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China's Military Hawks Go on the Offensive

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China's Military Hawks Go on the Offensive CHINA HAWKS FIGHTING FISHERMEN: A flotilla of Chinese fishing boats steams towards the East China Sea and a group of uninhabited islands that Japan and China both claim. REUTERS/ strINGER As China’s new Communist Party leaders take power, they face a more outspoken military brass. China’s military hawks go on the offensive BY DAVID LAGUE HONG KONG, JANUARY 17 , 2013 SPECIAL REPORT 1 CHINA HAWKS MILITARY BRASS GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE t was supposed to be a relaxed evening for a group of senior international mili- Itary chiefs. Gathered at Melbourne’s Crown Casino, they had changed out of uniform for dinner and discussion. China’s Lieutenant-General Ren Haiquan took the podium in a room over- looking the Yarra River last Oct. 29 and began diplomatically enough. But as he neared the end of his speech, he went on the offensive. “Some people” had ignored the outcome of World War Two and were challenging the post-war order, he told counterparts from 15 other nations. It was a pointed reference to Japan’s claim over islands in the East China Sea that Beijing insists are Chinese. “One should never forget history and (should) learn from history,” Ren said, ac- cording to a copy of his speech. “Flames of the war ignited by fascist countries engulfed GRUFF COMMENTATOR: Retired army Major General Luo Yuan has proposed sending a fleet of the whole region, and many places, includ- fishing boats to uninhabited islands that China and Japan claim to fight a “people’s war at sea”.. ing Darwin in Australia, were bombed.” REUTERS/STRINGER In a jarring coincidence, say officers in the audience, fireballs belched into the sky as he spoke, part of the casino’s hourly fire- There appears to be a most-outspoken generals are military aca- works display. discord between this peaceful demics or theorists. Visibly displeased at the dig, the senior rise language and the comments Foreign military analysts are uncertain if Japanese officer present, army Lieutenant from senior PLA officers. the hawks represent a majority opinion in General Yoshiaki Nakagawa, left with his the 2.3 million-strong military or exercise fellow officers as soon as the speeches con- Li Nan real influence over foreign policy. It is also cluded, people in the audience said. analyst at the United States Naval War College unclear if operational commanders share the Neither Ren nor Nakagawa were avail- views of these so-called “activist officers.” able for comment. moment. The more provocative of these of- However, there is one generally agreed ficers call for “short, sharp wars” to assert explanation for their prominence: The PLA “KILL A CHICKEN” China’s sovereignty. Others urge Beijing to now has something to talk about. The mili- Ren’s provocative dinner talk was no isolated “strike first”, “prepare for conflict” or “kill a tary budget has soared to almost $200 bil- outburst. His message was typical of the in- chicken to scare the monkeys”. lion, according to some Western estimates creasingly hawkish rhetoric coming from se- They routinely denounce the Obama - the world’s second-highest military bud- nior officers in the People’s Liberation Army. administration’s recent “pivot” to Asia - get behind the United States. That money At issue these days are the disputed is- without naming the United States, Ren has paid for the warships, strike aircraft and lands known as the Diaoyu (in China) or in his Melbourne speech accused “external missiles allowing the PLA to plan for dis- Senkaku (in Japan) and a string of islets in countries” of complicating disputes in Asia. tant conflict. For the first time in its mod- the South China that China is contesting In a political system where civilian of- ern history, China has the firepower to con- with various Southeast Asian nations. ficials hew to tightly scripted public po- test control of disputed territory far from its But the combative streak speaks to pro- sitions, these uniformed pundits, both coastal waters. found shifts in Chinese politics and for- serving and retired, appear free to go well Over the same period, China has eign policy that transcend the heat of the beyond the official line. Almost all of the emerged from decades of isolation to SPECIAL REPORT 2 CHINA HAWKS MILITARY BRASS GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE become a powerful trading nation with a For anxious neighbours, though, the that it highly regards Japan’s history as a complex global web of commercial and dip- tough talk backed up with firepower deliv- peaceful nation for more than 60 years after lomatic ties. That means military planners ered over a three-decade military buildup, the war,” the official said. are increasingly concerned with security of is sending an unnerving signal that a rising Japan’s Defence Ministry has flagged sea lanes - particularly in the South China China may be ready to use force. It also con- the Chinese armed forces’ growing role in Sea - that carry manufactured exports and flicts with repeated assurances of a “peaceful shaping foreign policy as a security risk. imports of vital energy and raw materials. rise” from the civilian leadership in Beijing. in its annual defence white paper last July, “Until quite recently, China didn’t have “There appears to be a discord between Tokyo said some believe relations between a lot of overseas interests,” said Li Nan, this peaceful rise language and the com- the PLA and the Communist Party leader- an analyst of the Chinese military at the ments from senior PLA officers,” said Li of ship were “getting complex”. The degree of United States Naval War College. “It didn’t the U.S. Naval War College. “There is no military influence on foreign policy deci- get involved in foreign-policy crises.” doubt about that.” sions could possibly be changing, the paper A Japanese Foreign Ministry official, said, adding: “The situation calls for atten- “PEACEFUL RISE” noting Lt-Gen Ren’s remarks in Melbourne tion as a risk management issue.” For some Chinese foreign policy research- and similar comments from China, stressed STRONG NATIONALIST ers, the emergence of the hawks is part of Japan’s own peaceful rise from the ashes of Beijing’s “good cop–bad cop” strategy to World War Two. The relationship will be closely watched influence diplomatic negotiations over the “China itself clearly stated in the Japan- as China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, begins disputed territory. China joint statement, issued in May 2008, to stamp his authority on the Communist Party and the military. Xi, the “prince- ling” son of late party leader, military Claims on the South China Sea commander and economic reformer Xi Six Southeast Asian nations and China contest all or parts of the Spratlys Zhongxun, has clearly signaled he will be a and Paracel islands in the South China Sea strong nationalist. His first speeches after taking power in November had a strong Paracel Spratly Claimed Oil/gas patriotic flavour, with appeals for a “renais- Islands Islands territory fields sance” of the Chinese nation. As chairman of the Central Military BRUNEI PHILIPPINES CHINA Commission and head of the party, Xi takes command of the PLA after years of cementing close ties with influential se- nior officers. One of his jobs after graduation from university was personal secretary to Geng Biao, a revolutionary military commander who became defence minister after the Cultural Revolution. TAIWAN MALAYSIA VIETNAM Xi is close to two influential and outspo- ken officers who like him are themselves princelings, or offspring of senior leaders: army general Liu Yuan, and air force gen- eral Liu Yazhou. (The two are not related.) Xi can even be said to be married to the military. His wife, celebrity folk singer Peng Liyuan, is a civilian member of the PLA, holding a rank equivalent to major general. Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of State, Some analysts say Xi’s family background Middlebury College, National Geographic and his own experience will enable him to SPECIAL REPORT 3 CHINA HAWKS MILITARY BRASS GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE exert more control over the PLA than his new warships, tanks, missiles and strike air- argued a short, decisive war, like China’s predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. craft now entering service with the PLA. 1962 border clash with India, would deliver “Xi has nothing to prove to the military,” The impact of these new weapons is end- long-term peace. He also said Washington said former Australian Prime Minister Kevin lessly analyzed, particularly in scenarios would not risk war with China over these Rudd, a Mandarin speaking ex-diplomat who where China is at war with the United territorial spats. has held talks with the new Chinese leader on States and its regional allies. “Since we have decided that the U.S. is several occasions. “There is no reason for him For retired officers on modest PLA pen- bluffing in the East China Sea, we should to overcompensate for them.” sions, this market for commentary and anal- take this opportunity to respond to these While it is too early to say if Xi will en- ysis provides extra income and the gratifica- empty provocations with something real,” courage or tolerate his outspoken generals, tion of a high profile in the media, Chinese he wrote in an Aug. 28 commentary pub- political analysts agree the hawks can be si- military experts say. And, serving officers can lished in the Chinese-language edition of lenced when it suits the political leadership. advance their careers if their views strike a the Global Times, a nationalistic tabloid When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited chord with the military hierarchy.
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