Regime Realism and Chinese Grand Strategy

By Hal Brands November 2020

Key Points

• The US-China contest is a clash of systems as much as a clash of interests. China is challenging American influence and America’s conception of what values an international order should embody. • China’s behavior is difficult to understand solely, or even primarily, through a “realist” lens. A paradigm of regime realism—one that combines an understanding of power and anarchy with an appreciation of ideology and the nature of a country’s government— offers greater insight. • The US-China contest is one for the long haul, even though its intensity will wax and wane over time. The United States cannot cease being a threat to the Chinese Communist Party without ceasing to be what it is—a democracy concerned with the fate of freedom around the world. And China cannot cease being hostile to the US-led international order without ceasing to be what it is—an autocratic regime whose strength masks pervasive insecurity.

Theories of international relations—and explana- century, Washington pursued a China policy meant tions of state behavior—rise and fall with the geo- to overcome the grimmest predictions of realism political tide. What we now call “realism” emerged by drawing China into the thriving, liberal world during and after World War II. The events of the order made possible by the Cold War’s end. That 1930s and 1940s had shown that the world was the opposite seems to have happened—that China rough and lawless and created an opening for an used the prosperity and influence gained through intellectual paradigm that emphasized the primacy economic integration to underwrite a policy of of power and the ruthlessness of geopolitics. The neo-totalitarianism at home and assertive expan- end of the Cold War, by contrast, dealt a sharp blow sion abroad—has upset more than the balance of to realism, by seeming to shatter its core premise. power. China would seem to be the country realists How, in a world ruled by power and self-interest, have been waiting for, one whose ambition and could a country as mighty as the Soviet Union penchant for geopolitical disruption rise inexorably simply acquiesce in its own decline and destruction? along with its power. The rise of China and the emergence of a sharp Thus, the administration of Donald Trump Sino-American competition are causing another described its National Security Strategy as a strategy swing of the intellectual pendulum. For a quarter of “principled realism”—a recognition that rivalry

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 1 is inevitable because states are driven to compete such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, back into the fold. by elemental antagonisms.1 Thucydides, considered A third goal includes reestablishing a sphere of the ancient founder of realism, is often invoked to semi-exclusive interest in China’s geopolitical explain how China’s rise has led inevitably to Sino- neighborhood, in which smaller countries defer to American hostility.2 Noted academic realists, some Beijing’s wishes and outside actors—namely, of whom accurately predicted that breathtaking America—are powerless to interfere. Finally, China Chinese growth would lead to trouble, have taken is seeking global influence as a means of weakening intellectual victory laps.3 If the post–Cold War era the US-led liberal order and, perhaps, constructing saw realism in eclipse, the era of great-power rivalry a Chinese-led order in its place. has seen realism’s revenge. That paradigm is increas- That China is pursuing this grand strategy rep- ingly the lens through which Chinese grand strategy resents a defeat of sorts for the strategy America and the Sino-America competition are interpreted. pursued after the Cold War. For a quarter century beginning in the 1990s, American policymakers sought to prevent exactly what has arisen today— a fierce competition for global leadership with an The United States doesn’t need a aggressive, authoritarian China—by drawing Beijing strategy of regime change vis-à-vis into the open, prosperous world taking shape around it. To be sure, they discouraged China from China. But it does need a sense of challenging the existing balance of power in the regime realism to understand the Asia-Pacific, by maintaining formidable military behavior of a potent rival. deployments and alliances in the region. But they also sought to make China a supporter of the US-led international order, by showing that membership The reality is not so simple. China’s unapologetic therein was the path to prosperity and influence. assertiveness and vaulting ambitions are, of course, More subversively, they hoped that economic inte- intimately related to the massive power shift under- gration would turn out to be a poisoned carrot—that way. The more brutish aspects of Chinese strategy as the Chinese economy grew and a middle class recall realist tenets going back to the dialogue at emerged, the pressure to liberalize politically would Melos. Yet the reason the Chinese challenge is so become irresistible. In retrospect, however, Chinese stark is that China blends the claims of a rising power leaders proved remarkably adept at exploiting the with the insecurities of an illiberal autocracy. The benefits of economic integration while limiting its nature of the regime, as much as the nature of the dangers and evading its shackles. international system, drives Beijing’s conduct. China used its entry into the global market to This dynamic, in turn, will make the competition power historic growth. Yet it simultaneously clamped between America and China more fundamental down on dissent to ensure that economic change and more protracted than it would be if it were did not open the door to political change, and it “merely” driven by realpolitik. The United States used unprecedented prosperity to buy a degree of doesn’t need a strategy of regime change vis-à-vis domestic legitimacy. As a result, China was able to China. But it does need a sense of regime realism to develop “comprehensive national power” without understand the behavior of a potent rival. making major political concessions. Rather than supporting the US-led international order, Beijing What China Wants used its surging power to blunt that order’s reach and begin challenging it in increasingly ambitious Today, China is pursuing a concentric circles grand ways—through a determined military buildup; a strategy, organized around four major ambitions. drive to build new international organizations and At the core is the eternal goal of the Chinese Com- capture the agendas of existing ones; an effort to munist Party (CCP)—preserving and strengthening seize the technological high ground of the 21st- the party’s power. A second goal is restoring national century economy; a multi-continent project to unity, by bringing wayward regions and provinces, spread Chinese economic, diplomatic, and perhaps

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 2 military influence far and wide; and other initiatives. realists believe, as the scholar Robert Gilpin wrote, Whereas 15 years ago China’s leaders assiduously that the “most important factor” in international disclaimed any intent to disrupt the international affairs is the “dynamics of power relations over status quo, now they have become far less embarrassed time.”9 Put simply, rising states inevitably want to about advertising Beijing’s ambitions.4 reshape the international system to their benefit— Xi Jinping has said that China seeks “Asia for to gain more wealth, prestige, and territory—and Asians” and intends to build “a future where we will this produces conflict with established powers. As win the initiative and have the dominant position.”5 Nicholas Spykman, the great realist scholar of the The “community of common destiny” he describes, mid-20th century, wrote, “The number of cases in writes Liza Tobin, would entail vast changes in which a strong dynamic state has stopped expanding how the world works. . . . or has set modest limits to its power aims has been very few indeed.”10 A global network of partnerships centered In fact, realists would have no trouble explaining on China would replace the U.S. system of many aspects of Chinese behavior. Realists would treaty alliances, the international community would regard Beijing’s authoritarian point out that China is hardly the only country in governance model as a superior alternative history to seek to translate growing power into a to Western electoral democracy, and the geographic sphere of influence and a global system world would credit the Communist Party defined on its terms; that is just what the United of China for developing a new path to States did during the 19th and 20th centuries. They peace, prosperity, and modernity that would note that surging economic powers, from other countries can follow.6 Athens to Imperial Germany, frequently turn money into military might. Other scholars have offered different versions of Likewise, many realists would argue that a rising what a Chinese-led order might entail. But a growing China was never going to become a responsible body of evidence shows that Beijing ultimately stakeholder in a US-led system, because doing so aims for global parity if not global primacy—that it would have required accepting arrangements— seeks an international environment in which such as Washington’s military presence and alliances norms, institutions, values, and power dynamics on China’s periphery and America’s protection of increasingly reflect Chinese preferences rather 7 Taiwan—that no great power would forever tolerate than American ones. Chinese grand strategy is once it had the capacity to change them. And realists now oriented toward a historic change in the balance would fully grasp why Chinese assertiveness has of power and the rules of the international road, seemed to peak at moments of American weakness, even if that means an undisguised competition such as in the aftermath of the 2008–09 financial with Washington. What is driving that behavior? crisis and more recently amid COVID-19.11 In all these ways, realists would correctly point out, Chinese What Realism Gets Right assertiveness and Sino-American antagonism are the oldest stories in the world. The answer favored by many realists is that China The tone of Chinese statecraft, which can be is simply doing what countless rising powers before brutally and unapologetically coercive, also seems it have done. Realism comes in many flavors, and straight out of the realist playbook. Realists believe realist scholars took widely divergent positions on 8 that when power speaks, considerations of law and China during the 1990s and 2000s. Yet that para- morality fall silent. Sure enough, Chinese diplomats digm is held together by a few key principles: that often talk and act in ways that seem taken directly the international system is anarchic and states must from the Melian Dialogue. When China’s foreign fend for themselves; that international relations minister told Southeast Asian nations in 2010 that thus tend toward conflict rather than harmony; “China is a big country and you are small countries, that states are (usually) rational actors that make and that is a fact,” he was echoing the Thucydidean decisions on the basis of pragmatic realpolitik; and dictum that the strong do what they will and the that considerations of power trump considerations weak do what they must.12 When Beijing simply of law, morality, and ideology. Most important,

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 3 ignored an international legal ruling that invalidated ideology, why are all of China’s friends authoritarian many of its claims in the South China Sea, when it states, and why does it so assiduously talk down walked away from international commitments to the value of liberal democracy while talking up the preserve Hong Kong’s autonomy, or when it effec- virtues of its own autocratic model? It certainly seems tively took Canadian citizens hostage to punish something else is going on here. Indeed, there is. that country’s government, it was sending the same message. To observe Chinese behavior is to What’s Chinese About Chinese Grand see some of the ugliest aspects of realism in action. Strategy? Finally, realism partially explains some of the fears and proclivities driving Chinese behavior. As If realism’s great strength is that it takes power realist scholars such as John Mearsheimer point seriously, its great weakness is that it doesn’t take out, China has no choice but to distrust the United much else seriously. Realism, particularly the States, because there is no guarantee, in an anar- structural variant that has dominated in recent chic world, that America will not turn its formidable decades, essentially views states as billiard balls— capabilities against Beijing.13 For the same reason, interchangeable units distinguishable only by the Chinese officials often saw their dealings, even the level of power they wield. It filters out all the other vibrant commercial relationship, with the United influences, such as culture, regime type, and history, States in zero-sum rather than positive-sum terms. that make states unique and drive their behavior. Chinese leaders, Aaron Friedberg writes, viewed One such influence is Chinese history—particularly the international economy (like any other aspect China’s up-and-down history as an imperial power. of foreign affairs) as an arena of competition and Howard French has argued, in effect, that we focused on acquiring the capabilities needed to shouldn’t see the challenge Beijing poses as “the thrive in a dangerous world.14 From a realist perspec- rise of China,” but rather as the “resurgence of tive, there is nothing shocking about this behavior. China,” for that is how many Chinese view it.17 The only shocking part is that it took American Well before America was ever a great power, China officials so long to realize what China was up to. was an imperial power that controlled far-flung It has thus become common to see Chinese lands and commanded deference from its neighbors. leaders as consummate practitioners of realpolitik— It used a mixture of attraction and coercion to shrewd, calculating statesmen who see the world enforce its writ, which it considered, immodestly, as it really is. When he is in China, one of the world’s to be “all under heaven.” China then went through most prominent realists likes to say, he is among its “century of humiliation” at the hands of the his people: CCP officials and American realists West and Japan. share a common strategic mindset even if they lack It is possible to make too much of these stylized a common tongue.15 Yet realism only gets one so historical narratives. But when Xi talks about achiev- far in understanding Chinese behavior. ing a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, invokes If states are rational actors, why has China the idea of a “community of common destiny”18 seemed determined to make as many enemies as that is global in scope, and speaks of re-creating a possible since early 2020—by practicing abrasive, world in which China receives the respect and con- “wolf-warrior” diplomacy; angrily coercing countries sideration it is due, he is channeling something deeply that displease it; and picking fights with multiple rooted in Chinese strategic culture—a belief that a nations at once?16 Why has it so thoroughly alienated larger role in the world is part of China’s historical countries such as the United Kingdom, which inheritance, not simply a result of its growing power. seemed to be slipping into its grasp, and Canada, A second influence is Confucianism. While it is which was desperate as of 2018 to improve relations easy to fall into simplistic analysis here, elements with China to lessen its dependence on the United of Confucian thought certainly loom large in Chinese States? Why has China chosen to so openly advertise strategic culture. Confucianism places a high value its global ambitions, when doing so was certain to on deference to authority, a natural hierarchy, and bring greater resistance from Washington and oth- the idea that a harmonious society is an ordered ers? And if realism doesn’t much concern itself with society. It emphasizes the idea that wise leaders

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 4 command respect not simply through the power of can be summarized with one message: ensuring the their arms but the power of their example. It is leading role of the Communist Party in all aspects hard not to see the Confucian legacy at work when of life.”22 Sure enough, the authoritarian nature of Chinese leaders demand deference from smaller the Chinese system profoundly influences Beijing’s nations, react so angrily to perceived slights from behavior and relations with Washington. “lesser” powers, and argue that China’s history and culture give it a privileged claim to international The Authoritarian Impulse and Chinese leadership.19 Grand Strategy

For one thing, the nature of the regime—just as much as the nature of the international system— The authoritarian nature of the Chi- drives Chinese fear and hostility toward the United nese system profoundly influences States. The problem, from the CCP’s view, is not simply that America is a very powerful country. It Beijing’s behavior and relations with is that America is a very powerful democracy. Chinese Washington. leaders worry, not without reason, that US leaders will never view them as fully legitimate. They have long alleged (wrongly) that Washington is scheming Third, and most important, China is not just any to overthrow the CCP, whether by seeking to state; it is a Leninist party state. Marxism may have empower dissidents and separatists or (rightly) by left the building decades ago, but Leninism—the trying to seduce Beijing with a strategy of “peaceful idea of a vanguard party whose fate is inextricably evolution.” Even workaday aspects of US civil society tied to the flourishing of the state and the citi- are potentially deadly to the Chinese regime: Beijing zenry, that tolerates no threats to its control and howled in protest after US-based news organizations leadership, and that is engaged in a constant strug- revealed pervasive corruption within the ruling elite gle against “subversive” elements and their foreign several years ago.23 As one Chinese leader recently sponsors—remains pervasive. Such a regime can said, it is clear to Beijing that the “U.S. has never never feel secure in its own rule because it does not given up its intent to overthrow the socialist system.”24 derive its authority from the freely given consent of The ideological gulf between Beijing and Washington the governed; it can never feel safe in a liberal world makes it impossible for China ever to feel fully order because liberal norms subvert the authoritar- secure in that relationship—and thus makes a degree ian ethos it uses to govern at home. Such a country of conflict, whether latent or overt, inevitable. will have particularly sharp conflicts with democratic Second, the nature of the regime is a powerful great powers, not just on the basis of divergent driver of Chinese behavior in its geopolitical neigh- interests, but on the basis of divergent views of borhood. Yes, even rising democracies have sought what makes a government legitimate.20 spheres of influence. But the United States did this, As Robert Zoellick remarked in a little-noticed in part, because it worried that having other forms portion of his famous “responsible stakeholder” of government—first monarchy, then fascism, then speech in 2005, not even shared interests could Communism—near its frontiers was inherently dan- sustain the US-China relationship over time if a gerous. Beijing has a similar calculation today. One gulf in fundamental political values persisted.21 reason Beijing wants preponderant influence along This was one point the advocates of engagement its periphery is to protect itself from potential “ide- got right. Regime security is an all-encompassing ological contagion” transmitted by nearby demo- obsession of autocratic rulers, because the penalties cratic states, reduce the odds that its neighbors will for failing to secure the regime are so high. The support anti-regime forces in China, and make it CCP desires global influence for “normal” reasons less likely that regional states will participate in of geopolitics and prestige—and because that campaigns to punish or isolate Beijing for repressing strength will help fortify the regime at home. As its own population. The farther away liberal influ- one Chinese official stated in 2017, “All President ences can be kept from China’s frontiers, the more Xi Jinping’s key speeches over the past five years

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 5 secure Beijing’s rulers will be. China’s vision of a the world, to support pro-democracy forces “harmonious Asia,” Timothy Heath writes, features there.28 In one sense, this behavior is a testament a “political order shaped by Chinese political prin- to China’s growing power to affect what is said ciples.”25 about it in countries around the world. But only an authoritarian regime would find it necessary to so aggressively police what is said about it overseas. Fifth, although the CCP is not the Communist If the United States naturally aligns Party of the Soviet Union, Beijing is holding up its with democracies because they own authoritarian system as a model for other countries while seeking to tarnish the prestige and share common values and interests, impair the functioning of democracies. In his land- China naturally aligns with tyrants mark speech to the Communist Party Congress in who share its fear of liberalism at 2017, notes one author, Xi “left no doubt that he regards China’s illiberal concepts of political and home and abroad. economic order as superior to so-called Western models, and that he seeks to export ‘Chinese wisdoms’ to the world as a ‘contribution to mankind.’”29 Third, China is not simply trying to build any sort Bei- jing has increasingly sought to export parts of its of global order; it is trying to build a global order in model to the world, by providing expertise and sur- which authoritarian forms of government are pro- veillance tools to leaders—in countries from tected and even privileged. This is the through line in China’s efforts to protect fragile authoritarian Southeast Asia to Sub-Saharan Africa—who hope regimes from Southeast Asia to Venezuela, strengthen to emulate the Chinese combination of a robust, authoritarian rulers by providing them with the moderately open economy and a closed, strictly controlled polity. Meanwhile, China is undermining tools and techniques of repression, alter international understandings of human rights and good democracy in countries from Australia to Europe to governance, create global internet norms that re- America, through influence operations, corruption, flect authoritarian proclivities, and many other in- economic coercion, and other means; CCP propa- itiatives.26 China is not the Soviet Union; it does gandists depict America and other democratic systems as corrupt, unjust, and lawless. It is entirely normal not have a messianic ideological compulsion to for rising powers to tout the virtues of their own spread its form of government to the end of the political system while seeking to highlight or even earth. But the CCP cannot feel safe in a world in exploit the weaknesses of their rival’s system. Yet which democratic norms are prevalent, so a world if China were not a rising authoritarian state, this where China is more influential will inevitably have a more illiberal, authoritarian cast. aspect of its strategy would surely be muted or even nonexistent. Fourth, regime type is essential to understanding Sixth, regime type influences China’s choice of a related aspect of Chinese grand strategy—its hyper- partners. China has good geopolitical reason to sensitivity to, and concerted efforts to stifle, criti- align with countries such as Russia: Both are in the cism from abroad. In recent years, China has crosshairs of American power. But there is also waged an audacious campaign meant to limit free speech on the global stage. It has sought to prevent some ideological affinity here, because both are deeply autocratic states trying to survive and thrive criticism of its human rights record and its foreign in a world still led by a democratic superpower. In policies, punish public and private entities that refer fact, many forms of Chinese-Russian cooperation— to Taiwan as a country, and otherwise regulate dis- suppressing “subversive” movements in Central Asia course even within democratic societies. Beijing and sharing best practices on internet management— has used the varied tools of statecraft, such as diplomatic pressure, economic coercion, and legal are explicitly authoritarian in nature. And when Russian and Chinese leaders discuss their fears of sanctions, to enforce its writ.27 The new Hong Kong the United States, America’s liberal impulse always security law takes this approach to an outrageous features prominently. “At a state level,” writes James extreme, making it illegal for anyone, anywhere in

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 6 Palmer, “authoritarianism seems to be the best glue system. That grand strategy is also deeply condi- of Sino-Russian friendship.”30 If the United States tioned by specific Chinese characteristics—above naturally aligns with democracies because they share all, the character of the CCP. If we want to under- common values and interests, China naturally aligns stand why China is so uncomfortable in an America- with tyrants who share its fear of liberalism at home led order, what it is seeking in the world, why it and abroad. behaves so abrasively, and why it aligns with certain Finally, authoritarianism is central to understanding states and not others, an understanding of regime one of the outstanding features of Chinese policy: type is essential. A paradigm of regime realism— the penchant for imperiousness and unembarrassed one that combines an understanding of power and bullying. Political scientists have theorized, and anarchy with an appreciation of ideology and the historians have shown, that democratic countries nature of a country’s government—offers the are better at managing alliance relations, because greatest explanatory insight. the habits of compromise and tolerance they practice Because understanding Chinese grand strategy at home spill over into their foreign relations.31 is so central to making American grand strategy, Conversely, the fact that the Chinese regime does there are also implications for the United States. not have to brook any disrespect or disobedience First, and most important, the prospects for any at home makes it feel that it need not suffer such sort of lasting détente, let alone a grand bargain, calumnies abroad. between Washington and Beijing are limited. Those This is surely one of the key reasons China has prospects are limited not simply by clashing geo- been so quick to lash out with wolf-warrior diplomacy, political interests but also by a vast gulf of political economic sanctions, and even hostage taking when values. The United States cannot cease being a democratic countries displease it—when the more threat to the CCP without ceasing to be what it is— “realistic” course might be to keep a lower profile a democracy concerned with the fate of freedom and focus on winning over friends that America is around the world. And China cannot cease being alienating. This helps explain why Chinese officials hostile to the US-led international order without are so willing to speak the language of raw power ceasing to be what it is—an autocratic regime in explaining their demands of smaller countries, whose strength masks pervasive insecurity.32 because raw power allows the regime to get its way The US-China contest is thus one for the long at home. And this may well be why Beijing has haul. It could be a twilight struggle every bit as seemed almost unable to avoid alienating so many challenging and protracted as the Cold War was, countries (particularly democracies) amid the current even though its intensity will wax and wane over pandemic. In other words, there is more than realism time. This is not to say that America should be at work in Beijing’s penchant for brutality: The working, in the near term, for regime change in more self-defeating aspects of Chinese diplomacy— China, a policy that would probably fail and might the tactics that encourage submission at home but well provoke an unwelcome Chinese response. Yet encourage anger and resistance abroad—may well Americans simply need to realize that the compe- be rooted in the habits of an autocratic regime. tition may not end until the nature of the Chinese regime changes significantly or Chinese power Toward Regime Realism ebbs to such an extent that Beijing can no longer pose such a severe threat to the United States and Realism goes a fair distance in explaining Chinese the world it has built. That is a depressing diagnosis, grand strategy, but not nearly far enough. The value no doubt, but it is less dangerous than clinging to of realism is that it recognizes that power and self- the illusion that some lasting settlement is just over interest inevitably shape state behavior. But it ignores the horizon. that how countries define their self-interest and Second, American officials need to understand use their power are profoundly influenced by char- that the US-China competition is a contest of systems acteristics that realism largely excludes. Today, as much as a contest of power. China is challenging China’s grand strategy is only partially what one American influence in key theaters around the would expect from any rising state in an anarchic

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 7 world. But it is also challenging America’s concep- that these efforts are unlikely to bring about dramatic tion of what values an international order should em- change anytime soon. body and what sort of domestic arrangements an in- Such prescriptions are typically anathema to adher- ternational order should support. The response to ents of realpolitik, who view them as distractions China’s challenge must thus involve efforts to from the core issues of geopolitical maneuvering shore up American values and power. That means and state-to-state diplomacy. Yet they will matter rejuvenating American democracy at home, sup- enormously in determining whether China succeeds porting democratic forces in the world, and exposing in pushing the world in a fundamentally more the weaknesses and abuses of China’s authoritarian authoritarian direction. When facing a challenge that model.33 It may also mean finding ways of supporting is heavily rooted in the nature of an authoritarian Chinese citizens who favor the emergence of a more regime, a purely “realist” response isn’t realistic at all. humane, inclusive system while understanding

About the Author

Hal Brands is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies US foreign policy and defense strategy, and the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He also writes a column for Bloomberg Opinion and is the author of several books on US foreign policy and international affairs. Notes

1. White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 2. Graham Allison, Destined for War? Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides’ Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). 3. John Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?,” National Interest, October 25, 2014, https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ can-china-rise-peacefully-10204. 4. For a good summary, see Aaron Friedberg, “Competing with China,” Survival 60, no. 3 (2018): 7–64. 5. See Hal Brands, “What Does China Really Want? To Dominate the World,” Bloomberg, May 20, 2020, https://www. bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-05-20/xi-jinping-makes-clear-that-china-s-goal-is-to-dominate-the-world; and Hal Brands and Charles Edel, “The Disharmony of the Spheres,” Commentary, January 2018, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/ hal-brands/the-disharmony-of-the-spheres/. 6. Liza Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance,” Texas National Security Review, November 2018, https://tnsr. org/2018/11/xis-vision-for-transforming-global-governance-a-strategic-challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/. 7. See also Nadège Rolland, China’s Vision for a New World Order (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020). 8. For relatively sanguine views, see Thomas Christenen, “Fostering Stability of Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy Toward East Asia,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006/07): 81–126; and Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 80–91. 9. Quoted in Jonathan Kirshner, “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China,” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (2010): 53–75. 10. See Nicholas Spyman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1942), 20–22. 11. For example, Aaron Friedberg, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness,” Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2015): 133–50. 12. Quoted in Tom Mitchell, “China Struggles to Win Friends over South China Sea,” Financial Times, July 13, 2016. 13. See John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2014). 14. Friedberg, “Competing with China.” 15. John Mearsheimer made this point at a conference we both attended at Yale University in 2017. 16. See Richard Fontaine, “China Has Squandered Its First Great Opportunity,” Atlantic, July 30, 2020, https://www.theatlantic. com/ideas/archive/2020/07/china-has-squandered-its-first-great-opportunity/614647/. 17. Howard French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (New York: Norton, 2017). 18. Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance.”

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 8 19. For one consideration of this issue, see Shaohua Hu, “Confucianism and Contemporary Chinese Politics,” Politics and Policy 35, no. 1 (2007): 136–53. For a somewhat different perspective, see Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 20. See Hal Brands, “Democracy vs Authoritarianism: How Ideology Shapes Great-Power Conflict,” Survival 60, no. 5 (2018): 61– 114. Parts of the following section draw on this paper. See also Tarun Chhabra, “The China Challenge, Democracy, and U.S. Grand Strategy,” Brookings Institution, February 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-china-challenge-democracy-and-u-s- grand-strategy/. 21. Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?,” US Department of State, September 21, 2005, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. 22. See South China Morning Post, “The ‘One Simple Message’ in Xi Jinping’s Five Years of Epic Speeches,” November 2, 2017; and Elizabeth Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 23. See William Wan, “China Blocks New York Times Web Site After Report on Leader’s Wealth,” Washington Post, October 26, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-blocks-new-york-times-web-site-after-report-on-leaders-wealth/ 2012/10/25/a94707a8-1f02-11e2-ba31-3083ca97c314_story.html. 24. Fu Ying, “After the Pandemic, Then What?,” China-US Focus, June 28, 2020, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/ after-the-pandemic-then-what. 25. Timothy Heath, “What Does China Want? Discerning the PRC’s National Strategy,” Asian Security 8, no. 1 (2012): 54–72. 26. See Brands, “Democracy vs Authoritarianism”; and Economy, The Third Revolution. 27. Hal Brands, “How Far Will China’s Surveillance State Stretch?,” Bloomberg, August 12, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/ opinion/articles/2020-08-12/how-far-will-china-s-surveillance-state-stretch. 28. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “With New Security Law, China Outlaws Global Activism,” Axios, July 7, 2020, https://www.axios. com/china-hong-kong-law-global-activism-ff1ea6d1-0589-4a71-a462-eda5bea3f78f.html. 29. Thorsten Benner et al., Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China’s Growing Political Influence in Europe, Global Public Policy Institute and Mercator Institute for China Studies, February 2, 2018, 7, https://merics.org/en/report/authoritarian-advance- responding-chinas-growing-political-influence-europe. 30. James Palmer, “The Great Authoritarian Kinship,” Foreign Policy, January 20, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/20/china- russia-authoritarian-kinship-xi-putin-ambition-insecurity/; and Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010). 31. See G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 32. Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Eberstadt, “China, Unquarantined,” National Review, June 4, 2020, https://www.nationalreview. com/magazine/2020/06/22/our-disastrous-engagement-of-china/. 33. See Hal Brands and Toshi Yoshihara, “How to Wage Political Warfare,” National Interest, December 16, 2018, https:// nationalinterest.org/feature/how-wage-political-warfare-38802.

The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s).

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