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SOCIAL CHANGE voluntary associations, communities, and social out, ‘‘is that it provides a credible point of entry for networks that maintain high levels of solidarity sociopolitical issues into a comprehensive multi- often do so by excluding outsiders. Thus, noninsiders and interdisciplinary approach to some of the are disadvantaged within those groups. Addition- most pressing issues of our time.’’ Social capi- ally, high social capital is contingent on a high tal may be seen as a common theoretical lan- degree of conformity within the group, and non- guage that can allow historians, political scientists, conformists can be ostracized. This greatly im- anthropologists, economists, sociologists, and pinges on personal freedom and expression. It policymakers to work together in an open and also can result in a great deal of power for those in constructive manner. positions in the group. Mafia-type power structures are an example of this. REFERENCES Tight social networks also can undermine entre- Baron, James, and Michael Hannan 1994 ‘‘The Impact preneurial activity. Successful business owners of- of Economics on Contemporary .’’ Journal ten are expected to help others, and this can affect of Economic Literature, 32:1111–1146. their ability to maintain their businesses. Portes Bourdieu, Pierre 1986 ‘‘The Forms of Capital.’’ In John and Landolt (1996) identify further ‘‘downward G. Richardson, ed., Handbook of Theory and Research leveling pressures’’ that can be consequences of for the . New York: Green- social capital. The pressure to conform to group wood Press. norms in order to access group resources (which Coleman, James 1988 ‘‘Social Capital in the Creation of may be perceived as the only resources available) Human Capital.’’ American Journal of Sociology, 94: can keep an individual from attempting to enter S95–S120. the mainstream and find a way up from poverty. ——— 1990 Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, Portes and Landolt use the examples of prostitu- Mass. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. tion rings and youth gangs. The network norms function to keep individuals within the familiar Portes, Alejandro, and Patricia Landolt 1996 ‘‘The group culture. Any attempt by a member to achieve Downside of Social Capital’’ American Prospect, 26:18–21, 94. something outside the network may be seen as a threat to group solidarity and is discouraged. ———, and Julia Sensenbrenner 1993 ‘‘Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action.’’ American Journal of Sociology, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIOLOGY 98(6):1320–1350. Within the discipline, sociologists recognize the Woolcock, Michael 1998 ‘‘Social Capital and Economic need to conduct empirical investigations as an Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework’’ Theory and , 27(2):151–208. important component of theory building. The concept of social capital has been advanced in many diverse subfields of sociology. Sociologists TRACY X. KARNER have applied it to the macro issues of moderniza- tion, economic development or lack of it, net- works, and organizations. Others have studied the SOCIAL CHANGE empirical implications of social capital for families Social change is ubiquitous. Although earlier so- and youth behavior problems, schooling and edu- cial scientists often treated stability as normal and cation, community life, work and organizations, significant social change as an exceptional process democracy and governance, and action that required a special explanation, scholars now (see Woolcock 1998 for an overview). expect to see change at all times and in all social As a theoretical concept, social capital holds organizations. Much of this type of change is con- great promise for furthering the sociological un- tinuous; it occurs in small increments and reveals derstanding of social action. There is still much to long-term patterns such as growth. Discontinuous learn; the perspective needs to be grounded in changes, however, are more common than has established bodies of empirical research before it been assumed. From the perspective of individual can be translated into optimistic public policies. Its organizations, these changes are relatively com- greatest promise, Woolcock (1998, p.188) points mon and often result in sharp departures from

2641 SOCIAL CHANGE previous states such as when are ingrained, habitual ways of deciding what new created, merged, or terminated. From the per- action fits an individual’s situation work without spective of larger populations of such organiza- conscious intention to reproduce overall social tions, relatively few discontinuous changes result patterns. A pattern of inequality in educational in comparably sharp departures from long-term attainment that is understood officially as meritocratic patterns and trends. Even that result and is genuinely intended by teachers to be so thus in dramatic changes of political and legal institu- may be reproduced in part because students from tions generally do not transform all of society nonelite backgrounds unconsciously lower their equally. Some previous patterns continue; others expectations for themselves, expecting elites to do are restored. better. Teachers may unconsciously do the same thing. When decisions are to be made, such as Cumulative social change must be distinguished whether to go to university, or which university to from recurrent fluctuations and the processual choose, elite students and their families are more aspect of all social life. Both sociologists and histo- likely to have the confidence and knowledge to rians study the latter by focusing on those dynamic invest in options with a higher long-term payoff. processes through which the social lives of particu- lar individuals and groups may change even though To understand social change, thus, it is neces- overall patterns remain relatively constant. Mar- sary also to understand what produces social conti- riages and divorces are major changes in social nuity. It would be a mistake to explain social relationships, but a society may have a roughly change always in terms of a new factor that inter- constant marriage or divorce rate for long periods. venes in an otherwise stable situation. Rather, Similarly, markets involve a continuous flow of social change commonly is produced by the same changes in regard to who possess money or goods, factors that produce continuity. These factors may who stands in the position of creditor or debtor, change in quantity or quality or in relation to who is unemployed or unemployed, and so forth. each other. These specific changes, however, generally do not Sometimes, however, specific processes of so- alter the nature of the markets. Researchers both cial life undergo long-term transformations. These study the form of particular transactions and de- transformations in the nature, organization, or velop models to describe the dynamics of large- outcomes of the processes are what is usually scale statistical aggregations of such processes (see studied under the label ‘‘social change.’’ Social life ‘‘Social Dynamics.’’) always depends, for example, on the processes of As Bourdieu (1977, 1990) and Giddens (1986) birth and death that reproduce populations through suggest, it is necessary to see human social life as generations. These rates (adjusted for the age of a always being structured, but incompletely so. population) may be in equilibrium for long peri- ‘‘Structuration,’’ to use their term, is as much a ods, resulting in little change in the overall size of a process of change as a reflection of stability. In- population. Alternatively birthrates may exceed deed, the existence of stable social patterns over death rates most of the time, resulting in gradual long periods requires at least as much explanation , but periodic disasters such as as does social change. This situation has led to war, famine, and pestilence may cut the popula- renewed attention to social reproduction, or the tion back. In this case, the population may show ways in which social patterns are re-created in little or no cumulative growth, but instead exhibit social action. This contrasts with earlier views of a dynamic equilibrium in which every period of continuity as a matter of inertia or simple endur- gradual increase is offset by one of rapid decline. ance. Some continuity in the is achieved Approximations to these two patterns character- intentionally by actors with enough power to resist ize most of world history. Population growth gen- changes desired by others; rulers thus maintain erally has been quite slow, although periodic de- their rule by force. Much social reproduction, clines have not offset all the increases. In the last however, works at a less consciously intentional three hundred years, however, a new phenome- level and is based on the ways in which people non has been noted. As industrialize and learn to think and act rather than on overt, mate- generally grow richer and change the daily lives of rial force. Bourdieu and Passeron (1977), for ex- their members, they undergo a ‘‘fertility transi- ample, follow Weber in studying the ways in which tion.’’ First, improvements in nutrition, sanitation,

2642 SOCIAL CHANGE and health can allow people to live longer. This product from which to extract tribute, , and results in population growth that can be very rapid military service. With the transformation first of if the improvements are introduced together rather agriculture and then of industrial production in than gradually developing over a long period. the early capitalist era or just before it, this rela- After a time lag, this encourages people to have tionship was in many cases upset. Increasingly, fewer children because more of the children they from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, do have survive. As fertility rates (birthrates stan- for example, the heads of Scottish clans found that dardized bythe number of women of child-bearing a small population raising sheep could produce age) also drop, a new equilibrium may be reached; more wealth than could a large one farming; their population growth will slow or stop. This is a attempt to maximize this advantage contributed to cumulative transition, because after it, the typical the migration of Scots to Ireland and America. rates of birth and death are much lower even This process was of course linked also to growing though the population may be much larger. A demand for wool and the development of the variety of other changes may follow from or be industrial production of textiles. Those factors in influenced by this process. For example, family turn involved new divisions of social labor and life may change with declining numbers of chil- increased long-distance trade. At the same time, dren, parents’ (especially mothers’) lives are likely the development of industrial production and re- to change as fewer of their years are devoted lated weapons technologies reduced the military to bearing and raising children, and childhood advantages of large population size by contrast to deaths may become rarities rather than common epochs when wars generally were won by the experiences. largest armies; indeed, population may be inversely Social history is given its shape by such cumu- related to power if it impedes industrialization. lative social changes. Many of these changes are This case provides an example of how shifts in quite basic, such as the creation of the modern the relationships of certain variables can alter not state; others are more minor, such as the invention only overall social patterns but broad cultural and spread of the handshake as a form of greeting. orientations to social change. Along with industri- Most, such as the development of team sports, fast- alization (and other dimensions of modern social food restaurants, and the international, academic life) has come a continuous process of technologi- conference, lie in the broad area in between. Thus, cal and . As Weber (1922) empha- cumulative social changes may take place on a sized, this process is at odds with a traditional variety of different scales, from the patterns of orientation to social life. Traditionalism implies an small group life through such as the expectation of continuity and respect for the ways business or church to overall societal in which things have always been done. Constant arrangements. Significant changes tend to have innovation is linked to the pursuit of more effi- widespread repercussions, however, and so it is cient ways to do things and an expectation of rare for one part of social life to change drama- continuous change. Leaders of China, long thought tically without changing other parts. the absolute size of armies would be decisive in While certain important changes, such as an conflict. They were shocked when both Japan and increasing population, are basically linear, others Western powers were able to win victories in the are discontinuous. There are two senses of discon- nineteenth century mainly on the basis of superior tinuity. The first is abruptness, such as the drama- technology rather than superior size. This helped tic contraction of the European population in the produce not only the collapse of a specific imperial wake of plague and other calamities of the four- dynasty but a crisis in a whole pattern of tradition- teenth century and the occurrence of the Russian alism. Instead of assuming that the best lessons for after centuries of tsarist rule and failed military strategy lay in the teachings of the past, revolts. Second, some social changes alter not just some leaders recognized that they needed to look the values of variables but the relationship of for new ways in which to make the country strong. variables to each other. Thus, for much of history This produced a tension between trying to pre- the military power and wealth of a ruler was based serve cultural identity by continuing to do things directly on the number of his or her subjects; the same way and trying to achieve technological growing populations meant an increasing total and other gains by innovating. This tension is

2643 SOCIAL CHANGE common in societies that have undergone broad much more emphasis on differences among vari- patterns of social change in the modern era. In ous kinds of social change and their settings; ac- China, after the death of Mao Zedong leaders cordingly, their generalizations are more specific. decided that strengthening the country and im- Researchers may limit their studies to the patterns proving people’s lives depended on technological of innovation among business organizations, for advancement and economic development. Recog- example, recognizing that those organizations may nizing both that large armies would not win wars act quite differently from others. They also may against enemies with technologically advanced ask questions such as, Why do innovations gain weapons and that rapid population growth would acceptance more rapidly in formal organizations make it difficult to educate the whole population (e.g., businesses) than in informal, primary groups and produce rapid economic growth, Deng Xiaoping (e.g., families), or what sorts of organizations are and other leaders introduced policies to reduce more likely to innovate? The changes may be very population growth rates. They also decided that specific, such as the introduction of new technolo- they needed to liberalize the economy and encour- gies of production, or very general, such as the age private business because state-owned enter- as a whole (Smelser 1958). prises could not innovate rapidly enough. On the The key distinguishing feature of these sorts of one hand, they encourage innovation in economy studies is that they regard changes as individual and technology, and on the other hand, they resist units of roughly similar sorts and aim to produce change in politics and culture. Although perhaps generalizations about them. contradictory, these two responses have been typi- cal of leaders in societies undergoing the process The second major sociological approach to of modernization. Although it is impossible to cumulative change—seeking an explanation for prevent major changes in technology and the econ- the whole pattern of cumulation—was long the omy from having an impact on politics and cul- province of of history that culmi- ture, it is possible to shape what those impacts will be. nated in the sweeping syntheses of the nineteenth century. Sociology was born partly out of the Sociologists generally have taken three ap- attempt to understand the rise of science, indus- proaches to studying cumulative social changes. try, and urban society. These and related transi- The first is to look for generalizable patterns in tions were conceptualized in frameworks that em- how all sorts of changes occur, the second is to phasized shifts from tradition to modernity, feudalism seek an explanation for the whole overall pattern to , and monarchy to republicanism or of history, and the third is to analyze historically democracy. As Sztompka (1993) points out, three specific processes of change. basic visions were developed, each of which has Following the first of these approaches, soci- left a mark on sociology and continues to be ologists have looked for characteristic phases influential in research: cycles, evolutionary prog- through which any social innovation must pass, ress, and historical materialism. The roots of the such as skepticism, experimentation, early diffu- cyclical vision stretch back to antiquity. The image sion among leaders, and later general acceptance. of the human life cycle, from birth and infancy to Ogburn ([1922] 1950) was a pioneer in this sort of old age and death, for example, was used to con- research, examining topics such as the character- ceptualize the rise and fall of whole societies and of istic ‘‘lag’’ between cultural innovations and wide- imperial dynasties that were thought to be vigor- spread adjustments to them or exploitation of ous in youth and feeble in old age. Few scientific their potential. In regard to the fertility transition, sociologists have regarded such images as more when improved health care and nutrition make it than metaphors, but they have been influential possible for nearly all children to survive to adult- among writers attempting to generalize about the hood, it takes a generation or two before parents course of history (e.g., Spengler [1918] 1939; stop having large families as ‘‘insurance policies’’ Toynbee 1934–1961). A number of sociologists, to provide for support in their old age. Earlier however, have studied more specific cyclical pat- researchers often hoped to find general laws that terns. Pareto ([1916] 1980) analyzed what he called would explain the duration of such lags and ac- the circulation of elites, a pattern in which spe- count for other features of all processes of social cific groups rose into and then fell from social change. Contemporary sociologists tend to place dominance. Sorokin (1937) analyzed cultural cy-

2644 SOCIAL CHANGE

cles, especially the oscillating dominance of idea- three crucial differences from other evolutionary tional (spiritual, intellectual) and sensate (sensual, theories. First, Marx and his followers argued that materialist) orientations. More recently, sociolo- material factors, especially the mode of produc- gists have identified cycles in social movements tion, shape the rest of society and that change is and collective action (Tilly 1989; Tarrow 1998; driven largely by improvements in the capacity for Traugott, 1995). material production. Second, following a dialecti- cal logic, Marxists emphasized the internal contra- Both historical materialism and evolutionism dictions within each stage of development. Capi- are indebted to another ancient idea, that of prog- talism, for example, generated tremendous increases ress. Here the idea is that social change tends to in productivity but distributed the resulting wealth produce a pattern of improvements in human life so unequally that it was prone to economic crises as measured in relationship to a standard of evalua- and social revolutions. Rather than a simple, incre- tion. In this regard, sociological evolutionism has mental , thus, Marxists saw evolution as commonly differed from evolutionary theory in taking place in discontinuous breaks marked by biology, which has been less focused on the overall clashes and struggles. Third, most versions of Marx- direction of change and normative . ist theory gave greater emphasis to human agency The great nineteenth-century evolutionary think- or ability consciously to shape the direction of ers Comte([1830–1842, 1851–1854] 1975) and social change than was typical of evolutionary Spencer (1893) conceptualized history as progress theory. The question of the extent to which evolu- through a series of stages. Comte based his analy- tion can be directed consciously has, however, sis on what he saw as improvements in social recently come to the fore of non-Marxist evolu- knowledge through theological, metaphysical, and tionary theory as well, as in in the work of the positive stages. Spencer, who was also an origina- sociobiologist Wilson (Wilson and Wilson 1999). tor of evolutionary theory in biology, had a much more complex and sophisticated theory, focusing The most important contemporary theories on the way structures developed to meet func- of social evolution attempt to generate not only tional imperatives and gaining direction from the overall descriptions of stages but causal explana- idea that ‘‘incoherent homogeneity’’ progressively tions for social change. Lenski, for example, has gives way to ‘‘coherent heterogeneity’’ through argued that increases in technological capacity the process of structural differentiation. Spencer (including processing as well as mate- (1893) addressed particularly the transition from rial production and distribution) account for most military to industrial societies, which he saw as of the major changes in human social organization basic to modernity. Durkheim (1893) developed a (Lenski et al. 1994). In his synthesis, Lenski ar- similar analysis in his description of the movement ranges the major forms of human societies in a from mechanical to organic solidarity. hierarchy based on their technological capacity and shows how other features, such as their typical [1 Schrecker (1991) has analyzed a pattern in patterns of , law, government, class in- which something similar to Spencer’s two stages equality, and relations between the sexes, are rooted alternated cyclically in Chinese society rather than in those technological differences. In support of forming the basis for a single evolutionary trend. the idea that there is an overall evolutionary pat- Periods of increasing industrialization and com- tern, Lenski et al. (1994) point to the tendency of mercialization (fengjian) were followed by eras in social change to move only in one direction. Thus, which agriculture and military prowess figured there are many cases of agricultural states being more prominently (junxian). Schrecker (1991) sug- transformed into industrial societies but very few gests that this intriguing combination of evolu- (if any) examples of the reverse. Of course, Lenski tionary and cyclical theories initially was devel- acknowledges that human evolution is not com- oped by classical Chinese scholars, although it was pletely irreversible; he notes, however, not only recast after the importation of Spencerian evolu- that cases of reversal are relatively few but that tionary theory.] they commonly result from an external cataclysm. Historical materialists, starting with Marx Similarly, Lenski indicates that the direction of (1863), also analyzed stages in historical develop- human social evolution is not strictly dictated ment (such as feudalism and capitalism), but with from the start but only channeled in certain direc-

2645 SOCIAL CHANGE tions. There is room for human ingenuity to deter- trality of historical conjunctures and contingen- mine the shape of the future through a wide range cies: the partially random relationships between of potential differences in invention and inno- different sorts of events (on historical accidents, vation. There are a number of other important see also Simmel 1977; Boudon 1986). For exam- versions of the evolutionary approach to cumula- ple, the outcome of military battles between Spain tive social change. Some stress different material (an old-fashioned empire) and Britain (the key factors, such as humanadaptation to ecological industrial-capitalist pioneer) were not foregone constraints (Harris 1979; White 1949); others stress conclusions. There was room for bravery, weather, culture and other patterns of thought more than strategy, and a variety of other factors to play a material conditions (Parsons 1968; Habermas 1978). role. However, certain key British victories, nota- bly in the sixteenth century, helped make not only Adherents to the third major approach to British history but world history different by creat- cumulative social change argue that there can be no single evolutionary explanation for all the im- ing the conditions for the modern world system to portant transitions in human history. They also take the shape it did. Against evolutionary expla- stress differences as well as analogies among par- nation, historical sociologists also argue that dif- ticular instances of specific sorts of change ferent factors explain different transformations. (Stinchcombe 1978). These historians and histori- Thus, no amount of study of the factors that cal sociologists emphasize the importance of deal- brought about the rise of capitalism and industrial ing adequately with particular changes by locating production can provide the necessary insight into them in their historical and cultural contexts and the decline of the Roman Empire and the eventual distinguishing them through comparison (Abrams development of feudalism in Europe or the con- 1982; Skocpol 1984; Calhoun 1995, 1998). Weber solidation of China’s very different regions into was an important pioneer of this approach. A the world’s most enduring empire and most popu- prominent variety of has stressed the lous state. These different kinds of events have view that Marx’s mature analysis of capitalism their own different sorts of causes. emphasizes historical specificity rather than the Predictably, some sociologists seek ways to use of the same categories to explain all of history combine some of the benefits of each type of (Postone 1993). Historical sociologists have ar- approach to explaining cumulative social change. gued that a particular sort of transformation, such Historical sociologists who emphasize the singu- as the development of the capacity for industrial larity of specific transformations can learn from production, may result from different causes and comparisons among such changes and achieve at have different implications on different occasions. least partial generalizations about them. Thus, The original Industrial Revolution in eighteenth- different factors are involved in every social revo- and nineteenth-century Britain thus developed lution, yet certain key elements seem to be pres- with no advance model and without competition ent, such as crises (financial as well as political) in a from established industrial powers. Countries that government’s capacity to rule (Skocpol 1979; are industrializing today are influenced by both Goldstone 1991). This recognition encourages one models and competition from existing industrial to focus on structural factors that may help create countries, along with influences from multina- potentially revolutionary situations as well as the tional corporations. The development of the mod- and actions of specific revolutionaries. ern world system thus fundamentally altered the Similarly, even though a variety of specific factors conditions of future social changes, making it may determine the transition to capitalism or in- misleading to lump together cases of early and late dustrialization in every instance, some version of a industrialization for the purpose of generaliza- fertility transition seems to play a role in nearly all tion. Similarly, prerequisites for industrial produc- cases. Although evolutionary theory is widely re- tion may be supplied by different institutional jected by historical sociologists, some look to evo- formations; one should compare not just institu- lutionary arguments for suggestions about what tions but different responses to similar problems. factors might be important. Thus, Lenski’s empha- Accident and disorder also have played crucial sis on technology and Marx’s focus on the relation- roles in the development of the modern world ship of production and class struggle can provide system. Wallerstein (1974–1988) shows the cen- foci for research, and that research can help deter-

2646 SOCIAL CHANGE mine whether those factors are equally important humanity stands on the edge of a — in all societal transformations and whether they postmodern, postindustrial, or something else— work the same way in each one. More radically, researchers and theorists need togive strong an- evolutionary socioglogy might follow biology in swers to the question of what it means to claim that focusing less on the selection of whole populations one epoch ends and another begins (Calhoun 1999). (societies) for success or failure and look instead at Many prominent social theorists have treated the selection of specific social practices (e.g., the all of modernity as a continuous era and stressed bearing of large numbers of children) for repro- its distinction from previous (or anticipated fu- duction or disappearance. Such an evolutionary ture) forms of social organization. Durkheim (1893) theory might provide insight into how practices argued that a new, more complex division of labor become more or less common, following biology is central to a dichotomous distinction of modern in looking for mechanisms of reproduction and (organically solidary) from premodern (mechani- inheritance, the initiation of new practices (muta- cally solidary) society. Weber (1922) saw Western tion), and the clustering of practices in interacting rationalization of action and relationships as basic groups (speciation) as well as selection. It would, and as continuing without rupture through the however, necessarily give up the capacity to offer a whole modern era. Marx (1863) saw the transition single explanation for all the major transitions in from feudalism to capitalism as basic but held that human social history, which is one of the attrac- no change in modernity could be considered fun- tions of evolutionary theory to its adherents. damental unless it overthrew the processes of Certain basic challenges are particularly im- private and the commodification portant in the study of cumulative social change of labor. Recent Marxists thus argue that the social today. In addition to working out a satisfactory and economic changes of the last several decades relationship among the three main approaches, mark a new phase within capitalism but not a perhaps the most important challenge is to distin- break with it (Mandel 1974; Wallerstein 1974– guish social changes that are basic from those 1988; Harvey 1989). Many sociologists would add which are ephemeral or less momentous. Sociolo- a claim about the centrality of increasing state gists, like historians and other scholars, need to be power as a basic, continuous process of modernity able to characterize broad patterns of social ar- (e.g., Tilly 1990; Mann 1986–1993). More gener- rangements. This is what sociologists do when they ally, Habermas (1984–1988) has stressed the split speak of ‘‘modernity’’ or ‘‘industrial society.’’ Such between a life world in which everyday interac- characterizations involve at least implicit theoreti- tions are organized on the basis of mutual agree- cal claims about the crucial factors that distinguish ment and an increasingly prominent systemic inte- these eras or forms. In the case of complex, large- gration through the impersonal relationships of scale societal processes, these factors are hard to money and power outside the reach of linguistic- pin down. How much industrial capacity does a ally mediated cooperative understanding. Com- society need to have before one can call it indus- mon to all these positions is the notion that there is trial? How low must employment in its increas- a general process (not just a static of attributes) ingly automated industries become before one common to all forms of modernity. Some claim to can call it postindustrial? Is current social and discern a causal explanation; others only point to the trends, suggesting that those trends may have economic the continuation of a long- several causes but that there is no single ‘‘prime standing trend or part of a fundamental transfor- mover’’ that can explain an overall pattern of mation? Although settling such questions is diffi- evolution. All would agree that no really basic cult, debating them is crucial, for sociologists can- social change can be said to have occurred until not grasp the historical contexts of the phenomena the fundamental processes they identify have ended, they study if they limit themselves to studying been reversed, or changed their relationship to particulars or seeking generalizations from them other variables. Obviously, a great deal depends without attempting to understand the differences on what processes are considered fundamental. among historical epochs (however hard to define sharply) and cultures (however much they may Rather than stressing the common processes shade into each other with contact). Particularly that organize all forms of modernity, some schol- because of the many current contentions that ars have followed Marx (and recent structuralist

2647 SOCIAL CHANGE theory) in pointing to the disjunctures between ence. Some postmodernist theories emphasize the relatively stable periods. Foucault (1973), for ex- impact of new production technologies (especially ample, emphasized basic transformations in the computer-assisted flexible automation), while oth- way knowledge is constituted and an order is ers are more exclusively cultural. The label ascribed to the world of things, people, and ideas. ‘‘postmodernity’’ often is applied rather casually Renaissance culture was characterized by an em- to point to interesting features of the present phasis on resemblances among the manifold dif- period without clearly indicating why they should ferent elements of God’s single, unified creation. be taken as revealing a basic discontinuous shift Knowledge of fields as diverse to modern eyes as between eras. biology, aesthetics, theology, and astronomy was At stake in debates over the periodization of thought to be unified by the matching of simi- social change is not just the labeling of eras but the lar characteristics, with those in each field serv- analysis of what factors are most fundamentally ing as visible signs of counterparts in the oth- constitutive of social organization. Should ecology ers. The ‘‘classical’’ modernity of the seventeenth and politics be seen as determinative over, equal and early eighteenth centuries marked a radical to, or derivative of the economy? Is break by treating the sign as fundamentally dis- or technological capacity prior to the other? What tinct from the thing it signified, noting, for exam- gives capitalism, feudalism, a kinship system, or ple, that words have only arbitrary relationships to any other social order its temporary and relative the objects they name. The study of representa- stability? Such questions must be approached not tion thus replaced that of resemblances. In the just in terms of manifest influence at any single late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, point in time or during specific events but also in another rupture came with the development of terms of the way particular factors figure in long- the modern ideas of classification according to term processes of cumulative social change. hidden, underlying causes rather than superficial resemblances and an examination of human be- ings as the basic source of systems of representa- REFERENCES tion. Only this last period could give rise to the Abrams, Philip 1982 . Ithaca, N.Y.: ‘‘human sciences’’—psychology, sociology, and so Cornell University Press. forth—as they are known today. Similarly, Foucault Boudon, Raymond 1986 Theories of Social Change. Cam- (1977) argued that the modern individual is a bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. distinctive form of person or self, produced by an Bourdieu, Pierre 1977 Outline of a Theory of Practice. intensification of disciplining power and surveil- Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. lance. Where most theories of social change em- ———, 1990 The Logic of Practice. Stanford, Calif.: Stan- phasize processes, Foucault’s ‘‘archaeology of ford University Press. knowledge’’ emphasizes the internal coherence of ———, and Jean-Claude Passeron 1977 Reproduction in relatively stable cultural configurations and the Education, Culture, and Society. London: Sage ruptures between them. Calhoun, Craig 1995 Critical Social Theory: Culture, His- Foucault’s work has been taken as support for tory, and the Challenge of Difference. Cambridge, Mass.: the claim (which was not his own) that the modern Blackwell. era has ended. Theories of ‘‘postmodernity’’ com- ——— 1998 ‘‘Explanation in Historical Sociology: Nar- monly argue that at some point the modern era rative, General Theory, and Historically Specific The- gave way to a successor, though some scholars ory.’’ American Journal of Sociology 108:846–871. (e.g., Lyotard 1977) have indicated, against the ——— 1999 ‘‘Nationalism, Social Change, and Histori- implications of the label ‘‘postmodern,’’ that they cal Sociology,’’ In F. Engelstad and R. Kalleberg, eds., mean not a simple historical succession but a Social Change and Historical Sociology. Oslo: Scandina- recurrent internal challenge to the dominant ‘‘mod- vian University Press. ernist’’ patterns (see Lash 1990; Seidman 1995; Comte, Auguste (1830–1842, 1851–1854) 1975 Auguste Harvey 1989; Calhoun 1995). Generally, they hold Comte and : The Essential Writings, edited by that where modernity was rigid, linear, and fo- G. Lenzer. New York: Harper. cused on universality, postmodernity is flexible, Durkheim, Emile 1893 The Division of Labor in Society. fluidly multidirectional, and focused on differ- New York: Free Press.

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Foucault, Michel 1973 The Order of Things: An Archaeol- Spencer, Herbert 1893 Principles of Sociology, 3 vols. ogy of the Human Sciences. New York: Random House. London: Williams and Norgate. ——— 1977 Discipline and Punish. New York: Pantheon. Spengler, Oswald (1918) 1939 The Decline of the West. Giddens, Anthony 1986 The Constitution of Society. Berke- New York: Knopf. ley: University of California Press. Stinchcombe, Arthur 1978 Theoretical Methods in Social Goldstone, Jack 1991 Revolution and Rebellion in the History. New York: Academic Press. Early Modern World. Berkeley: University of Califor- Sztompka, Piotr 1993 The Sociology of Social Change. nia Press. Oxford: Blackwell. Habermas, Jurgen 1978 Communication and the Evolution Tarrow, Sidney 1998 Power in Movement: Social Move- of Society. Boston: Beacon. ments and Contentious Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cam- ——— 1984–1988 The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 bridge University Press. vols. Boston: Beacon Tilly, Charles 1989 The Contentious French. Cambridge, Harris, Marvin 1979 Cultural Materialism. New York: Mass.: Harvard University Press. Vintage. ——— 1990 Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD Harvey, David 1989 The Postmodern Condition. Oxford, 990–1990. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. UK: Oxford University Press. Toynbee, Arnold 1934–1961 A Study of History, 12 vols. Lash, Scott 1990 Postmodern Sociology. London: Routledge. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Lenski, Gerhard, Jean Lenski, and Patrick Nolan 1994 Traugott, Mark, ed. 1995 Repertoires and Cycles in Collec- Human Societies, 7th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. tive Action. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. Lyotard, Jean-François 1977 The Postmodern Condition. Wallerstein, Immanuel 1974–1988 The Modern World Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press System, 3 vols. San Diego: Academic Press. Mandel, Ernst 1974 Late Capitalism. London: Verso. Weber, Max 1922 Economy and Society. Berkley: Univer- Mann, Michael 1986–1993 The Sources of Social Power. sity of California Press. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. White, Leslie 1949 The Science of Culture. New York: Marx, Karl 1863 Capital, vol. 1. New York: Viking. Grove Press. Ogburn, W. F. (1922) 1950 Social Change with Respect to Wilson, Edward O., and Edmund O. Wilson 1999 Culture and Original Nature. New York: Viking. Consilience. New York: Random House. Pareto, Wilfredo (1916) 1980 Compendium of General Sociology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. CRAIG CALHOUN Parsons, Talcott 1968 The Evolution of Societies. New York: Free Press. Postone, Moishe 1993 Time, Labor and Social Domina- SOCIAL COMPARISON tion. New York: Cambridge University Press. PROCESSES Schrecker, John 1991 The Chinese Revolution in Historical Perspective. New York: Praeger. How do people come to understand themselves? A Seidman, Steven 1995 The Postmodern Turn: New Perspec- response to this age-old question involves what has tives on Social Theory. New York: Cambridge Univer- been labeled everyone’s ‘‘second favorite theory’’ sity Press. (Goethals 1986): social comparison. The original formulation of social comparison theory (Festinger Simmel, Georg 1977 The Problem of the of History. New York: Free Press. 1954) demonstrated how, in the absence of objec- tive standards, individuals use other people to Skocpol, Theda 1979 States and Social Revolutions. New fulfill their informational needs to evaluate their York: Cambridge University Press. own opinions and abilities. The process of social ———, ed. 1984 Vision and Method in Historical Sociology. comparison underlies social evaluation (Pettigrew New York: Cambridge University Press. 1967) and relates to reference group processes Smelser, Neil J. 1958 Social Change in the Industrial (e.g., Hyman and Singer 1968), which in turn are Revolution. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. critical to understanding diverse sociological is- Sorokin, Pitirim 1937 Social and Cultural Dynamics, 4 sues pertaining, for example, to identity develop- vols. New York: American Book Company. ment, justice, interpersonal and intergroup rela-

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