Blanks_06_orange.qxd 18-01-06 10:50 Side 1 De RAPPORT 2006:6 Fi farg © ISF 2006 Report 2006:6 Institute for Social Research Munthes gate 31 Postboks 3233 Elisenberg N-0208 Oslo www.socialresearch.no ISBN: 82-7763-228-2 ISSN: 0333-3671 M aterialet i denne rapporten er omfattet av åndsverklovens bestemmelser. Det er lagt u t på internett for lesing på skjerm og utskrifter til eget bruk. Uten særskilt avtale med ISF er enhver eksemplarfremstilling og tilgjengeliggjøring utover dette bare tillatt i den utstrekning det er hjemlet i lov. Utnyttelse i strid med lov eller avtale kan medføre erstatningsansvar, og kan straffes med bøter eller fengsel. Contents Abstract.............................................................................................. 5 1. Breaking records........................................................................... 7 2. Volatile voters............................................................................. 11 3. Turnout ....................................................................................... 15 4 From minority to majority government ...................................... 17 5 The election campaign................................................................ 19 6. The role of political leaders ........................................................ 23 7. Changes in the electoral system.................................................. 25 8. Concluding remarks.................................................................... 29 References........................................................................................ 31 Abstract This report examines the recent parliamentary election in Norway. In view of the fact that the Norwegian economy is booming, not least due to the revenues from the oil industry, common wisdom would imply that the ruling center- right government should have won the election easily. However, a new cen- ter-left coalition won by a narrow margin – establishing the first majority government in Norway in twenty years. The paradox was that the campaign did not focus on economic success, but rather on unsolved social problems related to care for the elderly, health institutions and education. In itself this may not be a sign of increasing dissatisfaction, but rather continuous wide- spread support for a universalistic welfare system based on social equality. However, previous studies indicate that the contrast between unsolved prob- lems and the increasing pile of money in the state owned oil fund generates political distrust. Thus, the electoral success of the populist Progress Party may be indicative of challenges every Norwegian government will have to face in the years to come. The article also outlines major changes in the elec- toral system introduced in the 2005 election. 1 Breaking records How was it possible for the center-right coalition government of the Conser- vative Party (Høyre), the Christian People’s Party (Kristelig Folkeparti) and the Liberal Party (Venstre) to lose the September 12th election? The state owned oil fund – based on revenues from the oil industry – had increased to more than 1200 billion Norwegian kroner (over 150 billion Euros), taxes had decreased by more than 20 billion kroner (2.5 billion Euros), the average monthly wages had increased by 20 percent in the last four years, and unem- ployment was below 5 percent. No wonder the United Nations had pointed to Norway as the best country in the world to live in. The favorable state of the economy – at the private as well as at the national level – would in most coun- tries have guaranteed a clear victory for the incumbent parties. How then, could they lose the election? In this article I will give an overview and an ini- tial analysis of the 2005 election, using data from official election statistics and opinion polls.1 Several of the last elections in Norway have been characterized as excep- tional (Valen 2003; Aardal 1998). This applies to the 2005 election as well. Two of the government parties, the Conservatives and the Christian People’s Party, hit rock bottom and received their lowest share of the votes ever. The only successful government partner was the tiny Liberal Party. In 2001 the Liberals had failed to reach the 4 percent electoral threshold for adjustment seats, but won two seats in Parliament and three seats in the cabinet! Before the 2005 election, they appealed to government supporters to help the party cross the threshold. The Liberals succeeded and got 5.9 percent, increasing their representation from 2 to 10 seats. ——————— 1. I would like to thank Elisabeth Bakke, Rune Karlsen and Guro Stavn for most useful com- ments on earlier drafts. More extensive data from the Norwegian Election Studies will be available later. See http://www.socialresearch.no/page/Research/Menu_research_fields/7981/8066. Official election results are found at http://odin.dep.no/krd/html/valgresultat2005/frameset.html. 8 How to lose a walk-over election? The Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) reached an all time high, receiving 22.1 percent of the votes and 38 seats in Parliament. For a populist party in Western Europe this is a fairly high level of support. It seems that the best way to win an election is to lose the previous one – and vice versa. For in- stance, in the 2001 election Labor (Arbeiderpartiet) reached its lowest level since the 1920s, but appeared as one of the winners of the 2005 election.2 The Conservatives lost heavily in 1997, gained in 2001 and lost again in 2005. Table 1 and Table 2 show the results of the 2005 election in percent and num- ber of seats. Table 1. Storting Elections 1989-2005. Support in percent 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 Average Red Election Alliance 0.8 1.1 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 Socialist Left 10.1 7.9 6.0 12.5 8.8 9.1 Labor 34.3 36.9 35.0 24.3 32.7 32.6 Liberal 3.2 3.6 4.5 3.9 5.9 4.2 Christian 8.5 7.9 13.7 12.4 6.8 9.9 Center 6.5 16.7 7.9 5.6 6.5 8.6 Conservative 22.2 17.0 14.3 21.2 14.1 17.8 Progress 13.0 6.3 15.3 14.6 22.1 14.3 Coastal Party 0.4 1.7 0.8 1.0 Others 1.4 2.6 1.2 2.6 1.1 1.8 Turnout 83.2 75.8 78.3 75.5 77.4 78.0 Table 2. Storting Elections 1989-2005. Allocation of Seats 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 Average Red Election Alliance 0 1 0 0 0 0.2 Socialist Left 17 13 9 23 15 15.4 Labor 63 67 65 43 61 59.8 Liberal 0 1 6 2 10 3.8 Christian 14 13 25 22 11 17.0 Center 11 32 11 10 11 15.0 Conservative 37 28 23 38 23 29.8 Progress 22 10 25 26 38 24.2 Coastal Party - - 1 1 0 0.4 Others 1 - - - - 0.2 Total 165 165 165 165 169 The three incumbent parties, the Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party and the Liberals jointly won 26.8 percent of the votes and 44 seats of a total of ——————— 2. However, although the 2005 result represented an increase of more than 8 percentage points from the previous election, it was Labor’s second worst result since 1930. The election campaign 9 169, compared to 37.5 percent and 62 of 165 seats in the 2001 election. Their minority government therefore had to step down, and was replaced by a ma- jority government consisting of Labor, the Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) and the Center Party (Senterpartiet). The red-green alliance won 48 percent of the votes and 87 seats, and was the first majority government to take office in twenty years. 2 Volatile voters High volatility has been a distinguishing mark of Norwegian politics since the mid 1980s. Figure 1 shows the aggregate volatility since World War II, using the well known Pedersen index (Pedersen 1979). The 1973 election was an earthquake, following in the wake of the disruptive EEC-referendum in 1972. From a record high aggregate volatility of 20.4 percent in 1973, the system returned to “normal” in 1985 with only 4.4 percent volatility. However, the volatility has since then increased. The 2005 level of 18.8 percent almost ri- vals the 1973 record. Figure 1. Aggregate volatility in Norwegian parliamentary elections 1945- 2005 25 20,4 20 18,8 16,3 16,1 15,1 15,5 15 14,7 11,2 10 6,6 6,8 5 5,4 5 4,4 3,5 2,3 0 45-49 53-57 61-65 69-73 77-81 85-89 93-97 01-05 49-53 57-61 65-69 73-77 81-85 89-93 97-01 12 How to lose a walk-over election? Panel data confirm the pattern at the individual level. From 20 percent volatil- ity in 1985, there was an increase to 30 percent in 1989 and 37 percent in 2001 (Aardal 2003).3 Opinion polls, using recall data, indicate even higher individual volatility in 2005.4 Hence, there is no doubt that Norwegian voters have “begun to choose” (Rose & McAllister 1986), but they are not necessar- ily making erratic or accidental choices. Previous research shows that Norwe- gians are to a large extent influenced by underlying ideological orientations and even position in the social structure when they decide which party to vote for, or which party to switch to (Aardal 2003; Aardal & Waldahl 2004; Aardal & Van Wijnen 2005). Let us take a closer look at the direction of changing party preferences. Even though the respective party leaders claimed that the center-right coali- tion was a success, and that the relationship between the parties was amicable, there were signs of political strain, in particular between the Christian Peo- ple’s Party and the Conservatives. The transition matrices from the MMI polls show that the Christian People’s Party lost quite a few voters to Labor and to the Center Party. This indicates that some Christian voters may have felt that the party had moved too much to the right during the companionship with the Conservatives.