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UNIVERSITY OF ACADEMY

THE IMPACT OF POLICY ON THE MILITIA A HISTORY OF THE MILITIA IN DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

MELISSA M. JONES STUDENT NUMBER: 3316668

THESIS PREPARED IN REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS (RESEARCH) 2012

i ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

‘I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.’

Signed ……………………………………………...... Date ……………………………………………......

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ORIGINALITY STATEMENT...... ii TABLE OF CONTENTS...... iii ABSTRACT...... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... v INTRODUCTION...... 1 CHAPTER 1 – THE BEGINNING: THE MILITIA PRIOR TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR...... 11 CHAPTER 2 – A NEW WAR BUT THE SAME MILITIA...... 42 CHAPTER 3 – THE POLICY DIFFERENCES EXTENDED...... 100 CHAPTER 4 – THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DEFENCE (CITIZEN MILITARY FORCES) ACT 1943...... 133 CHAPTER 5 – THE MILITIA AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR173 CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION...... 198 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 203

iii ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to examine the decisions that impacted upon the structure and organisation of the militia (also commonly later known as the Citizen Military Forces (CMF)) during the Second World War against a backdrop of the history of the organisation. Such an aim is achieved by discussing the political and military decisions that impacted upon it within military circles, particularly in comparison to the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF). During the Second World War, the militia underwent numerous organisational and structural changes that impacted upon its role and responsibilities. Through the analysis encapsulated in this thesis, a number of constant themes will repeatedly surface. These themes - financial, social and historical - form the fundamental basis on which the militia was organised during the war.

For completeness and ease of analysis, the thesis commences prior to the Second World War and ends with a reference to the influential Millar Report of 1971. By doing so, the thesis traces the development of the militia from its historical predecessors and identifies issues relating to the organisation that were to constantly feature during the Second World War and beyond. By examining the various command, enlistment and training techniques used during the war, the thesis will also discuss how the ‘one Army’ concept conveyed at that time was little more than a public perception as pre-existing policy differences between the militia and 2nd AIF still existed.

Although the militia has been in existence in one form or another for over one hundred years, there are few works that discuss the policy differences to a great level. This thesis is an attempt to fill this gap in an important part of the history of the Australian Defence Force and more specifically, the , while highlighting the ultimate role of policy decisions on the management and organisation of any public matter.

iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is the culmination of two years of study and I would like to thank all those who have assisted and encouraged me along the journey.

Firstly, the assistance that I received in the early stages of my thesis from the staff at the National Archives of Australia, , National Library of Australia and the Australian Defence Force Academy Library, was extremely beneficial. They provided useful assistance whenever I asked them a question about the availability of resources, and were more than willing to discuss other options for sourcing documentation relevant to the work.

My supervisors, and Dr , were sources of profound insight. They were more than willing to answer questions I had and also discuss ways on improving the final product I wrote. To them, I offer my thanks for the assistance and discussions over the past two years which has allowed me to enhance my research skills.

My main thanks though goes to my family. My parents and brother have provided support and guidance over the years. They have always been willing to have a chat about the studies I have undertaken, and have bourne, with good humour, the discussions that I have always had about matters that I would like to learn more about.

Writing this thesis has allowed me to test myself to a greater level than what I had experienced previously with my academic studies. I have learnt a great deal not only about the militia (and indeed, the Australian Army), but also the opportunities available to me to test myself.

v SENIOR RANKS / APPOINTMENTS

Australian Prime Ministers during the Second World War

Robert Menzies (26 April 1939 – 28 August 1941) - United Australia Party Arthur Fadden (28 August 1941 – 7 October 1941) - County Party (7 October 1941 – 5 July 1945) - (6 July 1945 – 13 July 1945) - Australian Labor Party (13 July 1945 – 19 December 1949) - Australian Labor Party

Ministers for Defence during the Second World War1

Minister for Defence (also known as Minister for Defence Coordination (1939-1942)

Robert Menzies (1939-1941) - United Australia Party John Curtin (1941-1945) - Australian Labor Party

Minister for the Army

Geoffrey Street (1939-1940) - United Australia Party Philip McBride (1940) - United Australia Party (1940-1941) - United Australia Party Frank Forde (1941-1946) - Australian Labor Party

1 There was a Minister for Defence from 1 January 1901 until 13 November 1939. On the outbreak of the Second World War, the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies abolished the position and created separate Ministers for the Navy, Army and Air. Menzies also became Minister for Defence Coordination. This structure remained in place until 14 April 1942 when John Curtin took the title of Minister for Defence.

vi INTRODUCTION

We can rely, and rely with confidence, for the defence of Australia, not upon a standing army, but upon our citizen soldiers.1

Unlike earlier conflicts, the extent of international involvement in, and effect of, the Second World War had not previously been seen in world history. Its impact on the is reflected by the depth of military, sociological and policy research conducted on the subject since 1945. Unlike the First World War, technological, societal and political changes in the 1939-1945 period had seen the fighting of war come closer to Australian soil and communicated more quickly to the general public. As such, there were few Australians whose lives were not impacted by the events of the war. From a historiographical perspective, Australia’s involvement in the air, on the land and on the sea, has filled libraries around the country with publications dealing with the many experiences of the men and women who took part in the war effort. With regards to the wartime history of the Army, battles such as , El Alamein and Crete have become iconic tales of the involvement of Australian soldiers in battle and provided details of how policy actions impacted upon the overall structure of the military and its members. This thesis, however, eschews the traditional study of ‘battles’ fought by Australians. It instead focuses on the government policy and actions, along with Army decisions, that impacted on militia soldiers, stationed in Australia, from 1939-45. For ease of reference, the term “militia” will be largely used throughout this thesis to allow for comparisons to the events prior to the Second World War. However, as the term ‘Citizen Military Force’ (CMF) became common in the later years of the war to refer to the militia, references to events around this time and subsequently, will instead chiefly refer to that term.2

1 Senator J.H. Keating (1901) as quoted in Thomas W. Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldiers, Alternative Publishing Co-operative, , 1980, p. 29. 2 In an article titled “Militia’s Title is “C.M.F.”’ (The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 October 1942), it was reported that the Minister for the Army, Mr Forde, said that an Army general routine order set out the A.M.F. was the abbreviation for Australian Military Forces,

1 Both directly and indirectly, the Second World War followed the example of wars beforehand and impacted upon the lives of millions of people worldwide. The results of the war also impacted upon political and military thought and practice for many years into the future. For the first time in its history, it appeared for a time that Australia was at risk of attack from a foreign enemy, and thus had to ensure that it was sufficiently defended. Overwhelming numbers of Australian men served in the Australian military – mainly the Army – and therefore, even outside of direct military campaigns, the impact of the military connection was felt amongst the general community. At a time when war came to Australia’s doorstep, the nation was transformed.

Despite the importance of the Second World War on the general and military history of Australia, since 1945 there has been limited scholarly effort invested into examining Australia’s militia in its own right. This is particularly so with regards to the policy decisions which shaped the force during 1939-1945. More often than not, the history of the militia in the war is incorporated within unit histories and works published on the activities of the Australian Army in general.3 Within this limited historiography, there remains no definite work on the impact of Government policy decisions on the militia. This is the central issue of this thesis.

which ‘included the whole of the military forces of the Commonwealth’. The article also indicated that the general routine order stated that the abbreviation ‘A.M.F should not be used when referring only to the militia, the correct designation for which [was] the Citizen Military Forces, or C.M.F’. Both militia and CMF though were often used interchangeably in the public. 3 This thesis will utilise the term 'Australian Army' regularly. Although in 2012, the term 'Australian Army' refers to Australia's military land force, in the Second World War, it was known as the Australian Military Forces (AMF). While the term 'Australian Military Forces' is utilised at various stages throughout this thesis (including in references to quotes of the Second World War), for ease of reference and readability, where the term 'Australian Army' is used, it can, depending on the timeframe discussed, refer to either the Australian Military Forces of the Second World War or the current Australian Army (existing since 1980).

2 The militia is a worthy subject of investigation. By the time the Second World War had (officially) commenced in 1939, the militia had gone through a number of peaks and troughs in its history stemming from the earliest days of British settlement in the colonies. On the eve of war, the impact of the of the 1930s on the community was still evident in many aspects of Australian life. The militia was largely considered to be a home defence force at a time when external threats were not in the forefront of the minds of many citizens (in comparison to economic considerations). The organisation suffered financially in the period leading up to 1939 and yet when war did come, it proved to be a pivotal part of the nation's war effort.

While this thesis discusses the involvement of the militia in the Second World War, it will do so against a backdrop of both Government policy and Army administrative decisions pertaining to the organisation. Such policy and administrative decisions prior to 1942 focused on the role of a home army at a time when protection by Britain, under the principle of Imperial Defence, was still considered a formality. This principle was also evident in decisions on funding, training, structure and organisation of the militia. By analysing such decisions against the overall role undertaken by the militia during the war, this thesis reveals the continuation of pre-existing and variable policies for the organisation.

The use of the term 'policy' throughout this thesis seeks to reflect general principles, decisions and procedures utilised and undertaken by the various Governments in relation to the militia. Like many public structures, throughout its history, the militia was subject to competing interests from a variety of sectors. Particularly in the years immediately preceding the Second World War, differences in principles, decisions and procedures relating to the militia were expressed by both political (being the relevant Government of the day) and military institutions (the Department of Defence and within it, the uniformed members of the Australian Army). Each institution had its own factors to consider in its decision-making before and during the Second World War. More often than not, pre-existing and differing agendas would see a lack of consistency

3 between the institutions which caused many of the problems experienced by the militia. Constant changes in the political parties forming Government would see different political agendas being pushed in relation to the military and therefore, the militia. Furthermore, even if consistency was achieved between political and military institutions on the management of, for example, the militia, actioning those decisions would prove difficult with long-standing internal Army factions (between the Staff and militia officers). These issues and their impact on the policies affecting the militia will be reflected throughout this thesis.

Despite the importance of the militia in the Second World War, very little has been published concerning the policy decisions that shaped it during the war years. Indeed, a review of the literature currently available on the militia reflects the neglect of the organisation during the war. The scholarly work undertaken to research the militia in their own right has either largely focused on two eras; before the Second World War and after it, or the place of the militia (or more generally, citizen soldiers) in Australia’s military structure. This is despite the militia (through the preceding militia forces) being referred to in countless numbers of Australian Army history books and a high proportion of men joining the organisation in comparison to Australia’s overall population. However, in this regard, Claude Neumann’s thesis, Australia’s Citizen Soldiers 1919-1939, and Dayton McCarthy’s thesis (later published), The Once and Future Army: A History of the Citizen Military Forces 1947-74, provide a solid foundation for understanding the militia during those periods.4 In addition, both works provide evidence of a number of key themes and features that were a constant in the management of the militia even in the period of the Second World War. Neither, however, nor the body of literature they include for discussion, detail in any meaningful way the period of 1939-1945.

In his work, for example, Neumann primarily investigates the ability of the

4 Claude Neumann, 'Australia's Citizen Soldiers, 1919-1939: A Study of Organization, Command, Recruiting, Training and Equipment', MA (Hons) thesis (UNSW at RMC Duntroon, 1978); Dayton McCarthy, The Once and Future Army: A History of the Citizen Military Forces 1947-74, , , 2003.

4 militia between the 1918 and 1939 to achieve its objective of protecting Australia from external attacks. In assessing its strength, Neumann looks at both policy and military decisions that influenced the overall structure, command, training, recruitment and procurement of equipment for the militia. Neumann concludes that the varying opinions of the role of the militia, in conjunction with a limited amount and utilisation of resources, drastically diminished the ability of the organisation to carry out its prescribed objectives to an adequate level. Neumann’s work provides a solid starting point for establishing the basis in which the militia during the Second World War had to proceed as a military organisation influenced by changing world and domestic events.5

Sitting conveniently on the other side of the Second World War, McCarthy’s work focuses on the period from 1945 until 1974. This period was characterised by the Korean and Vietnam wars, and ultimately was the period in which the prescribed role of the militia that had been in existence for many years previously, was changed. In particular, McCarthy’s work reflects the changing opinions on the role of a militia force at a time when technology began to influence the military strategy and policy decisions relating to the Army. The work also discusses some of the structural and organisational changes from a political and military perspective that impacted upon the militia (which was, by that time, known as the CMF). Ultimately, these changes led to the influential Millar Report of 1971. The subsequent implementation of the Report's suggestions saw the traditional militia no longer existing and instead being replaced by the Army Reserve. This led to an overall increase in political support to the organisation.6 The main advantage of the work conducted by

5 Other useful works on citizen soldiering prior to the Second World War include D.H. Johnson’s Volunteers at Heart: The Defence Forces 1860-1901, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1974, and John Barrett’s, Falling In: Australian and ‘Boy ’ 1911-1915, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1979. 6 In early 1973, Thomas Bruce (T.B.) Millar was appointed to head a Committee of Inquiry into the future of the Citizen Military Forces. The Committee (also comprising General Kenneth Green, Major General Donald Dunstan, Lionel Simpson, Wilfred Jarvis and Graham O’Loughlin) handed down its report in early 1974 and recommended, amongst other things, that the Force change its name to the Army Reserve and that it

5 McCarthy is that it provides evidence that the impact of some policies on the militia after the Second World War also occurred in the period prior.

However, whilst providing an indication of the structure of the militia in those eras and the clear sense of issues experienced by an organisation that was once numerically superior to the Regular Army, the work of both Neumann and McCarthy do little to providers readers with in-depth knowledge about the political and military decisions that impacted upon the militia during 1939-1945. Instead, a thesis written (and later published) by Craig Wilcox, is perhaps the only known published work that contains a relatively in-depth discussion and analysis of the citizens who made up the militia and its predecessor affiliates. However, Wilcox’s book titled For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia 1854-1945, was written against a backdrop of almost 90 years of citizen soldiering in Australia and its colonies.7 In particular, it focuses on the changes that occurred over the years which impacted upon the practice of conscription being enforced. While Wilcox’s work assists in understanding more of the personal experiences of citizen soldiers, it does not include a significant focus on the details and aspect of the specific political and military decisions impacting upon the militia.

Outside of specific works focusing on the militia, the majority of references to the organisation in the period 1939-1945 are contained within general histories of the Australian Army which, in turn, often focused on the involvement of the wartime, volunteer expeditionary force, the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF) in the war. As an example of this and reflecting the impact of deploying personnel to overseas localities, the television series, Anzac: Australians at War in World War Two, while providing great detail on the Australian Army during the war, covered limited detail on the experiences of the

become more closely integrated with the Australian Regular Army. The National Library of Australia (collection number MS 8605) holds Millar’s papers of which series 7 contains papers and reports relating to the Citizen Military Forces during 1973-1976. 7 Craig Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia 1854-1945, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1998.

6 militia in the period.8 Likewise, with the role of the militia limited to the Pacific region, the published works by , High Command and Inside the , provided limited information on policy decisions impacting upon the militia.9 It could be suggested that such a limitation of discussion stemmed from the overall higher proportion of official focus on the role of the 2nd AIF rather than the militia (for example, the published 22 part official history, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, focused primarily on regions away from the Australian mainland).10 Furthermore, while a number of published works and journal articles have noted the discrepancy between the 2nd AIF and militia during the Second World War, there has been no in-depth study as to how and why such discrepancies occurred.

Through utilising wide range of available sources, this thesis aims to add to the thin historiography of the militia during the Second World War. In particular, by analysing the decisions made by political and military leaders at the time against the overall role played by the militia during the war, this thesis investigates the continuation of inadequate policies for the organisation that had started many years prior. Despite a public persona that the militia were ‘ready, willing and able’ to defend Australia from possible attack, the overall lack of support the organisation received from many political and military leaders is a persistent theme through the years of the war and the majority of literary resources available on the era. The militia’s involvement in the war in comparison to their colleagues in the 2nd AIF has tended to obscure the occasionally difficult relationship between the organisation, military command and government, along with its place in Australia’s military history.

8 Anzac: Australians at War in World War Two (featuring footage shot by official war photographers provided by the Australian War Memorial, ), 2007. 9 David Horner, High Command, Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, in association with the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1982; David Horner, Inside the War Cabinet: Directing Australia’s War Effort 1939-1945, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996. Jeffrey Grey’s, The Australian Army, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001, provides a useful overview of the initial triggers of the disparity between the regular and citizen armies of the country. 10 (ed), Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952-1977.

7 In order to achieve its aims, this thesis is largely structured chronologically, but is not intended to group issues into particular time-frames as many of the issues relating to the militia continued throughout the war. Further, to adequately highlight the issues relating to the militia, arguments are included which predominately discuss and compare those issues against the backdrop and implementation of political decisions. An introduction to the militia prior to the Second World War is provided in chapter 1. Specifically, the chapter examines the role of citizen soldiers in Australia from pre-Federation to 1939. In particular, the development of citizen soldiers in Australia in conjunction with the implementation of the Defence Act 1903 and the theory of conscription is considered. An analysis of the organisational and administrative structure of the militia in the early part of the twentieth century is undertaken to provide a basis for any similarities and differences to the events of 1939-1945. This chapter ultimately examines the military and political manoeuvres that moulded the militia in the lead up to the Second World War.

Chapter 2 of the thesis focuses on two issues. Initially, an examination of the events – both within Australia and around the world – that shaped the re-emergence of the militia at the start of the Second World War is considered. Following this, an investigation focusing on an examination of the organisational and command structure of the militia from 1939-1942 unfolds. Such an examination is crucial for a subsequent analysis of the intended role of the militia in light of training and funding influences. The chapter provides a basis for understanding the continuation of a distinction between the volunteer and ‘regular’ soldiers within the Australian Military Forces (AMF).

Chapter 3 of the thesis continues on directly from the issues raised in the preceding chapter and examines, in particular, those men who served with the militia in the early years of the Second World War and the impact of policy decisions on them. The chapter analyses various aspects including the cohesion of the soldiers, the support given to the servicemen, and the militia’s impact on families and the community. Various aspects of the militia applicable to its

8 personnel including recruitment, age of soldiers, retention rate, conditions of service, pay, enlistment of aboriginal and migrant men, and the exemption of enlistment for some men are also investigated. In particular, such aspects are compared to those applicable to personnel within the 2nd AIF to demonstrate the differing policies pertaining to the two organisations.

Chapter 4 examines the political dimension that surfaced between the years 1942-1943 and its impact on the militia. With the threat of Japanese attacks on Australia imminent, this chapter examines the effect of community attitudes on the role of the militia and the change in military structure which was shaped by the influence of the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943. The lead up to the new Act is also considered in light of the political standpoint that would change not only the role of the militia, but also the (seemingly) widely publicised distinction between it and the 2nd AIF. In addition, while a small part of the chapter acknowledges the role of the militia overseas, it also focuses on the impact of policies on those soldiers not sent to the South West Pacific Area (SWPA).

The penultimate chapter of this thesis examines the decisions impacting on the militia from late 1943 until the end of the war. In particular, with the threat of attacks on Australia diminishing, the chapter reviews the changing role imposed on the militia which left the organisation akin to a bare shell by the end of the war. The chapter also focuses on the decisions made by the Government in regards to the reallocation of soldiers and their subsequent demobilisation or discharge. The chapter also briefly considers the militia after the Second World War as a basis for providing a continuation of the policies and decisions relating to the organisation during 1939-1945.

In concluding the thesis, the final chapter describes and discusses the overall findings of the research conducted. With the ever changing role of the Australian military throughout history based in part on resources and policy decisions, the chapter presents an analysis of the role of those factors in the militia during the Second World War. It describes the various factors that influenced the

9 militia’s ability to find a place in the Australian military structure. It also argues that the various disparities between the militia and 2nd AIF had been in existence for over a century prior to the Second World War and, as such, the various policy differences between the two organisations during the campaign were just a continuation of previous generations. Based on the continuation of pre-conceived views of both organisations, the political and military decisions made by officials did little to diminish the differences, regardless of how much it was attempted. The only way such differences could be drastically diminished would have been through a complete organisational change which would not occur for some years after the war’s conclusion.

Limits on space prevent this thesis from providing an in-depth account of the militia’s battles in . However, its role in this regard has already been widely documented through the literature available, such as that pertaining to the Kokoda Track. Neither does this thesis provide an overview of individual unit histories within the militia. While some references are made to individual units, providing a complete account is beyond the scope of this investigation. Instead, one of the many histories of units serving during the Second World War can be read in conjunction with this thesis to provide additional perspectives of the impact of decisions upon military personnel.

Through the research conducted, the thesis also demonstrates the legacy of the decisions made in the First World War which led to the disparity between the two organisations. It was historian, Joan Beaumont, who noted that those who fought and made decisions in the Second World War were either involved directly in the First World War or the children of those from that generation.11 As such, they were influenced by the qualities and characteristics established at that time. While many historians have written works focusing on the 2nd AIF and militia disparity, such work often focuses on the events surrounding the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943 and the impact it had in creating ‘one army’. However, the events leading up to the enactment of the Act were prevalent before

11 Joan Beaumont, Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity 1941-1945, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988, p. 12.

10 that period and continued after that time which meant that the policy differences were still evident years after the war ended.

In utilising the structure described, this thesis examines the role of the militia from personnel, military and political perspectives. It is important not to forget the former as it was they who had to deal with decisions made from the top of the military and political systems. In a manner akin to the traditional writing style of historian, C.E.W. Bean, there is a discussion of the impact of decisions upon individual militia soldiers.12 However, any discussion of individual soldiers requires complementary discussion on the strategic decisions made by officials which shaped them. As such, the thesis will use official records, histories and private documents to provide a view of the militia in the Second World War.

There can be no question that the militia, and the government decision making that shaped it from 1939-1945 is an important, if under-studied, part of Australia’s military history. This study of the structure and development of the militia in the Second World War provides an insight of the behind the scenes decisions impacting upon the organisation. Given the foundations of the militia and the extent to which men served in it (not only during the war, but also before and after), it is an organisation that has had a significant role in Australia’s history. For far too long, analysis of the background to the militia in the Second World War has been neglected in comparison to the scope of research conducted on the 2nd AIF. Therefore, just as the role of the 2nd AIF has been covered extensively, the impact of policy and organisational decisions on the militia is an important object of study and one which should not be disregarded.

12 C.E.W. Bean established an Australian tradition when writing about war and focused on discussing the people within it. It was Michael McKernan (M. McKernan and M. Brown (eds.), Australia Two Centuries of War and Peace, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p. 13), who described Bean’s work as ‘democratic history’, so that individuals were made the focus unlike strategy.

11 CHAPTER 1 – THE BEGINNING: THE MILITIA PRIOR TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR

… the performance of the splendid citizen army of Australia in the First World War was largely due to the training and experience its senior officers received with citizen soldiers in the various colonial militias.1

This chapter examines the role of the militia and its predecessors in Australia prior to the Second World War. In doing so, it traces various political and strategic military decisions that influenced and shaped the militia from its inception in Australia up to the start of the war in 1939. This will identify the series of key and enduring themes which continued to impact on the militia throughout period between 1939 and 1945. From these early beginnings, principles were formulated that dictated the role of the organisation for many years into the future. Although the chapter will briefly discuss events prior to the enactment of the Defence Act 1903, a large part is devoted to the period immediately following the Act’s commencement, the period around the First World War, and the political manoeuvrings of the 1920s and 1930s. Despite the extent of years covered by this chapter, a number of themes influencing the forerunners of the militia were apparent, such as funding and equipment constraints, structural limitations, and a lack of continual support from the political field. These are themes that continued throughout the Second World War and are therefore traced throughout this thesis.

The fundamental basis of citizen soldiering has been in existence for hundreds of years.2 Within Australia, non-professional, citizen soldiers have existed since the early years of the colonies.3 However, the development of

1 D.H. Johnson, Volunteers at Heart: The Queensland Defence Forces 1860-1901, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1974, p. 201. 2 Wilcox provides a useful overview of the history of citizen soldiers in European countries (particularly in Britain) (see: Craig Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia 1851-1945, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1998, pp. 5-8). 3 A useful work outlining the history of citizen soldiering in Australia is: M. Austin, ‘The foundation of Australia’s Army Reserves 1788-1854’, Defence Force Journal, no. 34, May-June 1982, pp. 46-89. Particularly around the time of Australia’s involvement in the

12 citizen soldiering in Australia occurred at a time when the defence issues facing the colonies were either short, localised affairs or, in the case of international matters, a sufficient distance away to limit the potential role for colonial soldiers. As early as 1788-1789, Captain Philip Gidley King formed a militia unit on Norfolk Island fearing a convict uprising might take him and other officers’ prisoner.4 However, due in part to Australia’s distance from Britain, other than relying on the sparsely separated garrison of British soldiers to provide protection or, at the very least, civilian training, the early years of settlement saw a lack of focus in the colonies on more formal military arrangements.5

The lack of policy focus on various early colonial militia groups existed for many years. The first recognised evidence of a formally authorised citizen’s military force being established in the colony of New South Wales occurred in 1800 when Governor John Hunter established the Volunteers of the Sydney and Loyal Associated Companies to assist in enforcing local law, order and defence.6 However, the minimal amount of political and military guidance or support that was provided to these volunteers was demonstrated with the apparent ease in which the Association was disbanded in 1801, soon after the perceived threat eased. Even at this early stage of the nation’s history, citizen soldiers were seen as a group providing little more than an interim level of protection in the

Boer War, a number of colonial newspapers also discussed the history of the militia (see: ‘Our Second Line of Land Defence’, The Mercury, 24 January 1900, p. 5). 4 ‘Part 1: Colonial Security, the Sudan and the Boer War: 1788-1902’, http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/docs/PART_1.pdf, unknown date, accessed 20 April 2010. Captain Philip Gidley King was the founder of the first European settlement on Norfolk Island and later the Governor of New South Wales. 5 Wilcox, op cit., p. 4; Arthur Kinloch, The Australian Question: A Pamphlet Comprising Certain Letters Published in the South Australian Register and Times, Register and Observer Officer, 1853, p. 19. 6 Governor John Hunter was the Second Governor of New South Wales. The Volunteers of the Sydney and Loyal Associated Companies was established to provide protection following rumours that a plot to rebel and escape was being planned by Irish prisoners (see: Marjorie Masson, ‘Australia’s First Volunteer Force’, The Argus, 2 January 1915, p. 4). The establishment of the Association also coincided with the events of the Castle Hill Rebellion in 1804.

13 community until other forces (generally the British soldiers) were available. When combined with the early volunteer tradition of respectability and civic responsibility, the colony’s officials would not have seen any reason to adequately train or financially support any organisation formed along the citizen soldiering principle. This system of militia organisation continued in all Australian colonies throughout the nineteenth century.7 Even when management of decisions relating to the colonial militia armies were through a centralised system, there remained a lack of understanding on the practical necessities of the organisation.

From 1 January 1901, the defence of the newly federated Australia became the responsibility of the Commonwealth.8 A range of defence related issues from this date emphasise the impact that political decisions had on the country’s military. Whereas previously, colonial military officials had some freedom to make decisions relating to their personnel, the more formal approach that was to be taken in the new system of government meant that military versus political decisions would be a continuing theme that had to be managed into the future. A Minister for Defence (John Forrest) was appointed in early 1901 to represent the colonial military forces which comprised of a variety of permanent, specialist, paid militia and unpaid volunteer personnel.9 However, at this stage,

7 For example, both Governor Lachlan Macquarie and Captain Edward MacArthur (through unsuccessful submissions in 1814 and 1825, respectively), sought to ensure a more formal local citizen force was established in the colony. With the advent of the Crimean War between Britain and Russia in 1854, a surge in the principle of civilians being called upon to serve in the volunteer military force occurred along with some level of government attention being focused on militia forces and making relevant policy decisions. Initially, this occurred with the passing of the Militia Act 1854 by the South , but there were still questions about whether the personnel were legally to be considered as civilians (in uniform) or part of the military (and therefore subject to military discipline and liable to be called up for service). 8 Although it was only in March 1901 that it formally assumed responsibility for defence matters and merged the colonial armies to form the Commonwealth Military Forces. 9 Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army: A History, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2006, p. 8. John Forrest (later 1st Baron Forrest of Bunbury) had a long career as a surveyor, explorer and politician in . When the Commonwealth was

14 there was no legislative basis for governing how the nation’s military – including its citizen force – was to be managed both in times of peace and of war. The structure was largely influenced by the previous (and more well-established) Victorian Department of Defence, as the Secretary of that Department (Robert Collins) became the Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Defence.10 Within this structure, until an appointee could be found, there was also initially no General Officer commanding the military which impacted on the ability to plan and strategise on the likely role of the defence force.11

Against this backdrop, however, was an ongoing perception of the role of the British military in defending Australia. Although defence was the responsibility of the Australian Government, the influence of the British Admiralty in surrounding waters was always apparent in political decisions relating to defence (particularly the navy).12 It was not until the enactment of the

founded, he was elected unopposed for the electorate of Swan in the House of Representatives. His term as Minister for Defence (from 1901-1903) saw him cope with Australia’s involvement in the final stages of the Boer War, along with raising Australia’s first overseas contingents and arranging for the continuance of the British Naval Squadron in Australia. However, reflecting the importance of Britain in the defence planning of Australia, at the Colonial Conferences of 1887 and 1897 (along with when in in 1902), Forrest held the view that Australian defence was a question of Imperial strategy, and not one of colonial initiative (see: F.K. Crowley, ‘Forrest, John (1847-1918)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/forrest-sir-john-6211/text10677, unknown date, accessed 19 November 2010). 10 Robert Henry Muirhead Collins was, in matters of defence policy, first and foremost a ‘navalist’. A former naval officer, Collins often opposed increases to the Victorian military forces on the basis that the money would be better applied to naval reparations (see; Chris Cunneen, ‘Collins, Sir Robert Henry Muirhead (1852-1927)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/collins-sir-robert-henry-muirhead-541/text9719, unknown date, accessed 1 November 2010. 11 This remained the case until the appointment of Major-General Sir Edward Hutton as General Officer Commanding from January 1902 to December 1904. 12 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War – External Relations since 1788 (2nd edn), Maxwell Macmillan Publishing, Botany, 1991, p. 23.

15 Defence Act 1903 (Defence Act) that there was an attempt to formally incorporate the various forms of militia organisations that had been established over the years into the long-term policy plans of the nation. However, while the Government attempted to ensure the security of the newly formed Federation, the minimal and disparate focus of the Act showed evidence of the overall nature of policy decisions in relation to the militia, along with the role of the British military.

The Defence Act attempted to enact policies relating to the militia by providing that employees joining the militia would receive protection against their employer’s work requirements. In addition, employers were not able to reduce the wage of a militiaman or dismiss them from their employment because they had joined the organisation.13 The lead up to the enactment of the Defence Act, however, reflected the nature to which the militia were subject to the decisions made at a higher level and the focus on strengthening the nation’s links with Britain. The first Defence Bill was defeated in April 1902 due in part to the increasing awareness of managing the economy against the finances required to maintain a national military force.14 Furthermore, with the dominance of the , there were few in the country that saw the need to sustain a military (including an Army) to a high level. As the newly appointed General Officer Commanding the Australian Army, Major-General Sir Edward Hutton noted in his Minute upon the Defence of Australia, the protection offered by the British and the associated imperial military strategy that resulted,

13 Defence Act 1903(Cth), s. 118A. 14 The Minister for Defence and military commandants from the former colonies met in March 1901 to draft the necessary legislative framework to establish the nation’s Army. The original Bill also included establishing the Governor-General as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (instead of the Minister for Defence), thus making the Army independent of control by the Government, and also ensuring that the soldiers would be subject to the legislative basis of the Act. The Prime Minister, Andrew Forrest, redrafted the Bill, but the poor drafting of the changes saw the Parliament again oppose it (see: Richard Pelvin, ‘The Foundation of the Australian Army 1901-1904’, Defence Force Journal, no. 111, March/April 1995, http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/docs/The_Foundation_of_the_Australian_Army_190 1-1904.pdf, accessed 5 May 2010).

16 more than offset any potential threat from neighbouring countries.15 Interestingly, one of the individuals pushing for a different stance was the Secretary for Defence who argued for a reduction of dependence upon Britain (although focusing primarily on the role of the navy).16

Despite the overall numerical strength of the various colonial militia forces, key decisions relating to them were absent from the Defence Act.17 This was despite the events of previous military campaigns evidencing the need for a strongly organised military force being in place early. As an example, while the Act allowed for conscription to occur, it was only for domestic service. In addition, the militia would not be sent outside of the Commonwealth in times of war unless its members volunteered specifically to do so.18 Therefore, from the commencement of the federated nation, characteristics were becoming apparent in relation to policies impacting on the militia. With a separate force having to be established if Australia was required to send soldiers to areas outside of the Commonwealth, the militia were in the middle of political decisions to keep defence expenditure low (noting that the navy was the first mechanism of defence), avoid any public negativity of a large army, and reduce the likelihood of any militia trained personnel being sent to overseas localities in which their

15 Grey, op cit., p. 67; Michael Evans, ‘From Defence to Security: Continuity and Change in Australian Strategic Planning in the Twentieth Century’, http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/docs/Serving_Vital_Interests_Evans.pdf, p. 4, accessed 20 April 2010. For a complete overview of Hutton’s opinion, see: Sir Edward Hutton, The Defence and Defensive Power of Australia, Angus & Robertson, Melbourne, 1902. Hutton’s Minute, which received much criticism at the time, proposed a garrison force to defend the major coastal centres and ports of Australia, along with a field force that could be sent wherever Australian interests required it. 16 Influenced by his former role as an officer in the navy, the Secretary for Defence (Robert Collins) wanted a locally manned and maintained naval fleet (and therefore, against the Admiralty’s scheme of 1898 for a Royal Naval Reserve in Australia). Although Collins’ ideas were accepted in August 1899 at a conference of colonial naval officers, it was not until 1907 that the principles were adopted by the Deakin Government. 17 The Military Forces of the Commonwealth Tables, Australian War Memorial, Series 3, Item [22]. 18 Defence Act 1903(Cth), s. 49.

17 suitability may be questioned.

In the period following Federation, there was an increase in the resources being acquired by a number of countries near to Australia. This was evidenced with the 1905 victory of Japan over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. However, policy decisions relating to the militia were minimal in the years that followed. With a lack of resources, funding and strategic direction (in aspects such as training), it was apparent that changes had to be made to ensure the militia were adequately prepared.

It was not until 1909, however, that amendments to the Defence Act were proposed. The changes compelled all young men aged between 12 and 26 to undertake various periods of military training in a cadet or militia unit.19 While this would help facilitate a greater number of Australians being trained for military purposes, it did not necessarily extend to ensuring that those personnel would be a part of an overseas Army contingent as the 1903 restrictions on the role of the militia were still in place. Indeed, the need to gather support for the 1909 changes to the legislation was demonstrated with the inspection of Australia’s defence force by Field Marshall Lord Horatio Kitchener.20 During a visit to Australia in 1909-1910, Kitchener inspected the situation in relation to the nation’s defence force. Although largely a visit to support the earlier legislative changes following public and private concerns over the impact of the amendments, Kitchener indicated that it was possible that in the event of an attack on Australia, the British Royal Navy would not necessarily be able to make it to the country in time to provide the necessary military support. As such, Kitchener noted that every citizen should be trained to defend the country.21 In

19 See: Defence Act 1903(Cth) as amended by Defence Act 1909 (no. 15 of 1909). The Universal Service Scheme was in force between 1911 and 1929. 20 Field Marshall Horatio Herbert Kitchener, KG, KP, GCB, OM, GCSI, GCMG, GCIE, ADC, PC (1st Earl Kitchener) (1850-1916), was a British Field Marshall who won the Battle of Omdurman and secured control of the Sudan. He would later go on to play a central role in the early part of the First World War. 21 Edwin Sharpe Grew, Field-Marshall Lord Kitchener: His Life and Work for the Empire, vol. III, MacIntosh Press, 2008, p. 39.

18 addition, reflecting the need for a strong local force to defend Australian shores, Kitchener suggested that the Maroochy River was a suitable location for a small army to form against an invading force.22 Although the review conducted by Kitchener saw a number of recommendations and ideas submitted for consideration by the Government, of particular note was the focus he placed on ensuring that training to soldiers was real and designed for war purposes only, and that the military had to be kept outside party politics.23 With the treatment of the colonial militia forces still engrained in the memories of many Australian men along with the abolition of numerous volunteer units by Hutton, there was a need for policy decisions to be made to ensure that the militia was functioning at an effective standard.

Subsequently, in the years directly leading up to the First World War, attempts were made to satisfactorily structure the nation’s Army, including the militia force. In particular, the decision to introduce compulsory military training saw a substantial increase – up to 50 per cent at some stages – to the size of the militia.24 However, despite the increase, there had been limited policy decisions to address the shortage of resources required by the personnel to ensure they had the necessary equipment to undertake any sort of defence function.25 Despite the training opportunities being progressively provided to militia personnel, with a lack of funding to receive resources, the potential effect of enhancing the role of the organisation was limited. Even when funding became available to the nation’s military from the Government, the perceived defence requirements of the day saw variances in the comparative funding given to the and the Australian Army. The variances in funding emphasised that despite the apparent change in the role and perception of the

22 Paul Burns, Line Controversy – Political Opportunism versus National Security 1942-45, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1998, p. 1. The Maroochy River is located just north of Brisbane, Queensland. 23 Commonwealth Bureau of Statistics, Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, Issue 55, 1969, p. 1087. 24 This figure was even higher if post-training was included. 25 Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army: A History, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2006, pp. 37-38.

19 Army, the Navy was the Government’s main priority. By early 1915, Britain had lent Commonwealth nations a total of ₤24,500,000 with the majority of Australia’s proportion of funds being incorporated into the overall defence budget to resource the nation’s naval force.26

Despite the Australian Labor Party voicing its opposition to conscription in the Australian military in the advent of war, a large number of militia personnel transferred out of the organisation to train and serve with the newly formed Australian Imperial Force (AIF) at the outbreak of the First World War. This transfer continued throughout the War. With the lack of opportunities available in the militia, the number of personnel who transferred to the AIF reflected the willingness of the personnel to commit to the war effort. It also suggested that if provided with sufficient and relevant political and military incentives, the militia was likely to receive greater support from its personnel in regards to its role. Further, the continual level of enlistments into the militia throughout the war suggested that if given the opportunity, there were sufficient numbers of personnel in the militia to justify it being provided with a greater political and military focus to allow it to undertake its assigned role.

In 1918, the citizen force in Australia totalled over 105,000 soldiers.27 Despite the level of numbers, the influence of the AIF in military training and history at the time was shown when, in late 1918, the remaining militia units were ordered to bear AIF numbers to assist in maintaining the memory of the AIF’s role in the First World War.28 Following the disbandment of the AIF at the conclusion of the war, the militia was reformed on a divisional basis. Partly resulting from the shift in population to major centres, the militia units were distributed amongst the same areas that had raised units of the AIF.29 Despite

26 ‘Our War Expenditure’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 April 1915, p. 8. 27 Barrett, op cit., p. 223. This figure excludes cadet numbers (even though they would often end up joining the militia when they reached the applicable age). 28 ‘1st RNSWL’, Website of the Royal New South Wales Lancers – Lancer Barracks and Museum, http://www.lancers.org.au/site/1st_Light_Horse.asp, June 2010, accessed 15 June 2010. 29 ‘7th Battalion (North West Murray Borderers)’, Australian War Memorial,

20 their numerical strength and role following the disbandment of the AIF, there was minimal consideration given the need for the remaining Army force (being the militia) to be given sufficient resources to allow it to be an effective option to defend the country in the interim period between any future conflict. Although it could be argued that after the events of the First World War, there was the hope that conflict to such a scale would not reoccur for many years (if not ever), it is difficult to avoid the clear developments in technology (such as the increasing use of air power) and shifting military focus. As the events of the First World War showed, the increasing spread of military power throughout the world meant that threats to Australian soil were more likely. If the entirety of Australia’s military was not prepared for such an eventuality, Australia’s preparedness for attack would be undermined which would also increase the threat to the country. Australia could not rely on a traditional defence protection agenda and had to ensure that it had sufficient forces to meet the changing world dynamics.

Against this backdrop, the Army changed its training structure for its remaining personnel. Originally set at four compulsory quotas, training for the citizen force shrank to two compulsory quotes for males aged between 18 to 19 years, and then down to nil (except on a voluntary basis). As a result, personnel were encouraged to enrol in rifle clubs to ensure a reasonable level of marksmanship was maintained.30 Despite this, Australia’s political leaders were still keen on maintain the status quo, which reflected the lack of policies and funding of the pre-First World War era. The focus of the ‘new’ militia scheme did not change the overall political views of ensuring that Australia’s defence strategy was solid. As evidenced by the political focus and events of the First World War, there was still a belief that attack would initially come via the sea and therefore, the first arm of defence should be the nation’s naval force. In addition, after the role undertaken by the AIF during the First World War, the political view suggested that if required, the force could be re-established and be as effective as before.

http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_11933.asp, unknown date, accessed 16 August 2010. 30 H.G. Chauvel, Report of the Inspector-General of the Australian Military Forces, Albert J. Mullett, Melbourne, 1922, pp. 10-11, 13.

21 The inter-war period demonstrated a strong focus on using the British model of defence planning in relation to the Australian Army.31 Accordingly, there was little preparation undertaken on the potential movement south (by land) of the military forces of countries north of Australia. This was despite the lingering concern for many years in relation to the potential threat of the Japanese military. The combination of a reliance on the British to protect Australia along with a continuing focus on the navy was to be a significant difficulty for the militia in the years leading up to the Second World War. Indeed, the focus on increasing the navy’s strength led to an overall breakdown in the ability of the Army to achieve its objectives as a military force.

The implementation of the Strategy throughout the British Empire during the inter-war period was an evolving strategy designed to deter or defeat aggression by Japan. The Strategy was designed to shift the Royal Navy to the most suitable position (being Singapore) to ensure the continuing strength of the British Empire in the south.32 With the attention of the British Imperial Defence Policy focused on the plan, Australia, still heavily reliant on assistance from Britain for defence purposes, could hardly align its military focus away from the British and its focus on Singapore. With the attention on the navy, the militia struggled despite the acknowledged role of such an organisation. As was noted by Colonel Charles Reppington:

… compulsory service to resist invasion is still part of the law in , and that the power to call upon all liege subjects to serve in such event is part of the undoubted prerogative of the Crown. The Militia Ballott (sic) has fallen into disuse because we have a two, if not a three-power Navy collected round our shores and 700,000

31 David Horner, Inside the War Cabinet: Directing Australia’s War Effort 1939-1945, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1996, pp. 8-10. 32 For further information on the , see: ‘Battle for Singapore’, Australian War Memorial, www.awm.gov.au/units/events_221.asp, unknown date, accessed 6 October 2010; Malcolm Murfett, ‘The Singapore Strategy’, in Carl Bridge & Bernard Attard, Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation to the Second World War, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Kew, 2000, pp. 188-204.

22 voluntary soldiers in arms. [Australians] have neither, and consequently it will not be a matter of surprise if you elect to alter this stage of affairs and to apply in practice the principles of laws which remain in abeyance at home only because of the conditions which [have been] named.33

Competing views against the strong naval focus and the importance of maintaining a strong militia was acknowledged in June 1919. A committee headed by George Swinburne found that Australia ought to maintain a strong, stable military force, and that the country’s home defence requirements had to be determined and supported with strong direction.34 Fundamentally, the report recommended certain measures being taken to produce a more effective citizen force. However, the importance of Britain in Australia’s defence was emphasised when the Committee found that while the militia could provide a reasonable number of divisions through the Universal Training Scheme, its overall effectiveness to protect the country would be limited if the Royal Navy was not available.35

In August 1919, a second report commissioned by the Australian Government was completed by Lord John Jellicoe.36 In it, Jellicoe noted that ‘Japan could … [assemble a large, fully equipped force] … from whense (sic) it could dominate trade routes and paralyse the operations of the British Navy’.37 Such an event would, in Jellicoe’s view, be a more likely

33 As quoted in Barrett, op cit., p. 37. Colonel Charles Reppington was the military correspondent for The Times. 34 George Swinburne was a member of the Defence Business Board of Administration. 35 Report of the Swinburne Committee on the Army Reserve, NAA, MP 367/1, item 629/1/741 (paragraph 2). 36 Admiral of the Fleet John Jellicoe, 1st Earl Jellicoe, GCB, OM, GCVO, was a Royal Navy admiral who commended the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland in the First World War. He later served as the Governor-General of New Zealand in the 1920s. 37 Report of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, GCB, DM, GCVO on Naval Mission to the Commonwealth of Australia, NAA, A5954, 1004/3, item 30383. See also: Papers of D.C.S. Sissons, vol. I, p. 108. Interestingly, Jellicoe’s view foresaw the events of two decades into the future with the commencement of the Second World War.

23 scenario if Britain was involved in a conflict in .38 Overall, the report suggested that if Australia’s defence force was not adequately prepared or resourced, the nation was potentially susceptible from attack by a country with a strong military. Therefore, the Government found itself in a precarious situation in relation to balancing funding constraints with limited resources and a continuing reliance on Britain.39

As a result of the Government’s defence policies which primarily centred on supporting the Royal Australian Navy and Royal Navy, attempts began to be made by Army officials to utilise the previous reports and seek stronger political support for the role of the Army. In conjunction with a group of senior Army generals, in February 1920, -General Sir Henry Chauvel prepared the Report on the Military Defence of Australia, which was based on the understanding that Australia was required to have a land army which was sufficient in size and ability to prevent invading armies from attacking the nation’s shores. Noting the composition of the group, the Report recommended that there was required to be an immediate acquisition of supplies and equipment so as to facilitate the adequate safety of defences into the foreseeable future.40 When the Government formally adopted the Report in May 1921, most of the focus was directed to the enhancement of areas in the southern part of the country, which neglected the likelihood of attack from countries to occur in the north, thus reducing the overall cost. Indeed, the Government had initially stated that any proposal resulting from the Report had to be ‘within reason’ considering the

38 Report of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, GCB, DM, GCVO on Naval Mission to the Commonwealth of Australia, op cit., p. 6. 39 For example, by early 1920, the Minister for Defence, Senator G.F. Pearce, was commenting on Australia’s financial position and signalled the need to reduce spending. Peter Dennis, ‘Heading for Disaster? Australia and the Singapore Strategy’, paper presented at the Fall of Singapore 60th Anniversary Conference, National University of Singapore, 16-17 February 2002, http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/specials/noprisoners/viewpoints/dennis.htm, accessed 3 March 2011. 40 Burns, op cit., p. 4.

24 country’s financial situation.41

Despite the views of the nation’s Army officials, the Government’s reluctance to adequately fund the militia was also reflected by a review of additional world events at the time. In addition to the general military support anticipated to be provided by Britain, the Government was influenced by a 1921 Report by the Committee of Imperial Defence which found that the likelihood of Australia being invaded was less than prior to the First World War. This was due in part to the decimation of the Germany Navy during the war. While there was little analysis undertaken on the potential for other countries to be in a position of military power against Australia, the Committee did note that Singapore and Hong Kong were the countries that Japan were likely to attack.42 The full impact of financial considerations on the militia was also reflected soon after with the Washington Naval Conference which took place between November 1921 and February 1922. Despite the conference resulting in a disarmament movement of the naval forces around the world (such as a reduction in size of the Royal Navy), there was no major change in, and restructuring of, the strategic thinking of the role of the Australian Army. At a time when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in its last stages and the British Government showing an aversion to military spending, few in Australia believed that the events of the First World War would occur again, thus negating any requirement for continual high-levels of defence spending or more strategic thinking on the role of the militia.43 As such, there was perceived to be no significant need to train the militia. With the events of the period suggesting that Japan was no longer a threat to the region, the militia was also subject to the view of the electorate who expected defence expenditure to be reduced by the Government.44

41 Report on the Military Defence of Australia, 6 February 1920, AWM1, item 20/7. 42 ‘Oversea Defence Committee’, Naval Base – Development of Singapore as a Naval Base, NAA, A5954, p. 1. 43 Robert Alberta Dayer, ‘The British War Debts to the United States and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1920-1923’, Pacific Historical Review, vol. 45, no. 4 (November 1976), pp. 569-595. 44 Burns, op cit., p. 5.

25 While home training of the militia recommenced in mid 1921, the reduction in overall funding saw its 127,000 personnel reliant on a limited amount of training. The extent of the limitations in training was reflected when, in their first year, militia personnel could expect to spend most of their time arranging themselves as a result of the re-organisation of units under the divisional scheme, along with being issued clothing and equipment. There was minimal financial or structural support which, by 1922, saw the Government making the decision to cancel compulsory military training in rural areas of the country and limit the number of training camps designated to occur that year.45 Such a decision would have an impact on the preparedness of militia personnel in later years. Overall, the impact of the period between 1921 and 1922 on Australia’s future defence policies was reflected in the following analysis:

… as a result of the Washington Conference and the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance the strategic position in the Western Position [was] adversely affected … should Japan unfortunately become aggressive in the future … the Four Power Pact between the United States of America, France, Japan and the British Empire may not save [Australia] from becoming involved in war.46

With the Washington Conference reducing the size and number of worldwide naval vessels, the Government was confident that Australia was secure and that only ₤8,000,000 was required for defence purposes in 1921-1922.47 Furthermore, between 1923 and 1929, while ₤20,000,000 was spent on the Royal Australian Navy, only 50 percent of that amount was allocated to the Army.48 With the provisions in the Defence Act 1903 still being applicable, the reduction in funding and training meant that the personnel who undertook training were more likely to find themselves transferred out of the militia so as to serve overseas if war was declared. The extent of the declining personnel numbers

45 Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, no. 16, 1923, p. 618. 46 R. Thornton, ‘The Semblance of Security: Australia and the Washington Conference 1921-1922’, Australian Outback, vol. 32, 1978, pp. 78-81. 47 This was subsequently reduced further the following financial year. 48 Long, op cit., pp. 8-9. The defence funding allocation was even less for the newly formed Royal Australian Air Force.

26 was further emphasised when the combination of a decrease in funding and amendment to training schemes saw the number of militia personnel drop substantially from almost 125,000 to around 35,600 in the 1921-1922 period.49

Despite the significant downturn in numbers, the Government did not convey how the decrease would impact on the nation’s defence structure. While the Government subsequently declared that the Army would require a war establishment field force of 270,000 men (with half of that number formed by compulsory military membership), there was no urgency in ensuring that number was met due to the successes of the First World War and the overall cost.50 This view was emphasised with the comments of politicians such as the Australian Labor Party’s, D.C. McGrath, MP, who indicated that Australians were, with no prior military experience, ‘equal to if not superior to any other troops’ after a month or two of training. 51 With such a view being conveyed in conjunction with the perceived continuing strength of the British Navy and the Army’s success during the First World War, questions were raised on the value of lengthy training for the militia.52

Regardless of the role and resources of the Navy providing some protection against any potential attack on Australian soil, the vastness of the country's coastline meant that the Navy would be stretched to protect the entire country from attack. In addition, with the increasing availability of other forms of military action (such as by the air) and the growing military capabilities of other countries, there was a need to sustain the militia to a reasonable level. However, the continuing support of the Government to the Navy was reflected in

49 ‘The Australian Army Reserve’, Defence Reserves Support, http://www.defencereserves.com/aspx/army.aspx, 2010, accessed 14 May 2010. 50 Grey, A Military History of Australia, op cit., p. 121; Wilcox, op cit., p. 85; Peter J. Dean, The Making of a General: Lost Years, Forgotten Battles – 1894-1941, Thesis (PhD), University of New South Wales, 2007, p. 114. 51 As quoted in Long, op cit., p. 3. 52 ‘Facing the Facts – New Defence Policy, Army Training’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Thursday 18 May 1922, p. 10; ‘Federal Session – Defence Policy’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday 17 November 1920, p. 12.

27 comments made by senior officials. For example, Frederick Shedden was a strong supporter of the Singapore Strategy and noted that since Australia was an island nation, it primarily required a naval defence to prevent a naval blockade.53 By reducing the level of funding to the Australian military (more so in relation to the militia) along with the overall continued reliance on Britain, it could be suggested that the Australian Government did not see an immediate threat on Australian soil forthcoming.

The Army, however, strongly refuted the Singapore Strategy and the view that it was a 'well-argued and well-founded’ strategic doctrine, primarily on the basis of its strong attention on the Navy.54 Army leaders had a suspicion of a potential threat to Australia stemming from invasion from nearby countries (particularly Japan) and were committed to increasing the Army’s position in the wider Australian military. 55 On this basis, there was a concerted effort by senior Army officials to highlight defence issues and how the Army would be able to assist. It was General Sir , a senior AIF officer (and also long time supporter of the militia), who most strongly recognised that in the event of

53 Dennis, ‘Heading for Disaster? Australia and the Singapore Strategy’, op cit. Shedden would later become the Secretary for the Department of Defence between 193-1956. He was a career public servant, having joined the Department of Defence in 1910. His background allowed him to make valuable contacts with British military leaders, thus giving him a unique position in preparing military administration and organisation. 54 Peter Dennis, ‘Australia and the Singapore Strategy’, in Brian P. Farrell & Sandy Hunter, A Great Betrayal?: The Fall of Singapore Revisited, Marshall Cavendish, Singapore, 2010, pp. 23-25. 55 As early as 1895, when Japan had defeated China in a short war, the former had been identified as a potential threat. The magnitude of that threat became more obvious following Japan’s success against Russia in 1904-1905. During and following the First World War, Japan gained in strength. Its industries had grown as a result of their munitions production for the Allies, and they had been awarded mandated territories to approximately 1000 kilometres north of New Guinea. The Japanese threat had been confirmed by Admiral Lord Jellicoe during his 1919 visit to Australia were he concluded that when Britain was involved in conflict in Europe, Japan might invade Australia and seize the Netherlands East Indies and New Guinea. Even during the First World War, Australia’s Director of Military Intelligence, Major E.L. Piesse concluded that Japan posed a greater threat than that suggested by the British .

28 an attack on Australia, the country would have to rely on its own resources for a period of time and not those of Britain.56 The view of Chauvel was reflected in comments made by a number of other military officials and reflected the disparate nature of political versus military thought at the time. In a similar vein, Colonel was in disagreement with Shedden's earlier views and indicated that Australia's vast coastline reduced the likelihood of a naval blockade.57 Meanwhile, the decisions made by the Australian Government in regards to militia training suggested that the political focus on defence needs was minimal and was not strongly aligned with the perceived military outlook that a threat on Australian soil was possible. The Army hierarchy would hold onto their position for the next twenty years. This was despite the Government failing to approve any proposals to strengthen or provide some level of training support to the militia as a result of financial constraints. The unclear and ineffective direction of the Government in relation to the militia was primarily a result of the strong influence of the Navy on decisions relating to the military.58 Meanwhile, the strength of the militia's field force continued to fall to 30,000 (or approximately 25 per cent of the total war strength).59

Despite the previous lack of attention on the organisation and declining personnel numbers, the period from 1923 saw a gradual shift in the thinking of the potential role of the militia. Following a change in Government in 1923, estimates indicated that the Army would take at least four months training and preparation in order to be fully prepared for any potential attack on the country.60

56 Alan Dupont, ‘Australia’s threat options: a Search for Security – Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence’, no. 82, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991, p. 23. 57 The divide between the political and military perceptions on Australia's army was shown when, in the 1930s, Wynter was transferred to a junior post and Lavarack was replaced by a British officer (Lieutenant General ). 58 J. McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, St Lucia, 1976, p. 51. 59 Department of Defence, Estimates of Expenditure 1922-1923 – Explanatory Statement (prepared by Direction of the Minister for Defence), CPP, Vol. II, 1922, p. 1268. 60 Claude Newmann, Australia's Citizen Soldiers 1919-1939: A Study of Organisation, Command, Recruiting, Training and Equipment, Thesis (MA), University of New South

29 The Australian Labor Party subsequently outlined an alternative system to the strong naval focus of the Singapore Strategy and in doing so, established a link to the Army hierarchy’s earlier attempts to shift the attention of the Government away from the Navy. The Army’s earlier views had continued at varying levels. For example, in a lecture in 1926, argued that it was necessary to build up Australia's army and air capacities rather than solely rely on the Navy due to the vulnerability of Singapore.61 The Australian Labor Party favoured the focus on the nation's new Air Force, coupled with a well-equipped Army, to manage the potential vulnerability of naval vessels to mines, aircraft and submarines. Likewise, the option was also considered a cost effective solution to the country's economic condition as the Party identified that battleships cost significantly more to run than aircraft.62

By the late 1920s, in-depth political and military discussions were taking place in which the pros and cons of anti-aircraft guns and aircraft were deliberated. Such discussions impacted upon the potential for the Army to strategically plan its procurement of equipment in conjunction with the limited funds at its disposal. Reflecting the policy decisions of previous years which had dictated separate training systems in the Army, it was only in 1929 that the instructors' course (previously the sole domain of the regulars) was opened to the militia.63 However, the militia's pre-existing recruitment and retention issues continued for many years.64 By the late 1920s-early 1930s, in addition to the perceived role of the military during peacetime not being an important employment field, the life of a soldier was still largely an unknown to many civilians and, as such, not to be actively considered or undertaken.65 These

Wales at Duntroon, 1978, p. 78. 61 Long, op cit., pp. 8-9. 62 G. Hermon Gill, 'Prelude to Victory' in Australia in the War of 1939-1945 (vol. 1), Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957, pp. 18-19. 63 Grey, Australian Brass: The Career of Lieutenant General Sir , op cit., p. 60. 64 Jeffrey Grey, Australian Brass: The Career of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, Cambridge University Press, Oakleigh, 1992, p. 51. 65 As Gavin Long noted, 'if conferred little prestige; indeed, an Australian who made the

30 views about the benefits of military service along with the changing nature of the economy were reflected in changes to Government policy based primarily on world affairs. The Great Depression saw the Scullin Government having to reduce defence expenditure against general questioning of the value of the militia and the limited development of Australia's defences and low ammunition supplies.66 With the limited defence budget at the time, the militia also found it had to decrease its approved establishment by over 50,000 men and almost 1,000 officers over the period around 1920 to 1930. This led to there not being sufficient numbers of trained personnel available to command the remaining troops in units across the country.67 Defence expenditure alone in the 1929-1930 to 1930-1931 Federal Budgets dropped by almost £2,000,000, of which most savings occurred as a result of the disbandment of five citizen infantry . Military salaries and expenditure on capital equipment were also severely impacted.

The Australian Labor Party’s return to Government signalled a continuation of policies of previous years. A reduction in militia training coupled with the strong focus on maintaining the strength of the Navy (despite world events indicating that other strategies may prove beneficial), was a central agenda of the Party during this period.68 Hence, despite the focus of Australian defence planners on the potential threat of an increasingly powerful Japan to Australia's security, overall sustained support was given to the Army (and indeed, the Air Force) after the events of the First World War.69 Although there was no

militia a hobby was likely to be regarded by his acquaintances as a peculiar fellow with an eccentric taste for uniforms and the exercise of petty authority' (see: Long, op cit., pp. 11-12). 66 ‘Summary of Proceedings of the General Meeting of the Council of Defence held on 12 November, 1929', in Meany, Australia and the World, pp. 369-373. 67 ‘Correspondence concerning the provision of officers for the militia, second half of 1926', NAA, MP367/1, Item Number 465/6/2378. 68 Richard Williams, These Are Facts: The Autobiography of Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams KBE, CB, DSO, Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1997, p. 200. 69 The victory of Japan over Russia in 1904-05 was the first indication of Japan becoming a threat to Australia. There was an Anglo-Japanese alliance in the First World War, but with

31 direct threat to Australia at the time, the changing world dynamics suggested that there was the potential for issues to occur in the future. As such, the lack of opportunities afforded to the militia to strengthen its skills was further exacerbated in 1929 with the final abolition of compulsory military training (the Universal Training Scheme) and the reintroduction of the voluntary service system (which also led to a high turnover in units).70

By 1930, a further political decision on the militia saw the disbandment of one-twelfth of the militia infantry establishments.71 The abolition of the training also impacted upon the opportunity of the militia to sufficiently train additional personnel. This led to the militia having to find alternative options to the compulsorily enlisted personnel that had been influential since the end of the First World War. During the 1930s, the organisation of the Army continued in the same vein has had been the case in the First World War. The militia was structured into infantry and horse-mounted cavalry divisions, and fixed coastal fortifications were used at strategic ports.72 Despite low numbers, the militia was still able to provide a number of experienced officers and soldiers who could be used to expand the Army to an effective level in the event of war. However, with the downturn in personnel numbers over the preceding decade, it was not considered necessary for the militia to be represented on the country's Military Board during the period between 1920 -1930 in either a formal or consultative capacity.73 This led to insufficient detail being conveyed about the organisation’s

its increase in strength during that period, as Admiral Lord Jellicoe acknowledge, Japan was a growing threat. 70 Grey, Australian Brass: The Career of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, op cit., p. 51. 71 This comprised five infantry battalions, two light horse regiments and two batteries of field mostly from rural area. By July 1930, another two light horse regiments and nine battalions were removed from the order of battle (see: Neumann, op cit., pp. 90-91). 72 Ian Kurling, Red Coats to Cams: A History of the Australian Infantry 1788 to 2001, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 2004, pp. 106-107. 73 The Council of Defence was established in 1905 at the same time as the Military and Naval Boards and the post of Inspector General, to deal with policy matters. Expert advisors and representatives of the Citizen Forces were eligible to attend as consultative members. Prior to the First World War, a militia representative had been summoned as a consultative

32 needs from both the Government and Army.

Upon the United Australia Party (UAP) coming into power in 1932, a further shift in political planning on Australia's defence options occurred. Whereas the focus of the Australian Labor Party was to maintain the earlier 'anti-invasion' policy which was reliant on known and close threats, the UAP focused on the Army being restructured to repel raids and the ending of the loss of traditional militia establishments. In addition, there began to be a shift to seeking a greater understanding of the issues impacting upon the militia. For example, in 1932, the Minister for Defence, Sir George Pearce, directed the Military Board to convene a series of Militia Commanding Officers' Conferences to be held in each Military District. The conferences were to obtain the views of Commanding Officers (COs) on the results of the militia system of voluntary enlistment. This was to afford the COs with the opportunity of freely discussing the results of voluntary enlistment and to also consider suggestions relating to the voluntary training system.74

This shift was emphasised further in that with the end of the Great Depression, the Government was in a position to increase its spending on the armed forces. However, consistent with previous Government planning and the continuing influence of the Singapore Strategy, the Navy received the majority of funding (as evidenced by the acquisition of the ships Sydney, Yarra and Swan). The history though of a lack of resources and funding available to Defence, and subsequently the militia, limited the opportunities for training of its personnel and the potential for its officers to receive the appropriate training in both strategy and technology. For this new generation of militia officers, such limited training was to have a detrimental impact upon their place in the organisation in future years. As historians Jeffrey Grey and Craig Wilcox have noted, military technology and

member of the Military Board (see: J.W. McCary, Memorandum by the Minister of State for Defence on the Administration and Control of the Defence Forces of Australia, Melbourne, 2 November 1904 in C.P.P, Vol. 2, 1904, pp. 357-60 and Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No. 1 (7 January 1905)). Indeed, the militia did not have a full representative on the Military Board until 1948 when Major-General G.F. Wootten was appointed. 74 See: AAO 72 (31 May 1932) as quoted in Neumann, op cit., p. 133.

33 theory advancement were difficult to keep up with on a part-time basis.75 The part-time nature of the militia was further shown with many militia units parading at only 25 per cent of wartime establishment and militia officers only required to undertake two weeks of training a year (of which tactical exercises were minimal). This was focused on the new defence policy being on the provision of defence against raids. With the impact of the 1920 to early 1930s lack of support to the militia, it was also common to find militia units severely under strength (in some cases, up to 40 per cent) which also impacted upon the instructional and training capabilities afford to the personnel.76 The militia was never going to be equipped with modern weapons and equipment – the best they could hope for was the reuse of First World War weapons. For example, in the early 1930s, the militia's 19th Regiment found itself converted in status to an armoured car role. However, it never received the appropriate vehicles to conduct this role.77 The impact of the lack of focus on the organisation was further emphasised with the force only having 'a negligible number of out of date armoured fighting vehicles, no anti-aircraft artillery, no anti- weapons, no modern mortars for close support, no army field artillery … and inadequate quantity of medium artillery and no heavy artillery.'78

By 1935, the militia had only 21,000 active personnel. It was against this background that the Government commenced a recruitment campaign in the mid 1930s that attempted to promote to all sections of the community the benefits of joining the militia by emphasising the potential of personnel to receive unique, new uniforms and training. There was also a focus on establishing new units, assigning a recruiting officer to raise the publicity of the militia, and also provide an increase to the pay previously available to militia personnel. These factors

75 Wilcox, op cit., p. 93; Grey, The Australian Army, op cit., p. 98. 76 Grey, A Military History of Australia, op cit., p. 134. 77 Grey, Australian Brass: The Career of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, op cit., p. 61. 78 Wilcox, op cit., pp. 100-01. See also: Brett Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1998, pp. 49, 56-57; 'a) First Report, 1938, by Lieutenant General E.K. Squires, Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces, b) Revised Report by the Military Board, 1939, on the Squires First Report, 1938', AWM1, 20/11.

34 stemmed from previous evaluations into the militia, such as the fact that militia uniforms were found to be either unsuitable for training or a deterrent to enlistment.79 In 1938, the Government also announced a stockpiling of weapons and the doubling in the strength of 35,000 of the militia.80

The work required to alter the militia following earlier policy decisions was reflected when, even after the Government's military advisors sanctioned the formation of new militia units, the militia still only contained approximately 77,000 personnel. In part, this situation was emphasised in the comment by Craig Wilcox that politicians focused on acquiring weapons and equipment rather than nurturing the military.81 Further, the lack of policy support given to the organisation was still evident in that the new pay (8 shillings) offered during the training period to men willing to join the militia was hardly an incentive as it was still less than the average civilian wage available at the time.82 It should be noted, however, that if the new militia personnel stayed at drill for three years, they were promised a payment of twelve pounds for their training commitment (which was two and a half times the average weekly wage at the time).

The organisation and administrative structure of the militia prior to the Second World War also emphasised the varying nature of policies at that time. There was no consistency in the management of full and part-time Army personnel, and senior positions or decision making roles were often filled by (the minimal in number) regular soldiers with the commands of units and

79 Neumann, op cit., p. 137, 156. Such views were conveyed as close to the Second World War as 1936-1937. Despite attempts to rectify the situation, by mid-1939, there was an overall lack of uniforms (amongst other items) in the militia which would, in turn, impact upon the morale of the militia personnel and their support from the wider community 80 Mark Johnston, The Australian Army in World War II, Osprey Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 2007, p. 4. 81 Wilcox, op cit., p. 106; David Horner, High Command: Australia's struggle for an Independent War Strategy 1939-45, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1982, p. 13. 82 Wilcox, op cit., p. 101; C.B. Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression: A Study of Economic Development and Policy in the 1920s and 1930s, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1970, p. 128.

35 predominately assigned to militia personnel. Staff Corps officers were assigned command of the six district bases, the organisational headquarters based in each state, and provided the administrative and logistic support to the militia.83 The control and administration of the Army resided with the Defence Committee and the Military Board of Administration.84 With this difference in roles, it was common for militia personnel to complain of not being a party to policy decisions.

From this basis, the growing division between senior Staff Corps officers and those officers in the militia continued up until the Second World War.85 The issue surrounding the tension included the different rates of promotion for the two branches, and the debate over suitability for command.86 In relation to promotion, the end of the First World War saw many permanent staff losing their AIF rank and seniority. However, their ex-AIF colleagues in the militia were able to retain both their rank and seniority, while also obtaining promotion at a quicker rate. With some less experienced, part-time officers receiving promotion earlier than permanent officers, there was bound to be some sort of confusion, if not resentment, within the Army and which were exemplified by decisions impacting upon the organisation and its personnel. As the Inspector-General Major-General E.K. Squires commented upon in 1938, in relation to the Staff Corps:

… the present conditions of service are such that … they had created amongst the officers now serving – and particularly those who are now approaching higher ranks – a feeling of despondency which cannot be but detrimental

83 Grey, Australian Brass: The Career of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, op cit., p. 53. 84 The Defence Committee was founded in May 1926 and subsequently regularised in March 1929. It comprised three Chiefs of Staff and a member of the Secretariat of the Department of Defence. The Military Board of Administration incorporated the heads of the principal branches of the service (the Chief of the General Staff, Master General of the Ordnance, Quartermaster General, and a business member and a finance member, from the Department of the Army). 85 Dean, op cit., p. 156. 86 Grey, Australian Brass: The Career of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, op cit., p. 52.

36 to the best interests of the service.87

The negative relationship between the militia and their regular colleagues which stemmed from effects of policies also impacted upon the cohesiveness of the Army. There was limited opportunity available for militia personnel to be involved in policy decisions impacting on the organisation.88 The distinction and disparity between the two organisations was also impacted by the decision relating to the age of retirement of personnel.89 Officially, Staff Corps officers were not required to retire from the military until a later age than militia officers.90 Not only did these policies enhance differences and a level of resentment within the Army itself, but it also meant that Staff Corps officers were likely to stay in the military for a longer period. The alternate view though is that even with the most junior officer ranks (ie. ) not being required to retire until 48 (in the militia) and 55 (in the Staff Corps), their ability to undertake active deployments and exercises was more limited than that of their younger colleagues. Furthermore, despite the need to train and prepare all militia personnel, much of the attention by officers at this time was to increase the likelihood of individuals joining the commissioned officer ranks after having served times in the lower

87 'First Report by Lieutenant-General E.K. Squires, Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces', AWM54, Item 243/5/58, as quoted in Grey, The Australian Army, op cit., p. 104. 88 As an example, the Commanding Officer of the 20th Light Horse Regiment pressed for the formation of a light car troop in Shepparton (with a larger amount of wealth, and therefore, motorised vehicles), than at Seymour (with a larger amount of railway employees) (see: '12 June 1936 – Minute to the 3rd Calvary ', Australian Military Forces, Formation of Light Car Troop, NAA, MP358/3, 106/2/235). 89 In addition, the backgrounds of Staff Corps appointees also suggested a focus to ensuring that individuals with the more likely academic background to suit policy roles were placed in such a position. With their tendency to come from a wealthier background than CMF personnel, the members of the Staff Corps were thus in a greater position to push a particular agenda or influence decision makers. This was emphasised in the First World War when approximately two-thirds of the senior citizen soldiers coming from professional or business backgrounds (see: Neumann, op cit., p. 174). 90 '“No More Monashes”: General Hits Staff Corps', The Sunday Sun and Guardian, 28 November 1937, p. 3.

37 ranks.91

Against this lack of experience, militia officers and instructors were often unprepared to lead formations and the associated training of new tactics and the use of new military weapons.92 Neumann has suggested that the training provided by militia officers was ineffective as they were 'inclined to forget all the work they had learnt while serving in the ranks'.93 For example, as late as 1937, there was a lack of instruction provided to non-commissioned officers in regards to fundamental skills such as map reading and the utilisation of anti-gas techniques.94 At a time when militia training was not compulsory, this lack of training in an essential skill was not conducive to promoting the benefits of home defence. In addition, the sustained implementation of relevant policies continued to not occur, partly due to the overall lack of funds available from the government to run a sufficient number of courses.

The impact of the minimal training provided to the militia prior to the Second World War was subsequently noted by the militiaman, H.B.S Gullett, who noted in 1947:

From personal experience, I can say that the standard of the militia in pre-war days was so low that on the eve of the war the militia forces could not have undertaken the simplest military operation against a trained force with the least chance of success … . They were a paper army, good for nothing for practical purposes except in the minor degree that they served as a training ground for officers.95

Although partly influenced by the training expected during wartime, this view was also reflected in comments made by Lieutenant Colonel E.G. Keogh, who indicated that the training of soldiers was a 'waste of time', although officer

91 Defence Act 1903(Cth), s. 11A. 92 Major-General J.D. Lavarack to the Secretary of the Military Board, 'Training of Commanders and Staffs', 23 September 1935 in Military Board Agendum No. 88/1935 (no date of meeting), as referred to in Neumann, op cit., p. 226. 93 Neumann, op cit., pp. 176-77. 94 Ibid., p. 220. 95 As referred to in Neumann, op cit., p. 195.

38 training was good.96 This standard of training led to the effectiveness of the militia being diminished until actions were taken to rectify the situation.97

With the decreasing level of world stability, it was not until 1939 that sustained policy changes occurred to impart some level of realism into the training provided to the militia. On the outbreak of war, militia personnel were trained in how to fire and maintain light machine guns, mortars and anti-tank guns, and began to be issued and be able to wear steel helmets and gas masks.98 Despite the training though, on the ground, weapons were still limited as were human and material resources. By late 1939, it was becoming more apparent that Britain and Germany were on the brink of war. Permanent soldiers began to be called up to man garrisons and on 2 September, militiamen were called to reinforce the permanent artillery and engineers in the coastal forts.99 With such a show of reinforcing the exposed parts of the country, the public could be excused for believing the militia was suitability managed and resourced. However, the opposite was the reality to many men.

Leading up to the eve of the Second World War, the years of neglect by politicians showed that the militia was inadequately prepared for the 'business [of] modern soldiering' in light of a lack of funding.100 While training standards were showing signs of change, militia personnel did not have a solid awareness of the advances made in military technology and the associated techniques to combat against modern tools and engineering developments. They often had to rely on private vehicles, samples of new weapons (due to a lack of funds to acquire larger

96 Ibid. 97 Directorate of Military Training (Army Headquarters), 'The Basis of Expansion for War', Australian Army Journal, No. 12, May 1950, p. 7. 98 ‘War Touches in Rally – Recruiting at Newcastle', The Sydney Morning Herald, Friday 27 January 1939, p. 12. 99 ‘Australia Prepares – Defence Arms Manning', The Sydney Morning Herald, Monday 3 September 1939, p. 13; 'Melbourne Notes: First-Class Excuses for Second-Class Travelling', Cairns Post, 2 September 1939, p. 16. 100 Archibald Wavell, Generals and Generalship, Macmillan Publishing, New York, 1941, pp. 22-23.

39 numbers) or utilise weapons (such as the .303 inch Enfield rifle or Lewis guns) that were remnants of First World War supplies.101 It was also common for the weapons issued to the militia at the commencement of the Second World War to be handed out straight from storage from supplies of weapons used two decades previously, often without an awareness of their serviceability or suitability for service at that time.102 On occasions, militia personnel were also required to utilise token weapons in the absence of any serviceable weapons.103 In addition, the extra supplies that were available became unusable over the years as a result of the limited amount of training that the militia was able undertake. With a lack of modern weapons, the militia were only equipped for small scale invasions or attacks, which was hardly suitable considering the increasing likelihood of a major attack from nearby countries.104 As such, it would take a sustained period and updating of earlier policies to ensure that the militia was up to the standard required to face battle.

A number of weapons able to be used by militia personnel were not obsolete. However, while many countries utilised First World War weapons and supplies before the Second World War, they had also advanced the weapons of

101 H.G. Chauvel (as CGS) to the AG and the QMG, 'War Organisation of a Calvary Division', 19 March 1930, NAA, MP 7292, Control Symbol 19371/23; Colonel J.D. Lavarack (DMO & I) to all major HQs, 'Modern Formations 1931', AHQ Melbourne, 5 February 1932, MP 729/2, Control Symbol 19541/157. This situation had been occurring for a number of years. By the mid 1920s, the Council of Defence accepted a reduced reserve of 150,000,000 rounds of .303 inch ammunition (Council of Defence Meeting on 23 June 1927, Department of Defence, Council of Defence Meeting 23/6/1927, in NAA, MP729/2, Control Symbol 1851/2/243. This was half of the previously approved reserve (Inspector General's Report, Pt II, 31 May 1921, paragraph 8; Inspector General's Report, 31 May 1922, paragraph 10); J. Francis, 'The Citizen Military Forces', Australian Army Journal, No. 41, October 1952, p. 12. 102 Wilcox, op cit., p. 109; Stan Wick, Purple Over Green: The History of the 2/2 Australian Infantry Battalion, 1939-1945, Printcraft Press, Sydney, 1977, p. 5. 103 Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Lavarack (Director of Military Training), 'Maintenance of the Organisation of Units during Collective Training (Circular Memorandum MB 594), 16 December 1925 in 8th Field Regt – Year 1925, 10. Bundle of Files, AWM 417/20/31 as referred to in ibid., p. 247. 104 Ibid.

40 their respective military forces and continued to procure new military items. In part, the continual use of First World War weapons by the Australian Military Forces was considered beneficial from a Government perspective. With the level of funding required, the minimal funds required to ensure the militia had weapons at its disposal would have been a major influence in the ultimate decision to continue the use of some weapons. Overall, due to policy decisions on weapons resources and the strategic allocation of available funds, the militia were unprepared for weapon use both during training and during attacks, and any resources provided for training were hardly effective to ensure the maximum level of Australia's defence. As a result of the perceived lack of an imminent threat, the Government's prioritisation was on other matters pertaining to Australia's military forces. It would have been difficult for militia personnel to make the community aware of the inadequacies of their weapons as there was still the focus on the strength of the British military and that any limitation would be offset by the resources they could bring in any defence of Australia. As Long noted, '[o]bsolence and deficiency are relative terms; … Australians judged their force by the standard of the British regular army.'105

The events described in this chapter suggest that right up until the eve of the Second World War, there were limited policy decisions enacted and maintained to allow the militia to be prepared for any future conflict Australia would be a part of. Various ideas abounded as to the scope of any future threat to Australia. For example, the focus for the Minister for External Affairs (Sir ) was to constantly consider world affairs so as to defend Australia from invasion. On the other hand, the Government's decision of protecting the country from intermittent attack was supported by officials including the Treasurer (R.G. Casey) and high ranking military officers (General and Admiral Ragnar Colvin).106 Furthermore, the Army's ability to seek support for any future involvement in defending Australia was hampered by the views of the other forces, each intent on furthering their own service's agenda in a

105 Long, op cit., pp. 40-41. Although Long did later suggest that the militia were adequately supplied. 106 Ibid.

41 tight and restricted political minefield. For example, Admiral Colvin did not agree with the Army's view (enunciated by Major-General Lavarack) that moderate to large scale raids on Australia were a possibility, and Air Vice-Marshal Richard Williams’ argued that any raid would be dealt with more effectively by the Royal Australian Air Force than the Army.107 With the militia not having a member in a sufficiently high position to convey the requirements of the organisation, there was uncertainty in implementing and maintaining policies relating to it. Further, with disagreements occurring between services attempting to increase their respective influences and power, the militia could not obtain the necessary policy support to manage and further its personnel. To fully ensure the adequacy of the nation’s military, there was a need to impart relevant policies on all services. As such, from these beginnings, a shift was required in the policy directives relating to the militia. Such a shift had to occur before the organisation was in a position to adequately defend the nation and able to adapt to changing world affairs. Until then, the militia would be impacted in its ability to carry out its designated role.

107 'Notes of Discussion at Meeting of Defence Committee Held on Tuesday 1 March 1938', NAA, A2031, Vol. 4, p. 2.

42 CHAPTER 2 – A NEW WAR BUT THE SAME MILITIA

… there is, I believe a growing recognition of the fact that military training for the defence of Australia should be a normal part of our civic life, and that if it is to be just and democratic, it should be made compulsory.1

This chapter examines the role of the militia and how this, and other aspects of the organisation, continued to be shaped by government policies in the early years of the Second World War. At this time, the main theatre of war was centred in Europe which meant that many Australians would not (at least initially) experience the impact of war directly. This geographical and strategic reality dictated the role of the militia in the period from 1939 to 1942. With the Australian Government having to decide on the role its military would undertake during the war, imperial defence policies were still evident in the policy decisions made for both the defence of the nation and support to other Allied countries. Furthermore, with the provisions of the Defence Act 1903 still in force along with the raising of the 2nd AIF, the potential for an increase in the level of militia involvement in Australia’s war effort in the early years of the war was limited. Consequently, this meant that the training provided to militia personnel was of variable quality. As such, the militia’s organisational and command structure followed the pre-war precedent in the early years of the Second World War. In addition, the various political and military decisions on training in conjunction with funding options were limited, and this would impact on the role of the militia for the remainder of the war.

Despite a strong level of experience amongst its personnel, as a result of the events and policy decisions that occurred after the end of the First World War, Australia went into the Second World War with an Army ill-prepared, untrained and inadequately equipped for the requirements, structure and technologies of

1 Speech made by Prime Minister Robert Menzies, 15 November 1939, as quoted in ‘Fact Sheet 162 – National Service and War, 1939-45’, National Archives of Australia, http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs162.aspx#section1, unknown date, accessed 8 October 2010.

43 modern warfare. An examination of the numerical strength of the militia illustrates the impact of maintenance of a two Army system along with the constant issues of maintaining stable personnel numbers. As identified in chapter 1, prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the Australian Army was effectively split into two distinct forces. By September 1939, the smaller part of the Army comprised 2,800 full-time members of the Permanent Military Force (PMF) while the 80,000 part-time militia personnel made up the majority. Mixed in between the two were a large number of soldiers who had served in the AIF during the First World War and designated as part of the AIF Reserve.2

Despite the numerical strength specified by the Government, there was no policy directive on how such a number was to be maintained outside the initial push for personnel. On 25 August 1939, with the invasion of Poland by Germany still a week away, unofficial correspondence was sent to Captain W.D. McNeill Graham in the War Office detailing a list of militia officers in England who were likely to offer their services to Australia’s military force.3 Subsequently, on 2 September 1939, a communication was sent to Officials which indicated that Australian militia and reserve officers currently in England were to ‘return [to] Australia otherwise we [are] not responsible [for] pay of pension'.4 It was stated that the militia officers on the active list should take precedence over Reserve Officers in returning to Australia to undertake their respective appointments. However, as they were only required to serve in Australia, there

2 'A.I.F. Reserve', The Argus, Saturday 8 April 1939, p. 3; 'A.I.F. Reserve', The Argus, Wednesday 20 September 1939, p. 2. See also: 'Report by the Committee Assembled to Consider the Close Association of Members of the A.I.F. with the Australian Military Forces', Department of Defence, Melbourne, 1939. 3 Unsigned letter to Captain W.D. McN. Graham, 25 August 1939, in Australian High Commission, Militia Officers Return to Australia, NAA, A2908. Captain Graham was a member of the British Army and later Commanding Officer of the 172nd Field Regiment. 4 Cable from the Military Liaison Officer (unnamed in correspondence) to the Official Secretary (Military Liaison). Whilst unnamed in the correspondence, from a review of other documentation of the same file, the Military Liaison Officer is believed to be Lt. Colonel W. Bridgeford, M.C (then, attached to Australia House in London). The Official Secretary (Military Liaison) is not identifiable from the documentation on file.

44 was minimal policy support given for their passage home where required.5 In this regard, the potential for the militia to undertake a significant role in the defence of Australia was acknowledged. To achieve this though, they required a sustained level of solid policy support to effectively undertake their role in modern warfare and in an organised manner. Subsequent policy decisions though often minimised the level of resources provided to the militia, and therefore, impacted upon the number of personnel joining and remaining in the organisation.

Following the adoption of the Precautionary Stage on 2 September 1939, approximately 8,000 personnel from selected militia units were called up for 16 days' continuous camp training.6 These personnel were to assist with the coastal anti-aircraft defences across the country. However, the militia personnel were not in the position for a considerable period of time before the decision was made to relieve them of their guard duties in preference for the AIF Reserve Garrison Battalions.7 This is despite earlier efforts to assist militia officers stationed

5 Correspondence from the Military Liaison Officer to the Official Secretary, 'Militia and Reserve Officers', 2 September 1939, in Australian High Commission, Militia Officers Return to Australia, in NAA, A2908; correspondence from A/Military Liaison Officer to the Official Secretary, 'Militia & Reserve Officers', 12 September 1939, in Australian High Commission, Militia Officers Return to Australia, in NAA, A2908. 6 Brief from C.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) to the Secretary, 'War Measures Instituted since the Outbreak of War', 4 November 1939, in Department of Defence, War measures instituted since the outbreak of war, in Australian War Memorial, CRS AWM 54, Item 459307. This followed the measures outlined in the War Book Plans (the War Book of the Commonwealth of Australia is held at the NAA (A5954). See also: Ilma Martinuzzi O'Brien, 'Citizenship, rights and emergency powers in Second World War Australia', The Australian Journal of Politics and History, June 2007. The Precautionary Stage refers to steps taken when the international situation is so threatening that war seems imminent. A number of additional records are available outlining procedures to be taken as a result of the Precautionary Stage being announced. In particular, the militia's role in such a stage is detailed in: Military Board: Instructions regarding District Base Defence Schemes and tables showing militia units to be called up by districts at precautionary stage, in Australian War Memorial, AWM 54. 7 Brief from C.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) to the Secretary, 'War Measures Instituted since the Outbreak of War', op cit.

45 overseas to return to Australia.8 This suggests that there was limited policy consideration as to the most appropriate use of the militia personnel to defend Australian shores, which subsequently had the potential to lead to inadequate policy proposals relating to the militia itself. Indeed, the announcement of Australia’s involvement in the war with Germany on 3 September 1939 signalled the start of a political and legislative requirement to ensure the militia were sufficiently organised for warfare.9 This partly involved ensuring that there were sufficient numbers of personnel able to undertake military service so as to align with the war-time mobilisation figures designed to assist in maintaining the nation’s security and defences.

By 1am on 4 September 1939 – barely six hours after Prime Minister Menzies address to the Australian public confirming the nation’s involvement in the war - the Government was conferred with full powers to formally mobilise the militia along with other Australian military forces. The proclamation, which was signed by the Governor–General, stated that:

… such parts and members of the Citizen Military Forces as shall from time to time be directed by the Military or by any officer thereto authorised by the Military Board …[and] shall be employed on war service and shall attend as so directed.10

Subsequently, on 5 September 1939, the Government called up the militia in

8 The backgrounds of the militia officers who were provided with assistance to return to Australia from London at the start of the war varies considerably. Some examples include a Sergeant in the 13th Field Ambulance (6th Hygiene), A.A.M.C, , and a Lieutenant in the 12/50th Battalion, . 9 On the night of 3 September 1939, Australians heard their Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, announce that it was '[his] melancholy duty to inform [them] that in consequence of Germany's invasion of Poland, Great Britain [had] declared war upon her, and as a result, Australia [was] also at war'. The speech made by Prime Minister Menzies is quoted at numerous locations. A clip of the speech can be accessed at: National Film and Sound Archives, 'Menzies Speech: Declaration of War (1939)', http://aso.gov.au/titles/spoken-word/menzies-speech-declaration-war/clip1/, 2011, accessed 8 January 2011. 10 ‘Mobilisation Order’, The Argus, 4 September 1939, p. 7.

46 groups of 10,000 men noting that conscription into the militia for Australia's defence was every man's legal liability.11

In the week following the announcement of the militia call-up, there was uncertainty as to the enlistment options available for Australians in London as a message was received notifying the military to ‘stop recruiting at once’.12 The lack of clear guidance in this regard was reflected in another occasional occurrence where militia officers were unable to return to Australia and instead sought to join another Army, such as the British.13 These men were advised that there was no necessity for militia officers to submit their resignation from the organisation to be able to join the British Army concurrently.14 While they were willing to join the war effort, the overall lack of sustained policy action saw many personnel with knowledge and experience of the militia not returning to Australia. In turn, the policies prevented potential militia personnel from joining (or re-joining) the force early in the war as offers of military service could only be accepted in Australia.15 The loss of potential personnel in this manner impacted upon the building of the nation’s defences with personnel. This lack of firm policy decision on the militia early on in the Second World War would also impact on the overall organisation, preparedness and command of the personnel within the militia in future years.

Shortly prior to the Second World War, the Department of Defence examined proposals for the raising of a special force and improving the standard

11 Wilcox, op cit., p. 108. 12 Letter from Lieutenant G.H. Kinder to Captain R.G. Pollard, 9 September 1939, in Australian High Commission, Militia Officers Return to Australia, NAA, A2908. 13 Cablegram sent to Army Melbourne from the High Commissioner’s Office – London, 4 September 1939, in Australian High Commission, Militia Officers Return to Australia, NAA, A2908. 14 ‘Paraphrase of Cypher L. 206 – 20/9’, undated, in Australian High Commission, Militia Officers Return to Australia, NAA, A2908. 15 Letter from Lt. Colonel W. Bridgeford (Military Liaison Officer) to Alfred Stirling, 11 October 1939, in Australian High Commission, Militia Officers Return to Australia, NAA, A2908.

47 of militia training. From this, Prime Minister Menzies announced on 14 September 1939 that 40,000 members of the militia would be called up for training. Additionally, a 20,000 volunteer expeditionary force (to be known as the 2nd AIF) was also to be formed for overseas service.16 On 16 September 1939, news reports notified the Australian public that the Government intended to call up a militia force of 80,000 personnel (in two equal drafts) to receive one month continuous camp training.17 By doing so, it was intended to ensure that a total Army of 100,000 men would be available. However, the lack of clear focus on the role of the militia during wartime in comparison to their traditional role was reflected in that the men called up were only required to serve for 16 days at a time which, despite their part-time role, was a minimal period to prepare them for the realities of modern warfare. It was then intended that the position of the militia would be reviewed after two months and a decision on further training or expanding its strength be made.18 The Government’s decision to raise an infantry division of 20,000 men ‘specifically enlisted for continuous service either at home or abroad’ was partly designed to assist with the British war effort.19 By raising the force, however, at a time when concerns about the potential threat from Japan were still prevalent, it also suggested that the Government was more focused on maintaining policy considerations with Britain.20

16 The 2nd AIF was modelled on the Australia Imperial Force (AIF) raised during the First World War. 17 ‘Volunteer Force of 20,000 Men’, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 September 1939, p. 15. 18 ‘Cabinet Agenda – Militia Forces – Proposals for Raising a Special Force and Improving the Standard of Militia Training’, Department of Defence, Proposals for Raising a special force and improving the standard of militia training: Conference of A/C.G.S. and Militia Commanders with Minister – 16/8/39 and Cabinet Memorandum 22/8/1939, NAA, A5954, 896/6. 19 ‘How Can We Serve’, The Courier-Mail, Thursday 28 September 1939, p. 4. On 15 September 1939, the Australian Government announced the raising of an infantry division (later to become the ) ‘for service at home or abroad as circumstances permit’. By late November, it was decided that the 6th Division should leave for the Middle East with the first elements departing in January 1940. 20 This was primarily done on the belief that as long as Australia assisted Britain in wartime, Britain would, in turn, assist Australia.

48 While the initial Government focus was on obtaining sufficient numbers to support the required strength of the military, the slow intake of personnel into the 2nd AIF quickly changed once the Government undertook advertising campaigns to publicise the opportunities for the force to defend Britain and Australia overseas.21 However, outside of the initial push for personnel, there was no similar policy to maintain militia numbers. With such levels of Government focus, an increasing level of men enlisted for service in the 2nd AIF and were likely to have been influenced by not only the opportunity to travel overseas, but also to be involved in an organisation that received policy support. Meanwhile, the focus of the filling of 2nd AIF positions so as to assist in the war in Europe was not reflected to the same scale of the militia. While militiamen were encouraged to join the 2nd AIF, minimal policy decisions were made to fill positions that subsequently fell vacant. Instead, more policy attention was given to the movement of militiamen to the 2nd AIF and the impact of such a decision on the various industries that the economy and war effort were reliant upon. For example, commands were instructed by the War Cabinet on 19 October 1939 not to fill vacancies in the militia which were caused by both enlistments in the 2nd AIF and general discharges from reserved occupations.22 The level of militia transfers to the 2nd AIF at this early stage of the war was reflected in mid-October 1939 when the Minister for the Army, G.A. Street, observed that the burden of enlistment in the 2nd AIF would be required of the ‘men of the militia, their wives and families and employers’.23

21 Joan Beaumont (ed.) Australia’s War 1939-1945, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996, pp. 7-9. 22 Brief from C.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) to the Secretary, 'War Measures Instituted since the Outbreak of War', 4 November 1939, in Department of Defence, War measures instituted since the outbreak of war, in Australian War Memorial, AWM 54. The War Cabinet was the decision making authority for ‘all matters in relation to the conduct of the war other than matters of major policy’ (which was to be a full Cabinet consideration). 23 J. Grey, A Military History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Oakleigh, 1999, p. 142. However, Street also subsequently indicted the problems that would arise with ‘the withdrawal of militiamen from the industry’.

49 In November 1939, the compulsory military service provisions of the Defence Act 1903 were enacted in order to ensure that the required strength of the Army could be maintained for the length of time required by the Government.24 In a statement to Parliament on 15 November 1939, Prime Minister Menzies noted that the War Cabinet had determined that the militia forces needed to be kept at an adequately trained strength of not less than 75,000 men.25 After over a decade since it ceased, the decision would lead to the reintroduction of compulsory military training with effect from 1 January 1940. With the announcement of a return to conscription made soon after the announcement of war, this saw the first group of men eligible for full-time home defence duty being called up for service. Against the backdrop of the role of the militia, a War Cabinet meeting held in Melbourne on 5 February 1940 signalled an early focus on analysing the estimated strength of the militia and the manner in which the total strength was to be maintained to ensure it was kept as close as possible to the initial strength of 75,000.26 However, reflecting the nature of the debate on the militia’s strength and how reliant it was on funding was that, despite the recommendations of the Minister for the Army being approved, it was subject to the review of Estimates of Expenditure (by the Department of the Treasury).27

Influenced by these requirements, initial Government intentions had

24 The Round Table – A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the British Commonwealth, vol 39, 1940, p. 693. 25 Mr R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister to Mr R.G. Casey, Minister for Supply and Development (in London), ‘Cablegram unnumbered 6 December 1939’, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – Historical Publications, unknown date, accessed 18 May 2010, http://info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/2ecf3135305dccd7ca256b5d007c2afc/4 ae4e5366ce2e724ca256b7d007d1efe?OpenDocument; ‘Fact Sheet 162 – National Service and War, 193945’, National Archives of Australia, unknown date, accessed 6 April 2010, http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs162.aspx. 26 ‘Extract from Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, Melbourne, 5th February 1940’, in Department of Defence Co-ordination Secretariat, War Cabinet Agendum, No. 31/1940 – Policy to be Adopted for the Future Training of the Militia, A5954. 27 ‘Extract from Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, Melbourne, 28th February 1940, in Department of Defence Co-ordination Secretariat, War Cabinet Agendum, No. 31/1940 – Policy to be Adopted for the Future Training of the Militia, A5954.

50 preferred that approximately half of the 20,000 men required for the 6th Division AIF be drawn from the ranks of the militia. However, militia personnel were discouraged initially from joining by their superiors. It was often only when the officers joined the 2nd AIF that their subordinates followed.28 Despite intermittent attempts to increase militia numbers, by the end of February 1940, there was a continual shift in focus and enlistments to the 2nd AIF to the extent that the militia was still more than 12,000 men short of its numerical target.29 Wilcox suggests that such a numerical disparity was influenced in part by government policies that saw any increase in militia numbers through training negated by the transfer (to the 2nd AIF) or departure of approximately 75 per cent of the initial intake.30 The widespread impact of such numbers across the militia is reflected in the structure of the force’s war strength. At this time, the approximate strength of the militia for the 1940-41 year was identified as follows:

Militia (other than Light Horse) 20,000 Light Horse 10,000 Universal Trainees 20,000 (a) those called up under Part IV of the Defence Act (one quota) (b) those now being registered under Part XIV of the 30,000 Defence Act to commence training in 1940-41 (one and a half quotas)

Total 80,000 Table 1: Estimated strength of the militia for 1940-41 year.31

During 1940-1941, in order to preserve the strength of the militia for

28 Grey, A Military History of Australia, op cit., p. 143. 29 Wilcox, op cit., p. 112. 30 Ibid. 31 C.B. Laffan, Secretary to the Military Board, ‘Policy to be Adopted for the Future training of the Militia’, to the Secretary, Department of the Army, 13 February 1940, Department of Defence, [War Cabinet] Agendum – No 31/1940 – Future training of militia – Policy, NAA, A2671.

51 home defence, members of the militia were prevented from joining the 2nd AIF.32 While this action was partly a response to the long-standing threat of the Japanese military, it also demonstrated the need to ensure that the militia was prepared for any potential attack on Australian soil and that action had to be taken to ensure it had the personnel to undertake such a role. This policy shift to the militia was further shown in February 1940 when the Military Board outlined its proposed structure for the militia and indicated that the militia was to assist in providing a minimal basis for the mobilisation of the Australian Army in the event of co-operation between allied nations to defend the Commonwealth.33 While Australia continued to send its naval forces to Britain's aid, it was not until June 1940 that the first real signs of re-managing Australia’s home defence policies occurred. On 16 June 1940, the decision was made to train and develop a militia force of 250,000 men for home defence.34 The staggered nature of such an intake at a time when the war had already commenced meant that the effects would take time to be observed. The extent of the need to increase the size of the militia was reflected in the fact that by July 1940, the its strength had fallen to 60,500.35 In addition, figures showed that 19,525 militia personnel had transferred to the 2nd AIF until 5 August 1940 (with 3,717 of those transferring during the month of July and first 5 days of August 1940).36 Newspaper reports indicated that transfers from the militia to the 2nd AIF had ‘for some weeks’ been at a rate of 6,500 a week.37 Despite the growing understanding of the potential threat of Japan by the Government, the transfer of personnel at this time reflected the continual discussions in the Government on the role of the 2nd AIF.

The variable level of the total number of militia personnel available in the

32 ‘Ban on Militia Enlistments’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Tuesday 16 December 1941, p. 6. 33 ‘Policy to be Adopted for the Future Training of the Militia’, 5 February 1940, NAA, A2653/1, 1940, vol. 1. 34 David Horner, High Command, op cit., p. 36. 35 Wilcox, op cit., p. 108-113. 36 ‘Militia Men Join A.I.F’, Sunday Times, Sunday 18 August 1940, p. 10. 37 ‘The Only Way to One Army’, The Courier-Mail, Tuesday 15 September 1942, p. 2.

52 early years of the Second World War emphasised the impact of the Government’s policies regarding the organisational awareness and planning in existence for the force. By September 1940, the 2nd AIF had a total strength of over 114,000 while the militia only had 80,000.38 Almost a full year later (July 1941), the militia totalled 173,000, but they were not all utilised by the Army for service.39 Indeed, approximately 45,000 were on full-time duty at locations across the country.40 Militia personnel continued to be either transferred to the 2nd AIF or considered exempt from duty on the basis of being employed in essential occupations. Such a situation was hardly uncommon prior to the war.41 However, as time progressed, it became clear that active theatre operations would see a shift of personnel numbers between the two organisations so that the 2nd AIF would continue to outnumber the militia. The extent of the numerical composition of the two organisations was particularly evident at the time of Japan entering the war. The military actively sought militiamen to join the various divisions of the 2nd AIF and enlisted the large number of volunteers who wanted to fight the Japanese into the 2nd AIF while the remaining extra personnel were assigned to militia formations. This was despite the militia's purpose being the protection of Australia's borders.42

The requirement of compulsory military training continued during the war which provided a moderate level of certainty in relation to militia personnel

38 'Summary of Camp Strength by Camps of AIF and Militia Forces', 21 September 1940, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Summaries of Strength of AIF in Australian Camps, NAA, A816, 52/302/50. 39 F.M. Budden, The Chocos: The Story of the Militia Infantry Battalions in the South West Pacific Area 1941-1945, F.M. Budden, Summer Hill, 1987, p. 9. 40 Ibid., p. 12. 41 Some high-profile transferees from the militia to the AIF included, Colonel James Whiteside McCay (was the former Director of Intelligence in the militia, the Inspector-General of the 1st AIF and Commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade at Gallipoli and of the on the Western Front) and Lieutenant-General Frank Horton Berryman (who later became an Officer in the Australian Staff Corps). 42 Palazzo, op cit., p. 150.

53 numbers despite the transfers to the 2nd AIF.43 While unmarried men turning 21 were required to undertake three months of military training, by mid-1942 all men between 18 and 35, and all single men between 35 and 40, were also required to render military service. The Secretary to the Military Board, Mr C.B. Laffan, stated that in order to maintain the strength of the militia at a figure of between 75,000 to 80,000, there should be either:

(a) a restriction in the number of militia personnel at the rank of Private being invited to re-enlist in the force along with more liberal exemptions provided in the event that the total strength of the militia is too large; or (b) an intensive drive undertaken to induce militia personnel to continue serving and that an extension of training localities (to regions outside the Army’s main bases) would assist if it became apparent that the total strength of the militia was too small.44

However, it was still acknowledged by the Government that it was uncertain as to how many militia personnel were likely to join the 2nd AIF, thus leading to unsuitable policies and potentially impacting on the strength of the force. With the shift in organisational structure and personnel numbers, by October 1942, a decrease of militia personnel by over 20,000 had occurred, leading to a total force of 262,000. Meanwhile, the 2nd AIF’s numbers had risen further.45

While the number of transfers indicated support amongst personnel for the opportunities offered by the 2nd AIF, it also suggested that the limitations imposed on the militia as a result of the Defence Act 1903 maintained a two-Army system in Australia’s military structure, with each having their own respective administrative and management structures. However, the large scale transfer of personnel also reflected the issues of the Government policy during wartime. With the continual movement of personnel and units, there was a balancing act of the continuing requirements of the Defence Act and the need for one army to be

43 Military Organisation and Structure’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/structure.army.asp, unknown date, accessed 2 July 2010. 44 Ibid. 45 Wilcox, op cit., p. 124.

54 liable for service anywhere. There was also neglect in regards to the need for consistent policies to support and train the militia so as to minimise any practical difficulties for operational commands. With the Government’s policies focusing on the 2nd AIF, the impact of this in practice on the militia was reflected in enlistment levels and the overall loss of experience from its ranks.

In a further reflection of the state of policy pressure experienced by militia personnel, continual reports were received of Commanding Officers of units coercing militia personnel to transfer to the 2nd AIF. This was a change to the early years of the war. Complaints specifically indicated that members of the militia who did not join the 2nd AIF would be sent to Darwin, or Broome. These instances were in direct opposition to a general routine order issued by Army Headquarters which had at its basis the voluntary transfer of personnel.46 However, by February 1942, the Army regulations were changed to allow members of the militia to volunteer for service with the 2nd AIF but they would stay with their existing units. Despite the shift in the structure of units, differences in opinions between the 2nd AIF and militia were not limited to views expressed in public spaces.47 At times, it extended to within camp compounds. For example, it was common for members of both the 2nd AIF and militia to transfer items between each other.48 Although these actions were likely to be undertaken by members within each service, they may not have occurred had each service felt that they could obtain the support required for them to undertake their objectives.

Following the emergence of Japan as a threat against Australia, the excess men who applied for entry into the 2nd AIF were instead posted to militia units. Although still involved in the ultimate war effort, one must question whether their

46 ‘No Coercion to Join AIF – CMF Transfers’, The Argus, 1 August 1942, p. 2. 47 ‘Allied Land Forces in South West Pacific Area General Routine Order by General Sir Thomas Blamey’, 26 February 1943, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Transfers from C.M.F. to A.I.F. Advisory War Council Agendum No. 29/1943, NAA, A5954, 269/23. 48 John Clifford Moremon, A Triumph of Improvisation – Australian Army operational logistics and the campaign in Papua, July 1942 to January 1943, Thesis (PhD), Australian Defence Force Academy, 2000, p. 58.

55 intentions were to remain with the militia for the entirety of the war or seek transfer to the 2nd AIF when possible. This is particularly the case when the differences in resources and support provided to the two organisations were seen and experienced. There would also have been questions about the apparent lack of policy focus on the militia and increase in attention on the 2nd AIF despite the militia being assigned the home defence role.49 With the lack of focus on the structure and organisation of the militia, it was common to see militia units being redistributed to other headquarter locations based on training and equipment standards, more so than that occurring in the 2nd AIF.

While Prime Minister John Curtin had previously opposed compulsory military training prior to the First World War and conscription during it, the introduction of the United States into the region signaled such a shift in the thinking on overseas service for the militia (as General Douglas MacArthur thought it looked 'bad on paper for the Aussie government' that the militia could not join in a counter-attack on Japan).50 At various points, instead of being part of the main defence unit, militia officers and personnel were instead either sent as replacements for shortages in defences or were relieved by newly raised Garrison Battalions (and sub-units) to guard vulnerable points around the country and engage in close protection of fixed defences.51 In one instance, instructions were

49 'War Cabinet Agendum 197/1942, Future Policy of AIF', Department of Defence Co-ordination, Future Establishment & Organisation of the AIF – War Cabinet Agendum No 197/1941, NAA, A5954, 261/6; 'Formation of Training Units: Reinforcement 2nd AIF', 16 February 1940, Department of the Army, 3 Division Circulars December 1939-February 1940, Australian War Memorial, AWM 49 40; 'Reinforcement Officers: 2nd AIF', 27 February 1940, Department of the Army, 3 Division Circulars December 1939-February 1940, Australian War Memorial, AWM 49, 40; 'AMF Southern Command: Recruiting Corps Troops and AIF', 2 May 1940, Department of the Army, 3 Division Circulars April-September 1940, Australian War Memorial, AWM 49, 43. 50 Wilcox, op cit., p. 124; P. Love, 'Curtin, MacArthur and conscription 1942-43', Historical Studies, vol. 17, no. 69, pp. 506-7; C. Stewart, 'Curtin's changes to the National Service Act', in D.Horner (ed), The Battles that shaped Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1994, p. 284. 51 Chiefs of Staff, Standing Sub-Committee – Record of Army Action – Internal Security and Censorship’, Attorney-General’s Department, Chiefs of Staff – Standing Sub Committee –

56 issued for the enlistment of up to 250 militia personnel at Darwin, while 38 militia officers became available to make good shortages of Staff Corps when manning of essential coast defences was ordered.52

The policies on the appropriate standard of training to be offered to the militia were an influential reason for the varying level of personnel numbers. In order to be fully cognisant of their role and responsibilities, militia personnel had to have sufficient training. However, this was not available to the extent required of a defensive force. Although by October 1939 the training for the militia was extended to 3 months, the continual movement of personnel to the 2nd AIF limited the impact of the training as no clear, permanent structure was able to be formed within units. For example, many garrison duties were undertaken by full-time units staffed by returned soldiers of the First World War.53 Indeed, despite the apparent readiness to focus on sustaining the strength of the militia, these policies and decisions instead called into question both the training provided to personnel and their ability to defend Australia.

While the intention of the Government’s reintroduction of compulsory military training amongst the male population was to strengthen militia numbers, those sent for compulsory training in the militia had to undertake training for several months to be prepared for battle, thus lessening their immediate role in defending Australia from attack. In addition, evidencing issues with the compulsory military training requirements of the militia was that it was common in the early years of the war for media outlets to publish reports of issues with the compulsory training requirements. As noted by one individual:

Is it fair that young men serving in the Militia after their three months’ camp, should go on the reserve list and those who come under the compulsory training have to do another three months this year and be only paid 5d a day while voluntarily serving

Record of Army Action – Daily Statements, NAA, A11667, 4, p. 10. 52 ‘Chiefs of Staff, Standing Sub-Committee – Record of Army Action – Fixed Coast and Anti-Aircraft Defences’, Attorney-General’s Department, Chiefs of Staff – Standing Sub Committee – Record of Army Action – Daily Statements, NAA, A11667, 4, p. 12. 53 Wilcox, op cit., p. 109.

57 their country?54

The inconsistent views by the Government of the potential role of the militia were also emphasised with the lack of acknowledgement on the need for training to occur and the benefits additional training could bring to the organisation.55 The Department of Defence noted that 'the amount of training carried out by the militia during the year 1939-1940 was not sufficient to enable them to reach a standard which would fit them for active service, but was a valuable contribution towards that objective'.56 Reflecting the extent to which there was required to be a shift in the training provided to the militia comments made by the Military Board noting that:

… in view of the possibility of Japanese intervention at any time, immediate steps must be taken to bring the Militia Forces up to the highest possible standard of efficiency. This entails intensive training, not only of the rank and file in the use of their weapons, but also of commanders and staffs and of units of all arms in cooperation; there have been since 1918, no opportunities of gaining experience in training of this nature.57

Meanwhile, while many senior officers continued to be transferred to the 2nd AIF, age restrictions in that organisation meant that many older officers remained in the militia. Whilst such an option would provide experience to the militia, in reality, many of those officers had not kept up with technological changes that were most relevant to the Army in the Second World War.58 Maintaining the required strength of the militia was difficult to achieve as the 2nd AIF was receiving most of the interest from potential servicemen. In addition, the difference in the role of both forces saw the rapidly evolving needs of the 2nd

54 'Points from Letters', The Advertiser, Friday 19 January 1940, p. 26. 55 ‘For Home Defence’, The Advertiser, Monday 16 December 1940, p. 14. 56 R.M. Bennett, Expansion of the Australian Army, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1974, p. 29. 57 ‘Memorandum on immediate military requirements’, 9 September 1939, Department of the Army, Military Board Memorandum on Immediate Military Requirements, NAA, MP729/6, 50/401/107; See also: ‘War Measures Instituted since the Outbreak of War’, op cit. 58 Wilcox, op cit., p. 109-113; Horner, Crisis of Command, op cit., p. 54-55.

58 AIF for manpower and equipment limiting the scope available for the militia to obtain similar requirements.

These events suggest that the Australian military had minimal policies in place to deal with a lack of trained personnel and to ensure the militia was in a ready state for action. In comparison to the position shown by the Liberal Party, the Labor Party under the leadership of John Curtin opposed compulsory military training and called for a vast volunteer citizen army to be raised on the basis of selfless patriotism and for it to be equipped with up-to-date and expensive equipment.59 However, the public (and indeed, Party room's) lack of support for such an action, was due in part to the perceptions the military and government had been able to display since the events of the First World War along with the increasing cost of the war itself.60 As such, there was a lack of support given to Curtin's plan although still an acknowledgement of the need to 'forg[e] … a modern army' in Australia'.61 Military District commands were subsequently notified of a Cabinet decision to rescind the 1939 decision for the suspension of universal training and to apply the provisions of Part XII of the Defence Act in a modified form in conjunction with the existing militia organisation with effect from 1 January 1940.62

There were variances in the scope of training undertaken by the 2nd AIF and militia. As an example, the Department of Defence noted that 'the amount of training carried out by the militia during 1939-1940 was not sufficient to enable them to reach a standard which would fit them for active service, but was a valuable contribution towards that objective'.63 Not only were militia personnel liable for varying periods of (mostly brief) training, but the 2nd AIF trained in separate camps from the militia which led to a variable espirit de corps throughout the Army. Another suggestion was that the militia had become little

59 Wilcox, op cit., p. 113. 60 Parliamentary Debates (Aust), vol. 163, 28 May 1940, pp. 1365-1366. 61 ‘Forging a Modern Army’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 January 1940, p. 6. 62 ‘Chiefs of Staff, Standing Sub-Committee – Record of Army Action’, op cit., p. 6. 63 Bennett, op cit., p. 29.

59 more than training cadres for the 2nd AIF.64 By 1940-1941, the personnel of the were also expected to undertake training on a variety of levels. In particular, it was noted that the following training provisions were to apply:

i. Officers – 12 days’ camp and 12 days’ home training; ii. N.C.O’s. and Specialists – 12 days’ camp and 8 days’ home training; iii. Other private soldiers who have attended the training prescribed for universal service and V.E. personnel during 1939-1940 – 12 days’ camp and 6 days’ home training; iv. All other universal service and voluntarily enlisted recruits 70 days’ camp training. The first 58 days will be recruit training in brigade or unit camps and will be conducted by the training cadre of the unit to which the recruits are allotted. During the remaining twelve days’ camp recruits will be absorbed into their units for collective training.65

Although militia training was expanded by early 1941, it was done so on the basis of limited training before the war.66 Therefore, even though the threat from Japan was acknowledged through an increase in training, such an increase also indicated that the pre-war training policies were inadequate.67 The limited amount of training offered to militia personnel at an early stage of the war reflected the Government’s focus on the successes of the First World War, and their belief that the training offered in the interim years between the wars placed the militia in a good position to repeat the events of some twenty years prior. Coupled with the issues relating to training policies, the personnel were also

64 Russell Mathews, Militia Battalion at War: The History of the 58/59th Australian Infantry Battalion in the Second World War, 58/59th Battalion Association, Sydney, 1961, p. 1. 65 Memo, ‘Organisation and Training of Citizen Military Forces – 1940/41’, 26 May 1940, Department of Defence, Organization and Training of Citizen Military Forces, 1940-1941, Australian War Memorial, AWM54, 721/30/1. 66 ‘AHQ Operation Instruction No 12’, 24 February 1941, Department of Defence, Army Headquarters, Operation Instructions, Australian War Memorial, AWM 54, 243/6/42, 458980. 67 Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, op cit., p. 37.

60 impacted by the training techniques provided by senior staff. The uncertainty as to the possible role the militia would play in the defence of Australia during the early stages of the war saw differences in the training to be provided to personnel. With the uncertainties over the likelihood of an attack on Australia and the high retirement limit in the militia, many personnel were unable to gain a sufficient level of command experience in comparison to the 2nd AIF. As reflected in a comment prior to the war:

… the training [was] materially affected and the platoon officers and NCO's [did] not get the opportunity of practical experience in handling their commands.68

Militia units undertook a series of brigade camps beginning at the outbreak of war and ending with full-time service on mobilisation.69 In mid 1941, 2,000 militiamen spent the last weekend of their training period in a weekend 'battle for Melbourne' whereby they left camp at Mornington in 2 transport convoys, accompanied by anti-aircraft trucks, artillery, bren-carriers and antitank guns being disposed at strategic points to meet the enemy.70 However, despite the productive nature of the camps, their delay in commencement reduced the long-term benefits of continuous training. In addition, with the militia still only able to serve on Australian soil and a continuing number of transfers to the 2nd AIF, the extent of this training benefited the 2nd AIF more so than the militia.

The continuation of such training standards during the early years of the war reflected the difficulties experienced by the militia in obtaining policy support for a change in its structure. By September 1941, with compulsory training in full force for men aged 18 to 35, the size of the militia was more so than in

68 As quoted in Neumann, op cit., p. 128. 69 For example, the 5th Battalion (The Scottish Regiment) of South Melbourne, Victoria did a 90 day camp at Mt. Martha starting on January 3, 1940, another 90 day camp from September to December 1940 at Mt. Martha, and a third camp there from 1 May to 29 July 1941. At the end of the later camp, the battalion remained on full-time service. The 5th's experience was repeated by the other units of the militia. 70 'Militia resists “Invaders”', The Argus, 21 July 1941, p. 2.

61 previous years. 71 Whilst suggestive of the increase in focus on the country’s military, the majority were training in camp and not stationed in units around the country. In addition, the training offered to the militia, such as exercise, drill, manoeuvres, and how to survive in (for example) situations were poison gas was dropped, partly reflected the skills they would need in the 2nd AIF. There was a lack of specific 'home defence' training to be afforded to the militiamen, thus leading to newly trained men feeling 'unsettled and even unwanted', and with a desire to join the 2nd AIF.72 The militia were then left with few trained personnel once they had returned to their local towns and units.

The decision to raise full-time units to man garrison battalions while the militia was training impacted upon the role of the organisation. With the limited amount of training offered to the militia, it would take a number of years of continuous training before the units would have been considered suitable or sufficient enough to adequately protect Australia from threats. Some historians have suggested that the militia would have required up to three years training to achieve such a standard.73 While partly hoping that their service at this time would facilitate the opportunity to experience overseas service, the length of time for this to occur due to the changes required to the Defence Act meant that the men were more likely to join the 2nd AIF. Unlike the personnel within the 2nd AIF who knew that they would be required to undertake overseas service in various theatres of war, many in the militia were not adequately prepared for defending the country on the basis of the training arrangements undertaken before the war’s commencement.

It is arguable that one of the reasons in which militia training was largely different from that of the 2nd AIF was as a result of the impact of cadet training on many men prior to the commencement of the Second World War. Although not falling directly in the time period of this thesis, it is prudent to note the pre-war training provided to cadets as it ultimately influenced the role of the militia during

71 Wilcox, op cit., p. 113. 72 Penton, You, Me and this War, p. 167, quoted in Wilcox, op cit., p. 117. 73 Wilcox, op cit., p. 109.

62 the Second World War. Many former Army cadets from the 1930s and early 1940s later became members of the militia and 2nd AIF. With the increasing threat of a Japanese attack on Australia during the middle stages of the war though, the Government decided that there were benefits of using Army cadets in the militia to assist in stabilising militia numbers and to maintain adequate levels of preparedness. Prior to the commencement of the Second World War, the benefits of the cadet movement on the militia were reflected in comments made by Major-General J.D. Lavarack who stated in 1935 that ‘it is becoming increasingly apparent each year that the supply of efficient and educated officers for the militia must eventually come in an increasing degree from this source’.74 Subsequent comments and reports confirmed Lavarack’s statement and highlighted the benefits of the training obtained by the cadets in providing for the future of the militia.75 With this support, the cadet organisation was promoted throughout the war as a way of encouraging the expansion of the militia.76 For example, there was the view that cadet 'detachments [would] serve as a training ground to provide … the future officers and NCOs of the militia forces'.77 As was also later noted in 1944 by the Acting Minister for the Army, ‘the existence of cadet detachments widens the fields of selection from which the Australian Military Forces can draw replacements of trained and semi-trained personnel’.78

By 1933, cadets were trained under a strict program of drill, physical

74 Memo, ‘Chief of the General Staff to Military Districts’, 1935, NAA, B1535, 929/55/66. 75 A 1936 Military Board instruction indicated that the army ‘hoped that [the cadet] detachments … serve as a training ground to provide, to some extent, the future officers and NCOs of the militia forces, and as such they will occupy a foremost position in the scheme of national defence’ (see: Military Board Instruction, 1936, NAA, A5954, Item 895/11). 76 ‘Essay on the History of Army Cadets 1939-45’, Australian War Memorial, AWM 54, 147/2/1. 77 ‘Military Board Instruction’, 1936, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Senior Cadet Corps at Educational Establishments – Military Board Agendum No 100/1938, NAA, A5954, 895/11. 78 ‘War Cabinet Agendum Number 20 of 1943’, in Department of Defence Co-ordination, Senior Cadet Training, War Cabinet Agendum 20/1943, NAA, A5954, 274/13, Item 645495.

63 instruction, rifle training, field hygiene, technical services and, depending on the exact nature of the militia units the cadets were attached to, they could also be trained in engineering materials or signals duties.79 However, the training was both conducted at a time when Australia's security was relatively safe and also provided by militia instructors who often had little experience in warfare. As such, despite the level of support, there was no guarantee that a cadet unit would receive anywhere near the minimum level of military training from a militia unit due to either lack of instructors or a lack of willingness of the militia to train cadets.80 Therefore, there was unlikely to be a correlation between the training provided to the future personnel of the militia and what they could expect in the militia at the commencement of the war.

In 1939, all cadets with rank were issued certificates from their unit commanders upon discharge specifying their qualifications and competence, which were then used when ex-cadets joined the militia to obtain certain privileges and training exemptions.81 In part, the enlistment of young cadets in the militia allowed the force to be in a position to sustain its numbers (albeit temporarily) to the initial requirement of 75,000 with the initial shift of many militiamen already seeking to join the 2nd AIF.82 On 2 May 1940, the Military Board determined that senior cadets should be given an opportunity of enlisting in the militia at 18 years of age, their first year of training should be undertaken in the militia and additional facilities for their training as officers or

79 Department of Defence, Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets Instructions for Training, 1933, Government Printer, 1933, p. 64. 80 Stockings, op cit., pp. 123-124. See also: ‘Military Board Instruction’, 1936, op cit. 81 Stockings, op cit., pp. 148-149; Memo (internal), ‘4th Division’, August 1939, Department of Defence, Headquarters – 4th Division – Senior Cadet Detachments at Educational Establishments, Australian War Memorial, AWM 62, 105/6/133. 82 In particular, see file: Department of Defence, Enlistment of Cadets Into Militia, Australian War Memorial, AWM 62, 63/1/647. There was no doubt that cadets were keen to serve in the militia and, having received a considerable amount of training, were well placed to serve in an organisation that often had personnel still of the First World War mould within it. The pre-war standards of having senior school cadets being engaged in service in the militia was considered further in the early stages of the war.

64 non-commissioned officers should be provided.83 A War Cabinet Agendum dated 24 May 1940 provided by the Minister for the Army (G.A. Street), indicated that following an earlier War Cabinet decision suggesting that no provision had been made for the continuance of senior cadets in the militia, he had 'consulted [with] the Military Board on the desirability of again enlisting senior cadets in regimental establishments and of enabling both classes of cadets to enlist in the citizen forces immediately on termination of their cadet service'.84

At the commencement of the Second World War, policy dictated that men could not enlist in the 2nd AIF until they reached the age of 19 years. For men nearing the end of their teenage years, few were still at school by that age. Most were required to find a job, were looking for adventure, or sought to emulate the feats of their fathers who fought in the First World War. As such, many young men wanted to join the military (particularly as they were liable for service at 18 years of age). However, as militia personnel could not serve overseas at the commencement of the war, many young personnel served a year in the militia before transferring to the 2nd AIF.85 The continual transfer of former cadets was emphasised when, on 5 June 1940, the Minister for the Army, G.A Street, wrote to Prime Minister Menzies indicating that:

The numbers of Senior Cadets of a Militia Unit will be limited by a definite establishment. Ten per cent of the unit concerned is proposed.

83 ‘Military Board Minute – Agendum 129/1940’, 2 May 1940, Department of Defence Co-ordination, War Cabinet Agendum No 31/1940 – Policy to be Adopted for the Future Training of the Militia, NAA, A5954, 276/1. 84 'War Cabinet Agendum No. 31/1940, Supplement No. 1, Cadets – Voluntary Enlistment of and Continuous of Service in the Citizen Forces', 24 May 1940, Department of Defence Co-ordination, War Cabinet Agendum No 31/1940 – Policy to be Adopted for the Future Training of the Militia, NAA, A5954, 276/1, and 'War Cabinet Minute, Canberra, 28th May, 1940', Department of Defence Co-ordination, War Cabinet Agendum No 31/1940 – Policy to be Adopted for the Future Training of the Militia, NAA, A5954, 276/1. 85 ‘Department of the Army – Army Administration ‘, 20 July 1944, in Department of Defence Co-ordination, Army Administration and Policy – Customs Regarding – Use of AIF and CMF in New Guinea Higher Army Appointments and Transfer of Generals Higher Army Organization 1/11/43 – 8/1/45, NAA, A5954, 261/5.

65 Enlistment in the Citizen Forces of Senior Cadets on reaching the age of 18 years is not, in the terms of the agendum, limited. Attendance at special courses of instruction by cadet officers and non-commissioned officers will qualify them for such rank in the Citizen Forces.86

It could be suggested that the overall lack of focus on the training of the militia forces by both the government and military was in part due to the historical nature of the organisation and the men who were a part of it (incorporating former cadets). At the time the Second World War had commenced, the composition of personnel within the militia was largely made up of either former school cadets or men who had served with the force for number of years, often during the financially crippling decade of the 1930s.87 Although in their various organisations, they underwent some training, this training was largely inadequate for the reality of war and home defence operations.

Regardless though of the benefits of the cadet training to potential future militia recruits, to ensure a stable and consistent force, decisions had to be made to provide a level of certainty and support to militia personnel. However, where provided, such policies did not promote the organisation. The establishment of the 2nd AIF saw its units given the numbers of the 1st AIF from the First World War and taught the histories of their parent units. This helped ensure they had an identity. However, similar actions did not occur with the militia. 88 The men of the militia were either viewed as too young or old for service, possibly too unfit to

86 ‘Letter’ from G.A Street, Minister for the Army to the Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, K.C, M.P, Prime Minister, 5 June 1940, Department of Defence Secretariat, Agendum – No 31/1940 – Future Training of Militia – Policy, NAA, A2671, 31/1940. 87 In December 1931, for example, 1,255 of Regimental Cadets (or almost 1/3 of the total strength) enlisted in the militia (see: ‘Minutes of Militia Officers' Conference’, 4 December 1931, Department of Defence, Recruiting – Militia Forces and Senior Cadets, Australian War Memorial, AWM 62, 63/2/567). 88 Wilcox, op cit., p. 111.

66 train, or incompetent to lead troops in battle overseas.89 With a continuous turnover in personnel occurring due to transfers, there was little opportunity for the militia to receive a suitable policy direction and subsequently, funding and training options from the military and Government.

To give effect to the proposals outlined for the training of the militia, accommodation and equipment requirements for personnel had to be established.90 Militia accommodation and equipment prior to the war had not been satisfactory and action had to be taken to rectify the situation. Reflecting this were comments made in the Military Board Circular of August 1941 which noted the particular action to be taken to raise the standard of efficiency of the militia and also provide additional options for the rapid mobilisation of the force in case of emergency. In addition, there was also a need to changes in training amenities being considered.91

During the war, training camps for militia personnel were set up at Army training facilities around the country. It was often difficult though for the facilities within militia camps to be of a sufficient standard for military training and for general habitation over the required period. In a Memorandum from the Secretary of Defence in the early part of the war, it was noted that the Board of Business Administration had endorsed the Department of the Army’s proposal for the provision of accommodation at the estimated cost of £53,000. However, this was subject to funds being made available.92 The proposal had got to the stage

89 Ibid., p. 112. 90 This was particularly evident in ‘War Cabinet Agendum 252/1941 – Militia Training Policy’, Department of Defence, War Cabinet Agendum – No 252/1941 – Training Militia Forces, 1941-1942, NAA, A2670, 252/1941. See also: A.J. Wilson for F.G. Shedden, Secretary, Department of Defence Co-ordination, 6 October 1941, Board of Business Administration Agenda 404/1941,‘Future Training of the Militia’. 91 ‘Future Training of Militia Forces’, 10 September 1941, op cit. 92 Memorandum for Secretary, Department of Army from F.G. Shedden (Secretary), ‘Militia Camp Structures – Additional Funds – Hutments – Brighton Camp, Tasmania’, 11 March 1940, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Militia Camp Structures – Additional Funds, NAA, A663, O030/1/3.

67 referred to when the Tasmanian Premier sent a letter to the Prime Minister following a visit to Brighton Camp. Following the visit, Premier Robert Cosgrove noted that while the arrangements for the welfare and comfort of the militia personnel were a credit to all concerned, improvement was required as the personnel were housed in tents. The Director of Public Works subsequently indicated that while Commonwealth funds had been allocated to erect huts at the camp and the Works Department has the necessary supervision, the Commonwealth Department concerned had not been provided the formal authority thus leading to delays in the project.93 Therefore, instead of undertaking the necessary improvements for the training of militia personnel, the organisation was instead caught up in bureaucracy. The correspondence from the Secretary further noted that it had been determined that while the camp was to be used mainly by the militia, the endorsement provided was not in lieu of replacing the tents at other militia camps, but rather had been supplied due to the climate at the Brighton Camp.94

While on occasions spending on militia camps was approved, the Board of Business Administration often requested the Department of the Army to effect saving wherever possible.95 With this focus during the early stages of the war,

93 Robert Cosgrove, Premier of Tasmania, letter of 26 January 1940 to the Prime Minister, ‘Militia Camp Structures – Additional Funds – Hutments – Brighton Camp, Tasmania’, 11 March 1940, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Militia Camp Structures – Additional Funds, NAA, A663, O030/1/3. 94 Memorandum for Secretary, Department of Army from F.G. Shedden (Secretary), 11 March 1940, ‘Militia Camp Structures – Additional Funds – Hutments – Brighton Camp, Tasmania’, 11 March 1940, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Militia Camp Structures – Additional Funds, NAA, A663, O030/1/3. See also 'Extract from Minutes of Board of Business Administration meeting held on 7 March 1940' (notes from A.J. Wilson, Joint Secretary, Board of Business Administration), Department of Defence Coordination, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Militia Camp Structures – Additional Funds, NAA, A663, O030/1/3. 95 Memorandum for Secretary, Department of Defence Co-ordination, 20 April 1940 from J.T. Fitzgerald, Secretary, Department of the Army, quoting Minute dated 15 March 1940, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Militia Camp Structures – Additional Funds, NAA, A663, O030/1/3.

68 when the war in Europe saw a greater chance of the 2nd AIF being involved in military action and the threat from Japan still in its infancy, there was a greater likelihood of certain funding to the militia not being approved or reduced over time. Continuing policy deliberations were impacting on the readiness of the militia.

The inconsistency of funding offered to the 2nd AIF and militia enhanced the two Army structure and limited the ability of the militia to have sufficient resources available to ensure its personnel were adequately prepared to defend the country. The raising of the 2nd AIF by the Government at the start of the Second World War saw the Commonwealth’s defence funding shift to provide support to the new force instead of the home based militia. On 15 September 1939, special war measures were introduced into Parliament to increase the tax payable by companies to 2/- per ₤1, and impose a tax on gold of 75 per cent of the amount by which the price exceeded ₤9 an ounce fine. The taxes were expected to facilitate the acquisition of an additional ₤2,500,000 in revenue being received by the government in the 1939-1940 financial year.96 However, little of this amount led to resources being provided to the militia for their training or to allow them to solely focus on undertaking their military service to a standard required when there was a potential for an attack on Australia to occur.

The issue of limited funding options being available for the militia continued throughout the war. The world had moved on from the events of the Great Depression almost a decade prior and many countries were investing in their respective military forces.97 However, as an example of the funding options available to the militia, all militia units within the 4th Division were provided with a memo in May 1940 outlining the details of the organisation and training for the militia during 1940-1941. In it though was detail that made it clear that the

96 ‘Volunteer Force of 20,000 Men’, op cit. 97 ‘100 Years of Defence’, Year Book Australia 2002 – Australian Bureau of Statistics, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article22002 ?opendocument&tabname-Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2002num=&view=, 3 October2007, accessed 8 May 2010.

69 provision of conditions outlined in the memo were subject to the receipt of appropriate levels of funding. The memo outlined that the conditions of service would be applicable to:

1. Personnel at present on the strength of the militia units who volunteer to serve for the year 1940/41 at AIF rates of pay; 2. Personnel at present compulsorily called up for services under Part IV of the Defence Act; 3. Personnel registered under Part XIV of the Defence Act for service under Part XII thereof, vz. i. That portion of the 1919 quota who were both between 1st July and 31st December, 1919; and ii. The 1920 quota.98

The impact of such decisions was evident even to those not directly a part of the respective forces. The community were able to observe that on Australian shores, the 2nd AIF trained separately from the militia. With a need to prepare the militia and its personnel for the potential role they would play in defending Australia in the advent of an attack, the recommendations regarding the future training of the militia was approved at a meeting of the War Cabinet. However, reflecting the importance of funding to ensuring the militia was sufficiently prepared for combat if required, the training was subject to a review of the Estimates of Expenditure.99 Furthermore, in the same War Cabinet Minute, it was noted that Army proposals for increases for defence against ‘minor’ scales of attack had not been granted. The extent of the monetary commitment that the Government made to fund the 2nd AIF was shown in 1942, when the estimated cost of the commitments authorised for the Army in the financial year ending 30 June 1942 included ₤51,471,000 for the 6th Division and Ancillary Troops within the 2nd AIF. Meanwhile, the Army sought additional funding so that ₤8,142,000 could be put towards the future training of the militia.100

98 ‘Memo – Organisation and Training of Citizen Military Forces – 1940/41’, 26 May 1940, in Department of Defence, Organization and Training of the Citizen Military Forces, 1940-1941, Australian War Memorial, AWM 54, 946/1/1. 99 ‘Statements on Australia’s War Effort (War Cabinet Agendum 43/1940)’, in Department of Defence, War Cabinet Agendum No 43/1940, NAA, A261, 43/1940. 100 R.G. Menzies, Minister for Defence Co-ordination, 26 February 1940, War Cabinet Agenda – Review of Australian War Effort – Agendum No. 43/1940, copy no. 33’, in

70 The overall lack of funding available to the militia also impacted on their ability to receive suitable equipment to use for training and other purposes. After the war, the then Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Rowell made comments on the CMF at that time being 'immeasurably better equipped' and 'in a state of preparedness far in advance of 10 years [previously]'.101 This suggests that the militia personnel in the early years of the war were not adequately equipped and prepared for war. The militia’s lack of suitable equipment was also reflected in figures provided in another report on war material requirements for the three years from 1939-1940 to 1941-1942. In the report, it was noted that for the future training of the militia, out of a total of ₤1,656,000, only ₤24,000 was sought for armament and equipment with ₤264,000 required for ammunition. Meanwhile, out of a total of ₤40,560,000, the Corps Troops and 7th Division of the 2nd AIF had equivalent figures of ₤6,529,000 and ₤19,487,000.102 Despite their role in defending Australia’s shores and people from attack, these figures demonstrate that the militia was poorly funded in comparison to the 2nd AIF. When the 2nd AIF was sent overseas, it was estimated that the cost of that force to the Government would be the sum of ₤5 million a year.103 The following table provides an overview of how the funding provided to the militia and 2nd AIF were structured against the overall expenditure for Defence along with an indication of how small Australia’s defence expenditure was prior to the war.

Department of Defence, War Cabinet Agendum No. 43/1940, NAA, A2671, 43/1940. 101 'C.M.F. Better Equipped Than Army of 1939', The Canberra Times, Friday 4 March 1949, p. 3. 102 Appendix No. 3, ‘War Material Requirements’, in Department of Defence, War Cabinet Agendum No. 43/1940, NAA, A2671, 43/1940. 103 S.J. Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1955, p. 125.

71 TABLE – DEFENCE EXPENDITUREAND GDP FROM 1930-1950104 Year Defence Expenditure GDP Share of Cth Outlays ($m) (%) (%) 1929-1930 9.5 0.6 2.9 1930-1931 8.0 0.6 2.4 1931-1932 6.9 0.6 2.9 1932-1933 6.9 0.5 2.9 1933-1934 8.2 0.6 2.9 1934-1935 11.4 01.8 4.2 1935-1936 14.4 0.9 6.1 1936-1937 16.0 0.9 6.9 1937-1938 19.6 1.1 7.9 1938-1939 28.8 1.5 11.5 1939-1940 108.7 5.3 33.0 1940-1941 319.0 14.7 61.7 1941-1942 596.8 23.4 70.6 1942-1943 998.8 34.0 71.6 1943-1944 886.1 29.7 61.6 1944-1945 704.7 24.2 54.8 1945-1946 644.3 21.4 58.5 1946-1947 243.2 7.5 25.3 1947-1948 143.2 3.6 15.0 1948-1949 122.1 2.7 10.9 1949-1950 108.5 2.0 8.7

The funding distribution of the Government meant that the militia was not resourced for the structure of a modern war. With around 30-40,000 2nd AIF personnel in training at various stages during the early part of the war, the limited amount of facilities and equipment available went directly to them first and any remainder was assigned to the militia. This prevented the militia from having

104 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Defence Expenditure Over the Century', 1301.0 – Year Book Australia, 2001, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/featurearticlesbytitle/282E4CEB102B52BBCA25 69DE00203314?OpenDocument, 25 January 2001 (updated 3 October 2007), accessed 5 May 2010.

72 sufficient time and opportunity to train and strategise with the preferred weapons in the event that they were required. This delay also indicated that such decisions were only to resist a 'minor scale of attack'.105 As such, despite the war progressing quickly, the militia continued to be inadequately equipped throughout its early stages. , guns, munitions, transport, ammunition and artillery numbers were in minimal supply in the Army, and despite the threat to Australia, were often distributed based on the perceived priority levels from other Allied nations.106

The funding issues to be managed by the militia extended further than weapon resources. The 2nd AIF and militia also differed early in the war in relation to the health resources offered to personnel. Initially, members of the 2nd AIF were provided with inoculation whereas it was determined that those in the militia to wait for such an opportunity. Reflecting the impact of outside events on such a situation, there was the suggestion by the Minister of the Army (Mr Spender), that such inoculation should occur early, rather than in situations where Australia was under direct military threat.107 Combined with the split in the Australian Army structure between the 2nd AIF, militia and the Volunteer Defence Corps, the lack of funding also made it difficult for resources to be equally shared or effectively allocated between all organisations.108 For example, a telegram

105 ‘War Cabinet Minute 345, Melbourne, 18 June 1940’, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, Vol. III, pp. 451-453. 106 'Statement Showing Requirements of Initial (Fighting), Training and 6 Months Reserve of Certain Items of Equipment Together With Stocks Available and Percentage of those Stocks in Relation to the Initial (Fighting) Requirements for AMF (Order of Battle) Mobilization, AIF in Australia and Armoured Division (AIF)', 30 November 1941, in Department of Defence, War Cabinet Agendum – No 418/1941 and supplement 1 – Defence of Australia and Adjacent Area – Chiefs of Staff appreciation December 1941, NAA, A2671/1, 418/1941 notes that at the end of 1941, tanks were almost non-existent, anti-tank guns were at only 50% of requirement, grenades were even less at 31% and 2 pound anti-tank guns were only 1%.. 107 ‘Innoculation – Extension to Militia', The Canberra Times, 30 November 1940, p. 3. 108 ‘Home Defence – R.S.L. Volunteer Corps’, The Canberra Times, 14 August 1941, page 2. The R.S.L. Volunteer Corps was constituted as part of the militia for citizens who desired to serve in home defence.

73 sent to a detachment from the Attorney-General, H.V. Evatt, requested that they 'try and devote the enthusiasm and value of the [People's Army] scheme towards the strengthening of the V.D.C …'.109 Whilst similar to the increasing promotion of the 2nd AIF, this was inconsistent with that provided to the militia.

With the lack of funding available to the militia, the subsequent administrative issues spread to policies relating to the organisation’s daily management. For example, there were often issues associated with the lack of planning prior to the war in relation to uniform supplies. Shortly after the commencement of the war, the Secretary to the Military Board wrote to the Secretary of Defence in regards to the clothing requirements for the militia. Previous years had seen a limited supply of uniforms being issued to members of the militia. On 18 September 1939, the Minister of Defence issued a Minute indicating that consultation was to occur with Mr Norman Myer in regards to the requirements of the Army.110 The shift in focus to the 2nd AIF in relation to uniforms was demonstrated when the minute immediately referred to the 'specially enlisted force' (being the 2nd AIF) while it was not until the end of the Minute that it was noted that:

the main difficulty experienced in the past in the supply of uniforms for the Militia has been in connection with the production of cloth of correct pattern, shade and texture, rather than in the making up of the actual garments.111

There was no emphasis on the actions required to remedy the difference between the forces in terms of uniform availability. A Minute from the Assistant

109 Progress, 13 February 1942, p. 1. 110 Norman Myer was a businessman. During the War, he advised the Menzies and Curtin governments as a member of the Board of Business Administration, but was later accused of controlling prices and criticised by Arthur Calwell. For a full biography, see: David Dunstan, ‘Sir Norman Myer (1897-1956)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography Online, http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A150529b.htm, 2006, accessed 17 June 2010. 111 Minute from C.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) to the Secretary, 'Clothing Requirements for Militia Forces', 21 September 1939, in Department of Defence Co-ordination, Board of Business Administration - Clothing Requirements for Militia Forces, NAA, A663, O5/2/102.

74 Secretary to the Secretary of Defence reiterated an earlier Minute and indicated that the assistance of Mr Myer was not required on the Army side, but rather with the Department of Supply and Development.112 Indeed, the uncertainty in finding a role for a businessman willing to assist the Army manage its uniform supplies for its personnel reflected the uncertainty in the management and structure of the militia more generally.

At a time when conflict was nearing Australia, these situations also demonstrated the lack of strategic management on the part of the Government and military hierarchy on the role and requirements of the militia. The minimal preparation in the months since the outbreak of war meant that the new direction of the militia was a slow process as facilities and equipment for the personnel had to be arranged while those already provided to the 2nd AIF had to be maintained. Facilities and equipment had to be established and procured, while those resources already provided to the 2nd AIF could not be recalled. Without such preparation having been undertaken since the war’s commencement, there was also a need to improve the militia’s preparedness and structure.

The pre-Second World War Australian Army had largely been structured and maintained as an anti-invasion force.113 Successive governments had maintained this focus and it was almost inevitable that the wartime Government would follow this model as a result of the militia only being able to serve on Australian soil. However, there was also a lack of focus on the part of the Government to change the organisation of the Army so as to adapt to, and acknowledge changes in, technology, international affairs and the general speed in which wartime events were occurring.114 By not requiring personnel to maintain

112 Minute from Assistant Secretary to the Secretary, 'Business Consultant with Defence Department',30 September 1939, in Department of Defence Co-ordination, Board of Business Administration - Clothing Requirements for Militia Forces, NAA, A663, O5/2/102. 113 Duncan Chow, British and Commonwealth Armoured Formations (1919-46), Profile Publications Ltd, 1972, p. 52. 114 Although the earlier Swinburne Committee (of 1919) and Senior Officers’ Conferences previously referred to saw changes in the structure of the Australian Army, these had been

75 their level of readiness on a semi-regular basis, many who had served in the First World War kept a mindset of the methods and techniques of earlier years. The opportunities for the remaining militia personnel to enhance their understanding of modern military strategies and techniques were also impacted by the growing expansion of Army Headquarters. With more personnel taking administrative jobs, there was a reduction in the number of personnel able to guide and train local militia units in the ways of modern warfare. This led to a ‘delay in dealing with formations’ requirements; and [the] imposition of a high level of difficulty in the way of a proper co-ordination of the activities and administration of the Military Forces’.115

The continuing historical influence of the perceived role of Britain in Australia’s defence system led the Government and military hierarchy to question the need for the militia to be represented at a high level in the Army’s organisation and command. Indeed, the constraints imposed by the Defence Act were the major influence on the organisation of the militia and its place within the wider Australian military structure. However, there were numerous other policies which, whilst not directly discussing the militia, impacted upon matters which had an indirect impact on the force. For example, what was known as Plan 401 would play a role in the establishment of the 2nd AIF during the Second World War. Unlike subsequent policies relating to the militia, throughout the 1930s, the plans were kept under constant revision, particularly in relation to organisational and administrative arrangements.116 However, the constant maintenance of the

brought about almost a decade before the commencement of the Second World War. Much had occurred since then which had not been reflected in the structure and management of the militia and its personnel. Indeed, the numbers of active personnel in the militia was not conducive to the proposed structure. 115 First Report by Lieutenant-General E.K. Squires, Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces, 16 December 1938, paragraph 30, available in: Department of Defence, First Report 1938 by Lieutenant General E K Squires, Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces, Australian War Memorial, AWM 1, 20/11. 116 Ian Gow, ‘Australian Army Strategic Planning, 1939-39’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Volume XXIII: 2, August 1977, pp. 170-71. Plan 401 for expeditionary forces was originally devised in 1922 as a result of the Chanak crisis. As a result of the

76 arrangements was not mirrored in policies on the arrangements relevant to the locally based militia. Coupled with the restrictive structure of the Defence Act, the Australian Army had to be conscious of the most appropriate way to balance its forces for both the safety of the country, along with its intentions and commitments on the world stage. This focus had the potential to put Australia’s national security in jeopardy.117 It also saw the immediate needs of the 2nd AIF for manpower, equipment and other support constraining the militia during the early years of the Second World War.118 Militia personnel were largely seen as a part-time force and not requiring the same level of support provided to the 2nd AIF.

With the prevailing threat from Japan, a greater emphasis was required on the proper co-ordination and command of the militia. It has been suggested that militia armies had to be territorially based by necessary as such a placement would likely lead to cohesion amongst personnel.119 With the widespread influence of the militia across the Australian community and its history, units were often filled by personnel who knew each other outside of their military commitments. However, in the higher levels of the command structure, the remaining militia officers who had not transferred to the 2nd AIF often found themselves being subordinate to the members of the 2nd AIF. This even occurred

events occurring at Chanak at the time (such as tensions between a number of countries in the region), the Jess Report noted that Australia’s Military Board ‘might be informed that Parliament had decided to raise the dispatch an expeditionary force with the least possible delay). As the secrecy of the preparation of an expeditionary force was paramount, the official recognition of the plans could not be obtained and there was a requirement for officers within the General Staff at Army headquarters to prepare details of scheme for the organisation and composition of expeditionary forces drawn from the states to be subsequently dispatch under secret cover to District Base Commandants for actioning. 117 David Horner, Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the Making of Australian Defence Policy, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 2000, p. 2. 118 See: Department of Defence, War Cabinet Agendum No. 123/1940 – Equipment and Supplies for the AIF – Requirements which Australia can Provide from her Resources, NAA, 123/1940. 119 Eliot Cohen, Systems of Military Service: The Dilemmas of a Liberal-Democratic World Power, Thesis (PhD), Harvard University, 1982.

77 with new positions established during the war. In one such example, Major-General R.M. Downes was appointed as Inspector-General of Medical Services at Army Headquarters even though he had not served in the militia prior to the war.120 The resentment about decisions on command positions was one aspect of the tension between staff corps and citizen officers during the Second World War. However, the tension did not arise from a rejection of the notion that citizen soldiers had the ability to serve or that regular and citizen soldiers could not work together concurrently. Rather, it was a lack of consistency in the nature of policies relating to the militia and 2nd AIF.

Reflecting the inconsistent position of the place of the militia’s place in the Australian Army was when, on 18 October 1939, the Military Board issued an instruction by air mail for the reception of a broadcast message by the Australian Prime Minister to the militia in camp on 30 October 1939.121 While the broadcast was the most extensive undertaken in Australia at the time and perceived to be addressed to the militia, the references to the entire militia force were minimal.122 Instead of directly addressing the militia personnel on the importance of the role they would undertake during the war, there was a reliance on strong patriotic comments against the enemy to enthuse the organisation.123 Such a focus would maintain the status quo of limiting any attention on the level of policy support provided to the militia.

Unlike the militia, the 2nd AIF was considered independent from the Army’s normal chain of command. The Commander of the Army, General

120 ‘Army Medical Head’, The Argus, Tuesday 18 March 1941, p. 4. This is not to disregard through the fact that Major-General Downes had a variety of qualifications and experience to his name. 121 ‘Chiefs of Staff, Standing Sub-Committee – Record of Army Action – Memorandum Number 34884’, Attorney-General’s Department, NAA, A11667, p. 5. 122 ‘Broadcast by the Prime Minister’, Examiner, Saturday 28 October 1939, p. 9. Indeed, the Prime Minister only made reference to the 6th Division and made limited references to the remainder of the militia. Interestingly, even though the 6th Division primarily comprised of 2nd AIF personnel, many were ex-militiamen. 123 ‘Confidence in Allies Success’, The Canberra Times, Tuesday 31 October 1939, p. 1.

78 Thomas Blamey, reported directly to the Minister for the Army instead of the militia’s requirement to report to the Military Board.124 There was also continuing conflict between the Staff Corps and militia officers regarding 2nd AIF command appointments which tended to go to inter-war militia officers.125 Not only was the militia under the command of the members on the Military Board, but there was also a lack of serving militia personnel in decision-making positions in the Army hierarchy. The impact of these decisions on the militia was not fully comprehended by the Government. Few senior Ministers had prior military experience (particularly in relation to the militia) to enable them to understand the potential role of the militia against that undertaken by the 2nd AIF. As an example, by 1942, the Minister for the Army, Francis Forde, had no knowledge of military matters which required him to seek advice from other sources (who generally had a non-military background).126 With this overall command structure, the bulk of policy attention and resources (including weaponry, equipment and uniforms) were provided to 2nd AIF.

The potential threat against Australia by the Japanese in the Second World War saw a policy change in that units were moved between militia divisions so that the most combat-ready could be sent to areas believed to be under the greater threat of attack.127 The continual changing of units would lead to uncertainty as to the most appropriate place for militia personnel to serve in the military, and accordingly, limited guidance was provided. The militia were subject to and had to manage variances in the nature of command structures within its various units and battalions. In this regard, operation and administrative functions sometimes came under one command, while at other times, were separated and altered from a regional to a functional command system.128 Unless strictly supervised,

124 Horner, Crisis of Command, op cit., p. 14, and ‘Rising of Training Units and Reinforcements AIF and AMF’, Department of the Army, NAA, MP 729/6, 37/401/660. 125 Palazzo, op cit., p. 148. 126 Horner, High Command, op cit., p. 139. 127 Palazzo, op cit., p. 150; ‘WW2 Overview’, WW2 Nominal Roll, http://www.ww2roll.gov.au/doc/overview.asp, 2002, accessed 7 July 2010. 128 ‘The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001 by Albert Palazzo’,

79 personnel within the higher levels of such bureaucracies often moved to achieve their internal or individual interests. It is clear that there was the continual influence of the 2nd AIF on the militia structure even before the units could change in status. While 2nd AIF units were trained and became accustomed to the conditions of modern warfare due to the need to be ready for the war overseas, by contrast, militia units were predominantly commanded by officers with First World War experience only and their unit histories suggest that training was deficient.129 With the perceived need to support Britain's war effort, the initially outnumbered 2nd AIF were in a strong position of obtaining increasing levels of policy attention before deployment while the militia were primarily required to ensure consistency in its personnel numbers.

The internal structure of the militia also reflected the lack of policies implemented to ensure the suitability of command positions in the organisation along with its place in the nation’s defence structure. With the lack of policies in this regard, it reduced the opportunities available for militia concerns in a variety of subjects to be addressed in an efficient manner and consistent with that experienced by the 2nd AIF. At the commencement of the Second World War, the militia was part of a Defence Force that was primarily structured along the basis of an anti-invasion force. However, the militia had limited structure and organisation as a result of its inability to be called for overseas service. It was from this that the militia was structured around Military Districts so as to assist in its anti-invasion role.130 Such a structure was designed to be based upon the optimum number of militia personnel in the country. A Military Board at Army Headquarters would control the divisions during peacetime, but the highest position available to militiamen was a divisional commander. Whilst a suitable structure for peacetime, as the war progressed and it became apparent that

Australian Army History Unit, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/Australian_Army.asp, 30 November 2010, accessed 8 December 2010. 129 John Moremon, ‘No “Black Magic”: Doctrine and Training for ’, Army History Unit – The Foundations of Victory: The 1943-1944, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/docs/The_Foundations_of_Victory_Moremon.pdf, unknown date, accessed 4 June 2010. 130 Palazzo, op cit., p. 99.

80 Australia was under the threat of direct attack, the structure had to adapt to reflect the quickly changing circumstances of world affairs. The organisation of the militia reflects the varying levels of administration that were prevalent at the time of the war and subsequently, the potential for delays in effective decision making to have occurred. Not only was there an increased likelihood of limited policy direction occurring in relation to the control of the militia and funding it was able to receive, but there was also a greater chance of bottlenecks occurring when approval for a particular course of action relating to the militia was required.

Recommendations made by Inspector-General E.K. Squires in relation to the command system of Army organisation were initially introduced in October 1939.131 Initially, Squires sought to establish a simplified command arrangement whereby new militia units were formed. However, whilst the preceding Lyons Government approved many of the recommendations, the Menzies Government withdrew most of that approval to instead form the permanent force encompassing the 2nd AIF. The implementation of this command structure impacted upon the likelihood of serving militia personnel being appointed to representative positions which would help facilitate and allow the views and requirements of militia personnel being conveyed at a high level. Despite General Thomas Blamey assigning a number of brigade commands and the post of CRA to experienced (former) militia officers, serving militia personnel were provided with limited opportunities at similar roles.132 In regards to suitability for command, this

131 Long, op cit., pp. 28-29. This ‘command’ system was later replaced by the ‘functional’ system. 132 Such as Arthur S. Allen from the , Stanley George Savige from the 17th Infantry Brigade, Leslie J. Morshead from the , and Edmund F. Herring (CRA). The four (former) militia officers identified were some of the most influential personnel that had been associated with the force and were instrumental in maintaining the militia prior to the Second World War. For example, Allen, although initially serving in the AIF during the First World War, remained active in the militia during the inter-war period and was able to provide leadership commensurate with his experience in battle. Without the experience of First World War AIF veterans being brought into the militia to retain their currency, the structure and ability of the militia during the inter-war years would likely to have been adversely affected. This would likely have lead to the militia being in an even more precarious position in terms of their overall support during the Second World War.

81 debate rose to the highest levels of government, and led to another aspect of the strain in relations between the regulars and militia in that Prime Minister Menzies announced that all commands in the 2nd AIF would go to militia officers.133 While there has been dispute by historians over the exact meaning and scope of Menzies' reference, the fact that the comment was made at all would have cast doubt in the minds of Staff Corps personnel as to their real role and function in the Australian Army, and how much support they could expect to receive from the Government.134

The invasion of the France and Lowland region by Germany in 1940 led to many Commonwealth countries reassessing their military commitments. For Australia, this threat along with the continual perception of the military force of nearby Japan saw the Government change its focus on military command and structure, and led to the raising of the 8th Infantry Division of the 2nd AIF.135 Even though the Government’s decision to commit a second AIF division as well as a corps headquarters in 1940 saw many Staff Corps officers fill important decisions, many had to relinquish their command within the 6th Division AIF to militia officers.136 For many personnel, the continuing impact of the Government’s decisions at the early stage of the war would continue throughout most, if not all, of the Second World War. Such a situation was identified by a

133 Long, op cit., p. 45. 134 Menzies view was also influenced by the previously noted consideration of the impact of Australian soldiers in the First World War. Also, see David Horner, Blamey: the Commander-in-Chief, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1998, p. 130; John Hetherington, Blamey, the Controversial Soldier: a Biography of Field Marshall Sir Thomas Blamey GBE, KCB, CMG, DSO, ED, Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1973, p. 89; Long, op cit., pp. 45-46; Ivan Chapmen, Iven G. Mackay: Citizen Soldier, Melway Publishing, Melbourne, 1975, p. 151. 135 Gavin Long, The Six Years War: A Concise History of Australia in the 1939-45 War, Australian War Memorial/Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1973, pp. 29-30. 136 Peter Dean, ‘The Forgotten Man: Lieut.-General Sir Frank Berryman’, Australian War Memorial Journal, http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/berryman.asp, unknown date, accessed 16 August 2010; Grey, Australian Brass: The Career of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, op cit., p. 74.

82 number of individuals and conveyed in media reports, as was noted in a letter to the Sydney Morning Herald:

It has been apparent for at least some weeks, and to those well acquainted with inner moves in the Army for even longer, that senior field officers in the home army would inevitably have to share the same fate of seniors in the higher administrative posts, and give way to younger, more active men, men with actual experience of modern war. Those changes in high command are now being made public …

The least that a grateful Minister could do is to announce publicly the exact reasons for the changes, and inform the public that the commanding officers now being retired are certainly not being “sacked”.137

This model led to young officers with previous militia experience more likely to obtain command positions and overseas service if they transferred to the 2nd AIF. General Thomas Blamey appointed many of the country’s most experienced and senior Army officials to positions in the Military Headquarters or in the 2nd AIF. This limited the amount of direct contact or involvement those personnel would have with the militia. While assisting with military planning, such an action also moved a considerable level of experience out of the militia thus impacting upon the standard of training provided to militiamen. Even though the 2nd AIF was the organisation undertaking most of the fighting at this time, with the war moving closer to Australia, the requirements of the militia could not be disregarded.

The militia was not able to have a permanently assigned militia officer on the Military Board or within the War Cabinet to express their organisation’s particular needs and requirements. While prior to the First World War it was common to have at least one representative of the militia as a consultative member of the Military Board, such a practice had been rarely used since that time.138 Neumann suggested that this was likely to have occurred during and

137 ‘Changes in Militia Commands’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Saturday 3 January 1942, p. 8. 138 See: J.W. McCay, Memorandum by the Minister of State for Defence on the Administration and Control of the Defence Forces of Australia, Melbourne, 2 November 1904, in C.P.P.,

83 after the First World War as a result of the increased focus of the AIF.139 Such a theory is also supported in the period of the Second World War because while many officers on the Board had previous militia experience, such experience was likely to have occurred many years prior to the war’s commencement. In addition, many of those officers only transferred to the militia following the disbandment of the AIF after the conclusion of the First World War. With such a gap in their militia experience, it is arguable that they did not have the knowledge to support the role and requirements of the militia personnel to the extent required during wartime. Even in the event that they had the intention of supporting the personnel, with such a large focus of the political and military attention being focused on the war effort overseas, information on the militia would have been of a lower priority.

While a large number of 2nd AIF officers were drawn from the ranks of the militia, as the war progressed, substantial numbers of non-officer ranks within the 2nd AIF also began to show evidence of having previous militia experience.140 Indeed, Horner indicated that the experience of war rapidly melded the regular and citizen officers within the 2nd AIF together so that, by the middle of the war, they began ‘to think of themselves as belonging to one Army’.141 While such a suggestion may have been perceived in the view of the public and even many of the 2nd AIF and militia personnel themselves, once the impact of policies relating to the structure, role and management of the Army were taken into account, this was not necessarily correct.

In addition, the continuous reshuffling of the militia was experienced with many older militia officers being replaced with younger individuals from the 2nd

Vol. 2, 1904, pp. 357-360 and Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. 1 (7 January 1905) for the provision made for militia representatives to be summoned as consultative members of the Military Board. 139 Neumann, op cit., p. 102. 140 John Barrett, We Were There: Australian Soldiers of World War II, Penguin Books, 1988, p. 36. 141 D.M. Horner, ‘Staff Corps versus Militia: The Australian Experience in World War II’, Defence Force Journal, volume 26, January/February 1981, pp. 18, 21.

84 AIF.142 Such actions allowed those younger individuals to obtain leadership experience before they undertook overseas service. Despite being a former militia soldier himself, when Savige assumed command of the 3rd Australian Division in early 1942, he voiced his displeasure with the personnel who made up the latest generation of citizen soldier officers. In his view, the militia officers 'were the type who didn't want to fight' and that he needed to ensure 2nd AIF personnel were involved in command.143 While he believed in the spirit of the men and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), the fact that he did not think the same of the officers leads into questions as to how much support and responsibilities the men and NCOs could realistically expect to achieve.144 However, the inconsistencies in views on the militia was emphasised in that John Field commented that there were limited numbers of men in the militia who were not willing to fight.145 Rather, his view was that they had the same characteristics and personalities of 2nd AIF men, and that any policy creating an inferiority of one organisation over another should be avoided.146

On 5 March 1943, the Secretary of the Advisory War Council wrote to Spender to address reports that former militia personnel who had transferred to the 2nd AIF had had their papers marked “Not to go beyond Australia” or “To be retained at base”.147 Although investigations found no such instances had been noticed by the Minister for the Army and that such action would be contrary to

142 Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army: A History, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2006, p. 138. 143 Letter Savige to Hammer, 17 July 1943, Department of Defence, Salamaua Campaign Orders – Messages – Notes 30 June 1943-25 September 1943, Australian War Memorial, AWM 54, 587/7/27. 144 However, it should be recognised that the division did perform well at the later campaigns such as that in Salamaua. 145 Brigadier Field was a former militia member and later commander of the . 146 John Field, 'Warriors for the working day', chapter 10, pp. 5-6, contained in ‘Papers of Gavin Keating’, Academy Library UNSW@ADFA, MS341. 147 Letter from F.G. Shedden, Secretary, Advisory War Council, to Mr Spender, 5 March 1943, Transfers from C.M.F. to A.I.F. Advisory War Council Agendum No. 29/1943, NAA, A5954, 269/23.

85 Local Headquarters instructions, the fact that such reports had started aligns with the continual impact of policy distinctions between the militia and 2nd AIF. Similarly, at the Advisory War Council Meeting held in Melbourne on 16 June 1943, Mr McEwen sought information as to what new 2nd AIF units had been formed as a result of the transfer of militia personnel.148 As the war progressed and Australia's safety was affected, the Government and military had to constantly vary formations so that Australia's Army was deployed to the most important regions. The militia in particular was the one to be impacted upon by the changes and this reflected the policy neglect they had suffered behind the scenes for many years. Army Headquarters continuously transferred militia brigades and battalions among the divisions.149

While the maintenance of a two-Army system was still the preferred option, with political decisions dictating that the smaller 2nd AIF was to be sent overseas, competing interests within the Army were common and led to difficulties in ensuring appropriate policy allocation of resources and general organisation. Overall, the decisions impacted upon the likelihood of one Australian Army existing and for the defence of the nation to be assured. The organisation of the militia at this time along with the defence of Australia was largely reliant on actions occurring rather than a proactive model being in place when compared to other Commonwealth countries. While many countries were refocusing their attention to their home defences and the strengthening of their militia after years of basic training, the Australian Government’s attention was focused solely on providing support to the Allied campaign in Europe and the historically strong naval strength of Britain, despite the main threat being from Japan.150 This partially explains the minimal level of organisation on the militia

148 ‘Extract – Advisory War Council Minute, Melbourne Reports by Chiefs of Staff on Operations War Cabinet Agenda Nos. 257/1943 and 265, 1943, Weekly Progress Reports by Chiefs of Staff – Nos 175 and 196 – Weeks Ended 5th and 12th June, 1943’, 16 June 1943, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Transfers from C.M.F. to A.I.F. Advisory War Council Agendum No. 29/1943, NAA, A5954, 269/23. 149 Palazzo, op cit., p. 151. 150 Jacqui Murray, Watching the Sun Rise: Australia Reporting of Japan – 1931 to the Fall of Singapore, Lexington Books, 2004, p. 5. This is despite the pre-war events indicating that

86 when compared to the 2nd AIF.

During late 1941- early 1942, Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General , assumed the role of de-facto Australian Commander-in-Chief and principal advisor to the Curtin Government. Like a number of high-ranking Army officials, Sturdee had spent a short period of his early career in the militia.151 With this knowledge and experience, Sturdee had to manage the state of Australia’s defence strategy which had been strongly influenced by historical ties to Britain and the success of the First World War. However, this strategy did not align with the nature of modern warfare and the requirements of the personnel involved.152 The period around Sturdee’s appointment brought about a series of further changes to the role of the militia and the attention of the Government to its personnel and their role. The main change was that in February 1942, regulations were changed to allow members of the militia to volunteer for service with the 2nd AIF. This meant that they would be able to be sent to anywhere in the world, even though there were required to stay with their existing units. If 65 per cent of the establishment strength or 75 per cent of the actual strength of a CMF unit volunteered for the 2nd AIF, that unit then became an 2nd AIF unit. However, this meant that units were not to be reorganised to effectively manage a change in overall personnel and strategic locations. Those personnel who were part of a unit that had been transferred to 2nd AIF status were withdrawn to depots if they were eligible for overseas service.153 The reason for the transfer in status of militia units was largely a

Japan was becoming a stronger threat to Australia’s security. 151 Sturdee had spent nine months as a sapper in the militia’s Corps of Australian Engineers prior to receiving his commission in 1908. 152 Michael Evans, ‘From Deakin to Dibb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the Twentieth Century’, in A Century of Service: 100 Years of the Australian Army, p. 5. An overview of Lieutenant-General Sturdee’s role can also be found in David Horner, ‘Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee: The Chief of the General Staff as Commander’, in David Horner (ed), The Commanders: Australian Military Leadership in the Twentieth Century, Allen A. Unwin, Sydney, 1984, pp. 147-157. 153 ‘CMF Volunteers for AIF’, The Argus, Tuesday 28 July 1942, p. 2; ‘Militia Units for A.I.F.’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Tuesday 28 July 1942, p. 7.

87 compromise to ensure that the militia units would not fold completely with the initial shift in personnel to the 2nd AIF. However, such a focus along with the policy support offered to the 2nd AIF meant that there was interest amongst the militia personnel to transfer. A further discussion of this change will occur in chapter 4 of this thesis.

With these combined pressures extending further in the management of the Army, the training, structure and support of the militia took on a role more than just preparing the personnel for war. It also reflected the overall role in which the militia were viewed in the Australian military structure and the associated policies enforced by the Government on the organisation. Considering that the militia needed to be trained and equipped as a result of pre-war policies, the Secretary of the Department of the Army, J.T. Fitzgerald, noted in the early part of the war that administration and instruction was still required in this regard.154 However, the varying training requirements prescribed to the militia in the early stages of the war did little to assist it in being prepared for possible home defence. The tactics of the Second World War were constantly changing along with the technology being utilised by the various military forces in the conflict. Unlike the members of the 2nd AIF who could expect to maintain their currency and awareness of a number of important matters, with their part-time role, the militia personnel could not be expected to achieve the same level of awareness.155 However, with a lack of consistent training, it had the potential to make militia personnel under-prepared for the role they were required to undertake in

154 ‘Minute, Shedden to Fitzgerald’, 27 November 1939; reply 1 December 1939, Department of the Army, Home Training for the Militia, NAA, MP729/6, 50/401/110. 155 This is evidenced by the level of training required for the militia to undertake its role despite the fact that the organisation had been in place for many years prior to the war. In particular, in correspondence dated 10 September 1941 from Major General G.H. Cannon (Quartermaster General) to the Secretary (Military Board), reference was made to Military Board Circular 56902 (dated 6 August 1941) which discussed certain action to be taken to raise the standard of efficiency of the militia and provide better facilities for rapid mobilisation in case of an emergency (‘Future Training of Militia Forces’, 10 September 1941, Department of the Treasury (Defence Division), Training of Militia Forces 1941-1942, NAA, A649, 82/602/8.

88 defending the country.

The extent of the differences between policies pertaining to the militia and 2nd AIF reflects the continuation of the two Army policy of preceding years. However, the position of Australia’s global defence structure along with the world events also warrants consideration as it demonstrates the impact of foreign affairs on the policies relating to the militia. During the early stages of the war, the overall focus of the Australian Government away from the militia is perplexing considering the history of the potential threat posed from Japan. This is not to say that the Australian Government did not consider the potential threat from Japan. In a re-emergence of the views noted by Kitchener some thirty years prior, political and defence leaders began to seriously consider the threat posed by Japan.156 However, the threat was soon discarded. As noted by Prime Minister Menzies to the London-based Australian High Commissioner, until Japan's position was known, it was considered 'useless … to discuss the sending of [an] expeditionary force'.157 The Australian Government had been aware of the potential threat from Japan for some time. As Prime Minister Menzies noted, Japanese neutrality during the war was 'open to extreme doubt'.158 However, with New Zealand becoming committed to send an expeditionary force to the Front, Menzies knew that he had to deal with both the media pressure and an increase in pressure from Britain to raise an Australian force for service overseas since the Defence Act made such an action difficult to achieve.159

The Second World War maintenance of the two Army system also showed a lack of effective decision making by the Government. The Defence Act provided the necessary legislative framework to release the militia for overseas

156 See: Official History, Typescript draft of Chapter 2, “Australia’s Problem” with Notes, Australian War Memorial, AWM73, 14B. 157 ‘Cable, Prime Minister R.G. Menzies to Bruce’, 5 September 1939, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, Vol. II, 1976, p, 232. However, the Prime Minister would later change his view on the matter. 158 R.G. Neale, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, Vol II, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1976, p. 258. 159 Horner, High Command, op cit., pp. 24-25.

89 service in that it only required the changes to be enacted by Parliament to help facilitate a truly united Army. However, the Government decided to repeat the procedures of the First World War and raise the separate expeditionary force for overseas service.160 The 2nd AIF was predominantly filled with citizens who enlisted only for the duration of the war and who had little intention of remaining in the army in peacetime (even if they had undertaken some compulsory militia training previously).161 Despite this split in roles and responsibilities, the Government did not enact changes. Although a number of military officials acknowledged the threat from Japan, there were also those who did not believe an invasion from Japan was likely. Although the 2nd AIF was more akin to a temporary organisation than the militia, officials looked upon with suspicion the potential for a citizen's army to be given more power and resources than what had occurred in previous years. The direct impact on militia numbers commensurate with the likelihood of Japanese invasion was emphasised when the War Cabinet determined that men would not enlist in the militia for home defence if they thought Australia was secure from a Japanese threat. In addition, the political and military decisions had to deal with reports that a lack of equipment was impacting upon the numbers of men enlisting.162

The overall level of policy support to the militia at this early stage of the war was not necessarily comparable to that of other countries. For example, there was a clear difference between the Australian militia and the equivalent part-time Army in England – otherwise known as the Territorial Army.163

160 David Black, ‘Menzies and Curtin in World War Two’, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, http://john.curtin.edu.au/ww2leaders/print.html, unknown date, accessed 15 May 2010. Interestingly, when arrangements were being made for the 2nd AIF to be raised, it was stated that no permanent officer was to rise above the rank of Major. 161 Alan Ryan, 'Back to the Future: The One-Army Concept in a Time of Change', Army History Unit - A Century of Service: 100 Years of the Australian Army, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/docs/A_Century_of_Service_Ryan.pdf, unknown date, accessed 4 May 2010. 162 Paul Hasluck, the Government and the People, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p. 400. 163 'Territorial and Reserves', Ministry of Defence, http://www.army.mod.uk/structure/143.aspx, 2012, accessed 14 July 2012.

90 Predominately consisting of volunteers, the Territorial Army (also known as the Territorial Force) was created in 1908 with the combining of the Volunteer Force, militia and Yeomanry.164 After serving in the First World War, the Territorial Army's total strength in the Second World War was over 440,000 and primarily served in a home defence capacity.165 While Britain legislated for conscription and the ending of any distinction between the regular and citizen soldiers, Australia's Government was committed to ensure conscription in its complete form was absent from policies.166 In addition, the different focus of the British Government on the structure of the military – in particular, the Army – reflected the scope of variations in the Australian Army’s structure along with its lack of certainty or understanding stemming from years of insufficient guidance as to its structure. While Britain adapted and amalgamated its existing military organisations to fit in with the changing world circumstances, Australia decided to reinvent its military organisation and structure, and form a new force in the First World War (and re-formed in the Second World War). 167 Although the pre Second World War history of the militia and 2nd AIF had the potential to minimise any policy uncertainty as to the respective roles of both organisations, as the Second World War was fought a generation later with weapons in a different theatre, any likely continuity was limited. It was more likely that the events of the Second World War required each organisation to attempt to establish itself again in the military structure and wanting to show that they could do the job expected of them. Therefore, the 'two Army' system impacted upon the character

164 See: Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907. 165 'Historical Background of the Territorial Army', The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's) - the Official Website, http://www.argylls.co.uk/history-of-the-regiment/militia-volunteers-and-territorial-battalions /198-territorial-army, 2010, accessed 14 July 2012. 166 In October 1939, the British Government announced that men between the ages of 18 and 41 (who were not in a reserved occupation) were required to join the military if required. Subsequently, men aged between 20 and 23 were required to register in one of the military services. Other age groups also received their call to serve in subsequent years. 167 For example confronted in 1914 with a need to raise mass volunteer armies, Britain drafted the Kitchener volunteers onto its existing regimental structure.

91 of the militia along with its standing within the Army structure itself.168

With the militia only able to serve in Australia's territory, the establishment of the 2nd AIF was done so that Australia could commit to the strategy of imperial defence. However, with the 2nd AIF being raised separately from the existing military structure, it had its own conditions of service, unit establishments and seniority lists. In addition, up until 1942, its commander, General Blamey, answered directly to the Minister for the Army and not the Military Board, unlike the militia. The differences between the 2nd AIF and existing militia led to numerous administrative and strategic difficulties, which also exacerbated the pre-Second World War friction between the two forces.169 In another reflection of the policy disparities between the two organisations, in an attempt to distinguish the 2nd AIF from the militia, the expeditionary units that duplicated the militia units were assigned a prefix “2” to indicate it was part of the 2nd AIF. By assigning a separate prefix, it indicated that each force was different to the other, thus leading to the enhancement of two separate armies.170

Early in the war, the role of the militia was also called into question when Britain suggested the Australian Government deploy additional naval vessels for service outside Australia's immediate waters. With it being Australia's primary defence force and noting the previous focus on increasing the strength of the navy during the 1920s, any shift in the navy's immediate deployment area would call the role of the militia into greater question at a time when their preparation was not ideal. In late September 1939, the Australian Naval Board approved Britain's request.171 Therefore, in addition to the militia seeing their counterparts in the 2nd

168 , ‘Broken Lineage: The Australian Army’s Heritage of Discontinuity’, A Century of Service: Army History Unit - 100 Years of the Australian Army, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/docs/A_Century_of_Service_Stanley.pdf, unknown date, accessed 25 May 2010. 169 '2nd Imperial Force', Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_13201.asp, unknown date, accessed 4 June 2010. 170 Palazzo, op cit., p. 142. 171 Bruce T. Swain, ‘A Chronology of Australian Armed Forces at War 1939-45, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001, p. 3

92 AIF being provided with sufficient government attention through the acquisition of funding, resources and policy proposals, they had to observe some of the main components of Australia's overall defence structure being reassigned. This would place additional pressure on the personnel in the event of a potential threat on the country.

In this regard, the Government's focus was solely centred on the role of any expeditionary force overseas and since the militia could not partake in such a role, their position was relegated to a lower policy priority. Instead, on 28 November 1939, it was decided by the Full Cabinet to send the 2nd AIF overseas and the Prime Minister noted in Parliament that:

We regard the protection of Australia itself as of primary important; indeed, it is naturally the first aim of any Australian defence policy. But our second aim must be and is to make the best possible contribution to the victory of the Empire and allied cause whereever and whenever that contribution is needed.172

This announcement coincided with the commencement of the transfer of personnel from the militia to the 2nd AIF. During November 1939, many regular army staff from militia units began to be withdrawn to train with the 2nd AIF. Figures suggest that 135,000 militia personnel had transferred to the 2nd AIF by early mid 1943.173 Despite the perception that those transferred personnel would undertake a greater military commitment than what they had previously, the reality was different due to the policy disparities between the forces which had exacerbated the pre-existing tensions between personnel.

The relative uncertainty of the potential threat to Australia created issues with the overall planning of Australia's military and led to a clear consensus in political and military planning and strategy. While many Army officers maintained that there was a high possibility of the threat from Japan being real

172 As quoted in ‘Australia takes the Field’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Thursday 30 November 1939, p. 8. 173 ‘Advisory War Council Agendum Transfers from C.M.F. to A.I.F.’, 8 July 1943, Transfers from C.M.F. to A.I.F. Advisory War Council Agendum No. 29/1943, NAA, A5954, 269/23.

93 and eminent, there was no clear guidance from the military hierarchy in comparison to the reports being received from overseas. Further, as Horner also described, the change in focus on Australia's home defence strategy could also have been attributed to a combination of the 'phoney war' and the easing of tensions between Japan and Britain.174 However, Horner's acknowledgement of the primary importance of defending Australia leads to questions as to the resources and support provided to the militia at the beginning of the war and its ability to defend the country. This view on the role of the militia by the nation’s senior military officials was partly influenced by the experiences of the First World War and their involvement in the AIF. Following their experiences in that conflict, many were then either transferred to the inter-war militia, or discharged before re-enlisting upon the commencement of the Second World War.175 As such, their strategic ties and focus were still ultimately focused on Australia's role overseas, and not to the requirements to adequately defend Australia from attack.

Despite this, there were enough senior Army officers who believed that the threat from Japan was serious enough to warrant a report being generated on the defence of Australia. On 6 December 1939, the CGS ordered that a report be prepared on the matter, and at the end of January 1940, an appreciation of the employment of the AMF in Australia's defence was handed down. While the appreciation indicted that 'Japan can … invade Australia',176 a series of staff changeovers limited the likelihood of any effective impetus on the militia's role being enacted.177 Therefore, despite the hesitancy of many senior officials (such

174 David Horner, High Command, op cit., p. 32. 175 ‘Fact Sheet 152 – Army and RAAF pay records held in Perth’, NAA, http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs152, August 2005, accessed 3 May 2010. 176 Memorandum, Lieutenant-Colonel Durant, GS (MO) to Colonel Combes, DMO&I, 16 January 1940; Draft appreciation, dated 19 January 1940 and draft memorandum DMO&I to CGS, January 1940, all documents in Department of Defence, Draft Appreciation on the Employment of the AMF in Defence of Australia by General Staff 16 Jan 1940, Australian War Memorial, AWM54, 243/6/158. 177 ‘Movement of Officers’, The West Australian, Tuesday 26 September 1939, p. 8; ‘Appeal for Men for Second A.I.F’, Examiner, Tuesday 24 October 1939, p. 6.

94 as Major-General Lavarack) early on in the war, the Government decided to deploy the 2nd AIF to the overseas war effort. Although the Government publicly indicated that their policy centred on the continual strength of the militia, in reality, they eventually supported the transfer of militia officers to the 2nd AIF and did not restrict militia men in general from also joining.178 This was shown as early as February 1940 when the Southern Command, in seeking reinforcements for the 6th Division, encouraged militia officers and men to join the 2nd AIF. They also sought militia officers to train 2nd AIF personnel.

With varying issues to consider both at home and abroad, Horner has suggested that the decision to deploy the 2nd AIF to Europe was the most important decision the Australian Government made in the early stages of the war.179 In the early stages of the war, the decision was in line with strategic policy and would have been considered important in order to sustain Australia's relationship with England. However, as the war progressed, it became evident the decision was actually one of the most important decisions not only for determining whether Australia was adequately defended from attack, but also the ultimate role of the militia. Meanwhile, the Federal Opposition was opposed to both the raising of the expeditionary force and conscription for home defence. As both the militia and 2nd AIF determined to prove themselves to receive policy support, they were more likely to focus on advancing their own agendas and position in the military structure. Difficulties also arose in relation to enforcing strategic guidance on military matters. Historian Dr Albert Palazzo suggested that the problems with enforcing guidance were a result of respective Australian Government's not being sufficiency specific in that guidance.180 However, it could be suggested that the militia’s place in the Australian Military Forces was also impacted by such actions. In the late 1930s, the Army leadership defied clear Government directions to make defence against raids the principal role of the Army, with preparation of a small expeditionary force being a lesser

178 Palazzo, op cit., p. 150. 179 Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, op cit., p. 7. 180 Palazzo, op cit., 336.

95 function.181 With such a lack of focus by the Government on the militia's role during peacetime, this limited the force's ability to understand military strategy and guidance, while also maintaining the standard required during wartime.

Nearing the end of 1940, the potential threat to Australia was increasing while there was still no clear policy guidance to the militia about their role. In addition, the lack of foresight about the required role of the 2nd AIF outside Europe saw the potential ability they could have had closer to Australian soil reduced and this would later impact on the role the militia would undertake in the New Guinea region. However, with this lack of planning, the militia were also inadequately resourced for their later role in this region. A changing shift in world affairs impacted on the role of the militia and its focus by the Government. It was in September 1940 that the security of Singapore became a concern to the Australian government following the Japanese's entrance into northern Indo-China.182 However, it was not until the Advisory War Council meetings of 5 and 13 February 1941 that the Government acknowledged the danger to Australia.183 Reflecting the unpreparedness of Australia's defence strategy at this time was the need of the Government and military to rely on advice from Britain. The history of reliance on Britain diminished the opportunities of the Australian War Cabinet to make strategic decisions on a variety of issues.184 They were reliant on the thinking and strategy from the First World War along with the intelligence from Britain about there being no threat from Japan. On 2 July

181 ‘The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001 by Albert Palazzo’ op cit. 182 However, it was not until February 1941 when the first Australian Division (the less one brigade) arrived in the region, and December 1941 when Australian battalion groups landed at Ambon and . These forces had little time to prepare though with the later Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, along with their landing in Thailand and Malaya. The apparent quickness of these movements impacted upon the effectiveness of any structural organisation of the entire Army. 183 Primarily the threat was acknowledged because of the militia being able to go overseas and that only the 2nd AIF could reinforce Malaya against the threat from Japan. However, the 2nd AIF could not be increase because there was a lack of equipment for additional units (ie: even the Group of the 8th Division arrived in Malaya under equipped). 184 Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, op cit., p. 59.

96 1941, Japan decided to move its forces south. This led to Australia attempting to prepare home defences and Major-General being appointed as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Home Forces.185

The commencement of the war with Japan on 8 December 1941 placed Australia under pressure from attack and one would have assumed the militia would be required more so than ever before and that a shift in policy considerations was required. However, like many countries, the Government was caught unaware by the development as much of their pre-planning had been focused on the 2nd AIF personnel and the war overseas. In addition, with the Fadden Government falling as a result of a switch in support of two members to the John Curtin led, Australian Labor Party, the War Cabinet in 1941 was undergoing a changeover which impacted upon its ability to seamlessly make policy decisions.186

Although the militia were not completely neglected by the policies of the government and overall administrative attention of Defence, there was no long term objective for the militia evident from the limited attention. By the time the Second World War had progressed through its early stages, the term “Citizen Military Forces” or “CMF” began to be an acknowledged and accepted reference to what had been known for many decades as the militia. Throughout the war, the terms were often used interchangeably. The use of the term was particularly evident in government and military circles and arguably a way to deliver a more

185 Jeffrey Grey, ‘Sir Iven Giffard Mackay (1882-1966)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 15, Melbourne University Press, 2000, pp. 235-237. Lieutenant General Ivan Giffard Mackay, KBE, CMG, DSO & Bar, VD, commanded the New Guinea force in 1943. He became a Lieutenant in the Militia in 1911 before joining the 1st AIF in 1914 as the adjutant of the 4th Infantry Battalion. His appointment to the AIF was terminated in 1920 and he went into roles in the education sector (although he remained active in the militia and held an honorary rank of ). 186 Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, op cit., pp. 76-77 notes that Curtin's decision to retain the almost entirely unchanged Advisory War Council was a significant allowance for some sort of continuity and assistance. Horner also noted that Curtin had little defence policy experience, and had to rely on the government's military and defence advisors, particularly Shedden.

97 formal and recognised organisation into the continuously shifting military structure. However, the overall organisation and structure of the militia force demonstrated the varying perception on its role in the eyes of the Government and military. Although the personnel were the main deliverers of the militia's role in the years of the war, ultimately, their ability to do so within the structure of the Australian Military Forces would be governed by the organisation and command provisions afforded to them.

As Horner noted, by the end of 1940, it was becoming clear that the threat from Japan was increasing and there would be little support coming from Britain.187 However, with the focus of Australia's military strategy on potential attack from the sea, there was limited preparation for war on the land through the channel from Japan to Australia; specifically in Papua-New Guinea and for an extended period. As noted by McCarthy, 'ignorance of New Guinea … prevailed in army circles … [which] resulted in losses of life which could have been avoided, in wasted effort and tactical reverses.'188 Despite the pre Second World War focus on the potential threat against Australia from Japan, it was not until mid 1941 that the War Council fully considered the situation. Initially discussed by Shedden on 14 April 1941 and then Menzies on 10 June 1941, with the lack of support from Britain being slowly understood, the position of Australian officials on the country's defence in conjunction with a lack of defences in surrounding countries was beginning to change.189 However, this barely changed the overall policy positions relating to the militia.

By the time Japan entered the war, the lack of resources and facilities available to the Army became apparent. As Menzies noted '[Australia] would not resist having to defend [itself] against even a minor attack from Japan in less than year from now'.190 Accordingly, after the Japanese entered the war, the

187 Horner, High Command, op cit., p. 23. 188 Dudley McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area – First Year: Kokoda to Wau, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1959, p. 591. 189 Horner, High Command, op cit., p. 129. 190 Quoted in John McCarthy, 'The Imperial Commitment, 1939-41', Australian Journal of

98 Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Government that the nation had to establish and train the necessary forces required to prevent invasion of the country.191 As a result, the militia became an organisation that would only be called into action if Japan attacked and therefore, a training ground for the 2nd AIF. Historians have noted that with the threat of Japan increasing, Australia was on the defensive.192 However, with the Government’s shift to bringing back the 2nd AIF and its resources to Australia, it suggests that there had been minimal political attention given to ensuring the militia were in a similar position of preparation. As an appreciation of the situation noted that:

If there were adequate naval and air forces for the defence of Australia, an army of the numbers that would be required could nearly be met from Australia itself although a great deal of equipment would be required from abroad. Until such time as adequate naval and air forces are available, it is estimated that it would require a minimum of twenty-five divisions to defence Australia against the scale of attack that is possible.193

However, even at this stage of the war, the role of the militia was being further questioned which would form the basis of subsequent considerations in later years. The Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Vernon Sturdee, was one such example of a senior individual focusing on limiting the role of the militia instead of the wider threat worldwide. Lieutenant-General Sturdee was more concerned about citizens leaving their farms - which were a strong source of resources for the 2nd AIF – and having access to weapons, than the potential threat from a Japanese invasion force.194 With such a view of the focus required of citizens (despite the knowledge of international affairs), many potential militia personnel would have been unlikely to sign up into the organisation and instead focus their attention on the 2nd AIF to ensure they would receive support from the Government. As Horner describes, the later meetings of the War Cabinet and Advisory War Council in late 1940 were ineffective in dealing with the combined

Politics and History, vol. 23, no. 2, August 1977, p. 181. 191 Palazzo, op cit., p. 148. 192 Ibid., p. 179. 193 Quoted in Horner, High Command, op cit., p. 180. 194 Wilcox, op cit., p. 139.

99 issues of 2nd AIF divisions being sent to Europe while the Japanese threat increased.195 It was often perceived that the threat to Australia would initially be by the sea, then the air and finally, the land.196 The official historian, Paul Hasluck, noted that 'although the Singapore conference had revealed the weakness of Singapore and hence, in the reasoning of the Australian defence advisers, of the home defences of Australia, it did not lead to any substantial action to repair the weakness'.197 The political attention of the Government was largely focused on the role that the 2nd AIF could play in protecting Australia instead of the role that Australia's militia could play (despite the restrictions of the Defence Act).

From this inauspicious start to the militia's role in the Second World War, the personnel within it were already assigned to receive limited policy support in comparison to the men of the 2nd AIF. Policies directly impacting on the continual maintenance of the militia were few in number. Further, where such policies did exist, they were significantly different to those applicable to the 2nd AIF, often to the extent of the militia being hampered in terms of personnel numbers as men often joined or transferred to the 2nd AIF. With the flow-on effect of a lack of policies impacting upon the strength of the militia and therefore, its continual role during the war, the militia were disadvantaged during this period. The issues discussed in this chapter though were merely a catalyst for additional policy matters for the militia and its personnel to contend with during the later years of the war. The combination of these matters had to be overcome before the militia would be in a position to gain recognition and support consistent with that of the 2nd AIF.

195 Ibid., p. 26. 196 This view was expressed by Prime Minister John Curtin. 197 Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941, The Government and the People, 1939-41, Canberra, 1952, p. 298.

100 CHAPTER 3 – THE POLICY DIFFERENCES EXTENDED

The backbone of any CMF unit is the personal relationships with one another, and its links with that bit of dirt and those mayors and those numbers of parliament from their own area. That’s what makes it efficient.1

To further emphasise the impact of policy decisions on the management and role of the militia and its personnel, this chapter focuses on analysing and reviewing policy decisions directly influencing the personnel within the militia. Outside of the major cities where Command Headquarter decisions occurred and were initially implemented, the main impact of such policies was found most directly in the actions of personnel in towns and cities across the country. In particular, this chapter will examine the experiences of the enlistment process for militia personnel in the early years of the war. It was at this time when matters such as recruitment, age, retention rates, conditions of service, pay, the enlistment of aboriginal and migrant men, and exemptions from service had to be considered by policy makers to facilitate a efficient military. The policies on these matters will also be compared against the 2nd AIF to emphasise the continuing impact of policies on the numerical strength of the militia during the war. Through this examination, a greater understanding of the requirements of personnel to continuously adapt and implement policies will be demonstrated. The variable impact of policy decisions on the militia will also be discussed and, in particular, the impact of such decisions on the public’s understanding of the role and place of the militia in the wider defence structure.

As previously identified, citizen soldiering had been engrained in Australian society for many years and accordingly, the opportunity to serve the country as a volunteer had long captured the attention of members of the public. Despite this, the system to facilitate men joining and continuing service in the militia was hampered by problems in the early years of the war. This primarily arose from

1 Major-General P.A. Cullen as quoted in Dayton McCarthy, The Once and Future Army: A History of the Citizen Military Forces 1947-1974, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2003, p. 349.

101 the policy differences between the militia and 2nd AIF in relation to the role and resources required by both organisations. However, from the start of the Second World War, the lack of clear and consistent policies saw differences between the 2nd AIF and militia extend further than matters typically resulting from political decisions.

A constant theme in the experience of Australian soldiers in the Pacific region were the divisions in the Army between the 2nd AIF and militia that were evident in the community and which occasionally led to disagreements between personnel. Despite their different roles, the political and military attention on the 2nd AIF in comparison to the militia led to a continuation of pre-war friction between the personnel of the two forces which was emphasised in a minute to the Secretary of the Department of Defence in November 1935, in which it was stated that 'some cases of snobbishness must be presumed to occur in any large organisation'.2

During the Second World War, coupled with the issues of defining the appropriate role of the two organisations was an overall lack of foresight as to the best way to manage the men within the force. This included the need to ensure that there was one Army working together as efficiently and effectively as possible to achieve a common goal. Ill-feeling between many personnel within the 2nd AIF and militia often continued to the end of the war.3 At times, the relations between the 2nd AIF and militia were variable. Particularly in the early years of the war, reports of disturbances between militia and 2nd AIF personnel were publicised throughout the country. Emphasising the impact of such disturbances, reports on arguments and, on occasions, fights between 2nd AIF and militia personnel were regularly received in Army Headquarters. As an example, in early 1941, reports of friction between the militia and 2nd AIF in camp surfaced.

2 'Minute from Major General Jess to Secretary of the Department of Defence', 12 November 1935, Army Headquarters, Military Forces, Recruiting Pay etc, in NAA, MP 431/1, Control Symbol 929/19/115, Item 507418. 3 ‘2nd Australian Imperial Force’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_13201.asp, unknown date, accessed 5 October 2011.

102 Investigations indicated that troops from both organisations were involved and that at its core, was the role each side was to undertake during the war. However, instead of dealing with the issues causing the friction, the Minister sought opinions in regards to the practicability of separating the militia and 2nd AIF camps.4 Such a move would have reduced the opportunity for 'one Army' to exist. On another such occasion in 1941, reports from Brisbane indicated that the ‘AIF and the Militia [were] always having brawls’ which led to a fight where personnel from the 2nd AIF ‘cleaned up’ the militia.5 Due to the nature of the reports, investigations were conducted by the Northern Command Headquarters which found that the assertion made in the initial reports was without foundation as no militia personnel were found to be involved in the commotion. Rather, all personnel involved were found to be from the 2nd AIF.6

The circulation of such reports emphasises the extent to which the pre-existing disagreements between the two organisations had continued at an early stage in the war. In addition, where reports were received of disagreements between members of the militia and 2nd AIF, investigations conducted generally indicated that the disturbances were 'isolated occurrences, and none … [were] of a serious nature'. However, a handwritten note from the Director of Personal Service in the Military Board questioned whether such occurrences were a ‘minor

4 Minister to the Secretary, 'Friction between Militia and A.I.F. in Camps', 21 March 1941, Friction between AIF and Militia in Camps, Australian War Memorial, AWM113, MH 1/130. However a response provided by the Chief of General Staff indicated that the present policy was that militia and AIF units were to be accommodated in separate camps as far as compatible with the best use of existing training facilities (Correspondence from Chief of the General staff to The Secretary, 'Friction between Militia and A.I.F. in Camps', 28 March 1941, Friction between AIF and Militia in Camps, Australian War Memorial, AWM113, MH 1/130. 5 ‘Relations between A.I.F. and Militia’, 6 August 1941, Department of Defence, Relations between AIF and Militia, Australian War Memorial, AWM60, 150. 6 ‘Relations between A.I.F. and Militia’, 23 August 1941, Department of Defence, Relations between AIF and Militia, Australian War Memorial, AWM60, 150; ‘Secret S47/41, 6/8/1941: Relations between A.I.F. and Militia’, Department of Defence, Relations between AIF and Militia, Australian War Memorial, AWM60, 150.

103 incident’.7 Further reflecting the extent to which the disagreements occurred, there was also friction between the militia and Staff Corps officers in the 2nd AIF who were each determined to enhance their position in the military structure, therefore reducing the likelihood of harmony between the two organisations. Colonel Frank Berryman referred to many militia officers as 'mere weekend officers' and there was considerable tension between the officers of Australia's two forces.8 This was despite many senior 2nd AIF personnel, such as Generals Leslie Moreshead, Edward Herring, and Tubby Allen, all having inter-war militia experience as a result of the disbandment of the AIF after the First World War. In general though, the constant investigations by Command Headquarters demonstrated an intention to stop such issues happening. However, it is arguable that the only reason such reports were investigated was to deal with any publicity surrounding such disagreements, rather than managing the policy issues leading to the arguments. Essentially, disagreements between the militia and the 2nd AIF were seen to have been a normal part of the Army and references in unit histories to continual issues suggest that the disagreements still existed at varying levels throughout the war.9

The impact of the decision to maintain a two Army system between the 2nd AIF and militia extended beyond general physical disagreements. Conveying the negative focus on the militia were the derogatory names its personnel were often subjected to. Despite the outward appearance of support, the men of the

7 Letter from Officer i/c Administration Northern Command to the Secretary, 'Relations between AIF And Militia', 23 August 1941, Relations between AIF and Militia, Australian War Memorial, AWM60, 150; Letter from A/D.A.P.M, Northern Command to A.A.G, N.Comd, 11 August 1941, Relations between AIF and Militia, Australian War Memorial, AWM60, 150; Correspondence from Director of Personal Services to Northern Command, ‘Relations between A.I.F., and Militia’, 1 August 1941, Department of Defence, Relations between AIF and Militia, Australian War Memorial, AWM60, 150. 8 Stuart Sayers, ‘Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir : Joint and Allied Commander’, in Horner, The Commanders, op cit., pp. 247-8. 9 Richard Pelvin, ‘Australian Pacific War Unit Histories’, Australia-Japan Research Project, http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/research-print/EB86CC357AC7F226852565B000499 E75?OpenDocument, unknown date, accessed 28 April 2010. However, the rifts diminished somewhat in subsequent years with militia units able to become 2nd AIF units.

104 militia were still identified as 'Chocolate Soldiers' (or 'chocos') and 'Koalas' by many. While militia personnel occasionally used such terms, the references were more often than not remarked by the men of the 2nd AIF who still considered themselves as the more highly trained, and therefore elite, organisation out of the two.10 This was partly influenced by the previously discussed policy differences in relation to the required training and role of both organisations. The impact of the term 'chocos' being used to distinguish militia personnel from those in the 2nd AIF was a constant source of concern to militia men throughout the Second World War. Specifically, the term 'choco' indicated a 'soldier with a pretty uniform but no intention of doing any real soldiering' (ie. having an unwillingness to fight in battle).11 The name calling conveyed a message that the militia were cowards and could not manage the pressure of battle, despite many personnel being unable to join the 2nd AIF due to policy decisions which restricted certain personnel based on health and age issues.12 Likewise, there was no policy action to highlight the fact that such men had often tried to enlist in the 2nd AIF without success.13 There was also the suggestion that the militia, with its ability to only serve in Australia, reflected the selfishness of the people at home in the early years of the war.14 While many within the militia were determined to prove themselves, the continual use of the term 'choco' suggests that despite the apparent attention of the Government to display a public show of support to the militia, the impact of differing policies on sections of the Army was spreading and continuing in a negative manner.15

10 Ibid. 11 ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, History, http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-help/faq.htm, 11 November 2002, accessed 4 April 2010. 12 'Curtin Defends Army Administration', Daily Telegraph, 25 February 1944. 13 ‘Militia Forces Defended’, The Argus, Saturday 1 November 1941, p. 5. 14 Mark Johnston, At the Front Line: Experiences of Australian Soldiers in World War II, Cambridge University Press, Oakleigh, 1996, p. 179. However, it should be noted that Gavin Long later commented that in some Battalions, the term 'choco' was being used as a positive term (in a manner akin to the 'rats of Tobruk'). 15 Wilcox, op cit., p. 120.

105 In addition to the disagreements and comments between 2nd AIF and militia personnel, obtaining the necessary levels of recruitment numbers into the militia would prove difficult with the level of inconsistent political or military support provided on the subject. Political decisions made on appropriate advertising also expanded on the strong 2nd AIF focus of the Government and media. As an example, the support given to the militia was overtaken by the 2nd AIF when matchbox advertisements stating 'Enlist in Militia – Support the AIF', were distributed throughout the community.16 In addition to managing the public articles on the role of the militia and 2nd AIF and associated disagreements, the members of the militia were also often disparaged by Government Ministers to strengthen the argument for more American troops being required in and near Australia.17 Further, the lack of consistent policies impacted on the management of the militia and the view of the organisation as a solid mechanism to defend the country. General Blamey was hardly openly supportive of the militia. At Donadabu, Blamey addressed a parade of battalions who had taken part in the advance over the Owen Stanley Ranges. While praising the 2nd AIF contingent, he did not mention the 3rd Militia Battalion’s role in the battle.18

Outside of political circles, the decisions on the role of the 2nd AIF and militia saw limited media articles being published on the militia's role and resources. There was greater attention given to the reintroduction of the 2nd AIF and the link to their First World War predecessors. On occasions, militia members found themselves criticised by select sections of the public and these were covered in the media.19 In an article about the 2nd AIF published in the Sydney Morning Herald in 1940, a sub-heading proclaimed that there were ‘no better soldiers’.20 Although written by a member of the (1st) AIF and at a time

16 ‘Summary of To-day's News’, The Sydney Morning Herald , 11 January 1945, p. 1. 17 Budden, op cit., p. 10. 18 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 19 ‘Militia at Moresby Criticised in Barry Report’, Cairns Post, Saturday 23 June 1945, p. 5; ‘Unfairly Criticised Militia is Vital in Defence of Home Front’, The Courier-Mail, Thursday 18 September 1941, p. 4. 20 ‘A Member of the First A.I.F, ‘The Second AIF – A New Generation in Arms’, Sydney

106 when the 2nd AIF was being established (thus necessitating the need for public support and encouragement to the men enlisting), hearing that their colleagues had qualities of ‘sturdy independence, ... great likeableness, and of quick reaction to unusual situations’ did not convey that a high level of support was to be experienced by the militia when compared against the 2nd AIF.21

The differing views on the recruitment and retention of militia personnel along with associated policy decisions impacted on the strength of the organisation and the opportunities to enhance the dwindling numbers of personnel. In the early stages of the war when there was a slow intake of 2nd AIF personnel, the impact of the media and Government view on the lack of militiamen transferring to the 2nd AIF was often severe. Further, the call for volunteers to the militia was becoming muted, if best. However, as one journalist noted, had members of the 'forces been formed into a battalion of the AIF to serve overseas with their own officers and NCO's the response would have been different'.22 It was therefore reliant on the militia and a small number of members of the community to convey a positive view of the militia and their ability to manage the resources available to it. In response to a newspaper article indicating that militiamen were avoiding active service, an individual noted that:

According to [the] correspondent, any boy joining the militia should promptly transfer to the A.I.F before he receives his uniform. ... This is not 1914. ... The present militia is more or less a regular force, having been on duty for about five months in the last seven. A great many of these men have made very considerable sacrifices; young married men were running businesses which have practically collapsed while they were serving in camp. ... They enlisted for home defence, which must be carried on. I raise my hat to the militia.23

In addition, it was noted by Brigadier Bundock (Commander of the South

Morning Herald, Thursday 4 January 1940, p. 8. 21 Ibid. 22 'Militia and the A.I.F', The Mercury, 27 May 1940, p. 9. 23 ‘Militia and A.I.F – Points from Letters’, The Advertiser, Tuesday 30 April 1940, p. 14.

107 Australian Military District) that:

... if the public properly appreciated the great responsibilities that the militia were expected to discharge it would adopt a more tolerant and sympathetic attitude (to the organisation). This would give no little encouragement to men ready to risk their lives if need be in the defence of their country and in the protection of those who now abused them so freely.24

Brigadier Bundock also noted that the militia had, for a period of time, been subjected to adverse criticism which had crept into the 2nd AIF. This had led to misunderstandings between the two organisations which continued throughout the war.25 However, after the initial stagnation of articles on the establishment of the 2nd AIF, it was a consistent occurrence to see newspapers reproducing images of militia personnel training and moving equipment into position on Australia's vast coastline.26 Such reports though were published alongside reports about the differences in treatment and standards between the personnel of the 2nd AIF and militia. These differences were linked to the policy decisions relating to opportunities available to the militia. For example, one such report indicated that militia troops at Seymour were not being being provided with the same resources and treatment as the 2nd AIF troops at nearby . However, a response provided by the Red Cross Representative for Seymour and Puckapunyal, Lieutenant W.R. Johnston, indicated that all militia troops who were fit were well provided for in that they were provided with free pictures, cricket and swimming activities, and that those who were sick and injured were being supplied with extra equipment in camp hospitals.27

Even as the war progressed and militiamen had undertaken service in accordance with their enlistment requirements, there was limited policy support in providing them with the same status or recognition as personnel from the 2nd AIF.

24 ‘Militia Defended’, The West Australian, Saturday 1 November 1941, p. 6. 25 ‘Militia Forces Defended’, op cit. 26 Wilcox, op cit., p. 109. 27 'Comforts for Militia', The Argus, 31 January 1940, p. 6.

108 This extended further to decisions outside of the Government, and enhanced the limited policies in relation to recognition of service by militia personnel. The Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial League of Australia refused admission to militia men until after the war and were of the opinion that 2nd AIF members would not join the organisation if the militia were allowed in.28 In another example, a meeting of the Camperdown Diggers Returned Services League (RSL) noted a decision made by the Federal Congress that there was not to be any change to the prescriptions for membership at that time in which the militia were not eligible regardless of where they had served.29 In Victoria, it was not until the final months of the war the state RSL decided to admit certain eligible militia men to the organisation.30 Previously, the qualification for militiamen to join the RSL was that they had to have served north of Katherine from 19 February 1942 to 31 March 1942. However, if while serving in the militia, a militiaman applied for transfer to the 2nd AIF, the time was extended to 14 November 1944.31 Emphasising the differences between the militia and 2nd AIF outside political and military circles was that it was not until some months after the Second World War battles in the New Guinea region that the Victorian Branch of the Demobilised Soldiers', Sailors', and Airmen's Association admitted men of the militia. The subsequent Federal RSL Conference later authorised other State branches to follow the Victorian example.32

Recognition from the Government for the service rendered by the personnel was not immediate. Initially, upon discharge, only militia personnel who had been to Darwin or New Guinea were awarded with a badge to indicate their service to the country.33 It was not until 14 August 1942 when the Minister for the Army, Mr Forde, announced that eligibility for the 'Returned From Active

28 Budden, op cit., p. 24. 29 'C.M.F. Not Eligible for R.S.L. Membership', The Camperdown Chronicle, Friday 22 January 1943, p. 1. 30 'Militia accepted by R.S.L', The Canberra Times, 8 February 1945, p. 2. 31 'Militia and Membership of the RSL', The Argus, 20 March 1945, p. 6. 32 ‘Servicemen’s Body Admits Militia’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 31 January 1944, p. 2. 33 'Militia Badges', The Sydney Morning Herald, Thursday 10 December 1942, p. 3.

109 Service' badge was to be extended to include soldiers who were stationed on full-time duty in prescribed operational areas in Australia or in the Territories.34 In addition, for the first time, policies were enacted to allow female relatives (ie. mothers and widows) of militia personnel to became eligible to receive badges. The extended eligibility saw mothers and widows of all members of the forces on continuous service (militia as well as 2nd AIF) who were killed in action or who died from wounds or other causes resulting from service in Australia or abroad, becoming eligible for the mother’s and widow’s badge.35 These actions were variants on other policy issues that maintained a difference between the 2nd AIF and militia, and suggested that recognition and changes in prescribed roles was possible. However, such change had to extend to a variety of other fields by the Government.

While the Government's decisions had an impact on the management and responsibilities of the militia, they indirectly had an impact on many communities outside of capital cities. Unlike circumstances in capital cities, with their travel through towns on the way to camps along with their territorial basis, militia personnel provided a sustained military presence in many regional and rural towns. In turn, this provided many citizens in such localities with their only sight of the military which, at a time when the perceived threat from Japan was still apparent, enabled a sense of protection for those communities.36 The policy decisions that led to militia personnel transversing through the communities also influenced their war-time economies and town management in that an increase in economies tended to occur when militia personnel were undertaking their training and came through the town via the railways. The militia helped the economy of those localities when the personnel would spend their wage for the purchase of

34 ‘Returned Men’s Badge’, The Mercury, Monday 17 August 1942, p. 4. The prescribed operational areas and the commencing dates for qualifying service in those areas were Portion of the - February 19, 1942, Mandated New Guinea - January 4, 1942, Torres Strait Islands - March 19, 1942, Papua - February 2, 1942. 35 Sydney Morning Herald, Saturday 15 August 1942, p. 8. 36 Interview between Sheridah Melvin and Madge Jones (nee Smith), 15 December 1986, Coffs Harbour Voice of Time Project, original recording held at Coffs Harbour City Library (copy in possession of author).

110 camp food and stores, and also at railway stations during breaks.37 The enthusiasm and support provided to militia personnel was highlighted in a report from the rural community of Armidale, New South Wales, in which it was stated that:

Armidale is ready for the militia camp. The showgrounds and racecourse are dotted with tents and huts. Sewerage has been installed at both grounds.38

In many regional towns and communities around the country, it became a common sight to see trains and trucks passing through carrying militia men to training camps. This led to newspapers in such localities publishing stories about the training being undertaken by the militia and their preparedness for duty (despite the lack of resources that has previously been described). Outside the influence of militia spending in regional communities, there were other examples of militia support in small communities, such as militia buttons being handed out as prizes at particular functions.39 While members of the 2nd AIF also received support in local communities, it is notable that militia personnel were warmly received in certain sections of the community despite the impact of policy decisions on the organisation seeing their direct influence and role in the military being limited. For example, it was common for ceremonies to occur for the militia when they went to, and arrived back from training.40 Reflective of this, a newspaper report in The Courier Mail highlighted the events of one such send-off:

Members of the 121st Wynnum Voluntary Aid Detachment gave a send-off in the Wynnum Town Hall ... to members of the Manly half of B , 15th Battalion (militia) on the eve of their entering of long training. Music, sdancing competitions

37 ‘Rail Transport and Australia’s War Effort’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/exhibitions/underattack/mobilise/rail.asp, unknown date, accessed 8 October 2010. 38 ‘Agricultural Summer School at Armidale’, The Courier Mail (Brisbane), Monday 5 February 1940, p. 15. 39 'Musical Festival', The Argus, Saturday 13 July 1940, p. 6. 40 ‘Militia Trainees for Greta’, The Canberra Times, Thursday 12 June 1941, p. 4.

111 and community singing were held, and prizes were won ... .41

The militia had always been anchored in individual communities, such as suburbs or small towns. This geographic basis and affiliation had been both a source of strength and support for the militia during the Second World War. Units were often filled by men who were neighbours and knew each other socially or through a common background or locality. Without this historical support, it is possible that the impact both of and on the militia in regional and rural communities may have been different. With the Government preferring policies reflecting quality over quantity in regards to the recruitment of soldiers, the view was that war should be fought by those who had always fought it (often 2nd AIF personnel) and policies would assist in ensuring this occurred. 42 In addition, those who were in senior positions in the military had often fought in the First World War or who had undergone militia training prior to the war’s commencement. There were few who had entered in the militia from the minimum age or without prior experience and worked their ways up through the ranks to a high position. Despite militia men being seen as they passed through towns and cities on their way to camp, the lack of willingness and policy action to ‘bring in new blood’ into the organisation through effective recruitment campaigns, led to the realities of militia life being alien to many men who wished to join.43 Conversely, the movement of militia personnel through towns limited the opportunity to highlight the policy differences between the militia and the 2nd AIF in relation to a variety of issues already described in this thesis.

Despite aspects of support, the overall lack of political and military direction in the early stages of the Second World War saw the legislated role of the militia becoming lost in the myriad of new technologies, attention on the 2nd AIF, and a lack of movement away from the historical perception of the organisation.

41 ‘Send-off for Militiamen’, The Courier-Mail, Friday 26 January 1940, p. 14. 42 This was reflected in comments (indicating that militia officers were ‘mere weekend officers’) made by (then) Colonel Frank Berryman as quoted in Stuart Sayers, Ned Herring: A Life of Lieutenant-General the Honorable Sir Edmund Herring, Hyland House / Australian War Memorial, Melbourne / Canberra, 1980, p. 127. 43 ‘Militia Recruiting’, The Mercury, Wednesday 7 August 1940, p. 3.

112 With the lack of policy support they could expect to receive, it was common to hear of militia personnel considering themselves a part of the Australian Military Forces (AMF) rather than the militia.44 Although this could indicate a strengthening in the relationship between the two organisations, it also emphasised that the distinctive citizen soldier status of the militia along with associated resourcing and support requirements, were being lost and instead being replaced by other political and military requirements. Indeed, there was a wide spread of previously separated militia and permanent garrison artillery units becoming amalgamated, albeit slowly.45

Outside of the general perceptions and views relating to the militia and its personnel, there was limited attention given by the Government to ensuring that the part-time nature of militia commitments did not negatively impact upon the lives of the personnel, and specifically, their careers outside of the military. Specifically, with militia personnel often having employment in the private sector, policy decisions meant that ensuring that men who joined the militia were able to retain their employment status after training was difficult. This was despite at the conclusion of their training, there was meant to be special legislative action taken along the lines of Britain’s Military Service Act to allow for re-employment of militia personnel at the termination of their training. This difficulty would influence the personnel numbers in the militia. While 2nd AIF personnel would have a level of stability in their employment due to their prescribed role and the main theatre of war, men in the militia were not necessarily afforded that opportunity. Although they had the potential of employment during the war, there was no guarantee that such employment would continue for any length of time due to the restrictions on where militia personnel could serve. In addition, even though the period of their duty was to be for the duration of the war and an additional twelve month period, their service was able to be terminated at any time.46 In early 1940, the War Cabinet approved the recommendation to bring

44 Wilcox, op cit., pp. 119-120. 45 Ibid, p. 120. 46 Memorandum from F.G. Shedden (Secretary of Defence) to the Secretary (Department of the Army), 'War Cabinet Agendum No. 62/1940 – Australian Military Forces –

113 the coast fortress units up to the minimum required manning numbers.47 However, reflecting the lack of personnel previously in the militia, at both the officer and other rank levels, at least a doubling of personnel numbers was required.

The work involved at modern forts was highly technical and constant changes of personnel had the potential to cause a reduction in efficiency and subsequently, an increase in threats against the Australian mainland.48 With the limited pay offered to militia personnel, there was an added reliance on supplementary employment for many men. However, with a number of employed men enlisting in the 2nd AIF, it also became difficult for many employers to sustain their businesses and allow men to take leave to undergo militia training. Therefore, the issues associated with the call-up and enlistment of men into the militia was also identified in the early stages of the war as being unfair to both personnel and their employers. There was also no guarantee that men who enlisted for service in the militia would find their jobs still available to them at the conclusion of the war as there was no legislative facility available for such an option to occur.49 Indeed, reports circulated early in the war that militiamen were being refused re-employment on completion of training periods. This was despite National Security Regulations safeguarding the employment of trainee militiamen.50

Requirements for Manning Coast Defences', 2 April 1940, War Cabinet Secretariat, Manning of Coast Defences – enlistment of Militia for the duration of the War, NAA, A2671, 62/1940 47 Department of Defence, War Establishments and Amendments, Australian War Memorial, AWM54, 327./4/20. 48 ‘War Cabinet Agendum 62/1940’, 19 February 1940, Department of Defence, War Cabinet Agendum – No 62/1940 – Manning of Coast Defences – Enlistment of Militia for the Duration of War, in NAA, CRS A2671, 62/1940. 49 F.R. Sinclair for the Secretary, 10 October 1939, Department of Defence Coordination, War Cabinet Agendum No. 9/1939 - Rates of Pay for Special Military Force and called up Militia, NAA, A2671, 9/1939. 50 'Protecting Militia Trainees’, The Argus, 23 August 1941, p. 3.

114 The enlistment process also reflected the policy differences between the militia and 2nd AIF along with the subsequent opinions of individuals in both organisations. The results of initial recruiting efforts and policies saw reports circulated in various media on ‘feeling among the AIF that more militiamen did not enlist when the call went forth’ and ‘the AIF feels that the militia has let it down’.51 This view was partly a continuation of the earlier perceptions on the role of the militia that had been around for decades. However, there was also a resentment that many of the militia personnel did not enlist for overseas service despite the training they had received prior to the war commencing. As noted by some in the 2nd AIF, the shortage of good officers and NCOs in the organisation could have been filled by militiamen.52 Nonetheless, the Government's policies on the enlistment process for militia personnel did not initially facilitate the need for many men to transfer to the 2nd AIF and in turn, leave their families and work commitments for overseas service. As was noted in a media report, a 'little more imagination in the enlistment of the Second AIF might well have secured the response from the militia which was originally expected in official circles'.53

While the 2nd AIF eventually began to receive in increase in the level of men willing to join, this was at the expense of militia numbers and partly arose from the later focus of the Government and military on conveying the benefits of enlisting in the 2nd AIF to the public. However, the same level of focus did not subsequently occur with the militia. At times, it was also impacted by restrictive recruitment standards into the organisation. An early War Cabinet Minute noted the decision to permit the enlistment of married men into Light Horse units in cases where the recruit provided a suitable horse.54 Later in 1940, a subsequent War Cabinet Minute noted that there had been a suspension of the enlistment of

51 ‘The Second AIF – A New Generation in Arms’, Sydney Morning Herald, Thursday 4 January 1940, p. 8. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 ‘War Cabinet Minute, 26 November 1940’ (referring to ‘Agendum 250/1940 – Recruitment for the Militia’), Department of Defence Co-ordination, Militia Camp Structure, NAA, A663, O30/1/18; ‘War Cabinet Minute No 622(B)(v)’, Department of Defence, Recruitment for the Militia Forces – War Cabinet Agendum No. 259/1940, NAA, A5954, 269/7.

115 married men into the militia.55 Following this, War Cabinet Agendum number 259 noted the instructions relating to the enlistment of married men and accordingly identified single men as being given preference to enlist in the 2nd AIF.56

In 1941, the War Cabinet attempted to address the problem of how to adequately defend Australia. However, instead of focusing on policies relating to the militia and associated requirements of their strength and conditions of service, it was suggested that the shortfall in the order of battle also necessitated the recruitment of more women into the Australian Women's Army Service and the Women's Auxiliary Australian Air Force.57 Even though militia personnel were prevented from serving overseas for most of the war, in late 1941, General Blamey recommended that authority be given for the employment of women in 2nd AIF base units in the Middle East (specifically in the Pay and Records Sections and in the Post Office, and also as canteen workers). This recommendation followed the example of the South African military (who had a large number of women employed in the Middle East), the United Kingdom Military Forces (who had women transport drivers), and the Royal Air Force's Women's Auxiliary Service.58 The Minister for the Army was designated to make a submission to the War Cabinet in conjunction with the general review of the question of the employment of women in the Services.59 However, despite many men still able to be called up for service notwithstanding the exemption provisions available, policies relating to those provisions were not changed so as to allow more men to enlist into the services and to allow militia personnel to

55 ‘War Cabinet Minute 622’, 12 November 1940, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Militia Camp Structure, NAA, A663, O30/1/18. 56 ‘War Cabinet Agendum 250’, 25 November 1940, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Militia Camp Structure, NAA, A663, O30/1/18. 57 Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, op cit., p. 82. 58 Martin Brayley, World War II Allied Women’s Services, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2001; ‘Women in World War Two’, History Learning Site, 2010, accessed 8 May 2010. 59 ‘Item 1517 - Enlistment of Women for Service Overseas, Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting’, 18 November 1941, War Cabinet Secretariat, War Cabinet Minutes – Minute Numbers 1456 to 1643, NAA, A2673, VOLUME 9.

116 undertake a greater variety of roles.

Overall, the recruitment process for men desiring to join the militia varied throughout the Second World War and was influenced by the particular international situation at the time. Unlike the period immediately after the Great Depression, there was a sufficient level of Government funds to allow for men to willingly enlist in the militia. However, the exact level of pay offered was not sufficient to persuade men to leave their jobs entirely, thus influencing the continuing maintenance in strength of militia numbers. Initially, the pay within the 2nd AIF was slightly less than that of the militia. This gradually shifted to the extent that the difference was reversed and members of the militia could expect to receive pay equivalent to that of their colleagues in the 2nd AIF prior to embarkation for overseas service. Although emphasising a consistent policy approach between the two organisations, this did not extend further into roles and was also with the exception of Deferred Pay.60 At a time when the average pay for men was ₤5, men in the 2nd AIF could expect to receive the following pay:61

60 Letter from P.C. Spender, Minister for the Army to J. Curtin, Leader of the Opposition, 30 August 1941, Rates of Pay: AIF Militia, Britain, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada Military Forces – Request by Mr John Curtin MP, NAA, MP508/1, 247/701/360. 61 Teleprinter Message from the Assistant Secretary to the Secretary, Department of the Army, 12 December 1940, Rates of Pay: AIF Militia, Britain, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada Military Forces – Request by Mr John Curtin MP, NAA, MP508/1, 247/701/360; Tim Colebatch, ‘Average Wage Hits $1000 a Week’, The Age, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/05/20/1085028465633.html, 21 May 2004, accessed 7 May 2010.

117 Married and single men Per day Before embarkation Active pay 5/- Single Man After embarkation Active pay 5/- Exchange Allowance 6d Deferred Pay 2/- Total 7/6d Drawing Rate 5/6d Married Men As for single man loss 2/6d 3/- per day allotment Drawing Rate

However, there was later an increase in the subsistence allowance for members when food and accommodation was not provided by their Service. When living at home, the allowance for 2nd AIF personnel was increased from 2s 5d to 3s 1d a day, and when they were not living at home it was increased from 4s 4d to 4s 6d a day.62 In addition, policies allowed for allowances to be payable to the wives and children of 2nd AIF personnel.63 Such allowances were not provided for in the militia. While being slightly higher than the British and lower than New Zealand, the above figures were largely comparable to those in other Commonwealth forces.

Reflecting the barriers that had to be overcome in all sectors of the community were that reports circulated about there being resentment in the community of the potential for the militia to receive the same concessions as the

62 ‘War Cabinet Agendum No 247/1942’, 22 May 1942, War Cabinet Secretariat, War Cabinet Agendum No 247/1942 – Subsistence Allowance – Proposed Increase, NAA, A2670/1, 247/1942. 63 Prime Minister’s Department, AIF Rates of Pay, Allowances, etc & Leave Part I, NAA, A461, BD337/1/4 PART 1.

118 2nd AIF due to the projected £10,000,000 cost.64 However, on the basis that many of the arguments against policy equality were purely financial in nature, it was also suggested that those opposed to such concession allowances may have well advocated for a reduction in the pay of the militia personnel. The focus of the official stance on pay was based on the risk involved to the soldier. At a time when it was becoming more likely that the militia would be required to undertake further service against the Japanese that what had occurred earlier in the war (and to a level equivalent to 2nd AIF personnel in battle), equality suggested that they were entitled to the same deferred pay as an 2nd AIF soldier.65

In mid 1940, approval was given by the War Cabinet to allow Divisional Commanders of the militia in three months camp to receive the 2nd AIF rates of pay and allowances of a Major-General.66 However, newspapers noted that the policies of financial equality subsequently provided to the militia were not designed to abolish the distinction between the various forces within the AMF.67 Indeed, this apparent change in focus to the militia did not extend to all levels of militia personnel and was partly a result of senior personnel being focused on specific agendas. The differences in pay also increased the likelihood of suitable personnel transferring from the militia to the 2nd AIF, and therefore impacting upon the militia's overall personnel strength. One such example of the continuing differences in pay was reflected in a Treasury Circular distributed in the early stages of the war, which noted that:

64 ‘Training for Volunteers’, Barrier Miner, Tuesday 19 September 1939 65 ‘Militia – A.I.F. Units’, The Mercury, Tuesday 27 January 1942, p. 2. 66 'War Cabinet Minute – Agendum No. 100/1940 – Pay of Militia Divisional Commanders – Three Months' Camps', 13 May 1940, Pay of Divisional Commanders – Three Months Militia Camps – War Cabinet Agendum No. 100/1940. It should be noted that previously (29 November 1939), Cabinet had decided that Divisional Commanders were not to go on a daily rate of pay but were to remain on the consolidated rate of £250 per annum (Outwards Teleprinter Message from Mr Sinclair to the Secretary 'Pay of Divisional Commanders – Three Months Camp', 6 May 1940, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Board of Business Administration - Clothing Requirements for Militia Forces, NAA, A663, O5/2/102. 67 ‘Militia – AIF Units’, The Mercury, Tuesday 27 January 1942, p. 2

119 Officers in Militia Training will not receive Public Service pay during period in camp. Insurance payments therefore not available on policies, therefore request that officers be invited to elect deduction from last Public Service pay prior to entering camp.68

The extent of this difference continued throughout the war. At the beginning of the Second World War, the militia received no deferred pay and the 2nd AIF received 1/- a day either on embarkation or after six months’ service in Australia. By the end of July 1940, the Government ruled that members of the militia were not eligible for the exemption from payment of income tax on their military pay which was granted to members of the 2nd AIF abroad.69 This was reflected in that political determinations directed that the militia was required to pay tax on their pay while the 2nd AIF did not. The militia were also less entitled to pensions. This decision coincided with an increase in the number of militia personnel volunteering for service in the 2nd AIF.

During their 30 days continuous training, militia personnel received the existing militia daily rate of pay at the minimum of 8/- for a private. At the time of their 3 months continuous training, they were to be paid at the rates of pay and allowances applicable to the 6th Division.70 However, it was not until moves to change the role of the militia (in light of advent of Japan entering the war), that the issue of pay disparity was acknowledged formally and managed. In late 1941, the Government decided to increase the pay level of the members of the AMF. The War Cabinet decided in March 1942 that from a retrospective date of 7 December 1941 (the date of Japanese the attack on Pearl Harbor), it would allow deferred pay to the militia personnel at the same rates and conditions to

68 ‘Treasury Circular 1940/2 (2237/39/3059)’, 5 January 1940, Department of the Interior, Assurance Premiums (Circular Re) Officers Undergoing Militia Training, NAA, A659, 1940/1/644. 69 'Militia to pay Income Tax', The Canberra Times, 26 July 1940, p. 2. 70 'Press statement – War Cabinet Decision – Rates of Pay for the Services in Time of War', 5 October 1939, in Department of Defence Co-ordination, War Cabinet Agendum – No 9/1939 – Rates of Pay for Special Military Forces and Called-Up Militia, CRS A2671, 9/1939.

120 those personnel in the 2nd AIF.71 While the deferred pay rates ultimately varied depending on the seniority of the soldier, the decision by the Government to allow deferred pay was in part due to its plan to create a homogeneous home army.

In the early years of the Second World War, it became apparent that the impact of policy decisions led to disparities in the level of financial support able to be received by militiamen in comparison to their colleagues in the 2nd AIF. Reports of hardship circulated throughout the community, particularly in regards to married men in the militia. Specifically, there were complaints that married men who had undergone long periods of training would not be able to support their families.72 With the eight shillings a day pay men could expect to receive in camp being less than most pay provided to civilians, men were entitled to apply for exemption to service if it would have been a severe financial burden on their family.73

Particularly with many militiamen being a part of the public service, the Federal Cabinet decided to pay Commonwealth public servants in the militia the difference between military pay and their civil pay for the first 16 days they were in camp. However, they would then only receive their military pay for the final 14 days in the 30 day camp period.74 This fall in income coupled with the training requirements hardly encouraged public servants to join the militia instead of the 2nd AIF, and such a view was spread across a range of demographics. For an intermittent military force, the small amount of training may have seemed minimal at best. However, there was no doubt that training for war was required, instead of the training during peacetime that had previously occurred.

The Government also decided to later extend the militia additional monetary benefits, such as receiving the same service pension rights, death compensation rights and the same repatriation benefits as the 2nd AIF to the total

71 ‘Deferred Pay’, The Mercury, Saturday 21 March 1942, p. 4. 72 ‘Pay Inadequate’, The Canberra Times, Monday 3 March 1941, p. 4. 73 Wilcox, op cit., p. 116. 74 ‘Pay Rates in New Force’, The Argus, Thursday 5 October 1939, p. 2.

121 cost of roughly £10,000,000.75 Despite the change in policy reflecting varying public opinion on the militia, many believed that either the 2nd AIF should receive a further increase than that provided for by the Government, or the militia should not be entitled to the increase.76 Such an opinion was based on the notion of 'equality of sacrifice' which was influenced by the restrictions on service by the militia. In March 1942, the Government changed the policy so that the pay and conditions of militia soldiers were the same as their counterparts in the 2nd AIF. 77 The militia personnel also subsequently received entitlements such as alcohol and free mail service to the same level as 2nd AIF soldiers, and the militia was also able to receive tax free pay on the sustenance allowance.78

In addition to the militia's lack of support in achieving equality for a number of years in relation to matters such as pay and resources, even in 'leisure' activities, it could not be sure of obtaining Government and military support. One such area in which this was most prevalent was that of canteens. In particular, the men of the 2nd AIF had a greater chance of obtaining and retaining wet canteens while the militia's canteens were dry until sometime later in the war.79 This difference occurred despite early on in the war, commands were informed (on 18 October 1939) of the decision by the Government against the provision of wet canteens in camps was to be applied to the 2nd AIF, militia and Garrison Battalions.80 However, on 1 November 1939, the Military Board recommended that wet canteens, for the sale of beer only, should be established

75 ‘AIF, Militia, Garrison in One Army’, The Courier Mail (Brisbane), Tuesday 3 March 1942, p. 1; ‘Militia – AIF Units’, The Mercury, Tuesday 27 January 1942, p. 2; ‘AIF and Militia’, Burra Record, Tuesday 3 February 1942, p. 3. 76 James T. White, 'Rise for Militia', The Argus, 3 November 1941, p. 8. 77 Department of the Army, Establishment of Uniform Conditions of Service for Citizen Military Forces (Militia) and Australian Imperial Force, CRS MP508/1, 240/701/241. 78 ‘Tax on Militia Allowance’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Thursday 21 August 1941, p. 11. 79 Hasluck, op cit., p. 329. 80 ‘Chiefs of Staff, Standing Sub-Committee – Record of Army Action – General’, Attorney-General’s Department, Chiefs of Staff – Standing Sub Committee – Record of Army Action – Daily Statements, NAA, A11667, 4, p. 6.

122 under military control in camps of continuous training.81 In doing so, the Board indicated that the recommendation, if approved, would require an amendment of the Defence Act to cover militia camps already attended by soldiers called up for service under Part XII of the Defence Act.82 The Military Board informed all Commands on 10 November 1939 that subject to Ministerial approval, it was proposed to insurgate the Canteen Service and set up Canteens in appropriate Military Camps in the near future.83 While the Controller of the Canteen Service was to be an officer attached to the Army Headquarters (AHQ) and responsible to the Quartermaster General, it was only the Deputy Controller in each Military District who was to have the status of Militia Officer called up for part time or whole time duty as required.84

With the threat of war apparent to the community, there was no notion of civic duty not being required at that time. However, despite small policy changes gradually diminishing differences between the military and 2nd AIF, as noted previously, there was a continual issue with sustaining the number of recruits joining the militia. Therefore, it was likely that some other reason was influencing the militia numbers. To provide for the consistent recruitment of men into the organisation, a level of willingness had to be agreed to by the men to undertake the training required for home defence, along with the militia commanders to make it interesting and worthwhile so that the men would stay and influence more individuals to join. Although there were many personnel who remained in the militia throughout the Second World War, there were also many who were not willing to continue service in the militia and instead left, did not

81 ‘War Cabinet Agendum No 140/1942’, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Canteens in Camps of Militia Units, 2nd AIF and Garrison Battalions – War Cabinet Agendum No 140/1942, NAA, A5954, 198/1; Department of Defence Co-ordination, Canteen Service and Australian Military (Canteen Service) Regulations (Wet or Dry) Canteens in AIF & Garrison Camps, NAA, A816, 1/301/663. 82 ‘Chiefs of Staff, Standing Sub-Committee – Record of Army Action – General’, op cit., p. 6. 83 Ibid., p. 8. 84 Ibid., p. 7.

123 join, or transferred to the 2nd AIF.85 It was common for personnel who were influenced by the later conscription actions to be more likely to not continue their service once they reached the appropriate age to join the 2nd AIF. As such, the conditions of service prescribed upon them along with the actual role undertaken by the militia at the beginning of the war were not conducive to maintaining a constant level of recruits for military service. In addition, there were also difficulties in retaining personnel in the militia as a result of the support provided to other services to obtain enlistees. By the end of 1941, policies allowed members of the militia to enlist in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) as a direct result of the need for a large and steady flow of air crew to support the Allied effort in Europe.86 With the threat posed by Japan still not at its peak at the time, facilitating this transfer was to be expected by the Government. Overall, the number of transferees is reflected in that between November 1942 and the end of the war, fewer than 21,000 new men joined 2nd AIF units, but reflecting the difficulties in retaining personnel, more than 200,000 militia men changed their status to 2nd AIF by volunteering for overseas service within their units.87

Despite the policy differences between the two organisations and the total number of enlistments, there were also elements of differences relating to the age requirements and restrictions for both the 2nd AIF and militia. This partly influenced the structure of both organisations and ultimately, the differences between both as it often determined the training provided along with the opportunities afforded to both organisations to implement consistent policies. Prior to the Second World War, the militia often recruited single men between the ages of 18 to 21.88 This policy helped to ensure that ready, fit, young men were able to join the service and did not have the restrictions imposed on them when the men had young families or designated employment in a particular field. Furthermore, the compulsory nature of the training ensured that the young men

85 Peter Charlton, The Thirty-Niners, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1981, pp. 28, 31. 86 'Militia Men can Enlist in the R.A.A.F', The Mercury, 3 December 1941, p. 6. 87 ‘The Second AIF – A New Generation in Arms’, ibid. 88 ‘Enlistments in Militia’, The Argus, Tuesday 11 February 1930, p. 7.

124 had developed a sense of cohesion and unity in the work being undertaken. As suggested by Neumann, compulsory military training should 'have the effect of ‘democratizing’ (sic) the military in that youths of all social classes were … liable for service'.89 However, as they grew older, transfers were common thus leading to experience also moving. Indeed, Australian men who joined the 2nd AIF in the Second World War were generally young, though not perhaps as young as one might have expected based on pre-war enlistment figures. For example, the age limits set for enlistment in the 2nd AIF in 1939 were 20 to 35 for recruits and even higher for officers and some NCOs.90 The 2nd AIF maximum age was raised to 40 in 1940 and the minimum lowered to 19 in 1941 (and 18 in 1943), while written parental consent was required for anyone under the age of 21. Even when the limit was lowered to 18, men of that age were not permitted to go to New Guinea or the Northern Territory. The same restriction also applied in the militia, although there, the 18 year lower limit existed earlier.91

From 1942, a level of policy consistency occurred in that the militia shared with the 2nd AIF a requirement that all recruits under the age of 20 on enlistment undergo six months training before being posted to a unit.92 Despite this, the age restrictions on militia personnel had an impact on the overall strength of the militia in the years ahead. The militia’s upper age limit was 60, but by February 1944, 96.4 per cent of those conscripted had been between the ages of18-35, and the percentage by the end of the war would have been higher.93 The difficulties associated with the age restrictions on the militia were reflected in the lack of

89 Neumann, op cit., p. 170. 90 Long, op cit., p. 49; Allan S. Walker, Middle East and Far East, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1956, p. 34. 91 Department of the Army, Service Obligations and Employment Abroad of Australian Regular Army Soldiers under 21 years old – Enlistment of Personnel in AIF at 18 years of age, NAA, MP742/1, 275/1/34. 92 Department of the Army, Recruitment of Personnel for the Services, NAA, MP74/1, 275/1/43. 93 Mark Johnston, ‘The Civilians Who Joined Up 1939-1945’, Australian War Memorial – Journal, Issue 29, November 1996, http://www.awm/gov.au/journal/j29/civils.asp, accessed 9 June 2010.

125 recognition given to those personnel in the 2nd AIF who had to transfer over to the organisation. At the mid stage of the war, a General Routine Order was issued indicating that a number of personnel had to relinquish their unit patches if they initially sought enlistment in the 2nd AIF and had not undertaken service abroad.94 With the age of such transferees being quite young (such as Captains being required to transfer at the age of 35), the lack of recognition they could expect to receive could have impacted on the likelihood they would have transferred to the militia or left military service completely.

The age limits imposed on service in the 2nd AIF and militia had an impact on the structure of the two organisations. With many young men seeking to assist in the war effort, they often joined the militia if they were not of the appropriate age to allow for initial enlistment into the 2nd AIF. While this allowed the militia to increase their numbers, as many of those men ultimately sought to join the 2nd AIF so as to serve overseas, transfers to that organisation upon reaching the minimum age were common. Further, although this allowed the 2nd AIF to receive young personnel who had undergone training, it negatively impacted upon the militia as they lost personnel who were now able to fight on overseas shores.95 In addition, by transferring to the 2nd AIF, they were likely to be better off as they were then entitled to additional benefits of service.

The decisions relating to the enlistment of personnel extended further than the impact of age conditions on the militia. It also extended to the backgrounds of the personnel. History has tended to suggest a distinction in selecting officers based on social or employment status. Commercial, clerical and professional men tended to be found in amongst the ranks of Officers. Meanwhile, men employed in primary production would sometimes be found in the ranks of Officers, but labourers and miners would rarely be found in such a position. Neumann notes that of three militiamen known to have been commissioned between 1933 and 1940, one later became assistant town clerk, one an engineer, and the last, a wool

94 'Older Officers Back to C.M.F'', The Sydney Morning Herald, Tuesday 4 May 1943, p. 4. 95 John H. Blackwell, Choco to AIF, General Store Publishing House, Ontario, 1994, p. 8.

126 clerk.96 The militia of the Second World War followed the same structure as its preceding years.97 Social distinctions often saw officers recruited from the more well-off men in the community while those less fortunate found themselves in the roles of junior NCOs and Privates. By the Second World War, the proportion of farmers and graziers becoming senior officers in the militia had dropped from 23 to 5 per cent.98

In some instances, the changes in personnel background for the militia over the years could partly explain the difficulty for the militia to maintain a sufficient level of personnel over the course of the war. Instead of the Government and military attempting to rectify this difference, the distinction between personnel backgrounds continued throughout the war. Not only did policy issues in relation to pay mean that many men who were only able to serve in the militia instead of the 2nd AIF were more likely to obtain exemptions for service or decide to continue working in their farming careers, but the likelihood of them not being able to work their way up through the ranks would have also been an influential factor. By comparison, all ranks of personnel from the 2nd AIF came from a variety of backgrounds. Prejudices over the best personnel to fill positions was common, and it was more often than not that officer positions were filled by personnel from particular backgrounds or who had attended military academies, such as Duntroon. Few long-standing militia personnel had such backgrounds. While many militia personnel had the experience to see them being suitable for particular roles, the Government did not adequately seek to address the differences in backgrounds of militia officers to ensure a range of backgrounds were represented which, in turn, could bring in additional ideas and support from communities. If communities saw their male population succeeding in the military, it had the potential to influence the decision of other members of the population to enlist for service. While the militia were often the public face of the military in small communities, the composition of the force was

96 Neumann, op cit., p. 191. 97 In particular, refer to Neumann, op cit., pp. 170-192 for a discussion of the social composition of the militia prior to the Second World War. 98 Ibid., p. 175.

127 structured in a way that reflected societal values of the time and the commitment of men to serve the nation in times of war.

Despite the difficulties in obtaining policy support for militia personnel to undertake roles at higher levels, the decisions made in relation to lower levels can be further discussed. Although primarily a military force comprising of men of British descent, the role of Aboriginal and migrant men in the militia should not be forgotten. Indeed, their involvement reflects the militia being in a unique position in Australian history at a time when limited attention was given to such men. At the outbreak of the Second World War, the Superintendent of the Cape Bedford Mission for Aboriginals in North Queensland wrote to the Chief Protector of Aboriginals. This correspondence, which subsequently was conveyed to the Queensland Premier’s Department, Department of Defence and the Prime Minister, indicated that:

All halfcaste men military age twenty in number expressed their readiness serve their country in any way Government wish them to do so their registration cards posted.99

Estimates put the total number available for military training in the region at ‘at least 50’.100 The Mission, which was established in 1886 and controlled by the Lutheran Missions of New Guinea, had a male population at that time of 91 adult males meaning that over 50 percent of its male population was available for military training.101 Subsequently, approval was given by the Commandant of the 7th Military District for a limited number of ‘selected types of half-caste aborigines’ to enlist in the Militia forces in Darwin. The Minister of Defence

99 Letter from W. Morgan Smith, Premier of Queensland to the Prime Minister of Australia, 20 September 1939, Department of the Interior, Enlistment of Half-Caste Aborigines in the Militia Forces at Darwin, NAA, A659, 1939/1/12995. 100 Letter from H.S. Foll to the Hon G.A. Street, Minister for Defence, 17 August 1939, Department of the Interior, Enlistment of Half-Caste Aborigines in the Militia Forces at Darwin, NAA, A659, 1939/1/12995. 101 Letter from W. Morgan Smith, Premier of Queensland to the Prime Minister of Australia, 20 September 1939, op cit.

128 wrote that such an action would be ‘of value in meeting requirements in local militia units’ and also provide the Aborigines with some occupation in hours when they were not otherwise employed.102

Despite the lack of overall policy attention to stem the number of transferees to the 2nd AIF, enlistment in the militia was not just an option for Australian citizens (ie. British subjects), and the policies reflected this. While a number of men were exempt from serving in the militia, nationals within Australia from overseas localities was required to register for service with the militia.103 For example, in late October 1942, the Minister for the Army announced that American nationals in Australia were required to serve in the militia as directed. However, while they were subject to the Defence Act and aliens’ service regulations, they were not required to take the oath. American nationals subject to this announcement included those between 18 and 60 who were a resident in Australia or who remained in the country continuously for a month and had not volunteered for service.104 However, the split between the backgrounds of militia personnel and their continual enlistment also reflected the extent of the transfer of personnel from the militia to the 2nd AIF over the course of the war and the need to sustain numbers.

The disparate policies as to who was able to enlist in the militia were also enhanced by policy decisions on the exemption categories available to men in the community. Militia personnel were often sent home after completing camp and gaps in positions were instead filled with compulsory trainees. Men who worked in industries considered essential for the war effort were withdrawn from drill.105 The Government preference of war production over military service allowed many men to come forward and claim exemption from service. In a reflection of

102 Letter from G.A. Street, Minister for Defence to the Hon H.S. Foll, Minister for the Interior, 17 August 1939, Department of the Interior, Enlistment of Half-Caste Aborigines in the Militia Forces at Darwin, NAA, A659, 1939/1/12995. 103 The Argus, Friday 30 October 1942, p. 3. 104 ‘Americans Liable for Service’, The Argus, Friday 30 October 1942, p. 3. 105 Wilcox, op cit., p. 112.

129 the extent of the exemption provisions available to men, early on during the war, about 96 students at the were granted an exemption from national service on the basis of being in a reserved occupation.106 As men who worked in reserved occupations were unable to enlist in the Army and many of those employed in non-essential fields directed to war-related industries, there was limited scope for the militia to increase its numbers once many were assigned to work on the home front. Despite many occupations turning to the employment of women in the absence of men, a number of employers also applied to the military to either exempt or delay the appointment of men into the militia.107 In one example, the Secretary of the Adelaide and Suburban Master Bakers' Association wrote to the Man Power Officer at Keswick Barracks seeking the baking and bread carter trade being made reserved occupations. Amongst the reasons given for such a request was the comment that many 'younger employes (sic) [had] been ... called up for militia training', thus leaving many proprietors, particularly in the country areas, without support, thus leading to nervous breakdowns occurring to some.108 The situation also extended to occupations

106 'Students for Militia', The Argus, 13 January 1940, p. 2. 107 There are a significant number of documents available evidencing the variety of reasons why men were not appointed into the military at a particular time. On 22 September 1941, Major F.G. Moran (for Colonel Sir Alan Newton, Chairman, Medical Equipment Control Committee), wrote to Colonel Gordon (Officer Commanding 32nd Battalion, AMF) to notify that an application had been made by Lacy & Osborne (a firm that manufactured field, surgical and medical panniers utilised in the Services), for one of their employees to be granted extended leave to enable him to continue in the occupation. Evidencing the extent to which the situation had become known, the Medical Equipment of the Army made the ‘strongest representations’ to the Medical Equipment Control Committee for the man to remain in his civil employment due to the national importance of the role (see: Department of Defence, Release from Militia Service, NAA, A663, O130/3/1029). On the other hand, on 24 December 1941, an individual wrote to the Secretary of the Manpower Priorities Board notifying him that certain parties had been exempted from Military Duties (see: Department of Defence, Release from Military Training, NAA, A663, O130/3/1024); ‘Man Power: Exemptions from Service in Citizen Forces – Circular No. 42’, Department of Defence, Man Power: Exemptions from Service in Citizen Forces – Circular No. 42, NAA, A663, O130/1/437). 108 Letter from G.L. Ball, Secretary, Adelaide and Suburban Master Bakers' Association, to Lt Col. Darley, Man Power Officer, Keswick Barracks, 13 May 1941, Department of Defence,

130 such as abattoir workers, vacuum closers, slaughtermen, butchers, and foreman, along with students at institutions such as Roseworthy Agricultural College.109 Further compounding the issues associated with employment outside of the militia and the overall impact of this on personnel numbers were general conditions of service in the militia. As an example on the disparate conditions of service, on 22 January 1941, the War Cabinet considered the issue of Sick Leave Conditions for personnel including the Citizen Force personnel who had been called up for full time duty. In addition, members of the 2nd AIF were given War Service Leave on full pay at the rate of 7 ½ days for each six months service overseas.110

With a large number of its personnel overseas, there needed to be a military force in Australia to ensure public support of Australia's role (and associated costs of war) was achieved. The early years of the Second World War signaled a difficult time for the militia and its personnel. Although willing to undertake their duty to defend Australia against attack, the combined nature of pre-war and war-time decisions relating to the force limited the role the militia was able to do. By the time the threat posed by Japan was fully appreciated in early December 1941, the War Cabinet, military advisers and members of the

Meat Employees – Release from Militia Training, NAA, A663, O130/3/844. The letter from Mr Ball followed a letter from H.S. Coombe (of Berri) to him noting that even with an advertisement for a permanent Baker at the wage of £6 per week, he had not received any queries from prospective employees, thus leaving him without a baker, or, even at the bare minimum, someone to prepare the dough. Interestingly, despite the difficulties being faced, A.T. MacArthur, the Services Liaison Officer informed Lt Col Darley on 6 June 1941 that it was not intended to reduce the age of bakers in the list of reserved occupations below the present 25 years and that individual cases of hardship should see an application made under the National Security (General) Regulations 60A2(a). 109 Minister of Agriculture () to Col. Darley, Man Power Officer, Keswick, 3 March 1941, 'Militia Training for Students of Roseworthy Agricultural College', Department of Defence, Militia Training for Students – Roseworth Agricultural College, NAA, A663, O130/3/662. 110 ‘Agendum No 17/1941’, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Personnel – Army & General: Sick Leave Conditions – Permanent & Air Forces enlisted since 6th October, 1939, & Citizen Force Personnel called up for full time duty, NAA, A5954.

131 military were poorly prepared to deal with the new challenge posed by Japan.111 This insecurity within the Government and lack of Defence policy experience within the Government impacted upon its ability to effectively manage and strategise on the role of the military, including the militia. With the focus on the 2nd AIF (and even to other services, such as ensuring sufficient resources for the RAN), the impact on the role of the militia was apparent. As identified by a veteran of the First World War:

That there has been any distinction at all is due to the weakened policies of Federal Governments ... who lacked the courage to do the obvious thing when this war broke out, ie complete conscription of all manpower. ... [T]he army of Australia, whether fighting here or abroad, should be placed on one basis of pay and repatriation benefits.112

With the war gradually nearing Australia, it was clear that a shift had to occur in the management of the country’s defences, including its Army, to ensure the safety and security of the population. This action was soon to occur in one of the major policy actions undertaken by the Government during the Second World War and, for a brief period, the bureaucratic and legislative restraints on the militia were minimised. However, the events in the early years of the Second World War indicated that significant changes had to occur to policies to enable the militia to fully undertake its designated role in defending the country. Without changes to policies outside specific military requirements such as employment, support to families and benefits, there would be minimal impact on any changes to the military aspects of the militia. This was due to the overall impact on policies on the strength of the militia. As such, until such a time when major,

111 ‘The Directives of the Commanders-in-Chief Pacific Ocean and South West Pacific Areas’, Department of Defence, Book 4 (Original) Chapter 16 – The Directives of the Commanders in Chief Pacific Ocean and South West Pacific Areas, NAA, A5954, 769/2, pp. 6-7; Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, op cit., p. 74-76. Curtin's Government had nineteen minister's, a War Cabinet totalling seven, and retained the Advisory War Council. With the lack of Defence policy experience in the Government, the Prime Minister was required to rely on the advice of the Government's professional military and defence advisors, including the Secretary, Mr Shedden (who favoured sea power as Australia's first line of defence). 112 ‘A.I.F. and Militia’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Monday 12 January 1942, p. 3.

132 all-encompassing policies were implemented, the militia was bound to find itself subject to a system not conducive to it being adequately prepared for its role.

133 CHAPTER 4 – THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DEFENCE (CITIZEN MILITARY FORCES) ACT 1943

[T]here will still be Australians fighting on Australian soil until the turning point be reached, and we will advance over blackened ruins, through blasted and fire-swept cities, across scorched plains, until we drive the enemy into the sea.1

This chapter discusses the most influential period of the militia during the Second World War. Specifically, the political decisions during 1942 to 1943 are discussed in examining the impact such actions had on the role of the militia at the time and for the remainder of the war. During this period, the pre-existing threat from Japan reached its peak in the Pacific region. With Australia’s safety and security being directly tested for the first time during the war, there was a greater emphasis placed on the nation’s military forces to adequately undertake their role in defending the country. While the policy differences between the militia and 2nd AIF were progressively reduced over the length of the war, this was accelerated by the entry of Japan into the conflict. Indeed, the previous policy differences between the 2nd AIF and militia could not continue to the same level if the Australian military was to stem the threat from Japan. As such, this chapter also examines the impact in the community on the role of the militia and the change in military structure which was shaped by the enactment of the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943. In discussing the Act along with the political decisions and actions that occurred in the lead-up to its enactment, an analysis occurs on the changing role of the militia, the overall extent of differences between the militia and 2nd AIF at this time, along with the continuing impact of earlier policy decisions. However, although the new Act provided the militia personnel with opportunities outside Australian soil, this was limited and accordingly, this chapter primarily focuses on those men who remained in Australia during the middle years of the war.

The Second World War can be characterised by three wars in the regions

1 John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, Radio Broadcast to the United States of America, 14 March 1942, http://john.curtin.edu.au/audio/00434.html, accessed 10 January 2011.

134 of North Africa, the Pacific and Europe. The changing demands of the various conflicts during the war saw the composition of the Army having to constantly adapt. In the early years of the Second World War, the Government and public did not entertain the idea of mandatory overseas military service by citizens. This was a continuation of the views conveyed in the Defence Act which had prevented members of the militia from being sent overseas. The character and overseas location of wars fought by Australians at that time and subsequently in the First World War, made this provision not significantly impact on the management of the Army’s role in the region. However, the outbreak of the Second World War and advancements in technology saw the war come closer to Australia than previous years. With the 2nd AIF re-formed to primarily serve in overseas locations and the territorially based militia hampered by differing policies relating to training, preparation and overall resources, the Army was not in a suitable situation to adequately defend the country from attack. Emphasising this lack of resources, structure and overall role of the militia was that the Government later recalled the 7th Division from Europe to fight in the Pacific region, while many thousands of militia personnel remained on the Australian mainland.2 There was minimal effort made at the beginning of the war to alter the Defence Act to allow for militia personnel to serve overseas and provide for the necessary resources for this to occur. This, combined with the raising of the 2nd AIF, suggested that the Government was reluctant to utilise the militia to the greatest extent possible.3 While previous chapters have highlighted the policy differences between the militia and 2nd AIF in aspects relating to the administration and organisation of the force, the overall lack of sufficient support and resources available to the militia in comparison to the 2nd AIF saw the need for action to be taken at a high level and existing policies to be amended to assist

2 ‘7th Division Cavalry Regiment’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_13636second_world_war.asp, unknown date, accessed 9 April 2010. 3 The men within the 2nd AIF had often been transferred from the militia or who had only joined up for the duration of the war. Fundamentally though, the 2nd AIF was raised from volunteer troops who had rushed to enlist after war had been declared (‘2nd Australian Imperial Force’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_13201.asp, unknown date, accessed 14 April 2010).

135 in the defence of Australia.

The slowly changing perception in some quarters of policies relating to the militia was reflective of a shift by the mid stage of the war to have the ban on the militia undertaking overseas service amended.4 The context of previous policy decisions meant, though, that there were still arguments for and against such a change being argued by many, and that therefore, any change would be deliberated upon at length. Indeed, there was still enough of a policy divide on the subject that censors only reported on the subject to a level that would 'not lead outsiders to believe that Australia is wracked with dissension on this question'.5

The restrictive nature of the Defence Act on the militia was immediately felt upon the commencement of the Second World War as the Act prevented the militia from being sent outside Australia or its territories.6 As a result, many militiamen left the militia and join the 2nd AIF.7 By the middle of the war, the transfer system for soldiers between the militia and 2nd AIF was taking place. Names of militia personnel and in some cases, lists of entire units that sought a transfer to the 2nd AIF were compiled and commanding officers were provided with details about how to enforce the transfers.8 By September 1943, the 2nd AIF had over 265,000 members while the militia only had approximately 117,000, and by December 1943, the 2nd AIF was two and a half times bigger than the militia.9 This shift in numbers was in addition to the lack of policy decisions to demonstrate an intention to combine camps or have composite units of 2nd AIF

4 ‘File note for censors’, 19 November 1942, State Publicity Censor (NSW), Militia Forces – Universal Trainees, NAA, SP106/1, PC348. 5 ‘Mr Eather speaking’, 1 May 1942, State Publicity Censor (NSW), Militia Forces – Universal Trainees, NAA, SP106/1, PC348. 6 This is despite many of the country's men rushing to join the militia either as a result of conscription or a general willingness to join the military. 7 This is despite many officers urging their men not to join the 2nd AIF in the hope that circumstances would change and the militia sent abroad more widely and often. 8 'Transfers to AIF Heavy', The Argus, 11 June 1942, p. 6. 9 Figures suggest that a total of 206,000 personnel transferred from the militia to 2nd AIF over the course of the war.

136 and militia personnel.10 The structure of the Army in terms of locations its personnel were able to serve in was still conducive to a separation of training, which meant that the theme of ‘one Army’ presented by politicians to demonstrate a united front in the Australian Military Forces was not apparent. In addition, the separation of training between sections of the Army made it difficult to ensure an adequate number of militia personnel were retained during the years of the war to provide defence support to the country, and therefore, the cohesive nature of the militia units was also called into question.

As a result of decreasing numbers of militia personnel, conscription at a wider level began to be considered by the Government. While conscription had been in place previously in the Australian military, the Scullin Labor Government abolished compulsory military training over the period between 1929 to 1932.11 Initially, the Australian public did not want their young men drafted into the armed forces for service overseas and this led to conscription being a major point of contention in Australia’s military history by the time the Second World War had commenced. However, the potential threat to Australia saw these views slowly changing. In relying on the compulsion of men, the Menzies and Fadden Governments did not attempt to introduce overseas service conscription.12 Upon the outbreak of the Second World War though, Prime Minister Menzies instituted conscription for the militia operating in Australia and her territories. All

10 ‘Transfers to AIF Heavy’, op cit. 11 Australia had previously debated the arguments for and against conscription during the First World War when the issue (for overseas service) was put to the Australian people by Prime Minister, Billy Hughes, with two plebiscites in 1916 and 1917. Every citizen of voting age in Australia was asked to vote for or against conscription of Australian troops for service in Europe. Conscription was defeated twice in addition to not having the support of the other members of the ALP. In 1919, the ALP was against conscription on the basis of a number of reasons including war weariness and the 'bitterness' over 1916-17 proposals to conscript reinforcements for the volunteer AIF fighting overseas. For some books on conscription in the Australian military, see: J.P. Fletcher and J.F. Hills (Conscription under Camouflage), L.C. Jauncey (The Story of Conscription in Australia), J.M. Main (Conscription: the Australian Debate, 1901-1970). 12 Commonwealth of Australia, Hansard (Parliamentary Debates), vol 211, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1950, p. 3887.

137 unmarried men aged 21 and over were required to attend three months of compulsory military training to prepare them for home defence.13

While the Government did not have the intention of changing the conscription policy as compulsory training would prove beneficial for establishing a solid numerical strength in the Army, Australians from many different demographics began to appeal to the Government to introduce conscription.14 It was argued that conscription was a fairer way to raise troops as it was a duty as a citizen to defend one's country and voluntary military service did not put added pressure on Australia's labour force. Outside Government action, informal conscription was also instituted by some companies. For example, the directors of Dennys, a Geelong wool-broking company, demanded 'every single man of military age to offer himself for military service'. If they did so, they would be guaranteed a job upon completion of his military service.15

In 1941, John Curtin was made Prime Minister of Australia. In the First World War he had argued aggressively against conscription and was even jailed for a short period for such action.16 However, upon becoming Prime Minister, he assumed responsibility for Australia's war effort and defence, and with Japan’s expansion into the war gathering pace, a shift in Curtin's stance on conscription occurred.17 In addition, both Menzies and Fadden also began pushing the case to the Prime Minister for legislated conscription.18 At this time, Australian soldiers,

13 ‘Fact Sheet 162 – National Service and War 1939-1945’, NAA, http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs162.aspx, unknown date, accessed 31 March 2010. 14 Prime Minister’s Department, Personal Papers of Prime Minister Curtin, in NAA, M1415, 23. 15 ‘Single Men Expected to Enlist’, The Advertiser, Tuesday 11 June 1940, p. 15. 16 ‘Anti-conscription manifesto’, John Curtin – Opposing Conscription in Victoria, http://john.curtin.edu.au/battles/victoria.html, unknown date, accessed 7 May 2010. 17 Conscription is mandatory (compulsory) military service for a certain group of a country's citizens. 18 Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom Briefings – John Curtin’s War (from Original notes by Frederick T. Smith), National Library of Australia, Canberra, 1997, p. 21.

138 particularly those in the 2nd AIF had been seriously damaged by injury, disease and exhaustion.19 However, for Curtin to manage this issue and change the Defence Act in regards to the definition of ‘home defence’, changes had to also occur in regards to not only the public’s view on overseas service by the militia, but also party political traditions of the Labor Party (which continued to maintain a non-conscription policy).20 This meant changing the pre-existing policy distinctions between the militia and 2nd AIF in terms of being able to serve in overseas localities.

In order to change existing policy distinctions, the influence of actions outside Australia were paramount. Previously, whilst there were numerous instances of the need to alter policies to reduce the extent of differences between the militia and 2nd AIF, the actual events which led to this did not occur until some years into the war. It was the air strike on the United States Navy Base at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 that signaled a shift in the overall role of the militia during the Second World War.21 In addition to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces landed in both Thailand and Malaya, and also attacked the Philippines. The quickness of the Japanese movement was shown when on 23 January 1942, they attacked and captured , while on 15 February 1942, accepting the surrender of Singapore.22 It was on that basis that the militia found

19 Judith A. Bennett, Natives and Exotics: World War II and Environment in the Southern Pacific, University of Hawaii Press, 2009, p. 52. 20 Hetherington, op cit., p. 217. 21 The Japanese Imperial Navy attacked Pearl Habor in a surprise strike on 7 December 1941. It was a synchronised strike where Wake, Guam, Midway and the Phillipines were also attacked. Japanese troops established beachlands in Thailand and on the northeastern neck of the Malay Peninsula. For the first time, the real treat of the Japanese against Australia was known. As US President Franklin D. Roosevelt commented, the attack was 'a date which will live in infamy'. 22 Robert W. Coakley, ‘World War II: The War Against Japan’, American Military History – Army Historical Series, http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH/AMH-23.htm, 27 April 2001, accessed 14 June 2010. The Japanese subsequently overran Timor and Ambon a week later and by 12 March, had captured Java (see further Gavin Long, ‘The Six Years War’, Australian War Memorial/Australian Government Printing Service, 1973, p. 128, 147, 160, 165, 169, 175, 250-1. In addition to these events, the Pacific region was

139 itself as the defensive option for Australia. However, despite the initial planning at the commencement of the war, by the time of Japan's attack, Australia was not prepared for a Pacific war. The majority of the 2nd AIF divisions were overseas in the Middle East, and the only adequately trained soldiers (being the 1st Armoured Division) did not have sufficient resources.23 Further, at a meeting on 8 December 1941, Lieutenant-General Vernon Sturdee indicated that the militia had sufficient artillery pieces, anti-tank guns, light machine guns and rifles to equip the forces on a reduced scale.24

By the time the focus of the war had shifted to the Pacific area, the militia only had an available strength of 73.9 per cent of its war establishment. This number was strongly influenced by the circumstances in the early years of the war when many militiamen left the organisation and joined the 2nd AIF. At a time when the role of the local militia units had to be emphasised, what the Japanese threat also highlighted was the militia's overall lack of training facilities, equipment and instructors which was influenced by policies of successive Governments that had focused their attention of the active theatre of war in Europe.25

Despite attempts to strengthen the 2nd AIF, it was clear that circumstances closer to Australia had to be examined by decision makers. A shift had already begun to occur in relation to the appropriate location of militia units. Papua and New Guinea were two of Australia's most significant economic possessions. This was reflected in the comment at the Paris Peace Conference by Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes, who stated that '[a]ny strong power controlling New Guinea controlled Australia.'26 With a base unable to be established in New

experiencing a continuous attack from the Japanese forces. Japanese forces had reached Law and Salamaua (New Guinea) by March 1942, Bataan and Corregidor surrendered in April and May 1942 (respectively), and attempted an overland attack against Port Moresby in June 1942. 23 Horner, Crisis of Command, op cit., p. 34. 24 Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, op cit., p. 78. 25 Palazzo, op cit., p. 147. 26 W.J. Hudson, Billy Hughes at Paris: The Birth of Australian Diplomacy, Nelson,

140 Guinea, Australia's military strategists believed that the Japanese would use the most effective and efficient option (attacking Australia by sea), and therefore, the nation’s military had to be structured accordingly.27 By October 1940, the British and garrisons in Singapore were being strengthened (including through the involvement of the 8th Division which arrived in February 1941).28 The militia artillery unit had also begun to fight in Rabaul and were, in the words of their Commanding Officer, David Selby, 'excited as schoolgirls' to go into action.29 However, the lack of training and ineffectiveness of weapons used was evident in that they were not able to make any impact on the oncoming Japanese military. In addition, Australian battalion groups arrived at Ambon and Timor by December 1941 in accordance with the 1941 agreement with the Netherlands East Indies.30 Despite these events, the extent of the Government’s unpreparedness for the movement south of the Japanese military was demonstrated when, on 11 December 1941, the Chiefs of Staff advised that 'it was necessary to establish and train now the forces that would be required to prevent and to meet an invasion'.31 For such training to be adequately covered in the Australian military, an increase in the level of personnel available for home defence was required.

Melbourne, 1978, p. 93. 27 The League of Nations mandate imposed over the territory in 1919 forbade base development. 28 ‘Fall of Singapore’, Australia’s War 1939-1945, http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/japadvance/singapore.html, unknown date, accessed 8 May 2010. 29 As quoted in Wilcox, op cit., p. 121. Rabaul was considered a part of Australian territory under the Defence Act 1903 (see: ‘Fall of Rabaul’, Australia’s War 1939-1945, http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/japadvance/tolmassacre.htm, unknown date, accessed 6 June 2010). 30 Herman Bussemaker, ‘Australian Dutch defence cooperation 1940-1941’, Australian War Memorial Journal, Issue 29, November 1996, http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j29/herman.asp, accessed 7 April 2010; Michael Evans, ‘Developing Australia’s Maritime Concept of Strategy – Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942 – Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper No. 33’, Land Warfare Studies Centre, http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/docs/sp%20303.pdf, July 2000, accessed 15 May 2010. 31 As quoted in Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, op cit., p. 84. See also Long, op cit., pp. 37, 39, 103, 116.

141 With the militia only being able to be retained for home defence purposes, there was limited scope for Australia to defend its shores until an invasion actually occurred. Indeed, the limitations of the almost forty-year old Defence Act on the structure of the militia were becoming more apparent as personnel of the RAN and RAAF were available to serve in overseas locations, even if they were a part of the equivalent group to that of the Army's militia (ie. RAN reserves). The Government’s initial reluctance to provide the militia with a greater scope in the military coupled with the perception of many soldiers of the 2nd AIF of their militia colleagues being unwilling to fight outside the safety of Australia, seemed to be at odds with the large numbers of personnel within the militia transferring to the 2nd AIF once the opportunity became available. Indeed, as a result of the Defence Act, while the militia could serve in the Papua region, it could only do so as it was an Australian territory.32 Meanwhile, if the militia were needed to serve in the neighbouring New Guinea, an Act of Parliament was required to enforce such an event.

By the end of 1941, it was clear that a change to the Defence Act had to be made along with a re-organisation of the Army to adequately manage the role of the militia in the region. Media reports began to circulate noting that military advisers had informed the Minister of the Army of the need to provide the militia with the same privileges as the 2nd AIF in additional aspects of military service, such as wet canteens. This, and the need to amend policies so as to eliminate other pre-existing distinctions between the militia and 2nd AIF, was identified as being required as the militia were likely to remain under arms for the continuation of the war.33 There was no benefit in ensuring that pre-existing distinctions between the two organisations continued. As such, a delicate balancing act was required in ensuring that any potential increase in role of, and attention directed to, the militia did not subsequently result in a loss of identity for the 2nd AIF.

32 ‘Australian Army Reserve’, Australian Reserve Forces Day Council, http://www.rfd.org.au/site/army_reserve.asp, 26 July 2010, accessed 9 August 2010. 33 ‘Equal Rights for Militia Expected’, The Courier-Mail, Thursday 1 January 1942, p.1

142 To initially deal with the issue of a lack of higher ranking militia personnel, transfers (and promotions) of 2nd AIF officers to militia formations occurred.34 While the morale of 2nd AIF personnel may have been lowered due to their transfer, such a move actually favoured 2nd AIF personnel as it provided them with a stepping stone to further promotions once they returned to their 2nd AIF units.35 On the other hand, by the time of the 1942 campaign, personnel within the militia believed that the political and military leaders of the country saw the militia as an expendable force and therefore provided the organisation with less equipment and fewer reinforcements than it was entitled.36

In February 1942, the Government ordered the 1st (6th and 7th Divisions) to return to Australia and be redeployed in the region, which was in defiance to the request from British and the United States (US) Governments.37 This decision partly due to the appreciation completed by the Australian Chiefs of Staff which noted that Japan was 'now at liberty to attempt an invasion of Australia should she so desire'. However, this course of action against the comparative option of training the militia was brought about by policy views most clearly reflected by H.V. Evatt who indicated that, '[t]he (2nd) AIF are [Australia's] veteran troops and the very flower of [Australia's] Army'.38 The appreciation noted that the garrisons in Western Australian, Darwin and Tasmania would have to be increased, but that such an action would be done upon the return of the 2nd AIF as a result of a shortage of sufficiently trained militia personnel. Again, the lack of solid policies relating to the training and structure provided to the militia was being re-emphasised. Evatt constantly stated that if

34 ‘Militia Units to be Regrouped Following Transfers to A.I.F. Melbourne’, Cairns Post, Wednesday 17 June 1942, p. 4; ‘Militia Forces Ex-A.I.F. Officers Wanted’, The West Australian, Friday 23 August 1940, p. 6. 35 Mark Johnston, At the Front Line: Experiences of Australian Soldiers in World War II, Cambridge University Press, Oakleigh, 1996, p. 180. 36 Ibid., p. 186. 37 The 6th and 7th Divisions were recalled in January and February 1942, but would not arrive until some months later. 38 H.V. Evatt, Draft of Document, 21 February 1942, NAA, A5954, box 571.

143 reinforcements were not sent, Australia might fall.39 For this to be suggested by a senior official indicated that there were not enough militia personnel in the country and that even with an increase in the amount of personnel, they would have been unlikely to adequately fight or defend the country with the supplies available to them. In both cases, there was perceived to be a need to recall the 2nd AIF from overseas to reinforce the nation’s defences.

In early 1942, the War Cabinet gave in-principle approval for Australia to have one home defence Army in an attempt to manage manpower problems in the defence forces and vital industries. Media reports noted that, amongst other changes, the militia personnel would gain an increase in pay and general conditions of service in that they would qualify for deferred pay at the same rates and conditions of 2nd AIF members, would receive the same service pension rights as 2nd AIF members, and that the 2nd AIF and militia would have consistent repatriation benefits.40 Meanwhile, it was the Japanese advances in the Pacific region, particularly around New Guinea in early 1942 that saw militia divisions being mobilised. Port Moresby was also strengthened by two militia battalions and other units.

These actions were influenced by the decision made when General Blamey assumed command as Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces (AMF) in March 1942, despite the continuing focus on a two-army system whereby the militia and 2nd AIF existed side by side, linked by their common commander.41 Despite being linked, the consistency of having a common commander was uncertain. Although Blamey was still the head of the Australian military, the arrival in the region of General Douglas MacArthur signaled a shift in the military planning of the country and MacArthur was placed in charge of all

39 Speech by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, ‘Herbert Vere Evatt: Australia’s First Internationalist’, 31 August 1995, Melbourne, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/1995/gemanix.html, accessed 6 June 2010; Graham Freudenberg, Churchill and Australia, Pan Macmillan, Sydney, 2008, p. 411. 40 ‘A.I.F. Militia, Garrison in One Army’, The Courier-Mail, Tuesday 3 March 1942, p. 1. 41 Palazzo, op cit., p. 167.

144 strategic planning in the South West Pacific Area.42 Shortly after MacArthur's arrival on 17 March 1942, Prime Minister Curtin transferred control of Australia's military assets to him, and MacArthur subsequently activated his command on 18 April 1942.43 General MacArthur would later assume command of all combat units within the Australian Defence Force.44 In addition, in April 1942, the US formed the South West Pacific Area Command and, with the agreement of the Australian Government, appointed General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander, with General Sir Thomas Blamey appointed as his Commander Allied Land Forces.45 The formation of the Command area, while signaling a change in the role of the militia, still did not provide enough scope or certainty to allow for a one Army structure being adequately implemented. However, unlike the reception MacArthur received, Blamey's return to the country from overseas did not receive as much attention and his decision making authority and strategic approval had diminished.46

General MacArthur claimed that the Australian Government's military

42 The area was established in March 1942 when the Chiefs of Staff of Britain and America divided the world into individual operational areas. The SWPA was defined as a triangle bounded by the equator and the 110th and 159th meridians of longitude, and was under US Army control. Countries within the SWPA included Australia, New Guinea, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies. However, New Zealand was placed in the adjoining South Pacific Area (under US Navy control). With the US Army being in control, on 17 April 1942, the Australian government assigned all combat sections of the AMF to SWPA under the Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur. 43 Palazzo, op cit., p. 172. MacArthur was received by the Australian people as a hero (Manchester, American Caesar, p. 280-288. 44 David Horner, ‘MacArthur – An Australian Perspective’ in William M. Leary (ed), MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader, University of Nebraska Press, Nebraska, 2001, p. 114. 45 Long, MacArthur, op cit., p. 81; Rawdon Dalrymple, Continental Drift: Australia’s Search for a Regional Identity, Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire, 2003, p. 43. 46 D.M. Horner, ‘Blamey and MacArthur: The Problem of Coalition Warfare’, in William M. Leary (ed), We Shall Return!: MacArthur’s Commanders and the Defeat of Japan 1942-1945, p. 33

145 strategy was a 'largely defeatist conception' of defence from the ''.47 Soon after his arrival in Melbourne, it was MacArthur who provided a plan for Australia's defence in April 1942. MacArthur's focus was a result of Japan beginning to occupy the main areas of the Netherlands East Indies and focusing on the northern part of New Guinea. Horner suggests that MacArthur's arrival did not see a change in plans for the defence of Australia.48 Although it is true that the Government was showing a greater focus on the defence of Australia, such a focus coincided and was strongly influenced by MacArthur's arrival. The lack of an earlier clear and effective defence policy meant that if Australia's war effort was to be taken seriously by the rest of the world and provide adequate defence for the Australian mainland, drastic changes to recruitment also needed to be made. Prime Minister Curtin needed Australian conscript soldiers to fight the Japanese in the Pacific, but at that time, the militia were limited to the Australian mainland and her territories. Indeed, many American soldiers were stationed in Australia and Curtin was concerned about the message Australia was sending to the rest of the world. While American soldiers were conscripts sent to the other side of the Pacific to defend a country that was not their own, Australian personnel could stay in their own country.49

Over the ensuring months, continual discussions occurred between the Australian, New Zealand and US Governments and military officials about the appropriate way to manage the defence of the South West Pacific Area. Appreciations were constantly produced and reviewed, with the majority emphasising the likelihood of a Japanese attack. By mid 1942, the Japanese force was focusing their military tactics on seizing New Guinea. Two Japanese infantry regiments with supporting troops had landed at Gona and quickly moved towards the northern part of the Kokoda Track. It was becoming evident that they were planning to advance along the Track and take the community of Port Moresby.50 From there, Australia would be under direct attack. The only force

47 Gavin Long, MacArthur, Combined Publishing, Pennsylvania, 1998, p. 95. 48 Ibid., p. 130. 49 ‘Conscription or …’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday 8 April 1942, p. 5. 50 ‘Kokoda’, The Australians at War Film Archive,

146 able to defend the path was a small Australian force (later reinforced by the 39th Battalion).51 The need to realign the role of the militia was becoming evident and more apparent.

MacArthur's arrival saw Prime Minister Curtin inclining to accept strategic advice from MacArthur before that of his principal Australian military advisers.52 Instead of being at the forefront of strategic theory for the military, including the militia, the Chiefs of Staff and General Blamey saw their influence diminished. However, Blamey eventually decided to send a militia brigade to Port Moresby in May 1942 (and shortly after, to Milne Bay).53 The brigade was sent in the place of the 2nd AIF which in turn, led to much criticism amongst many military personnel and a continuation of pre-existing issues between the two organisations. It was only by the time the campaign in Papua was nearing its peak in mid to late 1942 that the strategic focus on the role of the militia specifically started to be considered. On 19 May 1942, the Secretary of the Department of Defence (Frederick Shedden) noted that the Advisory War Council had conveyed the opinion that well-trained and experienced troops (essentially, the 2nd AIF) should be sent to Port Moresby. In addition, MacArthur claimed that he asked Blamey to send his best troops to New Guinea.54 It was also MacArthur who indicated

http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/campaigns/Kokoda.html, unknown date, accessed 4 May 2010. 51 Following the re-organisation of the Australian Army in 1921, the battalion was raised as a militia unit (known as the Hawthorn-Kew Regiment). In 1937, it was amalgamated with the 24th Battalion to form the 24th/39th Battalion. On 1 October 1941, the 39th Battalion was re-raised as a single Battalion of the AMF as militiamen who were called up for national service. Although originally established in the First World War, the 39th Battalion had only been established as a single unit for 20 months during the Second World War before being sent to New Guinea in 1942. While they were originally meant to relieve the 49th Battalion in Port Moresby, the threat of Japanese invasion saw the High Command move the 39th Battalion to form part of the 30th Brigade and deploy to New Guinea. The Battalion arrive in Kokoda on 15 July 1942. 52 Horner, ‘MacArthur – An Australian Perspective’, op cit., p. 113. 53 Johnston, The Australian Army in World War II, op cit., p. 8. 54 Horner, ‘Blamey and MacArthur: The Problem of Coalition Warfare’, op cit., p. 31.

147 that the attack on Kokoda would not impact on Port Moresby.55 In May 1942, General Blamey sent the militia force to Port Moresby while another brigade was sent to Milne Bay.56

However, with the lack of training the militia had gone through in the preceding period, the Advisory War Council had instead preferred the option of sending the more experienced and resourced 7th Brigade AIF to Port Moresby. However, with the 7th Brigade AIF being stated by the CGS as being required for overseas training purposes, the militia were instead sent to a region they were not prepared to do battle in, thus influencing the role they were ultimately able to achieve.57 Generals MacArthur and Rowell indicated that the hierarchy were disappointed that the best soldiers were not sent to New Guinea and were instead replaced by ill-trained personnel.58 As MacArthur commented, the militia were 'not of sufficient quality for employment in the offensive.59 This training severely impacted upon the potential they could have had in fighting during the war. Even though the militia within the 7th Brigade fought at Milne Bay, for almost 2 years afterwards, they remained stationed in the area with no tasks assigned to them while 2nd AIF personnel continued to fight in near proximity. It was not that they did not want to fight, but rather, the 2nd AIF focus was still apparent with views that the militia were only suitable for local garrisons or labouring tasks.60 Furthermore, the impact of MacArthur's standing in military strategy upon the militia was reflected in the view of he and his staff that there was to be no attack on Port Moresby – despite British and American

55 Bob Wurth, 1942: Australia’s Greatest Peril, Pan Macmillan, Sydney, 2008, p. 301. 56 Transcript of Speech by Dr Peter Londey, ‘Remembering 1942’, Australian War Memorial, Thursday 5 September 2002, accessed 8 July 2010. 57 Shedden also noted that the AIF were not sent to Port Moresby by Blamey because of the difficulties the enemy would face in passing the Owen Stanley Ranges (see: Horner, High Command, op cit., p. 217). 58 Horner, High Command, op cit., p. 215, 217. 59 Signal Q 6924, MacArthur to Marshall, 10 January 1943, Sutherland Papers, Correspondence with War Department. 60 ‘Campaign in New Guinea Nearing Its End’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday 16 May 1945, p. 2.

148 code-breakers deciphering a message indicating otherwise – which prevented additional resources being sent to the region.61 As such, the militia forces there were undermanned and under-resourced despite the looming threat from the Japanese. If anything, the limited training provided to the militia reflected a policy of defence rather than offence.

Although there had been an increasing awareness to train the militia, as Prime Minister Curtin noted, the militia still had many characteristics not typical to a standard military structure and that the officers were not efficient or still had to be trained.62 Therefore, even through attempts had been made to improve the standards and resources of the militia, there had been neglect by the Government and military to adequately prepare the militia Commanding Officers for the roles required of them. Blamey indicated later in September 1942 that the only troops in Australia were untrained militia but that the return of the 2nd AIF would see personnel who were trained and fully equipped for service in New Guinea.63

While the militia subsequently received support to be sent overseas to the New Guinea region, the lack of strategic planning on the organisation was also evident in that there was insufficient planning on the impact of such a decision on operational plans to defend Australia on Australian soil. With the role of MacArthur in the region, it was left to Shedden (on the request of Prime Minister Curtin), to bring to his attention the impact of transferring many militia personnel overseas. However, MacArthur did not consider the militia to be adequately trained, and General Rowell stated that the decision not to send the 2nd AIF to New Guinea was disappointing.64 This suggested that even when the militia were able to undertake some form of role in defending Australia, there was

61 Michael Smith, The Emperor’s Codes: The Breaking of Japan’s Secret Ciphers, Arcade Publishing, New York, 2001, p. 134. 62 Horner, War Cabinet, op cit., p. 142. 63 Ibid., p. 144. 64 Steve Gower, ‘Command in New Guinea’, Australian War Memorial – 2002 History Conference – Remembering 1942, http://www.awm.gov.au/events/conference/2002/gower.asp, 2002, accessed 8 May 2010.

149 enough indecision and disparity in the views of the officials to impact upon any likelihood that the organisation would obtain a stronghold in Australia's military structure.

With MacArthur's arrival and appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA), it also added an extra step in the chain of command that was required of the Australian military. This new addition to the command structure was more likely to have benefits for the 2nd AIF rather than the militia. Although the military Chiefs of Staff were the Government's principal strategy advisers in the early years of the Second World War and had the responsibility for the operations of the defence forces protecting the country, the introduction of the American military into the Australian political sphere saw that change as responsibility fell to MacArthur.65 Both the Prime Minister and Secretary for Defence became increasingly focused on relying on MacArthur for advice. The likelihood of any policy change on the role of the militia was now limited as there was an increased reliance on persuading the US of the benefits of a particular proposal.66

The developing situation in the Pacific along with the influence of General MacArthur led to the Labor Government to consider changing the structure of the Australian Military Forces.67 In 1942, suggestions began to centre on a merger between the 2nd AIF and militia to allow for one Australian Army to be formed for service in any battle area.68 Part of the reason for the push by the Prime Minister to change Labor Party policy was as a result of the war plans of the Allied Command in the Southern Pacific being hampered by having all Australian forces

65 Black, op cit.; D. Clayton James, ‘Macarthur’s Lapses from an Envelopment Strategy’, William M. Leary (ed), MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader, University of Nebraska Press, Nebraska, 2001, p. 177. 66 Rawdon Dalrymple, Continental Drift: Australia’s Search for a Regional Identity, Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire, 2003, p. 46. 67 In that the Australian army structure hampered the war plans of the Allied Command in the South Pacific. 68 ‘Disposal of Militia – Should Fight Anywhere, Most Australians Consider’, The Mercury, Friday 13 March 1942, p. 4.

150 (2nd AIF and militia) available for service in parts of New Guinea while the rest of the territory could only be served by the 2nd AIF.69 Although his early political career was focused on opposing compulsory military service, the events of the war necessitated Prime Minister Curtin to subsequently amend ALP policy to allow members of the militia to serve overseas. This action was brought about for a number of reasons such as military efficiency, enhancing Australia’s military planning, and that there were large numbers of American conscripts arriving in Australia to assist in its defence. Curtin's decision to extend the scope of service for the militia was also based on complex strategic and political matters. It seemed unreasonable for conscripts from the USA to be sent overseas to defend Australia while many Australian conscripts within the militia could not be sent overseas. In addition, General MacArthur argued that until Australia devoted its all to the war effort, the resources allocated by the USA Government to the Pacific region would be limited. By expanding the locations of service for militia personnel, Curtin believed that Australia would gain strength in post war dealings with both Britain and the US.70

In November 1942, Curtin requested the Labor Party conference approve a plan to extend the territory in which Australian militia conscripts could operate to include the South-West Pacific Area.71 The Labor Party was initially not impressed by the suggestion and many Party members began to question Curtin's loyalty. Indeed, Maurice Blackburn and Arthur Calwell attacked Curtin's proposals aggressively.72 Despite going against the traditional Labor Party views on conscription, on 17 November 1942, the Prime Minister was granted leave by the ALP conference to introduce the subject of merging the 2nd AIF and militia

69 ‘PM Wants AIF-CMF Merged’, The Argus, Wednesday 18 November 1942, p.1. 70 ‘The Homefront’, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, http://john.curtin.edu.au/manofpeace/homefront.html, unknown date, accessed 14 May 2010. 71 Brian McKinlay, Australian Labor Party in Documents: The Labor Party, p. 117. 72 ‘Labor and Conscription’, The Argus, Friday 9 May 1941, p. 2; ‘Caucus Discusses Defence Issue’, The Argus, Friday 11 December 1942, p. 3. Both Blackburn and Calwell were politicians.

151 forces to form one united Australian Army.73 In the Cabinet meeting on the morning of 23 November 1942, the Prime Minister outlined to the Ministers present of the proposal that was placed before the ALP Conference in Melbourne. Rumours at the time suggested that Generals Blamey and MacArthur, or the United States Government recommended a change in Australia's defence policy. Commenting against arguments by Arthur Fadden, Curtin argued that:

The US had saved Australia, and the Government had had a desperate fight to get aid for Australia. He did not want to live those months again. Now the position was that there was a barrage of criticism in Australia and United States was directed at Australia that it would have Americans defend Darwin, but not Australians fight for the Philippines.74

Cabinet subsequently endorsed the approach made by the Prime Minister to the ALP conference on the matter concerning the use of the militia in areas adjacent to Australia.75 There was a lack of overall consensus though at the Cabinet level with the Minister for Labour, Mr Ward, announcing that he was in agreement with the then party view on no conscription.76 However, despite the impact that the decision would have on the personnel within the militia, there was a lack of strategic focus on the resource and structural impact of it. As Prime Minister Curtin announced when moving the change at the conference, 'having regard to the paramount necessity of Australia's defence' there was a focus on the ultimate military objective.77 The barrage of criticism and issues led to the Federal Conference of the ALP passing a compromise resolution on 5 January 1943. The resolution stated:

73 Even right up until the main ALP conference, a majority of delegates at previous conferences had opposed sending Australian forces, except volunteers, outside Australia for overseas service. 'PM Wants AIF-CMF Merged', op cit. 74 As quoted in Roy K. Forward and Bob Reece, Conscription in Australia, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1968. 75 ‘AIF and the Militia’, Army News, Wednesday 23 December 1942, p. 1. 76 'Attitude on Use of CMF Outside Australia', The Mercury, Wednesday 25 November 1942, p. 6. 77 'Move to Merge AIF-CMF', The Argus, Thursday 19 November 1942, p. 1.

152 That, having regard to the paramount necessity of Australia's defence, the Government be authorised to add to the definition of the territories to which the Defence Act extends the following words: 'and such other territories in the South-West Pacific Area as the Governor-General proclaims as being territories associated with the defence of Australia'.

Accordingly, the Defence Act was modified to allow militiamen to serve within the boundaries of the region defined as the South West Pacific Zone (also known as the South West Pacific Area) during the period of war.78 It extended the area in which the militia were obliged to serve although this approval would lapse within six months of Australia ceasing to be involved in hostilities. By doing so, the policy indicated that the Government did not intend for any increase in militia involvement to continue after the war and reflected the overall strategic view of the Government in that the militia were seen as an option only to be used in extenuating, uncommon circumstances, and not for the consistent defence of Australia in any territory. The new Bill was drafted to allowed for militia units to pass to 2nd AIF control if more than 75% of the unit’s strength or 65% of the authorised ‘war establishment’ (which ever was greater), had volunteers to join the AIF.79 While there were efforts made by the Federal Opposition to amend the bill to allow the Governor-General to alter the zone by proclamation, and by Labor MPs to add a clause requiring a referendum, these ultimately failed.80

As such, by the time 1943 arrived, Curtin had not only moved at the ALP Federal Conference that the definition of 'home defence' was extended to include

78 Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, vol 24, p. 109; ‘The Political Scene, January 1942 to August 1943’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images?histories/31/chapters/06.pdf, unknown date, accessed 8 July 2010. 79 ‘From Federation Through the World Wars: 1901-1945’, Army History Unit, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/docs/PART_2.pdf, unknown date, accessed 15 May 2010; Palazzo, op cit., p. 152. 80 Department of Defence, Defence Bill (No. 2) 1939 (Act No. 38 of 1939) (Labour Opposition to Compulsory Service for the Defence of Territories Outside the Commonwealth, and Advocacy of Liberalizing Provisions Relating to Conscientious Objectors, NAA, A663, 3/2/1299.

153 the Australian territories within the south-west Pacific military zone, but also briefed newspapers that the term 'one army' was to be used over the term 'conscription'.81 As reflected in the continuing differences in overall policies between the 2nd AIF and militia, the extent to which the term ‘one army’ was implemented though is questionable.

By June 1943, over 680,000 Australians were in uniform, but instead of combining the 2nd AIF and militia, the Government instead recalled two 2nd AIF divisions from the Mediterranean and actively sought the US Government to send their military to Australia.82 With the arrival of the US in the region and its history of citizen service, the militia found itself a part of a strong military force (albeit combined with elements of US soldiers and under the command of General Douglas MacArthur).83 Indeed, it became common for the public and military to find it incongruous that the US national Guardsman could be ordered to fight in Australia, but that the militia were confined to Australian territory.84

With negotiations underway for the return of troops from Europe, Curtin had no plans to call up militia personnel for such service and thus reduce the limitations of the Defence Act. Reflective of the view MacArthur had towards the Australian militia was when, in early January 1943, he sent a signal to Marshall indicating that he had insufficient forces to begin an offensive. In his view, the militia (his only available troops) were 'not of sufficient quality for employment in the offensive'.85 In MacArthur’s view, only 2nd AIF divisions were to be used for combat as the militia was only suitable for home defence and

81 Lloyd and Hall, op cit., p. 22. 82 ‘Minutes of Defence Committee’, 13 September 1943, Department of Defence, War Cabinet Agendum No 389/1943 – Review by Defence Committee of the Strength and Composition of the Services and the Munitions and Works Programmes, NAA, A2671, 389/1943; Johnston, op cit., p. 122. 83 Johnston, op cit., pp. 122-123. 84 Parliamentary Debates (Aust), vol. 169, 16 December 1941, p. 1106; 17 December 1941, pp. 1142, 1149. 85 George Odgers, Air War Against Japan 1943-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957.

154 garrison duties.86 What MacArthur's opinion showed was how ill-prepared the militia was for offensive fighting, as the overwhelming majority of their (somewhat limited) training was focused on Australia's defence on home soil. The request for a 'one army' was actually sought not by Curtin, but rather General MacArthur who sought the ability to manoeuvre soldiers wherever they were needed.87 Therefore, Curtin was not seeking to minimise the distinction between the militia and 2nd AIF, but rather maintain an international relations strategy first and foremost. If managing the distinction was a paramount issue, then the militia may have been provided with more training and equipment for the fighting that was to follow in Papua New Guinea.

Further, the continuing discussions on policies relating to the role of the militia indicated that there was no consistent consensus in Parliament for the proposal put forward by the Government. In particular, Opposition Leader, Mr. Arthur Fadden, announced that the bill was a refusal by the Government to bring Australia’s war effort in line with that of the other Allied nations and that the Opposition could move an amendment. However, as the Opposition was assured that the limitations in the Bill in relation to the militia’s zone of employment met the military strategy and needs of General MacArthur, they indicated that they would support the Bill regardless. The Opposition’s argument in this regard was focused on the time in which it took the Prime Minister to introduce the bill and the limited area in which the militia were required to serve (in comparison to the scope of resources requested from Allied countries to protect Australia).88 On 26 January 1943, the War Cabinet approved the Bill to give effect to the motion.

As the intended Bill would alter Labor policy, formal authority for the amendment of the Defence Act to permit the use of the militia in any area within

86 Eric M. Bergerud, Touched With Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific, Penguin Book, 1997; David Black, ‘The General and the Prime Minister’, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, http://john.curtin.edu.au/macarthur/essay2.html, unknown date, accessed 8 July 2010. 87 Ibid., p. 106. 88 ‘CMF Bill Criticised by Mr Fadden’, The Argus, Friday 5 February 1943, p. 3

155 the SWPA was sought at the pre-sessional Labor Caucus meeting on 27 January 1943.89 Prior to the meeting, although a large number of Labor members were in favour of the changes, there were equally a number who were initially expected to resist the changes. However, a number of days prior to the scheduled meeting, state based Labor Party members strongly indicated their support of both the proposed changes to the Defence Act and those Federal members who sought to introduce it. Despite these various opinions, in accordance with Party procedures, if the Caucus members sought to retain their Labor Party membership, they had to vote for the Bill once the Government declared it vital.90 In 1943, the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943 (Cth) was passed and subsequently, on 19 February 1943, the Labor Government allowed the conscripted AMF personnel to be sent to fight in the south-west Pacific, except for the Philippines, Western Java and Northern Borneo. While there continued to be some discontent about the change in policy, the majority of Australians were concerned about the Japanese threat and any defence mechanism provided was welcomed.

With the policy limitation of the militia to serve in a particular zone in the SWPA, the militia were still not given the opportunity to expand their fighting zone to an expanded region. Indeed, in the Second Reading Speech for the Bill on 3 February 1943, Mr Fadden pressed for the militia to be used in the whole of the SWPA. Fadden queried why there was a limitation of the militia to the SWPA under General MacArthur's command.91 Despite the opportunities afforded by the Act, it also emphasised the disparity between the militia and 2nd AIF. Specifically, as noted by the Member for Deakin, Mr Hutchinson:

[O]ne result of the creation of the two armies was the continual enriching of the AIF at the expense of the Militia. When the AIF was established, militia officers resigned

89 Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, Caucus Minutes 1901-1949: Minutes of the Meetings of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, vol 3, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1975, p. 516. 90 'Battle Today in Caucus on CMF', The Argus, Tuesday 26 January 1943, p. 3. 91 ‘CMF Bill Explained by PM’, op cit.

156 their commissions and non-commissioned officers in the hundreds forfeited their stripes to join the AIF. Equipment … went to the AIF. Militia became a neglected child and led to spirit of mistrust between two forces (therefore a lack of espirit de corps).92

It was clear from the passage of the Bill that the militia's role in overseas localities would largely be dictated by politics and not what the men of the militia had the ability to do. In the first reading speech for the Bill, it was noted that the boundaries of the SWPA which isolated the area in which the militia could fight would be based on factors such as the objectives of global strategy and ensuring it was within the scope of General MacArthur's operational command. MacArthur’s operational command, which was issued via a directive from the President of the United States of America, was also agreed to by the Governments of a number of countries, including Australia.

Despite this shift in role however, the militia were still unlikely to be provided with the scope of resources required for them to undertake their role to the fullest extent possible. This was partly due to the fact that the naval and air resources would provide the majority of the possible offensive strength in the region. In MacArthur’s view, air power closely integrated with ground forces under the direction of one commander, would be able to strike a blow against the Japanese forces. The ultimate defeat of that country in the Pacific region would be reliant on naval and air strength supported by land forces. As such, a large Army would not be required.93 The new focus on the militia's role was also fulfilling the Government's intention on the use of the militia to an extent that no further changes to legislation, such as the National Security Act, was required.94

Although the change in Labor Party policy would bring about a change in

92 Debate in House of Representatives, Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Bill 1943, Bill presented and read for second time (3 February 1943), pp. 477-478. 93 ‘CMF Limited to Command of Gen MacArthur’, The Argus, Thursday 4 February 1943, p. 3. 94 'Battle Today in Caucus on CMF', The Argus, Tuesday 26 January 1943, p. 3.

157 the role of the militia, there were many in the community who did not see the vote in this way. In particular, a former member of the AIF noted the following in a letter to the Editor of a Victorian newspaper:

The splendid vote by the ALP Federal conference for co-ordination of the AIF and CMF in adjacent areas represents solidarity between workers and soldiers for an all-in offensive against . The workers, like the soldiers – themselves intense workers – have a stake even greater than the 4 freedoms in the defeat of fascism. … The workers long since gave the Commonwealth the power to call them up for service in the CMF, the CCC, munitions, or wherever required for an all-in “people's war”. They have simply extended the scope of the Militia.95

Largely though, the Government's proposal to utilise the militia in a wider area of the Pacific than what occurred previously was generally well supported by the public and many pieces of correspondence from individuals and community organisations were received by the Government on the subject.96

Despite the shift in role, there still continued to be a loss of the most able and promising militia personnel to the 2nd AIF and their replacement by 'green' conscripts.97 The way in which the militia's inability to serve overseas was reflected in the personnel numbers at that time. Many militia personnel had signed up on the assumption that they would be able to serve overseas in some capacity, regardless of whether it was the militia being given the opportunity to serve or having to join the 2nd AIF at a certain time, such as when the personnel were of a suitable age. In early 1943, it was noted that in the previous six months, just over 16,000 men had been released or discharged from the militia, while the 2nd AIF had only lost 1,954 personnel. These figures did not include

95 H. Davy, 'Letters – AIF and CMF', The Argus, Friday 8 January 1943, p. 4. 96 Various correspondence in Prime Minister’s Department, War Records – Conscription (inc use of Militia outside Australia) – Part 1 [representations to Prime Ministers R G Menzies and John Curtin from unions, community organisation etc], NAA, A1608, V45/1/12 PART 1. 97 ‘Big Militia Swingover to A.I.F. Expected’, The Courier-Mail, Friday 15 May 1942, p. 1.

158 personnel discharged or released for medical reasons.98 However, the reasons for discharge from the militia ranged from a large number in reserved occupations or given a release to join the RAN or RAAF, but also on compassionate grounds and unsuitability as an efficient soldier (despite the shortage of personnel).

Though conducted under the direction of the US, the offensive campaigns in the New Guinea region were often planned and commanded by Australians.99 Australia had a headquarters at Port Moresby and Australian commanders and staff members were on the ground. Following approval of the new policies espoused in the new Act, militia personnel joined with 2nd AIF and American troops along with local helpers in the region. However, the military commanders and earlier training did not adequately prepare the militia personnel for the enemy army and the rugged nature of the terrain and climate in the region. Further, as the militia was assigned to the command of General MacArthur, they were not able to participate in battles outside the South West Pacific Area, such as the Indian area (incorporating nearby Malaya) which was under the command of Field-Marshal Wavell.100 This reduced the likelihood of many militia personnel staying in the organisation despite the legislative change that had just occurred. In this regard, the Prime Minister stated that if and when the position permitted, Australian forces would be available in any theatre they could be best employed in. In addition, the Prime Minister assumed that General MacArthur would reassign to the Australian Government the responsibility for defence of his main base (being Australia).101 At this time, policies had been following Britain's view in the status of international threats. Specifically, the primary aim of global

98 Copy of Inwards Teleprinter Message from Miss Polglaise to Secretary, 1 March 1944, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Army Administration and Policy – Criticisms regarding Use of AIF and CMF in New Guinea – Higher Army Appointments and Transfer of Generals – Higher Army Organisation, in NAA, CRS A5954, Control Symbol 261/5. 99 John H. Bradley, Thomas E. Griess, Jack W. Dice, The Second World War: Asia and the Pacific, Square One Publishers, 2002, p. 140. 100 ‘All That C.M.F. Can Undertake’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Thursday 4 February 1943, p. 6. 101 ‘CMF Limited to Command of Gen MacArthur’, The Argus, Thursday 4 February 1943, p. 3

159 strategy as agreed to by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt was the defeat of Germany and to then put resources into the fight against the Japanese in the Pacific.102

The effect of the Act has been the source of much debate over the years. The overall military effect of the amendment was not great, as the militia could already serve in Australian territories and it only extended the limits slightly. While militia personnel combined with 2nd AIF units to defeat the Japanese in Milne Bay in August 1942, only a few militiamen served outside Australian territory, at Merauke in Dutch Western New Guinea and in the British Solomon Islands.103 The was the only major unit to fight overseas in the SWPA. However, despite the restrictions that continued to be placed on the militia under the Act, for the first time, the new policies enabled the militia to receive legislative recognition of the role they had in the structure of the Australian military in the mid twentieth century. Meanwhile though, it becomes apparent that the changes also emphasised the previous policy distinction of the force against the 2nd AIF. Specifically, considerations included Australia's man-power resources, the maximum forces the country was capable of maintaining in the field, and the nature of the forces required for operations in the Pacific Area.104

Extending further than the impact of the Act on militia numbers was that introducing conscription facilitated a greater likelihood that all militia personnel would receive standard pay, repatriation, training and assignments consistent with that of the 2nd AIF. It was common for men within the 2nd AIF to undergo training on Australian shores and remain in the country, while those called up for service in the militia were ready to fight, but would receive less pay in

102 David Reynolds, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt and the International History of the 1940s, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 42. 103 Johnston, The Australian Army in World War II, op cit., p. 9. 104 Department of Defence, New Guinea Garrison – allotment of troops for defence of New Guinea – Operations in New Guinea – Brief for GOC New Guinea Force – January 1943, Australian War Memorial, AWM54, 285/3/1.

160 comparison.105 Horner suggested that the decision to send militia rather than 2nd AIF troops to New Guinea seemed to indicate that neither MacArthur nor Blamey had given the area the priority it deserved.106 Even three years into the war, the militia was inadequately resourced. Often hidden in between other military stories, newspaper articles commented that the militia had not been supplied with all necessary uniforms and equipment.107 Horner suggested that the intention of the Australian Government was to carry the fight to the Japanese just as soon as forces became available to do it.108 However, even though the militia forces could not assist in terms of disembarking in neighbouring countries, the fact that the militia continued to be inadequately equipped and resource despite the perceived intention leads to speculation about the true role to be played by the militia.

When Australia fought Japan in New Guinea, militia units continued to be inadequately prepared and hampered by policy decisions on resources to be made available. In addition, the administrative nature of the militia divisional headquarters saw units being assigned solely on readiness to travel to the region. When the Australian Military Forces adopted a jungle standard of planning, some militia units were able to obtain the previously lacking stability required for them to undertake their role.109 However, those militia personnel remaining in Australia were required to continue with the pre-existing training standards. The militia were also often caught in the middle of changing organisational and government policies. In the early years of the war, the Government decided that the Army required armoured units and these were formed with the raising of the 1st Armoured Division. The two militia cavalry divisions were first motorised and

105 ‘Increased Pay’, The Mercury, Friday 1 November 1939, p. 2. 106 David Horner, 'High Command and the Kokoda Campaign', 2002 History Conference – Remembering 1942, www.awm.gov.au/events/conference/2002/horner.asp 107 The Mercury (Hobart), 2 November 1942, p. 8. 108 Horner, Crisis of Command, op cit., p. 48. 109 ‘Comparison of Australian Standard and Jungle Division Organisation WW2’, Digger History, http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/ww2/pages-2aif-cmf/organisation-w w2.htm, 11 November 2002, accessed 6 May 2010.

161 then converted into armoured divisions in 1942 and the 3rd Army Tank Brigade was formed to provide support to the infantry. The Army reached its peak in numbers in 1942. This was the time in the war when the Japanese threat was at its highest. The Army had eleven infantry divisions and three armoured divisions as well as many support and service units at this time. However, the structure and numbers eventually began to decrease, with the majority of units disbanding being militia.

Even though Blamey considered that it was 'essential first to ensure that the defence of vital areas should be secured', and later presented proposals envisaging armies covering east and south Australia while Darwin was reinforced with the 19th AIF Brigade, it was uncertain as to the militia’s place in this regard as there were thousands of personnel stationed in the country.110 The 2nd AIF were seen as a more suitable option for defending the country and MacArthur was one of the earliest to seek the return of the AIF to Australia from overseas. The minimal role of the militia overall was also influenced by the impact that MacArthur had on Australia's strategic policy in enforcing particular agendas that the Australian government had held back from undertaking.111 In addition, there continued to be no clear policy structure to assist in the leading and management of the militia. Initially, MacArthur was insistent that he and Curtin should deal with the higher direction of the war together. However, it was not until later that it was clear that Blamey, as Commander in Chief of the Australian Military Forces, would direct access to Curtin on matters relating to military policy.112 With the arrival of MacArthur, there was a change in who was to be the Government's principal military adviser. This was despite the Australian Chiefs of Staff being more likely to have knowledge of certain aspects of the Australian military (including militia). Although MacArthur would have received such

110 Horner, ‘Blamey and MacArthur: The Problem of Coalition Warfare’, op cit., p. 29. 111 David Horner, ‘The ANZAC Contribution Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific War’, in Daniel Marston (ed), The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2005, p. 151. 112 Minutes of Prime Minister's War Conference, Melbourne, 8 April 1942, MP 1217, Box 1. 'Changes in Machinery for Higher Direction of War, 14 April 1942, signed by Curtin, Military Board Minutes, misc. 41/1942.

162 advice from the Australian Chiefs of Staff, as his role in Australia occurred some years into the war, he only saw the militia as it was at that time.

Despite the greater support given to the organisation to establish itself in Australia’s wartime military, the militia’s structure continued to be subject to continuous change even after the Act’s introduction. For example, when the moved to Queensland in 1942, it broke up the . When the Division transferred in 1943 for the Salamaua Campaign, the 15th, 29th and 17th (AIF) Brigades fell under their command. At the end of the campaign, the Division returned back to Australia and by 1944, was reconstituted as a jungle division but without 2nd AIF troops. Its later deployment to Bougainville in 1945 saw encompassing the 15th, 29th, and 7th Brigades.113 By the time the war reached Australia, the 7th, 8th, 27th, 43rd Infantry (militia) Battalions and the 19th Battalion were called up in the Darwin area.114 2nd AIF troops, whilst being experienced in overseas open warfare, knew little more about the ravages of jungle fighting than the militia.

In September 1943, the Defence Committee indicated that the objectives of the successful maintenance of the Army centred on principles including ensuring that there was a force available for offensive operations (and the subsequent relief of such forces), and having anti-aircraft and mixed defences, lines of communication and administrative units essential for the maintenance of the forces.115 Despite the potential role for the militia in all these aspects, on 31 October 1943, the Deputy Leader of the Federal Opposition, Mr Hughes, made a statement commenting that although much had been publicised about the Army’s

113 Palazzo, op cit., pp. 151-152. 114 ‘27th Battalion (South Australian Scottish Regiment)’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_11950.asp, unknown date, accessed 14 May 2010. 115 'Review of the War Effort of the Services in the Light of the Present Situation With Particular Reference to the Provision Being Made for the Defence of the Mainland', March 1944, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Basic Documents Relating to the Review of the Nature, Extent and Balance of the War Effort in the Light of the Manpower Position – Reports by War Commitments Committee – January 1944 and Defence Committee April 1944, NAA, A5954, 309/2.

163 success in New Guinea, little information had been provided in relation to ensuring the ‘whole of the armed forces were sharing the fighting equitably’.116 There were few occasions in which clarification was sought and publicised as to the extent to which militia units had been called on to undertake fighting in New Guinea in conjunction with the 2nd AIF. With the earlier focus on the 2nd AIF, Hughes’ comment indicated the continuing focus on the 2nd AIF and the overall impact of the policy at a broader level. Despite the apparent shift in focusing on the militia, the reality was different. Although the militia had fought alongside their 2nd AIF colleagues in New Guinea, it was the 2nd AIF personnel who were to receive leave before militia personnel. On 1 November 1943, newspapers reported 2nd AIF divisions should be relieved as quickly as permitted under operational circumstances and that, although militia units had played an important part in New Guinea, it was considered that the 2nd AIF division should get relief first.117 On occasions, despite the transfer of personnel from the militia to the 2nd AIF, many officers were also transferred from the 2nd AIF to the militia to improve a militia unit.118

Soon after the initial calls from Mr Hughes, the Opposition member on the War Advisory Council announced that he supported the view for equitable apportionment amongst the soldiers in New Guinea. 119 However, despite the role of the militia being acknowledged, the view portrayed was that it was the men of the 2nd AIF who should receive relief.120 The Prime Minister followed these reports by stating that the selection of which units was to be engaged in operations was up to the Commander in Chief (General MacArthur).121 In November 1943, with reports of heavy fighting against the Japanese in an area infested by malaria, the Deputy Leader of the Federal Opposition started to call

116 'Militia's Part in N. Guinea', The Herald, 1 November 1943. 117 Ibid. 118 For example, Brigadier Noel W Simpson was transferred to the CMF despite his earlier views that nothing could be achieved by transferring AIF personnel to the militia. 119 ‘Sharing Battles in New Guinea’, Barrier Miner, Thursday 4 November 1943, p. 5. 120 ‘Militia Useful to Relieve A.I.F. Divisions’, Cairns Post, Wednesday 13 October 1943, p. 3. 121 ‘Use of AIF Units’, The Mercury, Wednesday 3 November 1943, p. 8.

164 for information as to whether the whole of the armed forces were sharing the fighting in the New Guinea area.122 This followed indications from Labor MP, Mr Mulcahy, who had stated that he had received complaints from soldiers saying that although they had contracted malaria, they were being sent back to New Guinea.123

The pre-existing issues relating to the militia's recognition in the community continued to also be limited based on the media reports of campaigns. As Karl James noted, the publicity given to the 9th Division in relation to the Bougainville and campaigns, added to the debate between the militia and 2nd AIF about the place of each in Australia‘s military structure.124 Newspaper reports publicised the role of the 2nd AIF and its commanders in the campaigns, but often neglected the role of the militia, which was in the same area and, in many cases, more than the 2nd AIF.125 Not surprisingly, the morale of the militia men was impacted which had the potential to impact upon the structure and efficiency of the organisation.126 It was not until late 1943 that questions started to be raised about the real role played by the militia in the war. Queries began to be raised by members of the public and 2nd AIF personnel seeking information heard about the role of the militia. In one such response to a public query, the Prime Minister's Private Secretary, F.A. McLaughlin noted that the 'Prime Minister has been advised that the part played by militia formations has progressively increased as they have gained experience'.127 In the research for such a response, a

122 ‘Who is Sharing the Fighting Asks Mr Hughes’, The Argus, Monday 1 November 1943, p. 12. 123 ‘Japs Withdrawing on Choiseful Island’, The Canberra Times, Monday 1 November 1943, p. 1. 124 Karl James, The Final Campaigns: Bougainville 1944-1945, Thesis (PhD), University of , 2005, p. 216. 125 Ibid., p. 216-217. 126 Letter from Savige to Sturdee, 22 May 1945, Department of the Army, 2 Australian Corps G Branch Unit Diary (May 1942-May 1944; Oct 1944-September 1945), in Australian War Memorial, CRS AWM 52, Control Symbol 1/4/8, Item 1118794. 127 Letter from McLaughlin to Mr B. Jeannes, 18 February 1944, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Army – Policy Employment of AIF and CMF Units in New Guinea

165 communiqué from General Blamey to the Prime Minister indicated that the negative impression of the 2nd AIF about the role of the militia was often 'largely the result of the isolation of men in various units taking part in operations in New Guinea, where the troops in one area have very little contact with anything outside their own immediate surroundings and are not fully aware of what is happening in the whole area generally'.128 With the overall policy focus still being on the 2nd AIF and a small number of career soldiers, the impact of the distinction spread to the wider community and workplaces.

Despite the continuing overall policy differences between the militia and 2nd AIF, the militia's direct involvement in overseas locations saw a greater likelihood of both organisations being able to work in unison together. It was noted in numerous media reports as to the effective way in which the unified Australian Military Forces was undertaking its role in the SWPA. As one newspaper reported the comments of 2nd AIF soldiers in the region:

You may think down here that there is a difference, but I can assure you that up there it's the man that counts, and my experience is that the CMF is as good as any army in the world.129

In action we are mates. It doesn't matter 2 hoots whether a man's got “Australia” on his shoulders or not, we were out to give Tojo a hiding.130

Both sides had the opportunity to see the other at work directly. Furthermore, although rare, each side acknowledged the positive impact the other had. Reports from 2nd AIF men wounded in battles in the New Guinea region

Campaign – Representations to Prime Minister and Report by Commander-in-Chief, Australian Military Forces February 1944, NAA, A5954, 1630/1. 128 Letter from General T. Blamey to Prime Minister J. Curtin, 14 February 1944, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Army – Policy Employment of AIF and CMF Units in – Representations to Prime Minister and Report by Commander-in-Chief, Australian Military Forces February 1944, NAA, A5954, 1630/1. 129 Comment by unnamed Army member in 'Papua Harder than Desert', The Argus (Melbourne), Thursday 21 January 1943, p. 4. 130 Pte L. A. Higgins, The Argus (Melbourne), Thursday 21 January 1943, p. 4.

166 were quick to emphasise the good feeling between the two forces on the Owen Stanley Ranges and the good work undertaken by the militia in the early stages of the campaign.131 In the Owen Stanley campaign, militia units were required to serve under the command of 2nd AIF formations. The fighting in the SWPA saw the Army coming under a unified command and being employed on an as needed basis, regardless of the internal distinction between formations as either 2nd AIF or militia units.132

Despite the gradual shift in roles and policies, the overall number of militia personnel in the overseas units was limited, even despite the public indication that it was militia units solely undertaking the campaign. Figures gathered at the time suggested that around 86% of personnel within ‘militia’ units were actually 2nd AIF personnel. As such, despite the fact that they were fighting under the Australian banner, for the 2nd AIF personnel, their AIF status was not acknowledged in the wider community (although they were in the High Command) and this could have lead to disagreements about their role with the continuing differences in policy support between the two organisations.133 The numbers of the 2nd AIF emphasised this. Even though the six militia brigades had been involved in the fighting in areas such as Kokoda, Milne Bay,134 Buna, Salamaua-Lae135 and Finschhafen, their lack of experience saw them not involved

131 The Argus, 28 November 1942, p. 4. 132 Noel Sproles and Alex Yates, A Historical Study of Operational Command: A Resource for Researchers, Department of Defence, http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/bitstream/1947/3811/1/DSTO-GD-0430%20PR.pd f, 2005, accessed 18 June 2010. 133 Pelvin, op cit. 134 The militia battalions of the 7th Brigade played a key role in the Battle of Milne Bay. The battle was when Australian and United States forces defeated the Japanese in a large-scale battle for the first time during the war. 135 The Salamaua- campaign was a series of actions where Australian and United States forces sought to capture two major Japanese bases in the towns of Salamaua and Lae. Beginning with the Australian attack on Japanese positions near Mubo, on 22 April 1943, the campaign ended with the fall of Lae on 16 September 1943.

167 in as severe level of fighting as members of the 2nd AIF.136 Percentages indicated that the proportion of the total forces engaged in the New Guinea area were 60% 2nd AIF and 40% militia, with a slightly higher percentage of 2nd AIF personnel also casualties (7404 versus 2019).137 However, in the eyes of the public, there was no sense of the potential for disagreement between the two forces.

By September 1943, there were just over 117,000 members serving with the militia while over 260,000 in the 2nd AIF.138 The casualties in Papua led the Government to consider policies in relation to the required number of personnel to sustain the Army.139 The Government determined towards the end of 1943 that the Army’s strength was to be six infantry divisions and two armoured brigades. The decrease in armoured divisions was brought about, in part, due to the realisation that they were not suitable for jungle warfare in the South West Pacific Zone.140 However, Australia's resources were becoming stretched, with Curtin later indicating to Blamey that Australia had 'reached the maximum of her manpower, material and financial resources'.141 The initial intention for staffing arrangements with the 6th Division was to see half the recruits sent from the militia. Both the Government and militia officers did not want to see Australia left unprotected and as a result, the ranks in the Division were often filled from other sources.

136 ‘Battleground New Guinea and its Defenders’, Pacific War, http://www.pacificwar.org.au/KokodaCampaign/KokodaOverview2.html, unknown date, accessed 3 May 2010. 137 Copy of Inwards Teleprinter Message from Miss Polglaise to Secretary, 1 March 1944, op cit. 138 Mark Johnston, The Australian Army in World War II, Osprey Publishin, Oxford, 2007, p. 9. 139 Letter, General T. Blamey to CGS, 3 January 1943, Department of Defence, Statement of Army Policy to Govern Future Organization by T A Blamey, General Commander-in-Chief AMF 1943, Australian War Memorial, AWM 54, 721/12/24. 140 Moremon, ‘No “Black Magic”: Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare’, op cit. 141 Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, op cit., p 151; ‘Minutes of Prime Minister's War Conference, Canberra’, 12 February 1943, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Notes of Discussion with Commander-in-Chief Australian Military Forces 12th February 1943, NAA, A5954, 4/6.

168 With a limitation still in place as to which personnel could be sent overseas, in May 1942, General Blamey declared through a General Routine Order (dated 26 February 1943) that a militia unit was to be classified as a 2nd AIF unit when it reached either 75% of the posted strength or 65% of the authorised War Establishment for all ranks of such unit are members of the 2nd AIF. However, the Order indicated that it was up to the militia unit to inform the Local Headquarters, through the appropriate channels, of such an event occurring and the need for it to be classified as a 2nd AIF unit.142 This left it up to unit commanders to make the decision, and also did not provide scope for the unit to maintain its link with the local community. Despite the transfer of militia personnel to the 2nd AIF, there were initially reports of some personnel having their papers marked 'not to go beyond Australia'. Although investigations by the Minister for the Army found no confirmed instances of the comments being made, the speculation reflects the divisions between the two organisations.143

Outside of whole units changing status, steps were also taken to introduce policies so as to allow militia men to become full members of the 2nd AIF. Members of the militia who sought transfer to the 2nd AIF were informed by the Minister for the Army that they should apply to their Commanding Officers and not to go to recruiting depots. In addition to this, reports circulated that there would be ‘a flood of new applications’ to join the 2nd AIF.144 By mid 1942, lists of men wanting to change from the militia to 2nd AIF had been compiled and information provided to Commanding Officers on the details to be followed in effecting the transfers. In an indication as to how widespread the transfer of personnel between the militia and 2nd AIF was, while the transfer of individuals

142 Transfer from CMF to AIF – Noted on Advisory War Council Agendum No 29/1943, 6 October 1943, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Transfers from C.M.F. To A.I.F. Advisory War Council Agendum No. 29/1943, NAA, A5954, 269/23. 143 Letter from F.G. Shedden, Secretary Advisory War Council to Mr P. Spender, 5 March 1943, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Transfers from C.M.F. To A.I.F. Advisory War Council Agendum No. 29/1943, NAA, A5954, 269/23. 144 ‘Flood of Militia Volunteers for A.I.F. Expected’, The Canberra Times, Wednesday 20 May 1942, p. 2.

169 was heavy, in some cases, whole units transferred at the same time.145

However, despite systems in place to manage transfers, reports circulated of complaints that some Commanding Officers were not following policies and were coercing members of the militia to join the 2nd AIF so as to facilitate the change in status for the entire unit. Specifically, the complaints received by the Minister for the Army from a variety of sources indicated that Commanding Officers were communicating that militiamen who were not prepared to join the 2nd AIF would be sent to Darwin, Port Moresby and Broome. The Minister for the Army later confirmed that any transfer from the militia to the 2nd AIF must be on a voluntary basis, and that if coercion in any form was used, it was contrary to instructions. Specifically, an earlier routine order issued by the Army Headquarters stated that ‘[g]reatest care must be exercised to ensure that there can be no question of coercion in obtaining volunteers’.146 With such actions being taken, many men in the militia were not able to receive quick and immediate guidance on policies from their Commanding Officers. Furthermore, there was the potential, even in their unit, that they were second in priority and status to the 2nd AIF, and that they had to join the organisation in order to obtain any benefit from their military service. In many ways, this reflected not only a lack of equality between the two services, but also the lack of a strategic role for the militia itself in comparison to the 2nd AIF.

The lead up to the implementation of the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943 saw widespread interest and concern amongst the Australian public. In particular, what became known as the 'AIF-CMF Controversy' stemmed from discussions of the role of the militia at the ALP Conference and the nature of censorship in the country at that time. Again, policy impacted upon the militia's role. This next event in the role of the militia during the war occurred in mid November 1942, when the Chief of Staff (Mr. Curthoys) of Melbourne's Argus newspaper made inquiries about instructions previously received on the AIF and

145 ‘A.M.F. Transfers to A.I.F. – Policy on Transfer of Whole Units’, The Advertiser, Wednesday 17 June 1942, p. 7. 146 ‘No Coercion to Join AIF’, The Argus, Saturday 1 August 1942, p. 2.

170 militia controversy. Specifically, Mr. Curthoys asked whether he could send a story to the London Times on a proposal made by the Prime Minister (Mr. Curtin) stemming from the ALP conference. Mr. Curthoys produced messages to the London Times and New York Times which were subsequently reviewed by the GHQ Censor (Captain Myers), Chief Publicity Censor (CPC) and SPC. The information contained in the two messages, which included an amalgamation of the two forces was found to be incorrect. It was found to be uncertain as to how the story got to the newspapers, but that action had to be undertaken to correct the messages being conveyed.147 On 31 November 1942, the CPC, Mr. E.G. Bonney, wrote to censors in a number of locations indicating that in cables or broadcasting scripts discussing the militia controversy, it was prohibited to include, amongst others, 'slurs on the militia, unworthy reflection upon Australia's war effort, description of proposal as one to merge two Armies, and extracts from editorials or other comments likely to create hostility in the minds of our Allies or heighten enemy morale by giving the impression that Australia [was] dangerously divided by controversy'.148

Despite the introduction of the 1943 Act, its minimal impact on addressing the need to maintain the numbers of the military was emphasised with reports of the extent of the 2nd AIF's numerical superiority over the militia. In early 1944, it was stated that about 86 percent of medically fit Australian soldiers were eligible to fight anywhere in the world, with only about 14 percent only ineligible for service outside the South West Pacific Area.149 Indeed, despite any distinction potentially favouring the militia by the time of the South West Pacific Area being

147 Letter from T.P. Hosy (State Publicity Censor) to Chief Publicity Censor, 24 November 1942, Chief Publicity Censor – Press Censorship – AIF, CMF controversy, Militia, AIF controversy, NAA, A11663, PA3. 148 Telegram from E.G. Bonney, Chief Publicity Censor to State Publicity Censor (Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Perth), District Publicity Censor (Hobart) and Sub-District Publicity Censor (Launceston, Newcastle), 31 November 1942, State Publicity Censor (Victoria), Chief Publicity Censor – Press Censorship – AIF, CMF controversy, Militia, AIF controversy, NAA, A11663, PA3. 149 ‘Army “Militia” Divisions – 86 Per Cent Now in A.I.F.’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Saturday 22 July 1944, p. 4.

171 fought, by early March 1944, the 2nd AIF was the dominant organisation in the AMF. By the end of January 1944, 71% of Army personnel were in the 2nd AIF, and within that, 87% of the AMF’s force in the New Guinea region was 2nd AIF personnel.150 Despite this, further reductions in numerical strength were later ordered in August 1944 and June 1945. The introduction of the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943 saw a number of militia units having to be transferred to the 2nd AIF due to reaching the required percentage in personnel transfers. With such a transfer, there was no potential for these units to receive recognition in their own right and they partially lost their history of being solely designated as a militia unit. However, the transfer of the units to 2nd AIF status also reflected the changing thoughts of the personnel within the militia units. The mid-period of the war signaled a time in which many personnel were able to transfer overdue (in part) to a limitation of the age restriction. However, upon reaching the required age to be able to join the 2nd AIF, many personnel had the choice as to whether to transfer. For militia men, the opportunity to serve their country in overseas locations, and having sufficient resources, a transfer to the 2nd AIF over the militia was a preferred option. As such, just as the transfer of militia to the 2nd AIF also reflected the ineffective state the militia organisation was in, it also exhibited the perceived role of the organisation by the Government in that there was no policy change to deal directly with the funding and equipment issues that plagued the organisation.

The Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943 was arguably one of the major policy decisions made during the war. However, while the enactment of the Act resulted from General MacArthur’s claims that the South-West Pacific Area required reinforcements, the extent in which the militia were able to utilise the changes to its role in establishing its ability to undertake military service on the same level as the 2nd AIF was not clear cut. While the Act saw the militia incorporating volunteers and those conscripted to be serve (until compulsory military service came to an end in 1945), the personnel involved in the South West Pacific Area were still largely 2nd AIF personnel as a result of the unit transfer

150 Copy of Inwards Teleprinter Message from Miss Polglaise to Secretary, 1 March 1944, op cit.

172 level. Outside from the general policy change to allow militia personnel to fight in certain overseas locations, the limited area of this combined with minimal changes to policies on funding and resources saw the militia largely in the same position in the early years of the war. Meanwhile, attention and policy support was still focused on the 2nd AIF and until such a time when policies emphasised a broader outlook on the defence and military structure of Australia, there was unlikely to be any change in regards to the role of the militia.

173 CHAPTER 5 – THE MILITIA AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

[T]here can be no question of unhealthy rivalry or jealously between the Regular Army and the Citizen Forces. In Australia we have only one Army. The regular and non-regular elements are both essential parts of it, each is complementary to the other.1

This chapter focuses on the role of the militia in the final years of the Second World War. To demonstrate the nature and impact of the role at this time, the chapter also briefly discusses the policies impacting on the role of the militia after the war. After the introduction of the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943, there was a presumption that the militia had been provided with the policy opportunities to undertake a greater share of military commitments than what had occurred in the early years of the war. Accordingly, there was the opportunity for further policies to be implemented to reduce many of the disparities between the 2nd AIF and militia so as to enhance Australia’s Army. However, as emphasised in the previous chapter, with the war in Europe and the Pacific nearing its final stages, and the militia requiring a lengthy period of attention to negate the effects of the lack of pre-war focus on the organisation, such opportunities were still limited. With such a minimal focus, the end of the war signaled the greatest opportunity for the Government to implement policy changes required for any future military force. It became apparent that with the new political focus on an international level, that the structure of the Australian Army had to change, and that its effectiveness would be minimal until such a time its structure changed to provide for a more professional and resourced organisation. However, reflecting the impact on policy on the military, such changes were slow in eventuating for the militia.

By July 1943, policy dictated that all available eligible men between 18 and 40 years of age were on duty for home defence purposes. This led to compulsory enlistments in the militia totaling 270,000 by January 1944. The

1 Lieutenant-General Vernon A.H. Sturdee, Chief of the General Staff, 'The Citizen Military Forces', Australian Army Journal, volume 1, June/July 1948, pp. 3-4.

174 men included those individuals who were unable to join the 2nd AIF for one reason or another, such as those militia personnel unable to join the 2nd AIF due to medical conditions.2 Despite their number, the continual lack of clear policy directives relating to the militia in a manner consistent to the 2nd AIF and to ensure that their specific characteristics were best managed, were reflected by a comment in a brief discussing military numbers when it was noted that ‘[a]lthough figures may not be quoted, the truth is that there is no completely Militia formation in the Australian Army’.3

With the war shifting in favour of the Allies though, there was limited likelihood that the Government would introduce any major policies to directly impact upon militia personnel and therefore, for the personnel to experience the impact of any such change. Furthermore, even where militia personnel had the opportunity to still be involved assisting with the war effort as a result of the enactment of the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943, many of the early war issues which emphasised the disparities between the militia and 2nd AIF (such as training) continued. There were also continuing issues with the militia's equipment and overall functioning with the 2nd AIF. As part of a review investigating allegations of Army equipment deficiencies, it was noted that troops were being sent to New Britain devoid of suitable mechanical equipment required for a primary campaign. Newspapers commented that such an action indicated that it was considered by the (in Washington) to be a secondary campaign, and consequently, not warranting similar equipment as in nearby localities. Further, it was suggested at the Annual Conference of the NSW branch of the Australian Country Party (by Mr. Abbott, MP) that:

The A.I.F should be separated from the militia. The militia should be sent to contain the Japanese. If it were necessary to get them out then the militia should have proper equipment. But for heaven's sake don't murder our boys.4

2 ‘Department of the Army – Army Administration’ 20 July 1944, Army Administration and Policy – Criticisms Regarding use of AIF and CMF in New Guinea, Higher Army Appointments and Transfer of Generals, Higher Army Organisation 1/11/43 – 8/1/45, p. 1. 3 Ibid., p. 2. 4 ‘Army Equipment Check Demanded’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Friday 13 April 1945,

175 For such comments to be made despite the introduction of the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943 and the war running for over five years, reflects the continual nature of the policy differences between the 2nd AIF and militia, particularly away from the public spotlight.

In 1943, the Government and Defence hierarchy were already beginning to focus their attention to the demobilisation of the Army through the establishment of the Reconstruction and Demobilisation Committee under the Ministry for Post-War Reconstruction. With the Allies gaining control of the Pacific region, the Government was committed to finalising this campaign along with undertaking the necessary preparations and work to ensure the support was given to the other regions the Allies were still engaged in. The change in strategy in the region was noted on 23 December 1943 when General Blamey identified the role of the Army during 1944 in which:

The operational role of the Australian Military Forces engaged in forward operations in New Guinea will be taken over by USA Forces in accordance with plans now being prepared. Aggressive operations will be continued and reliefs necessary to maintain the initiative will be made by GOC New Guinea Force until Commander USA Forces takes over responsibility.5

At this time, policy arrangements were being enhanced about the reallocation of soldiers after the conclusion of the war. The Commonwealth’s manpower reallocation scheme did not propose that the militia would be singled out for 'special treatment' but that any discharges made for other essential purposes would be spread equitably over both the militia and the 2nd AIF. Releases from service were to be based on length of service and physical condition of the individual.6 As the war began to near its end, it also became

p. 4. 5 Department of Defence, New Guinea Garrison – allotment of troops for defence of New Guinea – Operations in New Guinea – Brief for GOC New Guinea Force – January 1943, Australian War Memorial, AWM54, 285/3/1. 6 ‘No Preference for C.M.F. in Man-power Comb-Out’, The Canberra Times, 7 July 1944, p.

176 clear that militia personnel were also subject to a variety of other circumstances which emphasised their difference to the 2nd AIF. In one example, demobilisation policies meant that a member of the militia was not eligible for assistance under the War Service Homes Act unless he had served outside the geographical boundaries of Australia (ie. New Guinea). While only a small number of militia were employed on active service outside Australia once the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943 was enacted, members of the 2nd AIF were able to enlist for service anywhere and were therefore eligible.7

During the management of the disbandment of the military forces, in the view of General Blamey's aide-de-camp, Colonel Carlyon, Blamey was 'concerned that the high quality of the AIF should be recognised'.8 However, he did not mention the militia. By December 1944, Blamey indicated that there was 'no distinction between the AIF and AMF because practically the whole Australian Army is now volunteer'.9 While this was true in terms of structure, there was still a bureaucratic and everyday distinction between the two forces, and Blamey's apparent lack of awareness (or willing to accept the distinction) only reinforced the lack of support the militia could expect to receive.

With this refocus on the war effort, even though a number of militia units fought outside Australia, media reports continued to highlight the 2nd AIF more so than the militia. This level of coverage maintained the impact of policy distinctions between the two organisations as one side continued to receive more public attention. At this time, the total number of 2nd AIF enlistments to January 1944 was 425,000, while there were 270,000 enlistments in the Citizen Military Forces (which, it said, was the accurate term for what had been commonly referred to as the 'militia').10 These numbers made it common for disagreements to occur amongst senior Army officers throughout the war and which were centred

2. 7 Old Comrade, 'Service Queries Answered',. The Argus, Friday 12 May 1944, p. 7. 8 Norman D. Carlyon, I Remember Blamey, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1980, p. x. 9 ‘Speculation on AIF’s Next Operation’, The Argus, Friday 8 December 1944, p. 16. 10 ‘Unified Army Command’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Friday 7 July 1944, p. 3

177 around their status as citizen or permanent officers before the war. By early 1944, media reports publicised how senior soldiers in the 2nd AIF who had not gone overseas during the war were still concerned about being classified as 'chocos'. For men in the 2nd AIF to publicly consider themselves in such a fashion demonstrated the differences in the organisations and the fact that many in the 2nd AIF still did not want to see themselves linked with the militia personnel in terms of combat and deployments, even despite the push for a 'one Army'.

The shift in the status of the war saw Army numbers begin to gradually decline. In August 1944, a conference was held in Brisbane in which the future role of the AMF was to be considered. By early 1944 though, the combined impact of 2nd AIF personnel returning to Australia from Europe and the transfer of militia to the organisation saw the 2nd AIF grow to become the dominant force within the AMF. By the beginning of February 1944, figures suggested that 71% of all Australian Army personnel were in the 2nd AIF. Despite the initial intention of the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943 to allow for militiamen to engage in battle outside the Australian mainland, by March 1944, Defence research indicated that the 2nd AIF were undoubtedly the bigger force in the New Guinea area, so much so that they comprised 87% of the total New Guinea force. This was in comparison to figures indicating that 71% of all personnel in the AMF were part of the 2nd AIF.11 The High Command saw such forces as 2nd AIF and employed them in the New Guinea zone accordingly.12 By this time, many militia units had officially become a part of the 2nd AIF and were fighting in areas (such as Bougainville and New Britain) outside the expanded area of operations that the remaining militia units were fighting in.13

11 Copy of Inwards Teleprinter Message from Miss Polglaise to Secretary, 1 March 1944, op cit. 12 Press Statement, 'Department of the Army – Army Administration', 20 July 1944, Army Administration and Policy – Criticisms Regarding use of AIF and CMF in New Guinea, Higher Army Appointments and Transfer of Generals, Higher Army Organisation 1/11/43 – 8/1/45. 13 Karl James, The Final Campaigns: Bougainville 1944-1945, Thesis (PhD), University of Wollongong, 2005.

178 Following a request from the Prime Minister to furnish a report on the contentions raised by a Australian, Mr W.B. Jeanes, on 14 February 1944, on the role of the militia and 2nd AIF, it was noted that:

When AIF formations were moved to New Guinea in 1942, the seriousness of the situation demanded despatch of the best troops available. These were undoubtedly the battle experienced AIF troops recently returned from the Middle East.14

Subsequently, on 18 February 1944, F.A. McLaughlin, Private Secretary, replied to Mr Jeanes indicating that:

It is realised that for some major operations it would be essential to use the best troops available, but the Prime Minister has been advised that the part played by the C.M.F. formations has progressively increased as they have gained experience.15

It is clear that despite the negative views of many military members along with their ‘secondary’ status in able to be involved in battles, the militiamen were still committed to serving in the military. Their willingness to undertake unrestricted overseas service saw more than 200,000 men, many of whom were conscripts, transfer to the 2nd AIF after the legislative changes were enacted.16 Even though they were becoming outnumbered, the militia had been able to entrench themselves within 2nd AIF units and demonstrate that they had the skills necessary for warfare. This view on the potential role of the militia was emphasised in Federal Parliament. In the House of Representatives on 10

14 Letter from General Thomas Blamey to the Prime Minister, 14 February 1944, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Army – Policy Employment of AIF and CMF Units in New Guinea Campaign – representations to Prime Minister and report by Commander-in-Chief, Australian Military Forces – February 1944, NAA, A5954, 1630/1. 15 Letter from Mr McLaughlin (Private Secretary) to Mr W.B. Jeannes, 18 February 1944, Department of Defence Co-ordination, Army – Policy Employment of AIF and CMF Units in New Guinea Campaign – representations to Prime Minister and report by Commander-in-Chief, Australian Military Forces – February 1944, NAA, A5954, 1630/1. 16 Mark Johnston, At the Front Line: Experiences of Australian Soldiers in World War II, Cambridge University Press, Oakleigh, 1996, p. 157.

179 February 1944, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Menzies, stated that '[i]f anybody imagines that I am saying that the militia does not want to fight, let him forget it; if anybody believes me to be saying that no Militia units have fought in this war, let him forget it. But I do say, and it cannot be contradicted, that by far the bulk of the fighting of this war, both in the Middle East and in New Guinea, has been performed by those three Australian Imperial Force divisions'.17

Indeed, the militia continued to be poorly armed in comparison to its 2nd AIF colleagues. For many years during the Second World War, the various units that comprised the militia continued to not be to be issued with sufficient equipment in the event that they were mobilised. The lack of effective training offered to the young men conscripted into the militia also continued to influence the differences in policies between the militia and 2nd AIF. It was often the case that those conscripted into the militia continued to be neglected in their training by militia officers, and were instead reliant on being taught military skills by returned servicemen.18 It was David Horner who described Australia's experience of strategic decision-making in the Second World War as an aspect that illustrated the multi-faceted nature of the problems of modern warfare facing an industrial technology. This centred on the problem of the separation of the national leader and his senior military commanders at the strategic level.19

Even outside the potential role they could undertake, the militia continued to be impacted by the policy decisions from internal discussions between high-ranking politicians and military officials. For example, by late June 1944, the already strained relationship between General Thomas Blamey and Prime Minister John Curtin was diminishing further with the increasing influence of General MacArthur.20 With Curtin becoming more likely to accept MacArthur's views, the militia was again impacted negatively as MacArthur's previously

17 Parliamentary Debates – Senate and House of Representatives, vol 177, J. Kemp, 1944, p. 109. 18 ‘Defence Warnings Unheeded’, The Argus, Friday 7 December 1945, p. 2 19 Horner, High Command, op cit., p. 434. 20 Dalymple, op cit., p. 46.

180 announced views were considered more favourably than those of General Blamey (as Australian Commander-in-Chief) which, in turn, influenced the strategic focus on the management of the Australian war commitment. The tension between Blamey and Curtin spread throughout the entire Cabinet and it was often the case that important plans were kept solely to the respective parties.21 This meant that during the mid to late stage of the war in which the militia had the best opportunity to prove itself in the Australian Army structure, it was hampered by political and military considerations at a high level.

The period from 1943 to 1946 was one in which it was common for militia units to disband or merge with their 2nd AIF colleagues. By doing so, the history and sense of camaraderie that militia units had sought to achieve were being moved aside and replaced with the history that the relevant 2nd AIF unit sought to achieve. Even though many militia units had already embraced the history that was assigned to them with the inclusion of the unit honours of the 1st AIF, by incorporating the history of the 2nd AIF, it reduced the focus of the militia even further. By the end of the war, the extent of the number of personnel who had transferred from the militia to the 2nd AIF over the course of the war was clearly apparent. Although direct enlistments in the 2nd AIF totaled 261,429, there were 199,466 men who had transferred from the militia.22 With the policy decisions made during the war enhancing this number, the militia’s ability to maintain its own history was impacted.

21 Dr James Wood, ‘The Australian Military Contribution to the 1945-1952’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/BCOF_history.pdf, unknown date, accessed 14 May 2010; John Robertson, Australia goes to War 1939-1945, Doubleday, 1984; ‘Conflict in Command During the Kokoda Campaign of 1942’, Adventure Kokoda, http://blog.kokodatreks.com/2010/06/17/conflict-in-command-during-the-kokoda-campaign -of-1942-did-general-blamey-deserve-the-blame-3/, 17 June 2010, accessed 19 September 2010; ‘War the Battle for Wewak Necessary?’, The Courier Mail, http://www.couriermail.com.au/extras/ww2/waswewanecessary.htm, unknown date, accessed 14 June 2010. 22 Brig. J.H. Rasmussen, ‘Our Defence – Voluntary Policy Ineffective’, The Argus, Friday 18 January 1946, p. 2.

181 Additionally, the opportunity for the militia to maintain its history was impacted in that for many years during the war, the men of the militia had received little formal recognition of their service on the home front. Despite the role the militia had during the war, with the impact of military and political decisions upon them, only one militiaman, Private Frank Partridge, was awarded a (VC) in the Second World War for his actions during an attack on the Japanese position known as Base 5 in July 1944.23 Although Partridge was recognised as a national hero, overall, the militia’s recognition in the community of its role was limited despite its successes. Such recognition was influenced strongly by the limitations in areas able to be served. However, in addition to Partridge’s VC and reflective of the work undertaken by militia personnel, a number of other decorations (such as the Member of the British Empire (MBE) and Distinguished Service Order (DSO)) were awarded to members of the militia during the Second World War. However, the ultimate numbers reflect the impact of earlier policy decisions on the role of the militia. By mid 1944, of the 1,669 awards won by Australian soldiers in the South West Pacific Zone, 163 had been awarded to militia personnel.24 Further, it was not until mid 1945 when the Government indicated that a badge was being considered to be awarded to members of the militia who had been based in Australia during the war.25 The impact of the lack of official focus on the organisation in previous years by the Government was still lingering. With limited opportunities available to them

23 Partridge was the son of a dairy farmer and banana grower in Macksville. He had been called up for service in 1943 and posted to the 8th Battalion. On 24 July 1945, the 8th Battalion came under heavy attack from Japanese forces and Partridge was shot twice in the left arm and in the thigh. Despite his injuries, Partridge retrieved a Bren gun from a dead gunner and attacked the enemy strong post by throwing grenades. Yelling “come out and fight” to challenge the enemy, Partridge also dived into a bunker and in a hand-to-hand fight, killed the occupant in there with a knife. Despite suffering a large loss of blood, Partridge remained in action until his platoon withdrew. ‘Private Frank John Partridge, VC’, Australian War Memorial – Fifty Australians, http://www.awm.gov.au/exhibitions/fiftyaustralias/37.asp, unknown date, accessed 7 July 2010. 24 The Argus, Melbourne, Tuesday 16 May 1944, p. 3. The 1,669 was out of a total of 3,905 with the remainder coming from the Middle East and Britain. 25 ‘Questions in Parliament’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Friday 25 May 1945, p. 5.

182 throughout the war, the number of militia personnel recognised in such a manner suggests that had policy decisions at the beginning of the war been different, the militia would have been in a solid position to enhance Australia’s military capacity and support in regions around the world. As such, many of the pre-existing views that favoured the 2nd AIF on the basis of a perceived greater ability were not necessarily correct.

Despite the continuing policies and related impact of core areas of the militia and 2nd AIF distinction, the differences between the two diminished in other areas. The change in military structure influenced by the transfer of militia personnel to the 2nd AIF led to the designation, 'Australian Military Forces' being utilised on a wider level to incorporate the 2nd AIF, militia and Permanent Forces. Additionally, by early 1944, it had been considered as no longer necessary to distinguish the 2nd AIF and militia on the basis of security reasons. Instead, the references to personnel in New Guinea operations were only to refer to 'Australian troops'.26 Whilst the changes could be perceived as reducing the disparity between the two organisation, particularly in relation to the soldiers’ perceptions of themselves, the behind the scenes distinctions formed by policy and organisational decisions were still evident.27 In the South West Pacific Area, it was perceived that the Australian Army had fought as a unified command.28 Whilst this may have been true in the eyes of the public, behind the scenes, as has been shown, the Army was still distinguished between two separate groups (being the militia and 2nd AIF), each with differences to the other and different policies

26 Chief Publicity Officer, 1 March 1944, 'For General Distribution to Press and Broadcasters – A.I.F. And Militia' in Department of Defence Co-ordination file – Army Administration and Policy – Criticisms Regarding - Use of A.I.F. & C.M.F in New Guinea, Higher Army Appointments and Transfer of Generals, Higher Army Organisation, 1 November 1943 – 8 May 1945. 27 As David Horner indicated, by the middle of the war, the citizen and regular soldiers began 'to think of themselves as belonging to one Army' (D.M. Horner, 'Staff Corps versus Militia: The Australian Experience in World War II', Defence Force Journal, vol 26, January/February 1981, pp. 18, 21). 28 Department of Information, Military Unified Command of South and South-West Pacific Areas and Speculation or Discussion Concerning this Subject, NAA, SP109/3, 308/52.

183 that they had to implement. Therefore, with the statement by the Army Public Relations team, it lessened any likelihood for the militia's concerns to be heard and actioned by the end of the war. Essentially, their concerns and issues were being pushed to one side in preference of the 'elite' nature of the 2nd AIF. Although this thesis is not intended to disregard the role undertaken by the 2nd AIF, the impact of policy decisions on the strength and role of the militia reflected the need for a ‘champion’ of the organisation to promote it in the community and during Government deliberations. However, such support was not going to be achieved from General Blamey due to further questions being raised in the public about his effectiveness for command.29 With such a senior ranking officer having to manage such comments at a time, it was likely that their ability to focus on the militia was limited.

Further, there continued to be a lack of clear policy guidance provided to personnel in the latter stages of the war about their discharge circumstances. In one example reported in the media, an individual noted that his certificate of discharge stated that he enlisted for the AMF but served on continuous war service in the militia before being discharged. The individual was subsequently advised that the militia covered all personnel with a “V” number, as distinct from the 2nd AIF.30 For those militia personnel who transferred to the 2nd AIF, they received new service numbers with an “X”.31 For personnel to seek clarification on such issues calls into question the level of information given to individuals in the militia about their service entitlements and records of service.32

What the variety of relatively small policy actions and comments made in the latter stage of the war emphasised was that the service undertaken by the militia during the Second World War, while beginning to be slowly acknowledged

29 David Horner, Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1998. 30 'Service Queries Answered – Citizen Military Forces', The Argus, Tuesday 20 June 1944, p. 6. 31 'New Number System for AIF', The Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday 2 September 1942, p. 6. 32 'CMF, Not AMF, is Proper Title of Militia', The Argus, Friday 16 October 1942, p. 4.

184 separate to that of the 2nd AIF at the higher levels of Government and the Australian Army, was still not of a nature to reduce any earlier distinction between the 2nd AIF and militia. Despite the militia having thousands of personnel throughout the war, it was always difficult for it to achieve some sort of command recognition. However, in July 1945, Blamey noted to the Minister for the Army that there was a case against the partial restoration of the Military Board as a result of its pre-war actions in:

[alienating] the militia forces from the permanent forces, partly by reason of the fact that the whole control was vested in the permanent officers, without militia representation, and, since the Australian Army must necessarily consist almost entirely of militia, this was a very serious fault in the organisation of the governing body.33

This was subsequently echoed after the war when the Member for Henty, H.B.S. Gullett asked the Minister for the Army, C. Chambers, whether:

… in view of the dependence of the Army on the citizen soldier … does not [the Minister] … believe that a citizen … soldier should be appointed to the Military Board?34

Although the above quotes reflect the role of the 2nd AIF, it is clear that it emphasises that throughout the war, there was a gradual acknowledgement of the need to ensure that the militia and its personnel were represented at the higher level of military planning and administration. Policy changes also began to occur in relation to promotion within the militia. Of particular note was that in 1944, the provisions governing promotions previously indicated that the promotion of militia officers up to and including the rank of major was to usually be made by seniority and a higher rank by selection. However, an amendment to the Act saw that promotions to Major were to now be made by selection.35

33 ‘Letter from General Thomas Blamey to Minister for the Army’, War Cabinet Agendum No 513/1945 – Machinery for the higher direction of Army, in NAA, A2671, 513/1945. 34 ‘Letter from HBS Gullett, Member for Henty, to C. Chambers, Minister for the Army’, 4 June 1947, C.P.D, Vol. 192, p. 3332. 35 'New Regulations for Offences in Services', The Argus, Friday 7 January 1944, p. 2.

185 Germany's surrender in May 1945 and Japan's in August 1945 signaled the end of the war both in Europe and the Pacific.36 By the time of Japan's surrender, the total strength of the AMF was 383,000. By June 1945, the Government and Army were planning on introducing policies so as to establish a permanent army of over 25,000 personnel in line with the Vasey Report into the Royal Military College, Duntroon. However, with such a number coupled against a Treasury forecast of any £60m being available annually for defence purposes, the militia was unlikely to be subject to any immediate changes in policy to highlight its position.37

36 V-P Announcement in Prime Ministers of Australia: A Compilation of speeches and interviews, Screensound Australia, National Screen and Sound Collection, Canberra, 214438, segment No. 179490. (At 10am on 15 August 1945, Prime Minister Chifley announced 'Fellow citizens, the war is over. The Japanese Government has accepted the terms of surrender imposed by the Allied nations and hostilities will now cease). The first (and main) surrender ceremony in the Pacific took place on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 where Japan's Foreign Minister, Mamotu Shigemitsu, signed the Instrument of Surrender on behalf of Japan. Although this ceremony was widely publicised on newsreels, smaller ceremonies were also held around the region in subsequent days. For an overview of Germany's surrender, see: C. Peter Chen, 'Germany's Surrender': 7 May 1945', World War II Database, http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=152, 2004-2011, accessed 13 September 2010. For an overview of Japan's surrender, see: C. Peter Chen, 'Japan's Surrender: 14 Aug 1945 – 2 Sep 1945', World War II Database, http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=13, 2004-2011, accessed 13 September 2010. See also: V-P Announcement in Prime Ministers of Australia: A Compilation of speeches and interviews, Screensound Australia, National Screen and Sound Collection, Canberra, 214438, segment No. 179490. (At 10am on 15 August 1945, Prime Minister Chifley announced 'Fellow citizens, the war is over. The Japanese Government has accepted the terms of surrender imposed by the Allied nations and hostilities will now cease). The first (and main) surrender ceremony in the Pacific took place on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 where Japan's Foreign Minister, Mamotu Shigemitsu, signed the Instrument of Surrender on behalf of Japan. Although this ceremony was widely publicised on newsreels, smaller ceremonies were also held around the region in subsequent days. 37 Robert O’Neill, Australia in the 1950-53, vol 1, Strategy and Diplomacy, Australian War Memorial / Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1981, p.

186 Upon the conclusion of the Second World War, a rapid demobilisation of personnel occurred in the Army (including militia), Navy and Air Force. Instead of focusing on the militia, in February 1946, policy attention turned to the maintenance of the ‘interim force’ (two year voluntary enlistment) instead of the militia.38 By mid 1946, 80 percent of Australia's wartime forces had been discharged. Offensive operations came to a halt and the War Cabinet focused its attention also to Australia's contribution to an occupation force for Japan. However, there was initially no willingness of the part of the Government to disband the 'two-Army' system that had caused so many problems for Australia's military for many decades prior. Despite the demobilisation and disbanding of many units, the Commonwealth legislation that established the Australian Regular Army saw the militia reformed to back up and augmenting the Regular Army. The Council of Defence mandated that the Army's permanent and citizen forces would only be raised on a voluntary basis and that the Defence Act's provision of requiring army personnel to volunteer to serve overseas was also not to be modified.39 By October 1945, demobilisation quickened albeit on a points system that was based upon their age of enlistment, years of service, and family/dependent circumstances. Therefore, at the conclusion of the war, despite the efforts put in by the men of the militia, their respect in the community was still second to that of the 2nd AIF. This is also despite the comments made by some military officials on the role the militia had played during the war. As Lieutenant-General Savige indicated, many of the militia were boys aged 13 to 15 at the outbreak of war, and who had been trained, seen action in Salamaua and Bougainville, and 'were equal to the best fighting troops of the older generation'.40

This focus was partly due to the changing strategic environment and the requirement for a higher readiness force available to support collective security goals of Australia and other allies. With the changing strategic environment

23, citing Defence Committee Minute 234/1945, 19 June 1945. 38 ‘Resumption of Recruiting’, 15 February 1946, NAA, MP742/1, 5/1/1940. 39 Palazzo, op cit., p. 206. 40 'Better Jobs for Former Fighting Men', The Argus, Saturday 13 October 1945, p. 2.

187 from that at the beginning of the Second World War, the Chiefs of Staff 'Appreciation of the Strategic Position of Australia' in early 1946 further signaled a shift in the militia's role into a more structured organisation essentially based within the ambit of the AMF as a whole. The Appreciation recommended mobile, well-equipped land forces designed for overseas or coalition operations rather than local or continental defence.41 With the lack of focus on the potential role of the militia in the preceding years, the ability of it to maintain its current status or role following the Appreciation was limited. As was stated shortly after by (Vice Chief of the General Staff), '[t]he peacetime army organisation of 1939 and earlier years affords no real basis for consideration of what is needed today'.42

The size, form and support required to the post-war Australian Army (including militia) was going to be largely reliant on the defence and foreign policy commitments made by the Government during the end of war transition period. Ahead of the Federal election in 1946, the post-war commitments entered into by the Chifley Government were numerous and required a rapid demobilisation of the Army.43 However, the lack of this opportunity occurring reflected on how the focus of the Government and military hierarchy was still on the 2nd AIF. The official historian, Paul Hasluck commented that the security of Australia and limits on manpower had governed the Australian war effort and this was reflected in post-war decisions on the Army.44 With the Labor Government again in power, it had reverted back to its pre-war view on the role of the military

41 ‘Appreciation of the Strategical Position of Australia (1946)’, Department of Defence, http://www.defence.gov.au/strategicbasis/pdf/1946.pdf, accessed 28 May 2010. 42 Lieut-General S.F. Rowell, ‘Australian Military Forces Minute Paper – The Post War Army – Policy Paper No. 1’, 6 March 1946, reproduced on Australian War Memorial, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/docs/AMF_Minute_Paper_Post_War_Army.pdf, accessed 14 May 2010. 43 The demobilisation period was from 1 October 1945 to 15 February 1947. In 16 months, 349,964 personnel were demobilised (‘Post War Army Organisation and Activities: Demobilisation 1939-45 War’, 25 March 1954, Department of the Army, Post war Army Organisation (Proposed), NAA, MP742, 240/1/3118, p. 1). 44 As quoted in Horner, War Cabinet, op cit., p. 161. See also, Hasluck, op cit., pp. 301-2.

188 and signaled its lack of support for compulsory military training and conscription. Likewise, the military was intent on ensuring that a hastily prepared and improvised Army force would no longer be required.45

The cost and effort to get the militia up to a required standard was too great and costly when combined with the changing nature of technology used by the military and the composition of the nation's Army in terms of personnel and resources had changed.46 As Wilcox described:

Growing professionalism in public life and the dominance of the staff corps favoured full-time over part-time soldiering; a growing sense of Australia's nationhood seemed to demand that it maintain an army rather than a militia. The government's military advisers were determined that Australia would never again have to improvise an army after a war had begun.47

In June 1947, John Dedman (Minister for Defence) announced that the Government was to create a field force within the Permanent Military Force (PMF) consisting of over 4000 soldiers. The enlistment facilitating such a structure was to commence on 1 August 1947.48 In addition, reflecting the change in thinking that was required in structuring the Australian Army was a comment made by Major-General Rowell in relation to Australia’s position in the Pacific:

The peacetime organisation of 1939 and earlier years affords no real basis for consideration of what is needed today. It was based on a conception of local defence against raids on, or invasion of, our country and carried no commitment, express or implied, in a wider strategical sphere. Even for its limited outlook, it was woefully inadequate for its primary task as events were subsequently to prove ... [the size and readiness of the peacetime army] ... must be directly related to the commitments we

45 Wilcox, op cit., p. 145. 46 Indeed, militia soldiers were also often guaranteed of a higher rate of employment in the outside world. 47 Wilcox, op cit., p. 145. 48 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol 192, 4 June 1997, pp. 3340-3341;

189 have entered into, or expect to meet in war. It is thus essential that it should be capable of taking the field unhampered by the dislocation and inefficiency which result from a major reorganisation on the outbreak of war.49

On this basis, it was in late 1947 that a small regular Army was established to fight anywhere in the World under the United Nations auspices with a small part-time auxiliary Citizen Military Force (CMF) standing alongside (and being entitled to the same pay, training, discipline and organisation to their regular colleagues).50 However, there was still a continual policy barrier against allowing CMF personnel to serve overseas and receiving limited support in comparison to the Regular Army. Despite recruitment tactics being utilised, by August 1949, the CMF only had 14,178 personnel in comparison to their establishment number of 50,000.51 Further, even at the end of the war, the same supply issues impacted upon the CMF. For example, in 1949, most CMF units had few vehicles and those that did only had enough sufficient for their own purposes.52 However, comments made by Lieutenant-General Rowell noted that the '[t]roops of the C.M.F. were immeasurably better equipped today than in 1939'.53

The strategic lessons of the Second World War were further reflected in the plans for the shape of the post-war Army and from these emerged the modern Regular Army and a reversed relationship between the regulars and the reserves. The final plan for the post-war Army was submitted to Cabinet in December 1946 and required a total of 42,421 militia personnel (and an increase in proportion of

49 ‘The Post-war Army: Policy Paper No 1’, 6 March 1946, A816, 52/301/245, cited in Grey, The Australian Army, op cit., pp. 167-168. 50 'Australian Army', Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/structure/army/, unknown date, accessed 13 July 2012. The actual formation of the Australian Regular Army though took longer, and is often considered to have formed in 1948. 51 Palazzo, op cit., p. 213. 52 'C.M.F. Strength and Transport', The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 July 1949, p. 3. 53 'C.M.F. Better Equipped Than Army of 1939', The Canberra Times, Friday 4 March 1949, p. 3.

190 the Regulars to 33,461). However, such a figure required an Army budget of approximately £20 million which the Government sought to reduce even further.54 The Australian economy was finding its way out of the period of the Second World War and the Australian Army found itself with a maximum budget of £15,000,000 per annum out of a possible £250,000,000 (over a five year period) allocated by the Government. This limited funding saw the Army having to be equipped with equipment already in stock and readily available (essentially, surplus supplies from the Second World War).55 In addition, the limited funding along with war experiences and higher civilian employment saw the Government consider that having a PMF available as first option for both overseas service and the overall defence of the country was more suitable for Australia. Finally, the bulk of the Defence budget was to provide for research and development instead of resources and training to the Forces (due to there being a large body of trained men available following their service in the war).56 As described by Sligo, during the period 1945 to 1948, the militia was essentially in a state of ‘suspended animation’ while the country found itself having an Interim Army available for service.57 In contrast to the level of support they could receive in a tight funding framework, the militia were still seen as the main striking force.58 However,

54 Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53, vol. 1, Strategy and Diplomacy, Australian War Memorial / Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1981, p. 23, citing Defence Committee Minute 460/46, 19 December 1946; NAA, MP742/1, item 240/1/2447, Acting Minister of Defence (Forde) to Minister for the Army (Forde), 19 July 1946, pp. 2-3, including quotations from the Treasurer. 55 Jeffrey Grey, Australian Brass: The Career of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, Cambridge University Press, Oakleigh, 1992, p. 167; CPD, vol. 192, p. 3341, 4 June 1947. 56 Major Graeme Sligo, ‘The Development of the Australian Regular Army, 1944-1952’, The Second Fifty Years: The Australian Army 1947-1997, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/docs/The_Second_Fifty_Years_Sligo.pdf, unknown date, accessed 5 June 2010. 57 Ibid. The Interim Army was created in May 1946, but with retrospective application to 1 October 1945. Personnel were progressively enlisted or transferred to it, and by 1 February 1947, all ‘non-volunteers for further service’ had been discharged from the Army. 58 D. MacLean, ‘The Development of the Australian Army 1945-50’, Thesis (BA(Hons)), University Collected, 1983, quoted in David Horner, The Gunners: A History of Australian Artillery, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1995, pp. 43-44.

191 there was a greater level of awareness of the Regular soldiers seeking recognition and the opportunity for them to obtain command and regimental experience.59 It was from this basis that the post-war PMF was to be created.

From this, it was becoming clear that the role of the militia was being downgraded in a continuation of the policy decisions made both during the Second World War and even earlier. Major-General K.G. Cooke suggested that such a downgrade was potentially occurring due to ‘a desire on the part of some senior Regular officers to lock out non-Regulars from command [despite] our ex-AIF officers [having] no real argument, in principle, with qualified Regulars being preferred’.60 This was despite them having served with the members of the militia during the Second World War. Indeed, it was only after the conclusion of the war, following support for the Minister, that a CMF officer (Major General G.F. Wootten) was appointed to membership of the Military Board. However, the position was only to exist during peacetime and the officer had no executive functions (and was instead, acting as an adviser).61 With the role of the CMF being seriously undermined so shortly after the events of the Second World War, the ‘one Army’ policy was not apparent.

It was not until September 1950 that policy changes saw positive change for the CMF. Specifically, the CMF was subject to a Government policy to see it increase in size, allow for service anywhere in the world (although reliant on a

59 Sligo, op cit. 60 ‘Major-General K.G. Cooke, ‘One Army’, The Second Fifty Years; The Australian Army 1947-1997. 61 Grey, The Australian Army: A History, op cit., p. 173; D. Horner, Crisis of Command, op cit., pp. 326-7. This followed the retirement of Major-General in 1945 (a non-professional soldiers who had retired from the militia in the mid 1920s), although until Wootton’s appointment in 1948, there was no militia general serving as a principal staff officer or on the Military Board. Instead, the Military Board (a corporate body) which was designed to control and administer the Army, had as its full members: the Minister, Lieutenant-General Sturdee as CGS, Lieutenant-General Rowell as VCGS, Major-General Clowes and Adjutant-General, Major-General Bridgeford as QMG, Major-General Beavis as MGO, Mr Fitzgerald as the Financial Member and Mr Kemsley as Business Manager.

192 formal declaration of war), and be enlisted and trained as a force which is itself an expeditionary force. This was to counteract the overall decrease in attention on the militia that had continued after the Second World War and which had to be addressed at a time when the Korean War was in its early stages. The subsequent National Service Scheme was introduced in 1951 to train 29,250 personnel and provide the manpower required for home defence purposes. Under the Scheme, all 18 year old men were required to serve 98 days full time training followed by three years part-time service the CMF. However, trainees could also elect to undertake six months full time service in the RAN, Australian Regular Army or RAAF as an alternative to the CMF.62 The options available saw around 95,000 enlisted in the Citizen Forces by 1956. However, the ceasing of the National Service Scheme in 1959 signaled another downturn in the policy fortunes of the CMF.

The negative perception and inability to prove itself in the Army structure was also reflected on the CMF with the second round of National Service in 1964. While it acknowledged the CMF so that individuals were exempt from full-time service if they signed on with the CMF for six years, despite being shown to allow the CMF to build up its capacity, the focus in the community was instead on how those people were instead ‘draft dodgers’. This led to many capable militia personnel enlisting in the Regular Army or entering the National Service system instead.63 With the Vietnam War also occurring, this limited the opportunities available for the militia to receive support from the Regular Army to ensure its training standards were at a suitable level. Without some form of change, the militia would clearly find itself viewed separately from their Regular colleagues and not able to achieve its full potential that was briefly shown in the Second World War. Over the ensuring years, despite the Regular Army being employed in a number of overseas locations, there were limited to nil attempts to utilise militia units.

62 ‘National Service - Policy’, NAA, A4940, C162. 63 ‘History of the Army Reserves’, Australian Army – Director General of Reserves, http://www.army.gov.au/dgresa/History.asp, 11 December 2008, accessed 5 May 2010.

193 Subsequent amendments to the National Service Act saw the number of personnel in the Citizen Forces drop to 35,000. The Vietnam War also saw the re-introduction of conscription and the involvement of a large number of CMF members in the campaign. By the mid 1960s though, the CMF had become an army reserve and its members could fight anywhere in the world. However, the Pentropic structure impacted on the organisation to such an extent that by the 1960s and early 1970s saw the role of the CMF seriously diminished. Members of the CMF sought ‘a clear and credible’ policy role for the organisation to undertake.64 The history of militia units being tied to local communities was being lost as traditional units were disbanded in favour of a regimental system, which meant that commands were too remote to benefit the militia. The extent in which this change impacted upon the militia is reflected in comments described by Major General K.G. Cooke. In a presentation some decades later, Major General Cooke retold a story of a scenario that occurred during a tour of Ballarat, Victoria:

The Mayor took me into the main Council Chamber to proudly show me the 8th Infantry Battalion Colours, on the wall above the Mayoral chair. I said what a pity it was that Ballarat did not then have its own battalion and it was my aim to see the local company built up to that level again. The Mayor said to me, ‘General, we do not understand this 2RVR nonsense. What the Army does not realize is that two generations of men from Ballarat have fought and died in the 8th Battalion. When the Army gives us back our 8th Battalion then Ballarat will give the Army its young men again.65

This period was arguably the most difficult for the militia and the men within it, and combined all the disparate policy decisions relating to the organisation over the course of its history. As Palazzo described, the treatment of citizen soldiers by the regular force during the Pentropic period was ‘callous and mean spirited’.66 This negatively within the Army also impacted on the ties

64 McCarthy, op cit., p. 366. 65 Cooke, op cit. 66 John Donovan, ‘Defenders of Australia: The Third Australian Division 1916-1991 by Albert Palazzo’, Army History Unit, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/Defenders_of_Australia.asp, 21 June 2010, accessed 4 October 2010.

194 potentially able to be formed between the community and specific units. From a gradual state of re-building, misjudgements and errors ensued in an attempt to integrate the Australian Army with its counterpart United States Army. However, the restructuring was focused primarily on CMF infantry battalions and led to policy decisions whereby many old units (often with community ties) were disbanded.67 The downgrading of the militia from the earlier 1950 policy was confirmed in 1971 with a Military Board Minute (number 40/71) that only allocated the militia a supplementary role in the Army structure. From these events, the downturn in personnel numbers re-emphasised the impact of policy decisions made during the Second World War.

It was not until a Committee of Inquiry review of the CMF was conducted in 1974 with the aim of making the organisation a more effective and viable force in Australia’s defence.68 The Millar Report was an in-depth review and was the first true opportunity for an effective restructuring and re-focus of the CMF through effective and appropriate policy.69 After many decades of indecisive policies and subsequent actions relating to the CMF, it was the Report that

67 ‘Peace, War and Peacekeeping: 1945-2009’, Army History Unit, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/docs/PART_3.pdf, unknown date, accessed 4 September 2010. 68 The Committee of Inquiry into the CMF was appointed by L.H. Barndard in April 1973. Its purpose was to report and recommend on the role, structure, strength, geographic organisation, conditions or service and training of the part-time army. The members of the Committee were Dr. T.B. Millar, Major General D.B. Dunstan, Major General J.D. Groen, W.A. Jarvis, J.G. O'Loghlin and Colonel L.A. Simpson. The Report came at a time when the militia’s numbers were rapidly declining and which would have seen the Army in a repeat of the events of the 1920-1930 period when there was no effective structure to the service, thus leading to inefficiencies in the event of war. 69 The principles conclusions of the Millar Report included: A partly trained Reserve force was an essential component of the defence of Australia, Australia should have one Army (ie total force) with two complementary elements, the Regular Army and the Army Reserve, The Army Reserve should be developed to provide an effective operational force for the defence of Australia at short notice and also to provide a basis for force expansion in the long term (see: ‘History of the Army Reserves’, http://www.raemensw.com/articles/Military/history_of_the_army_reserves.htm, unknown date, accessed 6 July 2010).

195 formally emphasised the importance of the organisation to Australia’s military structure along with the amount of work that had to be undertaken to ensure the force was an effective and suitable option in Australia’s military structure. This reflected the lack of policy support, resources and overall strategic thinking the organisation had received not only since the war, but also for many decades prior. Implementing these recommendations would not be an easy or quick option. The subsequent 1976 Defence White Paper reaffirmed the Government’s support for Millar’s recommendations and identified the likelihood of further changes to the CMF to be required.70 Renamed the Australian Army Reserve, the new organisation was structured differently than the militia of the Second World War, and saw its functional command structure operating as part of the Regular Army with direct representation in each of the three commands. The era in which the part-time volunteer soldiers found themselves under-represented in the military hierarchy was theoretically over. In the view of Palazzo though, the implementation of the reforms continued to signal problems with the establishment of a solid and effective CMF. In particular, processes used in the period immediately after the release of the Millar report ‘included an arbitrary raising of the barrier for unit survival by applying Regular establishments to part-time units previously operating against lower establishments’.71

Despite the change, in reality, the potential benefits to the CMF were actually slow in being forthcoming. A review of Australia’s defence capabilities found that the implementation of the Millar Report in relation to the CMF (now the Army Reserve) had only started to occur in the mid 1980s. Even in 1988, when the call-out of Reservists short of a Declaration of War or Defence Emergency became law, there was still no policy protection of the civilian interests of Reservists in the call out of events short of a National Emergency. Despite the apparent changes that had occurred in attempting to minimise the differences between the two organisations, by the mid 1990s, comments still

70 ‘History of the Navy, Army & Air Force Reserves’, Digger History, http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/other/reserves.htm, 11 November 2002, accessed 28 May 2010. 71 Donovan, op cit.

196 abounded of ‘you cannot give that to Reservists when we Regulars don’t get anything like that’ or ‘why should Reservists get that when professionals don’t’.72 This is not to say that change in promoting equality between the full and part time components of the Australian Army has not occurred. In relation to the policies influencing it, the Army Reserve of today bears minimal resemblance to its preceding militia and CMF units.73

The gradual shift in focus has also occurred due to a change in Australia's strategic environment in an international community along with the need for a higher readiness force available to support collective security goals. As the strategic situation has evolved in the post Cold War era, the organisation, structure, training and role of the Army Reserve has undergone considerable changes, and members of the Army Reserve are increasingly being used on overseas deployments, not only within Regular Army units, but also in units drawn almost entirely from Reserve units.74 When considered against the events of the Second World War, there has been a policy change to ensure consistent opportunities are available throughout the entire Australian Army, regardless of how the service individual serves and acknowledging the resources and support needed for organisations to effectively carry out its assigned role. In addition, they are also recognised on occasion) separate from the Regular (or Permanent) Army. For example, the Reserve Forces Day celebrates the role of Reserve personnel. 75 The strength of the Army Reserves and its ability to receive political and financial support is in stark contrast to the fortunes of the militia during the Second World War. It reflects the extent to which the militia of that

72 Cooke, op cit. 73 ‘History of the Army Reserves’, op cit. For example, the Reservists of today are provided with tax free pay. The importance of such an action is reflected in that a decrease in the strength of the reserves actually occurred in the mid 1980s when the tax exempt status of Reserve pay was removed in the 1983-1984 Federal Budget. The current Army Reserves are also given greater opportunities for a career structure and manage their reserve obligations in conjunction with their normal work conditions. 74 ‘The Australian Army Reserve’, Defence Reserves Support, http://www.defencereserves.com/aspx/army.aspx, 2010, accessed 13 October 2010. 75 Held on the anniversary of the reformation of the reserve forces in 1948.

197 period were disadvantaged by policy decisions when compared to the 2nd AIF. While they always strove to achieve their role, these would have become more manageable if greater support was received from the Government, military and public more generally.

The basis though of policies relating to the CMF by the end of the Second World War showed that although there had been changes to the role and resources provided by the Government, such changes had not significantly impacted on the management of the organisation during the war and in the years immediately following. With minimal policies implemented before the war, the opportunities for any significant policy changes to be introduced during the Second World War were limited. In addition, the need for the Government to balance competing priorities during the war of initially sustaining its support of the Allied campaign in Europe and subsequently, ensuring that Australia’s defences were maintained from the threat from Japan, meant that there was limited opportunity to ensure that any policies were appropriate over a sustained period. The impact of differing and, at times, inadequate policies on the militia at this time was instead only reflected in the years following the Second World War. The Government became more aware of the need to advance the nation’s military forces, including the CMF. Whilst it took almost two hundred years since the militia were first introduced into the colonies, the changes brought about in recent years in relation to policies in issues such as training and funding, reflect the increased awareness. Without such changes, there is the potential that many of the issues experienced by the militia during the Second World War, such as funding, training, resources and overall collegiality with the 2nd AIF, may well still be continuing in the Army today. As such, it is important that policies relating to the current Army Reserves are constantly reviewed and updated to ensure that a return to the circumstances of the Second World War does not occur.

198 CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION

Since European settlement, the primary means of Australia's defence has been its citizen soldiers and in particular, the continual involvement of the militia (or CMF). From these beginnings, policy variations had been apparent which introduced barriers to personnel within the militia forces. Such restrictions were still apparent up to, and during, the Second World War. Even today, when referring to the soldiers of the Second World War, significant attention has been conveyed by historians and the media about the 2nd AIF and their associated roles and policies. This is even the case in conflicts such as in New Guinea, where there was militia personnel in battle. While this suggests that the Australian Army has been able to adapt to different policy decisions effectively, it does not focus on the policies applicable to other aspects of the military, such as the militia. Indeed, many aspects of the background and stories of the militia are worthy of discussing. However, despite the snippets of passing references to issues between the militia and the 2nd AIF, there are few, if any, accounts on what actually led to such actions and how far they permeated.

Even army histories of major campaigns that the militia were involved in – such as Kokoda – have instead focused on the experience of the 2nd AIF personnel rather than the militia. The ABC series Australians at War indicated that the role the militia had 'had no strategic influence on the outcome of the war'.1 For an organisation that at one stage outnumbered the 2nd AIF and contributed such a large number of personnel to the organisation, it is disappointing that this has occurred. However, with the differences in policy decisions between the two forces, in some ways, it is hardly surprising. Even as recent as 2008, the disparity experienced by militia personnel during history was acknowledged when the Member for Blair, Mr Shayne Neumann, MP, said:

I looked into the history of the Citizen Military Forces, and it is really quite strange that we do not teach enough about this matter in our schools. We should. Our young people should

1 Episode 5: ‘The Thin Khaki Line’, Australian at War, Australian War Memorial, 2001.

199 know about this.2

The policies associated with the role of the militia in campaigns and the like is a subject that should be analysed further by historians both from a military and societal perspective.

This thesis set out to ensure this focus is presented by examining policy decisions made by the Australian Government and the military decisions made by the Australian Army in relation to the militia during the Second World War and understanding its impact on both the organisation and the men who served in it. Through examining and analysing of a number of key features, policies and events impacting upon the militia during the Second World War (including its purpose, organisational structure, administrative system, enrolment statistics, staffing levels, and training), it has achieved this goal. In addition, this thesis has discussed some of the major issues that impacted upon the running of the militia during the years of the war, such as the influence of pre and post Second World War policies and roles. Prior to the Second World War, despite their place in the Australian military, the militia were unable to undertake or fulfil their role with the lack of sufficient policies and in part, this impacted upon its ability to subsequently carry out future roles in the defence of Australia.

Military campaigns and structure are governed by a combination of strategic and political decisions. However, the fractured and discontinuous nature of Australia’s military throughout history also played a role in the ultimate struggles of the militia during the Second World War. With no consistency about the form and character the organisation was meant to take, each generation assumed that the procedures of preceding generations were the correct ones. Australia's involvement in the Second World War was influenced by a number of factors, both within the country and externally. Likewise, the role of the militia was influenced in part from those decisions made at a bureaucratic level which had barely changed since the events of the First World War. However, they were

2 Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Main Committee, Private Members' Business, Citizen Military Forces (Speech), 1 December 2008, Hansard, p. 12054.

200 also influenced by the perceived and preconceived role of the organisation that had been in existence many years previously.

Indeed, the Australian war effort, and particularly from the militia perspective, was influenced by funding arrangements and preconceived notions about the role of the militia in comparison to their counterparts in the 2nd AIF. From this, the fortunes of the militia largely waned throughout the war in many aspects when compared to the 2nd AIF. Issues should have been learnt from the past, but what this thesis has shown is that instead of it being solely a result of the policy decisions and events of the Second World War, such issues were also a result of the remnants of policies prior to that period. Even after the Second World War, the impact of policy decisions still lingered and impacted negatively on the militia. It also impacted on its relations with the 2nd AIF and therefore, the potential for a true ‘one Army’ to occur. Over the years, historians have suggested that the genesis of the tensions between the militia and 2nd AIF within Australia results from a variety of different circumstances. The experiences of the First World War, when a separate expeditionary force was raised for overseas services, signaled the first major event in which the uncertainty of the role and support required to the militia was made aware. However, the tensions continued throughout the Second World War in a series of peaks and troughs, exacerbated by political and military focuses and attention.

This thesis has also demonstrated that the disparity between the militia and the 2nd AIF was always evident throughout the Second World War, despite the public statement of Australia having 'one Army' in the mid to late period of the war. It shows that the militia during the Second World War was subject to the influence of a number of policy factors including the events prior to the war, lack of funding, lack of resources and an overall lack of understanding of their role in the military and associated requirements. In addition, the thesis demonstrated that the disparity and lack of understanding about the militia was not solely limited to the 2nd AIF, military hierarchy and political figures, but also extended to the wider Australian community. With the widespread nature of the views on the militia, the men within the force were impacted to a great extent by the internal

201 structure and outward perception of the force. The extent to which this was so is reflected by the events post Second World War, when it still took a number of decades before policy changes were made to alter the disparities experienced by the personnel. Further, the post-war re-organisation of the Australian Army emphasised the extent to which policy decisions during the Second World War were not conducive to a modern military force. This was basically a role refusal from the events prior to, and during, the Second World War.

Although it was numerically large in scope, at numerous times, the militia found itself struggling to exist and gain policy support against the resource rich 2nd AIF. However, these issues have largely been addressed following the implementation and evolution of many of the recommendations of the Millar Report. The modern day militia, the Army Reserves, has a well-defined role and adequate policy support (through finance and resources) is provided to it and its personnel. It also continues to remember the service of past units in that every Army Reserve infantry battalion now uses a traditional number or pair of linked numbers (albeit within the State Regiments). Not only is an acknowledgement of the history of the militia occurring, but also recognition of the importance of the men who served in previous years. However, with the variety of roles the militia undertook in Australia’s military history, lessons on the militia’s role and function can continue to be taken from the experiences of the organisation during the Second World War in helping to improve the current Reserve forces. As noted by Major-General Cooke, ‘there are still many lessons to be learned about part-time forces’.3 Historians need to refocus their attention on the role of the militia in campaigns along with the effect of policy decisions on the way in which the personnel conducted themselves.

Voluntarism has been an essential aspect of the Australian military and the service made by individuals. While the experiences of battles and the combats fought should not be forgotten, it is also important to remember and reflect on the 'behind-the-scenes' decisions made which impacted upon military personnel. Despite the policy decisions and events that plagued the militia during the Second

3 Cooke, op cit.

202 World War, and which were relicts of pre 1939 actions and reflected in post 1945 undertakings, the militia were still able to achieve a great deal at this time. Indeed, without the actions undertaken during that period, the Australian Army, and in particular, the current Army Reserves would be completely different today.4 At a time when the Australian continent was under direct threat of attack, the efforts and achievements of the militia in the Second World War meant that the men who enlisted and serve in the militia were truly 'twice the citizen' despite the wartime policies suggesting otherwise.

4 In 2000, a Senate Committee found that the Army Reserve could probably only support some 16,500 active members. After 40 years of what Dr Palazzo describes as "callous and mean spirited" treatment, it is surely a tribute to their dedication that so many citizen soldiers are prepared to struggle on to serve their country.

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215 y_Years_Sligo.pdf, unknown date, accessed 5 June 2010. Wood, Dr James, ‘The Australian Military Contribution to the Occupation of Japan 1945-1952’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/BCOF_history.pdf, unknown date, accessed 14 May 2010.

Archives Files

Australian War Memorial AWM1 – 20/11 'a) First Report, 1938, by Lieutenant General E.K. Squires, Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces, b) Revised Report by the Military Board, 1939, on the Squires First Report, 1938' AWM27 – 367/1 [Pay and Allowances:] Statement showing rates of pay and allowances of all ranks for each of the defence services [Permanent Naval Forces, Naval Reserve personnel called up, Permanent Military Forces, Military Forces (1939), 2nd AIF, Militia, Reserve Officers - Garrison Troops, Permanent Air Force, Citizen Air Force, Air Force Reserve (officers and airmen), RAAF and Special Air Force] (Jun 1940) AWM52 2nd AIF (Australian Imperial Force) and CMF (Citizen Military Forces) unit war diaries, 1939-1945 War AWM52 – 1/4/8 2 Australian Corps G Branch Unit Diary (May 1942-May 1944; Oct 1944-September 1945). AWM54 – 147/2/1 [Cadets - Australian Army Cadet Corps (AACC):] History of the AACC during the War 1939-1945, Organization following the introduction of Militia Training

216 AWM54 – 171/1/2 [Casualties – General:] Graph showing battle casualties AMF and CMF in New Guinea from June 1942 to Feb 1944 AWM54 – 171/2/18 [Casualties – Reporting:] Weekly reports to the Prime Minister – Setting out comparatively the casualties suffered by the AIF [Australian Imperial Force] and CMF [Citizen Military Forces] in New Guinea, 1943 AWM54 – 243/6/131 [Defence Schemes - Australia:] Department of Defence, Military Board: Instructions regarding District Base Defence Schemes and tables showing militia units to be called up by districts at precautionary stage, 26 Aug 1939. AWM54 – 243/6/158 Draft Appreciation on the Employment of the AMF in Defence of Australia by General Staff 16 Jan 1940. AWM54 – 285/3/1 New Guinea Garrison – allotment of troops for defence of New Guinea – Operations in New Guinea – Brief for GOC New Guinea Force – January 1943. AWM54 – 317/4/1 [Enlistment – PMF and CMF enlistment in AIF:] Allied Land Forces in South West Pacific Area. PMF & CMF – Enlistment in AIF, 1942 AWM54 – 317/4/2 [Enlistment – PMF and CMF enlistment in AIF:] 4th Division Administrative Order, No. 48/40. Voluntary enlistments, Militia Forces, 1939-1940 AWM54 0 – 327/4/20 War Establishments and Amendments. AWM54 – 391/1/10 [Honours and Rewards - General:] Story of three Awards to men of a Militia Battalion, 1944 AWM54 – 419/3/6 [Infantry - Unit Histories:] Fighting in New Guinea - Narrative of the 39th Militia Battalion. Its contact and defeat of the Japanese in the Mountainous Jungle of New Guinea, 1942

217 AWM54 – 495/1/43 [Mobilization, Allied and Enemy - AMF Generally:] Liaison between area Officers and Militia Units on the handling of Universal Service Personnel (n.d.) AWM54 – 577/7/29 PART 19 [Owen Stanleys - Reports:] Reports on operations in the Owen Stanleys, Buna, Gona area: "The Australian V the Jap", story of the 39 Militia Battalion [39 Australian Infantry Battalion] [Part 19 of 25] AWM54 – 587/7/27 Salamaua Campaign Orders – Messages – Notes 30 June 1943-25 September 1943. AWM54 – 721/2/12 [Organization (own) - Corps and Divisional:] Recruiting and Reorganization - Militia increased to 70,000 - 1939 AWM54 – 721/8/4 [Organization (own) - Infantry:] Re-organization of Militia Infantry Battalions 1940 AWM54 – 721/8/7 [Organization (own) – Infantry:] Suggestions for linking Infantry Battalions now disbanded, also linking of CMF Battalions, 1943-1944 AWM54 – 721/12/24 Statement of Army Policy to Govern Future Organization by T A Blamey, General Commander-in-Chief AMF 1943. AWM54 – 721/30/1 [Organisation – CMF:] Organisation and Training of Citizen Military Forces, 1940-1941 (25 May 1940) AWM54 – 721/30/2 [Organisation – CMF:] Militia Forces, organization and recruiting (Mar-Apr 1939) AWM54 – 755/5/1 [Personnel - Maintenance of Records:] Military Board memorandum and instruction concerning, records of Militia personnel - 1941 AWM54 – 755/5/6 [Personnel – Maintenance of Records:] Direction for records procedures No 64: PMF and CMF Transfer to AIF – 11 September 1943 AWM54 – 911/3/1 [Strength – New Guinea – New Britain –

218 Bougainville:] Two copies of graph showing AIF and CMF Strengths, New Guinea, June 1942 – February 1944 AWM54 – 911/3/7 [Strength - New Guinea - New Britain - Bougainville:] Estimated Manpower requirements, New Guinea Force (June 1944 - 15 March 1945), Total estimate of supply AIF and CMF 1 Aug 1944 - March 1945. Estimate nett requirements, 1 Australian Corp after allowing for return to duty of operational casualties (May 1944). Estimated gross manpower requirements, 1 Australian Corps (May 1944), 6th and 9th Division Task Force units to be raised as at 20 May 1944 and included in table deficiencies. 7th Division Task Force, May 1944. Forecast of Operational activity, appreciation of manpower position. Outline of Reinforcement situation, provision of personnel, May 1944 AWM54 – 911/6/1 [Strength – Citizen Forces (CMF):] Statistical Returns, Militia Forces – strength returns 1940 AWM54 – 917/4/5 [Supply - Planning:] Instructions governing the issue and accounting for supplies for, all personnel of Militia Forces, 2nd AIF Garrison Battalions and Permanent Military Forces, attached to any such Units when in camp or Barracks in any part of Eastern Command AWM54 – 946/1/1 Organization and Training of the Citizen Military Forces, 1940-1941 AWM54 – 946/1/3 [Training, Compulsory Military (including enemy) - General:] Future Training of Militia Forces - August 1941 AWM54 – 946/2/1 [Training, Compulsory Military (including enemy) - Conscription:] Compulsory Military Service, Medical examination, and incorporation in Militia

219 Units, of Males reaching the age of 21, in year ending June 1940 AWM60 – 150 [Relations between AIF and Militia] AWM60 – 638 Militia. Volunteers for Service at Darwin AWM60 – 649 [Antagonism between AIF and Militia] AWM60 – 687 [Male Population Queensland Towns, Militia Units] AWM60 – 797 [Calling up Militia for Temporary Posts in 15 Garrison Battalion] AWM60 – 843 Militia Members Proceeding to AIF AWM60 – 1117 [Future Training of Militia Forces – Accommodation] [Note: Includes area plans] AWM60 – 1330 Future training of militia. Camps 1941-1942. First series. AWM60 – 1331 Future training of militia AWM61 – 546/7/289 PART 1 Training – Universal Training General – Miscellaneous Papers regarding Recruiting for 2nd AIF (Australian Imperial Force) – Raising 6 Aust Div (6 Australian Division) – Citizen Military Forces – Universal Service. AWM61 – 546/7/289 PART 2 Training – Universal Training General – Miscellaneous Papers regarding Recruiting for 2nd AIF (Australian Imperial Force) – Raising 6 Aust Div (6 Australian Division) – Citizen Military Forces – Universal Service. AWM62 – 63/2/567 Recruiting – Militia Forces and Senior Cadets. AWM92 – 3DRL 6850/142 [Papers of Lieut Gen Sir Iven G Mackay:] 1 Australian Corps [Papers and correspondence relating to Disturbances between Australia and American troops, Militia Training etc] AWM147 Roll of Honour Cards, 1939-1945 War, 2nd AIF (Australian Imperial Force) and CMF (Commonwealth Military Forces)

220 National Archives of Australia - Canberra Reading Room

A461 - BD337/1/4 PART 1 AIF Rates of Pay, Allowances, etc & Leave Part I A649 – 82/602/8 Training of Militia Forces 1941-1942 A659 - 1939/1/12995 Enlistment of Half-Caste Aborigines in the Militia Forces at Darwin A659 – 1939/1/14245 Militia training leave. Conditions for employees (excluding officers) also includes AIF and RAAF A659 – 1939/1/14643 Canberra Technical College. Members of Militia – Leave of absence – Arrangements of classes - Examinations A659 – 1939/1/12995 Enlistment of half-caste Aborigines in the Militia Forces at Darwin A659 – 1942/1/497 Passes on Commonwealth Railways for members of Australian Imperial Force – Military and Naval (Citizens) forces on leave A663 – O5/2/102 Board of Business Administration - Clothing Requirements for Militia Forces. A663 – O30/1/3 Militia Camp Structures – Additional Funds A663 – O30/1/18 Militia Camp Structure A663 – O130/1/437 Man Power: Exemptions from Service in Citizen Forces – Circular No. 42. A663 -O130/3/662 Militia Training for Students – Roseworth Agricultural College A663 – O130/3/716 Future Training of Militia – University students A663 – O130/3/844 Meat Employees – Release from Militia Training A663 – O130/3/1024 Release from Military Training A663 - O130/3/1029 Release from Militia Service A816 - 1/301/663 Canteen Service and Australian Military (Canteen Service) Regulations (Wet or Dry) Canteens in AIF & Garrison Camps A816 – 52/302/50 Summaries of Strength of AIF in Australian Camps.

221 A1608 – F45/1/3 War 1939. Commonwealth Public Servants in Militia – Use of Furlough for Military Service Period A1608 – H45/1/2 Australian Reserves and Militia in New Zealand A1608 – L45/1/2 Militia Forces – Recruiting A1608 – V45/1/12 PART 1 War Records. Conscription (inc. use of militia outside Australia). Part 1 [representations to Prime Ministers R G Menzies and John Curtin from unions, community organisations etc] A1608 – V45/1/12 PART 2 War Records. Conscription (inc. use of militia outside Australia). Part 2 A1608 – Y45/1/12 War – 1939. Relief Workers in militia A2671 - 9/1939 War Cabinet Agendum – No 9/1939 – Rates of Pay for Special Military Forces and Called-Up Militia A2671 – 62/1940 War Cabinet Agendum – No 62/1940 – Manning of Coast Defences – Enlistment of Militia for the Duration of War. A2671 – 389/1943 War Cabinet Agendum No 389/1943 – Review by Defence Committee of the Strength and Composition of the Services and the Munitions and Works Programmes. A2671/1 – 418/1941 War Cabinet Agendum – No 418/1941 and supplement 1 – Defence of Australia and Adjacent Area – Chiefs of Staff appreciation December 1941. A2700 – 1386 Post War Army – policy on reconditioning of CMF (Citizens Military Force) training depots A2908 – S45A Militia Officers AMF Return to Australia A5954 - 4/6 Notes of Discussion with Commander-in-Chief Australian Military Forces 12th February 1943, A5954 - 198/1 Canteens in Camps of Militia Units, 2nd AIF and Garrison Battalions – War Cabinet Agendum No 140/1942.

222 A5954 – 261/5 Army Administration and Policy – Criticisms regarding Use of AIF and CMF in New Guinea – Higher Army Appointments and Transfer of Generals – Higher Army Organisation. A5954 – 269/7. Recruitment for the Militia Forces – War Cabinet Agendum No. 259/1940 A5954 - 269/23 Transfers from C.M.F. To A.I.F. Advisory War Council Agendum No. 29/1943. A5954 – 274/13 Senior Cadet Training, War Cabinet Agendum 20/1943 A5954 – 276/1 War Cabinet Agendum No 31/1940 – Policy to be Adopted for the Future Training of the Militia. A5954 – 654/20 Service in Australia and New Guinea of AIF and CMF Formations (Infantry Brigades Only) Since Outbreak of War with Japan, December 1941 A5954 – 895/11 Senior Cadet Corps at Educational Establishments – Military Board Agendum No 100/1938. A5954 - 896/6 Department of Defence, Proposals for Raising a special force and improving the standard of militia training: Conference of A/C.G.S. and Militia Commanders with Minister – 16/8/39 and Cabinet Memorandum 22/8/1939. A5954 - 1630/1 Army – Policy Employment of AIF and CMF Units in New Guinea Campaign – representations to Prime Minister and report by Commander-in-Chief, Australian Military Forces – February 1944. A5954 – 1943/1 AIF and Militia. Question of Merging. Employment of Militia Outside Australia. Amendment of Defence Act. A6006 – 1938/11/18 Uniforms for Militia Forces A7101 – 15 . . List of officers (a) still in Territory (b) on Service (i) AIF & RAAF (ii) New Guinea Volunteer Reserve (iii)

223 Militia (c) Returned to Australia. MP 431/1 – 929/19/115 Military Forces, Recruiting Pay etc MP508/1 – 240/701/241 Establishment of Uniform Conditions of Service for Citizen Military Forces (Militia) and Australian Imperial Force. MP729/6 - 50/401/107 Military Board Memorandum on Immediate Military Requirements MP729/6 – 50/401/110 Home Training for the Militia MP74/1 – 275/1/43 Recruitment of Personnel for the Services. MP742/1 – 275/1/34 Service Obligations and Employment Abroad of Australian Regular Army Soldiers under 21 years old – Enlistment of Personnel in AIF at 18 years of age. SP109/3 - 308/52 Military Unified Command of South and South-West Pacific Areas and Speculation or Discussion Concerning this Subject. SP112/1 – 265/9/2 Inquiries re rates of pay 2nd AIF & Militia SP112/1 – 265/9/3 Military Inquiries through Victorian Group Committees - "Militia not Joining the AIF" SP112/1 – 265/17/5 Burdens imposed on Farmers because of Militia training and enlistment in the AIF

Newspapers/Journals

Australian Army Journal. Cairns Post. Camperdown Chronicle. Defence Force Journal. The Advertiser. The Argus. The Canberra Times. The Courier Mail. The Daily Telegraph.

224 The Mercury (Hobart). The Sydney Morning Herald. The West Australian.

Legislation

Defence Act 1903(Cth). Defence Act 1903(Cth) as amended by Defence Act 1909 (no. 15 of 1909). Militia Act 1854 (SA).

Thesis

Cohen, Eliot, Systems of Military Service: The Dilemmas of a Liberal-Democratic World Power, PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1982. Dean, Peter J., The Making of a General: Lost Years, Forgotten Battles – Lieutenant General Frank Berryman 1894-1941, PhD thesis, University of New South Wales, 2007. James, Karl, 'The final campaigns: Bougainville 1944-1945', PhD thesis, University of Wollongong, 2005. Millar, T.B., 'The History of the Defence Forces of the Port Phillip District and Colony of Victoria, 1836-1900', Master of Arts thesis, University of Melbourne, 1957. Moreman, John Clifford, 'A Triumph of Improvision: Australian Army operational logistics and the campaign in Papua, July 1942 to January 1943', PhD thesis, University College (Australian Defence Force Academy), University of New South Wales, 2000. Neumann, Claude, 'Australia's Citizen Soldiers, 1919-1939: A Study of Organization, Command, Recruiting, Training and Equipment', MA (Hons) thesis (UNSW at RMC

225 Duntroon), 1978. Pratten, Garth, '‘Under Rather Disturbing Circumstances’: The CMF in Melbourne’s Eastern Suburbs, 1921-1939', Bachelor of Arts Honours thesis, University of Melbourne, 1994. Wilcox, Craig, 'Australia’s Citizen Army, 1889-1914', PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1993. Wise, Nathan, 'A Working Man's Hell: Working class men's experiences with work in the Australian Imperial Force during the Great War', PhD thesis, University of New South Wales, 2007. Zwillenberg, H.J., 'Citizens and Soldiers: the Defence of South Australia 1836-1901', MA thesis, University of Adelaide, 1970.

Video/Audio/Speeches

Anzac: Australians at War in World War Two (featuring footage shot by official war photographers provided by the Australian War Memorial, Canberra), 2007. Interview between Sheridah Melvin and Madge Jones (nee Smith), 15 December 1986, Coffs Harbour Voice of Time Project, original recording held at Coffs Harbour City Library (copy in possession of author). John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, Radio Broadcast to the United States of America, 14 March 1942, http://john.curtin.edu.au/audio/00434.html, accessed 10 January 2011. 'Menzies Speech: Declaration of War (1939)', http://aso.gov.au/titles/spoken-word/menzies-speech-declaration-war/clip1/, 2011, accessed 8 January 2011. Speech by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, ‘Herbert Vere Evatt: Australia’s First Internationalist’, 31 August 1995, Melbourne, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/1995/gemanix.html, accessed 6 June 2010.

226 Speech made by Prime Minister Robert Menzies, 15 November 1939, as quoted in ‘Fact Sheet 162 – National Service and War, 1939-45’, National Archives of Australia, http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs162.aspx#section 1, unknown date, accessed 8 October 2010. Transcript of Speech by Dr Peter Londey, ‘Remembering 1942’, Australian War Memorial, Thursday 5 September 2002, accessed 8 July 2010. V-P Announcement in Prime Ministers of Australia: A Compilation of speeches and interviews, Screensound Australia, National Screen and Sound Collection, Canberra, 214438, segment No. 179490.

Websites

‘1st RNSWL’, Website of the Royal New South Wales Lancers – Lancer Barracks and Museum, http://www.lancers.org.au/site/1st_Light_Horse.asp, June 2010, accessed 15 June 2010. ‘2nd Australian Imperial Force’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_13201.asp, unknown date, accessed 14 April 2010. '2nd Imperial Force', Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_13201.asp, unknown date, accessed 4 June 2010. ‘27th Battalion (South Australian Scottish Regiment)’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_11950.asp, unknown date, accessed 14 May 2010. ‘7th Battalion (North West Murray Borderers)’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_11933.asp, unknown date, accessed 16 August 2010. ‘7th Division Cavalry Regiment’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_13636second_world_war.asp, unknown date, accessed 9 April 2010. ‘Anti-conscription manifesto’, John Curtin – Opposing Conscription in Victoria, http://john.curtin.edu.au/battles/victoria.html, unknown date, accessed 7

227 May 2010. ‘Australian Army Reserve’, Australian Reserve Forces Day Council, http://www.rfd.org.au/site/army_reserve.asp, 26 July 2010, accessed 9 August 2010. ‘Battle for Singapore’, Australian War Memorial, www.awm.gov.au/units/events_221.asp, unknown date, accessed 6 October 2010. ‘Battleground New Guinea and its Defenders’, Pacific War, http://www.pacificwar.org.au/KokodaCampaign/KokodaOverview2.html, unknown date, accessed 3 May 2010. Black, David, ‘Menzies and Curtin in World War Two’, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, http://john.curtin.edu.au/ww2leaders/print.html, unknown date, accessed 15 May 2010. Chen, C. Peter, 'Germany's Surrender': 7 May 1945', World War II Database, http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=152, 2004-2011, accessed 13 September 2010. Coakley, Robert W., ‘World War II: The War Against Japan’, American Military History – Army Historical Series, http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH/AMH-23.htm, 27 April 2001, accessed 14 June 2010. ‘Comparison of Australian Standard and Jungle Division Organisation WW2’, Digger History, http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/ww2/pages-2aif-cmf/ organisation-ww2.htm, 11 November 2002, accessed 6 May 2010. Crowley, F.K., ‘Forrest, Sir John (1847-1918)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/forrest-sir-john-6211/text10677, unknown date, accessed 19 November 2010). Cunneen, Chris, ‘Collins, Sir Robert Henry Muirhead (1852-1927)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/collins-sir-robert-henry-muirhead-541/text9 719, unknown date, accessed 1 November 2010.

228 Donovan, John, ‘Defenders of Australia: The Third Australian Division 1916-1991 by Albert Palazzo’, Army History Unit, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/Defenders_of_Australia.asp, 21 June 2010, accessed 4 October 2010. Dunstan, David, ‘Sir Norman Myer (1897-1956)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography Online, http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A150529b.htm, 2006, accessed 17 June 2010. ‘Fact Sheet 152 – Army and RAAF pay records held in Perth’, NAA, http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs152, August 2005, accessed 3 May 2010. ‘Fact Sheet 162 – National Service and War, 1939-1945’, National Archives of Australia, http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs162.aspx, unknown date, accessed 6 April 2010. ‘Fall of Singapore’, Australia’s War 1939-1945, http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/japadvance/singapore.html, unknown date, accessed 8 May 2010. ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, Digger History, http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-help/faq.htm, 11 November 2002, accessed 4 April 2010. ‘From Federation Through the World Wars: 1901-1945’, Army History Unit, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/docs/PART_2.pdf, unknown date, accessed 15 May 2010. 'Historical Background of the Territorial Army', The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's) - the Official Website, http://www.argylls.co.uk/history-of-the-regiment/militia-volunteers-and-terri torial-battalions/198-territorial-army, 2010, accessed 14 July 2012. ‘History of the Army Reserves’, http://www.raemensw.com/articles/Military/history_of_the_army_reserves.h tm, unknown date, accessed 6 July 2010). ‘History of the Army Reserves’, Australian Army – Director General of Reserves, http://www.army.gov.au/dgresa/History.asp, 11 December 2008, accessed 5 May 2010.

229 ‘History of the Navy, Army & Air Force Reserves’, Digger History, http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/other/reserves.htm, 11 November 2002, accessed 28 May 2010. ‘Home Guard’, History Learning Site, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/home_guard.htm, 2010, accessed 16 May 2010. Horner, David, 'High Command and the Kokoda Campaign', 2002 History Conference – Remembering 1942, www.awm.gov.au/events/conference/2002/horner.asp ‘Kokoda’, The Australians at War Film Archive, http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/campaigns/Kokoda.ht ml, unknown date, accessed 4 May 2010. 'Military Organisation and Structure’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/structure.army.asp, unknown date, accessed 2 July 2010. ‘Part 1: Colonial Security, the Sudan and the Boer War: 1788-1902’, http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/docs/PART_1.pdf, unknown date, accessed 20 April 2010. ‘Peace, War and Peacekeeping: 1945-2009’, Army History Unit, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/docs/PART_3.pdf, unknown date, accessed 4 September 2010. Pelvin, Richard, ‘Australian Pacific War Unit Histories’, Australia-Japan Research Project, http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/research-print/EB86CC357AC7F2268 52565B000499E75?OpenDocument, unknown date, accessed 28 April 2010. Private Frank John Partridge, VC’, Australian War Memorial – Fifty Australians, http://www.awm.gov.au/exhibitions/fiftyaustralias/37.asp, unknown date, accessed 7 July 2010. ‘Rail Transport and Australia’s War Effort’, Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/exhibitions/underattack/mobilise/rail.asp, unknown date, accessed 8 October 2010. Sproles, Noel and Yates, Alex , A Historical Study of Operational Command: A Resource for Researchers, Department of Defence,

230 http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/bitstream/1947/3811/1/DSTO-GD- 0430%20PR.pdf, 2005, accessed 18 June 2010. ‘The Homefront’, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, http://john.curtin.edu.au/manofpeace/homefront.html, unknown date, accessed 14 May 2010. ‘The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001 by Albert Palazzo’, Australian Army History Unit, http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/Australian_Army.asp, 30 November 2010, accessed 8 December 2010. ‘The Australian Army Reserve’, Defence Reserves Support, http://www.defencereserves.com/aspx/army.aspx, 2010, accessed 14 May 2010. ‘WW2 Overview’, WW2 Nominal Roll, http://www.ww2roll.gov.au/doc/overview.asp, 2002, accessed 7 July 2010. World War II Database, http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=13, 2004-2011, accessed 13 September 2010.

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