Korea Economic Institute of America ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES July 22, 2015 Deciphering PLA Media Commentaries on North Korea: Going Rogue or Staying on Script By Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga Abstract Introduction As one of the most opaque actors at the center of China’s policy In December 2014, Lieutenant General Wang Hongguang, the toward North Korea, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reveals former deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region, wrote few official public details on its views of North Korea and their an article for the state-run Global Times saying “it is unnecessary nearly 60-year-old alliance. Yet as the Chinese government for China to sacrifice its own interests for those of the DPRK… allows greater debate on North Korea policy in the mainstream China has cleaned up the DPRK’s mess too many times… but 1 Chinese media, some of the most prominent voices are those of doesn’t have to do that in the future.” He concluded that North PLA commentators. Compromised mostly of PLA academics who Korea has “harmed China’s fundamental interests.” This article serve ultimately as propaganda artists, these “talking heads” caught the attention of Western officials and analysts as a rare public criticism of North Korea by the People’s Liberation Army or “hawks” serve to shape domestic public opinion and offer (PLA), but in reality, Lt. General Wang had already been writing Beijing plausible deniability for signaling intentions and resolve critically of North Korea in the mainstream Chinese media for over to foreign governments during periods of tensions related to the a year. Moreover, his voice is just one of many from PLA experts Korean Peninsula. These commentators provide a window into with a diverse array of opinions in the Chinese press, providing a PLA thinking on North Korea, but analysis is complicated by mixed wealth of source material to analyze PLA views of North Korea. messages and potentially misinterpreted signals. While isolated articles often lack authoritativeness without being placed in Lt. General Wang’s broadsides against North Korea come as Chinese the proper context of the larger strategic environment and PLA President Xi Jinping has overseen a noticeably chilled political relationship with Pyongyang following the North’s third nuclear actions, long-term trends in PLA commentators’ writings, such as test in February 2013. The Chinese government has permitted an the emergence of Lt. General Wang Hongguang’s critical narrative, increasingly open public debate since the last nuclear test, and can reflect shifts in official Chinese thinking about North Korea and PLA commentators have been an active part of this discussion, may better capture changing dynamics behind the scenes. Since along with Chinese academics and think tank experts.2 these PLA commentators have little impact on China’s overall policy toward North Korea, U.S. and South Korean analysts should This paper addresses five core questions, with a focus on be wary of overemphasizing these writings and push to engage commentary following the 2013 nuclear test. First, what do PLA- more authoritative PLA officials for future discussions of North affiliated commentators say in the mainstream Chinese press? Second, are these articles and statements authoritative for the Korea-related issues. PLA’s views and thinking on North Korea issues? Third, how do Key words: China-North Korea relations, Chinese foreign policy, public comments compare to private PLA discussions about North Korea, People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Chinese media North Korea? Fourth, what does this mean for China’s North Mr. Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga is the former Editor of the China Brief journal at The Jamestown Foundation. Korea Economic Institute of America This paper is the seventy-fifth in KEI’s Academic Paper Series. As part of this program, KEI commissions and distributes 1800 K Street, NW Suite 1010 approximately ten papers per year on original subjects of current interest to over 5,000 Korea watchers, government officials, think tank experts, and scholars around the United States and the world. At the end of the year, these papers Washington, DC 20006 are compiled and published in KEI’s On Korea volume. www.keia.org For more information, please visit www.keia.org/aps_on_korea. Deciphering PLA Media Commentaries on North Korea 1 ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES Korea policy? Lastly, how can this inform U.S. and South Korean This leaves the PLA as a wild card in better understanding policy decision-makers in their interactions with the Chinese China’s policy toward North Korea. Its central role in North Korea government, and specifically the Chinese military, on North affairs, especially security issues—not only for the nuclear and Korea issues? missile programs that alarm the international community, but While there is a wealth of PLA commentary on North Korea that also collapse scenarios that ossify Chinese thinking on North is largely unexplored by Western analysts, its utility for policy Korea—means the PLA’s views of the North are a critical factor makers in Washington, Seoul and beyond is evident only in the for foreign analysts to consider. Despite the general fanfare given context of broader PLA policy trends. PLA commentators provide to the relationship between the PLA and North Korea’s Korean an important window into better understanding PLA views of People’s Army (KPA), the reality has long been characterized by 6 North Korea, but with the important caveat that many of these an indecisive outlook and hesitant cooperation from Beijing. commentators are, though not reading a script, able to maintain Writing on the status of the military ties between Beijing and a high-profile persona because they are keenly aware of their Pyongyang, Andrew Scobell and Mark Cozad concluded that boundaries. They do not function as “agenda-setters” but rather despite the binding mutual defense treaty from 1961, “there project the view of events that the PLA would like Chinese and does not appear to be any real defense coordination mechanism foreign audiences to see. Thus, PLA commentary on North nor do the terms of the treaty ever seem to have been invoked,” Korea serves to shape Chinese public opinion by educating the as there are no known PLA-KPA multilateral exercises and a 7 audience according to the PLA’s worldview, while also signaling general “absence of robust mil-mil ties.” In his history of PLA PLA intentions on North Korea issues. views of North Korea, John J. Tkacik Jr. illustrates that even the founding moment of their bond, the new Chinese military leadership’s decision to enter the Korean War, was marked by Narrowing the Lens: The PLA and North Korea heavy resistance.8 The “general consensus among the Chinese As North Korea’s treaty ally and most important supporter, Politburo in September and October 1950 was against Chinese China will play a crucial role in the future of the Korean participation in the war […] it is now clear that Mao was in a Peninsula. Those involved in the region must understand distinct minority if he truly considered Korea to be of dramatic 9 Beijing’s policy and, therefore, the bureaucratic actors who strategic importance to China.” Discussing PLA-KPA cooperation shape it. Although foreign policy decision-making authority during the Korean War, You Ji states the “general feelings of PLA 10,11 has become increasingly centralized under President Xi, commanders were that North’s forces were not reliable [sic].” several bureaucratic stakeholders still wield influence over the As one European scholar noted, despite this tension between direction of China’s policy toward Pyongyang. The Politburo the two militaries, it is important to understand that the PLA is Standing Committee (PBSC), China’s top decision-making body, the most sympathetic Chinese actor to North Korea’s nuclear is the final arbiter on policy, with President Xi first among program, as its own nuclear program was also originally viewed the other six increasingly unimportant equals. The PBSC is as necessary for state survival. advised on policy by the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), currently managed by State Councilor Yang Jiechi, with an undetermined role played by the recently created Understanding the PLA in Chinese Media: National Security Commission (NSC).3 Below this top tier, the What Do We Already Know? International Liaison Department (ILD), the People’s Liberation There is little preexisting research on the PLA’s public commentary Army (PLA), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) are the on North Korea. The most important study on PLA views of North primary stakeholders in policy decision-making, in ranking Korea was published in 2006,12 before the North’s first nuclear order.4 While the ILD is the most important, there are rarely test, attacks on South Korea in 2010, and hereditary succession to any public statements or discussions that provide insight into Kim Jong-un in 2011—all events that undoubtedly gave Chinese ILD views of North Korea. And although the MFA is by far the leaders pause to reconsider the North’s strategic value to China. most transparent by virtue of its press briefings and affiliated Nevertheless, Tkacik already found that “there is certainly much think tank, the China Institute for International Studies (CIIS), it skepticism about the value of keeping company with the North is also by far the weakest actor of the three.5 Koreans among China’s nonintelligence military analysts.”13 2 ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES Yet he noted, “just what exactly the PLA thinks about North Korea One such internally focused expert is Wang Yisheng, who appears is a mystery to outside observers.”14 This study is one attempt to to publish nearly exclusively in PLA and MFA academic journals fill that gap and update this research.