The presentation highlights Norwegian experiences: • Sander 2018a: “? Implementing a policy for ecosystem‐based management of the Barents Sea.” Ocean and Coastal Management 2018; Vol 157, pp 111 ‐ 123. doi: 10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2018.01.020. but also makes some comparisons to Canada based on: • Sander 2018b: “Ecosystem‐based management in Canada and Norway: The importance of political leadership and effective decision‐making for implementation.” Ocean and Coastal Management 2018. Vol. 163, pp 485‐497. doi: 10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2018.08.005 .

I have included telegram‐style notes to give some additional info to the slides, including links to relevant web sites.

Summary of the article: Against all odds? Implementing ecosystem‐based ocean management in the Barents Sea The literature on ecosystem‐based ocean management has a bias towards understanding ecosystems at the of political processes that may lead to effective policies. This presentation analyses the Barents Sea Management Plan according to implementation theory. Applying this well‐established tradition also in the marine realm may facilitate systematic learning of why policies succeed or fail. The

1 tradition focuses on the delivered policy, not the intended, and explains this output as the result of the policy formulation process, the properties of the policy and the implementation process. In this case:

* The starting point for policy formulation was challenges described in ecosystem assessments that the ministries involved had to respond to. They received little advice on the design of effective measures. Major conflicts on oil, fisheries and the environment were negotiated at the highest political level in the cabinet.

* The policy had broad and ambiguous objectives with operative targets only for the state of the ocean environment. The instruments reflect a traditional governmental policy style. No administrative structures for overseeing implementation were established, and no money was pre‐allocated.

* Implementation was mostly based on the will and ability of the individual ministries.

Despite no statutory basis for the plans and several breaches of traditional advice for successful implementation, most measures are put into practice. Thus, the Norwegian political‐administrative system managed to implement a complex policy effectively in a top‐down manner. However, it is not possible to tell whether these actions solved the original policy problems.

A part of the explanation for this somewhat unexpected result is the context, with a political system characterized by a consensus‐seeking political culture, high trust, and a professional administration. The political origin of the management plans and the strong political support of the system is also noteworthy. Further explanations for the implementation results are the insights and political legitimacy achieved by a strong reliance on knowledge, the collaborative style of involving the ministries and the handling of conflicts with authoritative decisions from a cabinet in a parliamentary majority position.

Summary of the article: Ecosystem‐based management in Canada and Norway: The importance of political leadership and effective decision‐making for implementation A comparison of a Norwegian and two Canadian management plans reveals that most of the measures in the Norwegian plan were put into practice, whereas the Canadian plans did not result in the implementation of any new measures. This paper applies implementation theory to explain the different results. First, there is a striking difference in the leadership of the two governments and the way they organized for the planning. The Norwegian government led the process in a top‐down manner and tried to apply a “whole‐of‐government” approach. The Canadian government delegated the entire task to the regional branches of one ministry alone. Thedifferentrolestakenmaybeexplainedbydifferentpoliticalandeconomiccontextsthatcreat edifferentmotivationsforthegovernmentstoengage.Second,there were different ways of deciding when conflicts arose. The Norwegian coalition government negotiated internal compromises in the form of package deals. In Canada, the collaborative planning based on consensus concealed disagreements in high‐level statements and pushed concrete

1 solutions forward to later action planning that never occurred. These processes reflect different national policy styles and resulted in policy designs that created a very different impetus for implementation. The analysis demonstrate how theory‐driven case‐study methodology can lead to cumulative results.

1 2 Scale matters for what I study and try to generalize about: Large ocean areas – not for instance smaller coastal areas.

As will be seen in the framework for studying implementation (next slide), this implies that I must study ‐ the policy formulation process, ‐ the selected policy, particularly the choice of policy instruments (measures) ‐ the implementation process ‐the context

3 My ambition with applying implementation theory: I want to build a systematic, empirically founded basis for recommending what will work and what will not when making integrated plans for large ocean areas. Carefully selected case studies may gradually build a specific theory for this purpose. It may or may not be valid for other types of (marine) planning.

The general implementation theory studies the delivered policy as opposed to the policy‐on‐paper as can be found in policy declarations and plans. Fundamental questions: What has been achieved? This can be measured by the delivered services or regulations, the output, or their further impacts, the outcomes. Why do we find these results?

The theory takes the whole policy process into consideration when trying to explain results:

Policy formulation: The phase from a problem is acknowledged and reaches the agenda of governments (“something must be done”), via assessments and public debates about the nature of the problem and its policy solutions, to the final adoption of a policy. Critical questions: Are conflicts solved? Does the policy build on a valid causal theory, linking the selected policy instruments to the desired outcomes? Are decision‐makers

4 serious about trying to address the problems, or are their behaviour more symbolic?

Policy design, critical question: Will the means make it possible to reach the ends?

Implementation process: Complex policies require collaboration between many organizations. Institutions collaborate because they: • are under the same hierarchy, for instance departments and agencies under a government • see benefits: mutual goals, or access to other’s resources (material resources, information, knowledge, access to decision‐makers etc etc)

Street‐level bureaucrats have not been important in the cases I have studied, but to explain briefly: Large literature studying actors at the lowest level of public sector hierarchies, mostly in social services, schools, police etc. Very different views on their activities, often leading to modification of the policy as delivered: Are they clogs in the machinery and “saboteurs” of the political will from the top, led more by their own self interests than their manager’s instructions? Alternatively, are they the real heroes who, in close dialogue with their clients/target groups, understand the problems and find practicable solutions despite impossible policies and working conditions? Very few examples of application in resource management (I have found one article from Sweden). Could be applied for instance to study how coast guards, rangers in national parks etc. exercise public policies.

4 Answer to the first research question: Measures in the plans for the Barents Sea have been implemented.

Main characteristic of the plan: The Norwegian government took an active role in the preparation and formulation of the plan. A classic top‐down approach.

Background: Norway has divided its ocean space into three management plan areas. The following white papers with management plans have been presented: • Barents Sea: 2006, 2011 (update), 2015 (update on ice edge). A revision is under preparation, due for 2020 • Norwegian Sea: 2010, 2017 (update). The update is not translated • North Sea: 2013 Most of them are translated into English (not the 2015 update on the ice edge). See http://www.miljodirektoratet.no/no/Havforum/Forside/English/

More about the three white papers about the Barents Sea (pictures above):

2006: Several chapters based on the assessments. Concluded with a policy with objectives and a programme of measures.

5 2011: Agreement in 2006 to revisit the compromise on petroleum issues in 2010. Delayed to 2011, very much because of the blow‐out in the Gulf of Mexico and attempts to learn from that and re‐evaluate risks and measures for risk‐reduction. Despite this, the white paper had a wider scope than Lofoten‐Vesterålen and oil. Became a broad report on all relevant issues with an updated programme of measures. Objectives unchanged.

2015: New government: 2 + 2 parties. Agreement not to drill in ice infested waters. Unclear definition from Stoltenberg government on “ice infested waters”. Wanted to clarify and move ice edge northwards => Oil industry could mover too without breaking the agreement with the supporting parties. The white paper was rejected by the Parliament for formal reasons: it was not prepared according to the custom for how a management plan should be prepared. However, the Solberg government in practice has managed to apply their new definition of the ice edge in the licencing policy, which is the purview of the Government, not the Parliament.

5 Answer to the first research question: Measures in the plans for the Eastern Scotian Shelf (ESSIM) and Placenta Bay/Grand Banks have not been implemented.

Main characteristic of the plan: The planning was delegated completely to the regional level of one minstry alone – the DFO. A bottom‐up, or maybe rather bottom‐bottom approach since approval by the federal government was unclear.

Bacground: The LOMA plans built on an extensive policy framework:

The Oceans Act (1996) The Oceans Strategy (2002) The Policy and operational framework for integrated management … (2002) The Oceans Action Plan (2005) The Health of the Oceans (2007)

6 What I describe, is the planning in the oceans, which is a national (state) responsibility. It is a very different system from the decentralized system for coastal planning, administered primarily by the municipalities.

Background information: First context: Norway is a unitary state, as opposed to Canada’s federal state. There are three administrative levels: the state, the counties (regions) and the municipalities. The difference from Canada’s provinces/territories and first nation’s agreements, is that the counties and municipalities are not sovereigns themselves with legislative power. In Norway, the state, represented by the King as the head of state (very similar role as the Governor General), is the only sovereign. The state can delegate tasks to lower administrative levels, first of all by legislation. This is typical for instance with social services, health and education, where the municipalities and the counties/regions act as service providers on behalf of the state. On the other hand, there is a long tradition in Norway that the municipalities work broadly across all issues that are of local relevance (“municipal autonomy”), though they can not take over the responsibilities of the state or the counties. Supplementary/overlapping mandates can create multi‐level collaboration, whereas different interests may lead to political power plays, but also trigger mechanisms for conflict resolution.

The Planning and Building Act applies to all land‐use planning in Norway. Since the mid 1980s, it has gradually expanded its scope and relevance into the coastal areas. Now the geographical scope includes all land and water out to 1 nm outside of the baseline. The law creates a decentralized system where the municipalities play the main role in planning. Counties and the

7 state may also make plans according to the law, usually of a more strategic nature. In the coastal zone, government agencies participate in the local planning and ensure that the government’s interests and priorities are taken into account (such interests are specified by the government in various policy documents). As a last resort, a ministry or a government agency may block the municipalities’ adoption of a plan if against national interests. Government agencies also issue discharge permits etc. according to other sectorial legislation.

The management plans are pragmatic as regards the delimitation to the coastal zone. The assessments incorporate the coastal zone, including land, if that is relevant. For instance, it is not meaningful to study birds only in the open sea when almost all the data on populations etc traditionally have come from the hatching areas on land (prior to SEAPOP – see later slide). Regarding the measures, however, at least the Barents Sea management plan does not contain actions pertaining to the mandates of municipal or regional municipalities in the coastal zone (aquaculture, for instance, is not covered, though it might move off‐shore in the future). I have not checked, but it may be slightly different in the plan for the North Sea, where run‐off of contaminants from land‐based activities have considerable impacts in the coastal zone and even the ocean, despite decades with efforts from the municipalities (sewage etc) and state agencies (agriculture etc.) to clean up.

7 Starting in 2001, we find a series of political platforms for coalition governments containing compromises over petroleum activities: • The Sem declaration of the Bondevik government (“Centre – conservative”: H, V and KrF in minority coalition after elections in 2001). The impetus for the first and only white paper describing Norwegian ocean policy (see picture) • The Soria Moria I and II declarations of the Stoltenberg governments (“Centre – left”: AP, SP and SV in majority coalition after elections in 2005 and 2009) • The Nydalen agreement in 2013 for the Solberg government (“Conservative – populist”: H and FrP governing from a minority position, but in majority when support from V and KrF according to this agreement). • The Jeløya platform: General election in 2017: H and FrP first continued with Erna Solberg as prime minister, without a written agreement with supporting parties. When V (the Liberals) joined the government in January 2018, the three parties wrote the Jeløya platform. The Solberg government still does not have support from a majority in Parliament. The major issues addressed in the platforms are opening/closure of ocean areas for petroleum, though guidelines for the licencing policy also has been important.

The coupling of the petroleum agenda with EBM in the 2002 white paper can be understood as a policy (EBM) finding its problem (the oil conflict) and finally rising to the government’s agenda (ref Kingston on agenda‐setting). The petroleum conflict has

8 shaped the Norwegian version of EBM. It is not possible to understand the policy without relating it to this conflict. It receives most public and political attention, but has – through the management plans – contributed to higher interest also in other issues related to the oceans. The Parliament therefore has asked for revisions of the plans every fourth year and more thorough revisions every 12th year.

Notes: 1. There is no statutory basis for the management plans. The sectorial administrations, on the other hand, are based on legislation. 2. This white paper is the first and only one giving a holistic view of Norwegian ocean policy. The policy has gradually evolved and been described in subsequent white papers for the respective management areas.

The Steering group consists of civil servants from nine ministries. In the beginning, it was only four. The others have joined later – voluntarily.

8 9 Delimitation between the management plan areas were done according to ecological principles – not jurisdiction (the outer boundaries, howeveer, follow Norwegian jurisdiction). Note particularly how the Barents Sea is defined to capture the Lofoten area – important spawning ground for cod and other fish stocks migrating into the Barents Sea. Since there also are petroleum resources there, this has been the area where the political conflict has been most severe; it is tempting to call it «the battle of Lofoten» (which still rages).

The delimitations were made by the Steering group early in the planning process.. That was not an issue for negotiations or debate afterwards.

ESSIM: The project did the delimitation. Disagreements over delimitation became a major conflict with neighbouring province and the minister in DFO.

10 All the reports here, indicated by the squares (some squares are larger processes with lots of sub‐reports), were commissioned by the joint Steering Group. In 2002 – 06, each of the participating ministries instructed their subordinate agencies in parallel to participate. After 2006, the agencies were organized jointly into the Management Forum. Main point: there is a top‐down approach to science where the government defined what was needed and relevant. However, there were no restriction on the results, apart from an instruction to reach consensus as far as practicable. Which the agencies did, and which had an important political impact.

“Trial and error” in the preparation for the Barents Sea plan. Successful enough to become the model for the Norwegian Sea + North Sea management plans.

Decision by the steering group in the beginning: No new research – use what is available, compile what you know! Controversial, but in hindsight, wise.

Three phases: 1) State of ecosystem + certain socioeconomics (see figure), 2) Sectorial impact assessments, 3) Cumulative impact assessments + various reports for instance on environmental quality objectives and vulnerability, the latter not shown in the figure.

11 A general characteristic of this type of processes: co‐production of knowledge between science and politics.

Public participation was good in the preparation of the scientific reports. Put on display, public review. To a certain degree, stakeholders used that to give their opinions on policy options as well. The process in the government that produced the policy, however, was closed. There were no formal opportunities for stakeholders to give their opinions until the hearing of the white papers before discussion in a sub‐committee in the Storting.

There are many papers describing the planning processes. See for instance: • Hoel, A. H. (Ed.) (2008). Best practices in Ecosystem‐based Oceans Management in the Arctic (Vol. 129). Tromsø: Norwegian Polar Institute. (See chapter about Norway. Available at https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/173244 ) • Knol, M. (2010a). Constructing knowledge gaps in Barents Sea management: how uncertainties become objects of risk. Maritime Anthropological Studies, 9(1), 61 ‐ 79. • Knol, M. (2010b). Scientific advice in integrated ocean management: The process towards the Barents Sea plan. Marine Policy, 34(2), 252‐260. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2009.07.009 • Olsen, E., Gjøsæter, H., Røttingen, I., Dommasnes, A., Fossum, P., & Sandberg, P. (2007). The Norwegian ecosystem‐based management plan for the Barents Sea: a case study. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64(4), 599‐602. doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsm005 • von Quillfeldt, C., Olsen, E., Dommasnes, A., & Vongraven, D. (2009). Integrated ecosystem‐based management of the Barents Sea ‐ Lofoten area. In E. Sakshaug, G. Johnsen, & K. Kovacs (Eds.), Ecosystem Barents Sea (pp. 17). Trondheim: Tapir. • MESMA: EU‐project with case‐studies of the Barents Sea management plan http://www.mesma.org/default.asp?ZNT=S0T1O726

11 Lofoten – Vesterålen is the object for the hardest battles between the oil industry on the one side, and fisheries and environmental organizations on the other. The ice edge also has become highly contested after the 2015 white paper.

An attempt to work on a finer geographical scale with environmental values in Norwegian marine areas: http://www.havmiljo.no/ (press English)

12 Complete analysis: multidisciplinary with social sciences major role in first arrow and natural sciences in the second.

«Traditional managerial knowledge»: what the civil servant believed would work. Which may or may not be correct.

13 Political conflicts: The conflicts involved both vested interests in the ministries and the different policies of the political parties in the coalition. In the Stoltenber government, the three ministries at the figure were lead by ministers from each of the three coalition partners.

14 Context: All the first‐time management plans for the three management areas (+ the Barents Sea update from 2011) were prepared by the majority Stoltenberg government (2005 – 2013). Therefore the policy in reality was decided in these internal processes in the government. With minority governments (Bondevik 2001 – 2005, and Solberg 2013 ‐ ), the political dynamic is different; Parliament can dictate the government.

In the steering group, the ministries collectively had to find ways to address the challenges described in the assessments. The assessments shaped the understanding of the situations – learning. However, still disagreements. The civil servants tried as far as possible to find solutions that they thought would be politically feasible. When they could not reach agreement, conflicts were handed over to their political superiors, who negotiated compromises through various mechanisms (see figure).

The political level was mobilized step‐wise. Usually state secretaries (sort of deputy ministers) from 2 – 3 ministries would meet and try to settle the dispute. Many controversies fisheries – environment were solved this way. When they could not agree, the cabinet got involved. First a cabinet memorandum was made, describing the disagreement. If the cabinet in a meeting with all ministers did not find a solution, which they seldom did, it was delegated. The Stoltenberg government used two different mechanisms: • In 2006: The cabinet sub‐committee. That is a kind of inner cabinet in coalition

15 governments consisting of the prime minister, the leaders of the parties in the coalition, and a few relevant ministers. Similar developments in many European states have concentrated political power. • In 2011: Internal mediation between the relevant ministers led by a minister without a portfolio at the Prime minister’s office. This mechanism gradually replaced the other one in the Stoltenberg government simply because the highest ranking politicians “drowned” in too many cases and details.

These processes illustrate how a government try to achieve cross‐sectorial coordination in a system built up of hierarchical sectorial administrations.

15 :

16 Problems: • Objectives: Unclear: “Keep everybody on board” Little guidance for further policy development and management

• Ecosystem targets and indicators: * Role: How to explain if (not) reached?

* How to balance against other competing objectives? Guide for trade‐offs?

ESSIM and PB/GB: Also unclear general objectives. Difference: no goals for the ecosystem with indicators.

17 Basically little to tell about the implementation processes: the system worked as it was supposed to, in this case (which one should not interpret as necessarily typical for all Norwegian policies!)

18 Note the symbols I use on the slides to characterize implementation:

V = implemented, ‐ = not implemented, ? = status unknown

19 MSP: The BSMP has been reported as a case of MSP in several publications. That is debatable. It depends on the definition of and expectations to MSP.

Reason for the result: Opposition from various sectors Improved portal of data and maps instead.

MPAs: None in the Barents Sea – a few in the plan for the Norwegian Sea Opposition particularly from fisheries sector The Storting has ordered a plan (2016)

20 The reporting from the monitoring is presented on the internet. Regular assessment reports are also prepared by the Monitoring Group – a sub‐group under the Management Forum. See • Barents Sea: http://www.miljostatus.no/tema/hav‐og‐ kyst/barentshavet/miljotilstanden‐i‐barentshavet/ • Norwegian Sea: http://www.miljostatus.no/tema/hav‐og‐ kyst/norskehavet/miljotilstanden‐i‐norskehavet/ • North Sea: http://www.miljostatus.no/tema/hav‐og‐kyst/nordsjoen‐og‐ skagerrak/miljotilstanden‐i‐nordsjoen‐og‐skagerrak/

(unfortunately only in Norwegian. You will still get an impression of indicators etc without knowing the language, and may use google translate or similar)

21 The table illustrates more in detail (an early version of) how the indicators were linked to action thresholds. The column with reference value shows how the baseline for comparison was defined.

Note: Covers only the status of the ecosystem, not socioeconomics. The revised Barents Sea management plan (2020) will include more socioconomics than the first one, though it remains to be seen if there will be a parallel system of indicators.

22 Ap 150 mill CaD over 12 years for MAREANO + SEAPOP + Geological surveys. An unknown amount of money has been spent on other research initiatives that are relevant for the management plans.

MAREANO in English: http://www.mareano.no/en SEAPOP in English: http://www.seapop.no/en The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (responsible for i.a. resourceestimates): http://www.npd.no/en/

23 First context: The management of the petroleum resources in Norway according to the Petroleum Act, takes the starting point that all areas are closed. To open an area for exploration, an SEA is made and sent on public hearing before the Storting (parliament) takes a position on opening the area or letting it remain closed. This is the opposite of Canada, where areas as a starting point are open and eventually must be closed by a political decision.

The Framework illustrated on these maps was new in 2006 and came on top of the sectorial management of the petroleum industry. The management of offshore oil and gas is based on the Petroleum Act and under the responsibility of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, see description here: http://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/

The blue areas have restrictions on petroleum activities: completely banned (dark blue), or with restrictions on season for activities etc. In some cases, these areas had not been legally opened before (Lofoten – Vesterålen). The majority of the areas, however, had been legally opened, so the decision according to this framework meant closing them again. Previously un‐opened areas will need to be re‐assessed and opened by the Storting. A decision to start this process can be taken in the management plan. Previously opened areas that have been politically shut down with this new framework, may be opened according to a new political decision, for instance in the management

24 plan (the lack of formal rules for the management plans means that there are several possibilities for how such a decision may be taken).

In 2006, most of the valuable and vulnerable areas were completely closed (dark blue).

In 2011, the new compromise maintained the Lofoten area closed for petroleum activities. The “conservation camp”, however, had to give up other restricted areas as a compensation for this victory, meaning that the petroleum activities could expand. The former disputed zone towards Russia was also opened up after an SEA and decision in the Storting (the process was initiated in a management plan).

24 Most important: Routing + Traffic service Centre in Vardø with many roles for the whole coastline and for daily collaboration with Russian authorities

25 26 The simpler and more cost‐effective approach to managing commercial stocks that we have less information about, and/or which are fished in smaller quantities, is described in: Gullestad, P., Abotnes, A. M., Bakke, G., Skern‐Mauritzen, M., Nedreaas, K., & Søvik, G. (2017). Towards ecosystem‐based fisheries management in Norway – Practical tools for keeping track of relevant issues and prioritising management efforts. Marine Policy, 77, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.11.032

IUU‐fishing is now almost zero for the largest commercial stocks according to ICES and bilateral Russian‐Norwegian fisheries commission. Was a large problem before.

New Act replaced old act for salt water fisheries. Introduced i.a. EAF and precautionary principle. Gave the fisheries administration a new mandate to regulate bottom trawling and other harmful activities (done by area closures and by requiring stop in fisheries when maximum amount of spongues and corals are exceeded in a trawl haul)

Sea‐birds: More knowledge and collaboration scientists – Fisheries Directorate => reduced conflict, but no new measures from the fisheries administriation. The Storting is worried and has requested an action plan for sea bird species in decline.

27 Photo: A Glaucus Gull at Bear Island, dying at the nest after all body reserves of fat were depleted. Analysis if the carcass revealed high concentrations of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs). Bear Island is a hot spot for contaminants due to ocean and air currents and local meteorological conditions. The Glaucus Gull is a top predator, accumulating lipophile POPs in fat tissue.

28 29 30 31 Problematic sides of political belief in knowledge: • Popular democracy challenged by experts • Facts v.s. values • Pick and choose the facts that suit you • Strategic games about uncertainty and needs for more knowledge

The Parliament wants: * Regular updates every 4th year * Revisions every 12th year

32 Role of the sectors: No split policy formation – implementation, ref Pressmann and Wildavsky who characterized this as «the real devil» in implementation.

33 «We won what we had to win. But we also had to lose something.« (ex secretary of state, leading negotiations from one of the parties in the Stoltenberg government)

«I was very keen on not creating winners and losers, but to try to find joint solutions. It was my understanding that Jens Stoltenberg was too.» (former minister without portifolio at the Prime minister’s office, acting as internal mediator in the last years of the Stoltenberg government)

34 35 36 Regional monitoring: • See links above to the monitoring and reporting from the management plans (Norwegian only) • MOSJ covers land, ocean and atmosphere in «the Norwegian Arctic». It is based on pressures and state, to a limited degree also impacts. Note the pyramid that indicates how MOSJ selects – and delives – indicators of strategic relevance to environmental reporting: http://www.mosj.no/en/about/

BarentsWatch is «under construction». Not everything is translated. It will become the platform for exchange of marine and maritime data between governmentagenciesfor MSP (so far in each sector) and other purposes. There is a closed part of the system that is i.a. used for collaboration in emergency situations.

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