Why Was the Policy for Ecosystem-Based Management in The

The presentation highlights Norwegian experiences: • Sander 2018a: “Against all odds? Implementing a policy for ecosystem‐based management of the Barents Sea.” Ocean and Coastal Management 2018; Vol 157, pp 111 ‐ 123. doi: 10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2018.01.020. but also makes some comparisons to Canada based on: • Sander 2018b: “Ecosystem‐based management in Canada and Norway: The importance of political leadership and effective decision‐making for implementation.” Ocean and Coastal Management 2018. Vol. 163, pp 485‐497. doi: 10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2018.08.005 . I have included telegram‐style notes to give some additional info to the slides, including links to relevant web sites. Summary of the article: Against all odds? Implementing ecosystem‐based ocean management in the Barents Sea The literature on ecosystem‐based ocean management has a bias towards understanding ecosystems at the sacrifice of political processes that may lead to effective policies. This presentation analyses the Barents Sea Management Plan according to implementation theory. Applying this well‐established tradition also in the marine realm may facilitate systematic learning of why policies succeed or fail. The 1 tradition focuses on the delivered policy, not the intended, and explains this output as the result of the policy formulation process, the properties of the policy and the implementation process. In this case: * The starting point for policy formulation was challenges described in ecosystem assessments that the ministries involved had to respond to. They received little advice on the design of effective measures. Major conflicts on oil, fisheries and the environment were negotiated at the highest political level in the cabinet. * The policy had broad and ambiguous objectives with operative targets only for the state of the ocean environment. The instruments reflect a traditional governmental policy style. No administrative structures for overseeing implementation were established, and no money was pre‐allocated. * Implementation was mostly based on the will and ability of the individual ministries. Despite no statutory basis for the plans and several breaches of traditional advice for successful implementation, most measures are put into practice. Thus, the Norwegian political‐administrative system managed to implement a complex policy effectively in a top‐down manner. However, it is not possible to tell whether these actions solved the original policy problems. A part of the explanation for this somewhat unexpected result is the context, with a political system characterized by a consensus‐seeking political culture, high trust, and a professional administration. The political origin of the management plans and the strong political support of the system is also noteworthy. Further explanations for the implementation results are the insights and political legitimacy achieved by a strong reliance on knowledge, the collaborative style of involving the ministries and the handling of conflicts with authoritative decisions from a cabinet in a parliamentary majority position. Summary of the article: Ecosystem‐based management in Canada and Norway: The importance of political leadership and effective decision‐making for implementation A comparison of a Norwegian and two Canadian management plans reveals that most of the measures in the Norwegian plan were put into practice, whereas the Canadian plans did not result in the implementation of any new measures. This paper applies implementation theory to explain the different results. First, there is a striking difference in the leadership of the two governments and the way they organized for the planning. The Norwegian government led the process in a top‐down manner and tried to apply a “whole‐of‐government” approach. The Canadian government delegated the entire task to the regional branches of one ministry alone. Thedifferentrolestakenmaybeexplainedbydifferentpoliticalandeconomiccontextsthatcreat edifferentmotivationsforthegovernmentstoengage.Second,there were different ways of deciding when conflicts arose. The Norwegian coalition government negotiated internal compromises in the form of package deals. In Canada, the collaborative planning based on consensus concealed disagreements in high‐level statements and pushed concrete 1 solutions forward to later action planning that never occurred. These processes reflect different national policy styles and resulted in policy designs that created a very different impetus for implementation. The analysis demonstrate how theory‐driven case‐study methodology can lead to cumulative results. 1 2 Scale matters for what I study and try to generalize about: Large ocean areas – not for instance smaller coastal areas. As will be seen in the framework for studying implementation (next slide), this implies that I must study ‐ the policy formulation process, ‐ the selected policy, particularly the choice of policy instruments (measures) ‐ the implementation process ‐the context 3 My ambition with applying implementation theory: I want to build a systematic, empirically founded basis for recommending what will work and what will not when making integrated plans for large ocean areas. Carefully selected case studies may gradually build a specific theory for this purpose. It may or may not be valid for other types of (marine) planning. The general implementation theory studies the delivered policy as opposed to the policy‐on‐paper as can be found in policy declarations and plans. Fundamental questions: What has been achieved? This can be measured by the delivered services or regulations, the output, or their further impacts, the outcomes. Why do we find these results? The theory takes the whole policy process into consideration when trying to explain results: Policy formulation: The phase from a problem is acknowledged and reaches the agenda of governments (“something must be done”), via assessments and public debates about the nature of the problem and its policy solutions, to the final adoption of a policy. Critical questions: Are conflicts solved? Does the policy build on a valid causal theory, linking the selected policy instruments to the desired outcomes? Are decision‐makers 4 serious about trying to address the problems, or are their behaviour more symbolic? Policy design, critical question: Will the means make it possible to reach the ends? Implementation process: Complex policies require collaboration between many organizations. Institutions collaborate because they: • are under the same hierarchy, for instance departments and agencies under a government • see benefits: mutual goals, or access to other’s resources (material resources, information, knowledge, access to decision‐makers etc etc) Street‐level bureaucrats have not been important in the cases I have studied, but to explain briefly: Large literature studying actors at the lowest level of public sector hierarchies, mostly in social services, schools, police etc. Very different views on their activities, often leading to modification of the policy as delivered: Are they clogs in the machinery and “saboteurs” of the political will from the top, led more by their own self interests than their manager’s instructions? Alternatively, are they the real heroes who, in close dialogue with their clients/target groups, understand the problems and find practicable solutions despite impossible policies and working conditions? Very few examples of application in resource management (I have found one article from Sweden). Could be applied for instance to study how coast guards, rangers in national parks etc. exercise public policies. 4 Answer to the first research question: Measures in the plans for the Barents Sea have been implemented. Main characteristic of the plan: The Norwegian government took an active role in the preparation and formulation of the plan. A classic top‐down approach. Background: Norway has divided its ocean space into three management plan areas. The following white papers with management plans have been presented: • Barents Sea: 2006, 2011 (update), 2015 (update on ice edge). A revision is under preparation, due for 2020 • Norwegian Sea: 2010, 2017 (update). The update is not translated • North Sea: 2013 Most of them are translated into English (not the 2015 update on the ice edge). See http://www.miljodirektoratet.no/no/Havforum/Forside/English/ More about the three white papers about the Barents Sea (pictures above): 2006: Several chapters based on the assessments. Concluded with a policy with objectives and a programme of measures. 5 2011: Agreement in 2006 to revisit the compromise on petroleum issues in 2010. Delayed to 2011, very much because of the blow‐out in the Gulf of Mexico and attempts to learn from that and re‐evaluate risks and measures for risk‐reduction. Despite this, the white paper had a wider scope than Lofoten‐Vesterålen and oil. Became a broad report on all relevant issues with an updated programme of measures. Objectives unchanged. 2015: New government: 2 + 2 parties. Agreement not to drill in ice infested waters. Unclear definition from Stoltenberg government on “ice infested waters”. Wanted to clarify and move ice edge northwards => Oil industry could mover too without breaking the agreement with the supporting parties. The white paper was rejected by the Parliament for formal reasons: it was not prepared according to the custom for how a management plan should be prepared. However, the Solberg government in practice has managed to apply their new definition of the ice edge in the licencing

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