2 0000d eaths,forcin g10%to1 5%oftheentirep astoral populationtoreg isterin reliefcam ps. 17 There wasaseriousshortageo ffoodand suddenco llapseo fentitlementsthroughoutthen orthernreg ions.T henationalisa- tionprocessand th eintroductionofpriceco ntrolsserio uslyd isruptedfo od marketsin th enorthernreg ions.E venm ore damagingwasth eeffectiveshutting downofthem ajorh istoricArabian±S omaliland±E thiopiantrade ax is,w ith closureoftheEthiopianb orderandtightcontrolsattheRedSea p ortofBerbera. Thisw asfurth er exacerbatedb ythefailure ofthefoodrationingsystem, introducedb ythegovernmentto rep laceth efree marketsystem .Hundredsof government-ownedshopssellingfooditemsat®xedpricesw ere openedin major townsandvillages.R esidentswere issuedw ithid entitycard stob uy® xed amountsof fo odev eryw eek,butbecauseo fashortageofsupplies,o nlysm all numbers ofpeoplem anagedto b uysuf® cientfo odinth esesh ops.In ru ralareas, unregisteredpasto ralistsrelied o nfoodpurchasedon th eblackm arketat exorbitantprices.

117 ISMAILIAHMED®INALDHERBOLDGREEN

Thew idespreadcro pfailure andthesubsequentfoodshortagesin n eighbour- ingEthiopiaalso con tributedto th efoodcrisisin the reg ion.Theto llo fthe droughtwasen ormous,k illingan estim ated® vemillionan imalsin So malia/So- malilandandhavingfar-reachingconsequenceson th eruraleco nomyinb oth Somalilandandth eadjoiningH audareao fEthiopia.W hileth eeffectsofthe droughtwere receivedd ifferentlyth roughoutSomalia,th eruralp opulationhas never fullyreco veredfro mthedisaster.Pursuingitso bjectiveofsettlingand convertingpastoraliststo farm ers, thegovernmentcarrie doutaresettlement experimentinvolvingthetransfer ofover 100000nomadsfromreliefcam psin thenorthto th ree sitesin th emorearablelan dso fsouthernSo malia. 18 Although pastoralistsresiste dtheideaofsuddenlychan gingtheirw ayo flifean dengaging ina farminglivelihoodinw hichth eyhad n oexperience,th eyw ere forcibly coercedin toaccep tingtheirn ew hosten vironment.

Ogadenw arandrefugeeprob lems TheOgadenw ar hasb eeninterp retedb ysomeasth esinglem ostim portant turningpointfortheregime. 19 At theoutsetth econ¯ictcau seda ¯oodo fmainly ethnicSo malirefu gees.B y1979there were of® cially1 .3m illionrefugeesin th e country.20 More thana halfw ere settledinthe no rth,where oneinfo urofth e populationwererefu gees.T hearrivalo fforcedm igrantsin tensi®ed p ressure on limitedph ysicalreso urces andserv ices,fu rtheragg ravatingtensionsbetween localin habitantsandrefugees.R esentmentintensi®ed as theIssaqswere reduced tosecon d-classcitize nsinth eiro wnterritory. 21 Thegovernment’spolicyo f recruitingrefugeesinto th earmyalsospu rred onten sions.M oregen erallyth e failedw ar whollyero dedth ecredibilityo fthearm yandpolice,th easserted guardiansofPan-Somalin ationalism.

Formationofo ppositiongroupsandgovernmentreaction Somalia’sdefeatin O gadenled to an attem ptedco upinA pril1 978bysenior militaryof® cers from theMajerteenclan .Althoughthegovernmentcrushedth e rebellion,somesenioro f® cers whoescapedafter thecoupformedth e®rst oppositionmovement,calledS omaliS alvationDemocraticF ront( SSDF), with its headquarters inE thiopia.W ithsu pport fromtheEthiopianarm y,theseg roups carriedoutguerrillawarfare across theborder.T hegovernment’sreactionto boththe cou pattemptandtheformationof SSDF was repressionandvicious reprisalsag ainstth eMajerteenclan in the n ortheast. Theseco ndoppositionmovement,th eSomaliN ationalM ovement( SNM) was formedin 1 981b yagroupofbusinessmen,religiouslead ers, intellectualsan d former armyof® cers drawnfromtheIsaaqclan .Followingitsfo rmation,th e governmentintensi®ed its rep ressivepoliciesag ainstth eIsaaq.Tocreateenm ity betweenclan s,sen iormilitaryof® cers inth eSomaliarm yfromIsaaqclan swere deliberatelypostedin th eMajerteenreg ionswh ere theg overnmentwasw aging war againstlocal p eople. TheH awiye-dominatedU nitedS omaliC ongress ( USC)wasfo rmedin Italy in 1987,bywhichtim etheformalserv icep rovisionroleo fthestateh adv irtually

118 THEHERITAGEOFWARANDSTATECOLLAPSEINSOMALIAANDSOMALILAND ceasedto fu nction. 22 Itwasim mediatelyd ividedin totw orivalfactionsbasedo n differentsub-clans.T hearmedfactio nhadan allian cew ithth e SNM, which providedarm stoG eneralA ideedw howasto b ecometheleader ofthefactio n. TheOgadeni-ledSo maliP atrioticM ovement( SPM)wasfo rmedin 1 989follow- ingthearrest ofG eneralG abyo,theth enm inistero fdefencean dthehighest rankingO gadeniingo vernment.A few more oppositionmovementsw ere formedd uringth ecivilw ar inthe so uth,butthelargen umber offactionsw ith S-pre® xedacro nymsappearedafter thein terventionof UNOSOM.

The impact ofthe warinS omaliland Loss oflifea nddisplacementofp opulation Thenumber ofd eathsin the n orthernto wnshasb eenestim atedat aro und 100 000.23 Upto5 0000peopleare believedtoh avelo stth eirliv esinth ecapital city,Hargeisa,as a resulto fsummaryex ecutions,aerial b ombardmentsan d groundattack scarriedoutbygovernmenttroops. 24 Gersony,w hoconductedo ne ofthe®rst investigationsfor theUSStateDep artment,m aintainsthatth etroops conductedsy stematicattack sagainstthe civ ilianp opulation. 25 Someofthemore brutalacts o ccurred inru ralv illagesan dwere carriedoutb yspecialtro ops knownasth e`Isaaq ExterminatingWing’(D abar-goyntaIsaaq a) whowere believedto hav ebeenrecru itedfro mamongtheOgadenrefu gees.T argeting herders andfarmers perceivedas bein gaf® liatedw ithth e SNM,theyd estroyedo r poisonedw ellsÐvital fo rthepastoraleco nomyÐseizedlivest ockan dburned downentirev illagesto d eprivetheruralp opulationofitsb asicm eansof livelihood.

Loss oflivelihoods Althoughtheexact n umber ofanimalslo stas a resulto fthewar isstill unknown,itis estim atedth atm ore thenh alfo ftheco untry’stotalliv estock populationwas killedeith er directlyo rindirectly.T hetroopsalsod estroyed waterso urcesby b lowingupo rdrainingwaterreserv oirs.In so meareasop en wellsw ere poisoned,whileo thers were contaminatedw ithcorp ses. 26 The extensiveplantingofminesin ru ralareas w asalso p artlyresp onsiblefo ranimal losses. Another contributingfactorwasth edistress saleo flivestockb ypastoralists. Thewar alsod isruptedth emerchant-basedn etworkth attran smittedrem ittances fromGulfstates. C ropproductionwasev enm ore devastatedbyth ewar since allfarm ers were forcedto aban doncultivationforthefoury ears ofcon¯ict.

Socialandeconomicco sts Thewardestroyedm arketcentresw hilem iningoftransport routesv irtuallysh ut downtrade.Thiswasaccompaniedby th eclosureoftheBerbera portforanimal exports fromthesecon dhalfo f1988to19 91.Anaverageo f1.2m illionanimals usedto beexportedp erannumthroughBerbera. 27 Becausem arketexchangewas

119 ISMAILIAHMED®INALDHERBOLDGREEN centralto the su rvivalo fruralh ouseholds,th eclosure ofBerbera port andthe collapseo flocalm arketsfo rmeath ada devastatingeffect,forcingm anyto disposeo flargen umbers oftheiranim als. Ironically,thecommunityinsu rancean dtransfer systemsthath ado riginally playedim portantrolesin the co llectivecopingstrategieso fhouseholdstriggered socialcrisis d uringthewar.T here wasa suddenin creasein th esocialo bliga- tions,fo rcingm anyhouseholdstosell th eirassets. T hebloodmoneyp ayment, forinstance,w hichp layedan im portantrolein p reventingandcontaining localisedcon¯icts,also fo rcedm anyhouseholdstoliq uidatesom eorallo ftheir productiveassets.B ecausen either the SNM north eEthiopianau thoritiescon- trolledth erefugeecam pstherew asm assiveviolencean dlawlessness,cau sedin partb ytheproliferationoflightweapons.A saresultth ere were manydeaths andinjuriesattrib utedto freela nceb andits.T heabsenceofcentralauthority meantthatth eseh adto b esettledthro ughtraditionalm eansofco mpensation. Becauseof a fear thatan yinternalco n¯ictw ouldh indertheir co mmonstru ggle againstth eregime,the co uncilof eld ers hadco nstitutedem ergencylaws demandinganyoutstandingbloodm oneyto be settled w ithina shortp eriodof time.Arrear sinb loodmoneyp aymentsfo rcedm anyh ouseholdstod efaulto n paymentsfo rthe®rst time,jeop ardisingthe fu nctioningofthewholesy stem. Afurthersocialo bligationwhichho useholdsh adto m eetdu ringthewar was contributiontoth ewar effort.T wotypesof co ntributionswerereq uiredfro m individualh ouseholds:a malem ember wasreq uiredto jo inth e SNM forces, in additionto m akingapaymentofonesh eep(o ritseq uivalentincash) at least oncea year.T heseo bligationswere strictlyap pliedd uringth ewar. Thecrisis had a differentialim pacto nmenand wo menam ongtherural households.W hileco mparativelyless severe in th enorththan th esouth,the threato fphysicalv iolenceco ntributedev erywhereto a heightenedsen seo f insecurity.There wasa signi®can tincreasein the n umberan dtypeoftasks performedby w omendu ringthecrisis. A smenbecam eincreasinglyin volvedin thecommunity-levelactiv itiesasso ciatedwith th ewar,th eburdeno flabour shiftedtotask ssuchas q ueuingupforfoodrations,fetchi ngwater fromdistant sources andengaginginp ettytrad ingtosu pplementtheirin comes.

Famineandlo ss oflifea ndlivelihoods Evenafter theirdefeat ,theremnantso fBarreÂ’sforces maintaineda strongbase inth einter-riverineregionfornearlya year,d estroyingvillagesan dcrops. Animalsw ere killedo rstolen,forcinghundredsoffarmers to¯ eetoth eregional capitalBaid oawhichlater b ecametheepicentreo fthe1991±92 famine.Withth e exceptionofMogadishu,thisreg ionsuffered themostsev ere devastation.Asa result,`th einter-riverinepeoplew ere trappedb etweenA ideed’sforces inth e north,B arreÂ’sinso uthwest,an dMorgan’sÐBarre Â’sson-inlawÐ in th esouth,in whatb ecameknownasth eªtriangleo fdeathº.Baidoa,the cap italof th eregion becamealsok nownasth eªcityo fthewalkingdeadº.’ 28 Attheheightof theciv ilw arin1 991±92amajordroughthitth earea,lead ing toa devastatingfaminewhichkilled b etween3 00000and5 00000 29 and affectedas m anyasth ree million.Thelarg enumbero fdeathsresultedfro m

120 THEHERITAGEOFWARANDSTATECOLLAPSEINSOMALIAANDSOMALILAND theoutbreako finfectiousd iseasesas th ousandso fpeopleg atheredin relief camps.

Populationdisplacementandeconomicco sts Thewar inth esouthcreate dahugedisplacementofpeople,up rootingan estimated1 .7m illion,overo ne-thirdo ftheentirep opulationinth esouth. 30 As manyasa quarter ofamillionpeoplefro mruralareas p ouredin toM ogadishu, where aidag enciesh adset u preliefcam ps.A sthewar inM ogadishuan dthe surroundingareasinten si®ed, m osto fthecityresid entsan dinternalrefu gees were displaced,ag aincreati ngm assive¯owsofmovingpopulations.H eavy ®ghtingalongthesurro undingstateb orders preventedm osto fthemfro m¯eeing toE thiopiaan dKenya. Theresid ualserv icesan dinstitutionsthath adsu rvivedthe rad icalero sionof thelateB arreÂyears collapsedin th eensuingcivilw ar.K eyin frastructure, essentialfo reconomicactiv ities,su chas water andpower generators, re® neries, airan dseap orts,teleco mmunicationsinstal lations,b ridgesan dpartso fmost tarmacro adw ere destroyedo rceasedto fun ctionbecauseo fnon-maintenance whichhas b eenan en demicS omalip roblemev enin p eacetime.S choolsan d hospitalsw ere targetedd uringtheinitialfactio nal® ghtinginM ogadishuand surroundingareas.W hatwas notdestroyedin the w ar waslo otedan dshipped tosu rroundingcountries.

UN and NGO interventions Belatedin ternationalmediaco verageofthecrisis p layeda keyro leintrig gering anin ternationalresponse.B utthe®rst reports ofimpendingmajordisasterby th e very few NGOsthatrem ainedin th ecountrywh enB arreÂwasov erthrownduring thedevelopmentofthecrisisd idnotreceivesuf® cientattention.Thedecisionby theUSAandUNtoin terveneinth efaminewastragic allylate. Theag enciesfaced a multitudeofproblemsind eliveringhumanitarianaid . Becauseo fextremelevelso finsecurity,agencieswere forcedto rely o n expensivearmedpro tectionbymilitiato d istributeem ergencyrelief .For example, CARE,whichw asresp onsiblefo rthedeliveryoffo odsupplies,sp ent $100000permonthonbodyguardstocarry ou titsrelief d istributionactivities. 31 TheInternationalC ommitteeof th eRedC ross ( ICRC)hada muchh igher protectionbillo f$100000perweekw hichit paidto factio nalm ilitiastoprovide securityfo rthedistributionofemergencyrelief . 32 Notonlyw asthis an expensivewayo fprovidingrelief,butbypayinglargeamountsof m oneyto militias,as ev enth eUNfounditselfd oinginvoluntarily,thew ar economywas encouragedand d isarmamentdiscouraged. 33 Therew asa generallack o fpreparednessan dinformationaboutthedisaster, whichco ntributedto th edelaysinlau nchingth eintervention.O nlya handfulo f agenciesin cludingthe ICRC,Saveth eChildrenF undandMeÂdicinsSans FrontieÁres ( MSF)stayedin the co untryw henall the U Nagenciesan dmost NGOs withdrew fromthecou ntryfo llowingBarreÂ’sdemise.T heabsenceof m ostU N agenciesd uringth ecriticalperio dofthecrisism eantthatth eylack edex tensive

121 ISMAILIAHMED®INALDHERBOLDGREEN andaccuratein formationn ecessarytoorganiseand carry o utlarge-scaleh umani- tariano perations. 34 It wasd if® cultto co llectd etailedinformationan dmost agenciesfailed to co nsultth efew NGOsalreadyinth ecountry.Asaresult,lo cal foodmarketsan dhouseholden titlementsw ere destabilisedw henem ergency food¯owedin toth eregion. Interveningin a countryw ithoutastatestru cturewas somethingnew toth e agenciesw hichw ere usedto d ealingw ithcen tralau thorities.M oreover,th e operationalgu idelineso fagencieswere more applicableto n aturald isastersthan toco mplexem ergenciesthat req uirecreati veand¯ exiblep rogrammingunder conditionsofcontinuingcon¯ict.Q uestionsoverimpartiality,accountabilityan d appropriateco desof co nductadd edto th econfusion.T hiswas anearly unprecedentedin tervention(interm sofscale) ev enfo rthoseag enciessu chas the ICRC and UNICEF thath ada longexperienceo fworkinginco n¯ict situ ations. Mattersw ere madeworse byanear totallo ss ofbothw rittenan dhumanh istoric recordso fpreviousSomaliex perience.UN agencyreco rdswere lostw henth e MogadishuUNcompoundwas overrunandvirtuallyno staff withpre-1 991 Somaliex periencewerered eployed.Indeedthe cen tralU Nciviloperationunder theUnitedNatio nsDevelopmentProgramme( UNDP)seemedto v iewprio r territorialex periencew ithd isdain,ina territoryin wh ichit p roposedan d attemptedto create a proxycivilg overnancen etwork. Them ultitudeofagencieswith co ntrastingmandates,stru ctures, procedures, operationsandcapacitiesto o peratein S omaliaco mplicatedthe co ordinationo f 35 theinterventioninan alread ycomplexd isaster. Many NGOswerein th etheatre primarilyto cu rry favourwiththe m edia,in an effo rt tom obilisenam e recognitionandfunds.D oubtlessthey w ere concernedw ithsav ingliv esb utalso withb olsteringtheirbu dgetsvia in creasedgovernmentandU Nagencies transfers andpu blicd onations.T hehighpro®lemediaco verageofthecrisisalso createdother problems,wh ichun doubtedlyaffect edth equalityan ddeliveryo f humanitarianassistance. OperationRestore Hope,lau nchedin 1 992under UNresolution704,resulted ina contradictorym ulti-mandatedin terventioninvolvingpeacemaking,peace- keepingandpeace-enforcementactivities.W ithan an nualex penditure of$1 .5 billion,theinterventionwasth emostex pensivehumanitarianoperationever undertaken. 36 ALifean dPeaceIn stitute(1 995)studypointso utthat:

TheOperation’smandatewa svague,ch angedfre quentlyd uringtheprocessa nd waso pento m yriadin terpretations.T hemandatech angedfr omp rotectingthe deliveryo fhumanitariana ssistance,to en couragingandm aintaininga`secure environment’,tocap turingaleadero foneo fthefactionsatonestageand,late r,to encouragingnegotiationswithth atsam eleader¼ Asaconsequence UNOSOM was bedevilledwith d isagreementsam ongthevariousplayers. 37

Earlierin the interv ention,asdem obilisationandcontrolo fweaponswas deemedessent ial,th eUN’s®rst SpecialR epresentative,M ohamedS ahnoun, initiatedafood-for-armsprogrammeaimedat red ucingthewidespreadav ail- abilityan duseo flightweapons. 38 Thiswasanim portantin itiativethathadwid e support amongSomalis,in cludingmostfactio nleadersandelders. 39 However, thisap proachto co ntrollingarmswasso onreplacedb yanew strategy(after

122 THEHERITAGEOFWARANDSTATECOLLAPSEINSOMALIAANDSOMALILAND

Sahnounresig ned),whichsu ggestedd isarmingthem ilitiab yforce asth eonly meansofsuccessfullycurb ingthewidespreadav ailabilityo fweapons.T henew strategywas abandonedwh enU Ntroopsmet® erceresista ncefrom faction leaders. It was,fo rtunately,never attemptedin S omaliland,where tentative UNOSOM planstoseize B erberaand H argeisab yforcew ere abandoned. Theco ncentrationofthe hu manitarianaidin an daroundMogadishufurther limitedth eoperation’simpact;d rawingpeoplefrom ruralareas to u rbancen tres where reliefcam pshadb eenestab lished.Despitethe rh etorico fcapacity-build- ing,UNagenciesan dinternational NGOsgenerallyim plementedem ergency reliefactivi tiesw ithlittle o rnoinvolvemento flocalacto rs. Theyp erceivedth e 40 local NGOsÐnot alw ayscorrectlyÐasclan -basedco ntractors. Noconstructive attemptsw ere madetoeng agelocaln etworksandmosque-relatedg roupsas channels,bases, o rsources oflegitimacy,despitetheir lo calan dnational legitimacyan dprovencapaci tyto m obilised omesticreso urces.N orw ere clan elders recognisedas con stitutinggenuine,h istoricallyrootedco mmunityco n- duits;n orwasit realise dthatb ystrengtheningthem,peacelo rdswouldh ave beensup ported. Therew ere,h owever,a number ofpositiveoutcomes.T he ICRC’ s humani- tarianrelief w ork,fo rexample,at theheightofthefamine,providedwetanddry rationsto o ver onemillionpeopleth roughoutsouthernreg ionsofthecou ntry. Thisisbelievedto h aveavertedstarv ationoftenso fthousandso fpeople. ICRC’ s operationincludeda clearm andate;ex tensivelocalex perience;th eexistenceo f anationalcou nterpart(theSomaliR edC rescent);an dpoliticalimpartiality 41 acceptedb ythelocalp eople. Inco ntrast, UNOSOM’soperationwasw idely regardedas p artyto the con ¯ict,fo llowingits w ar withon eofth efactions,an d thecauseo fthedeathsofcountlessinn ocentcivilians.

Con¯ictreso lutionandpeace-building TraditionalpeacemakinginS omaliland Aserieso fgrassrootsreconciliationconferenceshav ebeenh eldsin ceearly1 992 inthe cities o fBuraoan dBerbera.T heeld ers embarkedon a peace-building endeavouraimedat reso lvingall m ajoroutstandingissuesb etweencom munities across thecountry.C on¯ictreso lutioninth enorthh asalw aysbeenth e responsibilityo feldersw hoh aveauthorityto rep resenttheirclan s.U nlikethe tribalch iefsin m anyA fricanso cieties,eld ers inS omalilandare `chosenb y virtueo ftheirp ersonalattrib utessu chas ag e,ex pertisein the po liticalartso f compromisean dpersuasion,powers oforatory,skillas a poet,relig ious knowledge,p iety,wealth,generosity,courageandreputationsfor fairness’. 42 In other wordsnotallo ldm enare elders,norareall eld ers aged.T heassemblies, or Guurti,promoted emocraticparticipationan dtheird eliberationsare held publicly.Becauseof their d ualk inship,womenare engagedas `clan am bas- sadors’ andplaya keyro lein th emediationofdisputes.T heyare oftenth eonly meansofcommunicationbetweenwarrin ggroups. Soonafter theendingofthewar signi®can tdifferenceso ver tradeaccessan d land,grazing,an dwaterrig htsem ergedw ithinan dbetweenth eIsaaqclan

123 ISMAILIAHMED®INALDHERBOLDGREEN familyan dtheDulbahantean dWarsangeliclan sinErigavo. 43 Theeldersm anaged toreso lvethecon¯icts in E rigavoandB uraoand ,uptoa point,th edifferences withinth eIsaaqclan fam ily.Theselocal lev elpeacem akingefforts reducedthe tensionsb etweenclan s,restore dtrustan dharmoniousrelationsbetweenco m- munities,in creasedintera ctionsand trade betwee nclansandre-esta blishedthe traditionalm eansofresolvingdisputes. 44 Insom eareasjo intcom mitteeswere formedtoresolveminordisputesan dpreventfreelan cebanditry,ensuringtosome degreeth atp eaceagreem entsb etweenco mmunitieswere observed.It isw orth underliningtheroleo ftheG adabuursi (non-Isaaq)elders from Borama,form ed for theirpeacem akingin co nferencesin S omaliland.Whilethe UN sponsored conferencesw erehigh lyp ublicised,thegrassrootspeacem akingp rocessw asou t ofthelim elight.W iththe except ionof someverylim itedlo gisticalsupportfo rthe Boramaconference,th eUNando therag enciesd idnotprovidesu pportfor (infact opposed)manysuccessfullocallevel initia tives.

`Forging’asettlement: UN-stylereco nciliationinSo malia TheUNhasorg anisedo ver 10h ighlyp ublicisedan dcostlyreco nciliation conferencessin ce1 993.Factionlead ers, whohaveplayedth ecentralro lein thesereco nciliationco nferences,h avedutifullysig nedag reementsat ev ery meeting.B uteachsettlem entcollapsedso onafter itw asag reed,sometimes withinho urs. Thecentralten etso fUN-brokeredp eacemakingare fundamentally differentfromlocalp eacemakingtechniquesem ployedin n orthernS omalia. Virtuallyevery U Nreconciliationconferencew ash eldo utsidethecountryw ith agendasoften set b ytheirsp onsors. Conferenceshav ebeenh eldin each o fthe neighbouringcountriesÐKen ya,E thiopia,D jibouti,Y emenan dEgypt.A major problemw ithth eseh ighpro®leaffair sisthat leg itimaterep resentativeso fthe affectedco mmunities,su chas eld ers, merchants,w omen’sgroupsand oth er genuinestakeholders, are notin cluded.Furthermore,co stco nsiderationsh ave oftend eterminedth edurationoftheseco nferences;con sequently,theyare short with® xedtim etables.W hileth eBoramaconferencelastedfo urmonths,th e longestU N-brokeredco nferencelasted w ellu ndertw oweeks! Althoughthe mandateso ftheseco nferencesh avebeenterm ed`peace making’and`reconcili- ation’,theyo ftenfo cussolelyo nreconstitutinga centralstate. P romoting`q uick ®x’solutions,th ey`falte redwh ere itm atteredÐon theground.Problemswere tob eªsolvedºbefore UNof®cials u nderstoodth enature ofthe pro blem’. 46 The ®rst reconciliationconferencein Ad disA babainJan uary1 993wash eldless thana monthafter theUNtroopsarrivedin M ogadishu.

Rehabilitation Economica ndliveli hoodrehabilitation Withth eexceptionofSo malilandandthenortheastreg ion,rehabilitation efforts havebeenlim itedan dinternationalaid is still larg elyco n®nedto emergencyassista nce.R econstructioninitiativessu ffered thesam eproblemsas theemergencyaid p rogrammesled b ytheUNandn ocoherentframeworkfo r

124 THEHERITAGEOFWARANDSTATECOLLAPSEINSOMALIAANDSOMALILAND rehabilitationhasy etb eend eveloped.Brydenarg uesth at`m anyoftoday’s ªreconstructionºandªrehabilitationºprogrammesare designedto do little m ore thanto repair ,piecemeal,th eruinsofthefo rmer system’. 47 InS omaliland, perhapsthesinglem ostex ternalreh abilitationprogrammehasb eenth eresto- rationofth ewatersy stemto the city of H argeisab yOxfaman d UNICEF. An estimatedtw o-thirdsofthecity’spopulationn owhaverunningwater,co mpared toless th ana thirdbefo re theonseto ftheco n¯ict. InS omalilandtheinformaland m edium-scaleen terprisesecto rs haveproven resilient.T heeconomyisb uoyant;liv estockan dcropproduction,andpublic servicep rovisionhavesincereco vered.Thisis less tru eofthenortheast,w hich never hadm uchp roduction.Thecurrentstablefree-m arketen vironmenthas facilitatedth ere-establishmentofremittance¯ owsfromSomaliex patriate workers inth eGulf,E uropeand N orthA merica.T here hasb eena shiftfro ma war- andsu rvival-orientatedecon omytoa functioningmarketeconomy.Encour- agedb ytheabsenceo fexcessiveregulations,corru ptionandm arketin terven- tion,theprivatesecto rhasstarte dprovidinga wholeran geofnewservic esth at thecountryh adn ever seenb efore.T heeconomicb oominS omalilandisp artly re¯ected in the fo reigntradeth atgoesthroughBerbera.Thecurrentmerchandise exports andimports are estimatedto be at least tw iceth elevelo fthoseb efore thewar in1 988.Thesmallp ort ofBosasoin th enortheasth asex perienceda similarin creasein the vo lumeofforeigntrade;it is u sedb ytraders toex port livestockan dothercommoditiessu chas incenseand h idesfro mSomalia,and to handleim ports becauseM ogadeshuport ish azardous. Theresilie ncean dsuccessoftheinformalsecto risn otnew.Evend uring Barre’sregimeit`d emonstratedconsiderablereso urcefulnessand resilie nceb y weatheringfrequentp olicyrev ersals,persist enthighin ¯ationandworsening securitypro blemsinth e1980s’. 48 Inm anyareasit h asp rovedto b eanen gine foreconomicrecon structionandhasin creasinglybeco meanin centivefo r peacemakingan dpoliticalrehabilitation.It isa factorthataid p rogrammes wouldd owellto un derstandsoas to p romotean env ironmentfor theco ntin- uedg rowtho fthedomesticco mmercialan dtransport sectors.

Politicalrehabilitation Perhapsth emostcritic alof all recon structionefforts inSo maliais th eques- tionofpoliticalrehabilitation.Views divergegreatlyo nhowto reco nstitute theSomalistate. So mearguethat th equestionofstatereco nstitutionsh ould takeitso wnco urse, inth ehopethatn ew state(o rstates)stru ctures will emergefrom thecivilso cietyo nceho stilitiesen d. 49 Indeed,`thefactth at Somaliadid fo rsometimeconstitutea statecan notb econsidereda suf® cientlyconvincingreasontog obackto it ag ain,u nlesso ne® ndsthat there were elementsin it that are stillw orthretain ingorbuildingupon’. 50 Still,un der UNOSOM’sbroadm andateto rebu ildS omalia,th eUNhasp ersis- tentlyen deavouredto reco nstructa centralstate. T hein¯u enceof th eUN modelh astrick ledd ownin tosu bsequentnon-UNConferenceso npolitical rehabilitation.T heCairopeace talk sheldin late 1 997andtheirsub sequent agreementw asch allengedb yEthiopiaov er Egypt’sapparenthijackingof

125 ISMAILIAHMED®INALDHERBOLDGREEN thepeacen egotiationsandfailure toco nsultIn tergovernmentAuthorityo n Development( IGAD)member countries.A lthoughneighbouringcountriesh ave avestedintere stin a peacefulsettlementtoth eSomalico n¯ictan dhave supportedreco nciliationinitiatives,th eirro leh asb eenlim itedin th epastb y UNintervention.Thesu rroundingstatesh avebeenb urdenedb ybothth e over¯o wofinsecurity(in cludingligh tarms) andasigni®can t¯owofS omali refugees.T heo nlyapp arentlysu ccessfulstatereco nstitutionisin So malilandÐ theoldB ritishS omaliland.It hasp eaceand p ersonalsecu rityalm ostev ery- where,an electe dtwo-houseParlia mentandPresident,a functioningcivil police/magistrates’co urt system,municipalg overnmentandsomeÐalb eit limitedbasic serv iced eliveryb yaprofessionalp ublicserv ice.

Conclusions The`ineluctable’d eclineof S omaliao ver 20years,th efailure ofUN-sanc- tionedin terventions,an dtheunsuccessfulattemptsat reco nstitutingacen- tralisedstate w ere notwritteninsto ne.R ecently,indigenous-ledp eace-building, decentralisedlocalg overnance,an dinstitutionsthatresp ectth eregions’h etero- geneityap pear toillu minatea more positivepathto wardsreconstruction. AlthoughSomaliastill su ffers, Somaliland,illegitimatein th eeyeso ftheworld, hasem ergedfrom theashesw ithp hoenix-likeactivity.Its rehabilitationefforts provideinsightsth atthe in ternationalaid com munityw oulddo w ellto ap preci- ate.B uildingontraditionalsystem sofcon¯ictm anagementandpartnerships withn on-secularinstit utions,an dencouraginglocalm arketscou ldlim itth e internationalco mmunity’sfrustratingexerciseo fwritinginsh iftingsands.

Notes 1 MHMukhtar,`Theplight of theagro-pa storalsociety in Som alia’, Reviewof A fricanP oliticalEconom y , 23(70), 1996, pp 543±553. 2 Ibid. 3 Waldron& NHasci, Stateof theart literatu rereview on Somalirefugee sinthe Horn of Africa, Refugees StudiesProgram me, Oxford Universityand the Swedish InternationalDevelop mentAuthori ty, 1994. 4 MDoornbos&JMarkakis, `Societyand state in crisis: what went wrong inSom alia?’, Reviewof A frican PoliticalEconomy ,59, 1994, pp82±88; I MLewis, Bloodand Bones: The Callof Kinshipin SomaliSociety , Lawrenceville:T heRedSea Press, 1994;and A. Simon, `Somalia:the structure of dissolution’,inLVillalon &PHuxtable(eds), The AfricanState at a CriticalJuncture :BetweenDisinteg rationand Recon®guration , Boulder,CO:LynneRienner ,1998. 5 Doornbos&Markakis, `Societyand state in crisis’ ,p84. 6 A Samatar, Socialist Somalia:Nationin Search of a State ,Boulder,CO:WestviewPress, 1988;Samata r, The Stateand Rural Transformationin Somalia ,1884± 1986 ,Madison, WI:Universityof WisconsinPress, 1989. 7 JAMubarak,`Theª hiddenhandº behind the resilienc eof thestateless econom yof Somalia’, World Development ,25(12), 1997, pp 2027±2041; and W orldBank, World DevelopmentR eport1997 ,Washington, DC:WorldBank, 1977. 8 Mubarak,`Theª hiddenhandº ’ ,p2028. 9 WorldBank, `Somalia:country strategy paper’ , AfricaDivision ,WorldBank, 1990; IMF `Somalia: framework for planningof long-termreconstructionand recover y’,1993. 10 JGGross, `Towards ataxonomyoffailedstates in the new world order:decayin gSomalia,L iberia,Rwanda and Haiti’ , Third World Quarterly ,17(3), 1996, pp 455±471.

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11 AfricanRights and Mines Advisory Group, `Violentdeeds live on: landmi nes inSom aliaand Som aliland’, December1993; and J Maxted& AZegeye,`State disinteg rationand human rights in Africa’, International Journalof Comparat iveSociolo gy ,38(1/2), 1997, pp 64±86. 12 HMAdam,`Formationand recognit ionof new states:Som alilandin contrast to E ritrea’, Reviewof A frican PoliticalE conomy ,59, 1994, pp 21±38. 13 Mukhtar,`Theplight of theagro-pas toralsociety in Som alia’. 14 DDLaitin& SSSamatar, Somalia:Nation in Search of aState ,Boulder,CO: WestviewPress, 1987, p69. 15 Lewis, Bloodand Bones , p 150. 16 Ibid, p 152. 17 RHitcock& HHussein, `Agriculturaland non-agri culturalsettlem entsfor drought-af¯icted pastoral ists in Somalia’ , Disasters,11(1), 1987, pp 30±39; and G Haaland& WKeddeman, `Povertyanalysis:the case of ruralSom alia’, EconomicDevelop mentand CulturalChange ,32(4), 1984, pp 843±860. 18 Mukhtar,`Theplight of theagro-pas toralsociety in Som alia’. 19 Lewis, Bloodand Bones ,ASamatar,`Introdu ctionand overview ’,inSam atar(E d), The SomaliChallen ge: From Catastropheto R enewal ,BoulderCO: LynneRienne, 1994. 20 KCahaill,`T heclinica lfaceof faminein Som alia’,inK Cahill, Famine, 1986. 21 ROmaar,`Som aliland:one thorn bush ata time’, Current History ,1994, pp 232±236. 22 RHGreen& JJamal,`Som alia:paradox es of privateprosperi ty, poverty,pockets,volatile vulnera bilityand publicpauperis ation,Report for UNICEF,Mogadeshu, March12, 1987. 23 `Sessionists inSomali landare preparin gtoparade their declara tionof independenceat the UN conference’, Guardian, 1993. 24 ABake,`UN bunglesagain’ , New African, 1993, p 31. 25 RGerson, `Why Somalis¯ ee:synthesis of accountsof con¯ict experien cein norther nSomaliaby Somali refugees,displacedpersons andothers’ , Bureau for RefugeeP rogrammes, Departmentof State, USA, 1989. 26 `A governmentat war withits own people’, AfricaW atch (London), March, 1990. 27 IAhmed, `Understandinghousehol dfood insecurityand fam ineconditi ons inrural Som aliland’,mimeo, WyeCollege ,Universityof London, 1994, p401. 28 Mukhtar,`Theplight of theagro-pas toralsociety in Som alia’, pp 341±551. 29 Ibid, p 341. 30 Whilethe Barre Âregimein1987± 88 claimeda populationof overeight m illion,the actual (Swedish managed)census suggests 5.5 millionÐfour millionin the south, 1.5 inthe north. On reasonable guesstimatesof births, deathsand crossbord ermovem entsthat suggests perhaps4.5 millionin the south and 1.8±2.0 millionin Som alilandtoday. 31 P Hillmore, Observer,January, 1995. 32 JPrendergast, Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids inSudan and Somalia ,London:Pluto Press, 1997. 33 M Bradbury, AidUnder Fire:R ede®ning Relief and DevelopmentA ssistancein Unstable Situatio ns , Geneva:T heUnited Nations Departm entof HumanitarianAffairs, 1995. 34 Afew agencies,including UNICEF,returnedfairly rapidly to the northwe st andm aintainedalimited Mogadishupresencevia Som alistaff. 35 Netherlands DevelopmentCoopera tion, Humanitarian Aidto Somalia ,TheHague: Netherla nds Develop- mentCoopera tion,1994, p18. 36 ILewis &JMayall,`Som alia’,inJ Mayall(ed), The NewInterven tionism1991± 1994: UnitedNations Experiencein Cambodi a, Former Yugoslaviaand Somalia ,Cambridge:Cam bridgeUniversi tyPress, 1996. 37 Lifeand Peace Institute Com prehensivereport on lessons-learnedfrom United Nations Operati on in Somalia,1995. 38 UNIDIR, ManagingA rms inP eaceP rocesses: Somalia .Geneva:United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,1995. 39 Ascouldbe expecte d,somewar leadersdid not support them easures, nor didyoung menwho saw thegun as theironly capital asset and ticket to `product ive’self-em ployment. 40 MSAbdillahi, Somaliland NGOs: challenges and opportunities ,London:Catholi cInstitutefor International Relations (CIIR), 1997. 41 Netherlands DevelopmentCoopera tion, Humanitarian Aids toSomalia . 42 Omaar, `Somaliland:one thorn bush ata time’,p234. 43 AFarah& ILewis, `Somalia:the roots ofreconciliation.Peace m akingendeavo urs of contemporarylineage leaders:a survey of grassrootspeaceconfere ncesin Som aliland’,ACTIONAID,London, 1993. 44 Omaar,`Som aliland:one thorn bush ata time’;andFarah & Lewis, `Somalia:the roots of reconciliation’. 45 Farah& Lewis, `Theroots of reconciliation’. 46 Omaar, `Somaliland:one thorn bush ata time’,p236. 47 MBryden, `Somalilandand peace in the Horn of Africa:a situationreportand analysis’ , UNEmergencies Unitfor Ethiopia,Addis Abba, 1995. 48 WorldBank, `Somalia:country strategy paper’ , p10. 49 Doornbos&Markakis, `Societyand state in crisis’ ;andPrender gast, Crisis Response . 50 Doornbos&Markakis, `Societyand state in crisis’ ,p87.

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