AGAINST ALL ODDS? EU-China Security Cooperation in the Context of Political Tensions

Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultät der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg Freiburg i. Br.

vorgelegt von Julia Gurol

aus Leverkusen, Deutschland

SoSe 2020

Erstgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Diana Panke Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

Zweitgutachter: Prof. em. Dr. Jürgen Rüland

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

Vorsitzender des Promotionsausschusses der Gemeinsamen Kommission der Philologischen und Philosophischen Fakultät: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Bernd Kortmann

Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: 27. Oktober 2020

ii Acknowledgements

Writing this dissertation would not have been possible without the support and help from many colleagues, friends and family members. First and foremost, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Diana Panke (University of Freiburg) for supervising my thesis. Her critical comments, considerate advice and continuous guidance helped me to complete this dissertation. Moreover, her persistent advice to be pragmatic and precise made it possible for me to conduct this challenging yet rewarding research project within three years. I also thank my second supervisor Prof. em. Dr. Jürgen Rüland (University of Freiburg), whose encouraging guidance supported me over the course of the whole research project and especially when planning and conducting my field research trip. I particularly thank him for equipping me with self-confidence and trust before heading off to the field as well as for last-minute comfort and motivation in the final stage of this PhD project. My sincere gratitude also goes to Prof. Zheng Chunrong from Tongji University in Shanghai, who hosted me during my fieldwork stay in China and shared his extensive network with me.

I would also like to thank my colleagues at the Chair for Multilevel Governance (above all Sören Stapel, Franziska Hohlstein, Ingo Henneberg, Anna Starkmann and Gurur Polat), and the Arnold- Bergstraesser Institute (above all Cita Wetterich and Fabricio Rodríguez) for continuous support, numerous hours of feedback talks, and many cups of coffee during the three years of this PhD project. My work within this great group of colleagues equipped me with valuable research skills, made me reflect critically upon my research and kept me going. In this context, I also thank Adnan Tabatabai and my colleagues from the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient, for never losing faith in my research skills and for supporting me continuously.

I am also thankful for the greatest group of friends from Bonn, Leverkusen and Cologne, who reminded me more than once of the Rhenish proverb “et hätt noch immer jot jejange”. A special thanks is also dedicated to Stefan Lang who supported me with a mix of comfort and sarcasm especially during the last and difficult stages of the research process. But most of all, I thank my family and Haller, who never stopped believing in me and the successful completion of my thesis. Thank you for being my greatest critics yet also my strongest supporters. This work is dedicated to you.

Freiburg, 15 May 2020

i Abstract

Why do we observe an increase of EU-China security cooperation over time, while at the same time, political tensions deepen? And why does cooperation emerge on some security issues but not on others? Although the main drivers of EU-China relations remain of an economic kind, meaning primarily concerns with trade, investment and intellectual property issues, the security dimension of the relationship has increased over time and has developed into a vital pillar of EU- China relations. While a lot has been written about EU-China economic affairs, their relationship in the security realm is a controversial and highly debated, yet under-researched issue. This dissertation examines the main drivers towards cooperation in EU-China security relations by applying a mixed comparison approach. Drawing on a combination of rationalist and constructivist explanatory factors it assesses the role of complex interdependence, economic interests, a convergent problem understanding and mutual perceptions in order to explain why EU-China security cooperation takes place despite deepening political tensions. A diachronic comparison investigates temporal patterns, revealing an increase of complex interdependence and a converging understanding of what constitutes security as the main drivers towards security cooperation over time. A synchronic comparison of three security issues, anti-terrorism, anti-piracy/maritime security and climate/energy security, further underlines these findings. In analyzing variation over time and between security issues, the present study provides a comprehensive assessment of EU- China security relations in the context of political tensions and shows why security cooperation takes place against all odds. It provides incentives for further in-depth process research on the roles of the EU and China in different security issues and has practical implications for the orientation of the EU’s future China policy.

ii Kurzbeschreibung

Wie lässt sich die Zunahme europäisch-chinesischer Kooperation im Sicherheitsbereich bei einem gleichzeitigen Anstieg politischer Spannungen erklären? Und warum kooperieren die EU und China in einigen Sicherheitsfeldern, während andere von Konkurrenz oder Konflikt geprägt sind? Obwohl im Kern europäisch-chinesischer Beziehungen wirtschaftliche Fragen wie Handel, Investition und Eigentumsrechte stehen, hat die Sicherheitsdimension ihrer bilateralen Beziehungen an Bedeutung gewonnen und ist zu einer zentralen Säule der EU-China Beziehungen geworden. Doch während sich die Forschung intensiv mit europäisch-chinesischen Wirtschafts- und Handelsbeziehungen auseinandergesetzt hat, ist die Sicherheitsdimension unterrepräsentiert. Basierend auf einem theoretischen Analyserahmen, der rationalistische und konstruktivistische Annahmen vereint, beschäftigt sich diese Dissertation mit den Triebfedern dieser Sicherheitskooperation zwischen der EU und China. Dabei liegt der Fokus auf vier aus der Theorie abgeleiteten Aspekten, die Sicherheitskooperation trotz bestehender politischer Spannungen in unterschiedlichem Maße ermöglichen oder notwendig machen können: komplexe Interdependenz, wirtschaftliche Interessen, konvergierende Definition von Sicherheit sowie positive wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. Diese werden sowohl im Zeitverlauf als auch anhand eines Vergleich dreier Sicherheitsfelder – Anti-Terrorismus, Anti-Piraterie/maritime Sicherheit sowie Klima- /Energiesicherheit – analysiert. Die Arbeit zeigt auf, dass komplexe wirtschaftliche Interdependenzen zwischen der EU und China auf weitere Politikfelder ausstrahlen und Sicherheitskooperation sowohl ermöglichen als auch notwendig machen. Auch die Zunahme ökonomischer Interessen fungiert als Triebfeder für Sicherheitskooperation. Zudem zeigt die Analyse, dass eine konvergente Problemdefinition von hoher Bedeutung für die Entstehung von Kooperation ist. Die sich verschlechternde wechselseitige Wahrnehmung dagegen, hindert die Entstehung weiterer Kooperationsformate. Durch die Analyse der Veränderung der EU-China Sicherheitsbeziehungen im Zeitverlauf sowie durch den Einblick in verschiedene Sicherheitsfelder, bietet diese Studie eine umfassende Bestandsaufnahme europäisch-chinesischer Sicherheitsbeziehungen in Zeiten wachsender politischer Spannungen und zeigt auf, warum Sicherheitskooperation entgegen aller Erwartungen entsteht. Damit stellt sie eine Basis für künftige Forschung zu den Rollen der EU und China in verschiedenen Sicherheitsbereichen sowie zur Entwicklung es europäisch-chinesischen Verhältnisses im Allgemeinen dar und hat praktische Implikationen für die Ausrichtung der europäischen Chinapolitik.

iii Table of Contents

List of tables ...... vii List of figures ...... vii List of abbreviations and acronyms ...... viii

1. Introduction: Cooperation despite Political Tensions? ...... 1

1.1. State of the Art ...... 5 1.2. Knowledge Gaps & Contribution of this Thesis ...... 11 1.3. Research Questions and Research Design ...... 14

2. The Empirical Terrain: Mapping the Development of EU-China Security Cooperation 19

2.1. Methodological Considerations: Data and Operationalization ...... 19 2.2. EU-China Security Cooperation Over Time ...... 28 2.2.1. The Research Puzzle: Security Cooperation Against All Odds ...... 38 2.3. EU-China Cooperation on Different Security Issues ...... 40 2.3.1. The Research Puzzle: Variation of Cooperation Between Security Issues ...... 43 2.4. Chapter Conclusion ...... 44

3. Theoretical Framework ...... 44

3.1. Ontological Considerations ...... 45 3.2. Potentials of Combining Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches ...... 47 3.3. Rationalist Approaches to Explaining EU-China Security Cooperation ...... 49 3.4. Constructivist Approaches to Explaining EU-China Security Cooperation ...... 54 3.5. Theoretical Expectations ...... 59 3.5.1. Expectations for the Increase of EU-China Security Cooperation Over Time ...... 59 3.5.2. Expectations for EU-China Cooperation on Different Security Issues ...... 60 3.6. Operationalization of Independent Variables ...... 62

4. Data and Methods ...... 74

4.1. Data Collection in Security-Sensitive Settings ...... 74 4.2. Triangulation and Data Sources ...... 75 4.3. Interviews as a Source of Evidence ...... 78 4.3.1. Access to the Field and Sampling Strategy ...... 81 4.3.2. Data Saturation And Responsiveness ...... 82 4.4. Data Analysis ...... 83 4.5. Case Selection...... 86

iv Analysis Part A – EU-China Security Cooperation Over Time ...... 93

5. Against All Odds? EU-China Security Cooperation Over Time ...... 93

5.1. Rationalist Explanations of EU-China Security Cooperation ...... 94 5.1.1. Complex Interdependence ...... 94 5.1.2. Economic Interests ...... 101 5.1.3. Supporting Rationalist Explanation: The US Factor ...... 103 5.2. Constructivist Explanations of EU-China Security Cooperation ...... 110 5.2.1. The EU’s and China’s Understanding Of ‘Security’ ...... 111 5.2.2. Mutual Perceptions ...... 120 5.4. Conclusion, Drivers Fit and Evaluation of Evidence ...... 128

Analysis Part B – EU-China Security Cooperation Across Issue-Areas ...... 133

6. Same, Same But Different? EU-China Non-Cooperation on Anti-Terrorism ...... 134

6.1. Context...... 135 6.2. Rationalist Explanations of Non-Cooperation on Anti-Terrorism ...... 136 6.2.1. Complex Interdependence ...... 136 6.2.2. Economic interests ...... 139 6.3. Constructivist Explanations of Non-Cooperation on Anti-Terrorism ...... 140 6.3.1. The EU’s and China’s Understanding Of ‘Terrorism’ ...... 141 6.3.2. Mutual Perceptions ...... 148 6.4. Chapter Conclusion, Drivers Fit And Evaluation Of Evidence...... 150

7. Sharing The Burden? EU-China Cooperation on Maritime Security/Anti-Piracy ...... 153

7.1. Context...... 154 7.2. Rationalist Explanations of EU-China Maritime Security Cooperation ...... 155 7.2.1. Complex Interdependence ...... 156 7.2.2. Economic Interests ...... 161 7.3. Constructivist Explanations of EU-China Maritime Security Cooperation ...... 164 7.3.1. The EU’s and China’s Framing Of ‘Maritime Security’ ...... 165 7.3.2. Mutual Perceptions ...... 168 7.4. Chapter Conclusion, Drivers Fit And Evaluation Of Evidence...... 169

8. New Partners for the Planet? EU-China Climate/Energy Security Cooperation ...... 173

8.1. Context...... 174 8.2. Rationalist Explanations of EU-China Climate/Energy Security Cooperation ...... 176

v 8.2.1. Complex Interdependence ...... 177 8.2.2. Economic Interests ...... 180 8.3. Constructivist Explanations of EU-China Climate/Energy Security Cooperation ...... 183 8.3.1. The EU’s and China’s Understanding Of ‘Climate/Energy Security’ ...... 184 8.3.2. Mutual Perceptions ...... 190 8.4. Chapter Conclusion, Drivers Fit And Evaluation Of Evidence...... 194

9. Comparison Of Findings Across Security Issues ...... 198

9.1. Plausibility Probe: What Drives EU-China Security Cooperation? ...... 199 9.2. Interaction Dynamics Between the Theorized Drivers ...... 205 9.3. ‘Mixing’ the Comparison: What to Learn from Part A and B? ...... 206

10. Conclusion: EU-China Security Cooperation in Context ...... 207

10.1. Summary Of The Main Findings: Research Puzzles Solved? ...... 208 10.2. Implications of the Findings for Research and Practice ...... 211 10.2.1. Contributions and Limitations of This Thesis ...... 212 10.2.2. Practical Implications and Policy Recommendations ...... 214 10.3. Final Remarks: EU-China Security Relations at a Cross Road ...... 216

References ...... 218

Appendices ...... 257

Appendix A: List Of Documents used for the Mapping ...... 257 Appendix B: List of Interviews ...... 259 Appendix C: Coding Schemes for MaxQDA ...... 261

vi List of tables

Table 1 Operationalization. Categories of (non-)cooperation...... 24 Table 2 The concept of (non-)cooperation. Own depiction...... 25 Table 3 Categories of security issues in EU-China security relations...... 27 Table 4 Expected causal relationship between IVs and EU-China security cooperation...... 63 Table 5 Description of indicators for IV 1 (complex interdependence)...... 66 Table 6 Description of indicators for IV 2 (economic interests)...... 69 Table 7 Description of indicators for IV 3 (problem understanding)...... 70 Table 8 Description of categories for IV 4 (mutual perceptions)...... 73 Table 9 Development of the EU's and China's framing of security over time, 1995-today...... 116 Table 10 Evaluation of theoretical expectations, increase of cooperation over time...... 132 Table 11 Comparison of the EU's and China's definition of terrorism...... 147 Table 12 Evaluation of theoretical expectations, anti-terrorism...... 151 Table 13 Comparison of the EU's and China's definition of piracy...... 168 Table 14 Evaluation of theoretical expectations, maritime security/anti-piracy...... 170 Table 15 Comparison of the EU's and China's definition of climate/energy security...... 188 Table 16 Evaluation of theoretical expectations, climate/energy security...... 195 Table 17 Summary of the findings across cases...... 199 Table 18 Plausibility probe of the theoretical expectation...... 205

List of figures

Figure 1 Overall research design of this dissertation...... 15 Figure 2 Design of the analysis...... 17 Figure 3 Forms of cooperation over time, disaggregated. Own depiction...... 32 Figure 4 Forms of non-cooperation over time, disaggregated. Own depiction...... 33 Figure 5 Forms of (non-) cooperation over time, aggregated. Own depiction...... 34 Figure 6 Mentions of policy fields in EU-China relations, 1995-2019. Own depiction...... 35 Figure 7 Forms of non-cooperation across policy fields, disaggregated. Own depiction...... 37 Figure 8 Forms of cooperation different policy fields, disaggregated. Own depiction...... 38 Figure 9 Mentions of security issues in EU-China relations, 1998-2019. Own depiction...... 41 Figure 10 Forms of cooperation across security issues, disaggregated. Own depiction...... 42 Figure 11 Forms of non-cooperation across security issues, disaggregated. Own depiction...... 43 Figure 12 Instances of cooperation on security issues in the Middle East, aggregated. Own depiction...... 90

vii Figure 13 Instances of cooperation on security issues in the Middle East, disaggregated. Own depiction...... 91 Figure 14 Cooperation arguments in the context of growing interdependence, Chinese interviewees, number of mentions. Own depiction...... 99 Figure 15 Cooperation arguments in the context of growing interdependence, EU interviewees, number of mentions. Own depiction...... 101 Figure 16 Role of US, Chinese interviewees, number of mentions. Depiction based on own data...... 108 Figure 17 Role of US, European interviewees, number of mentions. Depiction based on own data...... 110 Figure 18 The EU’s perception of China in the security realm, 2019. Own depiction...... 123 Figure 19 China’s perception of the EU in the security realm, 2019. Own depiction...... 125 Figure 20 Instances of cooperation on anti-terrorism. Own depiction...... 135 Figure 21 Instances of cooperation on maritime security/anti-piracy. Own depiction...... 154 Figure 22 Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the Arabian Sea. Own depiction...... 155 Figure 23 Number of mentions of forms of cooperation on climate/energy security. Own depiction...... 173

List of abbreviations and acronyms

ASEAN ...... Association of Southeast Asian Nations BASIC ...... Brazil, South Africa, India and China BCM ...... Bilateral Consultation Mechanism BRI ...... Belt and Road Initiative BRICS ...... Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa BTR ...... Backwards Tracing Research CAFTA ...... China-ASEAN Free Trade Area CBDR ...... Common But Differentiated Responsibilities CCP ...... Chinese Communist Party CCS ...... Carbon Capture and Storage CDM ...... Clean Development Mechanism CGPCS ...... Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia CMF ...... Coalition Maritime Forces CO2 ...... carbon dioxide COP ...... Conference of the Parties COSTIND ...... Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence CSP ...... Comprehensive Strategic Partnership DPRK ...... Democratic People's Republic of Korea EEAS ...... European External Action Service viii EU ...... European Union EU MSS ...... European Union Maritime Security Strategy FDI ...... Foreign Direct Investment FOCAC ...... Forum on China-Africa Cooperation GHG ...... Greenhouse Gas IPCC ...... Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IR ...... International Relations JCPOA ...... Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action MND ...... Ministry of National Defense MOOTW ...... Military Operations Other Than War MPS ...... Ministry of Public Security MSR ...... Maritime Silk Road NATCG ...... National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group NATO ...... North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEA ...... National Energy Administration NISCSS ...... China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies NSC ...... National Security Commission OFDI ...... Outbound Foreign Direct Investment PA ...... Paris Agreement PAP ...... People's Armed Police Forces PLA ...... People’s Liberation Army PLAN ...... People's Liberation Army Navy RATS ...... Regional Antiterrorism Structure RBMP ...... EU-China River Basin Management Programme SCO ...... Shanghai Cooperation Organization SHADE ...... Shared Awareness and Deconfliction UK ...... United Kingdom UN ...... United Nations UNCLOS ...... UN Convention on the Law of the Sea UNFCCC ...... United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNOCT ...... UN Office of Counter-Terrorism US ...... United States WTO ...... World Trade Organization XUAR ...... Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

ix 1. Introduction: Cooperation despite Political Tensions?

In its most recent Strategic Outlook on China, the EU’s China policy is described as multifaceted. The EU considers China “simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, […] an economic competitor […] and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance” (European Commission, 2019a). Likewise, China’s most current policy paper on the EU speaks of the Chinese EU- policy as an “all-dimensional, multi-tiered” sector-by-sector approach (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018). When the EU and China evaluate their Strategic Agenda for Cooperation at the end of 2020, they can look back on efficacious collaboration in an array of policy fields, yet also on profound challenges and recurring skirmishes. Current EU-China relations face an uncertain future that is vastly determined by broader geo-economic and geopolitical developments. This renders it even more interesting to disentangle the complex European-Chinese relationship.

While a lot has been written about EU-China economic affairs, their relationship in the security realm is a controversial and highly debated, yet under-researched issue. Taken that few world regions are under such scrutiny in current global politics as the EU and China, this is surprising. Albeit in very different manners, the two actors form central pillars of international politics, not only because they account for one third of global trade, but also because they represent a decisive axis in the current world order. Despite diverging political principles of inter-state and region-to-state relations, including state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and intervention policies, the EU and China have developed solid and recurrent interactions in a variety of policy fields. These range from people-to-people, social and cultural contacts, over economic negotiations to foreign and security policy. In doing so, they have substantially institutionalized their relations over time (Christiansen et al., 2019). Although the main drivers of EU-China relations remain of an economic kind, meaning primarily concerns with trade, investment and intellectual property issues (Kirchner et al., 2015; Huotari et al., 2017), the security dimension of their relationship has become more significant over time. It has by now developed into a vital pillar of EU-China relations. With respect to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) of 2003, and the Strategic Agenda for Cooperation of 2013, China and the EU have expressed the will to coordinate their foreign and security policy matters. Moreover, under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) they agreed to align their security policies to create a

“secure and stable environment from China to Europe, including Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria” (Schweisgut, 2015). It is therefore timely to undertake a comprehensive mapping of the existing interactions between the EU and China to extract the main drivers behind the development of EU-China security relations, and to highlight possible opportunities and remaining constraints for cooperation.

The expansion of EU-China security relations over time and concerning the array of security issues is an interesting and puzzling phenomenon. Although economic matters still dominate the EU-China agenda, the security domain is all but tenuous (Kirchner et al., 2015), not only because of the deepening economy-security nexus but also because of the rise of transnational security challenges like climate and energy security, maritime security or food security that equally affect the EU and China. Yet, for decades, EU-China security cooperation has been hindered by contradicting principles of foreign and security policymaking. Although these principles are still adhered today and lead to increasing political frictions, the intensity and scope of EU-China security cooperation have widened over time. Within an overall relationship dominated by increasing mistrust and political tensions, this is interesting to look at. Despite this fact, the security domain of EU-China relations has hitherto received less academic attention in comparison to the economic field. In my dissertation, I explore this knowledge gap and contribute to the rising discussion about EU-China security relations on a region-to-state- level. The overarching question guiding my research is the following:

Why do the EU and China engage in security cooperation despite deepening political tensions?

Using a mixed comparison approach, I focus on EU-China security relations through the lens of a theoretical framework that combines rationalist and constructivist explanations of international cooperation. I explicitly focus on security issues in the Middle East. The reason for this is that security is a pertinent issue in the Middle East and the region is significant to both the EU and China. Unlike the US, China has not interfered in the Middle East for centuries, avoiding immersion in the region’s turbulent politics. But now it is gradually developing into a strategic actor in the Middle East (Godement et al., 2017; Gurol, 2020; Gurol, 2018). Moreover, the Middle East is strategically important for the EU and China due to its pivotal position along the BRI (Dorsey, 2018a; Chaziza, 2016; Evron, 2017; Haenle et al., 2018; Lirong, 2010; Sun and Zoubir, 2018). Although the key interests of China in the region are still of an economic nature, security considerations become more pressing with rising number of Chinese

2 investments (Godement et al., 2017). Also in the EU’s external policy, the Middle East plays an important role and its recurring security skirmishes are frequently referenced in the EU’s Global Strategy (European Commission, 2016c: 34f). Having played a secondary role in the region thus far, the EU’s activities in the Middle East are growing and there is by no means a lack of strategic European interests in the region. Being adjacent to the Middle East, the EU’s security and economic situation is closely intertwined with that of the its troubled neighbor (Fiott, 2019).1 Especially against the backdrop of the gradual withdrawal of the US from the region, the interdependence between the EU and China rises, opening a window of opportunity for increased collaboration, deepening tensions notwithstanding (Gurol, 2018). This makes the Middle East a fruitful region to analyze EU-China security relations and their development over time.

By addressing EU-China security cooperation in the context of political tensions, my dissertation adds to the growing body of literature on EU-China relations in general and EU- China security relations in particular. As very little is known about the underlying rationales of EU-China security cooperation, it offers an empirical and a theoretical contribution. While a plethora of studies situates EU-China security relations in the light of a third party, which is most commonly the US or Russia (Stahl, 2011; Hackenesch, 2011; Alden, 2005), the focus of this project is on direct EU-China relations. Moreover, many scholars describe EU-China relations as a one-sided affair when it comes to the security realm, implying that the EU lacks actorness and manifest military capabilities. In contrast, I base my research on the argument that this conception disregards two mutually reinforcing aspects. First, I put forward that perceptions of the EU as a weak security actor stem from the fact that the EU’s security actorness is often unduly compared to that of the US. Second, I denote that such approach neglects non-military EU security capabilities and overemphasizes traditional over non- traditional security issues as it primarily assesses the EU’s security actorness in military terms. Of course, I recognize that China relates also to individual EU member states and that those bilateral relations, especially with Germany, France and the United Kingdom (UK) 2 are certainly more established than EU-China relations. Nevertheless, I demonstrate in my thesis that research can profit from also looking at EU-China security relations on a region-to-state

1 Hence, one could argue that the EU’s somewhat second-tier role in the region mainly derives from divergences among EU member states, not from insignificance of the region to the EU as such. 2 For most time of this PhD project, the UK was still a member of the EU. Therefore it is referenced here. In 2020, the UK finally decided to implement the Brexit decision and leave the EU. 3 level. Bilateral relations notwithstanding, EU-China region-to-state relations have their own dynamics and therefore deserve a closer look.

Finally, yet importantly, I want to make a theoretical contribution by assessing cooperation not only through agreements or actions but by taking into account the rhetoric level of cooperation from a constructivist perspective. Only few scholars include the level of intentions. Yet, in EU- China relations, many prospects for cooperation still remain at the level of discourse and have not yet been implemented. Departing from this conceptual gap, I develop a novel conceptualization that understands cooperation as a continuum of different forms of interaction in four dimensions: rhetoric, institutional, formal and activity. In addition, I explain the emergence of EU-China security cooperation from a combination of rationalist and constructivist perspectives as this provides the most promising insights into the main drivers towards cooperation. China‘s foreign policy is driven by internal, domestic influences. At the same time, it reveals a form of rational strategic culture dominated by realpolitik thinking (Johnston, 2003). Yet, a rationalist perspective alone would fall short on capturing the rationales that lead to EU-China security cooperation in their full scope and degree, as it does not include values, norms or perceptions. Moreover, it could not account for interactions between states that shape and change both their behaviour as well as the overall structures of the international community. I argue that is important to not only bear material interests or strategic calculations, but to also be aware of the paradigm through with this region-to-state relationship and the respective other are viewed. Thus, a combination of constructivist and rationalism seems fruitful.

In short, this PhD project endeavors to disentangle the complex EU-China relationship in the security realm in a multidimensional way. It explores the drivers towards cooperation in the wider sense of security as such and particularly sheds light on the widening scope of non- military EU-China security cooperation. I offer a close empirical examination and a differentiated theoretical and conceptual approach to EU-China security cooperation. In doing so, I also provide an insight into the Chinese perspective and discourse on EU-China relations beyond the economic realm. Thereby I want to react to the predominantly Eurocentric focus of many European scholars, who concentrate primarily on the European experience and on the EU’s strategies towards a rising China and less often take into account the Chinese perspective, due to reasons of accessibility of data or language barriers3. Of course, I still assess the regional

3 Accordingly, I addressed my Chinese interview partners in Chinese, whenever possible, and crosschecked the English translations of Chinese policy documents or media reports with the original Chinese versions. 4 context as a European researcher. However, during fieldwork, data collection and also over the course of the analysis, I tried to be sensitive to regional specificities and cultural contexts, especially when examining information stemming from Chinese sources.

1.1. State of the Art

In the present chapter, I review the relevant literature for my topic. I identify three knowledge gaps in the literature that my dissertation intends to fill. First, I will show that there is a considerable lack of research on EU-China security relations, especially in comparison to the economic dimension of their relationship. Moreover, the literature review suggests that further in-depth research on the existing instances of cooperation within the context of political tensions in EU-China relations is necessary, as most studies tend to consider China rather as a threat than as an opportunity. Although the EU and China have expanded their security relations over time, not many scholars have assessed whether this actually translates into cooperation, which security issues benefit from this tendency and which underlying drivers account for it. And third, I will show that there is a considerable lack of research that applies constructivist notions to EU-China security relations. Instead, rationalist interest-driven perspectives dominate existing scholarship. Such focus bears the risk to neglect role constructions and identities of the EU and China.

In general, this thesis is situated at the interface of two wide-ranging strands of research. Theoretically, it broadly speaks to scholars of International Relations (IR), who try to explain cooperation and conflict in the international system. It also relates to research on foreign and security policymaking and touches upon issues of comparative area studies. Empirically, it speaks to research on EU-China relations in general and security relations in particular, adding to an evolving strand of literature, which deals with EU-China relations beyond the economic scope. It also addresses studies of the EU’s foreign and security policy and the challenges it faces. Thereby, it contributes to a better understanding of the EU’s foreign relations. For each of these bodies of literature, a plethora of authors can be detected that scrutinize EU-China relations from either perspective.

Research on EU-China relations beyond the economic scope has hitherto received scant academic attention (Bersick, 2015) but is certainly growing. As regards Western and Chinese research on EU-China relations, two disproportions should be specified. The first imbalance is

5 the predominantly Eurocentric focus of European scholars, who commonly do research on European experience and on the EU’s strategies towards a rising China (Huotari et al., 2017; Griese, 2006). Less often they take into account the Chinese perspective, due to reasons of accessibility of data or lingual barriers (Gerring, 2007). The second disproportion concerns Chinese research on the EU’s foreign and security policy. While in general, the EU is a famous subject that features prominently with Chinese researchers, there are only few systematic studies on EU-China relations beyond the economic realm (exceptions include Lexiang, 2000; Xuetong, 2000). However, EU studies have become more popular in China and the group of so-called ‘Europe Watchers’ has gained more acquaintance outside of China (Shambaugh et al., 2008; Bingran, 2008). In this context a new strand of literature has emerged, which focuses on the EU as a security actor. For instance, Zhang (2016) examines the official Chinese media discourse on the EU’s actorness in its security partnership with China. Wenxiu (2002) also touches upon security issues in EU-China relations in his article on the connotation and orientation of the CSP and Hongjian (2018) examines the structural changes and prospects of China-EU relations, just to name some examples.

Although the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EU and China dates back to 1975, research on their relationship emerged significantly later. Despite the drafting of a Cooperation Agreement in 1985, the EU and China devoted little attention to each other in their foreign policy strategies in the first phase of diplomatic relations. The upsurge of new cooperation projects since the 2000s (e.g. the CSP in 2003) and the revitalization and amplification of relations in form of a European “pivot to Asia” (Casarini, 2013; Parello- Plesner, 2012)4 resulted in amplified scholarly attention to the topic. The emerging new strand of literature is characterized by very different approaches towards how to conceptualize EU- China relations, as it is neither per definition an interregional5 not a bilateral state-to-state relationship but rather characterizes as a region-to-state relationship (Rüland, 2006; Hänggi, 2006). Neither among European nor among Chinese scholars there is consensus about whether the EU can and does hold an important position as a unitary actor within the international system (Liqun, 2008). Thus, most scholars focus on what is commonly referred to as ‘Sino-European’ relations, namely the relations of individual EU member states with China. The main argument

4 This pivot was based on the „Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in Asia“ and was put forward by the former High Representative for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policies, Javier Solana. 5 Although some scholars would argue that a region-to-state relationship could be characterized as a quasi- interregional relationship, following the works of Baert et al. (2014), Rüland (2006), Hänggi (2006) or Gilson (2005), just to name some examples. 6 justifying this focus is that especially the development of foreign and security policies remains largely prerogative to the individual EU member states (Maher, 2016; Smith and Xie, 2010). Researchers, who situate themselves within this strand of literature argue that it is not useful to consider the EU and China as equal counterparts. They pledge for analyses on bilateral level as some EU member states have much longer and more involved security relations with China, as for example France or the UK. Furthermore, researchers of this skein of thought put forward the argument that the policy-making process of an institutional body like the EU is a complex and interwoven process of formulation of common interests, which spans so many levels (supranational, national and subnational) that it is difficult to compare EU foreign policy and China’s foreign policy, let alone to find commonalities and differences (Algieri, 2008).

With the rising discussion about the EU’s evolving role as a security actor, a different strand of research has developed that considers the EU as an international actor of increasing substance and rising agency (Doidge, 2011; Lan, 2005; Wallace, 1983). Advocates of this approach emphasize the scholarly interest and political relevance of the EU’s emerging security policy. Although the EU’s role has mainly been attached to economic influence and normativity, while the US has been regarded as the most important security provider (Chaban et al., 2017), the EU’s role as a security actor has increased and so has its impact on EU-China security relations, they argue. Therefore, it is also of analytical value to assess EU-China relations on a region-to- state-level and treat the EU and China as two global actors with increasing importance (Kirchner, 2015).

This assumption funnels into an overall debate about the EU’s security role in and together with Asia. While some scholars still argue that the EU is “free-riding” on US security guarantees in Asia (Keohane, 2012; Stares and Regaud, 1997), others claim that it is allegedly provided that Brussel is getting more involved in Asian security and is actively reaching out to many Asian countries as possible security counterparts (Berkofsky, 2014; Casarini, 2013; Parello-Plesner, 2012; Cameron, 2013; Kirchner and Sperling, 2007). Advocates of this strand of research promote the idea of a European pivot to Asia that differs from the US pivot as an instrument of containment of especially China. Instead, the European pivot focuses on a deeper economic, political and security alignment and the extension of institutional ties with many Asian countries and China in particular.6

6 It has to be mentioned that the EU maintains around 50 sectoral dialogue formats with China on multiple policy fields and issues. So far no other country except the US has received a similar amount of EU attention and resources (Berkofsky, 2014). 7

Besides those rather conceptual differences, the mutual perceptions of the EU and China have changed over time, which has been reflected in the literature. Until today, the discussion mainly circles around the question of how to interpret China’s rise economically, politically or security- wise as well how to evaluate its impact on the liberal international order. By now, two strands of literature have emerged over the question whether China’s rise will result in increased responsibility (Putten and Chu, 2012; Zhimin, 2016) or whether it will lead to revisionism (Johnston, 2003; Huiyun, 2009; Legro, 2007).

On the one hand, China’s rise can be interpreted as a “threat” and its increasing engagement in its Western neighborhoods as a menace to national and international interests of the EU in ideological, economic, strategic and geopolitical terms (Broomfield, 2003; Johnston, 2003; Christensen, 2015). In this interpretation China is seeking hegemony and thereby challenges other actors in the international system (Roy, 1994; Griese, 2006; Huotari et al., 2017; Benner et al., 2018). Especially from a realist perspective, the aspiration for power and economic wealth are used to explain China’s extensive expansion policy (Sørensen, 2013). Such studies mainly focus on power politics (Zweig and Bi, 2005; Dannreuther, 2014; Broomfield, 2003). For instance, Duchâtel and Duplaix conclude their analysis of China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) with the notion that it creates more competition than cooperation with the EU (Duchâtel and Duplaix, 2018). Consequently, they stress the importance of finding new and innovative strategies to respond to well-funded Chinese industrial policies and power aspirations to be able to continue competing for international influence. With a similar impression, Benner et al. present their work on China’s increasing efforts to influence Europe politically and consider China as a “challenge to liberal democracy as well as Europe’s values and interests” (Benner et al., 2018, p. 2).

On the other hand, although China’s rise challenges the international order, no military conflicts between the rising power and existing hegemons occur, as observed historically during the rise of other emerging powers. Thus, China’s rise could as well be understood as peaceful (He and Walker, 2015). Following this considerably smaller body of literature, there are not only constraints for cooperation with China but also opportunities for it (Kirchner et al., 2016; Maher, 2016; Shambaugh, 2007; Pradt, 2016; Möller, 2002; Cui, 2018; Christiansen and Maher, 2017; Christiansen, 2016; Dorussen et al., 2017; Christiansen et al., 2019). Although it is necessary to acknowledge the existing differences and political tensions, China makes important contributions to the international system (Stanzel, 2007; Shambaugh, 2005). Examples for efforts of integration into the international system are China’s active participation in the six 8 party talks with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as well as its contribution of troops for UN deployment in conflict areas (Oertel, 2011). The current common sense of this skein of thought is that cooperation between the EU and China in the security realm is possible but that deeper alignment is difficult due to contradicting foreign and security policy principles, deepening political tensions and geopolitical skirmishes (Stanzel, 2007). Thus, there seems to be a “stalemate” (Godement and Vasselier, 2017, p. 16) in EU-China relations that can be overcome with respect to being more competitive and cooperative at once, if recognizing that there is potential for cooperation with China despite remaining constraints and including the Chinese discourse and perspective on issues, which touch upon European interests (Dorussen et al., 2017; Kirchner, 2015). As possible areas for security cooperation, these authors mention non-traditional issues. They argue that non-traditional security issues pose a serious threat to international society and therefore enlarge the scope of security to encompass also political, economic, financial, technological or cultural security, according to the authors.

Drawing on this, the literature explores whether the interdependence between the EU and China has increased, arguing that increased collaboration in the security realm is unavoidable (Stanzel, 2007; Christiansen, 2016; Putten and Chu, 2012; Ghiasy and Zhou, 2017). Concerning the different regions, where this interdependence plays out and leads either to increased rivalry and competition or to deepened alignment and cooperation, Central Asia and Africa are addressed most often (Kavalski, 2007; Taylor, 2009; Stahl, 2011; Hackenesch, 2011; Duggan, 2017; Schiek, 2017; Dave and Kobayashi, 2018; Hartmann and Noesselt, 2020). The Middle East in contrast is a comparably under-researched region, albeit similarly prone to Chinese influence. Studies on China in the Middle East are still outweighed by research on China in Africa, Southeast Asia and Central Asia although recently a plethora of publications has addressed this issue (Dorsey, 2018a; Downs, 2013; Jun and Lei, 2010; Evron, 2017; Haenle et al., 2018; Ehteshami, 2018; Chaziza, 2016; Degang and Shaoxing, 2015; Yang, 2018; Sun and Zoubir, 2018; Gurol, 2020). Moreover, research is driven by China’s energy concerns, the BRI or great power politics and to lesser extent by China’s growing role as a security actor (Ehteshami and Horesh, 2020; Dorsey, 2018b). One exception are Huotari et al. (2017), who assess China’s emergence as a global security actor and make a first step towards an encompassing evaluation of this emergence and its impact on core European interests in Central Asia and Africa. They share the political notion that China has indeed the potential to become a closer partner for the EU but that it will also continue to act as a competitor and adversary.

Although studies of European or Western analysists still outweigh the number of studies from China, an increasing amount of Chinese and English articles have been published throughout the past decades that assess China’s views on the EU and EU-China relations in several policy fields. Following the Chinese academic and policy discourse, it becomes obvious that in general the Chinese perception of the EU was always closely connected to two factors: First, to power shifts in the global order and the role of China within this global order. Second, to the EU’s organizational structure and internal cohesion (Ye, 2011; Zhang, 2008). Furthermore, from the Chinese side, bilateral relations to distinct EU member states play a more profound role than region-to-state relations – in politics as in research. With the US’ changing international role, a shift can be detected away from prioritizing US-Sino relations towards exploring possibilities and constraints for cooperation within the Sino-EU Partnership (Gabriel and Schmelcher, 2017; Ross et al., 2010; Meijer and Jensen, 2018).

Despite temporal setbacks, like the Eurozone financial crisis (De Ville and Vermeiren, 2016; Zhan Zhang, 2016), the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 (Gabriel and Schmelcher, 2017) and the Brexit decision in 2017 (Yu, 2017), the general picture emerging from the Chinese policy literature on the EU is favorable and primarily optimistic (Dong, 2014; European Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2008; Long and Dai, 2018; Lan, 2005). In some documents, the EU is even mentioned as “one of the key directions of China’s diplomacy” (Cui, 2018) and according to Chen Zhimin, “Europe has been Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s key foreign policy priority during his two terms (…) in office” (Zhimin, 2012a, p. 2). Advocates of this strand of research do not deny that there are ongoing disputes between different EU member states and China on bilateral level, concerning for example human rights, the Tibet issue and the remaining European arms embargo on China. However, they put forward the argument that despite these dissents that erupted after the EU-China “honeymoon” in 2003, the EU is still an important partner, in economic, political and security terms under the Strategic Dialogue framework. They advocate that the PRC should strengthen its public diplomacy mechanisms with regard to Europe to avoid the spread of misunderstandings and negative sentiments (Zhimin, 2012a; Zhimin, 2016; Song, 2011).

The other perspective that Chinese scholars take on the role of the EU in world politics emphasizes the EU’s lacking actorness over possibilities for partnership or cooperation. Advocates of this strand of research criticize the lack of internal cohesion within the EU and the growing dissent between some of the member states (Feng, 2018; Chang and Pieke, 2018). For instance, Zeng (2017) argues that the EU plays only a marginalized role in China’s “new 10 type of great power relations” although it had once been considered the second most important pole in China’s vision of a multi-polar world. Other scholars even argue that the EU’s international influence will decline and resort to market protectionism and seclusion (Zuokui, 2017). Li Zhang (2016), who analyzes the EU’s actorness and partnership with China through an examination of the Chinese media discourse, detects that neither the “capability-expectations gap” (Hill, 1993) nor the “expectation deficit” (Tsuruoka, 2008) can explain the deterioration of EU-China relations but rather a lack of mutual understanding. She puts forward the argument that at the macro level, China expected a “united Europe to be a major force in the multi-polar system” (Li Zhang, 2016, p. 476) and that this perception has continued despite certain setbacks (Li Zhang, 2016). However, it is not only important to distinguish between different stages of EU-China relations but also between the role of the EU for China in economic or geopolitical and security terms. Several scholars argue that the EU would be secondary to China in the security realm if it wasn’t for the shrinking Sino-US relation, while the EU has an important status for China in economic aspects (Zeng, 2017; Dai, 2010; Ye, 2011).

To sum it up, Chinese scholars, who adhere to a rational choice reading of European policy behavior, consider cooperation and deeper alignment between the two as a win-win approach and stress the importance of cooperation despite deepening political tensions. Others stress normative differences and paint a more pessimistic picture of future EU-China relations (Feng, 2010), especially against the backdrop of the growing constraints.

1.2. Knowledge Gaps & Contribution of this Thesis

The above literature review suggests several aspects, which would benefit from additional scholarly attention. In particular, I identify three knowledge gaps in the literature that my dissertation intends to fill. The following section elaborates on these gaps and shows the contributions of my PhD thesis.

First, there is a considerable lack of research on the security dimension of EU-China relations, especially in comparison to studies on EU-China economic relations. Although it is undeniable that the main pillar of EU-China relations remains economy, the security realm is all but tenuous and has grown over time Yet, this has not translated into a stronger research focus on EU-China security relations which remain a comparably under-researched topic. Moreover, the constraints of cooperation in the security realm and the possible threat, which China poses to Western

11 actors, feature prominently in Western literature. Yet, there is a small amount of research, which deals with reasons for cooperation despite these constraints. This body of literature certainly requires a closer look. Empirically, very little is known about the rationales for security cooperation in the context of growing political tensions. Accordingly, this thesis makes a strong empirical contribution by assessing EU-China security cooperation and trying to extract the drivers towards cooperation in times of overall deepening mistrust and rising competition.

Second, there seems to be a strong dichotomy of considering China either as a threat or as a partner. In this regard, research that focuses on competition and conflict in EU-China relations heavily outweighs studies on the existing instances of cooperation that can be observed. Hence, scholarly literature can profit from overcoming this ‘either/or’-rationale and disentangling the complex nature of EU-China security relations. In my thesis, I endeavor to fill this gap.

And third, there is a lack of research that approaches EU-China security relations from a constructivist perspective. Most studies that analyse EU-China relations tend to privilege interest-driven explanations and focus on material structures and their influence on the relationship. They assesses EU-China relations from a rationalist interest-driven perspective that neglects the role constructions and identities of the EU and China although they repeatedly interact with each other and thereby shape and change both the behavior of the respective other as well as the overall structures of the international community. In this account, China’s main stance towards the EU is interest-driven, focusing on trade and investments to boost China’s economy. Sometimes scholars also assert that China is viewing the EU mainly as an opportunity to balance US hegemony.

This gap also affects the conceptualization of cooperation as a phenomenon. Most scholars assess cooperation mainly in three different ways. Either they measure cooperation by the amount of agreements of actions two actors sign on bilateral or multilateral level. Alternatively, they focus on the extent to which two actors engage in joint actions and actually implement an agreement. Few include the level of intentions or rhetoric into their operationalization of cooperation. However, many prospects for cooperation in EU-China relations remain at the level of discourse and declarations of intent. Hence, a broader understanding of the term “cooperation” would be beneficial. In reacting to this gap, I will develop a novel conceptualization of (non-) cooperation as regards rhetoric, institutions, agreements and activity, in order to provide a more encompassing definition. In my thesis, I will make a theoretical contribution by including constructivist notions and combining rationalist, interest-

12 driven notions with constructivist, experience-driven explanations for cooperation. Hence, my thesis also makes a theoretical or conceptual contribution.

Besides these three gaps, there is a conceptual imbalance that need to be addressed. Until today, there is a prevailing strong focus on bilateral relations between China and different EU member states. The recognition that the relationship between the EU and China is one between a state and a region – although the EU has already developed many characteristics of statehood – will guide the analysis of this dissertation. I will treat EU-China relations as a region-to-state relationship and acknowledge that the EU acts differently in its external relations than a state. Beyond the activity and actorness of the supranational institutions, the EU has to reflect the interests of its member states. These do not only have to find a common position when it comes to stressing EU foreign policy principles and policies but also maintain the autonomy to develop own policy strategies towards other states, like China (Christiansen et al., 2019).

Furthermore, it is crucial to consider not only bilateral relations between China and different EU-member states but also concentrate on the EU as a unified actor. Although China relates to individual EU-member states and although these relations, especially with Germany France and the UK, are certainly more established than EU-China relations are as such, focusing specifically on the EU and China as two entities would add additional value to the analyses of EU-Chain security relations. These region-to-state relations have their own dynamics and are meaningful and consequential in the context of global governance (Christiansen, 2016, p. 31). In-depth analyses with an actual EU-China focus would therefore complement the picture of what EU-China relations in the security realm entail in scope or degree. Yet, there are still very few studies shedding light on EU-China security relations on a region-to-state level.

Last but not least, the literature review reveals that it is necessary to conduct further thorough research on EU-China security relations incorporating the Chinese perspective. Supporting research includes the Chinese perspective and discourse will certainly provide interesting insights into the rationales behind EU-China relations in their current form and can pinpoint future developments. As already mentioned, this thesis is oriented at the aim to provide an insight into the Chinese perspective and discourse on EU-China security relations. Thereby it reacts to the predominantly Eurocentric focus of many European scholars, who concentrate primarily on the European experience and on the EU’s strategies towards a rising China and less often take into account the Chinese perspective, due to reasons of accessibility of data or language barriers. Remaining sensitive to regional specificities and cultural contexts, especially

13 when examining information stemming from Chinese sources, this is another empirical contribution offered by this thesis.

1.3. Research Questions and Research Design

The previous sections outlined the existing scholarship on EU-China (security) relations. I identified three gaps in the literature and explained the contributions I want to make. The aim of this section is to illustrate the overall structure of my thesis and to explain the logic of the order of the following chapters. In chapter 1, I already introduced the overall question guiding my research. It reads as follows: Why do the EU and China engage in security cooperation despite deepening political tensions?

This overarching research question is divided into three interrelated sub questions. As little is known about the empirical phenomenon of interests, the first sub question is a descriptive question that explores patterns of EU-China security cooperation and their variation over time as well as among issue areas. It reads as follows: Which patterns of EU-China security cooperation can be observed and how do they vary over time and among issue areas? The second and third sub questions address the drivers towards cooperation over time as well as among security issues. They read as follows: What are the main drivers towards EU-China security cooperation over time? Why does cooperation emerge on some security issues but not on others?

These research questions structure the subsequent chapters. Broadly speaking, my thesis entails two parts, one of which is descriptive and guided by the first question, while the other is explanatory, guided by the second and third question. Figure 1 displays the overall set-up of my research design.

Why do the EU and China engage in security cooperation despite deepening political tensions? • RQ: Which patterns of EU-China security cooperation part I - can be observed and how do they vary over time and mapping among issue areas? (descriptive) • Data: EU and China‘s official policy papers on on their relations (1995-2019) Joint Declarations of EU-China summits (1998-2019)

• RQ: What are the main drivers towards EU-China security cooperation over time? part II - analysis RQ: Why does cooperation emerge on some security (explanatory) issues but not on others?

• Data: Policy documents and official declarations; expert and elite interviews; speeches and media outlets

Figure 1 Overall research design of this dissertation.

Taking the heating debate about EU-China relations in general and EU-China security relations in particular as a starting point, this dissertation examines the development of EU-China cooperation in the security realm. It is a puzzling phenomenon that the EU and China engage in security cooperation although overall political tensions deepen and they find themselves on opposite sides in geopolitical skirmishes. Part I of the dissertation serves to grasp this counterintuitive phenomenon and to sketch the empirical terrain of EU-China security relations. It is a descriptive part, in which I operationalize the main concepts used throughout the thesis, namely ‘(non-)cooperation’ and ‘security’ and map the development of EU-China security cooperation over time and among issue areas. Hence, part I lays the baseline for the whole project. It provides insights into temporal patterns in EU-China security cooperation and further seeks to identify, on which security issues the EU and China are actually cooperating, which remain prone to non-cooperation and which remain irrelevant.

To this end, I pursue a very broad mapping of my dependent variable ‘EU-China security cooperation’ in chapter 2 in order to sketch the empirical phenomenon and extract interesting patterns for the analysis. I pursue in a three-tiered approach. First, I examine whether and to what extent the EU and China have embarked on cooperation over time. In a second step, I 15 compare the security dimension in EU-China relations to other policy fields and its position within the overall EU-China relationship. Thereby, I underpin the topic of this dissertation – EU-China security cooperation in the context of political tensions – with empirical evidence. I show that while the overall relationship between the EU and China has become more prone to non-cooperation and deepening tensions, the EU and China have increased their amount of security cooperation. Finally, zoom into the security realm and show which security issues are subject to EU-China security cooperation and which remain marginal or prone to non- cooperation. The overarching question guiding this first part of the thesis reads as follows: Which patterns of EU-China security cooperation can be observed and how do they vary over time and among issue areas?

The second part of the dissertation, namely the analysis, is dedicated to explaining the empirical patterns found in the first part. It takes a y-centered research approach in that it seeks to examine the drivers towards EU-China security cooperation and to this end builds on mixed comparison. The analysis consists of two interrelated parts that assess the overall phenomenon on two levels. While Part A examines the drivers towards the increase of security cooperation over time, part B sheds light on the conditions under which EU-China security cooperation takes place by assessing three case studies that reveal different amounts of cooperation. These are anti- terrorism, maritime security/anti-piracy and climate/energy security. Accordingly, the two parts shall not be understood as separate but add to answering the overall question. Figure 2 displays the set-up of the explanatory part of my thesis.

Figure 2 Design of the analysis.

I begin the explanatory part of my dissertation by constructing the theoretical framework for the analysis in chapter 3. In order to answer my research questions and in reaction to the dominance of rationalist approaches to EU-China relations, I develop a framework that builds both on rationalist and constructivist explanations of international cooperation. In particular, I draw on liberal institutionalist notions as a rationalist approach and on social constructivism as a constructivist approach. Based on this theoretical framework, I deduct theoretical expectation that shall guide the ensuing analysis. Moreover, I extract the main concepts that are later applied as independent variables in the analysis. These are complex interdependence, economic interests, a common problem understanding and mutual perceptions. I further provide a detailed discussion about how I operationalize these variables for the subsequent analysis.

Before delving into the actual analysis, chapter 4 is dedicated to methodological considerations with regard to my strategies of data collection, data analysis and case selection. I will carefully discuss the challenges of data collection in sensitive security settings like the authoritarian

China and elaborate on triangulation techniques to increase data saturation and augment the validity of the evidence. Moreover, I explain mixed comparison as my main method of analysis. It is ‘mixed’ in that I use a diachronic (within-case) comparison when assessing the increase of EU-China security cooperation over time and a synchronic (cross-case) comparison when analyzing cooperation on different security issues.

In chapter 5, the empirical analysis begins with the diachronic comparison. In this part of the analysis (part A, as indicated in figure 2), I examine why security cooperation has increased over time, despite deepening political tensions. The research questions guiding this part is the following: What are the main drivers behind the increasing EU-China security cooperation over time? I scrutinize my theorized drivers towards cooperation in the following order. First, I shed light on rationalist drivers, beginning with complex interdependence and then diving into economic interests. Subsequently, I explore the constructivist drivers, namely a common problem understanding and mutual perceptions. The chapter illustrates whether and how these drivers have contributed to the increase of EU-China security cooperation over time. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings and evaluates the probability of the theoretical expectations.

The chapters 6 to 8 are dedicated to the analysis of the three cases. In order words, it hosts the synchronic comparison. This second part of the analysis (part B, as indicated in figure 2) is based on the observation that security cooperation does not emerge equally on all security issues. While some issues seem to be marginal, others are at the center stage and either prone to non- cooperation or subject to cooperation. Also, the amounts of cooperation differ between the different security issues. The main research question assessed in this part of the analysis reads as follows: Why does cooperation emerge on some security issues but not on others? I focus on three different security issues that are characterized by different amounts of cooperation: anti- terrorism, which is not subject to EU-China security cooperation, maritime security/anti-piracy, on which the EU and China cooperate to some extent and climate/energy security, where many instances of EU-China security cooperation can be observed. Each case examination begins with some background information regarding the context of the security issue under scrutiny. Subsequently, I examine the theoretical drivers in the same order as in part A, starting with complex interdependence and economic interest and then moving on to the EU’s and China’s problem understanding of the issue under scrutiny and their mutual perceptions.

The analysis concludes with a comparison of the findings across the three cases and a plausibility probe of my theoretical expectations in chapter 9. I further delve into possible interaction dynamics between the drivers towards cooperation.

My thesis concludes with chapter 10 in which I summarize the main results from the analysis. Moreover, I elaborate on the implications of the findings for future academic research on EU- China security relations as well as for practitioners, providing some policy recommendations. I further discuss possible limitations and provide incentives for future research.

2. The Empirical Terrain: Mapping the Development of EU-China Security Cooperation

The previous chapter has introduced the main research questions and outlined the research design of my dissertation. The following chapter maps the development of EU-China security cooperation. It sheds light on variation of cooperation over time as well as between different security issues. Thereby, it provides a differentiated insight into the various facets of EU-China security relations and detects interesting patterns. The section is structured as follows. First, I outline my methodological considerations with regards to the selected text corpus for the mapping as well as the coding process. Based on that, I present a novel conceptualization of (non-)cooperation that includes eight different categories, ranging from unilateral hostility as the strongest form of non-cooperation to joint activities as the strongest form of cooperation. Subsequently, I map the development of EU-China security cooperation over time and elaborate on the first research puzzle which is the increase of security despite deepening of political tensions and prevailing adherence to divergent principles of foreign and security policy making. In the next step, I zoom into the security dimension and scrutinize puzzling patterns among a snapshot of different security issues to examine which ones are subject to increased cooperation and which are subject to (non-)cooperation. Based on that, I explain the second research puzzle which refers to the striking variance of cooperation among different security issues. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of my findings.

2.1. Methodological Considerations: Data and Operationalization

The text corpus that I used to map EU-China security cooperation consists of 32 documents, issued between 1995 and 2019. The EU and China have established diplomatic relations in 1975, yet there are no policy documents of that time. The first policy paper of the EU on China

19 was issued in 1995, which is why I took this year as the starting point for my mapping. The text corpus for the mapping includes the respective policy papers the EU and China issued on their relationship7 from 1995 to 2019, as well as the Joint Declarations summing up the annual EU- China summit that takes place since 1998. Official policy documents and declarations are a useful source to capture the official lines of the EU and China towards each other. Although their actual political behavior might not always match the content of these documents, they are suitable to understand their political perspectives on each other (Charteris-Black, 2005; Charteris-Black, 2014; Townshend, 2003). Therefore, the documents have been chosen precisely for their function as stylized expressions of the EU’s and China’s own role- conceptions and position vis-à-vis each other as well as the perception of the respective other (Michalski and Pan, 2017). Yet it is necessary to bear in mind that official policy papers and statements can be much more optimistic and result-oriented than the actual political behavior (Berkofsky, 2014). Yet, they help to understand the elite perspective on the phenomenon under scrutiny (Bowen, 2009). While they might be less suited for the analysis of the drivers toward cooperation, as they contain only few information on the processes leading to certain policies or statements (George and Bennett, 2005) they are a useful source to map EU-China security cooperation and to scrutinize interesting patterns.

As policy papers I understand all official policy documents that are issued by the EU on its China policy as well as by China on its EU policy. Thus, I do not include policy papers that touch upon national/EU-wide topics but only those that specifically address the EU’s and China’s respective policies towards each other. To detect interesting patterns as regards the development of EU-China security cooperation over time and on different security issues, I incorporate only cross-issue policy papers and declarations. Thus, I intentionally exclude documents like the 2004 EU-China Joint Declaration of the People's Republic of China and the European Union on Non-proliferation and Arms Control. Using EU-China policy papers for the mapping creates a certain imbalance as for the time period under observation the EU issued seven policy papers on China while China issued only three on the EU. Therefore, it is necessary to bear in mind during the mapping that the European position might overweigh the Chinese. In order to be able to present a more balanced picture, I included all 22 Joint Declarations, Statements or Press Communiqués following the annual EU-China summits since 1998, which equally present the EU’s and China’s views.

7 As the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides English translations of their policy papers, I coded the English versions. 20

In order to map EU-China security cooperation based on this text corpus, I used the qualitative data analysis software MaxQDA to do a structured qualitative content analysis, following the approach of Mayring (2015). In general, the aim of qualitative content analyses is to describe a phenomenon by making statements about implicit and explicit dimensions and structures of meaning making. In the following I elaborate on methodological considerations with regard to the conceptualization of cooperation and security and critically discuss my coding procedure.

Operationalization of cooperation and security

After having introduced the text corpus for the mapping, I now operationalize the two most important concepts used throughout the thesis. These are ‘cooperation’ and ‘security’. While I develop a novel conceptualization of cooperation and non-cooperation, which is informed by theoretical considerations combined with the categories of (non-)cooperation derived inductively during the coding process, my understanding of security is based on secondary literature and existing conceptualizations.

Cooperation, in Chinese research referred to as hézuò (合作), is a contested term in the IR literature. There is common agreement on a working definition introduced by Keohane: Cooperation occurs “when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane, 2005). This implies two aspects. First, it assumes that actors behave consciously and pursue certain goals. Second, it suggests that cooperation provides them with gains or rewards. Following Keohane’s approach that cooperation and discord/non-cooperation are closely linked and that it is necessary to understand the absence or failure of cooperation to explain cooperation (Keohane, 1988a), it is also required to define, what cooperation is not. Cooperation can be distinguished from competition, conflict and non-cooperation. While competition or conflict is usually understood as “goal-seeking behavior that strives to reduce the gains available to others or to impede their want-satisfaction” (Grieco, 1990; Haas, 1990), non-cooperation implies the absence of cooperation. Hence, non-cooperation is a broader category that entails all three – the absence of cooperation, competition and conflict. Often, IR literature focuses on the dichotomy between cooperation and competition/conflict. I argue that this distinction does not go far enough as it neglects the political meaning and impact of non-cooperation. Revoking a formal agreement or disrupting an existing dialogue format does not have to be directed against the other, yet it has huge political consequences. Similarly, the conscious decision not to cooperate with another actor has a significant political meaning and sends a clear message. This shows that

21 competition/conflict is not necessarily the other side of the coin when talking about cooperation in IR. Accordingly, I will use the term non-cooperation throughout this dissertation.

The discussion of cooperation as the key concept in the analysis of EU-China security relations raises important questions about how to operationalize and to measure developments in this respect. Therefore, it is necessary to elaborate on the different categories used to assess cooperation.

In general, I distinguish between different dimensions of (non-)cooperation: rhetoric, institutional, formal and activity. I derived these categories inductively during the mapping but they can be connected to theoretical debates. As mentioned before, most scholars measure cooperation either by the amount of joint institutions and agreements or by the extent to which actors engage in joint actions (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Mitchell and Hensel, 2006). However, communication also plays an important role in IR, as it is costless and non-binding but increases the amount of information about the communicating actors (Keohane, 1988a). For instance, communication in form of rhetoric statements can affect outcomes in game-theoretic settings that would otherwise lead to conflict, and thereby yields more cooperative results of interaction (Awaya and Krishna, 2019). As Majeski and Fricke state, “communication allows groups to exchange an understanding of the game structure, to state that mutual cooperation is beneficial if only they can coordinate and trust” (1995, p. 628). As communication abounds in the interaction of actors within the international system, not counting rhetoric acts such as the articulation of a will to cooperate as a form of cooperation might lead to unsatisfying results (Orbell et al., 1984; Dawes, 2008; Caldwell, 1976). Also in the Chinese rhetoric, the power of discourse, referred to as huàyǔ quán – 话语权, is stressed, i.e. the ability of states to promote their concepts and narratives and to shape international discussions (Duchâtel and Duplaix, 2018). Therefore, I also included the rhetoric level into the conceptualization of cooperation.

I did two rounds of coding. In the first round, I coded the data inductively, deriving different categories of cooperation. In the second round, I went through the material again based on these categories in order to code the texts as completely as possible. All text passages that contained information on EU-China cooperation were coded. I coded all 32 documents manually without using keywords or automatic coding. Thereby, I was able to take into account also latent meanings and contexts, which are not expressed explicitly. Thus, my coding units are phrases or paraphrases, seldom words. Although using keywords generally increases the intersubjectivity of coding in qualitative content analyses (Wiedemann, 2016), coding all policy

22 papers manually did increase accuracy in my case. It made it possible to include text passages, where the wording is vague. To raise the intersubjective reliability of the coding process, very specific coding rules and explanations are included into the coding scheme, which shall be as detailed as possible.

The coding process provided the following eight categories that cluster different forms of (non- )cooperation between the EU and China along a continuum from ‘unilateral hostility’ to ‘joint activity’. The categories are displayed in table 1, a detailed coding scheme can be found in appendix C. Cooperation, on the one hand, is assessed essentially in four different ways. First, through joint activities in which the EU and China engage, either on bilateral level or within multilateral frameworks. Second, through formal agreements, Memoranda of Understanding or the signing and ratification of conventions. Third, the establishment of institutionalized dialogue formats is understood as a form of cooperation. Such institutionalized dialogue formats include only those forms of dialogue which take place within the institutional policy- making setting of both actors.8 And fourth, on a rhetoric level, the articulation of a will to cooperate or to deepen cooperation is counted as an instance of cooperation.

Non-cooperation, on the other hand, is assessed either as unilateral hostilities that are directed against the other and include purposive activities to harm the other. On a formal level, non- cooperation can play out as the revocation of formal agreements or the disruption of processes that lead to the conclusion of a formal agreement. On an institutional level, disrupting existing institutionalized dialogue formats or refusing to continue discussions around a certain issue represents a form of non-cooperation. And last but not least, criticizing the respective other, explicating differences or expressing dissatisfaction over a certain topic is a rhetoric form of non-cooperation.

8 Other forms of communicative exchange, ranging from a conversation between a Chinese and a European citizen to a formal encounter with both actor’s Foreign Ministers are incorporated. However, for this study The choice of the category is justified by the explicit reference that both Chinese and EU official policy papers and key documents make to this particular term. For example, the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation proposes to “hold regular dialogues on defense and security policy” (European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2013). Furthermore, the overall EU-China cooperation architecture is composed of three pillars, which are officially labeled as dialogues (e.g. Pillar I – Political Dialogue) and consist of different sub-dialogues (e.g. Security and Defence Dialogue).

category description

joint activity includes all activities to which both actors contribute

includes all forms of agreement that a are formally concluded, as formal agreement well as Memoranda of Understanding

includes all forms of dialogue that happen on an institutional level institutionalized or between people with a certain representative function (e.g. dialogue ministers)

articulation of a will to includes the articulation of the will to initiate cooperation or to cooperate/to deepen deepen cooperation cooperation

includes criticism, the explication of differences and the criticism/explication of expression of dissatisfaction over a certain matter in the respective differences other’s affairs or in the bilateral relationship disruption of includes the disruption of institutionalized dialogue formats and institutionalized the refusal to continue communication about a certain topic dialogue

revocation of formal includes revocation of already concluded agreements or the agreement disruption of a conclusion process

includes forms of non-cooperative, hostile actions against the unilateral hostility other.

Table 1 Operationalization. Categories of (non-)cooperation.

To sum it up, cooperation is measured as the sum of cooperation instances whether in the shape of the articulation of a will to cooperate or deepen cooperate, of institutionalized dialogue, of a formal agreement or of joint activities. Non-cooperation is defined as the sum of non- cooperation instances in the shape of unilateral hostility, the revocation of a formal agreement, the disruption of institutionalized dialogue or criticism and the explication of differences. Table 2 sums up the concept of (non-)cooperation as heuristic tool for the ensuing analysis. It displays the different forms of (non-)cooperation as derived from the mapping and links them to the different dimensions of (non-) cooperation as deduced from existing theoretical approaches to cooperation.

Conceptualization of (non-)cooperation

articulation of revocation disruption of criticism/ unilateral will to cooperate/ institutionalized formal joint of formal institutionalized explication of hostility to deepen dialogue agreement activity agreement dialogue differences cooperation

action formal institutional rhetoric rhetoric institutional formal action dimension dimension dimension dimension dimension dimension dimension dimension

kind of (non-)cooperation

Table 2 The concept of (non-)cooperation. Own depiction.

Despite relying on latent coding over the course of the mapping, I will add information by performing some quantification in which the pieces of evidence of the distinct categories are counted and displayed in form of graphs. When doing so, I compile these categories to a composite indicator, which means that I aggregate the articulation of a will to cooperate/to deepen cooperation, institutionalized dialogue, formal agreement and joint activity into ‘cooperation’. Likewise, I pursue with the criticism/explication of differences, disruption of institutionalized dialogue, revocation of formal agreement and unilateral hostility, which I compile into ‘non-cooperation’. Following Saisana and Tarantola, I understand a composite indicator as “based on sub-indicators that have no common meaningful unit of measurement and there is no obvious way of weighting these sub-indicators” (Saisana and Tarantola, 2002, p. 5). Thus, a composite indicator reflects a complex system that consists of several components. Concerning the weight of the different indicators for the composite indicator, there are several possibilities. One would be not to distribute any weight to the indicators, which bears the risk of double counting them. The other possibility would be the creation of a composite indicator that is equal to the sum of the individual sub-indicators. This is the way that I have chosen. Thus, for the mapping, rhetoric action is as strong as joint activity, institutionalized dialogue or a formal agreement and they all represent instances of cooperation that I sum up under the composite indicator of ‘cooperation’.

The downside of such aggregation, as discussed by a plethora of authors is that it bears the risk to oversimplify the phenomenon under scrutiny and cannot differentiate between essential and less important sub-indicators. I achieve results that are more general than they could be. Yet, in 25 the case of EU-China security cooperation, which is a highly sensitive topic for both sides, data saturation is a huge research obstacle. Thus, a differentiated analysis of the single categories of (non-)cooperation in EU-China security relations, would require a degree of data saturation, which is not achievable on this highly sensitive issue. Moreover, it would certainly exceed the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, I have chosen the following way to go: During the mapping, I will proceed in a two-tiered approach. First, I will show the disaggregated and differentiated picture, then aggregate the different categories of (non-)cooperation and show the amount of cooperation/non-cooperation on an aggregate level. This makes it possible to display a complex concept like EU-China security cooperation more easily in form of a sole indicator that encompasses a plethora of sub-indicators. Therefore I build on the advantage of composite indicators that they are adequate to summarize complex or multi-dimensional issues and provide the big picture of a certain phenomenon. Moreover, I expect that focusing on the aggregated level makes it easier to detect and interpret patterns than trying to find and analyze such in many separate sub-indicators.

Operationalization of security

Besides mapping (non-)cooperation in EU-China security relations, I will shed light on how the importance of security as a policy field has developed in relations to other policy areas. Moreover, I will zoom into the security dimension and examine, which security issues are subject to non-cooperation and on which the EU and China cooperate. In order to do that, I defined seven policy fields prior to the analysis, which I systematically coded. These are climate and environment, culture, economy, education and youth, legal and administrative affairs, security and technology and innovation.9 While the choice of policy fields seems to be rather intuitive, the selection of specific security issues certainly deserves more explanation. In total, I distinguish between eleven security issues. The decision to focus on these issues stems from the explicit references that the EU’s and China’s policy papers as well as key documents such as China’s White Papers of Defense, the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2016 Global Strategy make to these particular security areas.10 The following table describes the different categories.11

9 For a detailed coding scheme, including examples and coding rules, see Appendix C. 10 Moreover, I follow the selection of security issues of Kirchner, Dorussen and Christiansen (2016) for their analysis of EU-China security relations and expand it by additional issues. 11 For a more detailed coding scheme, including examples and coding rules, see Appendix C. 26

category description

includes military aspects related to the People’s Liberation Army, military security soldier/police training, military interventions, arms exports/arms production includes security matters in the EU’s or China’s direct regional security neighborhoods, regionalization policies, regional security integration includes security matters related to the global cyberspace, digital cybersecurity security concerns nuclear non- includes matters of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear (de-) proliferation and militarization disarmament

anti-terrorism includes combatting terrorist threats / counter-terrorism measures

climate/energy includes aspects related to climate/energy fragility, vulnerability or security resilience

maritime includes aspects related to maritime security, combatting piracy, security/anti-piracy securing waterways, monitoring illegal fishing activities

includes food relates issues, food safety and quality, food procession, food security sustainable consumption, food control and inspection

includes dangers, risks and threats to human well-being and human human security rights, measures to diminish / tackle them, protection of civilians against natural/man-made disasters

conflict resolution and includes aspects related to intrastate conflicts, measures to resolve prevention them, (UN) peacekeeping operations, humanitarian interventions

includes concerns of migration and immigration with a security migration/immigration nexus

Table 3 Categories of security issues in EU-China security relations.

Having operationalized ‘cooperation’ and ‘security’, I now turn towards the mapping and examine the empirical terrain of EU-China security cooperation. I begin with temporal patterns and then zoom into the security realm to shed light on EU-China security cooperation across the whole spectrum of the security issues mentioned above.

2.2. EU-China Security Cooperation Over Time

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1975, EU-China relations went through different phases. This chapter outlines critical junctures that led to changes in the Sino- European relationship and sketches the overarching structures in which EU-China relations are embedded. In general, security relations between the EU and the People’s Republic can be divided into three phases. The first phase begins with the first EU policy paper on China in 1995 and lasts until the launch of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2003. The second phase lasts until the establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 and the third phase ranges from 2013 until today. The aim of this chapter is to give a first overview over the development of EU-China security relations, before I dive into a more concrete mapping of how EU-China security cooperation has emerged and developed over time as well as among different security issues.

In the first phase, the EU and China devoted little attention towards each other in their foreign policy strategies although they had officially established diplomatic ties in 1975. Yet, relations only started to develop with the EU’s first policy paper on China, which was issued in 1995. Before, the EU and China did not play a significant role for each. Yet, after the Tiananmen incident in 198912, the EU was forced to put its China-relations into a broader context that included international law, political principles and human rights (Christiansen et al., 2019). The first policy paper on China, A long-term policy for China-Europe relations, published in 1995 by the European Commission, clearly tried to balance the EU’s policies towards China between strategic economic interests and normative concerns (European Commission, 1995). The “global significance” of China’s economy is mentioned. Yet, the EU also stresses that “there is a danger that relying solely on […] declarations [of improving the human rights situation in China] will dilute the message or lead to knee-jerk reactions” from China. This policy paper set out the stage for subsequent developments and marked the beginning of what would be a long- term institutionalization of EU-China relations. It includes a variety of policy topics that remain on the agenda until today, with a clear focus on trade and economic relations. It also contains first attempts to establish a human rights dialogue with China.

Three years later, in 1998, a new policy paper on China was issued ahead of the first EU-China summit, titled Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China. Based on the engagement of

12 The Tiananmen Square Protests took place in 1989 and became famous as the Tiananmen Square Massacre, when the Chinese military fired at the demonstrating crowd, killing several hundred people. 28

China in world politics and the expanded scope of competences of the EU, after the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam and the creation of the office of a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, this paper stresses the enhancement of EU-China relations (European Commission, 1998). The main aim was to institutionalize economic relations and thereby achieve a wider political reform within China, in line with EU norms and values. They policy paper clearly focuses on a long-term “integration of China into the international community” and the world economy. The 2001 policy paper, EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more Effective EU Policy, reviews and stresses these points, enriched by concrete actions points (European Commission, 2001).

With the upgrade of EU-China relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2003, EU-China relations entered their second phase, which began with a so-called “honeymoon period” (Li et al., 2017, p. 35). Relations flourished and some observers even asserted EU- China relations to become a “new axis in world affairs” (Shambaugh, 2005). In this context, the scope of EU-China relations was enlarged and new issues lengthened the agenda, mainly from the realm of non-traditional security: terrorism, non-proliferation and public health (Christiansen et al., 2019). While in comparison to economic and trade relations, the policy field of security had been a relatively marginal issue in EU-China relations before, it was now incorporated into the EU-China cooperative agenda for the first time. At the same time, the EU started strengthening its security profile with the conclusion of the European Security Strategy in 2003.

In the aftermath of the establishment of a comprehensive strategic EU-China partnership both sides issued a policy paper. The EU’s policy paper on China did not differ significantly from its predecessor. Yet, it mentions a “new maturity in EU-China relations” that is “characterized by increasingly close policy coordination in many areas” (European Commission, 2003, p. 5). China’s policy paper on the EU, in contrast, included a number of conditionalities for EU-China relations. For instance, the EU should adhere to the One-China principle13, not initiate arms deals with Taiwan and not upgrade economic relations with Taiwan. In addition, China formulated clear requests like the granting of market economy status in the WTO or lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). This led to an intensification of the initial frictions. In some policy fields, political relations were even

13 This policy asserts that there is only one sovereign Chinese state, called the People’s Republic of China. In this context, the PRC insists that Taiwan is an inalienable part of one China and is supposed to be reunified one day. 29 characterized by retrogression so that relations turned from honeymoon to betrayed hopes. However, this did not touch upon the security policy field but mainly remained subject to trade and economic relations. Apparently, it was easier for the EU and China to overcome their differences in the security field by focusing on conflict resolution and prevention in third countries or supporting the international regime of non-proliferation than to find solutions for the recurring competition in direct bilateral economic and political relations. Especially China’s trade and investment policies constituted a growing challenge for the EU, while China seemed to feel offended by the EU’s decision to deny China market economy status (Carter, 2004). In the political field, the severe human rights situation in China hindered deeper alignment and only little progress was made in the China-EU dialogue on human rights (Li et al., 2017).

However, as setbacks were detrimental to both sides’ political and economic interests, the EU and China put effort in normalizing their relations. When Premier Minister Wen Jiabao travelled to European countries in 2009, he tried to rebuild the confidence both countries experienced after the conclusion of the CSP (Willis, 2009). This upsurge of confidence led to the expansion of the existing EU-China dialogue structure. At the 10th anniversary of the CSP in 2013, China and the EU used the opportunity to issue the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation in which they articulated mutual trust and support and expressed the desire to further coordinate their foreign and security policies (European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2013).

The third phase of EU-China relations (2013-today) is characterized by the objective to build a “realistic” (European Commission, 2019a, p. 1), “all-dimensional” (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018) strategic partnership and to find a more nuanced position towards each other (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018). This phase is simultaneously characterized by increased cooperation and deepening mistrust. On the European side, the 2016 communication of the European Commission to the European Parliament and the European Council was the first official document to reflect this shift. It suggests elements for a new European China strategy and puts the EU’s interests at the forefront of the relationship. Differences and controversies are named explicitly, like for example China’s authoritarian response to domestic issues, or the arrest of dozens of Canadian citizens in the course of the Huawei issue, which has increased hostilities and fear on behalf of the EU (Cerulus, 2019a). Those differences shall be “managed constructively” (European Commission, 2016a). The 2014 policy paper that China issued on the EU explicitly mentions the challenges the EU faces after the international financial crisis. Moreover, it stresses existing “disagreements and frictions on issues of value such as human 30 rights as well as economic and trade issues”. Yet, it leaves no doubt that China still considers the EU to be a “global player of great strategic importance and a key part in the evolving international landscape” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).

At the same time, the political level on which the EU and China meet, was elevated. While China’s relation to Europe has been a key responsibility of the Chinese Premier Minister (mostly Wen Jiabao, 2003 - 2013), this task was transferred to the President, when Xi Jinping came to power in 2013. Only EU-China relations on macroeconomic issues and urbanization were left to Premier Li Keqiang. Former Chinese presidents had mostly been in charge of relations with the US. This organizational change represents a substantive elevation of the importance of EU-China relations on behalf of the Chinese side. In addition, the implementation of the BRI since 2013 and the expansive foreign policy of China has made it necessary to readjust the EU’s foreign policy towards the PRC.

Consequently, the most recent strategy paper of the European Commission published in March 2019 reflects these changes and describes the European approach towards China as “multifaceted” (European Commission, 2019a, p. 1). Moreover, it states that China is “simultaneously […] a cooperation partner […], an economic competitor, […] and a systemic rival” for the EU, alluding to a sector-by-sector approach towards China. Furthermore, it points out that the EU could tighten the rules on Chinese investments in Europe if China does not change its behavior on issues like corporate state subsidies or public procurement. Likewise, China’s 2018 policy paper states that against the backdrop of “growing instabilities and uncertainties, with unilateralism, protectionism and de-globalization on the rise”, the EU and China should develop a realistic partnership that takes into consideration both divergences and commonalities (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018). Thus, there are attempts on both sides to manage differences through increased dialogue and to find complementary foreign and security policy strategies in a realistic way.

These developments are reflected in the text corpus. In order to provide an encompassing picture of the development of EU-China (non-)cooperation, I display a differentiated picture that distinguishes between the different forms of (non-)cooperation (figures 3 and 4). After that, I aggregate these findings and portray the overall development of cooperation and non- cooperation (figure 5).

Figures 3 and 4 display the development of EU-China relations over time with regard to the different forms of (non-)cooperation. In general, the number of interactions between the EU 31 and China in form of policy papers or declarations has increased over time. In total, I coded 815 interactions from 1995-2019, 733 instances of cooperation and 63 instances of non- cooperation. With the exception of the articulation of a will to cooperate, the number of cooperative instances in the form of institutionalized dialogue, formal agreements and joint activities increases over time. The decrease in the articulation of a will to cooperate can be explained by the rising number of institutionalized dialogue formats that are created as well as by the growing amount of formal documents and joint activities. Often, dialogue formats or documents result from a former articulation of a will to cooperate.

The figures further show that although the EU and China still critizice each other and explicate differences between their security policies, this happens less often since 2003. And non- cooperative actions, meaning hostile activities, which are directed against the other, decreased. Likewise, the institutionalization of dialogue formats to actually implement cooperation increased, especially since 2013, more cooperation agreements were concluded and there were more joint actions although this form of cooperation appears least often from all forms of cooperative interaction. Over time, relations became more and more institutionalized, as diplomatic relations between the EU and China deepened and were broadened concerning the policy-scope of cooperation.

100

) cooperation -

10 to all instances to all instances (nonof 1

1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 percentage instances of of cooperation in relations years

articulation of will to cooperate institutionalized dialogue formal agreement joint activity

Figure 3 Forms of cooperation over time, disaggregated. Own depiction.

100

) cooperation -

1 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

0,1

to all instances to all instances (nonof years percentage instances of of cooperation in relations unilateral hostility revocation of formal agreement disruption of institutionalized dialogue criticism / explication of differences

Figure 4 Forms of non-cooperation over time, disaggregated. Own depiction.

This disaggregated depiction helps to understand temporal patterns and informs about the instances of (non-)cooperation with regard to the different categories introduced in chapter 2.1. It is indeed interesting to see that the vast majority of cooperative as well as of non-cooperative instances takes place on the rhetoric level. The higher the levels the smaller the amount of (non-)cooperative instances. This imbalance might derive from the selected data sources. The policy papers as well as the Joint Declarations might paint a more rosy picture of EU-China security cooperation than in actual policy-making. It is certainly easier to announce the will to cooperate than to agree on a joint measure. As I did not take into account actual instances of non-cooperation that were not mentioned within the text corpus, the trends detected have to be slightly relativized and viewed within the context of political discourse.

Figure 5 shows the aggregated trend of the overall development of cooperation and non- cooperation in EU-China relations over time. Again, the high number of cooperative instances can be deduced to the form of data chosen for the mapping.

100

10 instances instances of cooperation

1 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 years

instances of cooperation instances of non-cooperation

Figure 5 Forms of (non-) cooperation over time, aggregated. Own depiction.

Now the interesting question is, which policy fields profit from the overall trend towards more cooperation over time and which are characterized by more non-cooperation. To begin with, I zoom into an aggregated depiction of all policy fields in EU-China relations. Figure 6 displays how often the selected policy fields are mentioned by the EU and China in their policy papers and Joint Declarations. It becomes obvious that economy is still the most important pillar of EU-China relations (648 mentions), albeit closely followed by the policy field of security (415 mentions). All other policy fields are mentioned significantly less often, for instance, climate and environment with 156 mentions.

700 648 600 500 415 400 300 200 156 110 101

100 67 61 number of mentions of number 0 policy fields

economy security climate and environment societal, legal and administrative affairs research, technology and innovation education and youth culture

Figure 6 Mentions of policy fields in EU-China relations, 1995-2019. Own depiction.

Strikingly, security has not always been a crucial pillar in EU-China relations but has emerged as such over time. When I look at the number of mentions of the security policy field in the text corpus, it becomes obvious that the EU and China have attached an increasing importance to this specific policy field. While in 1995, mentions of the policy field of security only made up 6.67 percent of all mentions of policy fields, this number rose to 16.41 percent in 2003 and to 30.18 percent in 2019. These results match the findings from secondary literature that during the first 25 years of EU-China relations, collaboration on economic and trade issues has been the main subject of cooperation (Stanzel, 2007; Maher, 2016). While the main drivers remain of an economic kind, meaning foremost concerns with trade, investment, monetary and intellectual property issues, security has become a rising topic (Kirchner et al., 2015; Giessmann, 2008).

A closer look into the documents reveals further information that emphasizes these findings. Since 2010, the CSP encompasses also foreign affairs, security issues and global challenges, including climate change, global economy governance, combatting terrorism, illegal migration and maritime security (European Commission, 2006). This also plays out in the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation (2013), which names peace and security as one of the most important policy fields of cooperation. Moreover, during the visit of China’s President Xi Jinping to the EU in 2014 he characterized EU-China affairs as “reaching a higher strategic level – based not just on trade but also on security” (Fallon, 2014, p. 181). Hence, over time, a

35 strong security pillar has emerged in addition to economy in EU-China relations. With regard to this increase, two observations should be mentioned. First, it should be noted that mostly non-traditional security issues are on the agenda of the EU-China CSP, taken that both sides have never tried to clash militarily over conflicting interests in each other’s geographical region. This is the main difference between EU-China and US-China relations. Moreover, it is interesting that, for example, the Joint Statement on Deepening the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit (European Council, 2014a) accentuates the need to review the security situations in Iran, Syria and the Ukraine to deepen cooperation. However, it does not contain any statement on the risk of conflict in the South China Seas or on the rising tensions on the Korean peninsula. That shows that the EU recognizes China’s strategic interest in the EU’s neighborhood but that China still avoids interference into other countries’ internal affairs in its own backyard.

However, the mere number of mentions of a specific policy fields does not automatically mean that it is subject to cooperation. In contrast, human rights are mentioned in each and every policy paper and declaration, but as the most critical issue in EU-China relations. Thus, we cannot conclude that the higher the number of mentions, the higher the will to cooperate. Therefore, I zoom into the different forms of cooperation within the policy fields to show overlaps. I proceed as above and begin with a differentiated depiction of the different forms of (non-) cooperation. After that I present the findings on an aggregated level.

Figures 7 and 8 show how often the distinct forms of (non-)cooperation are mentioned in combination with the specific policy fields. The results disclose a remarkable pattern. Especially in the context of legal and administrative affairs, both actors criticize each other harshly (22 mentions of ‘criticism and explication of differences’). For instance, China on the one hand explicates dissatisfaction over the fact that the EU maintains its arms embargo on the PRC, which was imposed in 1989 in reaction to the violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests through the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Furthermore, it criticizes the EU for denying China market economy status in the WTO. The EU on the other hand frequently reprimands China for ignoring human rights standards and lacking behind standards of international law. Yet, unilateral hostilities, directed against the other occur seldom in general (2 mentions with reference to security issues). Education and youth, technology and innovation as well as culture and climate and environment remain mainly untouched by any form of uncooperative form of interaction. This might be either for sake of the relations in general or

36 due to the reason that relations in these policy fields are less established or important than in others (Carter, 2004).

technology and innovation 25 20 legal and administrative security 15 affairs 10 5 0 economy education and youth

climate and environment culture

criticism / explication of differences disruption of institutionalized dialogue revocation of formal agreement unilateral hostility

Figure 7 Forms of non-cooperation across policy fields, disaggregated. Own depiction.

The policy field, in which the EU and China most often articulate the will to cooperate or to deepen cooperation, is the security realm (83 mentions), closely followed by economy (62 mentions) and climate and environment (33 mentions). These are also the three policy fields in which they established institutionalized dialogue formats (43 mentions of ‘institutionalized dialogue’ together with security, 40 mentions together with economy, 33 together with climate and environment). Especially in the field of security, the number of institutionalized dialogue formats has increased over time. Examples are the High Level Political Dialogue (2012), the High Level Strategic Dialogue (2013) and the Security Dialogue (2012). The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Dialogue (2004), the Security and Defence Dialogue (2014), as well as the Political China-EU Dialogue on the Middle East and North Africa (2014) and the EU-China Peace and Security Forum (2017) are additional channels for security cooperation. They were established under the framework of the CSP. Formal agreements are mainly mentioned with reference to the policy fields of economy (29 mentions), technology and innovation (15

37 mentions), climate and environment (15 mentions) and security (15 mentions). Joint activities take place in the fields of security (21 mentions), and climate and environment (6 mentions).

technology and innovation 100 80 legal and administrative security 60 affairs 40 20 0 economy education and youth

climate and environment culture

joint activity formal agreement institutionalized dialogue articulation of will to cooperate

Figure 8 Forms of cooperation different policy fields, disaggregated. Own depiction.

On an aggregated level, based on the composite indicator of cooperation, it thus becomes obvious that security is the policy field that reveals the highest number of cooperation instances, followed by economy and climate and environment. Concerning non-cooperation especially legal and administrative affairs stand out, followed by economic issues.

2.2.1. The Research Puzzle: Security Cooperation Against All Odds

The mapping in the previous sub-chapter has revealed a clear increase of EU-China security cooperation over the course of the observation period from 1995 to 2019. Despite the prevailing importance of economic issues, security has become the second most important pillar in EU- China relations. In addition, the EU and China have started to embark their foreign and security policies on common ground, despite deepening political tensions. This is puzzling in several aspects.

First and foremost, the EU and China differ significantly as regards their political principles. While China’s approach to foreign and security policy can be described as neo-mercantilist (Feng, 2011) and is clearly oriented towards power politics, the EU’s foreign and security policy is mainly based on norms and values (Geeraerts, 2011; Manners, 2008; Sjursen, 2006). A key 38 foreign policy objective of the EU is to promote the values enshrined in the EU’s treaties such as democracy, human rights or rule of law, and to call for these values in international politics (Manners, 2002; Manners, 2008; Aggestam, 2008; Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013). The EU‘s self- conception can therefore be understood rather as a „rule maker” than a „rule taker” in international relations (Laïdi, 2008; Nuttall, 2000; Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007). Even though this role is contested by some scholars (Diez, 2013; Acharya, 2016), it suggests that the EU's foreign and security policy can be understood above all in its normativity (Eriksen, 2014; Sjursen and Rosén, 2017), or its normative prioritizations (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014). China, in contrast, pursues a foreign and security policy-making approach that is regularly described as pragmatic (Cheng, 2019) and focused on economic gains, dealing with problems in a practical way. Thereby, Chinese foreign policy is based on a self-declared flexibility, informality and consensus-based pragmatism (Zhao, 2004; Finamore, 2017; Zhang, 2010).

Second, the EU and China differ over the objectives of their foreign and security policies. While the EU puts democracy promotion and good governance to the forefront, China focuses mainly on the adherence to three main principles: Chinese sovereignty (zhōngguó zhǔquán - 中国主权), territorial integrity (lǐngtǔ wánzhěng - 领土完整) and non-interference (bù gānshè - 不干涉). These principles have been inviolable over the past decades of EU-China relations, are deeply rooted in the country’s tradition and serve the domestic concerns of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), such as stability and regime survival (Huotari et al., 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2006a).14 Accordingly, China’s core understanding of governance (zhìlǐ – 治理), is a sovereign and strong state (Stahl, 2011). Chinese foreign policy follows the aim to pursue economic and political national interests (Giessmann, 2008). Thus, good governance (shànzhì - 善治) does not play a significant role. The EU, in contrast, is one of its the vigorous promoters of good governance (Wunderlich, 2015; Telò, 2007) in its foreign and security policy15. This also becomes obvious in the European Security Strategy that stresses the importance of good governance and a norm-guided foreign policy: “Spreading good

14 They originate from the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, formulated in the 1954 Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India (Kejing, 2013) and still shape China’s relations to other states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 1954). The Five Principles are 1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) mutual non-aggression, 3) mutual non- interference in each other’s internal affairs, 4) equality and cooperation for mutual benefit and 5) peaceful coexistence. 15 However, in the past years, the European understanding of “governance” has undergone significant changes from a concept to describe the EU’s internal structure (Jachtenfuchs, 2001) towards a concept which encompasses the EU’s main constitutional norms: human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Stahl, 2011). 39 governance […], establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order” (European Union 2003).

Thus, the EU and China are undoubtedly very different actors on the international stage concerning their founding ideals, their normative moralities and aspirations and the roots of their foreign and security principles. Based on these different principles of foreign and security policy-making, one would expect that they do not cooperate at all, especially not in the security realm. However, the intensity and scope of EU-China security cooperation have widened over time. Within an overall relationship dominated by increasing mistrust and political contradictions, this is interesting to look at.

2.3. EU-China Cooperation on Different Security Issues

The mapping now turns from the general policy fields to specific security issues and to variance between these. A snapshot of eleven different security issues shows that China and the EU emphasize some security issues over others. These eleven issues are regional security, conflict resolution and prevention, food security, military security, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, cybersecurity, anti-terrorism, climate/energy security, maritime security/anti- piracy, human security and migration/immigration. As mentioned earlier, the selection of these issues stems from the explicit references, the documents in the data corpus make.16

Figure 9 shows the number of total mentions of these security issues in the text corpus. Especially conflict resolution (83 mentions) and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (80 mentions) stand out, closely followed by human security (78 mentions), but also issues like anti-terrorism (55 mentions) and climate/energy security (30 mentions) are mentioned frequently. Interestingly, the issues that are mentioned most often are non-traditional or transnational security issues, while traditional security issues like regional security (22 mentions) or military security (20 mentions) are discussed less often between the EU and China. Moreover it might seem striking that the issue of human security ranks second after conflict resolution. This stems from the fact that human security also includes discussions around human rights, which are held frequently at EU-China summits and are included into each and every policy paper.

16 Moreover, they overlap with the security issues that other researchers have chosen for similar analyses. For instance Kirchner et al. (2016)and Christiansen et al. (2019) 40

100 83 80 78 80

60 55 48

40 30 22 20 number of mentions of number 18 20 15 6 0 security issues conflict resolution and prevention nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament human security anti-terrorism migration/immigration climate/energy security regional security military security cybersecurity maritime security/anti-piracy food security

Figure 9 Mentions of security issues in EU-China relations, 1998-2019. Own depiction.

However, not all security issues that are mentioned by the EU and China are subject to cooperation. The figures 10 and 11 show, which security issues are mentioned together with the different forms of (non-)cooperation, displaying the overlaps.

As regards forms of cooperation (see figure 10), the mapping shows that the EU and China repeatedly express the will to cooperate on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (31 mentions) and anti-terrorism (25 mentions). To align on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament they set up an institutionalized dialogue format in 2004. Furthermore, both are signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran that the UK, France and Germany signed on behalf of the EU. In regard to institutionalized dialogue, human security is frequently referenced (22 mentions), especially in the EU’s policy papers. The EU makes cooperation conditional on continuing discussions around improving the human rights situation in China. To facilitate that, a Human Rights Dialogue Forum was set up. As regards formal agreements, mostly the JCPOA is mentioned (9 mentions), followed by the Agreement on Strategic Cooperation between the European Police Office and the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China to combat terrorism (2 mentions). Besides that, no other formal agreements are referenced. Concerning joint action, the issue of maritime security and anti-piracy stands out (8 mentions), as EU troops and Chinese PLA forces are cooperating

41 through the international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) to defuse political tensions in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz. Joint efforts in this area are promoted mainly via the EU-China Dialogue on Security and Defense. Moreover, joint actions in the area of conflict resolution and prevention are mentioned twice.

regional security 35 conflict resolution and migration/immigration 30 prevention 25 20 cybersecurity 15 food security 10 5 0 maritime security/anti- military security piracy

nuclear non-proliferation human security and disarmament

climate/energy security anti-terrorism

articulation of will to cooperate institutionalized dialogue formal agreement joint activity

Figure 10 Forms of cooperation across security issues, disaggregated. Own depiction.

Regarding forms of non-cooperation (see figure 11) on the rhetoric level, it is mostly the issue of human security, which is subject to criticism. The clear peak (23 mentions) results from the repeated European critique of China’s stance towards human rights and international law. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the EU has continued to criticize the situation of human rights and the alarming lack of human security in China. Thus, every policy paper that the EU has issued on its China policy since 1995 mentions human rights violations and requests an improvement. For instance, the 2003 policy paper of the EU states that “the EU should continue to speak out on its human rights concerns, and to encourage the rule of law and political reforms in China”. Furthermore, the arms embargo that the EU imposed on China in 1989 is mentioned four times and was coded as “remaining sanctions or resolutions”. Giving the heated debates around a possible abolishment of this embargo in 2004 (Politico EU, 2005) it is striking that it is not mentioned more often in official declarations and policy papers of that time.

regional security 25 conflict resolution and migration/immigration 20 prevention 15 cybersecurity 10 food security 5 0 maritime security/anti- military security piracy

nuclear non-proliferation human security and disarmament

climate/energy security anti-terrorism

unilateral hostility revocation of formal agreement disruption of institutionalozed dialogue criticism and explication of differences

Figure 11 Forms of non-cooperation across security issues, disaggregated. Own depiction.

2.3.1. The Research Puzzle: Variation of Cooperation Between Security Issues

The mapping of EU-China security cooperation among issue areas has revealed a striking variance between different security issues with regard to the amount of cooperation that takes place. It became obvious that some security issues are subject to EU-China cooperation, while other security issues remain prone to non-cooperation ore are not mentioned at all in the text corpus. Furthermore, there are huge difference with regard to the amount of instances of cooperation. Especially conflict resolution and nuclear non-proliferation stand out. In addition, the fight against terrorism to be a security issue, which is widely discussed in EU-China relations, albeit without consensus. This is counterintuitive. One would assume that high levels of cooperation could be expected on security issues, which are closely intertwined with economic or national interests, such as food or human security. Lower levels of cooperation would be expected for security issues, in which differences over sovereignty issues, non- interference and territorial integrity remain, such as conflict resolution and prevention or maritime security/anti-piracy. The opposite is the case.

It is further surprising that when looking at the level of security as a policy field, cooperation in general seems to increase over time. Yet, when focusing on the level below, it becomes

43 apparent that the extent to which the EU and China cooperate differs among the distinct security issues. Accordingly, it is interesting to focus on both levels in the ensuing analysis.

2.4. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter sketched the empirical terrain of EU-China security relations. It sought to assess the development of EU-China security cooperation over time as well as with regards to the specific security issues. The data provided two interesting patterns.

First and foremost, the security dimension is all but tenuous in EU-China relations. Instead, it has risen in significance over time and complements the economic and political pillar of their bilateral relationship. Since 2003, there have been increasing attempts between the EU and China to embark their security policies on common ground and more instances of security cooperation can be observed. This is puzzling as the EU and China follow very different approaches to key principles of foreign and security policy and inter-state relations such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference. Besides, the EU attaches great importance to democratic aspirations and normative concerns such as human rights, the rule of law and good governance while China’s foreign and security policy can primarily be characterized as state-centric and pragmatic. As a further matter, the mapping has revealed that the increased amount of security cooperation does not turn into practice equally in all security areas. Instead, some security issues profit more from the overall cooperative trend, while others remain prone to non-cooperation. Examples for the first are climate/energy security, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament or conflict resolution and prevention. Examples for the latter are military security or human security. These patterns certainly require empirical examination.

3. Theoretical Framework

In the previous chapter I derived two interesting empirical patterns from the mapping that require a closer look and shall be subject to an empirical analysis. Over time, more instance of security cooperation between the EU and China can be observed, despite contradicting underlying foreign and security policy principles. Additionally, there is striking variation among different security issues. While some seem to be marginal in the bilateral EU-China context, some are prone to non-cooperation while others are subject to cooperation. This section develops an adequate theoretical framework for assessing EU-China security cooperation over 44 time and across a spectrum of security issues. In order to extract the underlying reasons for a) the increase of cooperation over time and b) the occurrence or absence of cooperation in specific security areas, I will take into account rationalist and constructivist approaches. It appears appropriate and fruitful to combine interest-based notions with experience-based approaches. Not only might strategic considerations play a role for the emergence and development of EU- China security cooperation but also different identity constructions and the framing of certain security issues.

Explaining cooperation is one of the primary concerns of International Relations and a core element of most theoretical debates. To construct the theoretical framework, the following proceeds in three steps: I begin with some general ontological considerations and outline the distinction between rationalist and constructivist notions in assessing cooperation in the international system. Second, I argue for a combination of rationalist and constructivist approaches to explain EU-China security cooperation and discuss the advantages of such proceeding. Based on that, I present the theoretical framework. Subsequently, I deduce theoretical expectations that shall later be subjected to an empirical examination. Finally, I operationalize the IVs for the subsequent empirical examination.

3.1. Ontological Considerations

As I will combine rationalist and constructivist explanations for international cooperation, I begin by sketching the general theoretical debate. Two overall ontological approaches form the main theoretical axe regarding cooperation in IR (Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010; Adler, 2002; Panke and Risse, 2006). Rationalism and constructivism are metatheoretical assumptions about the nature and constitution of actors in the international system (Wendt, 1999). They have different expectations about the relationship of agents and structures as well as about the underlying logic that drives the behavior of actors.

Rationalists follow a logic of “consequentialism”, which implies that actors are instrumental and rational, primarily seek to maximize their own gains and therefore act strategically. Rationalism denotes that all actors in the international system can be studied as actors per se (Glaser, 2010; Oakeshott, 1991), independent of the social structures within which they (inter)act. In this regard, actors follow an instrumental-strategic logic and pursue rationalist preferences to safeguard their own power and security to survive in the anarchic international

45 environment. All forms of (non-)cooperation are the outcome of goal-directed choices of rational actors (Little, 1991).

Two main readings can be differentiated: realism and liberalism/institutionalism. Realist rationalists are more pessimistic as regards cooperation, due to the problem of relative gains and the security dilemma. Both derive from the structural imperatives of the international system (Glaser, 1994; Herz, 1950; Collins, 1997; Jervis, 1978), in which all states are situated in a context of uncertainty and bounded rationality. The relative gains problem denotes that states not only intend to maximize their absolute gains but also attempt to achieve more in relation to others (Grieco, 1988; Waltz, 2000). They ignore the mutual benefits of cooperation because they fear that other states might gain more (Morgenthau, 1948; Krasner, 1976; Carr, 1964; Waltz, 2000). The security dilemma indicates that perceived external threats create insecurity within states. As a result, states are more inclined towards competitive or unilateral policies, while cooperative policies are not among their priorities (Glaser, 2010). Cooperating with others does not follow the logic of consequentialism and the primacy of national security impedes cooperation as a non-rational behavior. However, cooperation can occur even under a premise of strategic realist rationality (Grieco, 1988; Baldwin, 1993; Glaser, 1994): as a means of balancing or bandwagoning. Balancing means that two states cooperate to balance a powerful state and prevent it from striving for unipolarity (Mearsheimer, 1994; Snyder, 2001; Waltz, 2000; Walt, 1997; Glaser, 1994; Wohlforth, 2008). Bandwagoning refers to situations in which a weaker state forms an alliance with a more powerful state to survive and to pursue national interests.

Rationalist liberalists or institutionalists are more positive when it comes to assessing the likelihood of cooperation. They assume that cooperation occurs whenever it is a state’s most rational action for maximizing utilities (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Nye, 1990; Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; Keohane, 2005). Each state behaves according to self-directed national interests, assigns costs and benefits to possible policy choices and then acts upon this calculation. In this reading, cooperation means “that the actions of separate individuals or organizations – which are not in pre-existent harmony – be brought into conformity with one another through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane, 1988a, p. 51).

Constructivists, in contrast, follow a logic of “appropriateness”, which implies that actors strive for appropriate behavior, applying with international rules and norms instead of optimizing strategic aims. In contrast to rationalism, constructivism supposes that the world is constituted

46 by social action and intersubjectivity. This means that actors cannot be studied as priors but rather in relation to the surrounding structures (Giddens, 1984; Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1999; Onuf, 1989a; Biniossek and Gurol, 2016). Constructivism juxtaposes rationalist assumptions and argues that states engage within and contribute to an ongoing process that shapes the structures of the international system (Wendt, 1992; Finnemore, 1996). Within this process, (non-)cooperation emerges due to converging or diverging norms, values or identities (Cerny, 1990; Keohane and Martin, 1995; Moravcsik, 1997a):

“Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and identities” (March and Olsen, 1998, p. 951).

In this regard, common norms as intersubjective beliefs about the world and its constitution, confirmed by social practice (Farrell, 2002; Wendt, 1992) are the primary trigger for collaboration instead of “fundamental interest in self-preservation and material well-being” (Owen, 1994, p. 94). Hence, state-society relations matter for constructivists in a way they do not for rationalists (Burchill, 2014, p. 61). In fact, they oppose the thought that the balance of material power structures the international system. Instead, they flag up states’ identities and interests and locate actors in social structures, which constitute the actors and are shaped by their interactions (Checkel, 1998).

3.2. Potentials of Combining Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches

Both rationalist and constructivist approaches to explaining international cooperation certainly have their advantages and disadvantages. The decision to combine rationalist and constructivist notions for my analysis of EU-China security cooperation stems from several reasons. The advantage of rationalist models as explanatory basis for cooperation is that its inferences are easier to generalize cross-culturally and cross-nationally. Furthermore, they are well suited to identify the respective interests of actors in the international system and how these interests drive their behavior. However, rationalist models often tend to minimize the role of norms, values and perceptions (Little, 1991). Due to a focus on cost-benefit calculations, rationalists do not account for the influence of normative frameworks that might be powerful underlying factors leading to cooperation. In contrast, constructivist notions emphasize not only the role of norms, ideas and perceptions but also contend that the perceptions and identities of decision- makers are shaped in domestic processes of socialization, social learning and norm diffusion 47

(Checkel, 1999a; Fischer, 2003; Kodré and Müller, 2003). Moreover, relations among competitive sovereign states are assumed to be shot through with norms of cooperation. Furthermore, social constructivists stress the importance of identity for the construction of international relations (Wendt, 1992; Katzenstein, 1996). Thus, the advantage of constructivist notions is that they provide insight into the foundations of foreign policy choices by capturing how actors constitute their respective others and how behavior is changed through interactions. (Uemura, 2015).

Moreover, the EU and China are two very different actors (Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010; Wong, 2013). While the EU's foreign and security policy can be understood in its normativity above all (Eriksen, 2014; Sjursen and Rosén, 2017) or its normative prioritizations (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014), China explicitly abstains from a declaration of far-reaching norms and focuses on economic gains, dealing with problems in a practical way (Zhao, 2004). Most studies that analyse EU-China relations tend to privilege interest-driven explanations and focus on material structures and their influence on the relationship. In this account, China’s main stance towards the EU is presented as interest-driven, focusing on trade and investments to boost China’s economy. Sometimes scholars also assert that China mainly views the EU as an opportunity to balance US hegemony. These aspects of Chinese foreign policy are not deniable and certainly play a role for EU-China security relations. However, this approach premises non- cooperation over cooperation when it comes to assessing the possibilities and constraints for the relationship and simplifies it into either the one (non-cooperation) or the other (cooperation). In fact, EU-China security relations are much more diverse: different degrees of (non-)cooperation characterize different issues in their relationship, as shown in the mapping in chapter 2.

To extract the causalities behind this, explanations that only derive from rationalist interest- driven theories fall short on assessing the complex nature of the relationship as many developments in EU-China relations can be partially attributed to normative concerns that constitute the EU’s and China’s respective identities (Jørgensen and Wong, 2016; He and Feng, 2015). Moreover, especially in the case of China, historical contexts, identities and role prescriptions have a huge impact on foreign policy making (Qin, 2018). In addition, socially constructed factors are always present and undergird the burgeoning material relations between the EU and China (Jørgensen and Wong, 2016). By combining rationalist and constructivist notions, I can thus provide a more differentiated assessment of the rationales leading to security cooperation. 48

Accordingly, I follow Katzenstein and Sil’s analytical eclecticism when designing the theoretical framework for my analysis (Katzenstein and Sil, 2004; 2008; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). Being eclectic in the choice of explanatory factors for the analysis of EU-China security cooperation bears the potential to better grasp the complexity and messiness of EU-China security relations in their overall scope and degree. In constructing substantive arguments that take into considerations this complexity, being eclectic promises fruitful results when capturing the interactions between different types of causal mechanisms that would elsewise be analysed isolated from each other. As already indicated in the introduction, I want to go beyond the binary of assessing China’s role for the EU either as a threat or as an opportunity. Moreover, as I explained in detail, I want to overcome the dominant thinking sets that derive from applying mostly rationalist interest-based frameworks to the analysis of EU-China relations. In this regard, the combinatory logic of analytical eclecticism bears huge potentials as it enables me to develop a clearer and more encompassing picture of the context and drivers of EU-China security cooperation.

3.3. Rationalist Approaches to Explaining EU-China Security Cooperation

In the previous two subchapters I outlined the underlying ontological assumptions of rationalism and constructivism. Furthermore, I explained the main considerations behind the combination of rationalist and constructivist approaches, introducing its potential for the subsequent analysis. Thereby, I have laid the baseline for constructing a theoretical framework. The next section presents the rationalist explanations of international cooperation that I choose to analyse the drivers towards security cooperation between the EU and China.

Among the plethora of theories that are suitable to explain international cooperation liberal institutionalism features rather prominently. At the core of its assumption is that cooperation derives from the will or need to achieve common goals an pursue joint interests. Moreover, shared needs, be they economic or of other nature, is a core variable in liberal institutionalism. To solve common problems and to gain benefit in areas of complementary interests, states need to cooperate to achieve their goals (Nye, 1990). Accordingly, liberal institutionalism seems a fruitful an promising approach to analyze why the EU-China cooperate in the security realm. In the following, I will introduce the key assumptions of liberal institutionalism with a focus on complex interdependence and economic interests, which will serve as key explanatory factors in the ensuing analysis.

Liberal Institutionalism: complex interdependences and Economic Interests

In general, a liberal institutionalist approach to EU-China security cooperation builds on a number of assumptions about the construction of international relations (Christiansen, 2016). It highlights the impact of domestic factors on foreign policy making, the importance of trade and communication channels and the effects of complex interdependence on fostering cooperation. Liberal institutionalism emphasizes the cooperative possibilities in interstate relations and explains them not only in terms of common interests but also through the roles of institutions, the rule-bound surrounding, in which interaction between states takes place and the interconnectedness between actors in the international system (Keohane, 1989). Cooperation can elicit from pre-existing complementary state preferences (Keohane, 2005; Keohane and Martin, 1995). However, complementary interests in themselves do not lead to cooperation. Keohane argues that it is crucial to distinguish sharply between cooperation, harmony and discord. When harmony prevails among states, this does inevitably lead to increased policy conformity. When discord dominates, none of the actors has an incentive to change its behavior towards more cooperation as they want to hinder the others to realize their goals (Keohane, 1988a). Cooperation therefore “requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations – which are not in pre-existent harmony – be brought into conformity with one another through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane, 1988a, p. 51). To solve common problems and to gain benefits in areas of complementary interests, states need to cooperate to achieve their goals (Nye, 1990). Hence, cooperation is considered to create win-win situations within the anarchic international system.

I want to put emphasis of particularly two aspects that are at the core of liberal institutionalism when it comes to assessing and explaining international cooperation. These are complex interdependence17 and economic interests.

In general, if states are bound in complex interdependence they are more inclined to cooperate than not to cooperate. Keohane and Nye define interdependence as

17 Interestingly, the role of interdependence for cooperation in the international system also finds reference with other theoretical schools. For instance, some systemic constructivists postulate similar assumptions about the influence of systemic processes on the emergence of international alliances. For instance, Buzan and Ruggie denote that rising interdependence takes place through an increase of the “dynamic density” of interactions due to rising trade and capital (Buzan, 1993; Ruggie, 1983). And English school scholars describe this phenomenon as a rising “volume, velocity, and diversity of interactions within international society” (Meijer and Jensen, 2018, p. 213). Likewise, situation-structuralist regime theory contends that situations of strategic interdependence exist, in which individual and collective rationality can be at odds and which lead states to cooperate despite the overall assumption that actors behave in a way to further their own interests (Hasenclever et al., 1997; Hasenclever et al., 1996; Hasenclever et al., 2000; Mayer et al., 1995; Krasner, 1993). 50

“mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 8).

They further distinguish between connectedness and interdependence, contending that interdependence is only present if interaction causes mutual costs for all involved actors, albeit not necessarily in a symmetrical way. Whenever interaction does not cause such costs, they talk about connectedness (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 9). Interdependence evolves in the context of globalization as “an array of multiple transboundary forces and processes that reduce national control over what happens within national boundaries and enable a set of new political actors to project social, economic, and political influence over a long distance” (Zhao and Liu, 2010, p. 2). Accordingly, globalization is a key scope condition defined by advocates of complex interdependence. Based on the varying degrees of interdependence in different arenas, Keohane and Nye hold a less categorical and more contingent view of outcomes of state interactions than most realist perspectives that presume non-cooperative outcomes. Accordingly, they disagree with the realist claim, which states that interstate cooperation under conditions of anarchy is difficult (Knutsen, 1997). Instead, they argue that states are “hemmed in by webs of interdependencies” (Krasner, 1999). The main argument behind this assumption is that interdependence lowers the likelihood of war. Interdependent states would not invade those with whom they trade. In their reading, interdependence can have a strong economic focus in that bilateral economic exchange can create shared interests in relations between states (Nye, 2020). Therefore, economically interdependent actors have a strong interest in avoiding conflict and preserving peace. Yet, interdependence can also take other forms and evolve in the context of issues of global governance within which states are interdependent because none can tackle such issue unilaterally. Consequently, states wouldn’t invade those with whom they need to work on global issues, either.

Thus the higher the degree interdependence between two actors, the higher the likelihood for cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Krasner, 1995; Weede, 2010). Interdependent actors are bound to cooperate rather than not to cooperate or to compete, because interdependence increases the sensitivity and vulnerability of actors and reduces the possibility to meet common needs unilaterally. “Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 12) and includes costs, which occur if a state does not react to changes in a connected state. “Vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 13) and implies costs, which occur despite political reactions to changes in another state. In 51 other words, vulnerability is high, if a state has to adopt long-term political measures to adapt to changes. The dimension of vulnerability is more influential for state-interaction and is particularly relevant for the analysis of the structure of relations between two or more states. Interdependence increases the sensitivity and vulnerability of actors and reduces the possibility to meet common needs unilaterally since the realization of interests of the involved actors depends on the decision of all states involved in the interdependent relationship. Thus, interdependence can be both the condition and cause for cooperation. The density of interdependence in a specific issue area influences the cost-benefit calculation (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Oye, 1986). The denser the interdependence, the bigger the benefit of cooperation and the less likely unilateral action. Accordingly, the use of force is not considered an appropriate way of achieving goals as it is very costly and uncertain concerning its success. There is a growing range of issues, in which force is not useful, and interdependence imposes costs even on powers that dominate issue arenas (Zhao and Liu, 2010).

According to Keohane and Nye, complex interdependence has three major dimensions. First, multiple channels of communication connect societies and states on formal and informal levels. This further fosters their connectedness and is a crucial indicator for interdependence. Second, the agenda of interstate relationships is believed to consists of several issues that do not have a clear hierarchy. Accordingly, there is an absence of hierarchy among issues. This implies, among other things, that military security does not dominate the agenda and that the distinction between domestic and foreign policy issues becomes blurred. It is assumed that these policies require constant coordination in order to avoid costs emanating from inadequate handling. Another impact of this blurring is that different issues can generate different forms of constellations between the same two (or more) actors. While they engage in cooperation on one issue, they can compete on another. The third dimension of complex interdependence is the absence of the use of military force. In short, what liberal institutionalists like Keohane and Nye are implying, is that in a complex interdependent relationship states focus on cooperation as the key to success and seek to avoid conflicts of all kinds.

Another factor, which is at the core of liberal institutionalism is the role of economic interests. This stresses the liberal aspect of liberal institutionalism. The focus on domestic economic preferences again underlines that liberal institutionalism is not so much a systemic theory, but includes domestic components. It considers state preferences as deriving from domestic societies, not so much from the structural surroundings. Thus, foreign policy is believed to

52 emerge from below through the “aggregation and moderation of collective preferences” (Maull, 2017, p. 56).

As previously described, cooperation is believed to emanate from joint preferences. In this regard, not only the configuration of capabilities (as in realism) or of institutions (as in institutionalism) matter for international relations, but also the configuration of state preferences (Moravcsik, 1997a; Oye, 1986; Oye, 1985). Accordingly, cooperation is considered to be an outcome that occurs as a result of strategic considerations of the involved actors that weigh the costs and benefits of each choice of action. According to liberal institutionalism, states cooperate mainly to maximize their utilities. Despite the individualist logic that states follow, they can find themselves in situations in which pursuing their own interests individually can lead to a suboptimal outcome (Zürn, 1992; Rittberger and Zürn, 1990; Rittberger and Zürn, 1991; Axelrod, 1984). Such situations invoke the necessity and desire to find cooperative solutions and thereby avoid a suboptimal outcome (Hasenclever et al., 1997).

It can be distinguished between ideational and commercial preferences. While the former includes norms and values such as human rights or democratic principles, the latter refers to material considerations like profit. Both types of preferences can either lead to cooperative or competitive and conflictive foreign policies towards other actors. Departing from this, cooperation emerges when it fosters economic benefits and serves commercial or material interests or when two actors share a “fundamental interest in self-preservation and material well-being” (Owen, 1994, p. 94). Competition or conflict, in contrast, is due to arise when commercial interests contradict each other or when the gains for one implies a loss for the other. Such an approach to international cooperation does not consider cooperation as a “zero-sum game”, where the gains of one would be the losses of the other. Instead, cooperation characterizes as a “positive sum game”, increasing the prosperity and gains on both sides (Robert Powell, 1991; Moravcsik, 1997a; Keohane and Martin, 1995). That does not imply that conflict or competition does not exist but that the focus is on the economic benefits that can be gained from cooperation (Coleman, 1970; Walter W. Powell, 1991) in other policy fields. Therefore, cooperation is most likely to emerge when it either serves domestic economic interests or prevents economic losses.

Besides the role of complex interdependence and economic interests, liberal institutionalism focuses on the role of institutions as its name already implies. Institutions create a rule-bound environment in which interaction takes place (Moravcsik, 1993). There are different definitions

53 for institutions. They can understood as a “general pattern or categorization of activity” and “a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized” (Keohane, 2005, p. 47) with durable rules that prescribe behavioral roles to their members, as a “set of rules meant to govern international behavior” (Simmons and Martin, 2002, p. 194) or as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” (Keohane, 1988b, p. 383). Furthermore, liberal institutionalists believe that institutions can help to improve communication between actors in the international system and thereby increase the capacity of governments to make credible, binding commitments to each other (Keohane, 1988a).

Yet, this aspect shall not be at the core of the ensuing analysis. Instead, I will mainly focus on complex interdependence and economic interests when analyzing EU-China security cooperation.

3.4. Constructivist Approaches to Explaining EU-China Security Cooperation

Having outlined liberal institutionalist explanations of international cooperation as my main rationalist approach to EU-China security cooperation, I will now focus on constructivist approaches. To explain, why the EU and China have increased their security cooperation over time and why they cooperate on some security issues but compete on others, constructivist approaches can help to provide a more complete picture. For instance, rationalist interest- centered explanations may fall short on explaining why cooperation does not emerge on some security issues, where from a logical point of view cooperation would be completely rational and would lead to greater benefits than competition, unilateral action or non-cooperation. This is the case for the EU-China relationship on anti-terrorism where cooperation does not emerge, despite the need for joint measures and repeated rhetoric endorsement of this security issue for both sides.

Constructivism offers an explanatory framework that ascribes different types of behavior to an actor in different situations. In other words, it can explain, why in some situations a state will be rather security-conscious and power-seeking, because that is the way it learnt to behave towards another state within a specific issue and in a specific context, while in other situations interactions can lead the same state to having a different identity, interest and behavior.

In order to gain a better understanding about the underlying drivers towards cooperation from a constructivist perspective, I specifically focus on two aspects that constructivists put forward: mutual perceptions and a common problem understanding. In the following section, I will elaborate on these two explanations and explain why they are suitable to analyze my subject of interest.

Social Constructivism: Mutual Perceptions and a Common Problem Understanding

Constructivist explanations of international cooperation emphasize the role of norms, ideas and perceptions (Wendt, 1992; Katzenstein, 1996). They contend that the perceptions and identities of decision-makers are shaped in domestic processes of socialization, social learning and norm diffusion (Checkel, 1999a; Fischer, 2003; Kodré and Müller, 2003). I follow an understanding of identity as a shorthand for varying constructions of nationhood and statehood, national ideologies, collective distinctiveness and purpose (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 24). All arrangements between states, governments or international organizations and the interactions between these actors, are social constructions with particular patterns and rules (Onuf, 1989b). To analyze the development and construction of a (social) relationship between two actors, appreciating their respective identities can add analytical value. This assumption is based on the argument that identity is always relational and only shows during moments of interaction, when one state interacts with another and forms an image of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. As states “act (…) on the basis of meanings grounded in the conceptions that they hold vis-à-vis themselves and other states” (Wendt, 1992, p. 397), there is a connection between states’ mutual perceptions and their foreign policy behavior. This understanding also reveals that identities are not only based on states’ beliefs of themselves, but also on beliefs that states hold in relation to others. In addition “through repeated acts of reciprocal cooperation, actors form mutual expectations that enable them to continue cooperating” (Wendt, 1994, p. 390). This notion is also prominent in Chinese IR literature (Qin, 2009; Qin, 2018) that puts the impact of relationality to the forefront, focusing on the relational aspects of state interactions.

Changes in the identities of actors can lead to altered prospects for cooperation (Thies and Breuning, 2012; Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012). While early constructivists developed different identity conceptions and focused on the ego dimension, namely the ‘self’ (Holsti, 1970; Holsti, 1992), this concept was expanded to incorporate an alter dimension:

“it is in the practices and processes that the normative and ideational structure of the international system is produced and developed. Intersubjectivity not only forms

rules and norms, but also reflects the dynamism of the ego-alter relationship in a context based on these norms and rules, enabling action in interaction to gain shared meaning.” (Qin, 2009, p. 9)

In this regard, cooperation is one specific type of interaction that states choose deliberately when their identities vis-á-vis each other match. This does not imply that mutual perceptions necessarily have to converge for the emergence of cooperation in a specific policy area, but that at least some of the underlying beliefs and ideas have to be compatible. Thus, the “character of the interaction depends on the degree of congruence in norms and worldviews between the partners and their relative positions in the international system, ranging from competitive to accordant” (Michalski and Pan, 2017, p. 612).

When analysing the emergence of cooperative agreements, constructivists tend to put identity at the centre of their analysis (Checkel, 1999a). According to social constructivism, the meaning and construction of anarchy at the international level as well as the interest distribution among states depends to a high degree on the respective perceptions that states hold of each other (Wendt, 1999; Katzenstein, 1996).

Three different cultures of perceptions of the ‘other’ in the international system can be distinguished, which are ‘enmity’, ‘rivalry’, and ‘friendship’ (Wendt, 1999). The main assumption deriving from this distinction is that states act differently towards each other depending on the perception of the other as either a friend, a rival or an enemy. Likewise, the rules and logics of interaction and engagement of states with each other vary according to their perceptions. While friends tend to bound in alliances or deepen their overall alignment, rivals or competitors pursue interactions that are more pragmatic while enemies might not interact at all or direct their actions towards harming the other. This differentiation is an important analytical raster when it comes to assessing the emergence and depth of (non-)cooperation between actors in the international system. For instance, Owen argues that ideologies might be the most crucial factor to influence two actors to form an alliance (Owen, 1994). In contrast, others argue that national interests – although socially constructed through states and their citizens – can determine who joins which alliances (Finnemore, 1996). Interactions of various kinds, can lead to gradual shifts in a country’s strategic culture, the norms of international behavior and ultimately their conceptions of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ (Friedberg, 2005).

Referring to mechanisms such as persuasion and socialization implies a strong interactionist component of constructivism (Qin, 2009; Qin, 2018; Michalski and Pan, 2017; Klose, 2018). Interaction can not only alter actors’ identities, but also affects mutual perceptions. While 56 certain structural demands of the international system are fixed, perceptions of other agents can change whenever states interact with each other. The literature suggests that two elements of socialization are dominant in EU-China relations: emulation and (social) learning. While the latter emphasizes interaction and conscious adoption of alternative frames of mind, emulation is less interactive and less conscious (Simmons and Elkins, 2004). To explain the emergence of cooperation, social learning seems more adequate. From Wendt’s structural conception it follows that the status of states as international actors and the role(s) they play in the international system influence a state’s position in the international social order (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). Thies and Breuning concretize this by linking state socialization and foreign policy which they describe as a socialization game that takes place through the interaction among states that negotiate over the attribution of identities in the international system (Thies and Breuning, 2012, p. 25). Thus, socialization is a prominent driver towards cooperation in the international system. In general, socialization shall be understood as a process not an outcome, as the re-negotiation of the social order implies (Thies and Breuning, 2012, p. 27). Constructivists understand socialization as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community and assumes that socialization effects occur, the longer states interact with each other. Socialization, they argue, is not just a rationalist, but also a social process. Following this path, socialization becomes the key to a process of mutual constitution in which the structure is defined in social terms through shared ideas and understandings, and the latter in turn define the units’ identity and interests. Thus, socialization also has a strong interactionist component. The general emphasis of socialization is on the effects that continuous interaction has on states’ relations as well as on their perception of rules and norms.

The more rationalist understanding of socialization implies that during interaction states follow a logic of consequences during interaction but that they include strategic calculations about their identities into their behavior. The main assumption deriving from this is that the longer actors participate in routinized and institutionalized settings and the more often they interact within these settings, the more likely it is that effects of socialization occur (Checkel, 1999b; Ikenberry and Kupchan, n.d.). State socialization within international society occurs when norms are transferred to the national level in the form of new understandings, values, attitudes or types of behavior (Schimmelfennig, 2001). The more constructivist understanding of socialization includes both a time component and norm diffusion. The main assumption is that actors participating in institutional arrangements, be it on bilateral or multilateral level, are likely to develop similar perceptions of rules and norms. The longer two or more actors participate in an institutional arrangement and the more intense the contact is, the more likely 57 are socialization effects, which change the perception of what is appropriate behavior and the perception of the involved actors towards each other. Interaction between states can affect the external expectations (Qin, 2009; Qin, 2018) of states towards each other and increases the density of reciprocal information.

Besides mutual perceptions, a convergent understanding of a certain security issue or security threat is one possible motive for seeking cooperation. In general, the understanding of threats and the reactions to it, has been a key topic in research on intergroup conflicts and cooperation and international relations’ literature (Jervis, 1976; Benford and Snow, 2000). Common understanding and intersubjective beliefs (Hasenclever et al., 2000; Hasenclever et al., 1997; Hasenclever et al., 1996) about the world and its constitution are confirmed by social practice (Farrell, 2002; Wendt, 1992) as the primary trigger for collaboration. Common understandings are understood not only as the “aggregations of individual attitudes and perceptions but [also as ] the outcome of negotiating shared meaning” (Gamson, 1992, p. 111). As states share properties concerning their corporate identity, they have complementary interests (Wendt, 1994). Therefore, constructivists stress the importance of common goals for cooperation. In the case of security relations, such common goals and mutual interests can derive from a similar definition of the problem:

“Before states can agree on whether and how to deal collectively with a specific problem, they must reach some consensus about the nature and the scope of the problem and also about the manner in which the problem relates to other concerns in the same and additional issue-areas.” (Haas, 1992, p. 29)

Vice versa, a lack of common understanding of a problem can impede cooperation. This assumption is closely related to Mancur Olson’s collective action problem (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1982), which arouses when two actors lack the ability to create collective interests and overcome their purely national self-interests (Wendt, 1994; Olson, 1965). Such a lack of common understanding can be a constraint for further cooperation (Pan, 2010; Gottwald and Duggan, 2012) but does not necessarily impede it completely. Thus, a minimum of shared understanding concerning the issue at stake is necessary for cooperation to emerge (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986). Kratochwil and Ruggie call this a “principled and shared understanding” (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, p. 764) and thereby name it as an important condition or constitutive basis for cooperation the convergence of expectations. Cooperation can then either arise tacitly, as the actors’ expectations converge (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985), or after a process of communication in which the actors informed each other about their understanding of the issue under scrutiny. 58

3.5. Theoretical Expectations

The previous section has elaborated on rationalist and constructivist approaches to explaining international cooperation. For my analysis of EU-China security cooperation the theoretical approaches suggest two rationalist drivers (complex interdependence and economic interests) and two constructivist drivers (positive mutual perceptions and a convergent problem understanding) that seem suitable. In the present subchapter I derive theoretical expectations from these theoretical approaches. I begin with the expectations for the first empirical pattern, the increase of EU-China security cooperation over time. Subsequently, I develop theoretical expectations for the second empirical pattern, which is variation of cooperation between different security issues.

3.5.1. Expectations for the Increase of EU-China Security Cooperation Over Time

One would expect that the amount of security cooperation between the EU and China increases, if the level of complex interdependence between the two increases. The higher the complex interdependence, the higher the costs of non-cooperation. To put it more bluntly: the higher the complex interdependence, the higher the likelihood of cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Krasner, 1995; Weede, 2010). In this regard, cooperation would be the most rational choice of behavior for interdependent actors, because interdependence increases their costs of meeting security threats unilaterally. In a scenario of complex interdependence, not cooperating could bear the risk of losses for both sides. Accordingly, my theoretical expectation 1a reads as follows:

Expectation 1a: If the degree of complex interdependence between the EU and China increases over time, security cooperation increases, due to cost-benefit calculations.

Connected to this, one would expect that if commercial interests become stronger over time, security cooperation increases in order to increase the prosperity and gains on both sides (Robert Powell, 1991; Moravcsik, 1997a; Keohane and Martin, 1995). Accordingly, my second theoretical expectation denotes a causal relationship between economic interests and security cooperation.

Expectation 1b: The more economic interests become involved over time, the more security cooperation increases, because the risk of economic losses become higher than the costs of cooperation.

Besides, it can be extracted from social constructivism that having a convergent problem definition can contribute to the emergence of cooperation. Actually, a common understanding (Hasenclever et al., 2000; Hasenclever et al., 1997; Hasenclever et al., 1996) about the world and its constitution is put forward as one of the key triggers for collaboration. Accordingly, one would expect that the amount of security cooperation increases over time, if the EU and China converge on their understanding of security. This assumption informs my theoretical expectation 2a.

Expectation 2a: If the EU’s and China’s understanding of security becomes more convergent over time, security cooperation increases because they find it easier to agree on adequate response mechanisms to security threats.

It can further be deducted from social constructivist that the perceptions that the EU and China hold of themselves as well as of the respective other play a role for the emergence of cooperation. The main assumption deriving from this distinction is that states act differently towards each other depending on the perception of the other as either a friend, a rival or an enemy. Hence, my theoretical expectation 2b thus focuses on the impact of perceptions.

Expectation 2b: If the perception of the other in the security realm improves over time, security cooperation increases because friends are bound in security alliances or deepen their overall alignment, rivals or competitors might not interact at all while enemies might direct their actions towards harming the other.

3.5.2. Expectations for EU-China Cooperation on Different Security Issues

Concerning the variation of EU-China cooperation between different security issues, I theorize that the higher the degree of interdependence in a specific security issue, the higher the amount of security cooperation. Based on the varying degrees of interdependence in different arenas, this appears fruitful to analyze EU-China security cooperation on different security issues. One would expect that complex interdependence lowers the likelihood of non-cooperation., because the costs of non-cooperation would be higher than the costs of cooperation. Accordingly, my

60 first theoretical expectation regarding EU-China security cooperation among different issues reads as follows:

Expectation 3a: The stronger the complex interdependence between the EU and China in a security issue, the higher the amount of security cooperation, due to cost-benefit calculations.

Additionally, one can expect that security cooperation is more likely if economic interests are at play. Hence, it can be assumed that cooperation emerges when it fosters economic benefits and serves commercial or material interests. Not only for China but also for the EU economic considerations might play a significant role in the decision making process for security cooperation. If economic interests are at stake in a certain security area or endangered by a certain security threat, they might be more willing to shoulder the costs of cooperation in order not to bear the economic losses. Therefore, security cooperation is most likely to increase when it either serves domestic economic interests or prevents economic losses. Accordingly, my theoretical expectation 4b reads as follows:

Expectation 3b: The more economic interests are at stake in a security issue, the higher the amount of security cooperation, because the risk of economic losses is higher than the costs of cooperation.

Similarly as for the increase of cooperation over time, I further expect that a convergent problem definition can facilitate security cooperation. Assuming that a shared understanding concerning the issue at stake is necessary for cooperation (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986) this might be of particular relevance for the explanation of variation of EU-China cooperation between different security issues. This assumption is at the core of my theoretical expectation 4a.

Expectation 4a: The more convergent the problem understanding of a security issue, the more likely is security cooperation, because the EU and China do not rely on “self-help” or treat security as an individual responsibility of each but identify with the other and seek common responses.

I further theorize that whether state cooperate or not depends to a high degree on the respective perceptions that they hold of each other (Wendt, 1999; Katzenstein, 1996), as put forward by social constructivism. One would presume that states act differently towards each other depending on the perception of the other as either a friend, a rival or an enemy. Positive

61 perceptions of the other as a friend would then facilitate the emergence of security cooperation. Thus, I expect the following:

Expectation 4b: The more positive mutual perceptions in a security issue, the more likely is security cooperation, because friends/partners tend to bound in alliances or deepen their overall alignment, rivals pursue interactions that are more pragmatic while enemies might not interact at all or direct their actions towards harming the other.

3.6. Operationalization of Independent Variables

Having developed my theoretical expectations for the ensuing analysis, I now elaborate on the operationalization of my independent variables. Taking the selected rationalist and constructivist theoretical approaches as a starting point, four specific explanatory factors can be extracted. These are complex interdependence (IV1), economic interests (IV2), a common problem understanding (IV3) and mutual perceptions (IV4). The expected causal relationship between these explanatory factors and EU-China security cooperation is as follows for the two parts of the analysis.

 means ‘an increase of’ and + implies ‘the more/the higher’.

Independent Variables Dependent Variable

Part A

 complex interdependence   EU-China security cooperation

 economic interests   EU-China security cooperation

 convergent problem understanding   EU-China security cooperation

 mutual perceptions   EU-China security cooperation

Part B

+ complex interdependence  + EU-China security cooperation

+ economic interests  + EU-China security cooperation

+ convergent problem understanding  + EU-China security cooperation

+ positive perceptions  + EU-China security cooperation

Table 4 Expected causal relationship between IVs and EU-China security cooperation.

In the following, I will describe in detail, how I operationalize these IVs18. As I have different theoretical expectations for the two parts of the analysis, I have to adapt the way I operationalize some of the IVs in a context specific manner whilst making the operationalization as intersubjective as possible. In order to increase the reliability I will therefore explain in detail, how I intend to measure the different IVs and include examples.

Three points should be specified ahead of the operationalization. The first refers to the coding process. In general, throughout the coding process for the analysis I do not use buzzword to capture these indicators but rather rely on latent coding. I am aware of the fact that using buzzwords can greatly increase the intersubjectivity and reliability of the coding results. Yet, in the case of my analysis, there are compelling arguments to use latent coding as this enables a more context specific and context sensitive treatment of the data. First of all, there is a variance in data to be gained for the EU side and the Chinese side. This mainly stems from the authoritarian context in China and will be explained more in-depth in the following chapter on

18 Detailed coding schemes with coding examples for all four IVs can be found in Appendix C. 63 data and methods. In order to increase the saturation of data, I will rely on different forms of text genre for the analysis. As these are not standardized texts like for example primary law documents, latent coding makes it possible to capture indications of the different IVs that might be ‘hidden’ rather implicitly in vague statements. Especially for the Chinese context it can be expected that specific buzzword are either avoided on purpose or used on purpose in order to convulge a certain message. Hence, latent coding seems to be more promising and encompassing.

This also refers to the indicators for the different IVs. I will explain this using the example of IV1 ‘complex interdependence’. For my analysis it is not only relevant whether objective criteria point towards the existence of a specific IV, such as a growing amount of trade would indicate growing complex interdependence. It is also important how the EU and China understand and perceive this interdependence. Maybe the amount of trade does not grow but the two actors perceive that the interdependence between them is growing nevertheless. In order to capture this, I will also build on direct or indirect statements in the data that indicate interdependence. This once more stresses the necessity of latent coding and makes it possible to capture nuances inherent in complex and contingent relations.

The second aspects refers to the two actors whose behaviour I will analyze. As I operate with two actors – the EU and China – but only one phenomenon – security cooperation – it is very probable that the analysis reveals different results for the two sides. Again, I will use the example of IV1 to illustrate that. It is possible that one actor, e.g. China, perceives the complex interdependence to be stronger than the EU. This is not necessarily a problem, as the EU and China might indeed have different rationales to cooperate with each other, although the result is the same. Yet, this possibility should be kept in mind throughout the analysis and will be made explicit whenever the case.

These two aspects are also the reason why I do not define specific thresholds for the different IVs, as often recommended in literature on methods and research design. While such thresholds are certainly useful when using numerical data and increase the reliability of the operationalization, such quantification would not be of great help for my analysis, based on the variance of data, the different security issues that I examine and the different characteristics of the two actors that form part of my analysis. Moreover, an assignment of thresholds is not expected to produce relevant information as the qualities of my IVs are differences in kind not in magnitude and can therefore only be described in words, not numbers. Hence, the way in

64 which I weigh the indicators for the IVs and the IVs as such is rather inductive and derives from the data. Accordingly, it seems more promising to address the strength of the present IVs via the importance that is attached to them by the EU and China. I further examine whether the data puts forward the distinct IVs as a dominant rationales for cooperation.19 As it is at the core of qualitative research designs to apply explanatory concepts that seek to extract causal mechanisms, they often use complex IVs. Quantifying these complex constructs thus bears the risk of oversimplification and reduction of complexity at the expense of differentiated and nuanced assessments of the empirical phenomena (Gläser and Laudel, 2009, p. 79).

IV1 - Complex interdependence

To examine the plausibility of my theoretical expectations 1a and 3a, I examine the impact of complex interdependence on EU-China security cooperation. E1a expects that if complex interdependence grows over time, the amount of security cooperation between the EU and China increases. And 3a contends that the higher the degree of complex interdependence between the EU and China the higher the amount of security cooperation. I begin by sketching how I conceptualize complex interdependence. Based on the definition that Keohane and Nye put forward, complex interdependence means “mutual dependence and refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 8).

In order to assess whether and how the EU and China are bound in complex interdependence, I look at a number of different indicators. The first way to capture the existence of complex interdependence would be to look at the volume of trade between the EU and China. Information about this indicator can be found in Eurostat and Statista statistics. Especially for the increase of complex interdependence over time (Part A) a significant increase of trade indicates growing complex interdependence. For the amount of complex interdependence in a specific security realm (Part B) this is not a useful indicator as the amount of trade between the EU and China does not differ among the different security issues. Hence, additional indicators are necessary to capture complex interdependence.

Therefore, I build on Keohane and Nye, who introduced several indicators to detect whether complex interdependence is at play in EU-China relations. These are ‘multiple channels of

19 The only exception are the trade statistics that I consult for the measurement of complex interdependence and economic interests. 65 communication’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 24), an ‘absence of hierarchy among issues’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 25) and an ‘absence of the use of force’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 28). What do these parameters imply? According to Keohane and Nye, ‘multiple channels of communication’ includes communication channels on various levels – interstate, transgovernmental and transnational. The ‘absence of hierarchy among issues’ implies that the distinction between domestic and foreign policies becomes blurred and foreign policies touch domestic activity. The ‘absence of use of force’ means that two actors are not bound in any form of violent or military conflict in which the use of force of the threat of such use is prevalent.

Furthermore, based on the elaborations of Keohane and Nye, I include ‘vulnerability’ and ‘sensitivity’ as indicators for complex interdependence. While the former implies the liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 12), the latter points to pressures faced by various state actors as the result of others’ actions (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 13). The following table sums up how I define these indicators.

indicator description

communication channels exist on various levels between multiple channels of the EU and China – interstate, transgovernmental and communication transnational

implies that the distinction between domestic and foreign absence of hierarchy among policy becomes blurred -> foreign policies touch domestic issues activity

implies that the EU and China are not bound in any form absence of use of force of violent or military conflict in which the use of force of the threat of such use is prevalent

implies all forms of costs that occur through non- cooperation, applies whenever the EU and/or China vulnerability mention the ‘necessity’, ‘urgency’ or ‘inevitableness’ of cooperation or point towards possible costs that might emanate from non-cooperation

involves degrees of responsiveness: policies in China are sensitivity sensitive to policies in the EU and vice versa

Table 5 Description of indicators for IV 1 (complex interdependence). 66

In order to add some flesh to the bone of these indicators, I will now specify what kind of pieces of evidence I would assign to these indicators. For ‘vulnerability’ I would expect evidence in the data that reveal a ‘necessity’, ‘urgency’ or ‘inevitableness’ of cooperation. Moreover, it applies whenever there is evidence for possible costs that might emanate from non-cooperation and that are mentioned explicitly or implicitly in the data. For instance, statements such as “you cannot just ‘choose’ to cooperate with the second biggest economy in the world” (European Parliament, 2015) would point towards complex interdependence because it clearly indicates that cooperation, in this case from the EU point of view, is inevitable. Hence, it reveals a certain vulnerability of the EU, although voiced implicitly. Similarly, postulations such as the following are a clear indicator for complex interdependence: “if you like it or dislike it, there is no way but to cooperate, we are so dependent on each other” (Interview #19, 14-03-19). Moreover, it goes without saying that all indications that the EU or China directly frame their relationship as ‘interdependent’ point towards complex interdependence.

‘Sensitivity’ implies that policies in China are sensitive to policies in the EU and vice versa. Here, I would expect pieces of evidence that allude to impacts that policies implemented by one actor have on the situation of the respective other. For instance, the impact climate policy decisions taken by the EU would not stay within the boundaries of the EU but would also affect China, as is the case for many issues of global governance.

With regard to ‘multiple channels of communication’ a look at the distinct dialogue fora of the EU and China can reveal compelling evidence. Such fora can be located within multilateral for a, which would be indicated by references to the UN or the WTO, for instance. They can also take place on regional level, like ASEM or ASEF, or on bilateral level like the numerous EU- China dialogue formats. One example for the latter would be the EU-China Security and Defense Dialogue.

For an ‘absence of hierarchy among issues’ I would expect pieces of evidence that point towards a nexus between domestic and foreign policy. Also statements indicating that domestic considerations have influenced foreign policy decision would be coded as ‘absence of hierarchy among issues’. For example, statements or text passages that allude to domestic pressure as a reason for foreign policy decisions would fall into this category.

Regarding the ‘absence of use of force’, implying that the EU and China are not bound in any form of violent or military conflict that includes the use of force, I would, for example, code references that point towards the EU not having military presence in Asia. Also text passages 67 that imply that other measures are used to deal with possible conflicts between the EU and China would point towards an absence of use of force.

IV2 - Economic interests

Economic interests are at the core of my theoretical expectations 1b and 3b. E1b denotes that the more economic interests become involved over time, the more security cooperation takes place. Similarly, E3b expects that the more economic interests are at stake (in the respective security issue), the higher the amount of security cooperation. Economic interests is a highly complex concept. How economics matter to political processes such as security cooperation is difficult to measure as the researcher cannot see the value politicians place on economic factors.

Throughout the analysis I examine whether the EU and China make reference to an economy- security nexus or name economic factors as an argument for cooperation. Whether economic interests are at stake in one form or another can be measured either by the amount of economic interests that the EU and/or China have in the security realm in general or the specific security issue in particular. Obviously, the most logical indicator for this are statistical information about trade flows, import and exports that concern security or the distinct security issues. For part B, accordingly, I focus on the economic parameters connected to the specific security issues. For the issue of anti-terrorism this would be all forms of data that inform about economic damages deriving from terrorist attacks. For the issue of maritime security/anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden this would be statistics informing about the number of trade vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden annually, the amount of oil and gas shipping through this strategic waterway to China and the EU as well as the number of merch vessels that are attacked by pirates. Sources for these statistics can be found primarily with the Energy Information Administration (EIA), Eurostat and Statistics.

Alternatively, as not for all security issues that are subject to the empirical analysis these indicators can be clearly detected, statements about economic interests or threats to those can indicate whether the IV ‘economic interests’ is present or not. Hence, I will comb through the data material that I collect for the analysis in search for such statements. In order to get an encompassing grasp at this IV, I develop two different categories that I will code in the data. These are ‘economic interests’, including all references to economic interests in the realm of

68 security of the specific security issue under examination, or ‘threats to economic interests’20, including all references to possible damages of economic interests that possibly or actually emanate from a certain security threat. The following table sums up, how I define these categories.

indicator description

includes all indications of economic interests, current/future economic economic interests projects that touches upon security/the respective security issue

threats to economic includes all indications that point towards threats to economic interests interests or the own national well-being

Table 6 Description of indicators for IV 2 (economic interests).

For the former, I expect statements or text passages that refer to a nexus economy and security. Also indications that security cooperation serves or helps to maximize economic benefits would allude to ‘economic interests’. As specimens for evidence pointing towards the latter, ‘threats to economic interests’, I would expect passages that refer to cooperation as a means to prevent economic losses. One example for this would be a statements such as the following: „Kooperation auch im Sicherheitsbereich um Wirtschaftsinteressen zu schützen“ (Interview #3, 26-02-19).

Again, the possibility exists, that for one actor, either the EU or China, covariation between economic interests and cooperation exists, while for the other actor different rationales are at play, that nevertheless result in cooperation. Again, I will make this explicit whenever there is evidence for such imbalance and critically discuss it when probing the plausibility of my theoretical expectations.

IV3 – Problem understanding

For my theoretical expectations 2a and 4a, I examine whether the EU’s and China’s understanding of security/the security issue under scrutiny is convergent. E2a states that the more convergent the EU’s and China’s understanding of security becomes over time, the more

20 Cooperation could then emanate from the will to increase the economic gains, to ensure economic interests or to prevent economic losses. 69 security cooperation emerges. E4a denotes that the more convergent the problem understanding of a security issue, the more security cooperation takes place.

In order to compare the problem understanding of the EU and China, I inductively develop a number of indicators. These differ between Part A and Part B of the analysis. As in Part A I focus on security in general, I compare their problem understanding along the following criteria: scope of definition, extent of salience, target and institutional responsibility. For part B that requires more specific examination I compare their understanding of the respective security issue under scrutiny (anti-terrorism, maritime security/anti-piracy or climate/energy security) along the following criteria: type of security, extent of salience, scope of definition, target, institutional responsibility and political values that are attached to the security issue. The following table sums up, how I define these categories.

indicator description

Part A/B: includes whether the EU’s and China’s definition of scope of definition security/the respective security issue is narrow/specific or broad/vague

Part A/B: includes which target the EU and China consider most important/relevant/affected by the security issue and threats that might target emanate from it (e.g. does it affect domestic concerns or global concerns?)

Part A/B: includes the institutional framework within which the security issue is handled (e.g. whether it is embedded in the foreign institutional and security policy making apparatus or into homeland security, responsibility whether it takes place within multilateral frameworks or on bilateral level)

Part A/B: includes whether security as a policy field/the respective

security issue is of high, medium or low salience for the EU and China extent of salience based on their exposure to the issue and possible vulnerability

type of security Part B: includes whether the security issue is defined as a traditional or non-traditional security

Part B: includes the political values that are attached to the security political values issue and to threats that emanate from it (e.g. human rights, sovereignty, territorial integrity)

Table 7 Description of indicators for IV 3 (problem understanding).

The ‘scope of definition’ of security or the security issue can either be very narrow and specific or rather broad and vague. For a specific/narrow definition I would expect very concrete information about what constitutes security/the security issue. A broad/vague definition, in contrast, would leave room for interpretation and questions and does not sketch the phenomenon specifically. For instance, when the Chinese side talks about “propositions” as a part of terrorism, it is not clear what exactly is meant by that.

For the ‘target’ I look at whom the EU and China consider the main target of terrorist attacks. This can be domestic targets or international targets, specific institutions or areas.

‘Institutional responsibility’ captures how combatting terrorism is handled within the political institutions of the EU and China. Here I would expect pieces of evidence that show whether the security issue is located within the foreign policy scope of the two actors or whether it is embedded in homeland security. Also indications of specific institutions or frameworks dedicated to dealing with the specific issue would give information about the institutional responsibility. Furthermore, statements or text passages that provide information about the level on which security/the security issue is handled are of value. For instance, the EU or China could indicate whether they rely on national institutions to deal with security, whether they focus on bilateral cooperation such as ASEM or ASEF or whether the place emphasis on multilateral frameworks such as the UN when it comes to security.

The ‘extent of salience’ describes whether security as a policy field/the respective security issue is of high, medium or low salience for the EU and China based on their exposure to the issue and possible vulnerability. This cannot be measured in objective terms but is very much dependent on perceived vulnerabilities. Accordingly, I expect to find statements or text passages that provide information about the importance of security or the respective security issue for the EU and China. Also indications of being vulnerable, exposed or delicate to security provide information about the extent of salience. For instance, if Chinese sources point towards increased vulnerability of Chinese ships in the Gulf of Aden, this would be a fitting piece of evidence. Likewise, postulations of ‘importance’, ‘significance’ or ‘salience’ as such would obviously also inform about the extent of salience.

The ‘type of security’ is only used as an indicator for part B of the analysis. Here it is important whether the EU and China consider the security issues under scrutiny as traditional or non- traditional security issues. I expect to find very explicit statements or text passages indicating that. 71

For ‘political values’ I expect to find references to the political values that are attached to the security issue and to the threats that emanate from it. For instance, statements or passages that indicate that China’s understanding of terrorism is closely connected with territorial integrity or sovereignty would be coded.

IV4 – Mutual perceptions

My fourth IV informs my theoretical expectations 2b and 4b. They contend that if mutual perceptions become more positive over time, security cooperation increases (E2b) and that the more positive mutual perceptions in a specific security issue are, the more cooperation takes place (E4b). Based on the distinction between ‘friends’, ‘rivals’ and ‘enemies’ introduced by Alexander Wendt (Wendt, 1999) I developed five categories that capture different forms of perceptions, ranging from very positive (friend) towards very negative (enemy): friend, partner, necessary counterpart, rival and enemy.

First, let me introduce the categories developed by Wendt. ‘Friends’ are tend to be bound in alliances and trust each other. If they cooperate it is because of aligning ideas, norms or values. Furthermore, they identify with each and are empathetic with each other. Rivals, in contrast, compete with each other which can include the use of violence, albeit in a limited and calculated manner. ‘Enemies’ consider each other as threatening adversaries and intend to harm the other, which includes the use of force.

This Wendtian distinction is a good starting point. Yet, I add two categories to the existing distinction with the aim to capture in a more differentiated manner the different perceptions that the EU and China hold of each other. The development of the additional two categories is further informed by the information gained during the mapping. A first glimpse into parts of the empirical material has shown that there are perceptions that are not positive enough to characterize as friendly yet not negative enough to be coded as rival. Accordingly I add ‘partner’ and ‘necessary counterpart’. ‘Partner’ implies that the EU and China align for the purpose of creating win-win situations and mutual benefits or reduced costs. The relationship of ‘partners’ is limited to certain situations (temporally) or issue areas. Like friends, partners trust each other. Yet, the main difference between partners and friends is that the alignment of friends is driven by a notion of appropriateness and derives from converging norms and values. To be partners, norms and values do not necessarily need to converge. ‘Necessary counterparts’ work together although they might lack trust. Their respective ideas, norms and values might be diverging and

72 cooperation only occurs because of the necessity to do so or because an issue can only be tackled in collaboration with the respective other. These different perceptions have different rules of engagement, interaction logics and systemic tendencies. The following table sums up what I mean by the distinct categories.

indicator description

friends are tend to be bound in alliances, trust each other and do not necessarily expect something in return for services; their relationship friend extends beyond pragmatic win-win constellations that promote mutual benefits but cooperate because of aligning ideas, norms and values

partners align for the purpose of creating win-win situations and mutual partner benefits/reduced costs; their relationship is often limited to certain situations (temporally) or issue areas; partners trust each other

necessary counterparts work together although they might lack trust; ideas, norms and values might be diverging and cooperation only necessary occurs because of the necessity to do so or because an issue can only be counterpart tackled in collaboration with the respective other; their relationship is always limited to certain situations (temporally) or issue areas

rivals compete with each other which includes the use of violence for rival maximization of interests, however in a limited and calculated manner

enemies are characterized by threatening each other with violent enemy actions in an unlimited manner

Table 8 Description of categories for IV 4 (mutual perceptions).

Hence, I code all adjectives and attributes that are used by the EU or China to describe the respective other such as ‘trustworthy’, ‘friendly’, ‘rival/competitive’ or ‘enemy’. Such attributives also provide information about how the respective other is perceived. Sometimes also statements such as “there is no way not to cooperate” give insight into perceptions. In this very example, I would code ‘necessary counterpart’ because of the explicitly addressed necessity for cooperation.

It has to be mentioned that different perceptions can co-exist. For once, the EU and China can have divergent perceptions of each other. Also different sources (interviews, official statements

73 or media reports) might differ with regard to how China or the EU might perceive the respective other. During the analysis, I will carefully weigh the indications of each perception against each other in order to gain insight into which type of perception seems to be the most dominant one.

4. Data and Methods

Having sketched my theoretical framework for the subsequent analysis and having operationalized my IVs, the present chapter introduces and critically discusses my approaches to data collection. It puts particular emphasis on the challenges of collecting data in a security- sensitive setting like China. Retrieving information in written or oral form in such settings is all but straightforward and requires concise planning. I will reflect upon the main challenges that I faced and discuss how I tried to work around them by triangulating different forms of data. In a further step, I introduce mixed comparison as the method that I apply to answer my research questions and briefly elaborate on the appropriateness and advantages of this particular method for my analysis. Subsequently, I discuss the case selection techniques and substantiate the selection of two time periods for the analysis over time and of the three cases anti-terrorism, maritime security/anti-piracy and climate/energy security for the comparison between different security issues.

4.1. Data Collection in Security-Sensitive Settings

I begin with discussing the specificities of data collection in security-sensitive settings, like the authoritarian context of China. As mentioned in the introduction, it is a key component of my dissertation and a contribution to the state of the art to include the Chiense perspective into my research. This requires detailed data collection. Yet, many of the common tools of data collection do not apply for security-sensitive or autocratic settings (Sieber and Stanley, 1988; Renzetti and Lee, 1993) or have to be adapted (Ansorg, 2019; Grimm et al., 2020; Gurol and Wetterich, 2020). One of the main challenges during the process of data collection in security- sensitive settings is to find a balance between searching for access to data and the risk of bad data quality, due to biased information or low data saturation (Knott, 2019; Kapiszewski et al., 2018; Glasius et al., 2018). These challenges are especially high if the researched topic is sensitive, like the policy field of security in EU-China relations. I do not follow the assumption of David Art that “work on authoritarian regimes should obviously not be held to the same

74 evidentiary standards as work on the advanced industrial democracies” (Art, 2012). Yet, it is crucial to critically discuss methods to work around the risks of low data saturation, biased information and restricted access to the field.

In order to circumvent these flaws, I will carefully triangulate different sources of data to enhance the credibility of the analysis (Denzin, 2009; Merriam and Tisdell, 2016) and to provide a more comprehensive understanding of EU-China security cooperation. In particular, I will rely on three different sources of data. First, I will make use of official documents, declaration and statements issued by the EU and China. I will enrich these with elite and expert interviews with Chinese and European interviewees that I conducted during three field research trips to China21 and Brussels over the course of 2019. Finally, I rely on media sources for further triangulation. In the following subchapter, I will elaborate on my triangulation techniques and point out the advantages and disadvantages of these data sources. In addition, I will critically discuss the process of interview conduction as it requires further explication, based on the authoritarian Chinese context in which some of the interviews were conducted.

4.2. Triangulation and Data Sources

Triangulation refers to the use of multiple approaches to analyzing collected data to enhance the credibility of a research project. It aligns multiple perspectives and thereby leads to a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under scrutiny (Salkind, 2010; Mertens and Hesse-Biber, 2012; Flick, 2004; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). Especially in research contexts in which data availability is a challenge, triangulation is a useful means of double-checking information and enriching the data corpus (Denzin, 1978; Carter et al., 2014). In particular when the researched topic is politically sensitive (Davies, 2001), like the field of security in EU-China relations, this technique can provide fruitful results (Elman and Kapiszewski, 2014). Natow (2019) finds that triangulation is most common in studies that involved elite interviews by combining interviews with document review. Likewise, Kezar (2008, p. 415) notes that it is crucial to “conduct extensive analysis of documents and background work before conducting interviews” with elites or experts, as gaining access can be challenging. Moreover, using additional data sources can provide corroboration for the initial findings and can incorporate additional information to what the interview data may provide (Davies, 2011).

21 In China I primarily interviewed policy makers and experts from Beijing and Shanghai as the two politically most important cities. 75

In the course of the analysis, I will apply different forms of data triangulation. I will draw on multiple data sources by gathering data from different perspectives. This form of in-data triangulation means that I crosscheck information given by one interviewee with other interview partners. In particular, I asked my Chinese interview partners what they believe are European perceptions of China’s policies and vice versa. Furthermore, I interviewed elites and experts from different institutions. On the European side, I collected information from employees of different Directorate Generals, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the External Action Service and the European Delegation to China to provide corroboration for the pieces of evidence that I found. On the Chinese side, this proved more difficult due to the accessibility problems. Therefore, I tried to crosscheck information gained from elite interviews with policy experts and academic scholars whom I expected to speak more freely and independently. Similarly, I triangulated data from Chinese official sources with similar sources from the European side.

Furthermore, I used multiple methodologies as I employed more than one type of qualitative data collection procedure. In a first step, I collected official policy papers, statements and declarations of the EU and China. In addition to the elite and expert interviews I used supplementary documents such as media outlets and op-eds from Chinese and European media, press releases and speeches from politicians and political advisors. Denzin calls this approach “within-method triangulation” (2009, p. 307). Official policy documents and declarations, speeches of policy officials and politicians are useful to capture the official lines of the EU and China towards each other. In other words, it adds to understanding the elite perspective on EU- China security relations. Speeches and other forms of communication explicitly or implicitly carry political ideas (Charteris-Black, 2005; Charteris-Black, 2014; Townshend, 2003). However, these cannot necessarily be interpreted as ‘true’ representations of what policy- makers think or know about their state’s or organization’s position in the international system. Instead, the documents have been chosen precisely for their function as stylized expressions of role-perceptions and role positions commonly used in diplomatic contexts directed at other states and the wider public (Michalski and Pan, 2017). In total, I collected 32 official EU or China related policy documents and 17 minutes of parliamentary debates manually in the official EU databases, Consilium, EUR-Lex, the Legislative Observatory of the European Union and in Chinese databases, and ministries. There is a confidentiality problem concerning official documents in the European Council and to some extent in the European Parliament. Although most parliamentary debates are accessible to the public, some relevant process documents are not published despite transparency commitments. Besides these documents, I 76 also rely in the EU Global Strategy and the Implementation Reports the EU issues annually as well as further official documents related to security, such as the EU Security Strategy or the EU Maritime Security Strategy. For the Chinese side, I collected the Chinese Defense White Papers from 1995-2019. Moreover, I composed 36 transcripts of speeches of Chinese officials and 21 of their European counterparts.

As legal documents pose the risk of concealing the informal processes and considerations that preceded a certain decision or action (George and Bennett, 2005), I also collected other such as media reports for triangulation. In total, I collected a little more than 685 media documents manually and through a LexisNexis search. For the Chinese side, around 230 EU-China related media reports were collected from the two biggest public newspapers with an English version, China Daily and Global Times. Google searches with Chinese buzzwords led to additional sources, mainly from Xinhua News Agency, a state-run Chinese news agency and the South China Morning Post (among others). For the European side, data for triangulation mainly derives from the two news outlets on EU-level, namely EUObserver and Politico EU, from which a bit more than 230 articles were collected. The reason why I use media sources for triangulation is to gain an insight into why and how the EU and China adopt positions and develop and communicate them by looking at how they portray a topic to the public. However, the explanatory value of the Chinese media sources remains limited, as most media outlets are either state-controlled or free but censored and there are many red lines which reporters cannot cross. Therefore, all media reports serve as an additional source to confirm whether information from documents or interviews resembles to the information given to the public. However, the general problem with media outlets is that many of them do not contain valuable information for the subject under scrutiny as they either just mention the case or reformulate public press statements or declarations.

By using multiple triangulation techniques (Denzin, 2009; Thurmond, 2001), I seek to increase the validity of my findings by looking for convergence of several sources of empirical evidence. Thereby, what I was told in the interviews could be “checked against what […] [I] […] read about in documents” (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016, p. 245). Using triangulation further increases the reliability and validity of data and the ensuing analysis. Yet, it cannot respond to all concerns about replicability of the study at hand, as information given by the interviewees is always sensitive to the interviewer and the interview context (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002).

Conducting an analysis over time faces the challenge of determining a concrete starting and ending point of data collection, not in terms of the collection itself but of the collected data sources (Bennett and Checkel, 2014). When assessing the drivers towards increased EU-China security cooperation over time, there is no clear definition of where data collection should start and where it should end. While negotiation dynamics can be found within the minutes of parliamentary debates way ahead of a concrete policy choice, the media coverage of this choice is due to start after the decision has been taken. Moreover, if agenda setting is considered, the data collection cannot begin with the formal submission of a proposal or the first negotiation round but has to include the debates of strategic planning before the actual action takes place. Therefore, the collected written evidence generally covers the time span from 1995 to 2019, but specific forms of data dominate at one point in time while being scarce at another. As a starting point of the collection of official documents 1995 was chosen because in this year the EU issued its first policy paper on China.

4.3. Interviews as a Source of Evidence

In order to collect additional data for the analyses fieldwork in China (February/March 2019 and October 2019) and Brussels (September 2019) was carried out for this project. The aim of the two research stays was to conduct expert and elite interviews. In the following three sections, I will elaborate on these interviews as a tool to collect data. I will further discuss the risks and advantages of interview conduction, again with reference to the specific authoritarian context of China. In doing so, I will dive into questions of accessibility of the field, responsiveness of interviewees and data saturation.

The question of advantages or risks of using expert and elite interviews for political analyses has been widely discussed among political science scholars and qualitative methods researchers (Gläser and Laudel, 2010; Tansey, 2007; Leech, 2002). Interviews can corroborate processes of action and interaction and enable inferences about what people think. Thereby they can help to reconstruct activities and decisions post-hoc (Gläser and Laudel, 2010; Tansey, 2007). Interviews are a cost-effective device to generating unique reliable and valid data (Beamer, 2002). In using interviews, I can corroborate information from documents and shed light on the underlying causal mechanisms leading to EU-China security cooperation. Thereby, I can complement the documents that might lack documentation of these mechanisms.

For the analysis I conducted two types of interviews. While elite interviews target people who are directly involved in the political processes of the EU and China or do policy consultancy (Dexter, 2006; Natow, 2019), expert interviews focus on other (academic or non-academic) researchers who touch upon similar research topics. Hence, interviews with experts and policy- makers are meaningful sources of information on decision-making and negotiation processes between the EU and China. They provide me with an appropriate methodological tool to gain insight into the reasons for security cooperation between the EU and China and are thus the most useful pieces of evidence for this dissertation (Tansey, 2007). Furthermore, interviews enable me to collect evidence as the availability of alternative data such as written evidence, like protocols from party meeting or parliamentary discussions, is scarce, especially on the Chinese side. Accordingly, interviews can serve a corroborative purpose to confirm the accuracy of other pieces of evidence that have been collected, and can verify their validity and reliability (Tansey, 2007). They are a suitable device to go beyond the official statements issued by the EU and China and to extract underlying causalities. Especially in the Chinese case, interviews offer the possibility to leave asides the dominant “thinking sets” that have emerged in Chinese foreign policy studies (Xu and Du, 2015) and which are a sort of stereotype thinking about China’s foreign policy and are prominently quoted especially in Western IR scholars’ research about China. Moreover, they provide the possibility to go beyond official statements and declarations which often either convey a certain message or to conceal important pieces of information, especially in the authoritarian Chinese case. Hence, relying solely on official sources for the analysis bears the risk to either gain incomplete results or to divulge a too rosy picture of the Chinese rationales for cooperation.

Despites these advantages, using interviews as a source of evidence bears certain risks that should be discussed in detail. Especially in security-sensitive settings like China, the possibility pertains that the interviewees might be either less willing to give away information or lack the civil liberties that incline them to speak freely (Morgenbesser and Weiss, 2018). Thus, one of the main challenges during the interview process is was to find a balance between searching for access to the field itself, securing trustworthiness of the interviewees and the risk of bad data quality, conducting interviews in a biased way (Glasius et al., 2018). These challenges are especially high when political elites are concerned or if interviews take place in an authoritarian system (Wackenhut, 2018; Cronin-Furman and Lake, 2018). Besides the difficulties concerning elite interviewing in general, the case of China posed such research issues and complications, which might not have occurred in Western contexts.

In total, I conducted 31 semi-structured interviews in German, English and (partly) Chinese and held 13 background talks.22 Instead of standardization, I developed the concrete interview questions individually in the run-up to each interview. Moreover, I adapted the questionnaires to the specific information the interview partner could provide for the analysis and to her or his perspective on the topic, be it academic or from within the circle of policy-makers. This makes it possible to ask for key information in a more efficient and goal-oriented way and reduces the amount of information not valid for the analysis, to a minimum. This is the best approach in an authoritarian context like China in which asking the wrong questions can either restrict the access to further interviewees or lead to scepticism and mistrust on behalf of the target group (Glasius et al., 2018). Furthermore, lower degrees of structuring allow the respondents to talk freely. Thereby, I could gain detailed information about experts’ and elites’ thoughts and attitudes on central issues (Davies, 2011; Tansey, 2007).

In addition, I designed the interview guidelines in a manner to assess what the respective interviewee thinks about the other side’s perceptions in the sense of in-data triangulation. There might be a discernible cost here in terms of textbook recommendations on interview conduction as in such semi-structured approach respondents might not necessarily have been asked questions in the same order or not even the same number of questions (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). Yet, in a politically security-sensitive setting like the authoritarian China, keeping the interview process as flexible and tailor-made to the respective interviewees proved the most fruitful results. The advantages of conversational flow and depth of information thus outweighs the disadvantages of inconsistent ordering of questions, low structured guidelines and loose threads of conversation.

In the following sections, I will reflect upon the collection of interview data in the EU context and specifically in China, where I had to apply with strict regulations of discretion and political sensitivity that often arise from security-sensitive contexts (Davies, 2011; Tansey, 2007; Beamer, 2002; Berry, 2002). Thus, it was necessary to adapt the sampling strategy, data collection process and data logging to the Chinese cultural contexts. Many routine methodological approaches that are adequate for cases in Western countries are not suitable for China and had to be adapted accordingly.

22 After the process of interview conduction, I had to reject some interviews from the early stages of the data collection process as evidence and used them only for background information, as they did not contain relevant or helpful information concerning the reasons for cooperation or non-cooperation between the EU and China in the chosen cases. 80

4.3.1. Access to the Field and Sampling Strategy

The biggest challenge when conducting interviews in China was sampling, combined with matters of trustworthiness and gaining access to the shielded off political elite circles (Manion, 1994; Zhou and Baptista Nunes, 2013; Cornet, 2010). Within the cultural context of the PRC, members of the political elite mostly act according to the rules and opinion of the Communist Party. While non-officials were easier to access through interpersonal connections or contact persons (Gold et al., 2002), higher-level officials remained mostly out of reach. Furthermore, I observed a certain degree of collectivism (Hofstede et al., 2010), meaning that subordinates and in-groups seemed to depend on power figures for allowance and were therefore not willing to participate in interviews unless they were told so from their superiors. This did not apply to most university experts who answered freely and were easy to contact. Yet, despite challenges in interviewing Chinese state officials and people close to the policy circle, it was possible to reach out to actors outside the state and the party to gather information on policy information. In addition, I could solve some accessibility problems by promising anonymity to the interviewees and eliminating all pieces of information from my transcripts that might give away their identity. Concerning accessibility to the European political elites and experts, the process was easier and the response rate was higher. Yet, similar problems occurred with regard to quotation and some interviewees requested to remain anonymous.

When selecting interview participants, I proceeded in two steps. To select experts and political scientists, purposive sampling appeared adequate combined with snowball sampling to increase the ability to identify the complete range of expert views (Beamer, 2002). The overall aim was to select those key political players who were closest to the processes of interest (Berry, 2002; Tansey, 2007). However, in the Chinese context, this was difficult. Although I identified the key political decision-makers and sent out interview requests, the responsiveness was rather low. In fact, the snowball sampling strategy worked out best in the case of China. Furthermore, the responsiveness of possible interviewees was higher when other interviewees in their network contacted and recruited them. This applied to informal policy networks as well as to policy advisers and political decision-makers. Generally, the risk of snowball sampling is to introduce a certain bias into the sample, which makes information less generalizable. Yet, snowball sampling works well in shielded off samples like China, where trustworthiness of the interviewer is a huge concern. As the interviews addressed very (security-) sensitive issues, many were concerned for their own safety, as well as for their network. Hence, I had to prove both my expertise and trustworthiness to gain access (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009; Berger, 81

2015). These factors influenced the purposive selection of interview partners and led me to rely more on snowball sampling.

4.3.2. Data Saturation And Responsiveness

Besides challenges of accessibility and sampling, interviews pose the risk of latent selectivity in evidentiary sources (Bennett and Checkel, 2014), as actors might have instrumental reasons to either convey a particular message or to avoid divulging certain pieces of information (Ackerly and True, 2010). This is especially true for authoritarian settings, like in China (Morgenbesser and Weiss, 2018; Zhou and Baptista Nunes, 2013). Thus, “work on authoritarian regimes should obviously not be held to the same evidentiary standards as work on the advanced industrial democracies” (Art, 2012, p. 353). Moreover, further ethical and methodological challenges emanate from authoritarian research settings, deriving from possible surveillance and threats to data security (Gentile, 2013; Koch, 2013; Bahn, 2012).

These threats have certainly affected the interviews that I conducted in China. During the interviews in general and with political elite members in particular, the Chinese phenomenon of mianzi (面子) became obvious. Mianzi relates to the Chinese concept of preserving face (Gao, 1998; Kim and Nam, 1998; Lee-Wong, 200; Zhao, 2017). In general, mianzi could be characterized as “the recognition by others of one’s social standing and position” (Lockett, 1988). It became perceptible in the interview process when the interviewees noticeably responded in a way the might save their mianzi instead of being fully honest (Zhou and Baptista Nunes, 2013; Buckley et al., 2006; Cui, 2015). For the interview process, this implies that some of the interviewees responded in a way that could save their mianzi, instead of answering honestly. Hence, I had to be very careful during the interview process not to cause people to ‘lose face ‘(丢脸 – diūliǎn) as this would not only hamper my access to participants in the field but also might have societal or even political consequences. Furthermore, I made the same observation as Zhou and Baptista that “interviewees were not only inclined to save their own face, but also trying to preserve the mianzi of their colleagues and department” (Zhou and Baptista Nunes, 2013, p. 428) or differentiated clearly between the official line and their personal opinion, as in the following example: “I can offer two explanations. The official position of the government towards terrorism in the Middle East is neutral (…). I, as a scholar, have different views” (Interview #17, 11-03.19), thereby conveying information via latent meaning. The higher a position of an interviewee was and the closer its institution was to the CPP, the more evident was the phenomenon of mianzi, which reveals the high power distance 82 trait that characterizes Chinese culture. Often, the interviewees responded in a way that would emphasize their allegiance and loyalty to the Chinese regime. Thus, Chinese interview participants were generally less willing to divulge information than the European participants were. However, I expected this phenomenon to be even stronger and the willingness to reveal information, often in a roundabout way and always clearly distinguishing between the official and the personal opinion, surprised me.

Most of the interviews, especially with Chinese interviewees could not be recorded because of explicitly voiced confidentiality concerns. However, extensive notes and minutes taken from memory exist from these interviews. Moreover, I transcribed each interview directly after the interview process.

4.4. Data Analysis

The previous sections explained the various techniques of data collection applied over the course of the research process. In this section I introduce mixed comparison as the method that I apply to answer my research questions and briefly discuss the appropriateness and advantages of this particular method for my analysis. Moreover, I elaborate on how I selected the cases for comparison and explain the choice of two time periods for the first part of the analysis that assesses EU-China security cooperation over time. I will also introduce the cases of anti- terrorism, maritime security/anti-piracy and climate/energy security that I chose for the second part of the analysis that examines EU-China security cooperation on different issues.

As I want to reconstruct the process that lead to EU-China security cooperation, applying process tracing would be the most promising analytical approach to examining the underlying drivers towards cooperation. Thereby it would be possible to shed light on the causal mechanisms as such and to observe the process of the mechanisms that leads to the observable implication of the hypothesized theoretical drivers. Tracing the process makes it possible to “identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 206). Yet, such insight into the processes require a high level of data saturation and specific process evidence (Bennett, 2008; Checkel, 2006; Machamer et al., 2000; Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, 2017) to unfold the development of EU-China security cooperation. Yet, due to the challenges of data collection in the Chinese context on which I elaborated above,

I would not be able to reconstruct the hypothesized causal chain. Accordingly, I will not apply process tracing but will nevertheless try to reveal as much of the process between the theorized drivers and the outcome, EU-China security cooperation, as possible.

In doing so, I apply mixed comparison. It is ‘mixed’ in that I use a diachronic (within-case) comparison when assessing the increase of EU-China security cooperation over time and a synchronic (cross-case) comparison when analyzing cooperation on different security issues. Diachronic comparison is well suited to trace developments over time, which is the aim of part A of my analysis. Although in diachronic comparisons many unit- and context-related variables can be kept constant, it needs to be considered that additional temporal developments take place that have not been theorized but nevertheless influence the dependent variable. For EU-China security cooperation this is most certainly the case as EU-China relations do not stand for themselves but are embedded in broader geopolitical settings. Synchronic comparisons, in contrast, have the advantage that temporal and contextual variables can be kept constant more easily. In general, synchronic comparative case study analysis is based on the presumption that interactions in the international system are inherently complex (George and Bennett, 2004; Gerring, 2007; Bennett and Elman, 2007). Using case studies provide political scientists with an appropriate tool to address this complexity and disentangle the variety of factors that drive the behavior of actors. The overall purpose of comparative case studies is to “bring[...] into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts among cases” (Collier, 1993, p. 105) (Collier 1993, p. 105). Thereby it is possible to “establish [...] general empirical propositions” based on the in-depth analysis of a “small number of cases” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 682). Furthermore, case studies enable the researcher to dive into a case and thoroughly engage with empirical material to examine different aspects of the case and to look at it from different perspectives (Gerring, 2004). One of the key advantages of comparative case studies is that they involve the analysis and synthesis of similarities, differences and other patterns across two or more cases. Thereby they are a suitable device to produce knowledge. The specific method of comparison used during my analysis is a structured focused comparison. In general terms, this method is ‘structured’ in a sense that it applies standardized data collection, thereby enabling a systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings. In is further ‘focused’ in that it deals only with certain elements of the cases (George, 2019).

In order to analyze the cases, I pursue a qualitative content analysis with MaxQDA. Using MaxQDA helps to organize and comb through the data in a structured manner. I made my analysis subject to a number of research criteria that I will now discuss in detail. First and 84 foremost, my analysis follows the principle of theory-led interpretation. Having developed a theoretical framework, my analysis and all interpretations or inferences made take place within this framework. Moreover, I structure my analysis by comprehensible categories that increase the inter-subjective reliability (in chapter 5.6. I will introduce and discuss these categories in detail). These criteria can also be used by other researchers to interpret the same data and reconstruct my conclusions. Despite the structure I will further remain open to unexpected or even contradictory discoveries that cannot be explained by the preconceived theoretical expectations or even reverse them. In addition, using MaxQDA enables me to systematically proceed in data analysis of documents, speeches, media reports and interviews. It is a means of structuring data and presenting it in a way that could be replicated by other researchers in possession of the material and the coding schemes23. This is supposed to increase reliability and validity.

Seeking for the drivers towards EU-China security cooperation is inherently complex. The decision of states not only to interact but to cooperate with each other is usually influenced by a variety of factors. These can be structural factors, normative beliefs, values or ideas, rationalist considerations or the influence of institutionalized frameworks, alliances or regimes. To examine why the EU and China have increasingly cooperated on security issues over time and why some security issues profit more from this overall trend than others, case study analysis seems to be the most appropriate tool. Furthermore, the fact that two actors are involved whose perspectives have to be thoroughly examined increases the inherent complexity of the phenomenon and calls for a detailed, in-depth investigation. Hence, I will conduct a longitudinal diachronic case study to assess variation over time in EU-China security cooperation. To assess variation between security issues, I will choose three different case studies that reveal different amounts of cooperation. The following chapter explains my choice of cases and critically reflects them.

Finally, it is necessary to mention that I organized and coded the data collected for the analysis with MaxQDA. Like in the part in which I mapped the development of EU-China security cooperation, I did not use keywords for coding but rather coded based on meaning, context and message of specific sentences or paragraphs. Coding procedures assume paramount importance with regard to the reliability and replicability of research. Especially in research settings that include semi-structured interviews, a flexible and yet structure coding scheme is required to

23 All coding schemes are provided in Appendix C. 85 capture all evidence given by the interviewees – also those that is hidden in vague responses, metaphors and references. Accordingly, I apply latent coding over the whole course of the analysis, meaning that I look for the underlying, implicit meaning in the content of a text. Again, I will add information by performing some quantification of the categories in order to show my results more clearly.

4.5. Case Selection

Selecting appropriate cases for comparison is the primordial task for the case study researcher. Yet it is all but straightforward (Geddes, 1990; Collier and Mahoney, 1996; Seawright and Gerring, 2008) and has to be justified in detail. But what makes a case a “good” case? Case study research that focuses on a small number of cases might bear the risks to choose cases that are neither typical nor representative (Collier and Mahoney, 1996). Generally, most case study approaches seek to elucidate phenomena that are larger than the case itself and profit from generalization (Gerring, 2004). Yet, a truly representative case is by no means easy to identify (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Moreover, case study research, which only focuses on few cases, faces a number of boundaries. Although the case selection will be conducted as systematically as possible, a certain degree of ambiguity will remain, due to possibly biased case selection, missing evidence for the hypothesized mechanisms or lacking confirmation of the hypothesis by the evidence found. Furthermore, all conclusions drawn about the drivers towards security cooperation will be specific to certain scope conditions and are therefore only generalizable to all other cases with similar scope conditions.

As Gerring puts it, “theory confirmation/disconfirmation is not the case study’s strong suit” (Gerring, 2004, p. 350). Thus, the analysis of a small number of cases requires a careful, theory- guided selection of nonrandom cases (King et al., 1994; Brady and Collier, 2010; Gerring, 2007). Thereby, the generalisability of case studies can be increased by the strategic selection of cases (Seawright and Gerring, 2008).

In the present chapter I discuss how I selected my cases. In doing so, I develop rigorous and detailed explanation of how my cases relate to the overall universe of cases and how they are representative. The first part of the chapter elaborates on the choice of cases for the part A of the analysis, the diachronic comparison, while the second part dives into case selection techniques for part B of the analysis, the synchronic comparison.

The first part of the analysis sheds light on variation over time in EU-China security cooperation and assesses the main drivers towards increased security cooperation. To investigate the causal relationship between the selected explanatory factors and EU-China security cooperation, case selection criteria are longitudinally. This implies that one case is selected with two observations that represent a change over an observed period (Gerring, 2007). Accordingly, the first part of the analysis is a single in-depth case study. Longitudinal case studies combine different techniques to probe the probability of theoretical expectations by slicing and dicing the empirics within a single case study diachronically over time (Checkel, 2005; Yin, 2009; Falleti and Lynch, 2009; Gerring, 2004). Thereby I can extract whether the motivational factors for EU- China security cooperation change over time. Therefore, the time between the two chosen observations has to be sufficiently long. The chosen observations should include one period of observation, in which we observe no or little EU-China security cooperation as well as a period of observation, in which the EU and China cooperate increasingly. The mapping includes the period from the first policy paper of the EU on China in 1995 until the EU’s Strategic Outlook in China in March 2019. Accordingly, the period is sufficiently long to display a maximum variation over time.

The second part of the analysis sheds light on variation between security issues that reveal different amounts of EU-China cooperation. I will assess why EU-China security cooperation emerged on some security issues but not on others. To do so, I will compare three cases, which I select via a Backwards Tracing Research (BTR) design. Through such cross-case comparison, I will reveal the main drivers towards EU-China cooperation and search for generalizable findings about security cooperation.

In a first step, to select comparable cases, it is necessary to narrow down the possible universe of cases to one specific regions so that all cases selected are subject to similar scope conditions and context factors (Levy, 2008). By making the case studies more comparable, their external validity can be efficiently assessed and thereby their potential to be generalized is enhanced (Ruzzene, 2012). I chose the Middle East as the main region of interest for the ensuing analysis, due to several reasons.

First and foremost, the Middle East is a highly salient region for the EU and China (Gurol, 2020). The EU’s 2016 Global Strategy touches on the Middle East, in particular with reference to the recurring security skirmishes that characterize it (European Commission, 2016c: 34f). Moreover, the Middle East plays an important role in the EU’s external policy, albeit mostly in

87 bilateral relations (Osiewicz, 2019). Although it is undisputable that the EU has thus far played a secondary role in the region, its engagement is certainly growing, not at least triggered by the increasing Chinese activities. There is by no means a lack of strategic interests of the EU in the region. In contrast, ranging from security over political to normative concerns, there are many EU interests at stake in the Middle East. In particular, two factors render the Middle East a region of high salience to the EU. First, it is an immediate neighbor to the EU. Thus turmoil can easily spill over to European soil. Moreover, many important passages for goods traveling to and from Europe run through the Middle East on land or sea. This includes oil and gas, natural resources but also trade goods. Hence, the EU’s security and economic situation is closely intertwined with that of the Middle East (Fiott, 2019).24

The salience of the Middle East for China has certainly accelerated through the BRI (Dorsey, 2018a; Chaziza, 2016; Evron, 2017; Haenle et al., 2018; Lirong, 2010; Sun and Zoubir, 2018). The Middle East forms the “central plank of the BRI not just for its attractive markets (…) but for its timeless attribute as a global crossroads” (Ehteshami, 2018, p. 391). While China has been detached from this region for centuries, avoiding involvement in the region’s turbulent politics, the development of Chinese Middle Eastern policies of more active engagement can be observed now. This makes China a growing a strategic actor in the Middle East (Godement et al., 2017). Concerning policy areas, security considerations are gaining importance along with the need to create stable environments for Chinese investments (Godement et al., 2017). Stability in the region is of interest to both China and the EU as neighboring regions. In the past years, China has therefore elevated the diplomatic status of many Middle Eastern states and considers them as having a „rising status“ in China’s foreign relations (Quero, 2017; Jiadong, 2017). Accordingly, it is expected that Chinese participation in Middle Eastern affairs will increase even more in the next years, due to recent geopolitical changes (Zhang, 1999), which makes the Middle East a fruitful region to analyze China’s changing foreign policy and its impact on the European Union. A minor yet additional factor is that the Middle East matches the researcher’s “linguistic competencies, connections and previous acquaintance” (Gerring, 2007, p. 44). By reducing the universe of possible cases to the region of the Middle East, crucial context factors (e.g. political context, proximity to the two actors) can be kept as constant as possible. This enables me to “untangle how the variation of the dependent variable came about”

24 Hence, one could argue that the EU’s somewhat second-tier role in the region mainly derives from divergences among EU member states, not from insignificance of the region to the EU as such. 88

(Panke, 2018, p. 179) and why EU-China security cooperation emerges on some security issues but not on others.

Based on the high salience of the Middle East to the EU and China, it can be considered a most likely case for security cooperation. Hence, one could argue that it would be not suitable to explain instances of non-cooperation. This is not true. Despite the high salience of the region as such, vast differences pertain as to which degree the EU and China interfere in the region. Moreover, the scope of action is slightly different, with the EU focusing more on political aspects and China concentrating on economic issues in the context of the BRI. In addition, as I have argued elsewhere, the roles that the EU and China play for Middle Eastern countries are very different. Especially with regards to aspects like democratic aspirations, political support, non-interference and the approach to authoritarian structures, the European and the Chinese policies diverge significantly (Gurol, 2020). Hence, security issues that are relevant in the Middle East arguably provide enough variance to analyze instances of cooperation and instances of non-cooperation.

Within this universe of cases, which now only includes security issues that are relevant in the context of the Middle East, I select my cases on basis of the dependent variable. This approach towards case selection has been subject to criticism (King et al., 1994; Geddes, 1990; Panke, 2018; Seawright and Gerring, 2008; Collier and Mahoney, 1996) due to the risk of biased conclusions. However, my aim is not to constrain variation on the dependent variable but rather choose cases in which many instances of security cooperation can be observed and compare them to cases with none or few instances of security cooperation. Thereby I can overcome these problems of possible selection biases (Collier and Mahoney, 1996). By selecting cases that vary on the dependent variable and then trying to reconstruct the process that lead from the independent variables to EU-China security cooperation, the power of causal inference is greatly increased. Thereby the that “nothing whatsoever can be learned about the causes of the dependent variable without taking into account other instances when the dependent variable takes on other values" (King et al., 1994, p. 129) problem can be refuted. One strategy to pursue a structured case selection and to avoid selection biases is theory-guided Backwards Tracing Research. In doing so, I search for of variation on the dependent variable but simultaneously control for context variables in keeping them constant.

I will compare three cases, respectively security issues, that display different amounts of EU- China security cooperation. In order to find out, ow many instances of cooperation the different

89 security issues reveal, I combine the different issues with mentions of the Middle East or Middle Eastern countries and the indicators for cooperation. The results differ slightly from the general patterns detected in the mapping, which can be deduced to the regional focus. Figure 12 shows the number of cooperative instances in the different security issues in the Middle East.

regional security immigration/migration human security cybersecurity food security

military security security security issues anti-terrorism maritime security/anti-piracy nuclear non-proliferation conflict resolution climate/energy security

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 instances of cooperation

Figure 12 Instances of cooperation on security issues in the Middle East, aggregated. Own depiction.

Although I will not examine the different forms of cooperation, a closer look on to the disaggregated level reveals further interesting results that can help to select appropriate cases for the analysis. Accordingly, figure 13 displays the forms of cooperation that the EU and China refer to. They often articulate the will to cooperate, for instance on climate/energy security (4 mentions), conflict resolution (10 mentions) and nuclear non-proliferation (6 mentions). When it comes to the initiation of institutionalized dialogue formats, the EU and China refer to climate/energy security (5 mentions), nuclear non-proliferation (2 mentions), maritime security/anti-piracy and conflict resolution, albeit the latter are mentioned only once each. A similar pattern can be detected for formal agreements, which are mentioned three times with reference to climate/energy security and once as regards anti-terrorism, maritime security/anti- piracy and nuclear non-proliferation. Joint activities are mentioned in the field of climate/energy security (2 mentions), maritime security/anti-piracy (2 mentions), conflict resolution (1 mention) and nuclear non-proliferation (2 mentions).

regional security immigration/migration human security cybersecurity food security military security anti-terrorism 1 1

security security issues maritime security/anti-piracy 1 1 1 2 nuclear non-proliferation 6 2 1 2 conflict resolution 10 1 1 climate/energy security 4 5 3 2 0 5 10 15 instances of cooperation

articulation of will to cooperate institutionalized formal agreement joint activity dialogue

Figure 13 Instances of cooperation on security issues in the Middle East, disaggregated. Own depiction.

Accordingly, my main criterion for case selection is the amount of security cooperation. Based on this mapping, three groups of cases can be clustered. Choosing on the dependent variable means to seek maximum variance among the choses cases. Based on this mapping, this would imply to also choose one case that does not display any instance of cooperation. That they are not subject to EU-China security cooperation in the Middle might stem from the reasons that the EU and China either differ significantly on these issues and choose not to cooperate. Or the issues are marginal in general and are therefore not mentioned. Linking the findings of figure 12 and 13 to the overall mapping in chapter 3, it becomes obvious that military security, regional security, cybersecurity and food security are mentioned only rarely in the text corpus in general neither with reference to cooperation nor as subject to non-cooperation. Thus, they bear the risk of very low data saturation, being marginal in the bilateral EU-China context. Furthermore, as concerns military security and human security, data availability poses another big challenge to due to the facts that China provides very few official data and interviewees might not be able or willing to give away information on these sensitive topics. Hence, when choosing cases that require data collection within a security-sensitive setting like China, pragmatic approaches to data collection can also influence the selection process. Accordingly, I decided to cluster my universe of cases into three groups that display the maximum variance that is both possible and realistic to analyse.

Group of cases 1:  < 3 instances of cooperation in the Middle East Group of cases 2:  3-6 instances of cooperation in the Middle East Group of cases 3:  > 6 instances of cooperation in the Middle East

Security issues that fit for case 1 are: regional security, immigration/migration, cybersecurity , food security, military security, anti-terrorism. A security issue that fits for case 2 is maritime security/anti-piracy. And security issues that fit for group 3 are nuclear non-proliferation, conflict resolution and climate/energy security.

From group 1 I choose anti-piracy, based on the concern of data availability mentioned above. Moreover, a first search for official documents and statements promised a good database that I could build upon in my analysis. As there is only one typical case for the second group, maritime security/anti-piracy is my second case. From group I choose climate/energy security, based on two considerations. Nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East, albeit obviously subject to EU-China security cooperation and thus a case to look at, mainly refers to the Iranian Nuclear Agreement and EU-China cooperation to salvage the JCPOA. Although this is indeed a crucial topic in EU-China security relations, it would not be comparable to the other two cases. In contrast to anti-terrorism and maritime security/anti-piracy, the matter is mainly handled by the E3 countries Germany, the UK and France, not on an EU-level. As regards conflict resolution and prevention, the risk pertains that data collection would be difficult as this issue touches upon military and thus sensitive information. Furthermore, as the EU does not have its own army, most observations of EU-China cooperation on conflict resolution would be within the UN scope. In addition, as figure 13 shows, cooperation on this issue remains mainly on the rhetoric level. Although I will not analyze the different forms of cooperation but focus on the aggregated level, a case that displays different forms of cooperation could yield more interesting results. Hence, I choose climate/energy security as the third case for comparison.

To sum it up, I did not choose cases that display a maximum of variance, due to issues of data scarcity and the risk of low data saturation. Yet, the three cases selected display the maximum degree of variance possible and seem fruitful to analyze the different drivers towards cooperation and non-cooperation.

Analysis Part A – EU-China Security Cooperation Over Time

5. Against All Odds? EU-China Security Cooperation Over Time

As already mentioned, the analysis consists of two different parts. In part A, I assess the increase of security cooperation between the EU and China over time. Despite deepening tensions and growing mistrust in EU-China relations, the policy area of security has gained in importance and the amount of cooperation of the two actors in this field has increased steadily until today. This chapter examines the drivers that have facilitated this development. Hence, the research question guiding this part of the analysis is the following:

What are the main drivers towards EU-China security cooperation?

For the analysis, I rely on the official policy papers the EU and China issues on each other between 1995 and 2019 as well as on the official declarations following the annual EU-China summits from 1998 to 2019. Moreover, I draw on China’s official Defense White Papers. In total, the PRC issued eleven White Papers between 1995 and 2019. For the European side, I further look at minutes of parliamentary debates in the EU parliament during which topics related to China were discussed. Moreover, I rely on the 31 interviews with Chinese and EU policy makers and (academic) experts and use media reports for triangulation of different sources of evidence as well as to supplement the analysis. The analysis examines the following four theoretical expectations:

Expectation 1a: If the degree of complex interdependence between the EU and China increases over time, security cooperation increases, due to cost-benefit calculations.

Expectation 1b: The more economic interests become involved over time, the more security cooperation increases, because the risk of economic losses become higher than the costs of cooperation.

Expectation 2a: If the EU’s and China’s problem understanding of security becomes more convergent over time, security cooperation increases because they find it easier to agree on adequate response mechanisms to security threats.

Expectation 2a: If the perception of the other in the security realm becomes more positive over time, security cooperation increases because friends, partners or necessary counterparts are bound in security alliances or deepen their overall alignment, rivals or competitors might not interact at all while enemies might direct their actions towards harming the other.

The chapter has four main sections. First, it sheds light on theoretical expectations 1a and 1b and examines the rationalist drivers towards cooperation. The second section is then dedicated to the theorized constructivist explanations for security cooperation. In the last section, I discuss the findings of the analysis and evaluate the theorized drivers towards security cooperation.

5.1. Rationalist Explanations of EU-China Security Cooperation

In the following, I examine the plausibility of my expectation that interdependence facilitates the emergence of security cooperation, due to spillover effects. I presume that if the EU and China are interdependent in the economic realm, they are also bound to interact in the political and security realm. I further expect that economic interests play a role for the emergence of security cooperation.

The analysis reveals three major findings that I will introduce separately. First, there is evidence for a rising degree of economic interdependence between the EU and China that leads to increased security cooperation due to spillover effects. Hence, economic interests seem to drive them towards cooperation to a significant degree. Second, the EU and China are also increasingly interdependent on issues of global governance, which also fosters the emergence of security cooperation. Yet, they react differently to the rising interdependence. Although both seek more cooperation in the security realm, the underlying rationales differ. Third, I discuss the changing role of the US that further fosters these interdependencies, albeit with different implications for the EU and China. I introduce this as a supporting rationalist explanation.

5.1.1. Complex Interdependence

Over time, the EU and China have become more interconnected. By now they have emerged to be two of the most important actors in nowadays political scenery and are important players when it comes to issues of global governance. As the analysis shows, the increasing

94 entanglement of the EU and China is central to the development of cooperative agreements but also reflects variations in salience, scope and sensitivity for both.

First of all, it is very evident that over time the EU and China have become increasingly intertwined economically. The ubiquitous focus of economy in their overall relations notwithstanding, a temporal pattern can be detected that displays to which extent the EU and China are economically entangled. Not only has the mere volume of trade exchange between the EU and China grown over time. The EU and China have also become two of the biggest traders in the world and together account for one third of global trade. Since the beginning of their diplomatic relations, the amount of imports and exports exchanged between the two economic powers has constantly grown, as clearly depicted by Eurostat statistics. The earliest statistics that could be found date back to 1999 but still divulge this temporal pattern very clearly. Between 1999 and 2019 the overall trade volume between the EU and China has increased significantly. In 1999 the amount of EU imports from China reached 52.6 billion Euro, while it exported goods to China in the height of 19.7 billion Euro (Eurostat, 2011). Until 2019 these numbers rose up to 362 billion Euro as regards EU imports from China and 198.3 billion Euro as regards European exports to the PRC.25 Hence, in 2019, China had a share of nine percent in EU-exports26 and was the largest partner for EU imports of goods (19 percent) (Eurostat, 2020; Directorate General for Trade). By now, China is the EU’s second-biggest trading partner behind the US, while the EU has become China’s biggest trading partner (Xinhua News, 2019). Thus, the relationship between the EU and China and its development over the past decades, reflect the conditions of extensive economic interconnection.

An interesting picture evolves when looking at the development of foreign direct investment (FDI) of the EU in China and vice versa. Over time, the EU has become one of the favorite destinations for Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI). Cumulative Chinese FDI in the EU has increased from less than 2 billion Euro in 2000 to 131.9. billion Euro in 2017. Similarly, the EU’s FDI into China increased ever since the early 1990s, indicating the growing importance of China as a destination for European investments. The EU’s FDI in China has reached 132.2 billion Euro in 2017, which represent a growth of more than 125 billion Euro since 2000 (OECD, 2020. Although this looks balanced, there is clear evidence that political factors are causing imbalances at the expense of the EU due to a lack of reciprocity in market

25 In comparison, the EU imported goods for around 232 billion Euro from the US (Directorate General for Trade, 2020).

26 In comparison, the US had a share of 18 percent in EU exports (Directorate General for Trade, 2020). 95 openness and access (Rhodium Group, 2019). The annually published position papers of the European Chamber of Commerce in China further point towards increasing imbalances and disadvantages for European investors due to problems with the protection of intellectual property rights and shrinking investment opportunities due to limited market access (European Chamber of Commerce in China, 2020).

Talking about vulnerability, the analysis further reveals that both the EU and China perceive a growing vulnerability due to the increasing economic entanglement. This becomes especially apparent in the interview material. For China the importance of exports has grown considerably as it has developed into a strongly export-led country. Similarly, the European economic has become, albeit to a lesser extent, dependent on trading with China, as the data shows. Hence, there is evidence for a mutual dependence between the EU. However, the analysis also indicates a growing asymmetry in this dependence due to rising imbalance in EU-China. Trade. While the EU has had a positive trade balance with China since until 2000 and its exports have been higher that its imports, this positive trade balance has shrunk since then. Simultaneously, the Chinese trade surplus has grown. In 2019, the trade deficit of the EU reached amounted to 163 billion Euro (Eurostat, 2020). Accordingly, the EU seems to be increasingly vulnerable due to the entanglement of its economy with the Chinese economy and the lack of reciprocity in market access and investment opportunities (Interview #29, 11-09-19). This certainly harms the EU’s interest and makes the EU more vulnerable to China. Creating a level playing field has thus become the core of the EU’s China policy (Interview #29, 11-09-19).

Chinese interviewees, in contrast, considered their vulnerability to the EU rather as a political one (Interview #19, 14-03-19). This implies that the Chinese side seems to be well aware that it needs the EU as a cooperation partner in order to fulfill its growing role as a responsible great power and to be acknowledged as such. A deteriorating in its relations with the EU might thus harm the image the Chinese regime seeks to project of the country. I will further elaborate on this at a later point in the analysis, when I dive into the different rationales for cooperation that drive the EU and China.

The analysis further indicated that not only the amount of trade has increased over time, thus entangling the EU and China in complex interdependence. Also the channels of communications via which the communicate and interact have diversified over time. There are clear signs for a continuous institutionalization of EU-China bilateral relations. Especially since the conclusion of the CSP in 2003, the two have begun to interact in an increasing number of

96 for a. Thereby they react to rising global challenges. These fora encompass a variety of actors from different institutional levels, ranging from governmental over policy to people-to-people level. The lynchpin of this is certainly the annual summit meetings between the leaders of both sides – the European Council President and the President of the EU Commission from the European side and the Prime Minister from the Chinese side. During these annual meetings the two sides exchange their ideas at the highest level of government and significant strategic communication occurs on this level when major decision are made. A comparison of the EU- China dialogue architecture further shows that the number of communication channels has increased over time. Over time, the number of sectoral dialogues has increased from 22 (European External Action Service, 2005) to more than 50 (European External Action Service, 2015). Beyond these official dialogue fora there are also several non-executive dialogues such as inter-parliamentary meetings. On the transnational level, relations play out through organizations that operate regionally or globally. This mode of communication between the EU and China occurs under the UN framework or during the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Asia Europe Forum (ASEF). Moreover, according to the interviews, both sides highly value the continuation of communication and dialogue in EU-China security relations despite deepening tensions (Interview #15, 07-03-19; Interview #08, 01-03-19). Even on sensitive security issues, like terrorism, communication continued uninterruptedly (Interview #29, 11- 09-19).

Moreover, the analysis shows that globalization blurs the lines between national and transnational security, which indicates an absence of hierarchy of issues. This in turn increases the need to collaboration to address security threats (Interview #26, 05-09-19). In its White Paper of Defense of 2010 China recognizes that “non-traditional security concerns, such as existing terrorism threats, energy, resources, […] are on the rise” (The State Council, 2011a). And the European Security Strategy of 2003 explicitly mentions rising transnational security threats and states that “Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible, and less predictable” (European Union, 2003). It is also reflected in the EU-China relationship that military security concerns do not dominate the agenda of EU-China security relations and neither China nor the EU pose a military threat to each other and in contrast to the United States, the EU does not have any military presence in South East Asia (Interview #13, 07-03-19).

Accordingly, the analysis clearly reveals an increase of complex interdependence over time. Now, what does this mean for EU-China security cooperation? In general, it becomes obvious that the growing degree of interdependence indeed lead to an increasing amount of security 97 cooperation between the EU and China. The increasing economic entanglement lead to an increased urgency for the EU and China to interact not only in the economic realm but also in the political, and security realm. Furthermore, there is evidence for spill over effects from the economic to the security realm which become particularly evident in the interviews. As one European interviewee states: “Despite [growing tensions] China is a necessary and in some fields even unavoidable partner for the EU” (Interview #29, 11-09-19). Similarly, a Chinese interviewee contends: “we need a partner like the EU and not only for economic aspects but we need closer collaboration with the EU within international governance” (Interview #19, 14-03- 19). Such statements are also underpinned by China’s 2018 policy paper (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018) that speaks of increasing interconnection and interdependence. It states that such interdependence increases the necessity for EU-China cooperation, especially on topics of global governance (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018). Accordingly, minutes of a China debate in the European Parliament in December 2015 reveal that cooperating with China is not something the EU may “choose”, but something that becomes more and more necessary, based on growing “complex interdependence” (European Parliament, 2015).

In addition, almost all interviewees framed EU-China security cooperation as being driven by the “urgency/necessity” to cooperate. They reveal a strong notion of “having no other choice” than to cooperate with the other as “from an opportunity-cost calculation perspective there is no way not to cooperate” (Interview #26, 05-09-19). This once more stresses the existence complex interdependence, which is also discussed in the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2015). As the main driver towards cooperation with the EU for China, the interviewees named the urgency or necessity to jointly tackle security problems, referring to increasing globalization. This indicates that the increased interdependence between the EU and China actually led to security cooperation. Besides this, some interviewees suggested the interpretation that cooperating with the EU in the security realm is also a strong instrument for China to project a more positive image to other international actors.

As I have already indicated earlier, the type and extent of vulnerability that the EU and China perceive towards each other differ significantly. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the analysis reveals different rationales of the EU and China. In spite of the overall increase of complex interdependence that has certainly facilitate security cooperation, both react differently to the rising degree of interdependence.

During the interviews, I asked, how my interview partners would frame EU-China security cooperation. Figure 15 displays their answers. The two main reasons that were named, were the rising necessity (14 mentions) due to the increase of transnational security matters as well as the growing acknowledgement that in some fields of security it is beneficial to China’s own interests (12 mentions) to cooperate with the EU. And EU-China security cooperation was referred to as a win-win strategy three times. This is not surprising and matches the overall findings of the analysis with regard to complex interdependencies.

Yet, what is striking is the apparently significant rationale to project a more positive image of China through cooperation with the EU. This argument was mentioned 13 times as a key driver towards EU-China security cooperation. It matches the statement made above that the perceived vulnerability of China is rather a political than an economic one.

16 14 14 13 12 12 10 9 8 6

4 number of mentions of number 2 0 win-win beneficial to national means of projecting a urgency / necessity interests positive image

arguments for cooperation

Figure 14 Cooperation arguments in the context of growing interdependence, Chinese interviewees, number of mentions. Own depiction.

This rationale of an instrumentalization of cooperation as a means to project a more positive image of China to other international actors came up very dominantly during interviews with Chinese policy advisors and experts and seems to be closely connected to the rising degree of interdependence and entanglement. In general, there is evidence that for China cooperating within multilateral settings is a crucial strategic action to position China in a more and more interconnected and interdependent world. It points towards a different form of dependence that has, nevertheless, a huge impact on the amount of cooperation sought with the EU. As one interviewee pointed out:

“If China wants to have prosperous, peaceful and stable relations with all countries in the world, there is no other choice but to cooperate with the EU in the security realm, at least on non-traditional issues” (Interview #6, 28-02-19).

This has increased with China’s growing global footprint and its rise towards a global power, which is also observed by European policy makers (Interview #25, 05-09-19), who want to use this opportunity to “encourage[][e] more active and responsible international engagement by China” (European Parliament, 2019a). Similarly, as criticism of China has increased, the necessity to project such an image has grown. This observation is also emphasized by speeches of Chinese politicians, which have become full of positive rhetoric about China’s behaviour and its endorsement of multilateralism, like for example in Vice Foreign Minister Song Tao’s speech about building a new type of EU-China partnership (Tao, 2013). As regards this temporal trend, Chinese policy experts note a change towards a more outward- facing Chinese national security policy, embedded in a general overhaul of China’s foreign policy, which inclines the aim to be perceived as a responsible great power. To reach this strategic objective, they argue, China is more willing to take initiative and actively shape the international security environment, which works best in cooperation with a normative power like the EU. Furthermore, driven by the forces of globalization, new security challenges have emerged that need to be met cooperatively with the EU in order to protect the benefits of EU-China trade and investment. In this regard, the EU has proven to be an opportune partner for China because of its contribution to peace and stability as well as to effective multilateralism (Interview #4, 26- 02-19). The rationale driving Chinese efforts to cooperate with the EU can therefore be interpreted as an instrumental approach towards security cooperation, arguing that China recognized the fact that the security environment has changed and consequently started to adapt its policies flexibly.

Similar to China, EU interviewees suggested a strong impact of interdependence on security cooperation with China. The two main reasons that were named for cooperation, were the rising necessity (11 mentions) due to the increase of transnational security matters as well as the growing acknowledgement that in some fields of security it is beneficial to the EU’s own interests (9 mentions) to cooperate with China (see figure 15). This reveals a strong notion of increasing complex interdependences that have rendered security cooperation unavoidable over time (Interview #28, 10-09-19) (European Parliament, 2018). Yet, in contrast to China, no other strong rationales for cooperation can be detected.

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12 11 10 9 8 6 4 3 2

number of mentions of number 2 1 0 means of means of win-win beneficial to urgency / containment integration national interests necessity arguments for cooperation

Figure 15 Cooperation arguments in the context of growing interdependence, EU interviewees, number of mentions. Own depiction.

5.1.2. Economic Interests

As for the impact of growing economic interests on the increase of EU-China security cooperation over time, the analysis reveals very diverse results. First and foremost, with rising interdependence as one of the main features of globalization, economic interests have certainly contributed to the emergence and increase of security cooperation between the EU and China. Expectations of either gaining mutual economic benefits or avoiding economic losses have been main drivers towards security cooperation between the two. Especially since the conclusion of the CSP, their relationship was based on the prospects of interdependence and economic complementarity.

The analysis leaves no doubt that over time a strong economy-security nexus has emerged in EU-China relations. Yet, with twofold consequences. On the one hand, there are considerable linkages between the areas of economy and security that demand a continuous negotiation, coordination of policies and complementation of actions (Interview #19, 14-03-19). Similarly, Melania Gabriela Ciot, President-in-Office of the Council of the European Union stressed in a parliamentary debate about EU-China relations in April 2019 that EU-China foreign policy relations have implications on the EU’s economic interests and therefore calls for “reciprocity in all areas [of EU-China relations] so as to underpin our […] economic interests” (European Parliament, 2019a). Given the increasing levels of economic interests at stake for the EU and China, the assumption that they are bound to interact more intensely in the political and security 101 realm to secure their economic interests has created the notion of a new strategic relationship during the honeymoon of EU-China relations. Thus, economic interests indeed foster security cooperation. The analysis further indicates that both sides perceive security cooperation primarily as a means to safeguard national economic interests and to secure their close economic relations. One of the main reasons that Chinese interviewees named for cooperation with the EU was the growing acknowledgement that in some fields of security it could be economically beneficial to China’s own interests to cooperate with the EU. Similarly, European interviewees pointed towards economic considerations for cooperation. Securing their vulnerable economic interests seems to be of high salience for the EU and China as two of the world’s largest export countries and has contributed significantly to security cooperation (Interview #3, 26-02-19; Interview #6, 28-02-19). Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that security cooperation is framed as an extension of economic politics and mainly serves two purposes: to pursue domestic economic interests and to safeguard EU-China economic and trade relations.

On the other hand, the increasing economic interactions of the EU and China have not only led to cooperation beyond the economic realm but also to deepening frictions and misperceptions. Th analysis reveals evidence that the stronger focus on economic interests also perpetuates existing divides in EU-China security relations. This becomes very obvious by the following statement:

“We can say that the EU and China are both facing a security dilemma, to speak in realist terms, both fear about their survival in the global economy – it can go both ways, to more cooperation and to more competition (Interview #20, 15-03-19).

In this regard, the EU and China are both economic powerhouses that do not threaten each other in military terms but can certainly affect each other’s economic well-being and security. Facing different economic challenges, the EU and China strive to maintain and expand their position in the global economy and seek to protect their respective economic interests. Consequently, with the rising entanglement of their economies, the EU and China are more vulnerable to each other but also fear about their survival in the global economy. this is revealed in the latest strategy paper of the European Commission, which shows that China is an economic competitor to the EU but also an important negotiation and cooperation partner, in economic, political and security terms (European Commission, 2019a) and is reflected in parliamentary debates (European Parliament, 2019a).

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As already addressed in the section on complex interdependence, the trade balance between the EU and China has become increasingly unbalanced over time, with the EU’s trade deficit growing constantly. In this regard, the emerging economic wealth and power of China does represent a growing threat to the EU in economic terms and economic power and prosperity have created new vulnerabilities.

Now, how can these contradicting effects of economic interests on EU-China security cooperation be explained? Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that whenever European or Chinese investments abroad are concerned, the stronger focus on economy and the growing amount of investments have certainly fostered cooperation. This is based on the notion that in a world of complex interdependence, economic wellbeing can only by achieved in a cooperative climate. In particular, for the Chinese side, securing its investments abroad seems to be a key driver towards seeking more cooperation with the EU:

“concerning spill overs of economic to security issues I have to say: as we (China) are reaching the centre of the world and expanding the sphere of our investments, we have more and more the need for a peaceful and friendly environment for them” (Interview 19, 14-03-19)

Yet, when it comes to bilateral economic relations or economic interests that are connected to the respective other’s territory, economic interests rather lead to competition or conflict. The 17+1 format make this very clear. The increasing Chinese OFDIs in the 17 involved Eastern and Southern European countries have led to deepening frictions (Interview #22, 18-03-19).

To conclude, growing economic interests play an ambivalent role for EU-China security cooperation.

5.1.3. Supporting Rationalist Explanation: The US Factor

As mentioned in chapter 4, the downside of diachronic case studies is that possibly additional temporal developments or events that have not been theorized change the context and thereby the dependent variable (Panke, 2018). When assessing the development of EU-China security cooperation over time, this additional development is the changing US foreign policy under President Donald Trump. While combing through the collected data for the analysis, it became obvious that the US factor has become a very defining element for EU-China security cooperation. To put it more bluntly: the US is the big ‘elephant in the room’ in EU-China relations. Accordingly, I would present an incomplete picture of the drivers towards 103 cooperation if neglecting this elephant. This section addresses the US factor as a ‘supporting’ rationalist explanation for the growing amount of EU-China security cooperation. It can be linked to the section on complex interdependence because the analysis suggests that the changing role of the US has contributed to the increase of interdependence between the EU and China.

In general, it is noteworthy that the global security structure is undergoing a transformation from unipolar to multipolar. There are four major international security actors in the world security system today: the US, China, Russia and the EU, of which the EU, China and the US are the weightiest (Art, 2010). In recent years, the power of the major international security actors has been changing greatly. In some global security fields, China and Europe are starting to share responsibilities with the US (Shulong and Songchuan, 2011). This creates a strategic EU-US-China triangle. Consequently, the US remains a key factor in the security relations between the EU and China, not at least because it has extensive military entanglements with both actors, albeit in completely different ways. While it is allied with the EU states through NATO, the US is a military rival for China because of its attempts to contain the expansion of China’s military presence in East Asia, the US’ military assistance to Taiwan and the South China Sea arbitration (Art, 2010). According this backdrop, the changing US policy is expected to increase the interdependence between the EU and China and push them closer together. It is further expected to increase the need for closer collaboration in the economic realm but also beyond, as both feel the need and international expectation to take over leadership in global affairs and become driving forces in global governance.

In particular, the analysis reveals two dynamics that result from the changing US foreign policy and influence EU-China security cooperation.

The interviews reveal that on the one hand, Donald Trump’s unilateral foreign policy has effectively pushed China and the EU closer together and increased the need for closer collaboration in the economic realm but also beyond, as both feel the need and international expectation to take over leadership in global affairs and become driving forces in global governance. For instance, an EU interviewee emphasized that the changing foreign policy of the EU plays a positive role for the development of EU-China relations (Interview #23, 30-08- 19). Likewise, a Chinese interviewee stressed that as a result

“the EU and China in some fields now see their common interests more […] as in many world regions the US is no longer a security provider. This provides a vacuum for the EU and China that they can fill” (Interview #19, 14-03-19). 104

Although this is not mentioned to this extend in the official policy papers on EU-China relations since 2016, media outlets both in China and within the EU stress this rising interdependence. For instance, Politico EU emphasized that “in the age of Trump, Beijing pivots to Europe” (Politico EU, 2017) and talks about an emerging “common position from the EU and China” that is a blow to many American officials, who “hoped that the trade war would morph into a united front against Beijing” (Politico EU, 2019). With a similar notion, EU Observer titled that the “Trump chaos breeds better EU-China relations” (EU Observer, 2018). This matches the media coverage in China. Xinhua News quoted an EU expert who said that “EU-China cooperation [is] vital as U.S. multilateralism writ large” (Xinhua, 2017a) and China Daily stated that the result of the “changed international environment is a closer alignment between the EU and China on many issues” (China Daily, 2017a).

As regards traditional security issues, the US still appears to be the key player but in other areas – trade, investments, climate change, non-traditional security and development – the growing absence of the US from international cooperation has the (unintended) consequence of bringing the EU and China closer together. Especially with the US’ withdrawals from multilateral trade agreements, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and JCPOA, the US’ changing stance towards the Middle East and the announced withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan has raised interdependences between the remaining powers on the international stage to a new level and creates “very complex three-dimensional relations between the US, China and the EU” (Interview #28, 10-09-19). Security issues, in which this plays out visibly, are those in which the US actually withdrew from multilateral agreements. Therefore, EU-China security cooperation increased on the issues of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (triggered by the US withdrawal from JCPOA and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), climate and energy security (triggered by the announcement of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement) and dialogue on peacekeeping and state building in Afghanistan (triggered by the withdrawal of NATO in 2015 and the announced end of deployment of US troops in the country).

On the other hand, there is also evidence that the changing US foreign policy represents a hindering factor for both the EU and China in exploiting these new possibilities. The growing absence of the US from international cooperation frameworks has made the relationship between the EU and China more difficult as both feel the urge to steer between effective multilateralism and maintaining good relations with the US. For both, the US still appears to be the most important player and partner on the international stage. A Chinese interviewee stated 105 that “on official level, the US is still most important for China” (Interview #6, 28-02-19) and a European counterpart stresses that “the US is our ally” with whom the EU shares “many similar assessments” Interview #27, 10-09-19). Likewise the 2019 report “Implementing the European Union’s Global Strategy” stresses the importance of EU-NATO ties and puts transatlantic relations to the forefront (European External Action Service, 2019a). Similarly, China’s 2019 White Paper on China’s Position on the China-U.S. Economic and Trade Consultations (The State Council, 2019a) reveals the will to improve relations with the US. Thus, both are juggling between stepping up dialogue on EU-China level and finding new forms of alliance with the United States.

Disaggregating the data material for the European and the Chinese side, it is striking that the EU and China interpret the role of the US for EU-China security relations very differently. Therefore, I will address their respective perspectives separately in the following paragraphs.

The Role Of The US For EU-China Security Cooperation: A Chinese Perspective

Chinese scholars interpret the withdrawal of the US from several multilateral arrangements (the Paris Agreement, the JCPOA and the INF) and its tendency towards more unilateral policies, as a possibility to increase cooperation with the EU, under the condition that the EU can emancipate itself from the grip of its transatlantic “big brother” (Interview #8, 01-03-19). This perception is reflected in the hesitant Chinese behavior to align deeper with the EU despite the repeated articulation of the will and need to do so. A European interviewee confirmed this perception saying that China remains careful based on the assumption that the US might probably reach out to the EU to seek solidarity against China (Interview #23, 30-08-19). According to many Chinese policy scholars the changing policies of the US in the security realm creates a vacuum of power, with two consequences. First, it generates a window of opportunity for closer EU-China alignment. Second, it intensifies the interdependences between the two to cooperate, which is also reflected in Chinese media coverage on EU-China relations that ascertains a positive impact of the changing behavior of the US on EU-China relations (China Daily, 2018a; China Daily, 2018b). Nonetheless, the analysis suggests that there is an inconsistency of opinions within the Chinese policy circle as to which extent the EU can serve as a new partner of equal weight as the US.

Although a strategic US-China-EU triangle is emerging, from the Chinese perspective, this triangle is not equilateral (Interview #19, 14-03-19). The US and the EU share many common 106 interests, especially in the security realm and their alliance is traditional and manifested. As one interviewee puts it, it is one layer of the Chinese foreign policy to use the EU as a complementary partner to create a certain balance against the United States (Interview #19, 14- 03-19). This implies that the EU is not considered as a replacement of the formerly closer US- Chinese ties with regard to non-traditional security cooperation but rather as a complement to Chinese power itself. This statement cannot be triangulated through official written documents or media sources. Yet, as European interviewees also mentioned this tendency (Interview #25, 05-09-19), it seems plausible.

In any case, there is evidence that against the backdrop of recent geopolitical developments, the EU’s role in the security realm has increased from a Chinese perspective, along with the rising unilateralist foreign policy of the US, up to the point that it plays an important role as a possible new strategic partner in the overall Chinese foreign policy strategy (Interview #19, 14-03-19; Interview #4, 26-02-19). This is reflected in China’s EU policy papers that mention the EU as an important partner in global governance and as a necessary security counterpart (European Commission, 2001). In the realm of non-traditional security, few concrete rivalries seem to pertain in their relationship and some potential for cooperation was mentioned as to be exploited in the future, under the condition that the US does not actively try to pressure the EU to choose between new cooperative agreements with China and good transnational relations (Interview #21, 15-03-19). Furthermore, there is evidence that China seems to pursue a two-pronged approach. It attempts to improve its relations with ASEAN and other regional and multilateral bodies to progress on China-US relations and China-EU relations but at the same time increases its own capabilities and balances against the US (Interview #4, 26-02-19). Such statements are also reflected in China’s policy papers and the White Papers of Defense (The State Council, 2011a; The State Council, 2015; The State Council, 2019b).

On the other hand, the perceived lack of the EU to take decisions autonomously from the US represents a big obstacle to cooperation. Moreover a certain level or mistrust pertains, as Chinese officials are well aware of the fact that if it were to choose, the US would still be the EU’s main partner of cooperation (Wacker, 2010). The decision not to lift the arms embargo after the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China in 2003, as a reaction to US pressure is often referenced as a sign for that (Politico EU, 2005; Spinat, 2004). Furthermore, there is awareness that the EU’s security still depends on the US’ commitment and is mainly bound by NATO, especially as regards traditional security issues (Interview #3, 26-02-19; Interview #28, 10-09-19). However, when it comes to non-traditional security issues, 107

China very much appreciates the EU’s efforts, especially in the fields of climate and energy security, anti-piracy and maritime security, nuclear non-proliferation (Song, 2013).

Figure 16 sums up interpretations of the impact of the US on the development of EU-China security relations, as mentioned by Chinese interviewees. It displays, how often the Chinese interviewees mentioned the US either as a driver of EU-China cooperation (22 mentions), as an unintended elephant in the room (6 mentions) or as an obstacle to cooperation (9 mentions) and how often they considered the EU, the US and China to be bound in a strategic triangle (3 mentions). This sums up the results of the analysis that for China, the changing foreign policy of the US is interpreted rather as a chance for deeper alignment with the EU than as an obstacle to cooperation, albeit not unanimously.

25 22 20

10 9 6

numer of mentions of numer 5 3

0 driver of EU-China unintended elephant obstacle to EU-China EU-China-US triangle cooperation in the room cooperation different roles of the US

Figure 16 Role of US, Chinese interviewees, number of mentions. Depiction based on own data.

The Role Of The US For EU-China Security Cooperation: A European Perspective

Concerning the EU’s perception of the impact of the changing US behavior on the development of EU-China security relations, two different perspectives can be distinguished: the changing role of the US as a driver towards cooperation and as an obstacle. Although both approaches were also detected for the Chinese side, they are much more balanced from the European perspectives and skepticism concerning the influence of the US seems to be stronger.

On the one hand, the EU is eager to maintain good transatlantic relations, as becomes evident through strong interview statements such as “the US is our ally” with whom the EU shares 108

“similar assessments” (Interview #27, 10-09-19), which is also reflected in the EU’s Global Strategy, as mentioned above (European External Action Service, 2019a). The pressure of the US not to develop too deep relations with China presents an obstacle to closer collaboration on many issues (Interview #27, 10-09-19). This pressure is especially high on the different EU member states (Interview #27, 10-09-19). For instance, the US has been pressing the EU to ban companies that work with the Chinese 5G provider Huawei (Cerulus, 2019b). This creates a difficult situation for the EU to navigate its China-policy and simultaneously maintain good transatlantic relations. As expressed by the President-in-Office of the Council, Melania Gabriela Piot during an EP in April 2019, the EU “need[s] to see how best to navigate between US—China rivalries and steer the dynamics of the triangular EU-US-China relationship” (European Parliament, 2019a).

On the other hand, engaging with China is named as an inevitable action in certain policy fields, like conflict resolution in the Middle East, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament or climate and energy security (Interview #28, 10-09-19; Interview #5, 27-02-19). The EU’s support for the US is linked to a variety of factors, like traditionally strong transatlantic ties, similar value orientation and EU-NATO ties (European External Action Service, 2019a). There are many statements that the changing foreign policy of the US is a challenge to multilateralism, both in the interviews (Interview #18, 12-03-19) and in political speeches (Cañete, 2018). However, European policy-makers seem to be increasingly worried that China will exploit the changing US foreign policy to influence the EU (Interview #21, 18-03-19). Yet, this is not reflected in official documents.

Figure 17 sums up how often the European interviewees mentioned the US and its changing foreign policy as a driver of EU-China cooperation (6 times), as an unintended elephant in the room that creates a difficult situation for the EU (2 mentions), as an obstacle to EU-China cooperation in the security realm (5 mentions) or as a strategic triangle that should strive towards trilateral cooperation (1 mention). It is striking that, in contrast, to the Chinese position, European policy makers and experts seem to be much more critical as regards the impact of the US on EU-China security relations.

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7 6 6 5 5 4 3 2 2

number of mentions of number 1 1 0 driver of EU-China unintended elephant in obstacle to EU-China EU-China-US triangle cooperation the room cooperation

different roles of the US

Figure 17 Role of US, European interviewees, number of mentions. Depiction based on own data.

Thus, the analysis suggests that in sum, the impact of the changing US foreign policy on EU- China relations in the security realm can be interpreted both as a driver towards more cooperation and as a hindrance for cooperation. It becomes obvious that both sides feel that the changing role of the US draws the EU and China closer together in many security areas, where the US has before been the traditional security provider, and increases the interdependences between the EU and China in the economic but also the security realm. Simultaneously, the withdrawal of the US provides a hindering factor for closer EU-China alignment in the security realm. It can hinder the general balance of power and increases the insecurities both on side of the EU and China to which extent to rely on each other (Interview #22, 18-03-19).

5.2. Constructivist Explanations of EU-China Security Cooperation

This sub-chapter engages with constructivist explanations of EU-China security cooperation. Hence, I assess the plausibility of my expectation that security cooperation increases over time when the EU’s and China’s problem understanding of security becomes more convergent. I presume that if they have a similar definition of security, they find it easier to agree on adequate response mechanisms to security threats and seek cooperation. I further expect that improving mutual perceptions lead to an increase of security cooperation because friends are bound in

110 security alliances or deepen their overall alignment, rivals or competitors might not interact at all while enemies might direct their actions towards harming the other.

The analysis reveals two major findings. There is evidence that the EU and China have developed a similar problem understanding of security over time and that this indeed fosters security cooperation. Yet, as regards changing self- and mutual perceptions the analysis does not reveal a significant impact on growing security cooperation. In contrast, the mutual perceptions of the EU and China in the security realm seem to have decreased over time, representing a growing obstacle to security cooperation.

5.2.1. The EU’s and China’s Understanding Of ‘Security’

This section examines my expectation that the more convergent the understanding of security becomes over time, the more security cooperation emerges. In order to assess whether the EU’s and China’s understanding of security has converged or diverged over time, I will compare the development of their understanding of security along the following criteria that were already introduced in chapter 4: scope of definition, extent of salience, target, and institutional responsibility.

In general, the concept of security has been evolving since the end of the Cold War (Fanoulis and Kirchner, 2016). While it has been conflated with national security, focusing on military power and strength, the scope and degree of security is widening.

The analysis suggests that this overall trend is clearly reflected in the EU’s and China’s understanding of ‘security’. In the beginning of EU-China diplomatic relations, China’s understanding of security has been mainly state-centric, circling around national defense and diplomacy, securing national sovereignty and territorial integrity and condemning any form of intervention. This excessively narrow understanding of security in military terms has evolved over time. In recent years, we observe an emerging discourse on these non-traditional security issues (非传统安全威胁 - fēi chuántǒng ānquán wēixié) and the definition of security has widened towards “comprehensive security” (综合安全 - zònghé ānquán). This developments becomes obvious, when looking at China’s White Papers of Defense from 1995 to 2019 and how security is framed. For instance, China’s 2000 White Paper of Defense puts the construction of China’s national defense system and the building of capable armed forces to the forefront (The The State Council, 2000). Moreover, it mainly refers to China’s direct neighbourhoods, such as the

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Asia-Pacific and the Taiwan Strait, when talking about external security issues or threats. In contrast, China’s 2002 White Paper of Defense stated, “non-traditional security issues are looming large in some countries” (The State Council, 2002). Yet at this point in time, China still focused heavily on its national security. Despite the expanded scope of security, the 2006 White Paper of Defense leaves no doubt about the focus of China’s security policy and its understanding of security. It says that the main emphasis should be

“contributing to the country's development and security strategies, […] maintaining national security and unity, and ensuring the realization of the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way” (The State Council, 2006)

This changed around 2010 and the emphasis on non-traditional security issues became stronger. The 2010 White Paper of Defense warned, “non-traditional security concerns, such as existing terrorism threats, energy, resources, finance, information and natural disasters, are on the rise” (The State Council, 2011a). Also the White Paper of Defense published in 2013 emphasizes the emergence and importance of non-traditional security issues. Already in the preface it says that “peace and development are facing new […] challenges” and that China reacts to these new challenges with a “new security concept” that encompasses “traditional and non-traditional” security concerns (The State Council, 2013). This reveals the expanded scope of the Chinese security definition and the recognition to incorporate non-traditional security issues into the wider framework of security. This shift towards also non-traditional security stems from China’s national conception of both an essential entity to be protected against external interference as well as a rising player in “providing solutions to [numerous] non-traditional security threats” (Yongjin, 2008, p. 157).

Accordingly, China’s security concept has changed towards “comprehensive security” with the ultimate goal of “common security” that shall be reached through cooperation (Zhao, 2011). However, China continues to rely on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and repeatedly mentions national security. This shows that despite the widening definition of security, China’s priority is on national defense. Hence, we do not observe a shift in China’s security framing but rather an expansion of the definition. This is also reflected in Chinas most current White Paper of Defense, issued in 2019, in which the PRC explicitly mentions that the security situation of actors worldwide has become increasingly intertwined, which requires joint reactions (The State Council, 2019b). During the first meeting of the newly established Central National Security Commission (NSC) in April 2015, Xi Jinping summed up the current framing of China’s understanding security as follows: while national security is at the core,

112 comprehensive security shall constitute the substances (Tiezzi, 2014). Hence the focus of China’s security concerns has grown from a strong focus on national or domestic security to transnational security, albeit with a focus on China’s direct neighbourhoods. This also became obvious in February 2017, when Xi Jinping announced in a speech during one of the only seldom publicized meetings of China’s new National Security Commission that China would increase international cooperation on security matters and “guide the international community in these efforts” (Xinhua, 2017b). Likewise, China’s 2019 White Paper of Defense states that China’s national security concept should entail “far more subjects, a greater range and a longer time span” (The State Council, 2019b).

Similarly, the EU’s understanding of what security entails has widened in scope and degree over time and a redefinition of security has taken place. The security concerns now embrace not only matters of territorial integrity and military security, but also include non-traditional security issues. The first indication of this expansion and the importance that the EU attributes to non-traditional security issues can be found in the European Security Strategy of 2003. It claims that while “large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable, (…) Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible, and less predictable” (European Union, 2003). This notion becomes even more apparent in the Implementation Report of the European Security Strategy of 2008, which provides an encompassing list of all those issues that the EU puts to the forefront of its security strategy. It includes a number of non-traditional security matters such as energy security and climate change or cybersecurity. Hence, also the scope of the European understanding of security has widened over time, shifting from a focus on traditional security to also non-traditional security concerns. These non-traditional security issues seem to have become a mainstay of the EU’s foreign and security policy.

Concerning the salience attached to the security policy field, the mapping has already indicated an interesting pattern. Over time, the EU and China mention the policy field of security more often in their official policy papers on each other as well as their annual Joint Declarations following the EU-China summit. This is a first indicator that the policy of security has grown in salience over time. Besides this general finding, the analysis suggests that the salience attached to security policy differs slightly between the EU and China. While the EU has started attaching greater salience to security since the implementation of the European Security Strategy, for China, security has always been a priority. Yet, when it comes to the expanded scope of security, the analysis suggests that the EU attaches greater importance to non- traditional security issues than China. That stems from the ongoing Chinese focus on domestic 113 security and sovereignty – also in military terms. Thus it is not surprising that there seems to be a stronger belief that nontraditional aspects of security only thrive with the backing of military means, as the White Papers suggest. Accordingly to the rising salience of security – especially non-traditional – the EU and China have expanded their security capabilities over time. While the EU has particularly expanded its influence in international security through the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a Common Security and Defense Policy, China has focused on developing its military capabilities as well as the skills of the PLA to conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW), as the White Papers as well as strategy papers of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense reveal (Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 2017; Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 2013).

Yet, despite these converging aspects of the EU’s and China’s framing of security, differences prevail with regard to the ways in which they seek to handle security issues and deal with security threats. While over time, the EU has sought to promote a form of ‘effective multilateralism’ in handling security issues, China has slowly shifted from multipolarity in its security policy towards also encompassing multilateralism albeit in a very different manner, as the analysis shows. First and foremost, it becomes obvious that when the EU and China established their diplomatic relations, Chinese foreign and security policy was still structured around the principle of multipolarity (yī chāo duō qiáng - 一超多强). However, this mostly meant adherence to the so-called 韬光养晦 – tāo guang yang huì doctrine, meaning to “coldly observe, secure our positions, cope calmly, conceal our capabilities and bide out rime, keep a low profile, never take the lead and make a contribution” (Guangkai, 2010). Only at the end of his reign, Hu Jintao started to take a more active stance towards actual multilateralism, increased Chinese troop contributions to the UN, took the lead in setting up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 and became a key player in the BRICS group of emerging powers (Ferdinand, 2016). This tendency to open up continued under the leadership of Jintao’s successor Xi Jinping (2013-today), with rising ambitions to reshape the regional and international order. Thus, Chinese foreign policy shifted towards a more active contribution to international governance and multilateralism, also called 奋发有为 – fènfā yǒu wéi, which can be translated as a proactive, or self-achieving behavior (Yinhong, 2015; Sørensen, 2015). In October 2017, Xi Jinping announced during a speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that China was progressing towards becoming “a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence…and a proud and active member of the community of nations” (Jingping, 2017). Hence, while for a long time, China 114 was clinging to the principle of non-interference, also to conceal its lacking experience and capabilities as a security provider, China now seems to be more willing and able to take strategic initiative and participate actively in international security structures (Interview #19, 14-03-19), albeit for own purposes.

Hence, one could conclude from the analysis that a turn towards multilateralism has taken place since the late 1990s, with China participating in multilateral regional arrangements within Asia and beyond.27 Furthermore, China has become more active as a member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), not only as the largest contributor of peacekeeping forces of all five permanent members of the UNSC but also in crafting resolutions and presidential statements (Christensen, 2015). In addition, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Yet, such conclusion would be premature and could lead astray. There is still a considerable amount of evidence that in its security policy China choses unilateralism or bilateralism over multilateralism, if it serves its national purposes and preferences. Although it is indeed true that multilateralism features prominently in official Chinese foreign policy doctrines and that China increasingly uses multilateral channels it mostly does so to pursue national interests and to promote its own rules. Nevertheless, China pursue an approach of “selective multilateralism”, namely embracing multilateralism only whenever it seems adequate and useful to present China as a rising power that takes responsibility in the international system (Interview #3, 26-02-19; Interview #21, 18-03-19). This was even made astonishingly explicit by Chinese interviewees:

“China always talks about promoting multilateralism, but that is only rhetoric, actually it pursues a strategy of selective multilateralism; only cooperation where it serves national interests” (Interview #1, 15-11-18).

In contrast, the EU is one of the main advocates of multilateralism when it comes to handling transnational security issues. The search for an “effective multilateralism” has over time emerged to being one of the main pillars of EU foreign and security policy, guiding its global and regional activities and reflecting its efforts to strengthen cooperation among states. For instance, the goal to contribute to building a multilateral world was included into the Treaty on the European Union. Furthermore, the EU stressed the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for safeguarding international peace and security in the ESS.

27 Examples for these arrangements are Association of Southeast Asian Nations+3 (ASEAN), China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) but also beyond (i.e. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)). 115

Table 9 sums up the evolution of the EU’s and China’s framing of security over time, as regards the scope of their security definition, the degree of salience they attach to security as such as well as the focus of their security concerns.

The EU’s understanding of security China’s understanding of security

wider – narrow – narrow – wider – traditional scope of traditional and traditional traditional   and non-traditional definition non-traditional security security issues security issues security issues issues

extent of medium  high high  high salience

domestic and domestic and domestic and target  domestic  transnational with a transnational transnational focus on direct neighborhood

institutional “selective” multilateralism  multilateralism multipolarity  responsibility multilateralism

Table 9 Development of the EU's and China's framing of security over time, 1995-today.

Now, what does this mean for the emergence and increase of security cooperation between the EU and China over time? Overall, despite certain prevailing differences, the analysis reveals evidence for a converging security definition of the EU and China. Over time, they sought to embark their security policies on common ground. Responding to a changing security environment, China and the EU have started adapting their security concepts in similar ways. Terms for this change range from “new security concept” (Gill, 2010; Quille, 2004) to “extended security concept” (erweiterter Sicherheitsbegriff) (Daase, 2010). They emphasize the changing nature of current security threats, accentuating the pre-eminence of international terrorism, the influence of non-governmental actors and the asymmetrical nature of new confrontations (Stumbaum, 2011).

In particular, the expansion of the scope of their security definition towards non-traditional concerns has considerably fostered the increase of cooperation. Several interviewees stated that 116 the more encompassing focus of security has led to a greater increase of a willingness to cooperate (Interview #1, 15-11-18) due to diminishing differences and decreasing mistrust on issues of non-traditional security (Interview #4, 26-02-19). In other words:

“On traditional security issues the level of mutual trust is low so that signals that are send that could lead to more cooperation might be mutually misunderstood, interpreted wrong or taken as a trick; another problem is also the ongoing arms embargo of the EU on China. On non-traditional issues there is more common interests and less space for conflict.” (Interview #4, 26-02-19)

Further interviews as well as policy documents (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018; European Commission, 2019a) reveal that the transnational and global nature of many non-traditional security concerns support the emergence of EU-China security cooperation. With the rise of non-traditional security concerns such as climate and energy security, terrorism or international migration not only the need to cooperate has increased but also the possibilities to do so, based on the converging problem understanding. As one interviewee stated it, transnational non-traditional security concerns require a “common response to common problems; and over time the architecture for that was developed, so now there is the need and the architecture for cooperation” (Interview #10, 05-03-19). This is also largely reflected in secondary literature. Consequently, non-traditional aspects of security have become more protuberant in EU-China security relations over time (Kirchner et al., 2016).

Moreover, there is evidence that the widening of the security definition on both sides has offered a window of opportunity to redefine their security policies. On the EU’s side this entails both a stronger defense of liberal democratic values and “European” positions but also an increased possibility for cooperation in the security realm, based on augmented capacities and more profound capabilities (European Commission, 2019a). In some security fields, this has increased tensions between the EU and China, while in other security fields it has led to more cooperation (Interview #27, 10-09-19). In other words, the EU has become more of a pragmatic security actor, putting asides ideological and normative differences, where it seems indispensable. For the Chinese side, the analysis suggests the widening scope of China’s security policy has fostered security cooperation with the EU, driven by the Chinese regime’s wish to stabilize its domestic position and project a more positive image of China towards other international actors. China developing into a global security actor seems to increase the necessity that needs to be part of bi- and multilateral cooperative frameworks in the security realm (Interview #12, 06-03-19; Interview #18, 12-03-19). Keeping China on the pathway of

117 further development is only possible with stable relations with its direct neighbors but also with the global community (Interview #12, 06-03-19; Interview #18, 12-03-19).

Another piece of evidence that the widening scope of the Chinese security definition has contributed to a more active behavior in the security realm is China’s increased its activities in international and regional security and its active participation in multilateral security initiatives. For instance, China contributes more troops to UN peacekeeping missions than any other permanent member of the UNSC (USIP, 2016). According to the Ministry of National Defense (MND), as of June 2017, China had participated in 24 UN peacekeeping missions, sending around 13.000 personnel abroad (The State Council, 2019c; China Daily, 2017b). Thereby, it expands its influence in international security from its neighboring areas to regions much farther away, such as the Middle East. The analysis shows that this increasing globalization and transnationalization of China’s foremost national security policy reflects the overall policy of “going global” of China. This policy in turn increases its exposure to risks that result from its expanded economic presence overseas. Thereby also the attempts to protect China’s overseas investments, like BRI investment projects (National Development and Reform Commission et al., 2015) in unstable environments in the Middle East, through more security provision, have increased, like reflected in China’s 2015 White Paper of Defense, which names safeguarding the security of China’s overseas interests” as a priority of the PLA (The State Council, 2015). This reveals that China’s security policy has developed a strong economic component, serving primarily to secure China’s development and accumulation of wealth, thereby synthesizing the country’s military and economic strategy (Interview #22, 18-03-19).

Additionally, there seems to be a rising awareness of the Chinese government that a peaceful rise can better be achieved within a peaceful environment. This notion is also at the center of China’s White Paper on Peaceful Development (The State Council, 2011b) and the White Paper on China and the World in the New Era (The State Council, 2011c). Increased cooperation with other great powers shall demonstrate China’s willingness to join international efforts in addressing peace and security-related matters. The following statement of a Chinese expert on EU-China relations reflects this internal self-perception of China as well as the external expectation that China is approached with.

“To play an important role in world politics, we need to be accepted as one of the influential powers (…). If you are rising, you have to take responsibility for creating a good international environment. This is expected from China from others, especially from other big powers. (…) Rising power means more interests, means

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more responsibility, that’s logical and that was also the request from outside” (Interview #19, 14-03-19).

Yet, there is also evidence that the selective multilateralism approach of China and the diverging understanding of adequate response mechanisms constitute an obstacle to cooperation. For instance, the EU repeatedly criticizes China’s selective multilateralism. This does not only become apparent in the interviews but also in official documents (Interview #21, 18-03-19). For instance, the EU’s 2019 Strategic Outlook explicitly states that “China's engagement in favor of multilateralism is sometimes selective and based on a different understanding of the rules-based international order” (European Commission, 2019a) and emphasizes that this does not contribute to creating more cooperative relations but instead weakens the multilateral international order. Moreover, although all EU member states support the common EU foreign policy and security policy, in practice, due to different interests and policy priorities in their China policies, reaching a consensus among the 27 member states (and among the different EU institutions) has proved to be a hard or even impossible task. Hence, thee EU has difficulty when collecting priorities for how to engage with China in the security realm (Interview #27, 10-09-19). This further impedes deeper alignment of the security policies of the EU and China.

Social learning between the EU and China does not only occur on the bilateral level. Their relationship has also been heavily influenced by their membership in and commitment to international organizations. In the security realm, China’s membership in the UN was crucial to promote cooperation with the EU under the banner of multilateralism. As mentioned before, working together in multilateral frameworks or multinational agendas was frequently mentioned as a driver towards security cooperation, with a special focus on the UN as a platform that facilitates cooperation. This can be interpreted as a sign for successful institutional socialization and norm diffusion within the institutional arrangement of the UN. To a certain extent, this might be true. Yet, it has to be mentioned that the Chinese understanding of multilateralism differs significantly from the European understanding of the same term. Although China’s involvement in activities in the nominal multilateral category has been significant (Wang, 2010), a certain degree of instrumentalism prevails. Especially in the security realm, Chinese scholars and policy experts were straightforward in the interviews with the practical reasons for China’s endorsement of multilateralism in only limited respects or within a limited scope (Interview #1, 15-11-18; Interview #21, 18-03-19). Furthermore, Xi Jinping stated clearly in a speech that “when our country joins an international organization,

119 our top priority remains our sovereignty and our national interests. (…) We will not do anything contradicting our interests.” (Wang, 2010, p. 485). Thus, China’s increasingly positive policy towards multilateralism does not automatically indicate a full socialization into the norm of multilateralism (Interview #1, 15-11-18; Interview #21, 18-03-19).

To sum it up, the analysis has shown that over time the EU and China have developed an increasingly convergent framing of security, which has facilitated cooperation to some extent. Yet, prevailing differences on adequate response mechanisms to security concerns hinder a deeper alignment of the EU and China in the security realm. Hence, the theoretical expectation that a more convergent framing over time leads to an increase of security cooperation is only partly plausible and cannot explain EU-China security cooperation satisfyingly.

5.2.2. Mutual Perceptions

I will now analyze my second theoretical expectation. It contends that if mutual perceptions of the EU and China improve over time and become more positive, security cooperation increases accordingly. In order to assess whether and how perceptions play a role, I will examine the EU’s and China’s perceptions of themselves as well as of the respective other separately. In order to do so, I look at reciprocal expectations, voiced descriptions of the respective other and role prescriptions. In particular, I will examine whether the EU and China perceive each other as ‘friends’, ‘partners’, ‘necessary counterparts’, rivals’ or ‘enemies’. I will begin with the EU’s perceptions of China and subsequently will analyze the Chinese perceptions of the EU. I conclude the subchapter with discussing the relationship between changing perception and the increasing amount of security cooperation in search for covariation.

The EU’s perceptions of China as a security actor over time

On the European side, the amplified engagement in reaching out to China as a possible security partner dates back to the beginning of what is called the European pivot to Asia. While the EU considered its relationship to China as one of “constructive engagement” (European Commission, 1995) in 1995, it rose to a “comprehensive” partnership in 1998 and 2000 (European Commission, 1998; European Commission, 2001). Finally, in 2005/06, the EU established five key principles of foreign policy towards China, which remain influential until today. Those principles are to “engage China further”, to “support China’s transition towards

120 an open society”, “encourage the integration (…) into the world economy” and to “work together in support of peace and stability” (European Commission, 2006).

As regards the development of the EU’s perceptions over time of China, the analysis shows that over time, the EU has started to consider China a possible partner in the security realm. Accordingly, it has started to strengthen pragmatic cooperation with China in high-level dialogue on security issues (European Parliament, 2002). It expected China to transform into a responsible power by engaging with it and integrating it into the multilateral world order (Interview #21, 18-03-19). For instance, after the signing of the CSP, the EU had expected China to integrate more proactively into the international system and to take the initiative to cooperate with the EU. Often, this expectation was disappointed and the perception of China being a possible partner, decreased. One example for such developments is the issue of anti- terrorism. As an interviewee from the EU reported, it had been the idea of China to establish a specific counterterrorism dialogue with the EU. When the EU agreed, China repeatedly postponed further meetings on this issue until the establishment of this dialogue form was off the agenda at EU-China summits and working group meetings and European policy makers resigned in proposing it again (Interview #21, 18-03-19). This statement mirrors the initial optimism when the EU and China agreed to coordinate their anti-terrorism agendas in 2016 and even concluded an agreement to facilitate cooperation (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014; China Daily, 2016), but then nothing followed. This explains why the establishment of a dialogue forum or any form of joint action has not been discussed neither in Chinese nor in European media. A confirming source that China had actually intended to establish the forum could not be found. Yet, most Chinese interviewees stressed the fact that China had been eager to cooperate on anti-terrorism measures and that it had been the EU, who boycotted cooperation efforts due to normative concerns. Moreover, another European interviewee confirmed this observation (Interview #29, 11-09-19).

Moreover, explicit expectations for a rising China are formulated. For instance, during the parliamentary debate on 06th September 2006, a member of Parliament emphasized that China “needs to shoulder a growing international responsibility […] [and] it must also accept increased international responsibility and be a responsible partner” (European Parliament, 2006). Likewise, Federica Mogherini stressed during an EP debate in 2015 that China “is becoming a more integrated member of the global community and this means it has to accept the obligations and not simply the benefits of it” (European Parliament, 2015).

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Over time the confidence that China would meet the EU’s expectations to integrate into existing cooperative structures altered and the EU’s perception of China as a possible security partner decreased. This became obvious during a debate about EU-China relations in the European Parliament in April 2002. China’s development in the security realm was mentioned as to be appreciated. Over time, this expectation was altered and EU policy experts characterize current EU-China relations as “divergences (…) when it comes to values and ideology” while at the same time “economic connections are becoming stronger and therefore also the needs (to cooperate), so it is a complex relationship” (Interview #20, 15-03-19). Similarly, the EP debate held on 6 September 2006 explicitly discussed whether China’s rising global influence can be transformed into deeper integration of China into existing structures or whether it hinders a rules-based multilateral world order (European Parliament, 2006). The general redistribution of capabilities and ideologies that mark current international affairs add to that and lead to deeper cooperation on the one hand and more pronounced rivalries at the same time.

That matches European media coverage on China, which has become more critical and pessimistic since 2003. Similarly, debates in the European Parliament in which EU-China relations were discussed as an “extraordinary range of complex relationships” (European Parliament, 2009) that brings about challenges and opportunities in 2009 have shifted towards a more critical tone towards China policies. For instance, Federica Mogherini mentioned evident and “fundamental disagreements” between the EU and China in a parliamentary debate in September 2018, although stressing the importance that China has for the EU as being a global security provider (European Parliament, 2018). and discussed alike in the European Parliament. For instance, during an EP debate in April 2002, a member of the Parliament described China as a

“rising superpower with whom we certainly share interests and common ground, but – and let us be realistic here – with whom we also disagree as regards some very fundamental values and beliefs” (European Parliament, 2002).

Figure 18 displays the European perceptions of China as of today by showing how often the European interviewees mentioned China with regard to the displayed categories. Most interviewees considered China either a rival/competitor to the EU (11 mentions), especially in normative terms, or a necessary counterpart in the field of security, albeit less often (7 mentions). Two times, China is mentioned as an enemy in the security realm.

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friend 12 10 8 6 enemy 4 partner 2 0

rival/competitor necessary counterpart

Figure 18 The EU’s perception of China in the security realm, 2019. Own depiction.

This interpretation of China both as a rival/competitor and a necessary counterpart creates a balance that the EU has to act within (European Parliament, 2005a). A leading staff member in the EEAS China team described this as trying to detect points of engagement in an overall shrinking space of collaboration, thereby pursuing a “sector-by-sector approach” (Interview #30, 12-09-19). The interviews reflect the most current EU Strategic Outlook on China, which describes the European approach towards China as “multi-faceted” and states the following:

“China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, (…) an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” (European Commission, 2019a)

Likewise, in parliamentary debates within the EU Parliament, China is often discussed as both an opportunity and a challenge at the same time: “China’s rise provides opportunities and challenges - it is in precisely this balance that we have to act” (European Parliament, 2005a). This widely reflected in media coverage within the EU (Benner, 2016; von der Burchard et al., 2017; von der Burchard, 2019).

This reveals that the EU is forced to balance two competing agendas in its foreign and security policy towards and with China, which are pursuing its interests on the one hand and defending and promoting its values on the other hand. The main strategic and security interests of the EU and China do not overlap, and in some cases today, their preferences and priorities increasingly diverge. Yet, a growing number of analysists acknowledges that China is a necessary security 123 counterpart for the EU, notwithstanding the deepening level of mistrust and divergence between the two (Interview #24, 03-09-19). Thus, contrary to many assumptions and the general notion of the majority of media coverage on China, the EU countries did not align against China. Notwithstanding they do not have a longing for naivety (Interview #25, 05-09-19), but consider China as a complex counterpart. A statement of a high official from the EEAS China team sums up this complexity and reveals very well, the EU’s perception of China.

“The EU has certain limitations in terms of power and power projection, so we need this cooperation with China, but we also need to show our teeth, when we can and say, hey, do not expect us to cooperate on everything” (Interview #27, 10-09-19)

China’s perceptions of the EU as a security actor over time

In general, “China’s contemporary images of the EU are embedded in ideas that have developed over the past decades and that also reflect historical experiences” (Wu, 2010, p. 173). As regards perceptions of the EU in the security realm, the analysis reveals that there has been a quite significant change over time. It suggests that while China has considered the EU as a possible ally and trustworthy friend around 2003 (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003) during the phase of EU-China honeymoon, its expectations of the EU’s role have become more realistic and pragmatic over time (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018). Figure 19 displays the perception that Chinese policy experts have of the EU in its current form as mentioned in the interviews. The figure shows the number of mentions of the EU in different roles, ranging from a trustworthy partner to a rival / enemy in the security realm. It becomes obvious that in general, China now sees the EU as a significant other and a “necessary counterpart” (24 mentions) in the security realm (Interview #2, 13-12-18; Interview #6, 28-02-19) as well as a partner for security cooperation (12 mentions) but does seldom consider it as a friend (3 mentions). Moreover, the EU is mentioned as a rival/ competitor in the security realm four times and once even as an enemy. To conclude, the overall image that Chinese policy experts have of the EU’s security profile seems to be positive.

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friend 25 20 15 10 enemy partner 5 0

rival/competitor necessary counterpart

Figure 19 China’s perception of the EU in the security realm, 2019. Own depiction.

For instance, a Chinese policy expert states that there is “more and more recognition that the EU can be a partner for security cooperation, not only in the economic (…) field[s]” (Interview #6, 28-02-19). This is also widely reflected in the way, China talks about the EU in the paragraphs about peace and security in its policy papers (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014; Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018). A closer look into these paper reveals an interesting temporal pattern that further supports the interview statements. In its first official policy paper on the EU, published in 2003, the PRC terms the EU a “major force in the world” and states that there is no fundamental conflict of interests between both actors despite certain prevailing disagreements (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). China’s second EU policy paper in 2014 goes further and speaks of “tremendous changes” in EU-China relations, highlights “important strategic consensus” over disagreements, and states that “China and the EU have far more agreement than differences” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). And in its most recent policy paper of December 2018, China mentions the EU as an important counterpart when it comes to contributing to world peace and security (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018).

However, concerning the development of China’s expectations of the EU in the security realm, the analysis reveals two different contradicting trends. Some Chinese policy experts denote that there was no major change in China’s role expectation of and role performance towards the EU. 125

Those scholars state that Beijing has considered the EU an important partner in addressing “shared (…) security interests”, as evidenced in China’s 2003 EU Policy Paper, which lists “fighting against international terrorism, promoting sustainable development, eliminating poverty, and protecting the environment” as areas with common ground for security cooperation between the EU and China (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). Moreover, they say that over time, regardless of deepening tensions, security relations between the EU and China have improved over time, due to the extension of security policy capabilities on behalf of the EU since the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EES and the EU Global Strategy, the augmentation of security dialogue formats and the overall easement of relations since the CSP in 2003. Those analysts still consider the EU as a possible partner to align with on security matters and acknowledge the increasing necessity to treat each other as counterparts on equal terms in the security realm, especially against the backdrop of the US’ withdrawal from international security arrangements (Interview #12, 06-03-19).

Others denote that the Chinese perception of the EU as a security player was at its peak in 2003 and has decreased steadily afterwards, due to internal crises within the EU and the European criticism of China’s domestic policies (Interview #6, 28-02-19; Interview #4, 26-02-19). This reading is also widely supported by Chinese media. Moreover, China considered the refusal of the Market Economy Status through the EU and the refused lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China as political obstacles to closer cooperation (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018; Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). According to a Chinese policy expert:

“The arms embargo is still an issue, was not lifted for a long time and China’s market economy status is also a problem; so, over time perception stagnated and (…) gradually, from 2008 onwards, perceptions didn’t develop much more positive” (Interview #13, 07-03-19).

Similarly, the European financial crisis was referenced repeatedly as a game changer in EU- China security relations, albeit not towards the positive. While China continued its rise towards a global power, the EU was weakened due to domestic turmoil in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Interview #12, 06-03-19; Interview #13, 07-03-19; Interview #20, 15-03-19).

The existence of these two interpretations again reveals the two faces of China’s role in its relation to the EU. In some security issues, we see more integration of China in international institutions and rules because China has certain interests in liberalization and cooperation, and intends to project power outwards. In other security issues, however, China sticks to 126 protectionism and nationalism, reacting to local necessities and the urgency to project power inwards (Interview #24, 03-09-19). The overall aim is legitimization, yet the way to achieve it is twofold, either through cooperation or through unilateralism and protectionism. This reflects an overall trend in China’s international role performance that derives from the aim to become a global power that creates own rules in the international system and the need to be acknowledged as such by other international big players, like the EU. The strategic pick-and- choose of cooperation and challenge that drives EU-China security relations reflects this and, once more, shows the sectoral approach of China towards the EU (Interview #24,03-09-19) that is also reflected in China’s 2018 policy paper (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, 2018).

Again we can ask the question what these changing perceptions mean for the increasing amount of security cooperation and whether they can explain this puzzling phenomenon. In general, over time, the EU and China have developed a perception of shared responsibility for many issues of global governance, have enhanced their understanding of many security issues, as shown in the previous sub-chapter. Yet, the analysis of how their perceptions of each other in the security realm have changed over time reveals irreconcilable gaps exist that created hindrances to cooperation. This also becomes obvious when comparing the official sources with the information deriving from the expert interviews. While policy officials on both sides emphasize the like-mindedness of the EU and China and rhetorically endorse cooperation, establishing cooperative initiatives or implementing those remains difficult. As regards the development over time, it is noteworthy that in the first phases of the EU-China partnership, the EU strove to integrate China into the existing multilateral world order and persuade the country to adopt the EU’s norms and principles on international engagement (Michalski and Pan, 2017). With the weakening of the EU’s international position since the Eurozone crisis and China’s continuous rise as a global power, this changed and the EU’s ability to influence China decreased. This led to increasing mistrust and uncertainties on behalf of the EU and slowed down the process of socialization (Michalski and Pan, 2017). Moreover, neither for the EU, nor for China, the analysis provides significant evidence that changing perceptions led to increased security cooperation. The contrary is the case. Over time, their perceptions have slightly decreased and have become a growing obstacle to security cooperation as of today.

Of all data sources, it is the interviews which make most explicit that altering perceptions have a negative impact on security cooperation. One interviewee made this very explicit. He/she stated that “since 2005, perceptions worsened, from ‘honeymoon’ towards more pragmatic 127 relationship”, emphasizing rising difficulties to keep existing security arrangements between the EU and china running and growing obstacles to initiate new forms of security cooperation (Interview #12, 06-03-19). Concerning the concrete time, when perceptions have started to decrease, there seem to be different considerations, as another interviewee mentions 2008 and the financial crisis as a turning point for mutual EU-China perceptions. Yet, leaving asides these details, the overall notion is that “over time perception stagnated and did not become better” (Interview #13, 07-03-19). Another interviewee stated that due to these negative trends, “security cooperation is very difficult” and “a mutual trust deficit that handicaps cooperation in many areas where it could be possible” (Interview #16, 07-03-19). Now, one could wonder why security cooperation is still taking place, despite the worsening perceptions. Again, the most explicit answers to these questions can be found in the interview material. One interviewee mentions that the decreasing perceptions do not have a strong impact on the amount of security cooperation that takes place between the EU and China because both actors are located significantly far away from each other, in geographical terms. Hence, it is possible to put asides what they think of the respective other and focus on those issues on which cooperation is needed despite negative trends (Interview #25, 05-09-19). This is certainly a very interesting thought that can, however, not be triangulated with other data sources.

Yet, a similar notion can be found in the EU’s Strategic Outlook of 2019. As already mentioned, this paper provides three perceptions of China, which is to be a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival in different security issues. A closer look into the paragraph on security of this Outlook shows that in the security realm the reading that China is an unwanted and highly criticized but still necessary security counterpart (European Commission, 2019a). This can explain, why security cooperation has increased despite decreasing perceptions.

5.4. Conclusion, Drivers Fit and Evaluation of Evidence

The analysis reveals that a combination of rationalist and constructivist explanations is well suited to explain the emergence of EU-China security relations. Before moving on to the three specific security issues and the variation of EU-China security cooperation among them, I now evaluate the different theorized drivers. In doing so, I will address the probability of each of the theorized expectations regarding security cooperation.

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Theoretical expectation 1a: Complex interdependence

My theoretical expectation 1a states that if the degree of complex interdependence increases over time, security cooperation increases as well. The empirical evidence supports this theoretical expectation for part A of my analysis. The increase of interdependence has indeed led to more EU-China security cooperation. Thereby, I can explain the results from the mapping that there are more observations in the realm of cooperation than in the spectrum of non- cooperation, because non-cooperative behavior would have a negative impact on the EU and China due to complex interdependence. Even rhetoric criticism could yield problems. The rising interdependence of the EU and China both in the economic but also the security realm is central to the development of cooperation but also reflects variations in the sensitivity of the security relations for both actors. Not only has the overall volume of trade between the EU and China increased over time, thereby increasing their economic entanglement and rising the potential costs of non-cooperation. The EU and China also started communicating and interacting via a growing number of channels on bilateral and multilateral level and the number of dialogue formats, in which they discuss security and other matters has grown significantly. Furthermore, the analysis indicates rising levels of vulnerability of the EU and China, albeit in a different manner. While there is evidence that the EU seems to be increasingly vulnerable due to the entanglement of its economy with the Chinese economy, the analysis suggests that China considered its vulnerability to the EU rather as a political one (Interview #26, 05-09-19).

As regards the impact of this growing interdependence on the amount of EU-China security cooperation, the analysis reveals that the growing interdependence increased the costs of non- cooperation and has thus led to more security cooperation. The interviews point towards this the strongest, leaving no doubt that over time the EU and China have collaborated more because of the ‘necessity’ or ‘urgency’ to do so. The analysis also points towards a certain inevitableness that derives from the growing interdependence in that the EU and China are aware of the fact that there is no way not to cooperate with each other, regardless of political tension, normative divergences and recurring skirmishes.

Accordingly, my expectation 1a that a growing degree of complex interdependence functions as a driver towards increased EU-China security cooperation seems plausible.

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Theoretical expectation 1b: Economic interests

My theoretical expectation 2a states that the more economic interests become involved over time, the more security cooperation increases, because the risk of economic losses become higher than the costs of cooperation.

With regard to the impact of economic interests on EU-China security cooperation, the analysis reveals mixed results. On the one hand, it indicates that in order to secure their economic investments abroad, the EU and China have cooperated more. In particular, a strong economy- security nexus indeed seems to facilitate cooperation because of the apparent economic focus of the two actors. On the other hand, pursuing economic interests also led to growing competition between the EU and China, as indicated very clearly by the EU’s Strategic Outlook that names China as an economic competitor for the EU. With the rising entanglement of their economies, the EU and China are more vulnerable to each other but also fear about their survival in the global economy. Accordingly, my expectation 1b seems to be only partly plausible.

Theoretical expectation 2a: Convergent problem understanding

My theoretical expectation 2a states that the more convergent the understanding of security becomes over time, the more security cooperation takes place.

As regards the understanding or framing of security, the analysis reveals that the EU and China are intertwined in a similar situation as regards the dynamism of their political and economic trajectories. In addition, the EU and China have developed a notion of shared responsibility for many issues of global governance and their definition of security has widened over time, creating windows of opportunity for augmented engagement and increased cooperation. In particular, it becomes apparent that the scope of what they define as security matters has widened over time and non-traditional security issues have lengthened their security agendas. Similarly, for both the policy field of security has become of high salience. In particular, the expansion of the scope of their security definition towards non-traditional concerns has paved the way towards increased cooperation. as the more encompassing focus of security has led to a greater increase of a willingness to cooperate) due to diminishing differences and decreasing mistrust on issues of non-traditional security. Also the notion that ttransnational, non-traditional security concerns require a common response enables security cooperation.

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Yet huge differences prevail with regard to how security matters are handled by the EU and China. While the EU is one of the main advocates of multilateralism when it comes to handling international security issues, China still relies heavily on bilateralism. Although the PRC has turned towards multilateralism over times, the analysis reveals that it only chooses multilateralism if it serves its national purposes and preferences. Hence, multilateralism features prominently in official Chinese foreign policy doctrines and China increasingly uses multilateral channels it mostly does so to pursue national interests and to promote its own rules. Yet, it pursues an approach of “selective multilateralism”. This means it embraces multilateralism only when it seems adequate and useful to present China as a rising power that takes responsibility in the international system or when it serves national purposes. The analysis suggests that this selective multilateralism approach of China and the resulting diverging understanding of adequate response mechanisms to security concerns constitute an obstacle to cooperation.

To conclude, my expectation 2a that a converging framing of what security entails in scope and degree seems partly plausible. Indeed it has fostered security cooperation that the EU and China have developed a similar understanding of security over time. Nevertheless, differences prevail with regard to adequate response mechanisms and the right fora to address security challenges. While the EU bases its security policy on effective multilateralism, China pursues a pragmatic pick-and-choose of fora that can be called a ‘selective multilateralism’.

Theoretical expectation 2b: Positive mutual perceptions

My theoretical expectation 2b states that the more positive mutual perceptions becomes over time, the more security cooperation takes place.

The analysis suggests a clear decrease of perceptions over time. Irreconcilable gaps created hindrances to cooperation. Over time, the mutual perceptions that the EU and China hold of each other in the security realm, have decreased and have become a growing obstacle to security cooperation. The overall notion is that “over time perceptions stagnated and did not become better” (Interview #13, 07-03-19). It becomes very obvious that the EU and China are not far from being friends or partners. Yet, interestingly, both sides seem to consider the other as a necessary counterpart with whom cooperation is not favourable but necessary or even inevitable. This connects very well to the findings with regard to complex interdependence.

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In sum, I can conclude from the analysis that mutual perceptions have become more negative over time. That renders cooperation more difficult and growing trust deficits handicap cooperation in many areas where it could be possible. Hence, I can conclude that my theoretical expectation 2b is not plausible.

Table 10 sums up the results of the analysis with regard to my theoretical expectations.

Theoretical expectation Result of the analysis

Expectation 1a: If the degree of complex interdependence between the EU and China increases over time, security cooperation ✓ plausible increases, due to cost-benefit calculations

Expectation 1b: The more economic interests become involved over time, the more security cooperation increases, ✓ partly plausible because the risk of economic losses become higher than the costs of cooperation.

Expectation 2a: If the EU’s and China’s framing of security becomes more convergent over time, security cooperation ✓ partly plausible increases because they find it easier to agree on adequate response mechanisms to security threats.

Expectation 2a: If the perception of the other in the security realm improves over time, security cooperation increases because friends are bound in security alliances or deepen their X not plausible overall alignment, rivals or competitors might not interact at all while enemies might direct their actions towards harming the other.

Table 10 Evaluation of theoretical expectations, increase of cooperation over time.

To sum it up, the increase of EU-China security cooperation over time mainly seems to derive from deepening complex interdependence in the economic realm that spill over to the security

132 realm. Economic interests and a partly converging understanding of what constitutes security only lead to increased security cooperation to some extent. The decreasing mutual perceptions the EU and China hold of each other, in contrast, actively hindered cooperation and present an obstacle to deeper alignment instead of creating new opportunities.

Analysis Part B – EU-China Security Cooperation Across Issue-Areas

Part B of the analysis is based on the observation that security cooperation does not emerge equally on all security issues. While some remain marginal, others enter the center stages and either become prone to conflict or deepening rivalries, or they include deepening cooperation. Drawing on complex interdependence and economic interests, a convergent problem understanding and mutual perceptions, I conduct a synchronic comparison of three different security issues, namely anti-terrorism, maritime security/anti-piracy and climate/energy security. The analysis is guided by the following research question:

Why does cooperation emerge in some security issues but not in others?

The data corpus for the analysis consists of the same sources as in part A, with the difference that I focus on those parts that explicitly address the three security issues. I further enrich the data corpus by issue-specific data. I rely on the official policy papers the EU and China issues on each other between 1995 and 2019 as well as on the official declarations following the annual EU-China summits from 1998 to 2019. Furthermore, I assess case-specific policy documents such as the EU Maritime Strategy for the case of maritime security/anti-piracy or EUROPOL reports for the case of anti-terrorism. Moreover, I draw on China’s eleven official Defense White Papers issued between 1995 and 2019, focusing on the respective sections in which the three security issues are addressed. For the European side, I further look at minutes of parliamentary debates in the EU parliament during which the three security issues were discussed. Moreover, I rely on the 31 interviews with Chinese and EU policy makers and (academic) experts and use media reports for triangulation of different sources of evidence as well as to supplement the analysis. The analysis examines the following four theoretical expectations:

Expectation 3a: The stronger the complex interdependence between the EU and China in a security issue, the higher the amount of security cooperation, due to cost-benefit calculations.

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Expectation 4a: The more convergent the definition of a security issue, the more likely is security cooperation, because the EU and China do not rely on “self-help” or treat security as an individual responsibility of each but identify with the other and seek common responses.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I examine the case of anti-terrorism, followed by the analysis of maritime security/anti-piracy. The third subchapter is dedicated to the analysis of climate/energy security. Finally, I compare the findings across the three security issues and evaluate the theorized drivers towards security cooperation. For each case, I first assess the rationalist notions and subsequently dive into the constructivist explanations for cooperation. At the end of each case examination, I briefly discuss the covariation between the IVs and EU-China security cooperation and give a first hint about whether the theoretical expectations could be plausible. After having examined all three cases, I will compare the findings across the cases and systematically examine the plausibility of my theoretical expectations.

6. Same, Same But Different? EU-China Non-Cooperation on Anti-Terrorism

This sub-chapter assesses EU-China security relations with regard to anti-terrorism. As the mapping has shown, there is only limited cooperation between the EU and China on anti- terrorism. Figure 20 shows, how seldom cooperation on anti-terrorism in the Middle Eastern context is mentioned in the text-corpus. Only once the EU and China articulate will to cooperate in this realm. Similarly, on the formal level, the Agreement on Strategic Cooperation between the European Police Office and the Ministry of Public Security concluded in 2014 is the only instance of cooperation.

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anti-terrorism 1 1

0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 instances of cooperation

articulation of will to cooperate institutionalized formal agreement joint activity dialogue

Figure 20 Instances of cooperation on anti-terrorism. Own depiction.

The chapter has five main sections. The first section provides background information on China’s and the EU’s postures towards terrorism. The subsequent section sheds light on the constraints that stalled deeper alignment on combatting terrorism and analyses the plausibility of my theoretical rationalist expectations. Subsequently, I dive into the constructivist expectations and examine them empirically. The chapter resolves with an evaluation of the examined drivers and a discussion of the findings against the backdrop of the theoretical expectations.

6.1. Context

With the globalization of security and the increase of transnational non-traditional security concerns, terrorist and non-state armed groups have replaced conventional military threats as the main security threats to many states (Kaldor, 2012). Since the end of the Cold War, the diversification of terrorist groups became recognized as a substantial transnational security threat (Albanese, 2012). Terrorism has a transnational character and can pose severe challenges to economic and social stability of other countries (Bossong and Holmes, 2016).

Although the EU-China cooperation architecture on anti-terrorism seems well advanced at first glance – due to ongoing debates, the EUROPOL-MPS agreement and the expressed will to find joint measures to combat the rise of terrorism – the EU and China have failed to turn this into concrete action. Cooperation has hitherto remained scarce and terrorism does not feature prominently in EU-China documents. This is puzzling, as international terrorism has emerged in recent years as a direct threat to Chinese nationals living overseas and China itself (Bossong and Holmes, 2016; Murphy, 2017; Clarke and Kan, 2017). Likewise, the EU has gradually

135 become a target of terrorism in the past years (EUROPOL, 2019; Council of the European Union, 2015a; Council of the European Union, 2005a). Thus, it would be expected that due to the overlapping interest to combat terrorism, threats against the respective national security, the geographical proximity of both actors to the Middle East and Central Asia, from where most terrorist groups emanate, as well as the overarching UN framework should foster EU-China cooperation on this specific security issue. The opposite is the case. Instead, the EU’s cooperation with China on anti-terrorism is arguably the most limited in comparison to other strategic partners of the EU, such as India (Bossong and Holmes, 2016; Duchâtel, 2016).

6.2. Rationalist Explanations of Non-Cooperation on Anti-Terrorism

After having explained the EU’s and China’s postures towards terrorism, I now examine the plausibility of my theoretical expectations. I begin with the rationalist explanations of cooperation. I expect that the higher the degree of complex interdependence on the security issue at hand, the higher the amount of security cooperation (expectation 3a). Moreover, I expect that higher degrees of economic interests facilitate security cooperation (expectation 3b). The analysis reveals two major findings. First, it becomes apparent that neither the EU nor China has major economic considerations when it comes to the issue of terrorism. Moreover, the degree of complex interdependence seems to be significantly lower than on other security issues and the EU and China reach out to other cooperation partners instead of seeking cooperation with each other.

6.2.1. Complex Interdependence

First and foremost, there are signs for complex interdependence being at play in the realm of anti-terrorism. There is an absence of the use of force as neither the EU nor China pose a military threat to each other. The analysis also indicates that the EU and China interact and communicate via multiple channels. Discussions between the EU and China with regard to counter-terrorism measures take place on bilateral and multilateral level. On bilateral level, the EU-China Dialogue on Security and Defense, the Informal Dialogue on the Middle East and North Africa and to some extent, concerning terrorist activities in mainland China, also the EU- China Dialogue on Human Rights address these issues. Furthermore, the EU and China organized several specific meetings under the Asia-Europe-Meeting (ASEM) Framework, in which they tackled the terrorism matter. For instance, the first ASEM counterterrorism meeting 136 was held in Beijing in 2003 and then took place annually until 2012. In the context of the 10th ASEM summit in 2014, the EU and China decided to establish an institutionalized forum on the situation in the Middle East (extending to Afghanistan and Central Asia), Northern Africa and the Sahel zone to coordinate actions to combat the rise of extremism and terrorism in these regions (European Council, 2014b). In 2016, the two sides reached an Agreement on Strategic Cooperation between the European Police Office and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) of the People’s Republic (EUROPOL and Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2016) that includes the exchange of information and intelligence. On multilateral level, the UN provides the main framework for combatting anti-terrorism, in particular the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact. Both China and the EU stress the UN’s crucial role for counterterrorism and adhere to UN principles. Besides, both sides form part of the international counter-terrorism talks, at which also the Chinese First State Commissioner for Counter-Terrorism and Security Matters participates.

Yet, besides these pieces of evidence, the analysis suggests that different and more dominant strategic calculations are at play that drive the EU’s and China’s behavior towards non- cooperation. Despite the shared interest of fighting terrorism, pursuing strategic objectives in a purely rationalist manner hinders the emergence of cooperation. From an individual standpoint, it seems to be more rational for both no to cooperate (Interview #9, 04-03-19; Interview #27, 10-09-19; Interview #17, 11-03-19). This leads to maintaining the status of non-cooperation rather than to the more preferred cooperative outcome. As the analysis reveals different rationales that drive the decisions of the EU and China not to cooperate, it makes sense to explain their respective strategic calculations separately.

Concerning China’s non-cooperation with the EU, two different strategic objectives can be distinguished. These are a fear of retaliation and the easier possibility to cooperate with like- minded partners. For China, on the one hand, the approach taken to address terrorism reflects its dynamic domestic social and economic transformation, and influences its global security role. There is evidence that China is afraid of retaliation by terrorist groups in the Middle East and Central Asia, which would pose a threat to its territorial integrity and state survival, leads to its choice of defection over cooperation (Interview #1, 18-11-19). Closer cooperation with the EU would tear China further into the global war on terror, increasing the risk of exposure and thereby the costs of cooperation.

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Moreover, for China, cooperating with the EU on terrorism would mean an inclusion or adaptation of a European approach to human rights. Therefore, it reaches out to other cooperation partners, who are like-minded, like Russia. Sidelining with other autocrats give China the possibility to jointly combat terrorism and yet keep its own definition of it. For instance, although China had joined most of the international conventions on anti-terrorism already before 9/11 (Guang, 2004), it often reaches out to the Shanghai Five / Shanghai Cooperation Organization or builds on bilateral alliances with likeminded partners. To name an example, the SCO, which has a Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS) since 2003, seems to be the preferred forum for China to deal with counter-terrorism mechanisms (Interview #17, 11-03-19) in addition to bilateral coping partnerships. In a speech at the 15th meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of the SCO members, the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang emphasized the need to “beef up the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, hold regular joint anti- terrorism drills” (The State Council, 2016). In a similar manner, China reaches out to other like- minded cooperation partners in the Middle East, like Egypt (The State Council, 2020a) or the Gulf countries with whom China shares a “solid political foundation” (The State Council, 2019a).

One specific bilateral cooperative agreement that stands out in this regard is China’s cooperation with Egypt, with whom it pursues a strategy of “giving and taking” (Interview #17, 11-03-19). There is evidence for close cooperation on combatting Islamist extremism in the region in general and the Uighur extremism in particular, as Egypt reportedly sent a delegation of around 30 people to Xinjiang in 2018 to study China’s measures there and possibly adopt them (Interview #17, 11-03-19). Although not mentioned in official documents, one interviewee pointed to an agreement between China, contending that the Egyptian government observes refugees from Xinjian in its country, sending back all those that behave inadequately. In return, China provides assistance in economic terms, helping the country with infrastructure and technical investments (Interview #17, 11-03-19). As only one interviewee mentioned this agreement, the information could not be confirmed through triangulation and other Chinese interviewees denied giving a statement on this. Yet, what can be confirmed is that China and Egypt cooperate on anti-terrorism (The State Council, 2020a). Thus, the gains that are to be made from cooperating with other partners than the EU are certainly higher than those following cooperation with the EU. At the same time, the costs of cooperating within other fora like the SCO or other bilateral allies are lower than those cooperating with the EU would cause.

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For the EU, the risks of giving away standards of human rights and the rule of law are too high in comparison to the risks to be gained when making compromises to cooperate with China on antiterrorism. For instance, cooperation on counter-terrorism requires the exchange of information and personal data and thus entails intelligence collaboration (Interview #16, 07-03- 19). Yet, the EU remains skeptical concerning the uncertainties that continue regarding the exchange of personal data and a prevailing lack of trust hinders the establishment of cooperation with China (Interview #31, 12-09-19). Accordingly, an increasing securitization of digital policies (Interview #27, 10-09-19) hinders deeper alignment on the issue of counter-terrorism. This also becomes obvious in the debates on on the EU anti-terrorism Action Plan, held in the European Parliament in 2011 (European Parliament, 2005b; European Parliament, 2011). Thus, the EU did not mention China as a cooperation partner on counter-terrorism in its 2005 Counter- terrorism Strategy, albeit explicitly emphasizing the core role of the US as a fundamental component of the EU’s strategy (Council of the European Union, 2005a). In February 2015, the Council decided to step up external action to counter terrorism and reach out to new cooperation partners – again China was not mentioned (Council of the European Union, 2015a).

6.2.2. Economic interests

In the following, I will discuss my expectation that the higher the economic interests that are at stake, the more likely security cooperation emerges. This expectation bases on rationalist explanations of cooperation in the international system, which denote that strategic calculations play an important role. Based on the assumption that all actors follow an instrumental-strategic logic and pursue their own interests, it suggest that states cooperate when it helps them to maximize their economic gains (Keohane and Nye, 1998).

In general, the analysis does not indicate strong economic interests at play. Yet, there are some pieces of evidence that point towards economic considerations. For instance, the EU had used its economic leverage to freeze terrorist assets and contributes actively to combatting illegal financing of terrorism, as required by the UN Security Council and the Financial Action Task Force (European Commission, 2015). Similarly, China introduced measures for freezing probable terrorist funds and assets in 2011. Yet, these activities do not point towards economic interests. Neither are they driven by the intention to avoid economic damages and none of the data sources provides evidence for such considerations.

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The only indication that can be found for economic factors connected to anti-terrorism is related to the Chinese BRI investment. These seem to have twofold effects. On the one hand, the data suggests a growing fear on behalf of the Chinese that their increased economic engagement in its neighborhood exposes China to international terrorism, rendering a possibly fruitful target. This fear seems to be connected to a rising acknowledgement that China needs to engage in anti-terrorism measures in order to secure its investments in insecure or unstable areas in Central Asia and the Middle East (Interview #17, 11-03-19). Secondary literature further suggests that the implementation of the BRI that passes through China’s Western province of Xinjiang might explain the Chinese attempts to expand the fight against terrorism, albeit with a strong domestic focus on the Xinjiang province and its Muslim inhabitants (Cunningham, 2012). Although this reading seems plausible it could not be triangulated or verified by other pieces of information.

A similar problem occurs with the interesting argument of one Chinese interviewee, who mentioned that bilateral anti-terrorism cooperation with countries from the Middle East could yield economic possibilities for China to export expertise and technologies (Interview #17, 11- 03-19). In this context, also the increasing export of Chinese military equipment and armaments were mentioned. Yet, this piece of information could not be validated by any other source either. This difficulty also stems from the high sensitivity of the issue of terrorism in the Chinese context that affects data saturation to a great extent.

Thus, it has to be concluded that economic considerations do not seem to play a crucial role in the realm of anti-terrorism, neither for the EU nor for China. Yet, there are no indications that this absence of economic interests has contributed to non-cooperation. Accordingly, economic arguments seem to be of little explanatory value for the case of anti-terrorism and no particular economy-security nexus seems to exist.

6.3. Constructivist Explanations of Non-Cooperation on Anti-Terrorism

The following two sections engage with constructivist explanations of EU-China non- cooperation on anti-terrorism. I assess whether it is plausible that the EU and China do not cooperate on anti-terrorism because they lack a similar problem understanding or definition of terrorism as such (expectation 4a). Furthermore, I examine their mutual perceptions (expectation 4b). The analysis reveals two major findings that I discuss in detail. First, it

140 becomes very apparent that the lack of a common definition of what constitutes terrorism hinders EU-China anti-terrorism cooperation. Furthermore, the perceptions that the EU and China hold of each other in this specific security area are characterized by rivalry and mistrust which further impedes cooperation.

6.3.1. The EU’s and China’s Understanding Of ‘Terrorism’

In the following section, I discuss my theoretical expectation that a more convergent a definition of a specific security threat facilitates security cooperation. The expectation is based on the assumption that a lack of common understanding of a problem can impede cooperation, as shared meanings are a precondition for states to cooperate with each other (Hasenclever et al., 1996; Hasenclever et al., 1997; Hasenclever et al., 2000). If states lack such a principled and shared understanding of the issue at stake, it is much more difficult to agree on adequate measures to collectively combat a specific problem.

I compare the EU’s and China’s framing of terrorism along the following parameters: type of security issue, extent of salience, scope of definition, target, institutional responsibility and political values. The ‘type of security’ describes whether the EU and China consider the security issues under scrutiny as traditional or non-traditional security issues. For the ‘target’ I look at whom the EU and China consider the main target of terrorist attacks. ‘Institutional responsibility’ captures how combatting terrorism is handled within the political institutions of the EU and China. The ‘extent of salience’ describes whether anti-terrorism is of high, medium or low salience for the EU and China based on their exposure to the issue and possible vulnerability. Furthermore, I examine which ‘political values’ are attached to the security issue.

At first glance, the understanding of terrorism does not seem to differ significantly between the EU and China. For both, the issue has become increasingly transnationalized in the past years, not at least since 9/11. Moreover, for both, the increasing sectarian violence emanating from the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria) provides a risk to sovereignty, territorial integrity and “national” stability. Yet, at second glance, huge differences prevail regarding the Chinese and European definition and framing of terrorism as well as their approaches vis-à-vis adequate response mechanisms to combat terrorism. A closer look at their official definitions already yields interesting results. The EU has developed a mainly operational understanding of terrorism. According to the Council Common Position of December 2001, the EU defines terrorism as

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“acts, which (…) may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, as defined as an offence under national law, where committed with the aim of: (i) seriously intimidating a population, or (ii) unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or (iii) seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation” (European Council, 2001, p. 1).

Concerning terrorist threats from outside European territory, the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report of 2019 mentions Islamist terrorism as the biggest concern. As the main threats emanating from within the EU, it mentions nationalist, separatist, left- and right-wing or single- issue extremist terrorist groups (EUROPOL, 2019).

Article III of China’s 2015 counter-terrorism legislation defines terrorism as “propositions and actions that create social panic, endanger public safety, violate person and property, or coerce national organs or international organizations, through methods such as violence, destruction, intimidation, so as to achieve their political, ideological, or other objectives.” (National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 2015).

This shows that the Chinese definition of what constitutes terrorism is much broader than the European definition, which is much more concrete and specific. The EU for instance, explicitly refers to “acts” as terroristic behavior while China already considers “propositions” as terroristic actions, which broadens the scope of counter measures that can be taken at a much earlier stage. Moreover, the European definition speaks of serious damages as an indicator for a terroristic act, while the Chinese refers to the creation of social panic. In addition to these conceptual differences, it seems to be important for the EU that terrorism is something that is done consciously with a concrete “aim of […] intimidating, […] compelling or […] destabilizing or destroying”. Moreover, the EU distinguishes between “international, religiously motivated terrorism and territorial, secessionist-oriented terrorism with several hotspots also within the European Union” (European Parliament, 2011, p. 55). Such distinction cannot be found for the Chinese side.

The interviews support this first finding and reveal additional divergences as regards the framing of terrorism. Primarily, as stated explicitly both by Chinese and European interviewees, “their terrorism is not our terrorism” (Interview #9, 04-03-19; Interview #20, 18-03-19). Interestingly, both put anti-terrorism high on the agenda of EU-China relations although they never seem to reach a common understanding. For instance, at the EU-China summit 2019, China itself placed anti-terrorism on the meeting agenda and allowed an open and free 142 discussion, including the issue of Uighur minorities and human rights (Interview #25, 05-09- 09). This reveals that there is indeed the willingness to kick off cooperation but that the actual establishment fails. Another example for this is that the European External Action Service (EEAS) repeatedly tried to establish an anti-terrorism dialogue with China after the situation in Xinjiang started to escalate. However, all attempts were to no avail (Interview #21, 18-03-19; Interview #29, 11-09-19).

One huge difference regarding the target of terrorism is that for China terrorism is also a strong domestic concern. China’s 2015 White Paper of Defense (The State Council, 2015) names terrorism as the first concrete threat after “international and regional turmoil” and considers regional terrorism (地区恐怖主义 - dìqū kǒngbù zhǔyì), separatism (分裂主义- fēnliè zhǔyì) and extremism (极端主义- jíduān zhǔyì) as three rampant evils (The State Council, 2015). For China, the issue of terrorism has increased in salience over time, particularly in view of the fact that terrorist violence has experienced a significant increased since 2008 (Zhou, 2014; Bossong and Holmes, 2016; Clarke, 2008; Smith, 2009). Domestic extremism, leading to violence, is perceived as a growing problem. While for a long time, China’s main problem with terrorism has been reduced to the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the North-West of the country, China’s current stance towards terrorism reflects the contemporary international focus on Islamist-inspired terrorism and extremism in general, yet still with a strong focus on the XUAR (The State Council, 2015; Wang, 2014) as it links insurgency in the XUAR to transnational terrorism, emanating from Central Asia and the Middle East.

For instance, the rise of the Islamic State (IS), is interpreted by China mainly as a threat to national security and territorial integrity, as it might have implications for Islamist non-state groups operating on Chinese ground (Interview #17, 11-03-19). China’s commitment to combatting the IS is therefore driven less by humanitarian motivations but rather by fears about a possible spillover of conflict to Chinese soil through the return of Uighur fighters that joined the battle in Syria (Interview #17, 11-03-19). The Western province of Xinjian, where most of the Uighurs live is considered a herd of insurgency against the Chinese regime, which would facilitate a spillover of instability and terrorism to China, according to Chinese policy makers (The State Council, 2015). Hence, from the Chinese perspective. foremost Chinese national security and territorial integrity are endangered by the rise of Islamist terrorism.

A similar pattern can be found with regard to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Again, the analysis reveals a clear domestic focus of China’s understanding of terrorism. For China,

143 the political stability of the country exerts considerable influence on the stability and security of the whole region, as Afghanistan shares ethnic and religious ties with the northwestern area of China. With the withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan in 2014, China has started to adopt a more proactive stance towards the country, concerned about the effects of Afghan instability on the PRC, including terrorist attacks and a possible influx of militants or crossborder organized crime. With tensions rising between China and the Muslim Uighur minority in the Western Chinese province Xinjiang, the PRC wants to avoid possible collaboration between its own Muslim minorities and the Taliban, the Islamic or other Islamist groups in Afghanistan (Interview #17, 11-03-19). As already mentioned, China’s main concern is connected with the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), formerly called East Turkestan Islamist Movement (ETIM)28. It was funded by Uighur fighters in Western China and is believed to train Uighur fighters to scatter insurgency in Xinjiang as it seeks independence for the province. Furthermore between 5000 and 10.000 fighters of the Islamic State are supposed to reside in Afghanistan as part of the IS’ offshoot in the Khorasan province. As a reaction, China has established an anti-terrorism alliance with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan (Reuters, 2016). In 2016, a first joint Chinese-Tajik antiterrorism exercise was carried out on the Afghan-Tajik border to tackle Islamist terrorism in Central Asia. Therefore, the PRC supports the Afghan National Unity Government in the ongoing peace and reconciliation process (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2016) and its substantive engagement with Kabul were border control measures to prevent spillover of terrorism into China.

Observers denote that China fears that its deeper engagement in many world regions, including those long beset by terrorist violence and yet central to China’s BRI agenda, such as Central Asia or the Middle East, increases the Chinese exposure to the risk of terrorism. Therefore, the growing Chinese global footprint went along with an augmentation of capacities of the People’s Armed Police Forces (PAP) and an adaptation of China’s criminal law (The State Council, 2015). According to China’s 2009 White Paper of Defense, the PLA is allowed and able to “crack [] down on […] terrorism efficiently, appropriately, and legally. […] [and] it has taken part in operations […] to hunt down the ‘East Turkestan’ terrorists” (The State Council, 2009; The State Council, 2011a). This refers to China’s main concern when it comes to terrorism, namely Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), formerly called East Turkestan Islamist Movement (ETIM). Uighurs founded this party in Western China and, according to Chinese officials and

28 In September 2002, China managed to get the East Turkestan Islamic Movement listed for its association with Al-Qaeda. 144 media, are believed to train fighters to promote insurgency in China’s Western Province of Xinjiang, a Muslim-dominated province. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between transnational security issues, which have objective content, and transnational security threats, which are subjectively constructed, like the Chinese definition of terrorism.

With the extension of the Chinese definition of terrorism, the Chinese security discourse has adapted to the “Western” discourse of a global war on terror, linking the Uighur extremism to the global jihad and to Al-Qaida and later to the so-called Islamic State (Interview #17, 11-03- 19). For instance, a document of the State Council of the People’s Republic emphasizes that “China has made important contributions to the global fight against terrorism with its deradicalization efforts in Xinjiang” (The State Council, 2020b). China’s dilemmas are thus increasingly transnational (Interview #9, 04-03-19). According to an expert, the incidents of 9/11 were read in very positive terms as regards EU-China cooperation on terrorism. Some Chinese analysts thought the incident could boost cooperation between great powers, who are challenged by the same large-scale, transcontinental terrorist threats (Interview #9, 04-03-19). This is reflected by official statements of China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who stresses that counterterrorism is a “shared responsibility” based on the transnational threat it poses (The State Council, 2019d). In general, China’s dilemma with Uighur separatism and terrorism appears to fit within broad conceptualizations of transnational threats. Yet, this transnationalization is mainly instrumentalized to legitimate the more oppressive fight against Uighur separatism and the Uighur minority in general, as criticized by European actors. For instance, Chinese authorities repeatedly state that Uighurs most likely train in Afghanistan and that their terrorist campaigns are in line with Al-Qaida and the Taliban (Interview #17, 11-03-19). The broad conceptualization of terrorism enables a form of instrumentalization that allows China to go against its Uighur citizens that supposedly have the “propositions” to create “social panic” and insurgence. This instrumentalization is a central plank of criticism and seems to be one of the main barriers that make EU-China cooperation under the framework of the global war on terror impossible.

This refers to the different political values that are endangered by terrorism in the EU and China. A look at how terrorism is discussed in the European Parliament provides evidence that the European definition of terrorism is linked to democracy and human rights, as stated by a rapporteur during a parliamentary debate in 2005: “beating terrorism requires, firstly, a belief in the supremacy of democracy […] [as] terrorism is incompatible with democracy” (European

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Parliament, 2005b). Also the Directive 2017/541 that amends the main Council Decision on anti-terrorism, explicitly mentions that

“terrorism constitute[s] one of the most serious violations of the universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on which the Union is founded.” (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2017).

Very closely connected to the different scope terrorism in the Chinese and the European definition, is the question of institutional responsibility, referring to who is in charge of the decision-making process on counter-terrorism measures. According to one interviewee, the fact that the fight against terrorism is handled in different institutional bodies in the EU and China, shows that “a common willingness is not always enough, but also we need a common understanding of adequate response mechanisms” (Interview #27, 10-09-19). According to an expert, different political bodies in China are characterized by different degrees of protectionism and nationalism (Interview #30, 03-09-19) and discourses of legitimization play a crucial role for China’s foreign policy making. These discourses are constituted by economic performance and nationalism, of which the latter becomes apparent in the issue of terrorism. According to the same expert, all those policy fields, which are characterized by strong nationalism and need a higher degree of legitimization within China, are less prone to cooperation with external actors (Interview #24, 03-09-19; Interview #30, 03-09-19). Moreover, it is striking that China handles its fight against terrorism within its homeland security institutions. In addition, the PLA has intensified its strategic- and-operational-level command post training and troop training to gain more capacities and capabilities for MOOTW in counter- terrorism (The State Council, 2009). Under the umbrella of homeland security, China has established several coping institutions to deal with anti-terrorism. Shortly after 9/11, it created the National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group (NATCG) and the National Ministry of Public Security set up an anti-terrorism bureau in 2013 (CPC News, 2014).

The EU, in contrast, handles the fight against terrorism within its foreign and security policy. Even more, the fight against terrorism has been a key driver of the EU’s general development of a security profile as the EU formulates counterterrorism as a priority within both the External and Internal Security Strategies. In 2005, it adopted the EU counter-terrorism strategy to fight terrorism globally. The strategy circles around four main pillars: to prevent, to protect, to pursue and to respond to the international terrorist threat (Council of the European Union, 2005a).

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Table 11 sums up the framings of terrorism by the EU and China and compares them. Although for both, terrorism is a non-traditional security issue that is of high salience, their understanding of the scope of terrorism, relevant targets and the institutional responsibility to combat terrorism differ enormously.

The EU’s definition if terrorism China’s definition of terrorism

type of security non-traditional non-traditional issue

extent of high high salience

scope of narrow, specific broad definition

target domestic and transnational domestic

political values democracy and human rights, freedom, national sovereignty/territorial equality and solidarity integrity

institutional embedded in foreign and security embedded in homeland security policy responsibility policy

Table 11 Comparison of the EU's and China's definition of terrorism.

To conclude, the understanding of what constitutes terrorism differs significantly between the EU and China. The analysis suggests the difficulty of finding a common problem understanding as one of the most dominant obstacles to EU-China cooperation on anti-terrorism. For the EU, China’s instrumentalization of the narrative of the global war on terror for going against its Muslim minority in the XUAR clearly represents a no-go and seems to be one of the main barriers that make EU-China cooperation under the framework of the global war on terror impossible (Interview #25, 05-09-19; Interview #3, 26-02-19). The risks of giving away standards of human rights and the rule of law are too high in comparison to the risks to be gained when making compromises to cooperate with China on antiterrorism. Likewise, for China, cooperating with the EU on terrorism would mean an inclusion or adaptation of a European approach to human rights. Therefore, it seems to be easier to combat terrorism unilaterally or to reach out to other like-minded cooperation partners. As discussed above under

147 the geese of complex interdependence, sidelining with other autocrats give China the possibility to jointly combat terrorism and yet keep its own definition of it.

Moreover, the EU harshly criticize the broad scope of the Chinese terrorism definition, saying that “it is not okay what China does under the geese of anti-terrorism” (Interview #27, 10-09- 19) as it opens possibilities for extensive societal surveillance. This statement is also reflected in the 2019/2690(RSP) “European Parliament resolution on China, notably the situation of religious and ethnic minorities” (European Parliament, 2019b) that criticized that under the umbrella of fighting against terrorism, China has

“set up a sprawling state architecture of digital surveillance, ranging from predictive policing to the arbitrary, nationwide collection of biometric data in an environment devoid of privacy rights mass detention of ethnic Uighurs”.

Likewise, the Joint Statement On Human Rights Violations And Abuses In Xinjiang of 22 countries (among them 18 European countries) criticized China’s behavior in Xinjiang (UK Government, 2019). While some Western policy makers thought that the transnationalization of terrorism might be a fertile avenue through which to socialize China into prevailing international norms or conventions of countering terrorism, they were disappointed by this ongoing instrumentalization to tackle Uighur insurgency. As a former European policy maker made clear, the repetitive attempt of European stakeholders to convince China of so-called “European values” to foster cooperation on this issue, proved counterproductive, as the Chinese held their “Chinese values” in contra (Interview #23, 30-08-19).

This shows that a common willingness to combat terrorism is not enough. Instead, the analysis indicates very clearly the importance of a common problem understanding for the emergence of cooperation: “With the issue of terrorism, we see that a common willingness is not always enough, but also we need common understanding of adequate response mechanisms” (Interview #27, 10-09-19).

6.3.2. Mutual Perceptions

In this section, I discuss my expectation that a more positive perception of the respective other facilitates cooperation. In particular, I will examine whether the EU and China perceive each other as ‘friends’, ‘partners’, ‘necessary counterparts’, rivals’ or ‘enemies’ in the realm of anti- terrorism. I will begin with the EU’s perceptions of China and subsequently will analyze the Chinese perceptions of the EU. I conclude the subchapter with discussing the relationship 148 between changing perception and the increasing amount of security cooperation in search for covariation.

First and foremost, the analysis points towards the EU and China being rivals in the realm of anti-terrorism. Although their overall objectives align, which are to combat terrorism, under the surface they pursue highly contradicting aims. Indeed, when I asked the interviewees to voice their perception of the respective other in the security area of anti-terrorism, they frequently referred to a lack of trust or even growing mistrust in EU-China anti-terrorism relations (Interview #6, 28-02-19). In addition, the overall tone of voice, in which the European and Chinese interviewees talk about each other’s role in anti-terrorism, discloses that their perception of each other is not very friendly but rather characterizes as rival. Another piece of evidence is the EU heaping sharp criticism on China in its 2019 European Parliament resolution on the situation of the Uyghur in China (European Parliament, 2019) that leaves no doubt about the rival nature of EU-China anti-terrorism relations. A spiral of criticism seems to have emerged in which the EU criticizes China for how they handle the Uighur issue. As a reaction China criticizes the EU for criticizing China. As a result, they do not cooperate at all.

Besides this very obvious and overt mistrust and disapproval of how the respective other handles the fight against terrorism, the analysis reveals another interesting finding. There is evidence that the EU and China mutually perceive each other as not capable of combatting terrorism effectively. Many interviewees mention this perceived lack of capabilities as a major element that hinders the emergence of cooperation. On the Chinese side, there is a strong self- perception to be a weak, albeit rising, security actor, which does not yet possess the capabilities to combat terrorism outside of China and therefore has not only no interest to cooperate with the EU on combatting transnational terrorism in the Middle East but also lacks the capacity to do so (Interview #09, 04-03-19). This is one of many justifications, voiced by China, why the country focuses on the domestic element of terrorism. When I addressed this issue in interviews with European counterparts, this lack of capabilities in the counter-terrorism realm in China was confirmed. Moreover, one EU interviewee emphasized that for the EU the lacking Chinese capacities provide a major obstacle. Helping China to overcome these shortcomings would mean giving the country more capabilities in the military and police sector that could be used elsewhere, “so the question is, how far can we go without giving them too many capabilities?” (Interview #21, 18-03-19). This again reveals the high level of mistrust that exists in EU-China anti-terrorism relations. Yet, not only is the Chinese side aware of the limits of its actorness in counter-terrorism, also the European side acknowledges shortcomings (Interview #27, 10-09- 149

19). The EU has not yet played a significant role in supporting development to combat terrorism (Laakso, 2014). For instance, cooperation on counter-terrorism requires the exchange of information and personal data and thus entails intelligence collaboration (Interview #16, 07-03-19). Yet, the EU remains skeptical concerning the uncertainties that continue regarding the exchange of personal data and a prevailing lack of trust hinders the establishment of cooperation with China (Interview #31, 12-09-19).

6.4. Chapter Conclusion, Drivers Fit And Evaluation Of Evidence

Despite similar interests to combat terrorism, as proclaimed in national documents, the EU and China do not cooperate on anti-terrorism. The analysis has disclosed that huge differences prevail regarding the understanding of what constitutes terrorism. In particular the Chinese strong domestic focus and its interlinkage of terrorism with the Uighur Muslim minority hinder cooperation as this focus is to be incompatible with the EU’s definition of terrorism. Instead, the EU harshly criticizes China for how it treats the Uighurs. Accordingly it is not surprising that the EU and China perceive each other rather as rivals in the realm of anti-terrorism and doe not trust each other. With regard to economic interests, the analysis has shown that there is indeed an increased economic engagement of China in its neighborhood but also beyond, i.e. in insecure or unstable areas in Central Asia and the Middle East. This renders it necessary to engage more carefully and more actively with anti-terrorism measures. Yet, no particular economy-security nexus seems to exist in the field of anti-terrorism and economic interests do not result in cooperation with the EU. For the EU, on the other hand, the analysis has not revealed any evidence that particular economic interests are connected to the issue of anti- terrorism. Likewise, the EU and China are not bound in complex interdependence in the realm of anti-terrorism. Instead, cost-benefit calculations lead to unilateral behavior as well as to seeking other cooperation partners for the fight against terrorism that are more like-minded.

The following table sums up the results of the analysis with regards to the theoretical expectations. It gives a first towards which theoretical expectations could probe plausible, based on the results of this particular case. Yet, a complete probability probe will only be possible after having analyzed and compared all three cases.

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Theoretical expectation Result of the analysis

Expectation 3a: The stronger the complex interdependence between the EU and China in a security issue, the higher the amount of X not plausible security cooperation, due to cost-benefit calculations.

Expectation 3b: The more economic interests are at stake in a security issue, the higher the amount of security cooperation, X not plausible because the risk of economic losses is higher than the costs of cooperation. Expectation 4a: The more convergent a definition of a in a security issue, the more likely is security cooperation, because the EU and China do not rely on “self-help” or treat security as an individual ✓ plausible responsibility of each but identify with the other and seek common responses. Expectation 4b: The more positive mutual perceptions in a security issue, the more likely is security cooperation, because friends / partners tend to bound in alliances or deepen their overall ✓ plausible alignment, rivals or competitors pursue interactions that are more pragmatic while enemies might not interact at all or direct their actions towards harming the other.

Table 12 Evaluation of theoretical expectations, anti-terrorism.

In the case of anti-terrorism complex interdependence does not show significant explanatory value for non-cooperation. Despite the overarching complex interdependence between the EU and China on which I elaborated in chapter 5, the analysis did not show any evidence for interdependencies to be at play in the case of anti-terrorism. Instead, the EU and China base their strategic calculations and decisions on different rationales that result in unilateral actions, the establishment of other bilateral anti-terrorism alliances or the reliance on multilateral UN- led efforts to combat terrorism. Yet, I did not find any evidence either that the absence of complex interdependence actually led to non-cooperation. Accordingly, there might be a correlation between the absence of interdependence and non-cooperation but definitely no covariation. Hence, my expectation 3a that the higher the degree of complex interdependence

151 in a specific security realm, the more cooperation takes place does not seem to be plausible in the case of anti-terrorism.

It further became obvious that the EU and China seem to have a collective action problem (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1982) in a sense that despite similar interests, they lack the ability to create collective action and overcome their self-interests (Wendt, 1994; Olson, 1965). As the analysis of the strategic considerations of the EU and China has revealed, it is the most logical choice for both not to cooperate to keep the costs as low as possible. Applying the rules of individual rationality leads to a focus on the pursuit of own economic and security interests and the costs that cooperation would create are higher than the actual benefits. Especially China seems to be focused on national interests, as it declined many cooperation requests of the EU and tries to reach its favourable results without cooperation with the EU. The fact that China has behaved this way partly adds to the strategic considerations of the EU not to initiate cooperation in the first place, as they know that China will not accept the cooperation offer. One could argue that not to cooperate is the most rational form of behavior for the EU and China based on strategic economic and security considerations. Thus, my expectation 3b that the more economic interests are at stake, the more likely security cooperation emerges does not seem plausible either.

The analysis has further shown that the EU and China have a completely different understanding of the scope and degree, relevant actors and purposes of terrorism. While both consider terrorism a non-traditional security threat and attach high salience to the issue, their scope of definition of terrorism differs significantly. The EU’s definition is much more concrete while the Chinese definition is rather vague and includes propositions as an act of terrorism. This enables the PRC to connect the label of terrorism to the Uighur Muslim minority in Xinjiang as China considers terrorism mainly a domestic issue with a strong nationalist component that comes from the Uighur issue. Accordingly, it locates the fight against terrorism in its homeland security policy, while the EU primarily treats it as a foreign and security policy concern. Likewise, the EU and China name very different political values that they consider endangered through terrorism. For the EU this is democracy and human rights while for China mainly national sovereignty and territorial integrity are at stake. This divergent framing of terrorism and the difficulty to find common ground constitute one of the main obstacles for cooperation on anti-terrorism and have instead led to deepening frictions and rivalry. Thus, my expectation 4a that a convergent problem understanding of the security issue at stake can foster

152 security cooperation seems plausible, as the lack of a common problem definition hinder EU- China anti-terrorism cooperation.

In addition, the EU and China do not perceive each other as friends or partners in the realm of anti-terrorism. In contrast, there seems to be a significant lack of trust and even growing mistrust in EU-China terrorism relations that hinders the emergence of cooperation. Especially for the European side, the analysis has revealed that this lack of trust is closely connected to capabilities as cooperation with China would mean giving the country more capabilities in the military and police sector that could be used elsewhere. Similarly, terrorism cooperation would require the exchange of data and intelligence collaboration that requires a certain degree of trust. Accordingly, my expectation 4b that more positive perceptions facilitate security cooperation, because friends/partners tend to bound in alliances or deepen their overall alignment, while rivals or competitors pursue interactions that are more pragmatic while enemies might not interact at all or direct their actions towards harming the other, seems plausible.

As regards the interlinkages between the different independent variables, the analysis made clear why it is fruitful to combine constructivist and rationalist assumptions as part of the EU’s and China’s strategic and rationalist calculations whether to cooperate or not, are influenced by different framings of the issue at stake. If the framing was more convergent, this would probably alter their strategic calculations and change the costs assigned to security cooperation.

7. Sharing The Burden? EU-China Cooperation on Maritime Security/Anti-Piracy

This chapter assesses EU-China security relations with regard to maritime security, or more concrete, anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden, between the coasts of Yemen and Somalia. As the mapping has shown, the security issue of maritime security/anti-piracy is subject to all four forms of cooperation in EU-China relations (see figure 21). Not only do the two articulate the will to cooperate (1 instance of cooperation), they also created institutionalized dialogue formats (1 instance of cooperation), concluded formal agreements (1 instance of cooperation) and pursued joint actions (2 instances of cooperation) in the realm of anti-piracy. Since 2008, the EU and China are cooperating within the framework of the international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and carry out joint training sessions, escort missions and strategic planning until today.

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maritime 1 1 1 2 security/anti-piracy

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 instances of cooperation articulation of will to cooperate institutionalized formal agreement joint activity dialogue

Figure 21 Instances of cooperation on maritime security/anti-piracy. Own depiction.

The chapter consists of five main sections. The first section explains the strategic importance of the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden, where cooperation on anti-piracy between the EU and China takes place and provides background information on the EU’s and China’s stance towards maritime security/anti-piracy. It is followed by four sections that examine the key drivers towards cooperation on maritime security. I begin with shedding light on complex interdependence and economic interests and their impact on EU-China cooperation on maritime security/anti-piracy. Subsequently, I examine how the EU and China define maritime security/anti-piracy and whether this has an influence on the degree of cooperation that can be observed. Moreover, I analyse the role of mutual perceptions that the EU and China hold of each other in this specific security realm. The chapter resolves with an evaluation of the examined drivers and a discussion of the findings against the backdrop of the theoretical expectations.

7.1. Context

Few international sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are under such scrutiny as those that cross the Arabian Sea (Gurol and Shahmohammadi, 2019). The most crucial strategic hubs in the Arabian Sea that matter both for the EU and China are the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al- Mandab Strait Both SLOCs provide vital links to the trade routes between the Mediterranean and Asia. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that 4.8 million barrels of crude and petroleum products flowed through the Bab al-Mandab Strait in 2016 per day, with about 2.8 million barrels going north towards Europe, and another 2 million moving towards Asia (Lee, 2018; Cordesman, 2015). Likewise, more than 20.000 merchant ships frequent the Gulf of Aden every year, with a freight volume that accounts for about one-fifth of the world’s total sea cargo (Energy Information Administration, 2019). (see map, figure 22). 154

Figure 22 Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the Arabian Sea. Own depiction.

Besides, or perhaps because of its strategic trade location and meaning for global trade and shipping, the Gulf of Aden was the world’s area most frequented of pirates to attack merchant ships in the last two decades. Between 2005 and 2010, the number of attacks has started to increase significantly and in 2011, the number of incidents peaked, with 736 people and 32 ships held hostages (Winsor, 2015). This evoked international responses and more than a dozen nations sent their ships on anti-piracy missions to the Gulf of Aden. Some of them are participating in the Combined Task Forces (CTF) 150 and 151 under the multinational Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) framework (CMF, 2014) with UN mandate. The EU launched an own mission in 2008, the EU Naval Forces Operation Atalanta (European Union Council Secretariat, 2009; Council of the European Union, 2013) that operates in conjunction with the CTF 150 and 151 (Muratore, 2010).

7.2. Rationalist Explanations of EU-China Maritime Security Cooperation

I dive into the analysis by examining the theorized rationalist explanations of EU-China security cooperation on maritime security/anti-piracy. As introduced in chapter 3, I expect that the higher the degree of complex interdependence, the more security cooperation takes place

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(expectation 3a). Furthermore, I assume that a strong economic focus leads to security collaborating (expectation 3b).

The following analysis will be structured around these two components, complex interdependence and economic interests. In the first section, I will show that the need to share burden in order to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden is a significant factor that facilitates cooperation as the EU and China are bound in complex interdependence. Moreover, deriving from the strategic importance of the SLOCs to both actors’ trade flows, cooperation can be attributed to economic interests.

Interestingly, the analysis shows very clearly that the underlying rationales of China and the EU that lead to cooperation differ significantly in this security area. Although the outcome is the same (security cooperation), different objectives drive their behavior. For the Chinese side, two different rationales can be differentiated. These are: 1) meeting resource demands and securing an unimpeded flow of trade in strategically important SLOCS and 2) naval power projection, which includes training and testing their naval resources. For the EU the main aim is to share the burden to combat piracy and thereby increase the benefits while lowering the costs for all actors involved.

7.2.1. Complex Interdependence

In the case of maritime security/anti-piracy complex interdependence does not stem from bilateral trade relations in the overall EU-China relationship but rather from mutual dependence on unimpeded trade flows in the region under scrutiny, the Gulf of Aden. The majority of goods that circle between the EU and China are shipped through this highly important SLOC. The analysis reveals strong evidence that this dependence constitutes one of the main reasons for EU-China cooperation to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. I will first analyze how the EU reacts to this (inter)dependence, then shed light on the Chinese rationales for cooperation.

First and foremost, it becomes obvious that multiple channels of communication and interaction exist between the EU and China in the realm of maritime security/anti-piracy. Their joint presence in the Gulf of Aden dates back to 2008, when China’s PLAN conducted the first naval operation there, alongside the EU Atalanta mission. During the past two years, the Chinese Navy has held bilateral joint maritime training exercises with the navies of 14 countries, including Russia, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Pakistan, India and South

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Africa. China has also conducted different forms of multilateral joint maritime training exercises with pertinent countries, focusing on various tasks (The State Council, 2009). The EU and China are primarily cooperating within the context of the EU’s Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR Task Force 465), which was established in December 2008 by the EU Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP (European Council, 2008). Moreover, EU troops and Chinese PLA forces are conjoining under the CGPCS framework to defuse political tensions in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz, thereby mainly focusing on seaborne escorts of trade vessels through the Gulf of Aden (Gippner, 2016). The CGPCS is coordinated by the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) programme that seeks to organize the activities of all actors present in the Gulf of Aden, the NATO OCEAN SHIELD Operation, the US-led Coalition Maritime Forces (CMF), EU NAVFOR as well as independent deployers and the maritime industry (Gippner, 2016). From 2008 to 2017, the Chinese PLA dispatched 106 vessels and more than 28.00 officers and soldiers to escort more than 6700 Chinese and foreign ships (Xinhua, 2019a; Xinhua, 2019b). Between the EU and China more than 20 meetings and communications among fleet commanders have taken place in the same period (Xinhua, 2019b). In August 2019, the 33rd PLAN escort mission fleet was deployed to the region (Xinhua, 2019a). Even though the joint EU-China drills could seem negligible or tenuous in terms of cooperation, it has to be kept in mind that, the Chinese and the EU had navies never worked jointly before.

Within the overall cooperation architecture in EU-China relations, anti-piracy is discussed at the highest level, as indicated by the meeting of Xi Jinping and Van Rompuy in 2014, during which they talked about the benefits of military cooperation in the Gulf of Aden (European Council, 2014a). Joint efforts in this area are promoted mainly via the EU-China Dialogue on Security and Defense and the EU-China Dialogue on the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, in 2019, the EU and China held a first Experts’ Seminar on Maritime Security, which was organised by the Delegation of the European Union to China in partnership with China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS). Moreover, during their Blue Partnership Forum for the Oceans in 2019, they agreed to increase their efforts to improve international ocean governance and maritime security (European External Action Service, 2019b). Discussions also take place on ministerial level, during the High-Level Dialogue on Ocean Affairs.

Both Chinese and European sources suggested that EU-China antipiracy cooperation in the Gulf of Aden emerged mainly because of the clarity on how a joint antipiracy mission could benefit the EU and China. For the EU the main strategic objectives as regards the rationales behind its 157 cooperation with China within the framework of NAVFOR is to share the burden and to reduce the cost of combatting piracy alone. Moreover, maritime security issues reach beyond the scope of law enforcement activities of the EU’s CSDP operations and thus require multilateral action. This is also a key component in the EU’s recently published factsheet on Enhancing security cooperation in and with Asia (European External Action Service, 2019c) and stressed likewise in China’s White Papers of Defense. Accordingly, cooperation on the ground is understood to create a win-win situation through sharing the burden of combatting piracy (Interview #31, 12- 09-19). According to the interviewees, the argument of sharing the burden of combatting piracy through cooperating under the CGPCS framework is certainly the most important driver for the EU to cooperate with China. The following interview statement underlines this rationale.

“We asked the Chinese to escort a WTO vessel, so we were happy to share responsibility, also because our external actions when military costs are involved, are held by limited number of member states. (…) So, often burden-sharing is in the interest of the French and therefore, we started interacting with China on security and defence” (Interview #29, 11-09-19)

This notion is further stressed in the official EU Navfor press releases (EU Navfor, 2018). It is also reflected in European Parliament debates around safety at the Horn of Africa, where it says that to make “real progress in the creation of peace and security in this region”, the EU needs to coordinate “its support and actions […] with other countries, such as, for example, China” (European Parliament, 2007a). Similarly, piracy is understood as a “strategic-type threat; it is a shared challenge that requires collective action” (European Parliament, 2012a). In the same debate in the European Parliament, one representative stressed that through Atalanta, it is easier to establish such cooperative frameworks: “the partners working in cooperation with the EU – that is Russia, China and India – find it easier to work with the EU than they do with NATO” (European Parliament, 2012a) as this would involve the sharing of intelligence codes which is a sensitive military and political issue. The EU’s eagerness to cooperate with others is also reflected in official visits and cooperation agreements with European military officials and their counterparts in partnering countries. For instance, in 2017, Chinese officials hosted the EU NAVFOR commander on their Huang Gang frigate to exchange views on the ongoing antipiracy missions (European External Action Service, 2017b). Similar visits have taken place before (Liberation Army Daily, 2012).

For China, the organization of patrols and escorts was far more efficient and less cost-intense in cooperation with the EU than in unilateral efforts (Interview #21, 18-03-19). China’s navy is extremely vulnerable when it enters the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Thus, international 158 cooperation is necessary to address piracy. There is also evidence that the Chinese leadership is faced with internal and external pressure to cooperate on combatting piracy. As the legitimacy of the Chinese government rests on perceptions of how it handles security threats to national Chinese economic, environmental and human security, the decision to cooperate with the EU in the Gulf of Aden, was also driven by domestic pressure (Erickson and Strange, 2013). This also becomes obvious through the fact that China deployed the PLA to the region and decided to cooperate with Atalanta, only after increasing pressure on the Chinese government that sought to show its capability to protect Chinese vessels and citizens abroad and integrate into multilateral cooperation frameworks (Interview #9, 04-03-19). One specimen for this is the Chinese initiative to host an international conference to coordinate anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden in November 2009.

Besides that, the cooperation of China with the EU’s mission also expresses its budding role in countering piracy as evidence of the growing expeditionary character of the Chinese navy and the PLAN’s transition from a traditionally coastal defense navy to a global blue water navy (Gurol and Shahmohammadi, 2019). By joining the multilateral anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, China did not only show its willingness to cooperate internationally to obtain higher benefits. One Chinese interviewee also pointed out that the Chinese decision to work together with Atalanta was also due to the necessity of the poorly equipped and unexperienced Chinese navy (Interview #9, 04-03-19) (Liberation Army Daily, 2004). This interviewee called the Chinese behavior an “integration because of lack of own capabilities”. There was a significant gap between Chinese interests and needs and its influence in international maritime security, which was a driving factor in the initial phase of Chinese engagement with EU Atalanta. As a Chinese expert stated: “in the beginning, the main reason was necessity: China wanted to learn how to operate in piracy, how to tackle that problem, how to operate in deep seas” (Interview #14, 07-03-19). This is underlined by a report of Hu Jintao, issued at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 that emphasizes the need to “enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks” (Xinhua, 2012).

This fits within the overall approach of China to adapt its behavior as a global power that also has to deal with the challenge to secure international waterways of strategic importance (National Development and Reform Commission et al., 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2013). Thus, there is evidence that China’s participation in the EU’s Atalanta mission also seems to be driven by strategic considerations, such as training naval resources and image building (Interview #9, 04-03-19). Collective action on a low-risk 159 issue such as antipiracy could be an instrument for China to build confidence in great power relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014; Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 2017; CGTN, 2018). This purpose of image building was also mentioned by one interviewee, who pointed to the specific time of engagement of the Chinese PLAN, which he considered to be well planned. This interviewee stressed that China needed good international reputation because of the upcoming Beijing Olympics and was the only country in the UNSC that was so far not taking part in anti-piracy missions – but that was nevertheless expected from China as a responsible international power (Interview #9, 04-03-19). Therefore, China was happy to engage in a multilateral cooperation framework (Interview #14, 07-03-19) like the CGPCS or the monthly (SHADE) meetings in Bahrain. Being integrated into multilateral structures enabled the PLAN not only to gain experience, learn from more experienced navies but also served its image (Interview #9, 04-03- 19). Also China’s 2010 defence white paper suggests that Chinese officials were eager to cooperate with the EU (The State Council, 2011a). This is also reflected in a number of visits between Chinese and EU military officials.

Moreover, through being involved, Beijing increased its ability to lead new developments in maritime security in a direction that suits Chinese needs, thereby increasing its influence and tactical and operational knowledge. Yet, until today, the gap in experience prevails and influences the activities of the EU and China within the cooperation framework. While the EU sought to combat piracy proactively, the Chinese ships rather acted on demand, when a ship in danger called for help (Interview #9, 04-03-19). One interviewee suggested that although the rules of engagement of the PLA remain unknown, they were probably very conservative (Interview #9, 04-03-19), in terms of security national interests, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and departing from the policy of non-interference as little as possible.

To conclude, the analysis reveals that both the EU and China have strong interests in combatting piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Yet, China seems to be more dependent on the EU, based on the lack of training and experience of the PLA(N) and the resulting inability to combat piracy alone. Moreover, cooperation with the EU can be attributed to the necessity to cooperate in multilateral frameworks in order to project a more positive image of China. The EU, in contrast, is not necessarily dependent on China in this particular security issue. Instead, its cooperation with China derives from the overall necessity to create a multilateral framework to combat piracy. By cooperating with other international actors, the EU can share the burden of combatting piracy and thereby increase its benefits while lowering the costs. 160

7.2.2. Economic Interests

This section examines the expectation that security cooperation is facilitated if economic interests are at play or if a certain security threat endangers economic interests. As theorized before, national interests – although socially constructed through states and their citizens – can determine who joins which alliances (Finnemore, 1996) in the international system. Moreover, the configuration of state preferences (Moravcsik, 1997a) matter for the emergence of cooperation or conflict.

In general terms, the analysis leaves no doubt that the SLOCs passing through the Gulf of Aden are of high economic salience to both the EU and China. They provide vital links to the trade routes between the Mediterranean and Asia and are strategic choke points for the import of crude oil and petroleum. Every day several million barrels of these resources pass through the Gulf of Aden. Estimate 2.8. barrels make their way to Europe, which around 2 barrels travel eastbound to Asia. But not only for crude and petroleum trade, the Gulf of Aden is a strategic hub. Additionally, more than 20.000 merchant vessels pass through it annually, which renders it economically important to both China and the EU (Energy Information Administration, 2019). Speaking in terms of economic interests, it is thus of no doubt, that the Gulf of Aden is a crucial area for both of them.

Besides this rather obvious economic importance, the analysis indicates that the EU and China are vulnerable to possible economic damages than emanate from ongoing piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Because of its strategic trade location and significance for global trade and shipping, this SLOCS the majority of worldwide piracy attacks during the past two decades has taken place in the Gulf of Aden. The number of attacks escalated in 2011, after a sharp increase since 2005 (Winsor, 2015). In 2011, when piracy in the Gulf of Aden was at its peak, 739 seafarers were being held hostage and 32 ships, according to the European Commission (European Commission, n.d.). The global economic costs of these incidents are estimated to range up to 24,5 billion US-dollars per year. According to a report by the European Parliamentary Research Service, these evaluations include a broad variety of first order costs, such as ransom payments, insurance costs and military operations, as well as second order costs, such as the effects on fisheries, food security and tourism. In recent decades, shipping companies have started to circumnavigate piracy hot spots, making shipping routes longer and significantly increasing transport costs (Pichon and Pietsch, 2019).

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As of 2015, about 48 percent of the EU’s exports to third countries and around 53 percent of its imports were transported by sea, according to Eurostat (Eurostat, 2016). As of 2018, sea transport accounted for about more than a half of all goods traded by the EU, according to Eurostat (Eurostat, 2019a). More precisely, sea transport accounted for 47% of goods exported and 55% of goods imported. Comparing 2018 with 2002, sea thereby was the mode of transport for EU trade in goods that increased the most. Accordingly, a level playing field is a key factor to secure the EU’s economic interests and maritime security has become an increasing priority for the EU’s global strategy, as a report by the European Parliamentary Research Service points out (Pichon and Pietsch, 2019, p. 16). The report further elaborates on piracy as a threat to the EU’s economic interests, stating that “one decisive element to maintaining this level playing field is the openness of sea lanes for international trade. […] pirate gangs pose a significant source of insecurity for EU trade routes.” (Pichon and Pietsch, 2019, p. 16). Already in 2014, the European Commission had stated that in the very first sentence of its communication For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union maritime security strategy that “Europe’s maritime interests are fundamentally linked to the well-being, prosperity and security of its citizens and communities“ (European Commission, 2014). Also the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS), adopted in 2014 and its revised version of 2018 make this economy-security nexus very explicit, creating measures to ensure the economic gains connected to maritime trade (Council of the European Union, 2018). Hence, for the European side, piracy in the Gulf of Aden clearly endangers economic interests and prosperity.

For the Chinese side, the analysis reveals a comparable picture. Most of China’s economic needs are met through seaborne traffic. Thus, China is extremely vulnerable to disruptions of trade by pirate attacks. According to Chinese sources, 20 percent of Chinese ships sailing through the Gulf of Aden since 2008 faced pirate attacks of some kind (Dossi, 2015). Let alone in 2008, five Chinese ships were attacked: Tianyu 8, a fishing boat, the tanker Zhenhua 4, the cargo ship Dajian and two ships, which were registered in Hong Kong (Erickson and Strange, 2015). By disrupting trade and resource flows and destabilizing the crucial waterways in the Gulf of Aden, piracy affects China’s maritime commerce. This also becomes obvious in the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jinchao’s explanation: “Piracy has become a serious threat to shipping, trade and safety on the seas. (…) That’s why we decided to send naval ships to crack down” (The Guardian, 2008). In this regard, it has to be mentioned that the importance of the Middle East in general and the Gulf of Aden in particular have become of increased importance for China since the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative had started in 162

2013 (Interview #16, 07-03-19). To ensure and uninterrupted supply of economic, energy and military goods from the Middle East, China needs to secure the Gulf of Aden as one of its most strategic maritime-terrestrial supply chains (Interview #19, 14-03-19) as its increased investments in Africa and the Middle East have augmented the costs the PRC would face in case of an interruption of trade flows through piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden (Interview #14, 07-03-19).

Thus, even minor incidents in the Gulf of Aden carry the risk to badly harm China’s shipping in the straits and possible disruptions of its strategic oil cargo routes can have devastating economic consequences. This also becomes apparent in China’s 2019 Defense White Paper, in which the PRC emphasized the need to protect its “maritime rights and interests” (hǎiyáng quányì – 海洋权益) and to safeguard its “overseas interests” (kaigai rieki – 海外利益) (The State Council, 2019b). As a reaction, Chia has felt compelled to attach increasing importance to maritime security in order to protect its economic interests. This becomes very obvious in an article published by the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, stating that

„Traditionally, the Chinese navy's primary responsibility is coastal defense. But with rampant pirate hijacking activities along the Gulf of Aden, which threatened the economic interests of Chinese merchant vessels, the navy was called upon to safeguard maritime security.“ (Zhuo, 2019)

Similarly, China’s maritime strategy explicitly mentions a nexus between security and economy when it comes to maritime interests and puts protecting maritime rights and interests (wéihù hǎiyáng quányì – 维护海洋权益) to the forefront of the PLA(N)’s mission.

To conclude, many European and Chinese economic interests are at stake in the Gulf of Aden and piracy attacks can have devastating consequences for their respective economic wellbeing. Now what does that mean for EU-China cooperation on maritime security/anti-piracy? Did the economic interests and the obvious threats that piracy constituted to them actually foster cooperation?

In the first place, both Chinese and European sources put forward that the primary reason for cooperation is the clarity that a joint anti-piracy mission would economically benefit the EU and China in facilitating the actual cooperation on the ground and in combatting piracy (China Military Online, 2014a; European External Action Service, 2019d). Similarly, most interviewees put forwards that cooperation on combatting piracy in the Gulf of Aden mainly

163 emerged because of the one-dimensional non-complicated economical nature of the issue at stake. The costs – regarding effort and in economic terms – are considerably lower when they cooperate. One interviewee called this a “win-win situation” that is “purely interest-based” (Interview #31, 12-09-19). Likewise, many Chinese interviewees suggested the primary motivation to participate in international antipiracy efforts was to secure China’s main trade routes in the Gulf of Aden in the first place. These interests result in in the Indian Ocean, including the supply of military equipment for Chinese allies and building military bases and commercial ports, but also in increased bilateral cooperation. One interviewee mentioned that the increasing Chinese exposure to threats like piracy fostered China’s willingness to cooperate and explicitly stated that security cooperation is easier whenever it touches upon economic interests (Interview #3, 26-02-19). Another sign for that is that with the increasing Chinese investments along the MSR, cooperation has further increased with the rationale to secure economic investments (Interview #10, 05-03-19).

Especially for the Chinese side, the need to secure economic interests was the strongest driver towards cooperation with the EU because the PLA(N) quickly realized that it wasn’t able to protect Chinese vessels in the Gulf of Aden unilaterally. So far, China has had little experience in navigating its navy in blue waters, yet an increased interest in participating in maneuvers beyond their direct coastlines (China Military Online, 2014a). During joint training missions with Atalanta ships, the PLAN intended to increase its rapid reaction ability, far-seas deployment ability, replenishment and weapons supply as well as combat capabilities and joint war fighting skills (among others) (China Military Online, 2014b; China Military Online, 2014a; China Military Online, 2019). Through cooperation, China could assess European technologies and capabilities and learn how to modernize its maritime equipment (Interview #9, 04-03-19). But also for the EU, economic interests led to increased cooperation efforts. In 2012, the European Parliament stressed in a resolution that only by “increased coordination and cooperation among all international actors” securing the economically important SLOC in the Gulf of Aden would be possible (European Parliament, 2012b).

7.3. Constructivist Explanations of EU-China Maritime Security Cooperation

Having outlined the rationalist drivers towards EU-China cooperation on maritime security/anti-piracy, I now engage with constructivist explanations of their cooperation. In particular, I shed light on how the EU and China define maritime security/anti-piracy. I expect

164 cooperation to occur when the definition of the security issue under scrutiny is convergent (expectation 4a). Moreover, I assess the mutual perceptions of the EU and China in this particular security issue, expecting that the more positive they are, the more cooperation takes place (expectation 4b).

The analysis will touch upon two main findings. First, the EU and China seem to have a very clear an convergent definition of what constitutes piracy. This undoubtedly facilitates security cooperation. Moreover, they do not perceive each other as rivals or enemies in the realm of maritime security but rather as security partners that can and should work together. This positive perception further supports cooperation.

7.3.1. The EU’s and China’s Framing Of ‘Maritime Security’

I begin by comparing the EU’s and China’s understanding of maritime security/anti-piracy. I compare their respective definitions along the same categories as in the chapter on anti- terrorism (type of security issue, extent of salience, scope of definition, target, institutional responsibility and political values).

To begin with, both the EU and China formally adhere to the UN’s definition of piracy. According to the article 101 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), legally, acts of piracy include

“any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft (…) on the sea, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft (…) in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” (United Nations, 1982)

For both, piracy constitutes a non-traditional security threat. Already in 2004, the former Chinese foreign minister Hu Jintao mentioned the need for increased military operations other than war to tackle the rising non-traditional security threats. He considered antipiracy missions overseas to be a core component of Chinese foreign and security policy (Jintao, 2004). Likewise, China’s Defense White Paper of 2013 stressed that it is at the core of China’s foreign and security policy to “protect national maritime rights and interests and national security interests in outer space and cyber space” and that it is indispensable to sustain and secure China’s overseas interests (Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 2013). The

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2015 White Paper, titled China’s Military Strategy, went even further and promoted far-seas operations to secure China’s maritime interests. It states that

“with the growth of China’s national interests, its national security is more vulnerable to (…) piracy, and the security of overseas interests (and) strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), has become an imminent issue.” (The State Council, 2015)

This strong domestic component of the Chinese definition of piracy also becomes apparent in China’s White Paper on the Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (The State Council, 2013) that defines the key roles of the PLA overseas as the evacuation of Chinese nationals and the provision of security support for China’s interests overseas.

For the EU, maritime security is a key priority in its foreign and security policy and immanent to the EU as the world’s largest trading bloc and global security provider (European External Action Service, 2019d). In 2014, the EU adopted the EUMSS that fixates the EU’s maritime interests and seeks to advance concrete actions to ensure internal and external aspects of the EU’s maritime security (European External Action Service, 2017c). For the EU, anti-piracy constitutes a cross-cutting security threat that is discussed both in traditional terms under the framework of the EU’s defence policy, as well as non-traditionally on environmental and humanitarian grounds (Pichon and Pietsch, 2019). Moreover, the EUMSS frames anti-piracy as a transnational issue (European Parliament, 2013). Similarly, in debates in the European Parliament, piracy is framed as “organised crime that is happening at sea and on land” (European Parliament, 2012a). According to a Chinese expert, this European framing of piracy as a non-traditional and transnational security threat facilitates cooperation. He states that

“it is all about mutual trust. It makes it easier that neither traditional, national security is involved nor weapons, missiles or nuclear power.” (Interview #4, 26-02- 19).

Moreover, the EU and China have the same problem definition and unlike the case of terrorism, share a common understanding of the threat. To quote another Chinese expert, “in this area, the enemy is so clear, it is the pirates”, which makes it easier to agree upon adequate response mechanisms to tackle the issue (Interview #10, 05-03-19). Similarly, an EU expert underlines that the clear common threat of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden facilitates cooperation (Interview #25, 05-09-19). It also seems to play a crucial role that the defined problem does not have linkages to any form of (political) dogma and is (more or less) free of political values and does not touch upon religious or ideological issues (Interview#22, 18-03-19). Unlike acts of 166 terrorism, which are often subject to wider political or ideological agendas, pirates are mainly driven by economic factors. Consequently, counter-piracy measures do not touch upon ideological or political issues and do not require convergence on ideational interests. This makes fighting piracy jointly easier for the EU and China than fighting terrorism. This is largely reflect in the debates held in the European Parliament, which show the difficulty to establish cooperation with China on issues that touch upon values, norms or ideology. As regards the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden, it is neither possible nor needed for either side to “ideologize” the issue to legitimize it internally (Interview #12, 03-19). This makes the case of anti-piracy so different from the case of anti-terrorism, although both touch upon domestic interests of China.

In addition, both European and Chinese interviewees suggested that it is easier to cooperate in third countries and within a clearly defined territory, which does not touch upon European or Chinese territory and does not require action on either European or Chinese soil (see for example Interview #10, 05-03-19; Interview #16, 07-03-19). Similarly, it does not endanger specific political values like sovereignty or territorial integrity, especially because anti-piracy missions take place in international waters, beyond national boundaries. This is of importance especially for the Chinese because of the principle of non-interference and the unwillingness to accept foreign (-led) activities in areas of Chinese territory or interest. This is another aspect, in which the case of anti-piracy differs from anti-terrorism. Moreover, this argument can serve as an explanation, why cooperation on anti-piracy and maritime security in the Gulf of Aden is subject to EU-China cooperation while there are no cooperation efforts of the two actors in the South China Sea (Interview #31, 12-09-19).

Moreover, based on the economic importance of the Gulf of Aden, as described above, both the EU and China are vulnerable to piracy along the coasts of Yemen and Somalia and thus conceive the fight against piracy as an issue of relatively high salience. Yet, there are crucial differences as regards the degree of perceived vulnerability and salience. As voiced by the Chinese interviewees and supported by import and export data, for China, the SLOCs that cross the Gulf of Aden are vital to secure a continuous supply of economic, energy and military goods from the Middle East and Central Asia and to protect access to imported natural resources. This renders the vulnerability of China higher and thus increases the salience of anti-piracy measures for China (Interview). Similarly, many EU member states rely on seaborne transportation and the fisheries sector. According to the EUMSS, European energy security is highly dependent on the security of maritime infrastructure (European Union Maritime Security Strategy, 2014). 167

Table 13 sums up the framing of terrorism by the EU and China.

The EU’s definition of piracy China’s definition of piracy

type of security non-traditional non-traditional issue

extent of medium (indirect vulnerability) high (direct vulnerability) salience

scope of specific specific definition

target economic interests economic interests

political values / /

institutional foreign policy concern domestic security concern responsibility located within the EUMSS framework located within national PLA(N) missions n Table 13 Comparison of the EU's and China's definition of piracy.

It can be concluded that the EU and China have a very clear ang convergent understanding of maritime security/anti-piracy. As the analysis has shown, this principled and shared understanding has facilitated cooperation within the NAVFOR framework.

7.3.2. Mutual Perceptions

In general, the analysis reveals that for cooperation on anti-piracy, perceptions seem to play only a minor role. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there is evidence that China perceives the EU as a civilian power and therefore as a preferable collaboration partner in the realm of maritime security/anti-piracy. The EU’s normative foreign policy approach plays into China’s attempt to position itself as a responsible international power and to diversify its global security cooperation (Interview #19, 14-03-19). This is widely reflected in other researchers’ work on the Chinese participation in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden (Erickson and Strange, 2013). Moreover, as one interviewee mentioned China shares “extended trust” with the EU and therefore prefers to cooperate within the Atalanta framework instead of joining the NATO OCEAN SHIELD Operation or the US-led Coalition Maritime Force (Interview #19, 14-03-

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19). The EU itself seems to be well aware of this perception and of the underlying reason of the Chinese cooperation efforts. According to an interviewee “cooperating with the EU as a responsible global power promises returns and China needs it as a rising global power that wants to establish legitimacy on global stage” (Interview #26, 05-09-19).

The EU, in contrast, perceived China just as one of many cooperation partners with whom to address the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. It did not consider China as a partner of particular importance but as one among many (Interview #29, 11-09-19). This might stem from the fact that the EU initiated its NAVFOR mission without China in the first place and was therefore less dependent on cooperation than China, who joined the mission after failing in tackling the piracy-problem unilaterally.

7.4. Chapter Conclusion, Drivers Fit And Evaluation Of Evidence

In general, cooperation between the Chinese PLAN and EU Atalanta forces can be interpreted as a showcase of successful security cooperation in EU-China relations. The two actors have cooperated in the Gulf of Aden continuously since 2008. Their main aim is to defuse political tensions through seaborne escorts of trade vessels through this crucial SLOC and frequent patrol missions. The EU and China are mutually dependent on unimpeded trade flows in the of Aden, through which most goods that circle between the EU and China are shipped. The analysis reveals strong evidence that this dependence constitutes one of the main reasons for EU-China cooperation to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Besides, the analysis suggests a strong economy-security nexus as cooperation is framed as a “win-win situation” that is “purely interest-based”. Besides, it is very apparent that cooperation on anti-piracy was comparably easy to establish between the EU and China, as they have a common problem definition and could thus easily agree on adequate response mechanisms. In contrast, mutual perceptions did not seem to be of high explanatory value.

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The following table sums up the results of the analysis as regards the theoretical expectations.

Theoretical expectation Result of the analysis

Expectation 3a: The stronger the complex interdependence between the EU and China in security issue, the higher the amount ✓ plausible of security cooperation, due to cost-benefit calculations.

Expectation 3b: The more economic interests are at stake in security issue, the higher the amount of security cooperation, ✓ plausible because the risk of economic losses is higher than the costs of cooperation.

Expectation 4a: The more convergent a definition of a security issue, the more likely is security cooperation, because the EU and China do not rely on “self-help” or treat security as an individual ✓ plausible responsibility of each but identify with the other and seek common responses.

Expectation 4b: The more positive the perception of each other as a friend or partner in security issue, the more likely is security cooperation, because friends / partners tend to bound in alliances X not plausible or deepen their overall alignment, rivals or competitors pursue interactions that are more pragmatic while enemies might not interact at all or direct their actions towards harming the other.

Table 14 Evaluation of theoretical expectations, maritime security/anti-piracy.

The Gulf of Aden is a region of strategic economic importance to both the EU and China. With more than 20.000 merchant ships frequenting this waterway annually, any interruption of trade flows or any danger posed to the cargo vessels can create high economic damages for both actors. Hence, when it comes to cooperation on maritime security/anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden a strong economy-security nexus is at play, as the analysis has shown. Especially in the interviews the notion that cooperation was easy to establish because of the one-dimensional and non-complicated economical nature of this security issue, became very apparent. In short, one of the primary reasons for cooperation is the economic benefit that derives from unimpeded

170 trade flows through the Gulf of Aden, or, put differently, the damage to economic gains that can be avoided by combatting piracy. Hence, my theoretical expectation that the higher the economic interests at stake in a particular area of security the more cooperation occurs, seems plausible in the case of EU-China cooperation on maritime security/anti-piracy.

Deriving from these economic interlinkages, the EU and China are mutually dependent on unimpeded trade flows in the Gulf of Aden. Not only does a majority of trade that circles between them pass this strategic waterway. Securing this SLOC is only possibly through joint efforts. Accordingly, the EU and China are bound in complex interdependences when it comes to piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The analysis reveals strong evidence that this dependence has contributed to EU-China cooperation on this particular security issue. One of the main arguments for cooperation that can be extracted from written and oral sources is that burden- sharing functions as a key drivers towards cooperation. Thus, the EU and China realized that they can act complementary and profit from cooperation as it reduces the cost of engagement for both while increasing mutual benefits. Although the Chinese PLAN tried to solve the issue unilaterally in 2008/2009, it realized that combatting piracy is nothing that it can do without the support of others. Therefore, it integrated into the EU’s Atalanta mission. For the EU, on the other hand, sharing the burden with as many cooperation partners as possible reduces the costs involved in combatting piracy. As a key driver towards cooperation, strategic economic considerations can be named, as for both China and the EU the economic consequences of piracy would be fatal.

Yet, the EU and China react differently to this interdependence and the rules of engagement in combatting piracy differ. While the EU is focused on proactively combatting piracy to secure unimpeded trade flows, China similarly seeks to secure the Gulf of Aden as one its main oil- and product supply routes leading from the Middle East to Asia, but rather acts upon demand. Interestingly, China seems to be more vulnerable to the adverse effects of piracy. Moreover, it is in itself less capable of combatting piracy alone due to a lack of experience of the PLAN and worse equipment. Hence, China is actually more dependent upon the EU than vice versa and benefits more from cooperation. The analysis clearly reveals evidence that the strategic aim was to train the PLAN by being exposed to other navy systems and learning from them in joint training and patrol missions was a crucial driver towards cooperation on the Chinese side. To conclude, complex interdependencies seem to be of explanatory value. My expectation 3a that the higher the degree of complex interdependence between the EU and China in a certain security area, the more cooperation takes place, seems plausible.. 171

The analysis further put forwards that cooperation was comparably easy to establish between the EU and China because they quickly found a common problem definition and could easily agree on adequate response mechanisms. As one interviewee put it quite fittingly, ‘the enemy is so clear’. Their definition of what constitutes piracy and threatens maritime security converges on almost all compared parameters. First of all, the scope of their definitions is very specific. In general, both formally adhere to and underline the importance of the UNCLOS definition of piracy that frame it as “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft (…) on the sea, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft (…) in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” (United Nations, 1982). This leaves little doubt and sketches a very concrete scope of action for anti- piracy measures. Moreover, for both the EU and China, piracy is a non-traditional security threat that can harm the EU’s and Chinas economic interests, as the Gulf of Aden is a crucial SLOC. The analysis has further exhibited that anti-piracy is vastly free of political values and does not touch upon religious or ideological issues. In addition, both European and Chinese interviewees proposed that it is easier to cooperate in third countries and within a clearly defined territory, which does not touch upon European or Chinese territory and does not require action on either European or Chinese soil. This has further facilitated cooperation.

The only two parameters on which the comparison differs is the salience of anti-piracy to the EU and China and the institutional responsibility. Concerning the former, the analysis shows that the threats emanating from acts of piracy can harm China more, also based on its lacking capabilities to combat such threats alone and the poor equipment of the PLAN. Hence, the extent of salience is higher for China, based on direct vulnerability, than it is for the EU. As regards the institutional responsibility, it becomes apparent that the EU locates the fight against piracy within the scope of its EUMSS framework. For China, in contrast, maritime security/anti-piracy is a security concerns with a strong domestic component that is handled within national PLA(N) missions. Thus, my expectation 4a that the more convergent a definition of a specific security threat, the more likely is cooperation, seems plausible.

With regards to mutual perceptions as an explanatory driver, the analysis did not reveal significant importance. No doubt, the EU and China do perceive each other as partners when it comes to combatting piracy. However, this did not have a crucial impact on the emergence of cooperation and has proven to be of little meaning. Especially for the EU, the analysis suggests that it perceived China just as one of many cooperation partners with whom to address the 172 problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. It did not consider China as a partner of particular importance but as one among many. Thus, as regards my expectation 4b that positive perceptions lead to cooperation does not seem plausible in the case of maritime security/anti- piracy.

8. New Partners for the Planet? EU-China Climate/Energy Security Cooperation

This chapter assesses EU-China climate and energy security relations. This security issue could be framed as a flagship of EU-China cooperation (Energy Information Administration, 2019). As the mapping in chapter 5 has shown, climate and energy security is subject to all four forms of cooperation in EU-China relations (see figure 23). The figure displays, how often the different forms of cooperation are mentioned by the interviewees. Not only do the two articulate the will to cooperate (4 instances of cooperation), they also created institutionalized dialogue formats (5 instances of cooperation), concluded formal agreements (3 instances of cooperation) and pursued joint actions (2 instances of cooperation) in the realm of climate and energy. Cooperation takes place on bilateral level, between different EU-member states and China, on region-to-state level between the EU and China as well as in multilateral settings under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the UN Security Council and the G20 group.

climate/energy 4 5 3 2 security

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 instances of cooperation

articulation of will to cooperate institutionalized formal agreement joint activity dialogue

Figure 23 Number of mentions of forms of cooperation on climate/energy security. Own depiction.

The chapter has four main sections. The first section provides background information on climate/energy security in context of EU-China relations. The subsequent sections are dedicated to the analysis. Finally, I evaluate these drivers against the backdrop of my theoretical expectations and critically discuss the findings of the analysis.

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8.1. Context

While climate security implies that climate-related alterations create risks in society that endanger the security of human beings, ecosystems, economy and infrastructure, energy security is the association between the availability of energy resources of all kind and national security. It entails topics like diversification of oil and gas supplies, offshore oil and gas safety and critical infrastructure (European Commission, 2019b). While there has been a considerable amount of work on the politics of climate change and energy security as separate issues (Toke and Vezirgiannidou, 2013) sometimes measures to ensure climate security can contradict initiatives to ensure energy security (Chalvatzis and Hooper, 2009). Moreover, some scholars argue that both can be achieved through similar policies (Brown and Huntington, 2008). Climate security and energy security are both global concerns and energy accounts for around 60 percent of emissions globally. Thus, the two issues are closely related as tackling energy security concerns is crucial for climate mitigation. Another reason, why climate and energy security are analyzed together in the course of this dissertation is that in China, climate change matters and energy security concerns are inseparably linked (International Energy Agency, 2019; Wu et al., 2012). Moreover, both climate security and energy security feature prominently on the respective agendas of the EU and Chinas as well as on the agenda of EU- China relations (Holzer and Zhang, 2008). Due to their strong dependence on fossil energy supplies, the EU and China are vulnerable to energy security problems, and the large carbon footprint of their energy sectors (Espa, 2018).

Moreover, they are the biggest (China) and third biggest (EU) emitters of carbon dioxide (CO2) and account for around one third of all energy-related CO2-emissions worldwide (International Energy Agency, 2015; European Commission, 2016b). China is the world’s largest energy consumer since 2011, probably accounting for 22 percent of the global energy consumption in 2040, according to the BP Energy Outlook 2019 (BP Energy Economics, 2019). In addition, China has become the world’s largest emitter of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) in 2006, surpassing the emission levels of the US (Schreurs, 2016). By 2014, it made up for around 29.7 percent of global CO2-emissions (Torney and Gippner, 2018). According to the country’s latest carbon “inventory” submitted to the United Nations in 2019, China’s GHG emissions hit 12.3 billion tons in 2014, rising around 53,5 percent in just a decade (CNBC, 2019). With current policies, China’s greenhouse gas emissions are projected to rise until at least 2030 (Climate Action Tracker, 2019a). Despite China’s ambition to diversify its energy supplies, its overall energy

174 consumption is heavily dominated by coal, while renewable energy resources represent only a minor share of China’s total consumption (US Energy Information Administration, 2015). Coal combustion is therefore one of the main sources of pollution in China and the country is heavily dependent upon oil. In its hunger for energy, and ongoing demand for oil, China increasingly turns towards the Middle East, as its main national oil fields in Daqing, Shengli and Liaohe are drying up (Zhang, 1999).

Similarly, China has increased its oil imports from Iraq. For instance, in January 2018, Iraq revealed that it was constructing an oil refinery at the port of Fao on the Persian Gulf together with two Chinese companies and in June 2018, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil signed new contracts with two Chinese firms develop oil and gas blocks in Iraq (Xinhua News, 2018). Besides this strong dependence on oil and the overall resource scarcity, it is striking that China has recognized the economic potential of green technologies and is already dominating this branch, especially in comparison to the US (Lema and Lema, 2012). As of early 2017, China owned five of the world’s six largest solar-module manufacturing companies and the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturer (Slezak, 2017) and in 2019, China was the number one country investing in clean energy (in sum 83.4 billion US-dollars, in comparison to 55.5 billion US- dollars of investment in the US and 4.4 billion in Germany) (Statista, 2019).

Like China, the EU meets more than two thirds of its total energy consumption through fossil fuels (oil, natural gas and coal). In general, in the EU, energy consumption is constantly rising, according to Eurostat Statistics (Eurostat, 2019b), putting the EU further away from its 20 percent energy savings objective for 2020. Furthermore, it failed to provide financial support for the deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) demonstration plants as planned in 2007. Many experts argue that such technologies would be needed to supply coal-dependent developing nations like India or China with clean energy (Bo et al., 2016).29 On the other hand, the EU reduced its GHG emissions by 22 percent by 2017, compared with 1990 levels, putting the EU closer to its 2020 target to reduce GHG emissions by 20 percent by 2020 and 40 percent by 2030 compared with 1990 (Eurostat, 2019c). Yet, the Climate Action Tracker considers this target as “insufficient” and expects the EU to put forward a revised and more ambitious 2030 NDC target in 2020 (Climate Action Tracker, 2019b).

29 Yet, it has to be mentioned that CCS is a highly controversial topic in Europe. Experts are divided over the advantages and disadvantages. This discussion cannot be deepened in the course of this chapter. For further information see (Volkart et al., 2013; Bouvart et al., 2011; Corsten et al., 2013; von Stechow et al., 2011; Bruhn et al., 2016). 175

In general, within the overall EU-China cooperation framework, the issue of climate and energy security is discussed at a node between bilateralism and multilateralism. On the one hand, there are several bilateral agreements between the EU and China. On the other hand, both are pivotal members of the multilateral climate system of the UNFCCC, especially since the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement (PA) in 2017. Moreover, climate and energy security is a concern that is discussed within the UN Security Council and the G20 group. However, the EU and China have often been on opposing sides in UN-led international negotiations on climate and energy. For instance, in the run-up to the Kyoto-Protocol, EU- China cooperation seemed to become a stepping-stone to overcome the tensions between the global North and South. Yet, China’s reluctance to commit to the reduction of GHG emissions interrupted the beginning North-South rapprochement (Dai and Diao, 2011). Likewise, the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen in 2009 challenged emerging cooperation between the EU and China, as parties failed to conclude a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. In Copenhagen, the EU and China found themselves on opposing sides of the negotiation table, as China sidelined with the BASIC countries, a coalition of the four emerging economics Brazil, South Africa, India and China (Groen et al., 2012). This changed at the 2015 COP in Paris, which marks a milestone in international climate governance and resulted in the conclusion of the PA. This success partly resulted from closer ties between China and the US hand and the EU and China (Schreurs, 2016). Although this did not put EU-China contradiction to a complete hold, it set forth more cooperation on climate and energy. When the US administration under Donald Trump announced the plan to withdraw from the PA in 2017, this tendency intensified. An immediate reaction to this declaration was the attempt of China, the EU and Canada to build a new coalition to salvage the agreement (European Commission, 2018).

8.2. Rationalist Explanations of EU-China Climate/Energy Security Cooperation

But what are the driving dynamics that lead to EU-China climate/energy security cooperation? Taking these background information as a starting point, I now dive into possible explanations for EU-China cooperation on climate/energy security. In a first step I analyze the degree of complex interdependence between EU and China in the realm of climate/energy security. Afterwards I assess the impact of economic interests on the amount of climate/energy security cooperation.

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The analysis leaves little doubt about what drives EU-China cooperation on this particular security issue from a rationalist vantage point. In particular, four main findings are striking and will be discussed in detail. First and foremost, the EU and China are interdependent when it comes to climate and energy security and seem to be well aware of the fact that they cannot tackle this security issue without the respective other. Most of the strategic considerations that the analysis extracts circle around the necessity to jointly address climate and energy security concerns. Moreover a strong economy-security nexus becomes apparent. Yet, the latter has ambivalent consequences for the amount of cooperation between the EU and China. On the one hand, economic incentives are certainly a push-factor for cooperation. On the other hand, especially when it comes to the economic prize of mitigating climate and energy security concerns and financing measures to combat them, the EU and China become entangled in competition.

8.2.1. Complex Interdependence

As indicated in chapter 3, I expect that the higher the degree of complex interdependence between the EU and China in the security issue under scrutiny, the more security cooperation takes place. When I analyzed the increase of EU-China security cooperation over time in chapter 5, the analysis has already revealed that the EU and China are particularly interdependent on issues of global governance of which climate/energy security is certainly one. In the following I shed light on whether and how complex interdepence contributes to EU- China cooperation on climate/energy security.

To begin with, the analysis clearly shows that for both sides, the gains to be achieved through cooperation are higher than the costs. As mentioned before, the levels of perceived “sensitivity” and “vulnerability” to the consequences of climate change and energy scarcity vary, with important consequences for their approaches to cooperation. Yet, both sides perceive a rising degree of interdependence, and the interviews reveal a strong notion of “having no other choice” than to cooperate with the other. Almost all interviewees framed EU-China climate/energy security cooperation as being driven by the “urgency/necessity” to cooperate (see for example Interview #10, 05-03-19; Interview #11, 06-03-19), which is also the key argument of the joint EU-China Leaders' Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy (European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2018). This became even stronger when the US announced its withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement, this drastically changed the constellation of the remaining relevant signatories, and rose the vulnerability of the EU and China to the effects of 177 climate change but also its responsibility to combat it as two of the largest emitters (Climate Change News, 2018). To reach the goals of the Paris Agreement and to keep the rise of the global average temperature below 2°C or even 1,5°C above pre-industrial level, quick and determined action is necessary. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report published in October 2018, international efforts are ever more urgent to reach these goals and mitigate the adversative effects of climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). Thus, as a matter of global concern, the aspect or sharing the burden to combat it seems to be a strong driver towards cooperation (Interview #29, 11-09-19).

Moreover, it is relatively easy for the EU to engage with China on climate/energy security because it touches upon the “narrowly defined” Chinese national interests (Interview #29, 11- 09-19). Whenever cooperation promises to serve these interests, China seems to be willing to engage with the EU, to increase benefits and decrease costs through burden-sharing. In the case of climate/energy security this is facilitated not only by the increased Chinese vulnerability to climate issues due to its growing economy and increasing dependence on energy resources from the Middle East, but also by the notion that climate deterioration and energy scarcity are global challenges, which have an impact inside China but are dealt with outside of China (Interview #30, 12-09-19).

Furthermore, the increasing interdependence between the EU and China, which rose with the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement in 2017, facilitates EU-China cooperation on climate and energy (Interview #10, 05-03-1). In this regard, the 2018 statement can be understood as a response to the US’s announced withdrawal from the PA, since it is an appendix to the declaration of the 2018 EU-China summit, but was already drafted in 2017, when a joint declaration fell through due to trade issues. The 2018 version was published with only minor changes. Passages such as “they call on all Parties to uphold the PA” and the expressed support for “global free trade” and a “multilateral rule-based system” can be read as a response to the US (European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2018). Thus, the US’s withdrawal created a window of opportunity for the EU and China to fill the resulting vacuum and readjust their behavior. A leading Chinese academic emphasized that before 2018, cooperation with the US was a key pillar of China’s climate policy, while after the US’s withdrawal the EU took over the role of the US as a leader in that field, but in a different way, seeking to share the burden of leadership with China (Interview #10, 05-03-19). In a similar vein, the 2019 EU strategic outlook on China underlines the necessity of EU-China cooperation on climate change, stressing the need “to continue developing a strong relationship” and that the “partnership is 178 essential for the success of global climate action” (European Commission, 2019a). At the same time, however, the EU critically notes that China is investing in coal energy production in many countries (European Commission, 2019a) (Interview #28, 10-09-19) and explicitly formulates the expectation in its Strategic Outlook that China should peak its emissions before 2030, departing from earlier policy papers on China in terms of clear language (European Commission, 2019a).

Besides this, multiple communications channels exist between the EU and China in the realm of climate/energy security. Bilateral discussion between the EU and China on climate and energy security issues take place on all levels, even governmental, encompassing institutionalized dialogue formats on ministerial level and high-level working groups (Torney, 2015; Torney and Gippner, 2018). On governmental level, climate and energy security issues are mostly discussed within the dialogue format of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Environment on the EU’s side and the Chinese State Environmental Protection Administration (Bo et al., 2016).

Under the Economic and Sectoral Dialogue, the main cooperation on climate change takes place within the framework of the EU-China Climate Change Partnership. This Partnership contains a Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on Climate Change to ensure regular follow-up meetings (Yan and Torney, 2016) as well as a climate change rolling plan, which is regularly updated by mutual agreements (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2006b). The BCM was upgraded to the ministerial level in 2010. Other important fora to discuss climate and energy security issues are the Energy Working Group, the Environment Policy Dialogue, the Water Platform Dialogue, the Urbanization Dialogue and the Dialogue on Development. Moreover, additional dialogue formats exist to discuss rather specific topics under the broader environmental policy framework. Examples are the China-EU River Basin Management Programme RBMP (2006-2012), the EU-China Biodiversity Programme (2005- 2010), the EU-China Bilateral Cooperation Mechanism on Forests (launched in 2009), or the Sustainable Urbanisation Partnership (launched in 2012).

In addition to ongoing dialogues on ministerial level, the EU and China have established a number of bilateral cooperation projects, with the overall aim of capacity building on national and local level with respect to climate and energy security policy making (Torney and Gippner, 2018). Flagship projects among these are cooperation on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is supposed to support China’s transition to a sustainable economy (EuropeAid,

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2010), a project on near-zero emission coal (launched in 2005) or the EU-China Environmental Sustainability Programme (launched in 2012). Furthermore, several negotiated cooperation agreements came out of bilateral discussions, like the EU-China Joint Declaration on Energy Security (2005b), the Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy (2018) and the Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Emissions Trading (2018), just to name some examples. Recent policy papers and joint declarations of the EU and China frequently mention the issue of climate and energy security. Environmental policies in general, seem to play a crucial role in their overall relationship. In sum, the EU-China bilateral partnership changed from one between a development aid donor (the EU) to its recipient (China) towards a cooperative partnership on equal terms (Europe-China Clean Energy Centre, 2015).

To sum it up, from a rationalist point of view, EU-China climate/energy security relations would characterize as a “positive sum game” (Robert Powell, 1991; Moravcsik, 1997a; Keohane and Martin, 1995) increasing the prosperity and gains on both sides. Thus, not cooperating would harm both sides. Yet, that does not imply that conflict or competition does not exist. Quite the reverse, it is remarkable that both sides acknowledge that their so far cooperative relationship on climate and energy security can turn into competition in the trade realm (Interview #31, 12- 09-19). Increasing imbalances of energy supply and demand as well as current geopolitical tensions around energy could lead to increasing energy competition between the EU and China or could turn them into rivals when competing to secure access to key energy resources around the world. In other words, the same dependence and urgency that facilitates EU-China cooperation on climate and energy security could affect trade relations between the EU and China in the field of energy. Yet, the EU and China focus more on the benefits that can be gained from cooperation to reach burden sharing and jointly tackle a problem of global concern (Interview #10, 05-03-19; Interview#24, 03-09-19).

8.2.2. Economic Interests

Besides the impact of complex interdependence, economic consideration can facilitate cooperation. Interest-based explanations of international cooperation denote that cooperation is an outcome that occurs as a result of strategic considerations of the involved actors that weigh the costs and benefits of each choice of action. For such considerations economic benefits play an important role (Coleman, 1970; Walter W. Powell, 1991). Hence, I theorized in chapter 3 that security cooperation is most likely to emerge when it either serves economic interests or prevents economic losses. 180

The analysis reveals a considerable impact of economic considerations on the emergence of EU-China climate/energy security cooperation. In general, it shows that there is a strong nexus between economy and climate and energy, based on the fact that climate deterioration and energy scarcity can have devastating impacts on economic development. The articles 2.3. and 3.14. of the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFFF in article 4.8. therefore clearly emphasize the importance of taking economic drivers into the equation.

That this is necessary becomes especially apparent for China, whose rapid economic development has come at devastating costs for climate/energy security. Climate/energy threats to China’s national wellbeing have a substantial impact on its economic and social development. In its 13th Five Year Plan (National Development and Reform Commission, 2019), the Chinese leadership announced an annual economic growth rate of up to 7 percent. Yet, it also acknowledges that China’s economic wellbeing is directly vulnerable to the consequences of the deterioration of the climate and the scarcity of energy resources. Over the past decades, China’s economy was heavily dependent on fossil fuels for decades, especially domestic coal, and saw a rapid growth of energy use and related CO2 emissions until 2010. According to the country’s latest carbon “inventory” submitted to the United Nations in 2019, China’s GHG emissions hit 12.3 billion tons in 2014, rising around 53,5 percent in just a decade (CNBC, 2019).

Moreover, despite efforts to diversify Chinese energy supplies, coal still heavily dominates China’s overall energy consumption. Thus, it is not surprising that the US Energy Information Administration names coal combustion as one of the main sources of pollution in China and therefore a main threat to China’s economy. Thus, one crucial Chinese rationale to seek cooperation with the EU on address issues of climate/energy security is a domestic one – to ensure the Chinese well-being and prosperity. Hence, it becomes obvious that the Chinese leadership has accepted that the resource intensity of its current economy is all but sustainable- Thus, it has started encouraging growth driven by efficiency gains, technological innovation, and renewable energy, responding to weaknesses in the ‘old’ economic growth model.

Furthermore, there is evidence for an increasing “economization” of climate and energy security on behalf of China, which leads to increased cooperation efforts to push forward the development of new technological devices to combat climate change. The analysis suggests that making its economic growth model more sustainable has become a major concern of the Chinese government. Further, the concept of a low-carbon economy contains important

181 elements of a model that is more promising to the party elite, as it also offers international symbolic recognition. As a an EU interviewee rightly points to, China has recognized the economic potential of green technologies and is already dominating this branch, especially in comparison to the US (Interview #26, 09-09-19). As of early 2017, China owned five of the world’s six largest solar-module manufacturing companies and the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturer (Slezak, 2017) and in 2019, China was the number one country investing in clean energy (in sum 83.4 billion US-dollars, in comparison to 55.5 billion US-dollars of investment in the US and 4.4 billion in Germany) (Statista, 2019). Thereby, China has developed into a key participant in negotiations on trade liberalization of environmental technologies and services. Thus, there is evidence for political-economic reasons, driving cooperation with the EU on the Chinese side.

A similar development can be observed for the EU, albeit on a smaller scale. Due to its strong dependence on fossil energy supplies, the EU is highly vulnerable to energy security problems, and the large carbon footprint of its energy sector. More than two thirds of the overall EU energy consumption is met through fossil fuels (oil, natural gas and coal). As the EU’s energy consumption is constantly rising, according to Eurostat Statistics (Eurostat, 2019b), putting the EU further away from its 20 percent energy savings, economic risks are constantly growing. Thus, diversifying sources, suppliers and import routes and further developing cooperation and dialogues on energy security ranks high on the EU’s agenda (Council of the European Union, 2015b).

A strong economy-security nexus does not automatically imply that economic interests or concerns actually lead to EU-China cooperation on climate/energy security. Having outlined the economic concerns attached to climate/energy security for the EU and China respectively, I conclude this chapter by briefly discussing, whether there is evidence for covariation with the high amount of EU-China cooperation on this very issue. First and foremost, there is considerable evidence that economic rationales not only drive the respective unilateral European and Chinese activities in the climate/energy security realm but indeed foster their cooperation.

One clear indicator for this covariation can be found in the EU-China Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy. In this document, both sides explicitly state the objective to “achieve sustainable, secure and competitive economies”, indicating that “tackling climate change and reforming [the] energy systems are significant drivers of […] economic growth”

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(European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2018, p. 2). The economy-security nexus further becomes obvious through the leaders’ proclamation that EU-China collaboration on climate/energy security shall also be part of the economic pillar of their relationship. An interview partner further explained that in the realm of climate/energy security EU-China cooperation takes place because of this particular economy-security nexus (Interview#25, 05- 09-19).

Moreover, the interviews further indicate that especially for China, the economic rationale drives its cooperation with the EU. As cooperating on climate/energy security serves its national economic interests, China seems to be willing to engage with the EU in order to increase benefits and decrease costs through burden-sharing. In the case of climate/energy security this is facilitated not only by the increased Chinese vulnerability to climate issues due to its growing economy and increasing dependence on energy resources from the Middle East, but also by the notion that climate and energy security issues are global challenges that no state can tackle alone (Interview #30, 12-09-19).

8.3. Constructivist Explanations of EU-China Climate/Energy Security Cooperation

The following two sections engage with constructivist explanations of EU-China climate/energy security. I examine whether it is plausible that the EU and China cooperate on mitigating the adverse effects of climate deterioration and energy scarcity because they share a similar problem understanding or definition of what constitutes climate/energy security (expectation 4a). I assume that the more convergent the definition of climate/energy security, they more cooperation takes place. Such similar understanding makes it easier to agree on adequate response mechanisms. I further shed light on the mutual perceptions that the EU and China hold of each other in the realm of climate/energy security. I contend that the more positive these mutual perceptions are, the more security cooperation takes place (expectation 4b).

Two findings shall be discussed in particular. First and foremost, the analysis makes very clear that that the EU and China share a similar problem understanding of climate/energy security. Agreeing upon what constitutes climate and energy security in its scope and degree, as regards the main target of climate/energy security threats and concerning adequate response mechanisms does indeed foster security cooperation. Moreover, the perception of each other in

183 this security area is certainly positive. The EU and China consider each other to be partners with regard this security issue, despite prevailing differences. In addition to the convergent framing of climate/energy security, this functions as a second significant driver towards cooperation.

8.3.1. The EU’s and China’s Understanding Of ‘Climate/Energy Security’

As climate and energy security cooperation is considered to be the flagship of EU-China security cooperation, it can be expected that the EU and China have a convergent problem understanding of climate and energy security issues as well as common ideas of adequate measures that are needed to collectively deal with the problem. In the following section, I examine the plausibility of this expectation and compare the EU’s and China’s problem understanding of climate and energy security along the same criteria as in the other two cases (type of security issue, extent of salience, scope of definition, target, institutional responsibility and political values).

First of all, the analysis clearly reveals that both the EU and China consider climate and energy security as a non-traditional security issue, which is transnational in scope and cannot be tackled unilaterally but requires joint action (Interview #10, 05-03-19; Interview #26, 05-09-19; Interview #25, 05-19-19). Moreover, both connect climate and energy security to global governance and stress the importance of multilateralism in coping with climate change and energy scarcity (European External Action Service, 2018b; Europe-China Clean Energy Centre, 2015; European Parliament, 2005c).

For the EU, climate and energy security is a non-traditional security threat that has risen in importance and salience over the past decades (European Union, 2003). The EU’s perception of climate and energy as security concerns evolved since 2003. While the European Security Strategy (2003) already entails both aspects but does not include them into the key threats, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008) considers both issues as key security challenges for the EU. Following this report, many Council conclusions, and joint declarations between the European Commission and the European External Action Service have framed security concerns as one of the main underlying rationales for enhancing the EU’s climate diplomacy since then (Council of the European Union, 2011; Council of the European Union, 2013; European External Action Service and European Commission, 2011). Likewise, the EU’s Global Strategy of 2016 lists “climate change” and “energy insecurity” under the 184 heading of “the security of our Union” and stresses that these issues are security threats that “endanger our people and territory” (European Commission, 2016c, p. 9). In 2009, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council contended that “climate change and its international security implications are part of the EU’s wider agenda for climate, energy and the CFSP, and therefore central to the endeavors of the EU” (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 1).

Moreover, both issues were among the top priorities of the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, for his 2015-2019 term (Bo et al., 2016). Furthermore, climate and energy security plays into the EU’s overall interests of prosperity, sustainable development and worldwide stability, as mentioned by an interviewee (Interview #30, 12-09- 19). The salience of climate and energy security issues for the EU is high, as it imports more than 50 percent of its overall energy consumption (Eurostat, 2019d). The EU is highly dependent on fossil energy supplies and meets more than two third of its total energy consumption through fossil fuels (oil, natural gas and coal). As its energy consumption is constantly rising (Eurostat, 2019b), the EU is increasingly vulnerable to energy security problems, and the large carbon footprint of its energy sectors. Thus, diversifying sources, suppliers and import routes and further developing cooperation and dialogues on energy security ranks high on the EU’s agenda (Council of the European Union, 2015b).

As regards the institutional responsibility, climate and energy security are embedded in the EU’s foreign and security policy, as they form a central part of the European Security Strategy of 2003. Likewise, energy security is a key pillar of the European Green Deal that was proposed in 2019 (European Commission, 2019c)and constitutes a crucial component within the Green Deal’s roadmap to resources efficiency, biodiversity restoration and decrease of pollution. Accordingly, the EEAS has the task to develop diplomatic strategies within the realm of climate and energy security and to integrate climate and energy security into the EU’s foreign policy strategies. Moreover, climate and energy security issues is discussed within the Commission’s Directorate-General for Environment. And the EU Global Strategy Report “Year 2: a year of action to address ‘predictable unpredictability’” mentions climate and energy security as a “cross cutting” challenge that interlinks internal and external security policies of the EU (European External Action Service, 2018b).

China’s problem understanding of climate and energy issues as security concerns has evolved since around 2007 while climate change has primarily been perceived as a development issue

185 beforehand.30 The first time that China linked climate and energy concerns to security was in its White Paper of Defense in 2008, which mentions climate and energy security along with other new nontraditional security issues as rising threats (The State Council 2009). This framing of climate and energy security concerns as threats to China’s national wellbeing went along with a rising vulnerability of China to the adverse effects of climate change, which have substantial impact on its economic and social development. Interestingly, China frames climate and energy security as closely related to national security concerns, in the 2008 White Paper of Defense, affirming that it touches upon food security, water security, ecological security and other concerns of national dimension such as human security and public health concerns. Likewise, the 2010 White Paper of Defense states that “non-traditional security concerns, such as […] energy, resources, […] are on the rise” (The State Council, 2011a). Similarly, Premier Li Keqiang announced a national “war on pollution” (Reuters, 2014), following the sharp decrease of China’s environmental standards and a rising number of environmental problems. Thus, although China recognizes the international dimension of climate change and is part of the UNFCCC framework, climate and energy security is located in its homeland security (Bo et al., 2016). Beyond that, China handles climate and energy security within the institutional responsibility of the National Energy Administration (NEA) and one of its implementation bodies, the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND).

Yet, China engages actively in multilateral fora on climate and energy security and has taken more responsibility for the mitigation of the adverse effects of climate change after the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, sidelining with the EU on reaching the PA goals. Moreover, climate and energy security issues are closely connected to the CCP’s legitimization, which reveals a strong domestic dimension of climate and environmental issues (Interview #28, 10-09-19). The 2008 and 2009 White Papers of Defense also reveal this. Moreover, there is evidence that climate and energy security are framed under the narrative of alleviation of poverty in China and is used to stabilize the power of the CPP and to grant it internal legitimacy. Locating climate and energy within the context of national power politics makes China more open for cooperation with others on climate issues, both bilaterally and in the multilateral arena (Interview #24, 03-09-19; Interview #25, 05-19). As regards energy security, China considers itself the primary player, leading the way for the EU in terms of cooperation (Interview #11,

30 This picks up the debate between climate security and energy security and shows that in the Chinese case, both issues are intrinkably connected to each other, as discussed in the literature (Bo et al., 2016). 186

06-03-19). Its energy security concerns are fed by worries or resources scarcity and the necessity to diversify energy sources to decrease China’s dependency on fossil fuels (The State Council, 2012). Energy security touches upon questions of legitimacy within China. According to a leading scholar on Chinese foreign policy, energy concerns increase the internal pressure on the Chinese government and pollution is now a very serious issue (Interview #10, 05-03-19).

As mentioned before, the EU and China both adhere to the UNFCCC, within which they are pivotal actors. This becomes obvious in many statements the EU and China issue on climate and energy security as well as in the interviews with European and Chinese policy experts. For instance, in the document announcing the launch of an EU-China Partnership on Climate Change, one of the mentioned aims is to support the UN-led process and “strengthen (…) dialogue on climate change policies and exchange views on key issues in the climate change negotiations” (Council of the European Union, 2005b). Likewise, the EU and China stress in their 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation that they have a “common responsibility for advancing global development” (European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2013), emphasizing the necessity of joint action. In a similar vein, the 2019 EU strategic outlook on China underlines the necessity of EU-China cooperation on climate change, stressing the need “to continue developing a strong relationship” and underlining that the “partnership is essential for the success of global climate action” (European Commission, 2019a). However, at the same time, the EU critically notes that China keeps investing in coal energy production, which contradicts many joint activities and undermines mitigation efforts. Consequently, it demands that China should peak its emissions before 2030 (Interview #14, 10-09-19; Interview #16, 12- 09-19). This alludes to the possibility that a common framing does not necessarily cause common understanding of adequate response mechanisms.

Moreover, the joint documents and interviews reveal different principles, which support this converging understanding. The EU primarily emphasizes multilateralism and the importance of rules- and institution-based international cooperation and frequently mentions the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the PA as a basis for cooperation. Other international institutions and fora, including the G20, are evoked as platforms for climate cooperation. Thereby it becomes evident that the EU considers climate and energy matters as an issue that shall mainly be addressed in multilateral fora. A sign for that is that EU policy papers and declarations repeatedly mention “multilateralism”, for instance in 2018: “The PA is proof that with shared political will and mutual trust, multilateralism can succeed in building fair and effective solutions to the most critical global problems of our time” (European Union and People’s 187

Republic of China, 2018). Similarly, Chinese sources make reference to multilateral fora quite often. This shows that China has accepted the EU’s understanding of international cooperation in the course of its interaction with the EU. Yet, there are also differences that prevail, especially when it comes to the distribution of responsibility to mitigate climate change, which shows that some issues of climate and energy security are handled domestically by China. For example, China often refers to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. According to a China-EU expert, this reflects that China perceives its responsibilities as an emerging economy as different from the EU (Interview #9, 18-03-19). Here we see how China refers to itself as a developing country, as it does not accept the same responsibility as the EU (and which implies a different willingness to accept the economic burden of mitigating climate change).

Table 15 sums up how the EU and China frame climate and energy security and compares their understandings.

The EU’s definition of climate/energy China’s definition of security climate/energy security

type of security non-traditional non-traditional issue issue of global concern issue of global concern

extent of high (direct vulnerability due to high (direct vulnerability due to salience dependence) dependence)

scope of specific specific definition

target economic interests economic interests

political values / /

institutional Embedded in foreign and security policy; Embedded in homeland security responsibility cross-cutting between internal and policy external polices

Table 15 Comparison of the EU's and China's definition of climate/energy security.

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While the overall understanding of the issue seems to converge, both locate the issue at different places in their policy-making apparatus. China frames climate and energy security as a global problem, yet it embeds adequate response mechanisms to it in its homeland security policy, treating it as an issue of domestic concern. In contrast, the EU embeds climate and energy security in its overall foreign and security apparatus, emphasizing the transnational scope of the issue. Accordingly, the EU is more likely to discuss climate and energy topics in multilateral fora and bilateral cooperation dialogues, a vast degree of China’s climate and energy security policy is made at domestic level and in domestic fora, before taking it to the multilateral level.

With regard to the consequences of this overall convergent framing of climate/energy security for the amount of cooperation between the EU and China, the analysis has indicated two different trajectories.

On the one hand, the common problem understanding and the repeatedly emphasized common responsibility that the EU and China perceive has contributed to cooperation (European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2013). This is not only stressed in the interviewees but also in the key documents issued by both sides. For instance, the 2019 Strategic Outlook of the EU accentuates that climate/energy security is one of the issue on which the EU and China share a similar understanding and can develop a strong partnership. Such collaboration is further highlighted to be “ essential for the success of global climate action” (European Commission, 2019a).

On the other hand, the EU and China diverge over the adequate response mechanisms to combat climate and energy security threats. These divergences persist especially when it comes to the economic and financial costs connected to the mitigation of climate and energy concerns. The analysis denotes that China plays a somewhat ambivalent role in this regard, trying to balance climate and energy security and economic development. In particular the fact that China pursued a strategy of pick-and-choose when it comes to presenting itself in the realm of climate and energy security either as a global and responsible power or as a developing power underlines this. This ambivalent role will also become apparent when analyzing the EU’s and China’s mutual perceptions in the following section.

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8.3.2. Mutual Perceptions

Besides a similar understanding of climate/energy security as a matter of global governance and global responsibility, mutual perceptions contribute vastly to EU-China climate energy security cooperation. As theorized, the more positive the mutual perceptions, the more security cooperation is expected. The following section analyzes the plausibility of this expectation.

Indeed, when I asked the interviewees to voice their perception of the other in the area of climate and energy security, they frequently referred to the respective other as a ‘partner’ (see for example Interview #29, 11-01-19) or considered the EU and China as new ‘joint leaders’ in combatting climate change and energy scarcity (Interview #11, 06-03-19). Three thought- provoking aspects can be identified. The first is the EU’s perception as a bridge-builder in international climate governance and its now more pragmatic approach towards climate/energy cooperation partnerships. The second is China’s new perception as a more responsible great power that also seeks to be acknowledged as such by other major powers and cares about the image it projects internationally. And the third is the mutual perception the EU and China of each other as necessary counterparts in climate/energy security.

The EU has always been a key player in setting up the UNFCCC (1992) and the negotiation of the Kyoto-Protocol (1997) in the earlier years of international climate politics (Oberthür and Groen, 2017). It further made a substantial effort to save the Kyoto Protocol and supported its entry into force in 2005, eight years after the international community had signed it. However, the 2009 COP negotiations in Copenhagen utterly challenged the EU’s leadership in climate diplomacy. Until then, the EU leadership style had been exceedingly normative or ideational and the EU strategy had been based upon a combination of ‘leading by example’, i.e. unilateral reduction pledges and climate policies, and the promotion of norms vis-à-vis third parties. Yet, during the failed negotiations for a successor to the Kyoto protocol, the EU had been sidestepped by the US, and the BASIC coalition of the four emerging powers Brazil, South Africa, India, and China. Falling behind its ambitious expectations, the EU came out considerably weakened from the Copenhagen negotiations, which had an extensive impact on its self-perception that was challenged by the emerging gap between leadership ambition and negotiation reality.

Cooperation with China emerged strongly, when the EU shifted its self-perception after this incident. In the literature this is commonly described as a shift from a leader to a “leadiator”, a combination of leadership and mediation that made the EU take a more pragmatic approach 190 towards climate and energy and towards teaming up with others on combatting climate change (Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013; Groen et al., 2012). There is a strong notion on the EU side that climate and energy security is an issue, which it cannot deal with alone so that normative differences and ideological tensions need to be put asides to reach the common goal of combatting climate change. This becomes obvious in the European Parliament, in which climate and energy security is discussed as a “fresh momentum in the wider international process in which the EU plays such a crucial role. China and India […] are particularly important partners for the EU in tackling climate change” (European Parliament, 2005c). Despite its relative success in negotiating the PA, the EU is still struggling to be a leading actor in international climate politics and feels the urge to cooperate with others. This became clear during the 2017 COP in Bonn, where the EU failed to step up its own climate action and did not manage to resolve conflicts over equity concerns. This changed when in the run-up to the Katowice COP in 2018, the EU sidelined with China to adopt a rulebook on climate cooperation, clearly showing the necessity to work together.

China’s increased efforts in mitigating climate change derive vastly from its position as a more responsible great power in international politics. For a long time, China has shown a “weak power” face, considering itself a developing country, which claims a right to development and economic growth, reinforcing the dominant narratives of developing countries in the UNFCCC system. From this perspective, the US, Europe, Japan, Australia and other highly developed countries have the historical responsibility for climate change and should provide financial support for mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries. Thereby China refers to the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), a concept written down in the 1992 Framework Convention. China was one of the major players establishing this principle and reiterating it in UNFCCC negotiations, while the EU initially accepted it as a means to release pressure from developing countries, but also expected that developing countries eventually have to cut emissions in the future. Therefore, China denied having an active role in climate change and resisted any demands for emission reductions for a long time, even though both China’s economy and GHG emissions have increased rapidly. This led to tensions between China’s internal position on its global obligations and the external expectations of the international community, as observed by an EU interviewee (Interview #8, 15-03-19). This is also reflected in discussions in the European Parliament, in which China is accused of failing to “stand shoulder to shoulder” with the EU (European Parliament, 2008).

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This has changed and China is now pursuing a more proactive stance. Although in general, China displays more characteristics of leadership, China pursues a political strategy of pick- and-choose when it comes to displaying itself as a developing or a great power. One interviewee stated that we see “political tactics at play” in China’s choice of climate policies due to a multiplicity of political realities, which China faces (Interview #5, 06-03-19). However, during the negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement, China sidelined with the US and the EU for the first time, displaying leader characteristics in international climate governance. Why was that the case? According to the interviews, foreign pressure on China increased, mainly due to the dissonance between China’s fast-growing economy and its low level of accountability when it comes to mitigation efforts (Interview #8, 14-03-19). Further, internal pressure to participate more actively in climate change mitigation and to transform the country into a resource-efficient economic power independent of financial aid, increased, as observed by a Chinese academic (Interview #4, 05-03-19). This goal is also recorded in China’s 13th Five Year Plan on Energy Development, issued by the NEA in January 2016 (National Development and Reform Commission, 2016a) as well as by the Renewable Energy Five-Year Plan (National Development and Reform Commission, 2016b). And at the 19th National Congress of the CPC, Xi Jinping stressed the aim to “build an energy sector that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient for China and the vision of ecological civilization” (Jingping, 2017). To meet internal and external pressure and to pursue national interests, China began taking a more proactive stance towards climate change.

One may argue that China’s aim to be perceived as a regional hegemon has paved the way towards more possibilities for cooperation (Interview #3, 14-03-19), as China is reaching out to conclude new bilateral partnerships to demonstrate its increased responsibility (National Development and Reform Commission, 2016b; Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China, 2017; National Development and Reform Commission, 2017). Furthermore, China has proven that it is willing to take adequate responsibility matching its economic power, when the US announced its withdrawal from the PA. China used this as a window of opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to become a major power in global climate governance (European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2018). However, the strategic pick-and-choose of policies continues and becomes obvious during the 2017 and 2018 COPs in Bonn and Katowice. During the 2017 COP, China fell back to old habits to adapt the dominant narrative of other developing countries like the group of Like-Minded Developing Countries on Climate Change (LMDC) and the G77 group, claiming more financial support to implement the PA. Thereby, China failed to continue its proactive behavior exhibited in 2015, 192 when the country announced to spend around 3 billion dollars for climate finance in the context of the South-South Climate Cooperation Fund. During the 2018 COP in Katowice, in contrast, China flagged openness to following uniform climate change rules and thereby deviated from supporting a clear division of responsibilities for rich and poor countries (Climate Change News, 2018).

These changing perceptions of the EU and China contributed to the emergence of a cooperative partnership on climate/energy security. The EU considers itself as an ambitious leader, trying to get other countries on board with a strategy of “leading by example” (European Parliament, 2007b): “so in in this way we shall show that we practice what we preach and we shall persuade them to follow in a global agreement”. In contrast, a Chinese policy expert described China as an emerging economy claiming a “right to develop” and consequently a right for further emissions (Interview #6, 07-03-19). Nevertheless, both actors started a bilateral partnership on climate cooperation in 2005 publishing a joint Declaration on Climate Change. Several statements, declarations, and cooperation programs followed. In 2005, the EU and China launched their Partnership on Climate Change, formulating concrete cooperation objectives. One of the aims is to support the UN-led process and “strengthen (…) dialogue on climate change policies and exchange views on key issues in the climate change negotiations” (Council of the European Union, 2005b), but the main objective is technical cooperation and knowledge exchange on issues like energy efficiency, and low-carbon and renewable energy technologies. This shows the connection between climate change, energy policies, and energy security in EU- China relations.

Furthermore, this focus implies that energy security, i.e. the secured supply of cheap and ‘clean’ energy to serve economic demands and create economic benefits from technology innovations, might be equally important or even supersede motivations to curb climate change. The 2012 Joint Declaration on Energy Security reiterates the importance of this topic for EU-China cooperation and mentions climate change as a concomitant for energy security (European Commission and People’s Republic of China, 2012). Newer documents are broader with regard to climate change matters. The 2015 joint statement published before the Paris COP, and the 2018 statement reflect more general issues discussed in the international climate system, i.e. mitigation and emission reduction options, adaptation measures or climate finance for third (developing) countries among others (European Commission and People’s Republic of China, 2015; European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2018). However, some issues prevalent since the first cooperation steps, are still visible in recent publications, for instance the emphasis 193 on economic arguments for EU-China climate cooperation, on market mechanisms (especially emissions trading), as well as on energy security.

Over time, normative considerations, an increased importance attached to climate change, and a higher awareness of the critical position of China and the EU become apparent. In 2013, the EU-China Strategic Agenda highlighted “a common responsibility for advancing global development”, and in 2014, during a discussion in the European Parliament a representative stated that “with the recent climate change commitments of the US and China, we are no longer alone. Now is the time to find a truly global solution to a truly global problem” (European Parliament, 2014). The 2015 declaration that followed the EU-China summit recognizes the EU’s and China’s “critical roles in combating global climate change, one of the greatest threats facing humanity” (European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2015). It marks a clear point of departure from earlier statements, and the language of the 2018 EU-China Leaders' Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy further emphasizes this development (European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2018). This statement expresses the severity and urgency of climate change, frames the responsibility to solve the issue as a common one, and underlines the significance of the PA, which it calls “an historic achievement”. Furthermore, the document emphasizes the commitment of the two parties, stating that “the EU and China are committed to show firm determination” and the parties “underline their highest political commitment to the effective implementation of the PA in all its aspects” (European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2018).

8.4. Chapter Conclusion, Drivers Fit And Evaluation Of Evidence

EU-China cooperation on climate/energy security has developed from cooperation on energy and technology issues to a partnership at eye-level that aims at shaping global climate politics. This reflects the understanding of the EU and China that they are in a critical position in the international system and shows their leadership ambition and willingness (Interview #9, 18-03- 19). Moreover, EU-China cooperation on climate/energy security has shown to be the most profound among all three security issues that were subject to the empirical examination. The analysis has revealed that a similar understanding of climate and energy security, positive perceptions of each other as a ‘partner’ in the realm of climate and energy security as well as complex interdependence between the EU and China have contributed to cooperation.

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Moreover, to some extent economic considerations have facilitated cooperation, albeit to a lesser extent.

Hence, all four theoretical expectation seem plausible for the case of EU-China cooperation on climate/energy security. The following table sums up the results of the analysis as regards the theoretical expectations.

Theoretical expectation Result of the analysis

Expectation 3a: The stronger the complex interdependence between the EU and China in a security issue, the higher the ✓ plausible amount of security cooperation, due to cost-benefit calculations.

Expectation 3b: The more economic interests are at stake in a security issue, the higher the amount of security cooperation, ✓ plausible because the risk of economic losses is higher than the costs of cooperation.

Expectation 4a: The more convergent the definition of a security issue, the more likely is security cooperation, because the EU and China do not rely on “self-help” or treat security as an individual ✓ plausible responsibility of each but identify with the other and seek common responses.

Expectation 4b: The more positive mutual perceptions in a security issue, the more likely is security cooperation, because friends/partners tend to bound in alliances or deepen their overall ✓ plausible alignment, rivals or competitors pursue interactions that are more pragmatic while enemies might not interact at all or direct their actions towards harming the other.

Table 16 Evaluation of theoretical expectations, climate/energy security.

With climate/energy security being an issue of global concern and global governance, the EU and China are bound in complex interdependencies when it comes to tackling security concerns emanating from this issue. The analysis revealed a strong awareness of the fact that this security

195 issue cannot be addressed unilaterally. As two of the largest global energy players, the EU and China face similar strategic and practical challenges that renders cooperation fruitful. Moreover, they are both increasingly dependent on imports of fossil fuels. This, in turn, makes them more vulnerable to the effects of climate change and energy scarcity. Furthermore, sharing the burden to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change and diversify energy sources in order not to suffer from energy scarcity seems to be a strong rationale for cooperation. Both sides perceive a rising degree of interdependence, and the interviews reveal a strong notion of ‘having no other choice’ than to cooperate with the other.

As the analysis has shown, cooperation on climate/energy security is driven significantly by the ‘urgency’ or ‘necessity’ to cooperate. This argument is supported by the interviews (see for example Interview #10, 05-03-19; Interview #11, 06-03-19), and the EU-China Leaders' Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy. Another crucial aspect that has contributed vastly to the interdependence between the EU and China in the realm of climate/energy security is the announced US withdrawal from the PA. There is considerable evidence that this has increased the vulnerability of both the EU and China to the effects of climate change but also their responsibility to combat it as two of the largest emitters. This has contributed to the emergence and strengthening of cooperation on climate/energy security concerns. The costs of non-cooperation would be unbearably high as both sides consider climate and energy security an issue that no state can deal with on its own. Thus, we do not see a problem of divergent understanding and a cost-benefit calculation that suggests either side not to choose cooperation, like in the case of anti-terrorism but rather a cost-benefit calculation that renders cooperation the most rational choice for both sides. Therefore, my expectation 3b that cooperation is higher when the benefits of cooperation exceed the costs, seems plausible for both actors in the case of climate/energy security. It can therefore be concluded that in the case of climate/energy security my expectation 3a that the stronger the complex interdependence between the EU and China, the higher the amount of security cooperation, seems reasonable.

In the case of climate/energy security a strong economy-security nexus is at play. This implies that economic interests/considerations drive the EU’s and China’s actions in this security area and contribute to the emergence of cooperation. Not only does the leaders’ statement proclaim that EU-China collaboration on climate/energy security shall also be part of the economic pillar of their relationship, thereby emphasizing the economy-security nexus. Also, the economic consequences of a deteriorating climate and increasing energy scarcity to their respective economic and social developments are perfectly obvious to both actors. Moreover, the analysis 196 reveals evidence for an ‘economization’ of climate/energy security concerns in a sense that in particular China capitalizes on the development of new techniques to combat climate/energy security issues. In seeking cooperation with the EU the Chinese leadership promotes these new developments. Hence, it has recognized the economic potential of green technologies and is already dominating this branch, especially in comparison to the US. Hence, my theoretical expectation 3b, contending that the more economic interests are at stake, the higher the amount of security cooperation, seems plausible for the case of EU-China cooperation on climate/energy security.

The analysis further revealed that the EU and China have a common understanding of the issue under scrutiny and face similar threats emanating from a deteriorating climate and a shrinking amount of fossil fuels, of which both are highly dependent. The definition of climate/energy security converges on all compared issues but on one: both locate the issue at different places in their policy-making apparatus. China frames climate and energy security as a global problem, yet it embeds adequate response mechanisms to it in its homeland security policy, treating it as an issue of domestic concern. In contrast, the EU embeds climate and energy security in its overall foreign and security apparatus, emphasizing the transnational scope of the issue. Accordingly, the EU is more likely to discuss climate and energy topics in multilateral fora and bilateral cooperation dialogues, a vast degree of China’s climate and energy security policy is made at domestic level and in domestic fora, before taking it to the multilateral level. Beyond this aspect, their definitions of climate/energy security are convergent which has made cooperation on this particular issue a sight easier. Accordingly, my theoretical expectation 4a that the more convergent the understanding of a specific security issue the more likely security cooperation occurs seems plausible for the case of climate/energy security.

Furthermore, changing perceptions have proved to play a supporting role for the emergence of EU-China climate and energy security cooperation. The interviews and the official statements of the EU and China have shown that changing perceptions of the EU and China in international climate governance contributed to the emergence of a cooperative partnership on climate/energy security. For a long time, the EU and China were competitors in the international climate system but now perceive each other as ‘partners’. Especially, since the announced US withdrawal from the PA the notion of being ‘necessary counterparts’ has augmented. Thus, my expectation 4b that positive perceptions lead to cooperation seems plausible for the case of climate/energy security.

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Interestingly, although the issue of climate and energy security is the most profound with regard to the amount of cooperation between the EU and China, it also seems to be the most ambivalent. Although the EU and China are fully aware of the threats posed by a deteriorating climate and growing energy scarcity, their climate and energy security relations are not only characterized by deep(ening) cooperation but also by persisting divergences on bilateral and multilateral level. Accordingly, beyond these drivers that have contributed to cooperation, the analysis suggests an interesting factor that leads to competition in the overall EU-China climate/energy security relationship. When it comes to financing mitigation measures, there is a distributional conflict between the EU and China, as China seems to be very hesitant to shoulder the financial burden of combatting climate change and takes refuge in the narrative of being a still developing country that has a right to develop. They agree upon the necessity to combat climate change, secure, and diversify their energy supplies. Yet, they sometimes have contrasting opinions about the adequate response mechanisms and differ with regard to the question who should shoulder the costs for mitigating climate change. While the EU considers this a cost item that should be distributed equally, China continues to claim common but differentiated responsibilities and attaches a domestic notion to climate and energy security. Thus, there might not be a conflict of interest but indeed a conflict of distribution, albeit on small scale. Hence, it is necessary to keep in mind Keohane’s and Nye’s proclamation that complex interdependences can lead to cooperation but in the same instance also evoke competition on the very same matter.

9. Comparison Of Findings Across Security Issues

Before moving on to the general conclusion about the development of EU-China security relations, it is commendable to compare the findings from the three case studies to evaluate the different components of the theorized causal mechanisms. The three cases of anti-terrorism, maritime security/anti-piracy and climate/energy security display great diversity with regard to the different Chinese and European rationales behind security cooperation. This diversity notwithstanding they paint a clear picture of the main drivers towards EU-China security cooperation. It becomes obvious that the concurrence of several factors significantly influenced their decision to cooperate or not.

After the analyses of each of the security issues, in the previous chapter I have already given a hint towards possible plausibility of the different theoretical expectations, by summing up the explanatory value of each of the theorized drivers towards security cooperation. In the following

198 section, I will systematically compare these drivers. Moreover, I will examine the plausibility of the theoretical expectations formulated in chapter 4.

9.1. Plausibility Probe: What Drives EU-China Security Cooperation?

I want to dive into this chapter by briefly summing up the findings across the different cases as extracted during the analysis, differentiated into the different theorized drivers towards security cooperation. The first four columns show the theorized drivers that were expected to lead to EU-China security cooperation. ‘-‘ implies that a theorized driver was not present, ‘o’ means that it was present but not strong and ‘+’ means that the driver was present and has proved to be of high explanatory value. The column’ cooperation’ displays the different amounts of cooperation as introduced in chapter 4, when discussing my case selection technique.

complex economic convergent positive mutual cooperation interdependence interests understanding perceptions

anti-terrorism - - - - -

maritime security/anti- o + + o + piracy

climate/energy + + + + ++ security

Table 17 Summary of the findings across cases.

Departing from these findings, I will now systematically discuss the plausibility of my theoretical expectations.

Theoretical expectation 3a: Complex interdependence

My theoretical expectation 3a states that the higher the degree of complex interdependencies in a particular case, the more security cooperation takes place. It is expected that being bound in complex interdependencies increases the costs of non-cooperation and simultaneously lowers the costs of cooperation. Hence, the EU and China are supposed to choose cooperation over non-cooperation if complex interdependencies are strong. The empirical evidence partly supports this theoretical expectation.

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The analysis clearly indicates that complex interdependencies create a notion of ‘having no other choice but to cooperate’. In the cases of maritime security/anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and climate/energy security the EU and China are clearly dependent upon each other and cooperation creates situations of win-win, lowering the costs and increasing the benefits for both. As one interviewee rightly summed it up, most cooperation between the EU and China takes place “where the necessity is strongest and where there is interdependence” (Interview #13, 07-03-19). Of all three cases, this does most strongly play out in with regard to climate/energy security. The analysis revealed high interdependencies between the EU and China in this security field and a strong awareness of those. As two of the largest global energy players, the EU and China face similar strategic and practical challenges that renders cooperation fruitful. Moreover, they are both increasingly dependent on imports of fossil fuels. This, in turn, makes them more vulnerable to the effects of climate change and energy scarcity. Sharing the burden to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change and diversify energy sources in order not to suffer from energy scarcity seems to be a strong rationale for cooperation that derives from complex interdependencies. Similarly, the case of maritime security/anti- piracy indicates that securing the strategically important SLOCs in the Gulf of Aden is only possibly through joint efforts. The analysis reveals strong evidence that this mutual dependence has contributed to EU-China cooperation on this particular security issue. One of the main arguments for cooperation that can be extracted from written and oral sources is that burden- sharing functions as a key drivers towards cooperation as it decreases the costs involved in combatting piracy.

Two striking aspects with regard to complex interdependencies deserve a closer look. First, the analysis has shown that the EU and China react somewhat differently to this interdependence and have coordinated their cooperation in a way that makes their respective actions complement to each other. While the EU focuses on proactively combatting piracy flows, China rather acts upon demand. Second and even more interesting is that China seems to be more vulnerable to the adverse effects of piracy and therefore more dependent upon the EU than vice versa.

Only the case of anti-terrorism contradicts the theoretical expectation 3a. Although anti- terrorism constitutes a transnational threat that equally affects the EU and China and although the overall degree of complex interdependencies between the EU and China has increased over time (see chapter 6.2.1.) no cooperation takes place. Two important factors come into play and need to be explained in order to understand these dynamics. First, both the EU and China are not able to tackle the issue of terrorism unilaterally. Yet, there are other cooperation partners 200 that come along with lower costs regarding the compromise that joint actions would require. For instance, China stretches out to different countries in the Middle East for bilateral partnerships (e.g. Egypt and Saudi-Arabia) and the SCO for multilateral cooperation. Similarly, the EU strongly refers to anti-terrorism cooperation within the UN framework and similarly seeks bilateral cooperation with Middle Eastern countries. Hence, the complex interdependencies that are undoubtedly existing do not lead to security cooperation in this case, because other factors influence the strategic considerations of the EU and China more strongly.

To conclude, EU-China security cooperation is partly fostered through complex interdependencies. The amount of cooperation depends on the degree of complex interdependence the EU and China are bound within. Hence, the analysis of the three cases partly supports my theoretical expectation 3a.

Theoretical expectation 3b: Economic interests

Complex interdependencies are just one factor suggested by liberal institutionalism to explain international cooperation. When opting for cooperation, the EU and China are not only driven by complex interdependencies but also take into consideration economic factors like economic interests or threats to those. Following this logic, my theoretical expectation 3b states that the more economic interests are at stake in a particular case, the more security cooperation takes place.

The insights from the analysis concerning this expectations are in tendency supportive. The analysis of the three cases and the amount of EU-China security cooperation indicates that the extent to which economic interests are at stake influences whether and how strongly the EU and China engage in cooperation. Economic factors have an impact in that the EU and China are more likely to cooperate if they can thereby pursue their economic interests or avoid damages to their economic preferences. The more economic interests are involved or the higher the threat to economic preferences, the more cooperation is observed.

Especially the insights gained from the cases of maritime security/anti-piracy and climate/energy security are supportive. Within the realm of climate and energy, the EU and China agree upon the necessity to combat climate change, secure, and diversify their energy supplies. As two of the largest global energy players, the EU and China they face similar strategic and practical challenges. While China’s economic wellbeing is directly vulnerable to the implications of a deteriorating climate and increasingly scant energy reserves, the EU face

201 the prevailing challenge to overcome economic damages caused by its dependency on fossil fuels. For the Chinese side, the need to secure its economic interests is thus a crucial drivers towards cooperating with the EU, as the analysis has indicated. The following statement by a Chinese interviewee probably sums up this effect at best: “The more investments are spreading and increasing to other world regions, the more vulnerable we are, the more need for security cooperation arises” (Interview #19, 14-03-19).

The nexus between economy and security and the impact of economic interests on cooperation further becomes apparent through the EU-China Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy that explicitly contends that “tackling climate change and reforming [the] energy systems are significant drivers of […] economic growth” (European Union and People’s Republic of China, 2018, p. 2). Departing from this objective it then puts it to the forefront of the EU’s and China’s joint climate/energy security agenda to “achieve sustainable, secure and competitive economies”, which further underlines the economy-security nexus.

Yet, interestingly, the analysis also indicates divergences between the EU and China with regards to economic interests. Whenever it comes to shouldering the financial costs of addressing climate/energy security, their positions differ. While the EU considers this a cost item that should be distributed equally, China continues to claim common but differentiated responsibilities and attaches a domestic notion to climate and energy security. Thus, there might not be a conflict of interest but indeed a conflict of distribution, albeit on small scale.

Regarding the economic side of strategic considerations, also the case of maritime security/anti- piracy reveals strong evidence that this mechanisms has come to play. In combatting piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the EU and China profit considerably from burden-sharing that reduces the cost of engagement for both while increasing the mutual benefits.

Another indicator that economic interests are a strong driver towards cooperation can be extracted from the analysis of anti-terrorism. In this case, no strong economic foci could be detected on either the European or the Chinese side. Accordingly, not security cooperation has emerged. Only two references to economic factors could be found in the data, albeit not interlinked to cooperation with the EU. For once, the increased economic engagement of China in insecure regions from which terrorism emanates (such as the Middle East), increases the need for anti-terrorism measures by China. Yet, this does not lead to seeking cooperation with the EU due to other, stronger divergences. Besides this, one Chinese interviewee hinted towards the fact that bilateral anti-terrorism cooperation with countries from the Middle East could yield 202 economic benefits for China in that it can export expertise and technologies (Interview #17, 11- 03-19). However, this piece of evidence cannot be triangulated and is not picked up by any other interviewee. Thus, economic considerations seem to be a driving factor towards cooperation and their absence in the case of anti-terrorism can explain why the EU and China do not cooperate in this particular security issue31.

Theoretical expectation 4a: Problem understanding

My theoretical expectation 4a stated that the more convergent the understanding of a specific security issue, the more security cooperation takes place.

Having a common problem understanding vastly contributed to the emergence of cooperation on anti-piracy/maritime security and climate/energy security and impeded cooperation in the case of anti-terrorism. The EU and China share a common problem definition of what constitutes piracy and could therefore agree easily on adequate response mechanisms. In other words, “in this area, the enemy is so clear, it is the pirates” (Interview #10, 05-03-19). In the realm of climate and energy security, the EU and China share the same understanding of the issue under scrutiny and the scope and degree of the implications emanating from a deteriorating climate and a shrinking amount of fossil fuels, of which both are highly dependent. Although in both cases the institutional responsibility differs between the EU and China, as the EU handles both security issues within its foreign and security policy, while China addresses anti-piracy as a domestic security concern located within national PLA(N) missions and climate/energy security within homeland security, this did not impede cooperation.

Yet, when it comes to counter-terrorism, the analysis has revealed that a completely different understanding of the issue under scrutiny can indeed hinder cooperation. The EU’s and China’s definitions of what constitutes terrorism, couldn’t be more different. They have a divergent understanding of the scope and degree, relevant actors and purposes of terrorism. In contrast to the EU, who has a very concrete definition of terrorism, China’s official classification remains rather broad and includes “proposition” as an act of terrorism. Moreover, the strong domestic focus of China’s anti-terrorism initiatives, directly mainly against its Uighur Muslim minority in the XUAR impedes collaboration with the EU. This shows that there is also a need for a

31 All the contrary, the implications of the divergent framing are so strong that they cast a shadow over all sorts of cost-benefit calculations that could have been taken by the EU and China.

203 convergence of ideas about the type of security to be achieved and the appropriate measures to provide it. Hence, it can be concluded that the common understanding mechanism has a strong impact on the emergence of (non-) cooperation.

Theoretical expectation 4b: Mutual perceptions

My theoretical expectation 4b stated that the more positive mutual perceptions in a particular security issue, the more security cooperation takes place.

The perception mechanism has not proved to be of high significance for the emergence of cooperation, although in the cases of maritime security/anti-piracy and climate/energy security the mutual perceptions of the EU and China of each other as a trustworthy partner and necessary counterpart has been favorable and contributed to the emergence of a cooperative partnership. In the case of anti-terrorism the analysis has revealed that a considerable lack of trust and even growing mistrust between the EU and China hindered the emergence of cooperation. Yet, this mainly stems from the underlying diverging problem definitions that result in mutual criticism and misunderstanding. Thus, the perception mechanism does not seem to have a significant impact on the emergence of (non-) cooperation but can rather strengthen existing mechanisms like the common understanding mechanism.

Table 18 sums up the conclusions that can be drawn after comparing my findings across the three cases and displays, which theoretical expectations are plausible.

Theoretical expectation Results of the analysis

Expectation 3a: The stronger the complex interdependence between the EU and China in a security issue, the higher the amount of ✓ partly plausible security cooperation, due to cost-benefit calculations.

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Expectation 4a: The more convergent the definition of a security issue the more likely is security cooperation, because the EU and China do not rely on “self-help” or treat security as an individual ✓ plausible responsibility of each but identify with the other and seek common responses.

Expectation 4b: The more positive mutual perceptions in a security issue, the more likely is security cooperation, because friends / partners tend to bound in alliances or deepen their overall ✓ partly plausible alignment, rivals or competitors pursue interactions that are more pragmatic while enemies might not interact at all or direct their actions towards harming the other.

Table 18 Plausibility probe of the theoretical expectation.

9.2. Interaction Dynamics Between the Theorized Drivers

Taken together, all three cases show interesting dynamics of interplay between the different mechanism models. Except for the case of anti-terrorism, it can be concluded that the understanding and the perception mechanism condition each other in a sense that a diverging understanding would not hinder cooperation if mutual perceptions were friendly and trustworthy. Moreover, depending on the issue area, strategic considerations can trump perceptions and understanding if the economic or ideational interests are so high that any form of non-cooperation would harm the involved actors. This matches the findings from the analysis of the increase of EU-China security cooperation over time that has revealed that role conceptions and expectations play a minor role if they are embedded in conditions of overall complex interdependences.

Interestingly, in all three cases, there are signs for constructivist and rationalist drivers towards cooperation being mutually reinforcing. For instance, in the case of anti-terrorism the lack of a common problem understanding funnels into rationalist considerations of the EU and China as it changes the equation of costs and benefits of cooperation. It might rise the costs of cooperation significantly if a considerable amount of time needs to be dedicated to finding a 205 common definition of what constitutes terrorism and then developing adequate response mechanisms. Accordingly, sidelining with more like-minded partners or relying on UN- structures more strongly, seems to be the more rational choice. Such interlinkages between rationalist and constructivist drivers emphasize the validity and analytical value of combining explanatory factors from both ontological strands. In this regard, the analysis has shown that following Katzenstein’s analytical eclecticism (Katzenstein and Sil, 2004, 2008; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010) and combining analytical components from different explanatory theories seems to be a promising approach for the analysis of EU-China security relations.

9.3. ‘Mixing’ the Comparison: What to Learn from Part A and B?

Finally, I would like to discuss the results from the analysis of EU-China security cooperation over time and among the three security issue as they provide an interesting picture of the drivers towards security cooperation in EU-China relations. First of all, it becomes apparent that the drivers towards cooperation over time are not necessarily the same that explain cooperation on the three security issues. Let me specify this, by recalling the results of the diachronic comparison in part A. Based on the results of the analysis, a rising degree of complex interdependence is a plausible driver towards cooperation. The increase of economic interests at stake in the realm of security has proved to be partly plausible, just like the converging understanding of security. Mutual perceptions, in contrast, could not explain the increase of cooperation over time as they deteriorated over time and have become a growing obstacle to cooperation instead of functioning as a driver. As the analysis of the three security issues has further indicated, it very much depends on the type of security issue if the overall increase of complex interdependence actually impacts EU-China relations in that particular issue and leads to cooperation. Similarly, economic interests are very influential on the level of security issues, while they has not proved to be of high explanatory value for the analysis over time. Likewise, for cooperation to emerge on a specific security issues the analysis indicated that having a convergent understanding of the issue under scrutiny is a very crucial condition and can explain very well why the EU and China do not cooperate on anti-terrorism, but on maritime security/anti-piracy and climate/energy security. And mutual perceptions have played a partly important role on the level of security issues. This shows that although on a more general level, perceptions might deteriorate but on some issues, like climate and energy security, they are still positive and can explain security cooperation.

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Now, what is to be learnt from these results? Interestingly, they match the overall approach of the EU and China to conduct their relations towards each other on a sector-by-sector level. Moreover, the results call for an even more specific assessment of EU-China security relations, not on the level of sectors, i.e. policy fields, but on the level of concrete issues. Thus, an issue- by-issue approach could be promising for future EU-China security relations in particular but also relations in general. I will further discuss this topic in the following chapter, when providing policy recommendations.

10. Conclusion: EU-China Security Cooperation in Context

The purpose of my thesis was to explore EU-China security cooperation, which have hitherto received scant attention in academic literature. The main questions that guided the analysis was the following: Why do the EU and China engage in security cooperation despite deepening political tensions? This question was divided into three distinct, yet interrelated sub questions: Which patterns of EU-China security cooperation can be observed and how do they vary over time? What are the main drivers towards EU-China security cooperation over time? Why does cooperation emerge in some security issues but not in others? I have assessed the topic in a three-tiered approach. First, I mapped the development of EU-China relations in general, and security relations in particular, over time, to detect interesting patterns. Based on these findings, which revealed striking variation over time as well as differences between different security issues, I analytically approached the increase of security cooperation between the EU and China, despite deepening political tensions. In a third step, I shed light on varying amounts of cooperation in three exemplary case studies: anti-terrorism, maritime security/anti- piracy and climate/energy security. The main purpose of this three-tiered approach was to inform the reader about the development of EU-China security relations in broad scope and degree and examine the main drivers behind this development. In the following section, I briefly summarize my main findings and outline the contributions of my dissertation. Subsequently, I elaborate on the implications of the results for academic research on EU-China security relations as well as for practitioners and policy-makers in the context of EU-China relations. I conclude by reflecting on the challenges and limitations of my dissertation and point toward possible avenues for future research.

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10.1. Summary Of The Main Findings: Research Puzzles Solved?

This thesis has assessed the development of EU-China security relations over time and in three particular security issues, anti-terrorism, maritime security/anti-piracy and climate/energy security. It departed from the conventional academic literature that examines EU-China relations from a region-to-state perspective and embarked on the objective to study EU-China security relations by focusing on the EU and China as two entities.

My thesis started by flagging the two main research puzzles in chapter 2. To this end, I mapped the development of EU-China security cooperation over time as well as across different security issues in search for variation. I introduced a novel and innovative conceptualization of (non-)cooperation that stretches from unilateral hostilities to joint activities and encompasses activities in four different dimension: the dimension of activities, the formal dimension, the institutional dimension and finally, the rhetoric dimension.

Subsequently, I mapped the development of EU-China security relations, based on a text corpus of 32 documents, including all policy papers the EU and China issued on their bilateral relationship as well as the Joint Declarations following the annual EU-China summits. The results revealed two interesting patterns. First it became apparent that over time, the EU and China have increased the amount of security cooperation. This constitutes my first research puzzle. Why has security cooperation increased over time, while political tensions deepened and different principles of foreign and security policy making prevail? To sketch the counterintuitive momentum of this development, I introduced the main divergencies in the EU’s and China’s foreign and security policy making, which have hindered the emergence of cooperation for decades. While China’s approach is clearly focused on power politics, the EU’s foreign and security policy can be described, above all, by its normative prioritization. Moreover, China adheres to the principles of sovereignty (zhōngguó zhǔquán - 中国主权), territorial integrity (lǐngtǔ wánzhěng - 领土完整) and non-interference (bù gānshè - 不干涉), while the EU democracy promotion and good governance to the forefront. Hence, one would rather expect that they do not cooperate at all in the security realm. But, these differences apart, there has been a great deal of security cooperation between the EU and China and the intensity and scope of EU-China security cooperation have widened over time. This constitutes a puzzling and interesting phenomenon that should be examined empirically.

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The second interesting pattern detected in the mapping is that there is a striking variance between different security issues. While some are now subject to cooperation (e.g. climate/energy security, maritime security/anti-piracy, conflict resolution, nuclear non- proliferation and disarmament), others are prone to non-cooperation (e.g. military security, regional security) or remain marginal (e.g. food security, immigration/migration). One would assume that high levels of cooperation could be expected on security issues, which are closely intertwined with economic or national interests, such as food or human security. Lower levels of cooperation would be expected for security issues, in which differences over sovereignty issues, non-interference and territorial integrity remain, such as conflict resolution and prevention or maritime security/anti-piracy. The opposite is the case. This variation between different security issues constitutes my second research puzzle.

Based on these findings, I developed a theoretical framework in chapter 3. I combined rationalist and constructivist approaches to explaining international cooperation in order to provide a comprehensive assessment of EU-China security cooperation. The choice of IVs was informed by two broader strands of theory – liberal institutionalism as a rationalist approach and social constructivism as a constructivist approach. From these theoretical vantage points, I extracted four explanatory factors for the ensuing analysis. These are complex interdependencies, economic interests, understanding and mutual perceptions.

Collecting data for the analysis was all but straightforward in the politically security-sensitive setting like the authoritarian China, as discussed in detail in chapter 4. One of the main challenges has certainly been to find a balance between searching for access to data and the risk of bad data quality, due to biased information or low data saturation. To prevent low data saturation enhance the credibility of the analysis, I decided to use several data sources that I triangulated carefully. I made use of official documents, declaration and statements issued by the EU and China. I further enriched these with 31 expert and elite interviews conducted in Shanghai, Beijing and Brussels. Finally, I relied on media sources for further triangulation.

In chapter 5, I investigated the increase of EU-China security cooperation over time. The analysis revealed that one of the main drivers was the increase of complex interdependencies between the EU and China. Further, the need to secure economic investments has proved to play a crucial role for both sides to reach out to the other as a security counterpart. Besides, the analysis has indicated that the changing role of the US has contributed to the increase of EU- China security cooperation, in particular by augmenting the interdependence between the two.

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Moreover, the analysis suggested that the increase of cooperation is driven by a common understanding of the changing nature of security threats that require joint action or responses at both the regional and global level. Also, the nature of security threats has changed. Generally, non-traditional security threats have risen in importance not only in Europe but also in Asia, including climate change, rising terrorism, the threat of energy scarcity, the pursuit of food, as well as the effects of regional conflicts. Over time, the EU and China have developed a more convergent understanding of what constitutes ‘security’ and which security challenges are especially high. They have embarked their security policies on the perception of shared responsibility for many issues of global governance. This enhanced understanding of many security issues has led to a rising level of security cooperation, despite deepening political tensions. With the rising salience of this policy field in their overall relations, also the efforts to engage in cooperation has increased.

Likewise, the mutual perception of the EU and China in the security realm have changed considerably, albeit not towards the positive. In contrast, the mutual perceptions that the EU and Chine hold of each other have clearly deteriorated over time, being riddled with deepening mistrust and scepticism. While around 2003 at the time of the EU-China ‘honeymoon’ the two considered each other to be friends or partners, the EU now regards China mainly as a combination of three distinct roles: a partner, a competitor and a rival. Similarly, China now considers the EU mainly a necessary counterpart in the security realm, no longer a friend or trustworthy partner. These findings partly reject my theoretical expectation that more the more positive perception become, the more security cooperation takes place. Yet, it is interesting that security cooperation has increased despite the deteriorating perceptions. The results from the analysis indicate that the decreasing perceptions do not have a strong impact on the amount of security cooperation that takes place between the EU and China because both actors are located significantly far away from each other, in geographical terms. Hence, they managed to put asides what they think of the respective other and focus on those issues on which cooperation is needed despite negative trends with regard to mutual perceptions. This reflects the high explanatory value of the rationalist drivers and indicates that they might be more influential than the constructivist drivers.

The three comparative case studies (chapters 6, 7 and 8) further made obvious, how complex and multifaceted EU-China security relations are. Apparently, being interdependent contributes significantly to the emergence of security cooperation and the higher the interdependence, the more security cooperation takes place. Also economic considerations play a crucial role for 210 security cooperation on the distinct issue. The more economic interests are involved or the higher the risks of economic losses, the more willing the EU and China are cooperate and the more actively they pursue such cooperation. Accordingly, I rightfully expected that the more economic interests are at stake, the more security cooperation takes place. Especially in the cases of maritime security/anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and climate/energy security, which both reveal a strong economic component, the amount of cooperation between the EU and China is high and a strong economy-security nexus is at play. Likewise, in the case of anti- terrorism, which reveals no strong economic focus, security cooperation does not emerge.

Having a common problem understanding impacts to a vast extent whether the EU and China embark their security policies within a specific security issue on common ground or whether they do not cooperate. A lack of common understanding of what constitutes terrorism has proved to be the main hindrance to EU-China anti-terrorism cooperation, while a similar problem definition has made cooperation on maritime security/anti-piracy and climate/energy security relatively easy. In contrast, mutual perceptions have not proven to be of high explanatory value for the variation of cooperation between the three security issues. Although the EU and China consider each other as partners or necessary counterparts in the realm of anti- piracy and climate/energy security, the analysis indicates stronger explanatory value of the other factors. Similarly, in the case of anti-terrorism the analysis has revealed that a considerable lack of trust and even growing mistrust between the EU and China hindered the emergence of cooperation. Yet, this mainly stems from the underlying diverging problem definitions that result in mutual criticism and misunderstanding. Hence, positive perceptions seem to be favourable for the emergence of security cooperation but do not automatically lead to it.

10.2. Implications of the Findings for Research and Practice

Having summarized the main findings, I now point towards the implication of my findings for research and practice. I will pursue in two consecutive steps, First, I discuss the contributions and limitations of this thesis. In doing so, I will link back my findings to the existing literature on EU-China relations and outline the main contributions of my thesis. Besides, I critically discuss the limitations of my study in methodological, theoretical and empirical terms. In the second step, I turn towards the practical implications of my findings for practitioners and policy-makers.

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10.2.1. Contributions and Limitations of This Thesis

In short, this dissertation has disentangled the complex EU-China relationship in the security realm in a multidimensional way. Through a close empirical observation and a differentiated theoretical and conceptual approach to EU-China security relations it analyzed both opportunities and constraints for cooperation. It thereby provided an insight both into the Chinese and the European perspectives and discourses on EU-China relations beyond the economic realm. Moreover, it went beyond the majority of literature that concentrates primarily on the European experience and on the EU’s strategies towards a rising China and less often take into account the Chinese perspective.

For the time being, this thesis makes several empirical, conceptual and theoretical contributions. First, it adds to the growing body of literature on EU-China relations. For now, the majority of studies that assess EU-China relations focus on the economic pillar of the relationship. In recent years, academic research has more often taken into consideration also the security dimension of their relationship. My thesis resonates well with this trend. It adds to this growing body of literature and provides links to the current debates about the possibilities and constraints of EU- China security cooperation (Kirchner, 2015; Kirchner et al., 2016; Dorussen et al., 2017; Dossi, 2015). To begin with, it illustrates that the security realm is all but tenuous in EU-China relations. The analysis reveals that there are indeed drivers that point towards cooperation, despite diverging underlying principles and tensions. Fittingly, my study indicates that EU- China security relations cannot be understood as either rival or cooperative but that different aspects of their security relationship reveal different amounts of cooperation and non- cooperation.

This resonates well with the overall debate about China’s role in international politics that divides between scholars that consider China mainly as a threat (Broomfield, 2003) and scholars that put forward the possibilities for cooperation. By cutting across the cleavage that EU-China relations are characterized either by threats or by opportunities (Breslin, 2013), and shows that they co-exist. It has sought to put forward a differentiated analysis of EU-China security relations that moves beyond existing black-and-white views on China’s role in the international system in general and for the EU in particular, my thesis contributes to grasping EU-China security relations in their overall scope and degree and points towards how diverse and complex their relations are. As very little is known so far about the rationales behind EU-China security cooperation, my findings are of great value and can kick off further academic debates.

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Second, in order to filling the analytical gap of region-to-state relations between the EU and China my thesis assessed the relevance of these relations in their own right rather than derivative from a US or Russian centered perspective. There is a huge body of literature that deals with the EU’s foreign and security policy and the EU’s role for global security. In recent years, with the rising discussion about the EU’s evolving role as a security actor (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007), a strand of research has started to develop that considers the EU as an international actor of increasing substance and rising agency (Doidge, 2011; Lan, 2005; Wallace, 1983). It responds to all critics that argue that the EU does not possess a unified foreign and security policy and that the development of such polices is still a prerogative of the member states, which weakens the EU as an entity in this regard. While acknowledging that this is certainly the case, my study has indicated that in the realm of non-traditional security, the EU is indeed a powerful and autonomous actor. From this vantage point, my study further contributes to discussions about the EU’s external relations. The findings about the EU’s external relations with China can link to discussions about the EU’s relationship with the other emerging powers (South Africa, India, Russia and Brazil) and whether their rise is a threat or opportunity for the EU (Freire, 2017; Rewizorski, 2015; Keukeleire and Hooijmaaijers, 2014).

Third, apart from these empirical insights, my thesis has particular conceptual implications for the academic understanding of cooperation in international relations. It assesses cooperation not only through agreements or actions (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Mitchell and Hensel, 2006) but by taking into account the rhetoric dimension of cooperation. In doing so, it develops an innovative conceptualization that stretches from unilateral hostilities to joint activities and encompasses activities in four different dimension: the dimension of activities, the formal dimension, the institutional dimension and finally, the rhetoric dimension. Hence, I went beyond most conceptualizations of cooperation that account for formal agreements or the number of joint activities when measuring cooperation but leave asides the level of discourse. By taking into account the articulation of a will to cooperate as a form of cooperation in the rhetoric dimension and criticism and the explication of differences as a form of non-cooperation, this enables a more detailed and specific assessment of what cooperation entails in scope and degree.

Finally, the limitations of this thesis must be carefully addressed to provide incentives for further research on the topic. This thesis put a strong focus on region-to-state relations between the EU and China. Different bilateral relationships between EU member states and China have not been sufficiently discussed. As the making of foreign and security policies remains a 213 prerogative of the different EU member states, a comprehensive multidimensional analysis that compares region-to-state and state-to-state relations in the overall EU-China context could provide interesting insights into the drivers of the EU’s China policy. Moreover, official Chinese view on EU-China relations beyond joint statements, speeches and public declarations, could add analytical details on how EU-China relations are perceived from a Chinese vantage point. Due to problems of accessibility of the relevant interview target group, this thesis could not include such a view. Similarly, a detailed reconstruction of the processes towards cooperation was not possible, due to low data saturation. This, in turn, emanates from the difficulties of data collection in a politically security-sensitive setting like China. Additional interviews and a longer stay in the field might have provided deeper insight into the processes.

The scope of this thesis, which privileged breadth over detail, could not dedicate adequate attention to these important factors. Future research could analyze other security issues to complete the picture of EU-China security relations to full scope and degree.

10.2.2. Practical Implications and Policy Recommendations

A key insight from this study is that EU-China relations are all but black and white. Neither does China constitute merely a threat to the EU nor does it provide only opportunities. Instead, EU-China relations in general and in the security realm in particular, are characterized by a complex web of opportunities and obstacles. Based on these findings, the subsequent sections elaborates on possible implications for the EU’s policy-making towards China and formulates a number of policy recommendations.

My thesis has cut across the cleavage that EU-China security relations are characterized either by threats or by opportunities and shows that they co-exist. Against this backdrop, it is crucial that the EU moves beyond existing black-and-white views on China’s role in the international system in general and in the security realm in particular. While a more unified European position toward China would be desirable, the strongly diverging interests of the different member states and internal power struggles have impeded progress in the past and will certainly continue to challenge the EU’s China policy in the future. This study has shown that the question of strategic and academic importance is that on certain issues the EU and China indeed manage to put asides growing ideological and normative tensions and focus on those areas, in which interests converge, pursuing different trajectories but following a joint aim. In that respect, security seems to be a policy field that rather brings the EU and China onto the same

214 path than driving them apart. Searching for complementary action with China despite focusing on the political constraints and divergent principles could help to formulate a more effective, diverse and concrete China policy. In that regard, the EU could explore the possibilities for security cooperation with China on a case-by-case approach, differentiating between fields of competing interests which call for a unified European response to Chinese policies and fields where complementary action with China based on shared interest is possible and fruitful. Such approach can lead to mutual benefits on some issues while still retaining fundamental differences in others. As already briefly touched on when discussing the results of the mixed comparison, my analysis points towards an issue-by-issue approach in EU-China relations. As the EU’s and China’s main policy papers show, they already conduct their relations towards each other on a sector-by-sector level. My results call for an even more specific assessment of EU-China security relations, not on the level of sectors, i.e. policy fields, but on the level of concrete issues. Such an issue-by-issue approach could be promising for future EU-China security relations in particular but also relations in general.

The analysis has further revealed certain possible entry points for the EU to integrate China into existing frameworks. Focusing on these entry points even if they are very thing could yield promising results. One of these entry points is China’s obvious desire and need to be recognized as a valid partner in multilateral frameworks. China seems to be very well aware of the fact that other international actors expect it to behave like the global power it is portraying itself as. Capitalizing on this can help to integrate China into existing frameworks and to socialize it into international standards and rules.

Extending the geographical focus and speaking in more general terms, such approach could further influence the EU’s external relations with other emerging power, such as Brazil, India, Russia or South Africa and to navigate its ‘strategic partnerships’ with them. This leads to another recommendation for the EU which is maybe the most difficult: the EU has to adapt to a world order in which Western countries do neither automatically nor systematically dominate but which is characterized by global power shifts to the East and to the South. The analysis of EU-China relations has clearly revealed that the EU does not even have a coherent China strategy – let alone a policy to address the changing distribution of power in the 21st century. In this regard, the insights of this thesis have shown that the EU could profit from accepting other ways of making policy. It can and should, no doubt, continue to promote its own vision of effective multilateralism but should presume that other actors share its idea of how international

215 politics are made. This in turn, requires a certain flexibility in that the EU pursues its own interests but also seeks new type of alliances within the changing geopolitical context.

10.3. Final Remarks: EU-China Security Relations at a Cross Road

The findings of my thesis provide significant insight into possible avenues that EU-China security relations might take in the near future. To put it very bluntly: EU-China security relations certainly are at a cross road. From the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1975 onwards, the EU and China have gone through different stages in their relationship. Once having realized the benefits of cooperation, they have engaged in a form of ‘honeymoon’ with very optimistic yet retrospectively also unrealistic expectations of how their relationship might develop. Living through phases of extreme mistrust and criticism, they have, however, never stopped talking to each other, no matter how difficult their relationship and how intense geopolitical skirmishes. As already mentioned in the introduction, when the EU and China evaluate their Strategic Agenda for Cooperation in summer 2020, they can look back on efficacious collaboration in an array of policy fields, yet also face profound challenges and tensions. In short: current EU-China relations face a shallow future that is vastly determined by broader geo-economic and geopolitical developments. I want to briefly elaborate on some of them in order to point towards the timeliness and topicality but also towards the brisance and sensitivity of this thesis.

EU-China security relations take place within a fluid international setting, in which alliances are constantly changing. Let alone during the time of writing this thesis (2017 –2020), the US withdrew from the JCPOA, the INF and the Paris Agreement, the Brexit-negotiations came to an end and the UK left the EU. The US and China embarked in a trade war that does not seem to settle soon, democratic countries like Brazil, Hungary and Poland experienced an authoritarian turn and populists gained strength in several European countries. Not at least, the spreading of COVID-19 made visible the downsides of globalization, put the EU and China into a state of constant insecurity and bafflement and heralded a global crisis of unprecedented amount. In such fluid environment, not only alliances are constantly changing. Also, different actors cooperate on different issues and on different levels, and most actors find themselves entrapped in multiscalar relationships, in which they are cooperation partners in one policy field, while being opponents in another. The same applies to EU-China security relations, which vary in scope and intensity across different issue areas. Although the aim of this thesis was to dive

216 into the cooperative patterns within EU-China security relations, which have hitherto received scant academic attention, and to extract the main drivers behind these patterns, the overall deepening tensions in EU-China relations should not be neglected. While there are general patterns of cooperative behaviour, there is also a considerable variation across different security domains.

While generalizations are difficult and predictions highly speculative in such fluent environments that is continuously evolving, I can nevertheless conclude that the upcoming years are very decisive for the avenues EU-China relations will take – in general but in particular in the security realm. While the thesis has shown a significant amount of security cooperation, there are also numerous obstacles to cooperation, even on issues in which the EU and China have the same interests or objectives. Given these obstacles, let alone the highly divergent principles of foreign and security policy making that have been described in detail throughout the analysis, the actual amount of convergence and cooperation between the EU and China in the security realm is highly remarkable. Taking a careful look into the future, it can be concluded that as strategic comprehensive partners, the EU and China will continue to engage with each other. Although generalizations are difficult and bear the risk of oversimplification in times of a constantly changing world order, the question of strategic and academic importance is that on certain issues the EU and China indeed manage to put asides growing ideological and normative tensions and focus on those areas, in which interests converge, pursuing different trajectories but following a joint aim. In that respect, security seems to be a policy field that rather brings the EU and China onto the same path than driving them apart.

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Appendices

Appendix A: List Of Documents used for the Mapping

Chinese Policy Papers  China’s Policy Paper on the EU (2003)  China's Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen The China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership For Mutual Benefit and Win-Win Cooperation (2014)  China's Policy Paper on the European Union (2018)

EU Policy Papers

 A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations (1995)  Building a Comprehensive Partnership With China (1998)  EU Strategy Towards China: Implementation Of The 1998 Communication and Future Steps For A More Effective EU Policy (2001)  A Maturing Partnership - Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations (2003)  EU – China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities (2006)  Elements for a new EU strategy on China (2016)  EU-China – A Strategic Outlook (2019)

Joint Declarations

 First EU-China Summit: Joint Press Statemen (1998)  Second EU-China Summit: Joint Press Statement (1999)  Third EU-China Summit: Joint Press Statement (2000)  Fourth EU-China Summit: Joint Press Statement (2001)  Fifth EU-China Summit: Joint Press Statement (2002)  Sixth EU-China Summit: Joint Press Statement (2003)  Joint Statement of the 7th EU-China Summit (2004)  Joint Statement of the 8th EU-China Summit (2005)  The Joint Declaration of the 9th EU-China Summit (2006)  Joint Statement of the 10th EU-China Summit (2007) 257

 11th EU-China Summit: Joint Press Communiqué (2009)  Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit (2009)  Joint Statement of the 13th EU-China Summit (2010)  Joint Press Communiqué of the 14th EU-China Summit (2012)  Joint Press Communiqué – 15th EU-China Summit: Towards a stronger EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2012)  EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation (2013)  Joint Statement: Deepening the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for mutual benefit (2014)  EU-China Summit Joint Statement: The Way Forward After Forty Years of EU-China Cooperation (2015)  List of Outcomes of the 19th EU-China Summit (2017)  Joint Statement of the 20th EU-China Summit (2018)  EU-China Summit Joint Statement (2019)

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Appendix B: List of Interviews

Due to confidentiality concerns and in order to guarantee the safety of my interview partners, I can only provide their position and institutional affiliation. Further information can only be provided upon request.

Number of interview Institutional affiliation of the interviewee Academic scholar, EU-China relations, Interview #1, 15-11-18 Jinan University Academic scholar, China in the Middle East Interview #2, 13-12-18 Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg Academic scholar, EU-China relations Interview #3, 26-02-19 EU Studies Center, Tongji University Shanghai Senior Researcher; Director of Strategic Cooperation Division Interview #4, 26-02-19 Fudan Development Institute Interview #5, 27-02-19 Former Ambassador of Germany to Beijing Senior Researcher Interview #6, 28-02-19 Department of International Relations, Tongji University Shanghai Associate Research Fellow Director, Center for European Interview #7, 01-03-19 Studies Shanghai Institutes for International Studies

Associate Research Fellow Director, Center for European Interview #8, 01-03-19 Studies Shanghai Institutes for International Studies Research associate, China’s security policy Interview #9, 04-03-19 School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University Shanghai Senior researcher Interview #10, 05-03-19 School of International Relations and Public Affairs Fudan University Senior Research Fellow, Institute of European Studies Interview #11, 06-03-19 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Senior Research Fellow, Institute of European Studies Interview #12, 06-03-19 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Senior Research Fellow Interview #13, 07-03-19 China Institute of International Studies Senior Research Fellow, Maritime Studies Interview #14, 07-03-19 China Institute of International Studies Research Fellow Interview #15, 07-03-19 China Institute of International Studies Senior Research Fellow Interview #16, 07-03-19 China Institute of International Studies

259

Associate Professor Interview #17, 11-03-19 Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University Senior Research Fellow Interview #18, 12-03-19 EU Studies Center, Tongji University Shanghai Professor, Jean-Monnet Chair for European Studies Interview #19, 14-03-19 Fudan University, Shanghai

Foreign policy expert Interview #20, 15-03-19 School of International Relations and Public Affairs Fudan University, Shanghai Policy Officer Interview #21, 18-03-19 EU Delegation to China, Beijing Research Fellow Interview #22, 18-03-19 Carnegie Tsinghua, Center for Global Policy Former member of the Delegation for Relations with the Interview #23, 30-08-19 Peoples Republic Policy advisor Interview #24, 03-09-19 European Institute for Asian Studies Policy Advisor, Foreign Policy Team Interview #25, 05-09-19 European Political Strategy Center Head of Sector Regional Integration Asia Interview #26, 05-09-19 DG for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO.H) Policy Coordinator Interview #27, 10-09-19 European Commission, Secretariat General, Directorate E3 Researcher Interview #28, 10-09-19 European Institute for Asian Studies Desk Officer Interview #29, 11-09-19 European External Action Service, China Desk Desk Officer Interview #30, 12-09-19 European External Action Service, China Desk Deputy Head of Cabinet (Security Union) Interview #31, 12-09-19 European Commission

260

Appendix C: Coding Schemes for MaxQDA

Coding scheme I – Policy fields

Code/Category Explanation of category Coding example Coding rules

 do not code energy or climate security issues This category includes references to climate or “Promote collaboration on global environmental  code water issues only if environmental issues. Words and phrases coded in climate and challenges, including enhanced co-operation on the climate and environmental this category are mostly mentioned in the context environment Kyoto protocol […[ and on follow-up to the World consequences are of “climate change” or “environmental Summit on Sustainable Development.” mentioned, if not water challenges”. issues belong to "economy" This category includes references to either “China will encourage high quality cultural exchange European or Chinese culture (music, language, culture activities and explore new modalities of cooperation in history), cultural exchanges or cultural activities of culture-related industries.” any kind (concerts, exhibitions).

This category captures the China's or the EU's “A key objective of the negotiations for a new economic situation, development or EU-China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement […] will be economic relations. Also references to trade, better access to the Chinese market for European economy finances, import and expert, intellectual property exporters and investors, going beyond WTO foreign direct investment and economic commitments, better protection of intellectual property investments are included. and mutual recognition of geographical indications.”

261 This category includes all references to the EU’s “Encouragement of the development of European and China’s schooling systems and educational  code also professional education and studies in China as part of the proposed programme of structures; EU-China student relations or education (e.g. of youth university cooperation, to build a better picture of the exchanges as well as further education and workers) EU in China over the long term.” University-related mentions.

“The Chinese Government wishes to see an increase of This categories organizes references to political  code only if political or legal and exchange and cooperation between the Communist relations and legal and administrative affairs. It legal affairs are explicitly administrative Party of China and all major EU political parties, incorporates indications of party politics, legal mentioned, or if parties affairs parliamentary party groups and regional organizations frameworks and explicit mentions of politicians. are mentioned of political parties.”

This category includes references to the security issues, threats and challenges. This category is a summary of different sub-codes (see coding scheme ‘security’). It incorporates the following “They should co-operate closely in the framework of  For a detailed coding security issues: regional security, conflict the UN, working to find multilateral solutions to scheme for the security security resolution and prevention, nuclear non- emerging crises, and to combat terrorism and increase issues see Coding scheme proliferation, anti-terrorism, climate/energy regional co-operation.” III security, human security, cybersecurity, food security, maritime security/anti-piracy, migration and immigration, military security

“Cooperation between scientific and technological This category summarizes references to the  concerns technological technology and intermediary agencies of the two sides as well as the situation or development of certain technologies, issues and innovation in innovation interflow and training of scientific and technological new innovation and research projects. all scientific areas human resources should be encouraged.

262 Coding scheme II – forms of (non-)cooperation

General coding rules

1. Do not code what is labeled as context or background information. 2. Do not code summaries of former policy papers. 3. Do not code appendices with background information (e.g. on a country's economic performance). 4. Do not code information on relations with Tibet, Taiwan, Macao or Hongkong. 5. Do not code statements of conditions for cooperation. Example: "The EU should regularly review the outcomes of these dialogues" (2016 Elements for a new EU strategy on China) 6. Do not code evaluations of cooperation projects.

Code/Category Explanation of category Coding example Coding rules

 code only if directly directed towards the other all forms unilateral hostile actions "Immediately after the Tiananmen Square events in  code if sanctions are mentioned or unilateral hostility against the other. June 1989, the EU imposed a number of sanctions." imposed; code also if mentioned that already imposed sanctions shall remain in place "Immediately after the Tiananmen Square events in decision not to lift sanctions or June 1989, the EU imposed a number of sanctions revocation of a  code also if it is mentioned as a possibility resolutions that have been which have been only gradually relaxed (a ban of formal agreement that an agreement could be revoked imposed arms sales is still in place)."

263 disruption of All decisions to stop existing "An EU-China specific dialogue on human rights  code only if clear indication for institutionalized dialogue formats or to not was launched in 1995 and interrupted interruption dialogue continue them in the Spring of 1996." "China is still far from meeting internationally  code when one side criticizes the other, criticism and Either China or the EU criticize accepted standards on human rights. (...) These notes unfulfillment of requirements or explication of the other or explicate differences remain matters of grave concern to the EU, its indicates dangerous or difficult behavior differences between each other Institutions and public opinion at large." on behalf of the other

The EU and/or China explicitly articulation of will to "Leaders reiterated their willingness to develop express the will to coordinate  code the articulation to establish a cooperate or to their cooperation in the fields of non-proliferation their activities and cooperate on a dialogue format deepen cooperation and disarmament." certain topic  all dialogue formats mentioned in policy papers count as institutionalized; "The two sides agreed to hold ad-hoc expert level All forms of dialogue, which "strengthen dialogue" is coded as consultations on counter-terrorism, and promote happen on an institutional, formal institutionalized dialogue, as there institutionalized multilateral and bilateral cooperation on countering level or between persons with a apparently are dialogue formats; "develop dialogue violent extremism and terrorism through the Global certain representative function dialogue" is coded as "articulation of Counter-Terrorism Forum and the Financial Action (e.g. Ministers) will"; do NOT code "summit" in the Joint Task Force." Declarations of the annual EU-China summits  code if an agreement or negotiations "The two sides fully recognized the Memorandum All forms of agreement, which around a concrete agreement, of Understanding on China-EU Dialogue on formal agreements include a signed writing and are Memorandum of Understanding, Code of Energy and Transport Strategies signed in enforceable by law Conduct, Joint Declaration, or Programme September 2005." are mentioned All actions, to which both actors "Leaders welcomed the progress on the  code also if former actions are mentioned joint activity contribute with resources and implementation of the EU-China partnership on or evaluated (regardless whether positive which pursue joint interests climate change." or negative)

264 Coding scheme III – security

Code/Category Explanation of category Coding example

“China and the EU will maintain high-level military-to-military exchanges, includes military aspects related to the People’s develop and improve, step by step, a strategic security consultation military security Liberation Army, soldier/police training, military mechanism, exchange more missions of military experts, and expand interventions, arms exports/arms production exchanges in respect of military officers' training and defence studies.”

includes security matters in the EU’s or China’s direct “Enhance consultations with China on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), regional security neighborhoods, regionalization policies, regional to reinforce the ARF's role on regional security issues” security integration

includes security matters related to the global “Strengthen cybersecurity dialogue and cooperation and promote the cybersecurity cyberspace, digital security concerns building of a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative cyberspace.”

nuclear non- includes matters of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear “Develop co-operation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, thereby proliferation (de-) militarization helping to promote global nuclear non-proliferation.”

“International terrorism, as well as growing concerns over the proliferation includes combatting terrorist threats / counter- anti-terrorism of weapons of mass destruction, have brought new types of international terrorism measures security concerns to the top of the global agenda.”

“Global energy security is crucial to ensuring economic growth and includes aspects related to climate/energy fragility, climate/energy security livelihood of people, maintaining world peace and stability and promoting vulnerability or resilience development worldwide.”

includes aspects related to maritime security, maritime security/anti- “…extending the successful EU-China offshore co-operation on combatting piracy, securing waterways, monitoring piracy counter-piracy to peacekeeping and capacity-building onshore.” illegal fishing activities

265 includes food relates issues, food safety and quality, “The two sides are determined to enhance coordination and cooperation food security food procession, sustainable consumption, food bilaterally and in such international institutions as the United Nations and control and inspection the G20 and on major issues including […] food safety.”

includes dangers, risks and threats to human well- being and human rights, measures to diminish / tackle “It has proved capable of exerting a progressive influence well beyond its human security them, protection of civilians against natural/man-made borders and is the world’s largest provider of development aid.” disasters; also includes references to development aid

“In recent years, the EU has increasingly deployed civilian and military includes aspects related to intrastate conflicts, crisis missions overseas, notably in Africa. Likewise, recognizing its conflict resolution and measures to resolve them, (UN) peacekeeping growing global responsibilities, China is making a growing contribution to prevention operations, humanitarian interventions peacekeeping and counter-piracy operations, and has increased its military assistance to the African Union.” migration and includes concerns of migration and immigration with “There should be a dedicated dialogue with the Ministry of Public Security immigration a security nexus covering migration”

266 Coding scheme IV – IV1 complex interdependence

Coding category Explanation of category Codes Explanation of code Coding examples

communication channels exist on various multiple “The channels of communication are open.” levels between the EU and China – channels of “Now the platforms of cooperation are changing interstate, transgovernmental and communication towards different dialogue formats.” transnational “In China, terrorism is understood mostly in implies that the distinction between absence of domestic terms […] a law was created to counter domestic and foreign policy becomes hierarchy of terrorism, but that referred mainly to domestic blurred -> foreign policies touch domestic issues incidences first, then an international element activity was added.”

“Generally speaking, the EU and China are the implies that the EU and China are not two far ends of the Eurasian landmass, they pose absence of use bound in any form of violent or military no military threat to each other, no security Codes organized in this of force conflict in which the use of force of the category include threat. This is a very strong point, especially complex threat of such use is prevalent references to complex compared to US that has strong military in Asia.” interdependence interdependence in EU- implies all forms of costs that occur China (security) relations through non-cooperation, applies whenever “The more investments are spreading and the EU and/or China mention the increasing to other world regions, the more vulnerability ‘necessity’, ‘urgency’ or ‘inevitableness’ of vulnerable we are, the more need for security cooperation or point towards possible costs cooperation arises.” that might emanate from non-cooperation involves degrees of responsiveness: “The EU became more sensitive.” sensitivity policies in China are sensitive to policies in “It is sensitive to involve for both actors but the EU and vice versa nevertheless crucial.”

includes all references made explicitly to “Just think of the AIIB, and the participation of interdependence being ‘interdependent’ or bound in EU countries in it, that is an obvious evidence for ‘interdependence’ how connected we are and how interdependent.”

267 Coding scheme V – IV2 economic interests

Coding category Explanation of category Codes Explanation of code Coding examples

Codes in this category includes all indications of economic interests, “Kooperation auch im summarize the extent to economic interests current/future economic projects that touches upon Sicherheitsbereich um which economic interests security/the respective security issue Wirtschaftsinteressen zu schützen.“ play a role for the EU economic and China when it comes interests to cooperation. The “Between 2006 and 2007 there were codes in this category increased attacks on Chinese ships in threats to includes all indications that point towards threats to differentiate between the Gulf of Aden, especially Chinese economic interests economic interests or the own national well-being economic interests and fishing boats. That endangered threats to them. economic interests.”

268 Coding scheme VI – IV3 convergent problem definition

Coding Explanation of category Codes Explanation of code Coding examples category

Narrow/specific: “In this area, the enemy is so clear, it is the pirates.” Broad/vague: “propositions and includes whether the EU’s and China’s actions that create social panic, scope of definition definition of security/the respective security endanger public safety, violate issue is narrow/specific or broad/vague person and property, or coerce national organs or international organizations.” (Chinese definition Codes summarized in this category of terrorism) sketch the problem understanding that the EU and China hold of problem includes which target the EU and China security in general or specific e.g. ‘domestic concern’: “In China, understanding consider most important/relevant/affected by security issues in particular. They target the security issue and threats that might terrorism is understood mostly in grasp various facets of their emanate from it (e.g. does it affect domestic domestic terms.” understanding. concerns or global concerns?)

includes the institutional framework within which the security issue is handled (e.g. whether it is embedded in the foreign and e.g. references to the EUMSS as the institutional security policy making apparatus or into European framework to combat responsibility homeland security, whether it takes place piracy in the Gulf of Aden within multilateral frameworks or on bilateral level)

269 includes whether security as a policy “There were two reasons for field/the respective security issue is of high, selecting this region as a test case extent of salience medium or low salience for the EU and […] The first was the strategic China based on their exposure to the issue importance […] for the EU.” and possible vulnerability (referring to anti-piracy) “nontraditional security threats, includes whether the security issue is defined type of security such as […] terrorism, […] climate as a traditional or non-traditional security change.” includes the political values that are attached “The infiltration and spread of to the security issue and to threats that extremism is a hotbed for violence political values emanate from it (e.g. human rights, and terror, constituting a direct threat sovereignty, territorial integrity) to human rights.”

270 Coding scheme VII – IV4 mutual perceptions

Coding Explanation of category Codes Explanation of code Coding examples category

friends are tend to be bound in alliances, trust each “For China, the EU is a positive other and do not necessarily expect something in return actor, trustworthy and with good for services; their relationship extends beyond intentions […] especially when you friend pragmatic win-win constellations that promote mutual compare the EU to the US, the EU is benefits but cooperate because of aligning ideas, norms perceived more as a friend than as a and values competitor, despite competition.”

partners align for the purpose of creating win-win “I want to emphasize for China: we situations and mutual benefits/reduced costs; their partner need a partner like the EU and not relationship is often limited to certain situations only for economic aspects.” (temporally) or issue areas; partners trust each other Codes in this category express how the EU and mutual necessary counterparts work together although they China perceive each perceptions might lack trust; ideas, norms and values might be other the in the security diverging and cooperation only occurs because of the “China is a necessary and in some necessary realm. necessity to do so or because an issue can only be fields even unavoidable counterpart counterpart tackled in collaboration with the respective other; their for the EU.” relationship is always limited to certain situations (temporally) or issue areas rivals compete with each other which includes the use of violence for maximization of interests, however in a “I think they [the EU and China] are rival/competitor limited and calculated manner competitors there in many issues.”

enemies are characterized by threatening each other, enemy also with violence, in an unlimited manner; there is a “There is a mutual trust deficit.” lack of trust

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