A Case Study on Peace-Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina
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WWW.IPPR.ORG StatesofConflict Acasestudyonpeace-buildingin BosniaandHerzegovina BeritBliesemanndeGuevara November2009 ©ippr2009 InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch Challengingideas– Changingpolicy 2 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina Contents Aboutippr ............................................................................................................................. 3 Abouttheauthor.................................................................................................................. 3 Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 3 ‘StatesofConflict’................................................................................................................. 3 Abbreviations........................................................................................................................ 4 Introduction........................................................................................................................... 6 BosniaandHerzegovina–anoverview ............................................................................... 8 TheinternationalinterventioninBosniaandHerzegovina................................................. 12 Conclusions:somethoughtsonfutureforeignpolicyformulation..................................... 23 References .......................................................................................................................... 25 3 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina Aboutippr TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank, producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand sustainableworld. Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakinginthe UK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeand providepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues. WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedas possible,whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextend ourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationfor highqualityresearch. ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected] www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065 ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinNovember2009.©ippr2009 Abouttheauthor BeritBliesemanndeGuevaraisaResearcherattheInstituteforInternationalRelations, HelmutSchmidtUniversity,Hamburg,fromwhereshehasaPhD. Thispaperisbasedontheresultsoftheauthor’sfive-yearresearchproject(2003–2008)on theeffectsofstate-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina,publishedinBeritBliesemannde Guevara(2009) StaatlichkeitinZeitendesState-building.InterventionundHerrschaftin BosnienundHerzegowina, Frankfurta.M.:PeterLang. Acknowledgements ipprisgratefultotheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandtheSwedish ForeignMinistryfortheirgenerousfundingofthispieceofwork. ‘StatesofConflict’ Thispaperisoneofaseries.TheotherpaperscoverMacedonia,Kosovo,Afghanistanand Haiti.DueforpublicationinAutumn2009,theywillbeavailablefrom www.ippr.org/publicationsandreports 4 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina Abbreviations AFBiH ArmedForcesofBosniaandHerzegovina BiH BosniaandHerzegovina CARDS CommunityAssistanceforReconstruction,DevelopmentandStabilisation CSA CivilServiceAgency DPA DaytonPeaceAgreement DFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment[UK] EUPM EuropeanUnionPoliceMission EUSR EuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentative FBiH FederationofBosniaandHerzegovina GDP Grossdomesticproduct IDC ResearchandDocumentationCenter,Sarajevo HJPC HighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncil HR HighRepresentative IDP Internallydisplacedperson ICTY InternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia IFI Internationalfinancialinstitution IFOR ImplementationForce IMF InternationalMonetaryFund IPTF InternationalPoliceTaskForce ITA IndirectTaxationAuthority JISB JournalofInterventionandStatebuilding NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation NGO Non-governmentalorganisation ODA Officialdevelopmentaid OHR OfficeoftheHighRepresentative OSCE OrganisationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope PfP PartnershipforPeace PIC PeaceImplementationCouncil PRSP PovertyReductionStrategyPaper RS RepublikaSrpska SAP StabilisationandAssociationProcess SBS StateBorderService SFOR StabilisationForce SFRY SocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia SIPA StateInvestigationandProtectionAgency 5 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina UNECE UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforEurope UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme UNHCR UNHighCommissiononRefugees UNMIBH UnitedNationsMissioninBosniaandHerzegovina USAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment 6 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina Introduction Inearly2009,BosniaandHerzegovina(BiH)1 witnessedafamiliarspectacle:during negotiationsonthefuturedesignofthestate,theprimeministeroftheRepublikaSrpska, oneofthecountry’stwomainpolitical-territorialdivisions,demandedtherightofsecession forthisSerb-controlledentity,whileBosnianMuslimrepresentativeswarnedthatifthe disputeoverconstitutionalreformswasnotsettled,anewwarcouldbetheultimate consequence.Priortothedispute,theBosnianMuslimmembersofthestatepresidencyhad threatenedtodismantlethecountry’sentitystructure,disregardingSerbianinterests.The politicians’adversepositionsledtosplitswithinbothethno-national2 communities. ThesituationboreastrikingresemblancetotheperiodbeforetheBosniancivilwaratthe beginningofthe1990s.Aftermorethan13yearsofinternationalinterventionandtenyears ofexplicitstate-building,fundamentalproblemsthatcoulddestabilisetheBosnianstate remainunsolved. SincethesigningoftheDaytonPeaceAgreement(DPA)3 inDecember1995,Bosniahas experiencedextensiveinterventionbywesternstatesandinternationalorganisationswiththe objectiveofconsolidatingpeaceandbuildingastabledemocraticstate.Duringthefirstfour yearsofpeace-building,internationally-prescribedreformsfollowedthedictatesofpolitical andeconomicliberalisationtheories.In1999–2000,however,thenegativeeffectscausedby policiesaimingtoestablishdemocracyandamarketeconomypriortostrengtheningthe stateledtoastrategicshifttowardsinstitutionalisation.4 Sincethen,Bosniahasbecomethe arenaforamassiveinternationalstate-buildingprojectconcentratedontheestablishmentof central-stateinstitutions. Aimsandstructureofthepaper Thispaperexplorestheeffectsofinternationalstate-buildingeffortsontheBosnianstate.It addressesthecentralquestionofwhathappenswhenexternalideasaboutwhatconstitutes a‘modern’stateconflictwithlocalcontexts,asking: •Whatkindofstatehastheinternationalstate-buildingprocesscreatedinBosnia? •Whatarethelimitsofthisapproach? •Istheexportoftheliberalstatemodelappropriateasameansofpromotingthe securityandwelfareoftheBosnianpopulation? •Whatdoesthisallmeanforfutureforeignpolicyformulationregardingstate-building ingeneral? Toanswerthesequestions,thepapertakesastepbackfromtheexigenciesandchallenges ofday-to-daypoliticsandlooksatthestructuraldeterminantsofstate-buildingbeyondthe practicesofsingleactors.Fromthisperspective,explanationsofthesetbacksofinternational 1.Hereafterweusethename‘Bosnia’asanabbreviatedwayofreferringtoBosniaandHerzegovina. 2.‘Anethno-nationalgroupusuallyreferstopopulationswhichexpressanethnicidentityandmakea claimtobeingrecognisedasanation’(Cashmore2003:148). 3.Officially:GeneralFrameworkAgreementforPeaceinBosniaandHerzegovina. 4.Themainlessonlearnedregardingtheliberalisationstrategyisthatexternaldemocratisationand marketliberalisationsetsfreemechanismsofpoliticalandeconomiccompetitionwhichareunproblematic inconsolidatedstates.Inunconsolidatedstates,however,theytendtoendangerthepeacebecause regulatoryinstitutionsarestillmissingorweak(Paris2004).InBosnia,theprolongingofethno- nationalistruledespiteinternationalelectoralengineering(Belloni2004,ManningandAntić 2003),and theappropriationofstateassetsbypowerfulelitesintheprivatisationprocess(Donais2002a,Pugh 2002)werebuttwosymptomsofthisproblem.Therefore,bytheendofthe1990s,institutionalisation cametobeseenasapreconditionforliberalisation(onthegenesisofthestate-buildingapproachsee BliesemanndeGuevara2008a:350-1). 7 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina state-buildingcannotbelimitedtolocal‘spoiling’or‘corruption’.Rather,localresistanceand informalpracticeshavetobeseenasevidenceofstructurallimitstostate-buildingwhose resultsaremuchmoreambiguousandlesscontrollablethanmightbeexpected. Themainargumentisthatstate-buildinginBosniahascontributedtotheestablishmentof whatresemblesa‘Potemkinstate’–theproverbialvillagesmadeupofpaintedfaçadesthat FieldMarshalPotemkinbuiltforRussianEmpressCatherineIIduringhervisittothenewly- conqueredCrimeain1787inordertohidethetrue,desolateconditionoftheregion.In otherwords,state-buildinginBosniahasstrengthenedaformalstatefaçadebymeansofan internationally-ledprocessofinstitutionalisationbutbehindthisfaçadetheBosnianstate’s capacityandlegitimacyhaveremainedprecarious. Thepaperstartswithabriefoverviewofthecountryanditsrecentexperienceofconflict, andgoesontodescribethemostimportantinternationalactorsandtheirapproaches towardspeace-buildinginBosnia.Thesubsequentsectionanalysestheeffectsofstate- buildingontheBosnianstate.Itarguesthattheinterventionhascausedsimultaneous, contradictorydynamicsofstate-strengtheningandstate-weakeningwhichhaveresultedin anexternallysupported,butinternallyunconsolidated‘Potemkinstate’.Thefindingsare illustratedwithexamplesfromthethreecorestatefunctionsofprovidingsecurity,enablinga