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UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY THE IMPACT OF POLICY ON THE MILITIA A HISTORY OF THE MILITIA IN AUSTRALIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR MELISSA M. JONES STUDENT NUMBER: 3316668 THESIS PREPARED IN REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS (RESEARCH) 2012 i ORIGINALITY STATEMENT ‘I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.’ Signed …………………………………………….............. Date …………………………………………….............. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ORIGINALITY STATEMENT................................................................................ii TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................iii ABSTRACT............................................................................................................iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................................................................... v INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................1 CHAPTER 1 – THE BEGINNING: THE MILITIA PRIOR TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR....................................................................................................... 11 CHAPTER 2 – A NEW WAR BUT THE SAME MILITIA.................................. 42 CHAPTER 3 – THE POLICY DIFFERENCES EXTENDED............................100 CHAPTER 4 – THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DEFENCE (CITIZEN MILITARY FORCES) ACT 1943.......................................................................... 133 CHAPTER 5 – THE MILITIA AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR173 CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION...........................................................................198 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................ 203 iii ABSTRACT The aim of this thesis is to examine the decisions that impacted upon the structure and organisation of the militia (also commonly later known as the Citizen Military Forces (CMF)) during the Second World War against a backdrop of the general history of the organisation. Such an aim is achieved by discussing the political and military decisions that impacted upon it within military circles, particularly in comparison to the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF). During the Second World War, the militia underwent numerous organisational and structural changes that impacted upon its role and responsibilities. Through the analysis encapsulated in this thesis, a number of constant themes will repeatedly surface. These themes - financial, social and historical - form the fundamental basis on which the militia was organised during the war. For completeness and ease of analysis, the thesis commences prior to the Second World War and ends with a reference to the influential Millar Report of 1971. By doing so, the thesis traces the development of the militia from its historical predecessors and identifies issues relating to the organisation that were to constantly feature during the Second World War and beyond. By examining the various command, enlistment and training techniques used during the war, the thesis will also discuss how the ‘one Army’ concept conveyed at that time was little more than a public perception as pre-existing policy differences between the militia and 2nd AIF still existed. Although the militia has been in existence in one form or another for over one hundred years, there are few works that discuss the policy differences to a great level. This thesis is an attempt to fill this gap in an important part of the history of the Australian Defence Force and more specifically, the Australian Army, while highlighting the ultimate role of policy decisions on the management and organisation of any public matter. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis is the culmination of two years of study and I would like to thank all those who have assisted and encouraged me along the journey. Firstly, the assistance that I received in the early stages of my thesis from the staff at the National Archives of Australia, Australian War Memorial, National Library of Australia and the Australian Defence Force Academy Library, was extremely beneficial. They provided useful assistance whenever I asked them a question about the availability of resources, and were more than willing to discuss other options for sourcing documentation relevant to the work. My supervisors, Professor Jeffrey Grey and Dr Craig Stockings, were sources of profound insight. They were more than willing to answer questions I had and also discuss ways on improving the final product I wrote. To them, I offer my thanks for the assistance and discussions over the past two years which has allowed me to enhance my research skills. My main thanks though goes to my family. My parents and brother have provided support and guidance over the years. They have always been willing to have a chat about the studies I have undertaken, and have bourne, with good humour, the discussions that I have always had about matters that I would like to learn more about. Writing this thesis has allowed me to test myself to a greater level than what I had experienced previously with my academic studies. I have learnt a great deal not only about the militia (and indeed, the Australian Army), but also the opportunities available to me to test myself. v SENIOR RANKS / APPOINTMENTS Australian Prime Ministers during the Second World War Robert Menzies (26 April 1939 – 28 August 1941) - United Australia Party Arthur Fadden (28 August 1941 – 7 October 1941) - County Party John Curtin (7 October 1941 – 5 July 1945) - Australian Labor Party Frank Forde (6 July 1945 – 13 July 1945) - Australian Labor Party Ben Chifley (13 July 1945 – 19 December 1949) - Australian Labor Party Ministers for Defence during the Second World War1 Minister for Defence (also known as Minister for Defence Coordination (1939-1942) Robert Menzies (1939-1941) - United Australia Party John Curtin (1941-1945) - Australian Labor Party Minister for the Army Geoffrey Street (1939-1940) - United Australia Party Philip McBride (1940) - United Australia Party Percy Spender (1940-1941) - United Australia Party Frank Forde (1941-1946) - Australian Labor Party 1 There was a Minister for Defence from 1 January 1901 until 13 November 1939. On the outbreak of the Second World War, the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies abolished the position and created separate Ministers for the Navy, Army and Air. Menzies also became Minister for Defence Coordination. This structure remained in place until 14 April 1942 when John Curtin took the title of Minister for Defence. vi INTRODUCTION We can rely, and rely with confidence, for the defence of Australia, not upon a standing army, but upon our citizen soldiers.1 Unlike earlier conflicts, the extent of international involvement in, and effect of, the Second World War had not previously been seen in world history. Its impact on the history of Australia is reflected by the depth of military, sociological and policy research conducted on the subject since 1945. Unlike the First World War, technological, societal and political changes in the 1939-1945 period had seen the fighting of war come closer to Australian soil and communicated more quickly to the general public. As such, there were few Australians whose lives were not impacted by the events of the war. From a historiographical perspective, Australia’s involvement in the air, on the land and on the sea, has filled libraries around the country with publications dealing with the many experiences of the men and women who took part in the war effort. With regards to the wartime history of the Army, battles such as Tobruk, El Alamein and Crete have become iconic tales of the involvement of Australian soldiers in battle and provided details of how policy actions impacted upon the overall structure of the military and its members. This thesis, however, eschews the traditional study of ‘battles’ fought by Australians. It instead focuses on the government policy and actions, along with Army decisions, that impacted on militia soldiers, stationed in Australia, from 1939-45. For ease of reference, the term “militia” will be largely used throughout this thesis to allow for comparisons to the events prior to the Second World War. However, as the term ‘Citizen Military Force’ (CMF) became common in the later years of the war to refer to the militia, references to events around this time and subsequently, will instead chiefly refer to that term.2 1 Senator J.H. Keating (1901) as quoted in Thomas W. Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldiers, Alternative Publishing Co-operative, Sydney, 1980, p. 29. 2 In an article titled “Militia’s Title is “C.M.F.”’ (The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 October 1942), it was reported that the Minister for the Army, Mr Forde, said that an Army general routine order set out the A.M.F. was the abbreviation for Australian
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