UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Date: 11-May-2010

I, Carrie Galsworthy , hereby submit this original work as part of the requirements for the degree of: Doctor of Philosophy in Classics It is entitled: Language and Intent in Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle

Student Signature: Carrie Galsworthy

This work and its defense approved by: Committee Chair: Holt Parker, PhD Holt Parker, PhD

William Johnson, PhD William Johnson, PhD

Susan Prince, PhD Susan Prince, PhD

5/28/2010 621 Language and Intent in Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the Department of Classics of the College of Arts and Sciences

by

Carrie Galsworthy

B.A. (Honours) The University of Western Ontario (Canada), 1994 M.A. The University of Western Ontario (Canada), 1996

May 2010 Abstract

In this dissertation, I analyze how Empedocles uses language to present himself and his intent. Although Empedocles’ contemporaries and more modern readers present him as a scientist or magician, he portrays himself as a god and claims that he will teach others to become a god like him in order to manipulate the universe. In Chapter One, I examine the concept of science from an Aristotelian bias and from the standpoint of modern expectations of science to show that, despite verses that describe how the world works, Empedocles does not follow the patterns of active conversation with other thinkers that are available. His stated intent (fragment 111) is to teach others how to control the universe – cure disease and old age, affect the weather, and raise the dead – rather than learn about it theoretically. In Chapter Two, I will show that although the claims that he makes link him to magicians, he does not present himself as one. Magicians act as intermediaries between men and the gods (at least in the time contemporary with Empedocles); the gods do as the magicians ask them because the magicians have built up a successful relationship through sacrifices and incantations. Empedocles, on the other hand, accomplishes these feats on his own as a god. Chapter Three sets out what sort of god Empedocles is: he is a mortal, long-lived god in contrast with the immortal gods – Love, Strife, and the four roots (fire, water, air, and earth). Anyone can become a god, as I illustrate, as long as one is pure enough and wise enough. Chapter Four returns to Empedocles’ use of language to express his intent. Since controlling the world can be a dangerous lesson, Empedocles uses ambiguity and the model of initiation into a mystery intentionally to conceal the lessons from hoi polloi. The audience must decode Empedocles’ message before they can make further observations of the world on their way to meeting their goal. Following the model for initiation, the readers will come to the ultimate revelation on their own. Finally, Chapter Five focuses on what can be determined from Empedocles verses: the readers must learn how to emulate the actions of Love and Strife since they are the active agents of change in the world. By learning about how the world works from Empedocles’ verses and their own observation, his students, as gods themselves, will also influence the fabric of the universe to achieve whatever they wish.

ii iii Acknowledgements

A project this big is not done without support. My committee has been invaluable as I developed my own ideas and got my researcher’s legs under me. Holt Parker handled my questions with grace; William Johnson asked piercing questions of me and my text; Susan Prince provided much insight into where this project can go next. My greatest thanks go to Ann Michelini who started this project with me as I grappled with the material; this project would not be what it has become without her asking that I push myself and my ideas further.

For research support, the staff of the John Miller Burnham Classical Library – Jacquie, Mike, David, and Jean – manage the best collection and have all been helpful personally. I have benefited from the generous financial support of the Classics Department with the Semple Fellowship, teaching assignments, and a summer term with the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. All the faculty have been supportive in and out of the classroom, contributing to my development as a scholar and a teacher. A doctoral fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC) has also assisted me in accomplishing my goals.

My friends have contributed to the successful completion of this project. The members of the Dissertation Discussion Group over the years – Carol Hershenson, Kathleen Quinn, Julie Hruby, Shari Stocker, Joanne Murphy, Jim Newhard, Susan Wise, Anne Feltovich, and Allison Sterrett-Krause – have listened to my problems, helped me to solve them, and reminded me just how important friendship is. The same goes for other friends and colleagues who are too numerous to name – in the academic sphere and out – who have lightened the load with stories and laughter in the tearoom, in the classroom, and in the “real” world. I need especially to thank my colleagues at Miami University who have become my friends – Judith de Luce, Deborah Lyons, Denise McCoskey, Steve Nimis, Peter Rose, Zara Torlone, and Steve Tuck.

Finally, I thank my family for their unwavering belief that I could do anything – my grandparents, my parents, Ken and Nancy, who helped in so many ways that it would take forever to list just a few, and my little boy, Nick, who tells me I’m awesome (until I say that we can’t have chocolate for supper). Who rocks, baby? That’s right, we do.

iv Table of Contents

Abstract ii Acknowledgements iv Introduction 1

Chapter 1 – Empedocles the Scientist 7

Part 1: Looking for Reasons Why 11

1.1 Aristotle Judges the Presocratics 12 1.2 Modern Scholars on the Presocratics 16 1.3 Empedocles as Presocratic Scientist 18

Part 2: Communicating with Others 23

2.1 Competition and Debate 24 2.1.1 Presocratics Respond to Divine Explanations 29 2.1.2 Presocratics Respond to Other Presocratics 33 2.2 Empedocles’ Lessons 38 2.2.1 Empedocles’ Criticism – Fragment 2 39 2.2.2 Empedocles’ Criticism – Fragment 39 42 2.2.3 A Different Focus 46 2.3 Clarity and Persuasion 49 2.3.1 Aristotle on “Uncommon” Language and Science 54 2.4 Empedocles’ Intent 59

Chapter 2 – Empedocles the Magician 64

Part 1: Why Magic? 65

1.1 Atoning for Wrongs 69 1.1.1 Repercussions for Unavenged Murder 73 1.1.2 Helping the Souls of the Dead 79 1.2 Bewitching People 81 1.3 Curing Disease 84 1.4 Affecting the Environment 88

v Part 2: Was Empedocles a Magician? 91

2.1 Empedocles’ Claims against Magicians’ Claims 92 2.1.1 Atoning for Wrongs 93 2.1.2 Bewitching People 94 2.1.3 Curing Disease 95 2.1.4 Affecting Weather 96 2.2 Empedocles’ Presentation and Others’ Perceptions 97

Chapter 3 – Empedocles the God 105

Part 1: What are the Gods? 106

1.1 Unchanging and Immortal 107 1.1.1 The Roots 108 1.1.2 Love and Strife 112 1.2 Empedocles’ Mortal Gods 116 1.2.1 Empedocles’ model for the long-lived gods 117 1.2.2 The Composition of the Sphere 119

Part 2: Becoming a god 123

2.1 Transmigration 126 2.1.1 The daimones 128 2.1.2 The Necessity of Transmigration 132 2.2 Escaping the Cycle? 133 2.2.1 Being Pure 134 2.2.2 Being Wise 136

Chapter 4 – Empedocles’ Mystery 141

Part 1: Ambiguity 141

1.1 A Tradition of Ambiguity 143 1.1.1 Oracles and Ambiguous Language 144 1.1.2 Allegory and Mystery Relgion 146 1.2 Empedocles’ Ambiguity 153 1.2.1 Not a Tell-All 154 1.2.2 A Desire to Obscure 158 1.3 Empedocles’ Secret 163

Part 2: Empedocles’ Initiation 169

2.1 The Journey of Initiation 172

vi 2.1.1 Fragment 110 173 2.2 The παράδοσις in Empedocles’ Text 176 2.2.1 Fragment 6 – An Example 178 2.3 The Rest of the Journey – The ἐποπτεῖα 185 2.3.1 Sensation 187 2.3.2 Thinking 191

Chapter 5 – The Revelation 198

Part 1: The Nature of the Cosmic Cycle 199

1.1 Repetition in the Cycle 208 1.1.1 Fragment 17 209 1.1.2 Fragment 26 211 1.2 The Necessity of the Cycle 214

Part 2: How the Cosmic Cycle Operates 215

2.1 The Roots 217 2.1.1 How the Root Parts Fit Together 220 2.1.2 The Attraction of Like to Like 223 2.2 Love 226 2.2.1 Love Combines Unlike Things 227 2.2.2 The One 232 2.3 Strife 239 2.3.1 Strife Separates Unlike Things 240 2.3.2 Strife’s Ultimate Goal – The Many 243 Conclusion 254 Works Cited 256

vii Introduction

Empedocles is an enigmatic figure. On the one hand, his efforts to explain how the world works link him with contemporaries, whom Aristotle calls natural philosophers

(φυσικοί or φυσιολόγοι). On the other hand, he also writes about the nature of the soul and claims further that he could manipulate the world at his whim. Empedocles, however, does not present himself as a man who outlines how the world works for its own sake, nor does he present himself as a magician. Empedocles claims to be a god and his intent is to teach others how they, too, can become gods and control the universe. Empedocles, therefore, has written about how the world operates, so that his students will gain the knowledge and power they need to control the world as gods. They, moreover, must have pure souls so that they can ascend to perfection of form; Empedocles, therefore, sets out how one can achieve sufficient purity. Since this message is too dangerous for the consumption of οἱ πολλοί, Empedocles followed the tradition of ambiguity used by archaic authors and by the mysteries in order to conceal his message purposefully, thus aggravating potential misinterpretation of his verses. These are extraordinary claims that will affect our understanding of Empedocles.

Various fragments and testimonia reveal the many aspects of Empedocles’ self- identity. Fragments that describe phenomena from the cosmic cycle (how the world comes into being and ends) to his theories on the development of embryos reveal his interest in what we would call science. On the basis of such evidence, Aristotle’s placement of Empedocles in the tradition of presocratic philosophers appears apt. Yet

1 there is evidence that sets Empedocles apart from them at the same time. There are references to Empedocles’ concern for the soul that elucidate his beliefs in reincarnation and transmigration of the soul linking him to mystery religions and the akousmatikoi of the Pythagoreans. Finally, the testimonia and fragment 111 establish his ability to perform magic, for example, controlling the wind and restoring life to the dead.

The various sources that provide a glimpse of Empedocles’ other characteristics exacerbate the challenge of interpreting Empedocles and his verses. The sources fail to give a complete picture individually since they provide both direct quotations and interpretive descriptions of Empedocles’ doctrine in accordance with their own interests.

Aristotle and his successors emphasize scientific theories of the universe while the neo-

Platonists discuss Empedocles’ philosophy on the soul, often considered a religious topic;

Empedocles’ magical powers are preserved in biographical fragments (specifically B111 and B112) and testimonia. There is little overlap among the sources for science, magic, or religion. Modern scholars then interpreted the various aspects as incompatible, a position aggravated by contemporary biases, especially Frazer’s tripartite division of magic, religion, and science.1

This strict distinction in the sources and modern prejudices made it impossible for the

19th and early 20th century scholars to accept that Empedocles could be a religious figure, as some sources maintain, since Aristotle insists he is a scientist. Some suggested that

Empedocles was philosophically inconsistent while others proposed that later in life

Empedocles either converted to a life of faith or lost his faith altogether.2 Diogenes

1 Frazer 1922 The Golden Bough. 2 Rohde 1925 (382-83), Millerd 1908 (89-94), and Jaeger 1947 (132-35) argued that Empedocles did not fully think through the implications of his philosophy. Diels 1898 (406) and Wilamowitz 1929 (655) believed that a latter life conversion led to the production of the Καθαρµοί while Bidez 1894 (160-71) and

2 Laërtius speaks of two poems (τὰ µὲν οὖν Περὶ Φύσεως αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ Καθαρµοὶ εἰς ἔπη

τείνουσι πεντασκισχίλια (Lives of Philosophers 8.77 = DK 31A1) “His works ‘On

Nature’ and ‘Purifications’ extend to 5000 lines”)3 and this allowed scholars to separate the fragments. Editors assigned those fragments that describe the physical world to Περὶ

Φύσεως and those with religious overtones to Καθαρµοί, primarily his doctrine of the soul’s reincarnation, the hierarchy of souls, and prescriptions associated with reincarnation, especially those against animal sacrifice and the consumption of meat.4

Scholars originally discounted the claims of magic in fragment 111 altogether or minimized them because such a label was considered pejorative in the 19th century when magic was viewed as primitive, the source from which religion and then science evolved.5

Scholars, however, subsequently argued that the distinction between Empedocles’ theories of reincarnation and of how the world works is a mirage.6 The evolutionary model of magic, religion, and science has been rejected. The problem of unity for

Empedocles’ thought is now generally set aside and manifests itself primarily in the question of whether Empedocles wrote one poem or two. If all of Empedocles’ doctrines are closely entwined, this might support the belief that he wrote only one poem. 7 Others

Kranz 1935 (111-19) proposed that the later years were marked by a loss of faith and the Καθαρµοί were written in his youth. 3 Empedocles addressed the Καθαρµοί to the citizens of Acragas (Diogenes Laërtius Lives 8.54) and Περὶ Φύσεως to Pausanias (ibid. 8.60). 4 Long 1949 (144). 5 Karsten 1838, van Groningen 1956. 6 Nestle 1906 first argued this position. Other scholars to follow this trend include: Long 1949, Kahn 1960, Guthrie 1965 (2:134-38, 244-65), Barnes 1967, Babut 1976, Wright 1981 (57-76), Osborne 1987, Inwood 2001, Kingsley 1995a. 7 Osborne 1987 (24-32) made this claim first. Inwood 2001 (8-19), McKirahan 1994 (256-258), and Trépanier 2004 (1-30) are among supporters for this interpretation. Not everyone shares this interpretation,

3 argue, on the other hand, that the poems should not be considered separate on the basis of subject matter, but on the variation between audiences, that is, the Καθαρµοί was written for a more general audience (exoteric) and Περὶ Φύσεως for a more specific and learned listener (esoteric).8

Despite recognition of the unity of Empedocles’ thought, the Aristotelian bias regarding the study of Empedocles’ physical theories persists: οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν

Ὁµήρῳ καὶ Ἐµπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ µέτρον, διὸ τὸν µὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ

φυσιολόγον µᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν. (Aristotle Poetics 1447b17ff. = DK 31A22) “And there is nothing common between Homer and Empedocles except for the metre, wherefore it is right to call the former a poet, and the latter a physiologos rather than a poet.” Aristotle makes two equally important claims: 1) that Empedocles is a physiologos and, therefore, seeks simply to describe the nature of the world, and 2) that Empedocles is not a poet, and this mode of delivery prevents a clear presentation9 of what Aristotle argues is

Empedocles’ message. Scholars continue to treat Empedocles’ fragments as though it were his intent to produce a complete and coherent account of how the world operates as

Aristotle expects of the physikoi, rather than as a means to an end, that is, to gain control over the world as a god. This is evident in a recent analysis of Empedocles:

The over-arching goal of Empedocles’ poem, I have argued so far, was to convert the hearer to a new, unified vision of reality, one whose initial expression was put forth in fragment 17/ensemble a. By such an undertaking, Empedocles not only sought to restore legitimacy to the project of inquiry into nature, called into question by

for example, Sedley 1989 (270-74) and O’Brien 1995 (431-436). Hesiod, for example, wrote two distinct poems with closely entwined doctrines (Clay 2003). 8 Kahn 1974 (429ff.). Kingsley 1995a (chapter 23) develops this interpretation more fully; he repeats it in 1996 and 2002 (344-50). 9 Aristotle Rhetoric 1407a31-7.

4 Parmenides, but also claimed to provide his own final answer to that quest. (Trépanier 2004: 181).

Empedocles does describe how the world works – a significant percentage of the extant fragments illustrate the cosmic cycle, that is, the framework for creation, and the construction of various components within the cycle. But his goal is not simply to establish the structure since fragment 111 constitutes a statement of Empedocles’ intent.

Aristotle’s definition of physikos has limited our interpretation of Empedocles. The extant fragments and Empedocles’ social and intellectual context reveal a philosophy with practical implications. Like a mystery religion, Empedocles will help his students, the initiates, become pure, learn the lessons they require, and acquire the final revelation – control over the world.

Chapter 1 examines the concept of “scientist” both from a point of view contemporary with Empedocles and from the more modern definition. In both cases, clear communication designed to share theories is necessary. Aristotle is right when he claims that Empedocles is ambiguous and never provided a complete account of how the world works. What the readers see, however, is a promise to learn how to cure disease, control the weather, and raise the dead (fragment 111). Chapter 2 investigates the various skills attributed to magicians roughly contemporary with Empedocles and how they claim to accomplish these things. Magicians perform these feats by seeking help from the gods;

Empedocles, however, claims to be a god himself and thus does not present himself as a magician. Chapter 3 explores Empedocles’ concept of divinity: he posits two kinds of gods, immortal and mortal. The immortal gods are Love, Strife, and the four roots (fire, air, water, earth); the mortal gods are compounds that are perfectly balanced in their composition of roots and have Love spread throughout. Empedocles claims to be a mortal

5 god who achieved this state through living purely and being wise. Chapter 4 examines the tradition of divine ambiguity in which Empedocles presents his ideas and how he expects the readers to undergo an initiation of interpreting text balanced with careful examination of the world in order to understand how the universe really works. Finally chapter 5 looks at Empedocles’ cosmological fragments to show that the lesson the readers will derive is how Love and Strife are able to manipulate the world. If the readers can mimic how Love unites the roots and Strife separates them while respecting the roots’ innate attraction of like to like, they, too, should be able to manipulate the world as Empedocles promises in fragment 111.

6 Chapter 1 – Empedocles the Scientist

As I note in the introduction, analysis of Empedocles’ verses have traditionally relied on putting him into one of two categories – “scientist” or magician. Each seemed natural to those labeling him thus owing to the content of his verses and the various testimonia about him; Aristotle, for example, says that Empedocles should be called a “scientist”

(physiologos) rather than a poet: οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὁµήρῳ καὶ Ἐµπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ

µέτρον· διὸ τὸν µὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον µᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν

(Aristotle Poetics 1447b17ff. = DK 31A221) “And there is nothing common between

Homer and Empedocles except for the metre, wherefore it is right to call the former a poet, and the latter a physiologos rather than a poet.” The Presocratics recognized that they were pursuing an investigation of nature that differed from what came before them in that they did not rely on the gods to explain natural phenomena such as the motion of the sun or earthquakes.2 But did Empedocles include himself among them? I will explore this question from two points of view: Aristotle, who is often called the first historian of science3, and modern historians of science who continue to identify Empedocles as a scientist.

1 I use the Diels-Kranz text. I will note any variations. 2 Various presocratics attempted to remove divine agency from meteorological phenomena in particular, but they still believed that the gods were part of the world. Anaximander accounted for wind, rain, thunder and lightning, and storms (Hippolytus Refutatio 1.6.7 = DK 12A11, Aetius 3.3.1-2 = DK 12A23). Anaximenes accounted for earthquakes (Aristotle Meteorologica 365b6 = DK 13A21) as well as clouds, rain, and snow (Aetius 3.4.1 = DK 13A17). Democritus accounted for thunder, lightning, and waterspouts (Aetius 3.3.11 = DK 68A93). 3 Since Aristotle used investigations earlier than his own to illustrate how his own methods were preferable, he casts a long shadow and it is necessary to look beyond Aristotle’s bias to give other theories a balanced

7 Aristotle classifies Empedocles as a physikos (φυσικός) or physiologos (φυσιολόγος)4, an individual who studies φύσις, nature, along with others now called the Presocratics.

Aristotle considers himself the most recent of all these physikoi seeking knowledge about how the world works, describing his predecessors as “those who have come before us5 in the investigation of things that are” (τοὺς πρότερον ἡµῶν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν τῶν ὄντων

ἐλθόντας Metaphysics 983b1-2). Aristotle believes that the most important thing to do in studying the things that are (τῶν ὄντων) is to preserve the phenomena, that is, to uphold what one observes about what is, in opposition to Plato and his theory of the Forms.6 It is also important to pass on clearly one’s theories to other people.

Modern historians of science also call Empedocles a scientist together with the

Presocratics.7 Although it would be easy to declare that they were not scientists because

reading. Cherniss 1935 traces this problem with Aristotle as a historian of science. For other treatments, see Guthrie 1957, who gives a more charitable interpretation of Aristotle as historian, and Collobert 2002, who argues that Aristotle was not a good historian. Juffras 1989 (199-200) argues that Aristotle is a true historian of philosophical problems since he provides a focus for his investigation, that is, his own outcomes. 4 The terms are interchangeable. Physiologos: οἱ δὲ φυσιολόγοι καὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν διακοσµοῦσιν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὸ τὸ ὅµοιον ἰέναι πρὸς τὸ ὅµοιον, διὸ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὴν κύν’ ἔφη καθῆσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς κεραµῖδος διὰ τὸ ἔχειν πλεῖστον ὅµοιον. (Aristotle Eudemian Ethics 1235a11) “And physiologoi arrange the whole universe taking as a principle that like goes to like, wherefore Empedocles said that the female dog sat on the tile because it had the most similarity”; φασὶ γὰρ οἱ µὲν ἐν τοῖς σπέρµασιν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἐναντίωσιν εὐθύς, οἷον Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ ἕτεροι τῶν φυσιολόγων· . . . οἱ δ’ ἐν τῇ µήτρᾳ, καθάπερ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς· (Aristotle de generatione animalium 763b31) “Some people, such as Anaxagoras and other physiologoi, say that this opposition exists immediately in the semen … others, like Empedocles, say it occurs in the womb.” Physikos: Τὰ γὰρ πάθη, καὶ τὰ δι’ ἀέρος ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι, θεοῦ λέγοιτ’ ἂν ὄντως ἔργα εἶναι τοῦ τὸν κόσµον ἐπέχοντος· ἐξ οὗ, κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν Ἐµπεδοκλέα … (Aristotle de mundo 399b25) “For it would be said truly that phenomena – all that is in the air, upon the earth, and in the water – are the works of god who rules the universe, from whom, as Empedocles the physikos says…” 5 This may be a nos modestiae or a reference to his audience. Aristotle’s works may be either esoteric, that is, not written for consumption by the public, or they may be lecture notes published by his students (Barnes 1995 (12)). 6 Aristotle describes his method in Physics 1.1 and in Posterior Analytics 2.19. In natural science, one begins with what is most evident, that is, what is perceived. When enough examples are perceived, it is possible to draw more general conclusions. See Bolton 1991 for a more in-depth analysis of the passages in question. See also Nussbaum 1982 on preserving appearances. 7 History of ancient science handbooks often begin from Thales: de Santillana 1961, Furley 1987, Graham 2006, Lindberg 2007. Handbooks on the Presocratics from classicists emphasize the various scientific

8 they did not come up with the “right” answers or they made use of descriptions

(qualitative) rather than equations (quantitative) or they had no experimental method to speak of as triumphalists would argue8, more recent philosophies of science recognize that definitions of science change with time and location. First, for example, Crombie

1994 (pp. x-xi) argues that as long as the individuals who investigate how the world works can agree on which phenomena should be studied, which questions are valid, what evidence is acceptable as proof and how the evidence should be presented, then they are pursuing a scientific course.9 On the other hand, Karl Popper (1958 (1962) 136) argues that the purpose of a scientific tradition is simply to understand the world we live in and to solve problems that arise through observing the world and through critical discussion

(1962, 155). He attributes to the Presocratics the innovation of scrutinizing the received tradition. In both of these theories, the shared emphasis is on developing theories and sharing them, whether through presenting evidence or through critical discussion. Finally,

Classical scholars argue that the Presocratics were a revolution in thought and science10 because each Presocratic thinker shared with the others a set of assumptions: that the world (κόσµος) they lived in was ordered and predictable because it was based on a

views they expound: Burnet 1930, Popper 1958, Guthrie 1962, Hussey 1972, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, McKirahan 1994, Wright 1995, Curd and Graham 2008. 8 The primary problem here is the assumption that we know the “right” answers. 9 Compare Hussey 1995 who argues the Presocratics stand at the beginning of science because they all followed “the rules of the game”: unity, economy, and symmetry of theory; analogy and eikos-reasoning; and the concept of physis. 10 Kahn 1991, reviving the beliefs first put forward by Tannery 1930 and Burnet 1930. Hussey 1995 is more reserved in seeing the Presocratics as a revolution; for a more enthusiastic version of this thesis, Graham concludes in his 2006 study: “Without our Ionian forebears, the world we live in would be so different we do not know what it would be like. But probably it would not be a world built on advanced science and technology.” (p. 307) This is against the view represented by Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983 in chapter 1, for example, who treat the Presocratics as a continuation of both Homer and Hesiod, on the one hand, and Near Eastern myth and astronomy on the other.

9 physical nature (φύσις) that could be studied through observation and reflected upon

(ἱστορία).11 At the very least, the Presocratics are at the beginning of a scientific path.

Although these two points of view are separated by thousands of years, Aristotle and the historians share similarities in what they seek from ancient scientists. The first part of this chapter will show that they believe scientists should ask why the world works as it does, looking for answers from within the very fabric of the world rather than from supernatural or external forces. The second part of the chapter will investigate the necessity of unambiguous communication with others who also want to know how the natural world operates. Aristotle believes that if a scientist does not express his ideas clearly so that others can understand, then the scientist does not understand himself. The ideals, on the other hand, of modern institutional science – that scientific claims and results will be tested without reference to the attributes of the person/ people who advanced them, that results belong to the scientific community as a whole, that every scientist pursues knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and that final judgment is postponed until all evidence has been collected12 – are often postulated backwards.

Although the ideals do not often apply to the reality13, cooperation tends to be the norm in

11 The importance of the concept of the κόσµος and φύσις has been stressed by Lloyd 1970 (8 ff.), Lloyd 1979, and others including Kahn 1991, Hussey 1995, Graham 2006, and Hankinson 2008. 12 Merton 1942 (“The Normative Structure of Science” reproduced in Merton 1973) developed these four norms – he calls them ‘universalism’, ‘communism’, ‘disinterestedness’, and ‘organized skepticism’ – on the basis of noticing that from 17th century England, science became the province of the elite and frequently had little practical payoff. 13 Kuhn 1962 points out the short-fallings of the ideal since the scientific community tends to propagate the “paradigm” of the moment – whether it is “big bang” or relativity – to the detriment of scientists who try to argue a counter-position, such as Dunning-Davies points out in Exploding a Myth: ‘Conventional Wisdom’ or Scientific Truth? (Horwood Publishing Limited, 2007). Bucchi 2004 refers to the study published by Mitroff (1974) that illustrates how Merton’s four norms are matched by counter-norms where scientists are motivated to keep some results secret, thus preserving the integrity of the smaller group in which the scientist works and maintaining the superiority of one’s own theory without all the data (or even in light of contrary data).

10 the scientific community with co-authored papers and refereed journals; for this reason, historians emphasize the non-institutional “community” that the Presocratics shared.

From his own words, Empedocles appears to fulfill the first condition of being a scientist since he writes about how the world functions; but he does not fulfill the second. When one tries to fit Empedocles to the second constraint, whether through unambiguous writing or through dialogue (implicit or explicit) with other “scientists”, it becomes clear that Empedocles would not call himself a scientist either.

Part 1: Looking for Reasons Why

Science tries to determine why things happen in the world. The sun rises in the east and sets in the west. Summer follows winter and summer comes again. A seed is sown in the ground and a plant grows from it. People have always observed how nature operates and can exploit it with, for example, agriculture, but do not necessarily understand how or why it happens. In Greek society, the poets explained all such natural phenomena, whether those that follow a regular and predictable pattern or extraordinary events such as plague, lightning, and earthquakes, as coming from the actions of the gods; and rituals were carried out to preserve an amicable relationship with the gods, thus maintaining the status quo and attempting to prevent disasters.14 Modern scholars argue that science came into being when some Greeks looked for an explanation that tried to reduce all phenomena to natural cause and effect, that is, one thing happened in nature and this led to an outcome in nature. The Presocratics distinguished themselves from the Near Eastern thinkers, especially in astronomy, because they moved beyond observing phenomena and

14 See part 1 of chapter 2 for more on this.

11 keeping records15 to postulating how and why things work, and they are separate from

Homer and Hesiod because they do not assign natural events to the province of the gods.

Examination of Empedocles’ verses illustrates how he has his own interpretation of how the world works and assumes that it has a physical nature whose regularity can be studied. According to this first criterion, Empedocles deserves the title “scientist.”

1.1 ARISTOTLE JUDGES THE PRESOCRATICS

Aristotle studies these Presocratic physikoi and how they study φύσις, nature, in order to compare their activities with his own.16 Aristotle first sets out in Physics the requirements of what a physikos must do, and that is to determine the causes (αἴτια) of things.

Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συµβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς

µεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα

γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόµεθα γιγνώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἴτια

γνωρίσωµεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας καὶ µέχρι τῶν

στοιχείων), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήµης πειρατέον

διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

Aristotle Physics 184a10-16

15 Neugebauer 1957 and 1975. 16 The study of nature is part of the larger field that Aristotle calls ἐπιστήµη, that is, scientific knowledge or science. This knowledge is always, or for the most part, certain: ἐπιστήµη µὲν γὰρ πᾶσα ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ—πῶς γὰρ ἢ µαθήσεται ἢ διδάξει ἄλλον; (Aristotle Metaphysics 1027a20-22) “For all epistēmē is either of what is always or what is for the most part – for how will one learn or teach another [if you are not certain]? Aristotle identifies three categories of ἐπιστήµη. The first two are productive science (τέχνη), for example, agriculture and carpentry, and practical science, that is, how do people act whether as an individual (ethics) or as a society (politics). The third category is theoretical and includes mathematics, the study of divinity, that is, things that do not change, and natural science, the study of φύσις. Natural science focuses on everything that is below the moon.

12 Since knowing and scientific knowledge about all intellectual pursuits that have principles, causes, or elements occurs from being acquainted with them – for we think that we know each thing when we are acquainted with the first causes and the first principles as far as its elements – it is clear that one must try first to determine the principles of knowledge regarding nature (i.e., natural science).

Since Aristotle argues that the Presocratics seek, essentially, to do the same thing as he does, they too must look for the beginnings and causes of the “things that are.”17 One should start with what one can perceive before proceeding to an analysis of why it is that way; and Aristotle argues that one thing that unites all things in this world is that they change or are subject to change (Physics 185a12-13), and when the physikos studies nature, therefore, he is attempting to discover the causes (αἴτια) of change – why they change or do not change – by inferring from what is known by perception.18 This change can be of substance (coming into being or being destroyed), quality (an alteration, for example, from hard to soft or vice versa), quantity (growing or shrinking), or of place, that is, motion.

Aristotle identifies four αἴτια: material, formal, efficient, and final.19 Aristotle claims, moreover, that to understand and explain change fully, one must understand all four for each object of study (Physics 198a22-25). The material cause is the substance of which

17 τεθεώρηται µὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς περὶ αὐτῶν ἡµῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως, ὅµως δὲ παραλάβωµεν καὶ τοὺς πρότερον ἡµῶν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν τῶν ὄντων ἐλθόντας καὶ φιλοσοφήσαντας περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κἀκεῖνοι λέγουσιν ἀρχάς τινας καὶ αἰτίας· ἐπελθοῦσιν οὖν ἔσται τι προὔργου τῇ µεθόδῳ τῇ νῦν· ἢ γὰρ ἕτερόν τι γένος εὑρήσοµεν αἰτίας ἢ ταῖς νῦν λεγοµέναις µᾶλλον πιστεύσοµεν. (Aristotle Metaphysics 983a33-b6) “We have examined sufficiently these things in our work on nature [Physics], but nevertheless let us take up those who have come before us in the investigation of things that are and who philosophize about reality. For it is clear that even they speak of certain beginnings and causes. For there will be some profit to the present inquiry from them, whether we will find some other sort of cause or we will have more confidence in the causes already stated.” 18 Aristotle discusses this primarily in the first book of Physics. See Boas 1947, Bostock 1982, Bolton 1991. 19 Aristotle begins this discussion at Physics 194b17. For a general discussion of the two major modern interpretations, see Moravcsik 1991 (cause as ‘because’ or explanation) and Freeland 1991 (cause as cause).

13 the object of study is composed. The formal cause is the substance actualized – its form, its shape, its pattern. The efficient cause explains why the object changes, or does not change. It makes clear the relationship between the agent that produces change and the object, whether the change is imposed from outside or if an internal cause of change is present. The last cause is called final because it explains the reason for which the object exists; it is the goal of change. To use a person as an example, in the infant, the form of the human is present (formal cause) and the infant’s goal of change (final cause) is to become an adult. The formal cause and the final cause are entwined. This infant contains an internal source of change (efficient cause) as it grows, but the father is also an efficient cause as he provides the form of human, since he possesses this form as well, to the matter of flesh, blood, and bones. To use a bronze statue as an example, bronze would be the material cause; the formal cause is the shape that the art of the sculptor (efficient cause) bestows to the bronze.20

When Aristotle examines his predecessors’ theories in light of his own criteria, it is hardly surprising that he is disappointed. Nevertheless, they do attempt to uncover the underlying principles that unite all of nature and account for the regular cause and effect that they assume is happening. Aristotle complains that the earliest Presocratics (for example, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes) address only the material cause

(Metaphysics 983b6-20), but they probably assume that souls are the efficient cause since possession of a soul distinguishes living from non-living things.21 In general, Aristotle believes that the Presocratics failed to tackle large gaps in their explanations.

Empedocles, on the other hand, earns praise for both the sophistication of his material

20 Aristotle Physics 2.3, Metaphysics 5.2. 21 Hankinson 2008 (442-3).

14 causes and attempts at efficient causes, although ultimately, for Aristotle, he is not completely successful.

καὶ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς ἐπὶ πλέον µὲν τούτου χρῆται τοῖς αἰτίοις, οὐ µὴν

οὔθ’ ἱκανῶς, οὔτ’ ἐν τούτοις εὑρίσκει τὸ ὁµολογούµενον.

πολλαχοῦ γοῦν αὐτῷ ἡ µὲν φιλία διακρίνει τὸ δὲ νεῖκος συγκρίνει.

… Ἐµπεδοκλῆς µὲν οὖν παρὰ τοὺς πρότερον πρῶτος τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν

διελεῖν εἰσήνεγκεν, οὐ µίαν ποιήσας τὴν τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλ’

ἑτέρας τε καὶ ἐναντίας, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ὡς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει λεγόµενα

στοιχεῖα τέτταρα πρῶτος εἶπεν (οὐ µὴν χρῆταί γε τέτταρσιν ἀλλ’

ὡς δυσὶν οὖσι µόνοις, πυρὶ µὲν καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῖς δ’ ἀντικειµένοις ὡς

µιᾷ φύσει, γῇ τε καὶ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι· λάβοι δ’ ἄν τις αὐτὸ θεωρῶν

ἐκ τῶν ἐπῶν.)

Aristotle Metaphysics 985a21-b3 = DK 31A37

And Empedocles employs the causes more extensively than [Anaxagoras]; not, however, sufficiently nor does he achieve consistency in the use of them; at any rate his Love often separates and Strife combines. … Empedocles, then, in contrast to his predecessors was the first to introduce a distinction in the cause by not making the principle of motion22 one but [making them] different and opposite [to each other]. Moreover, he was the first to say that the so-called material elements were four. But he does not use the four, but [as though] there were only two; fire on its own and the opposed elements – earth, air, and water – as one nature. One may conclude this by reflection on his verses.

Aristotle claims, therefore, that Empedocles has sought to explain how and why things change or fail to change by using two of the causes that Aristotle identifies – the material

22 Love and Strife, the principles of motion (τὴν τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν), are Empedocles’ efficient causes.

15 and the efficient. Empedocles has fulfilled, imperfectly, the primary requirement that

Aristotle set out for physikoi.23

1.2 MODERN SCHOLARS ON THE PRESOCRATICS

Modern scholars also recognize as scientists Empedocles and the other Presocratics for much the same reason as Aristotle: these individuals sought natural explanations for things that exist in the natural world. The world was predictable and ordered (κόσµος) with a physical nature (φύσις) that could be studied and described (ἱστορία).24

The word, κόσµος, originally meant order or orderly, e.g., κατὰ κόσµον (οἳ εὗδον

καµάτῳ ἀδηκότες, ἔντεα δέ σφιν | καλὰ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖσι χθονὶ κέκλιτο εὖ κατὰ κόσµον |

τριστοιχί· παρὰ δέ σφιν ἑκάστῳ δίζυγες ἵπποι. (Homer Iliad 10.471-3) “Overwhelmed by fatigue, they [the Thracian soldiers] slept, their gear lay in good order in three rows on the ground around them, and by each man stood his chariot team.”25), thus suggesting organization, if not the best organization for maximum efficiency. Heraclitus is the first extant writer to use the term to explicitly mean the world as an organized and regular system: κόσµον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’

ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόµενον µέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύµενον µέτρα.

(Clement Stromata 5.104.1 = DK 22B30) “This world (order), the same of all26, no one of gods nor men made, but it always was and is and will be an ever-living fire, kindled in

23 I will examine Empedocles’ verses in §1.3 below to illustrate in more detail how Aristotle (and modern scholars) come to the conclusion that Empedocles should be called a scientist. 24 Graham 2006 25 Compare Iliad 11.48 and 12.85, for example, as the Greek and Trojan forces respectively prepare for battle. 26 See Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983 (198 n. 1) regarding the authenticity of the phrase τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων.

16 turn and extinguished in turn.” Although the earlier Presocratics did not use the term (at least according to the accident of preservation), their fragments illustrate a belief in regular cause and effect that suggests an implicit acceptance of a predictable world order.

Thales, for example, believed that earthquakes resulted from waves in the water on which the world rested. Just as a log or ship floats on water and rocks with the water’s motion, so too the earth floats and quakes – a predictable cause and effect.27 Since they assume that the world is ordered and regular, this means that repeated effects, such as lightning or earthquakes, have repeated causes that can be discovered.

Causes can be discovered for effects because the world has a φύσις, a nature with qualities that are particular to it; each thing in the world has a nature particular to it, creating an interwoven web of φύσεις. And the world and everything in it will act according to its nature (κατὰ φύσιν or φύσει). The Presocratics, therefore, draw a distinction in causation owing to the predictability of a thing’s nature; they argue that events in nature – ordinary and extraordinary – are not random nor the acts of a capricious god. The Presocratics were confident that they could uncover the φύσις of the

κόσµος to explain through investigation (ἱστορία) of how things work and why events occur.28 They share in common a desire to uncover what tied the nature of the κόσµος

27 Aristotle relates that Thales described the world as floating on water like a log: οἱ δ’ ἐφ’ ὕδατος κεῖσθαι [sc. τὴν γῆν]. τοῦτον γὰρ ἀρχαιότατον παρειλήφαµεν τὸν λόγον, ὅν φασιν εἰπεῖν Θαλῆν τὸν Μιλήσιον ὡς διὰ τὸ πλωτὴν εἶναι µένουσαν ὥσπερ ξύλον ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. (Aristotle de caelo 294a28 = DK 11A14) “Some say (the earth) lies on water. We have received this very old report, which they say that Thales the Milesian says that it remains floating like a log or some such thing.” Seneca says that Thales explained earthquakes via the floating-earth theory: ait (sc. Thales) enim terrarum orbem aqua sustineri et vehi more navigii mobilitateque eius fluctare tunc cum dicitur tremere (Seneca Nat. Quaest. 3.14 = DK 11A15) “For he (Thales) says that the earth is held up by water and carried in the manner of a ship and it rocks by that (water’s) motion at the time when it is said to quake.” 28 Graham 2006 (302) used this term of the Presocratics. Herodotus is our first use of the word to describe the investigations he undertook in history and ethnography, and is the root of our word “history”: Ἡροδότου Ἁλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε. (Herodotus Histories 1.1) “This is the publication of the investigation of Herodotus of Halicarnassus.

17 together, that is, what made it a unified whole. By reducing the material stuff from which all things were made – whether of one substance, for example, water (Thales) or air

(Anaximenes), or a limited number, for example, water and earth (Xenophanes) or fire, water, earth, and air (Empedocles), or something undefined from which all else came, for example, apeiron (Anaximander) – every phenomenon would simply be an effect from that material’s natural action and reaction.

1.3 EMPEDOCLES AS PRESOCRATIC SCIENTIST

Aristotle and modern scholars have good reason to believe that Empedocles is a scientist according to their definitions. Aristotle argues that physikoi should discover the causes –material, formal, efficient, and final – of change in the natural world. Modern scholars expect scientists to describe the world as organized and regular (a κόσµος) with a nature (φύσις) that acts and reacts in a predictable fashion, without relying on the gods to explain how the world operates. Both look for reasons that derive from nature to explain nature.

Although Aristotle does not quote any of Empedocles’ verses to support his observations, Simplicius cites fragment 1729 when he comments on Physics 187a21ff, where Aristotle is discussing how Empedocles describes the world as coming about from a cycle of mixture from one to many. Empedocles outlines the basic cycle in which the world comes to be from the constituent elements (the material causes) through the agency of Love and Strife (the efficient causes).

29 The recent edition of the Strasbourg papyrus (Martin and Primavesi 1999) places fragment 17 within the poem as a whole. Ensemble a of the papyrus continues this fragment for another 34 lines and a mark at the final line indicates that it is the 300th. Since Simplicius took the fragment from the first book (ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν παραδίδωσι (Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.157.27)), fragment 17 begins at Physics 1.233.

18 δίπλ’ ἐρέω· τοτὲ µὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη µόνον εἶναι

ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ’ αὖ διέφυ πλέον’ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι.

δοιὴ δὲ θνητῶν γένεσις, δοιὴ δ’ ἀπόλειψις·

τὴν µὲν γὰρ πάντων σύνοδος τίκτει τ’ ὀλέκει τε,

ἡ δὲ πάλιν διαφυοµένων θρεφθεῖσα διέπτη.30 5

καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀλλάσσοντα διαµπερὲς οὐδαµὰ λήγει,

ἄλλοτε µὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόµεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,

ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύµενα Νείκεος ἔχθει.

<οὕτως ἧι µὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων µεµάθηκε φύεσθαι>

ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἑνὸς πλέον’ ἐκτελέθουσι, 10

τῇ µὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφισιν ἔµπεδος αἰών·

ᾗ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαµπερὲς οὐδαµὰ λήγει,

ταύτῃ δ’ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.

ἀλλ’ ἄγε µύθων κλῦθι· µάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει·

ὡς γὰρ καὶ πρὶν ἔειπα πιφαύσκων πείρατα µύθων, 15

δίπλ’ ἐρέω· τοτὲ µὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη µόνον εἶναι

ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ’ αὖ διέφυ πλέον’ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι,

πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ αἰθέρος31 ἄπλετον ὕψος,

30 I have printed Panzerbieter’s (1844, 8) emendations following most modern editors and commentators: Dümmler 1889; Gomperz 1901; Millerd 1908, 44-47; Burnet 1930, 234-5; Solmsen 1965, 138; Guthrie 1965, 167-85; O'Brien (passim); Cleve 1969; Mansfeld 1972, 17; Long 1974, 401; Wright 1981, 41-44; Graham 1988; Inwood 2001, 44-49; McKirahan 1994, 269-70; Martin and Primavesi 1999, 78-82, 89, Trépanier 2004. Not all editors use Panzerbieter’s emendation: von Arnim 1902, 26 and Hölscher 1965, 31 retain θρυφθεῖσα; Bollack's text (fr. 31) differs considerably from other texts (δρυφθεῖσ᾽ ἀποδρύπτει). 31 αἰθέρος: Plutarch quom. adul. ab amico 22 (p.63D), Clement Strom. 6.17; ἠέρος: Sextus adv. Math. 9.10, Athenagoras 22, Simplicius Physics 158.17. The earliest editions of Empedocles use αἰθέρος as opposed to ἠέρος (Karsten (1838) verse 103, Panzerbieter (1844) p.9). Diels-Kranz (=B17) set the standard for later editions (Bollack (1969) fr. 31; Wright (1981) fr. 8; Inwood (2001) fr. 25) on the basis of their interpretation of Clement Strom. 5.48 (=B38) where αἰθήρ is distinct from ἀήρ and they interpret αἰθήρ as

19 Νεῖκός τ’ οὐλόµενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἁπάντῃ,

καὶ Φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν, ἴση µῆκός τε πλάτος τε· 20

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.1-19 = DK 31B17.1-20

I will say two-fold things: for at one time, [they]32 grew to be One alone from Many and at another time, moreover, they grew apart to be Many from One. Double is the birth of mortal things and double their passing away, for on the one hand the coming together of all both creates and destroys the one [i.e., ἀπόλειψις] and on the other hand, the other [i.e., γένεσις], having been nurtured, flies off when [all] separate again. And these things never cease from constantly alternating, at one time, all things coming together into One through the agency of Love and at another each thing being carried apart by the enmity of Strife. In this way, insofar as they have learned to become One from Many and they end up as Many when the One is divided again, in this respect they come into being and there is no secure life for them. But insofar as they never stop changing constantly, in this respect they are always unchanged in a cycle. But come, listen to my words for learning will increase your mind. For, as I have said before when I revealed the limits of my words, I will say two-fold things: for at one time, [they] grew to be One alone from Many and at another time, moreover, they grew apart to be Many from One – fire and water and earth and the boundless height of air, and destructive Strife apart from them, equivalent in every respect and Love among them, equal both in length and breadth.

The Many, which Empedocles does not identify by name until line 18, are the material causes; Aristotle calls them elements (στοιχεῖα)33 but Empedocles, in fragment 6, calls

fire to keep the fragment as a listing of four elements. Kingsley 1995a (ch. 3) (see also Kingsley 1995c (§1)) argues that Diels and Kranz’ translation of B38 is flawed. The situation was aggravated by a lack of understanding of the early use of αἰθήρ vs. ἀήρ (Kingsley 1995a ch. 2) – αἰθήρ was used of air generally whereas ἀήρ was a wet, heavy air, mist-like. West 1966 (351-2) points out how αἰθήρ and ἀήρ were frequently exchanged in manuscripts, Compare Simplicius’ own comments on Empedocles’ use of the term: καλεῖ (Ἐ.) δὲ τὸ µὲν πῦρ καὶ Ἥφαιστον καὶ ἥλιον καὶ φλόγα, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ὄµβρον, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα αἰθέρα (Simplicius Physics CIAG.9.33.3-4) – he calls fire Hephaistos, sun and flame, water rain and air aither. This shows how ἀήρ was the common term for air for Simplicius as opposed to αἰθήρ. 32 Neuter plural subject based on πλέον᾽ in line 2. 33 See, for example, Aristotle Metaphysics 985a21-b3 = DK 31A37 quoted above.

20 them roots (ῥιζώµατα): fire, water, earth, and air.34 Love and Strife combine and separate these roots in turn, generating countless combinations to create the world around us and also destroying it. In Aristotle’s interpretation, therefore, the efficient causes (Love and

Strife) produce the changes in the world from the material causes (fire, air, water, and earth).

The fragment begins with a programmatic statement: διπλ᾽ ἐρέω “I will tell two-fold things.” Empedocles reveals a double tale of unification (from Many to One) and separation (from One to Many). Although unidentified at first, the Many are the roots named in line 18 of this fragment – air, water, fire and earth. Lines 1-2 lay out the thesis for the fragment, that is, the alternation from One to Many and from Many to One.35

Lines 3-5 are an addition to this central tenet as marked by δὲ of line 3: the coming together and separation of all things cause (γάρ) the double birth and double destruction of mortal things. The creation and destruction of mortal things are discrete from these phases of One and Many. There are two worlds of mortal things within a single cycle from Many to Many. Mortal things are a by-product of this unification and separation.

The conjunction καὶ in lines 6-8 appends a further point, namely that this alternation occurs over and over again. After the One has been formed, Strife then will separate the roots into Many, but not until another world of mortal things has been created and destroyed. Lines 9-13 are a consequence of lines 6-8 (οὕτως); since the alternation continues without end, the only stability that mortal things can count on is the process of the cycle. Although change does not cease as Love and Strife manipulate the roots into

34 See §1.1.1 in chapter 3 and §2.2.1 in chapter 4. 35 I describe the One in §1.2 of chapter 3 and §2.2.1 of chapter 5. I describe the Many in §2.3.2 of chapter 5.

21 One and then Many, a certain stability arises from the consistency of the cycle. The remainder of this section (lines 14-20) builds on these movements from Many to One and from One to Many, identifying and describing the components (that is, the roots) and processes (that is, Love and Strife). Separation following unification becomes a motif that is repeated throughout this fragment and imitates it while describing it since the world will be created and destroyed many times. Despite the changes that the roots undergo the basic stability of the cycle remains untouched. This same pattern is repeated in other fragments that describe the cosmic cycle.36

Empedocles indicates that the verses quoted above are the πείρατα µυθῶν (line 15) – the limits of his words. Homer uses a parallel phrase when Nestor explains to his son,

Antilochus, how to drive his chariot in the funeral games of Patroclus: ἐπὶ ᾧ παιδὶ

ἑκάστοθ πείρατ᾽ ἔειπε (Iliad 23.350) “he spoke to his son the limits of each thing.”37

Nestor has explained all that Antilochus must know for success in the competition. In the same way, Empedocles has established in these verses all that is necessary to understand the cycle of creation. There is room to expand on individual points, but Empedocles has demarcated the essentials within the whole and outlined his general theory.

Aristotle and modern scholars, therefore, have little difficulty using Empedocles’ own verses to support their assessment that he is a scientist because he seeks to explain how an ordered world operates. Fragment 17 shows that the world is ordered and predictable since the same matter – earth, air, water, and fire – combine to create all the combinations

36 Guthrie 1965 (167-85) discusses this traditional model of One to created world to Many to another created world and back to One to begin the cycle again, taking into account changes proposed by O’Brien (1969) before his book was published. Although this model was prevalent before the challenge of various single creation models in the 1960’s, Graham 1988 returned to the cycle, taking into account the logical, literary, and rhetorical structure of fragment 17 as a whole. I outline Graham’s interpretation. Compare also Cleve 1969, Wright 1981, Osborne 1987, Inwood 2001, McKirahan 1994, Martin and Primavesi 1999. 37 Bollack 1969 (3:63).

22 of mortal things in the world, and when the mortal things perish, they go back to those same constituents. The forces responsible for these changes also act and react in predictable ways. But the other requirement, which they establish for scientists – that they communicate and debate with others looking for answers in the natural world, cannot be found in Empedocles’ words.

Part 2: Communicating with Others

In addition to trying to figure out why things happen in the world, another element that some modern scientists find crucial for identifying science and scientific progress is the presence of some sort of community that shares, tests or verifies, and builds on ideas.38 Members of a scientific community share ideas through publication and more informal methods, and peer review is designed to ensure that the research methodology is sound. If the community, therefore, is non-existent, the science is questionable.39 Modern historians, therefore, emphasize the competitive nature of presocratic philosophy since some emphasize the institutional nature of scientific exploration starting in the

Renaissance as the beginning of “science”.40 Ancient biographers described many

Presocratics as being the pupils of an earlier philosopher41, but modern scholars cast them instead as responding to earlier theories, shaping their own through debate, and

38 Compare Fish’s “interpretive communities”, a group of individuals who share a set of presumptions about a text and read it accordingly (Fish 1980). See §2.2 in chapter 4. 39 Kuhn 1962 argues, however, that the existence of scientific revolutions, in which considerable changes occur, undermines the reliability of the scientific community to be adequate judges. See n. 13 above. 40 Hall 1983, Cohen 1985. Others argue that there would have been no “revolution” in the Renaissance without the study of Greek, Latin, and Islamic texts in the Middle Ages: Grant 1996, Gaukroger 2006. 41 The Suda (s.v.), for example, identifies Anaximander as kinsman, student, and successor (συγγενὴς καῖ µαθητὴς καὶ διάδοχος) of Thales; Diogenes Laërtius says that Anaximenes was the student of Anaximander (ἤκουσεν Ἀναξιµάνδρου) or Parmenides (Lives 2.3) and that Parmenides was the student of Xenophanes (Lives 9.21). See Fairweather 1974 and Lefkowitz 1981 for scholarly skepticism of such biographical details.

23 presenting them persuasively through rhetoric.42 Although they were not based in the same location, the Presocratics were clearly aware of one another and the theories of each. Aristotle also argues that the Presocratics must express their science clearly so that others can respond to their criticisms and input.

When trying to identify this criterion in Empedocles’ words, however, it becomes clear that Empedocles avoids the openly competitive stance of some of his predecessors and contemporaries. While he criticizes his predecessors’ theories, he fails to argue why those theories are inadequate. Although he does address many of the same topics such as the composition and creation of the world, he emphasizes that the lesson his audience will learn is to control the world. As for persuasion and clarity, when Aristotle complains about Empedocles’ ambiguity, comparing him to the oracle at Delphi, he inadvertently points out Empedocles’ intent: to set out his lessons on how to control the world as a revelation from a god.

2.1 COMPETITION AND DEBATE

Ideas spread around the ancient Mediterranean not so much by books and publications in libraries (as happens in more modern scientific communities), but by itinerant craftsmen plying their trade. With their relative mobility since they were not tied to the land, they could travel from community to community, offering their services for a fee.

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν

ἄλλον γ’, εἰ µὴ τῶν, οἳ δηµιοεργοὶ ἔασι

42 Lloyd 1979, especially chapter 2.

24 µάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων,

ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὅ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἀείδων.

οὗτοι γὰρ κλητοί γε βροτῶν ἐπ’ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν·

Homer Odyssey 17.382-386

For who invites a stranger from somewhere else, except one of those who are skilled craftsmen – a prophet or healer of ills or a builder of beams or even a divine singer who delights with song? For these men are invited all over the earth.

The tradition is a long-standing one and widespread. Solon, the various tyrants of

Corinth, and Themistocles are examples of leaders who invited craftsmen to immigrate to their city.43 Herodotus describes how Democedes, a doctor originally from Croton on the southern coast of Italy across the Ionium sea from Corcyra, became a personal physician to Darius in Susa. As a young man, he moved first to Aegina to practice medicine; from there he moved to Athens within a few years and then to Samos at the invitation of

Polycrates. Democedes was captured in Sardis when Polycrates was lured there by

Oroetes and brought to Susa.44 Engineers were also invited to various cities. Biton45, describing the war machinery and catapults of Zopyrus, states that he was originally from

Tarentum and designed machinery in Miletus (62.1 Wescher) and in Cumae (65.2

Wescher).46 Travel, therefore, was common among individuals in specialized trades.

43 Burkert 1992 (23). Solon: Plutarch Solon 24.4; Corinth: Herodotus 2.167.2; Themistocles: Diodorus Siculus 11.43.3. 44 Herodotus 3.131. In the same chapter, Herodotus mentions that the doctors from Croton and the musicians from Argos were best. Including musicians in this anecdote has confused some readers, but makes sense since both were itinerant craftsmen in demand across the Mediterranean. Polycrates, for example, also brought Anacreon, Ibycus, and Theodorus to his court. 45 Biton Κατασκευαὶ πολεµικὼν ὀργάνων καὶ καταπαλτικῶν. Published in Carle Wescher Poliorcétique des Grecs Paris 1867. 46 Kingsley 1995a dates Zopyrus’ activities in Cumae to the late 420s (154-5) and in Miletus to between 411 and 402 (150-2). He postulates that Zopyrus may have been in Syracuse in 399 when Dionysius I invited engineers to develop war machinery for the city. (150, 153)

25 The craftsmen listed by Homer, especially doctors and engineers, are the same men who need to understand how the world works in order to provide their services. Kingsley

1995a (143-155) argues persuasively that Zopyrus the Pythagorean, whom Clement

(Stromata 1.21.131.3) cites as the author of Krater, is the same person as Zopyrus the mechanical engineer of war machinery, especially catapults. This suggests that the mathematical theories developed by some Pythagoreans are being applied in the practical world by other (or the same) Pythagoreans, since the construction of catapults requires knowledge of the same tension and harmonics that underlies musical/numerical theory.

The same connection between scientific theory and practice can be observed in doctors.

An early Hippocratic writer, for example, criticizes some doctors because they argue that one needs to understand the origins of man from his creation in the world in order to treat disease. He clearly does not agree with this position.47

λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἰητροὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔνι δυνατὸν

ἰητρικὴν εἰδέναι ὅστις µὴ οἶδεν ὅ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο

δεῖ καταµαθεῖν τὸν µέλλοντα ὀρθῶς θεραπεύσειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

τείνει δὲ αὐτέοισιν ὁ λόγος ἐς φιλοσοφίην, καθάπερ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς ἢ

ἄλλοι οἳ περὶ φύσιος γεγράφασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος,

καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον καὶ ὅπως ξυνεπάγη. ἐγὼ δὲ τουτέων µὲν

ὅσα τινὶ εἴρηται σοφιστῇ ἢ ἰητρῷ, ἢ γέγραπται περὶ φύσιος, ἧσσον

νοµίζω τῇ ἰητρικῇ τέχνῃ προσήκειν ἢ τῇ γραφικῇ. νοµίζω δὲ περὶ

φύσιος γνῶναί τι σαφὲς οὐδαµόθεν ἄλλοθεν εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἰητρικῆς.

47 Lloyd 1979 (86-98) discusses various Hippocratic treatises, which stress the importance of rhetoric for winning over patients and attacking criticism.

26 Hippocrates48 On Ancient Medicine 20

Some doctors and sophists say that it is not possible to know the medical art unless one knows what man is, but that it is necessary that the man who intends to cure men correctly know this. Their reasoning applies to philosophy, just like Empedocles or others who have written about nature; they say what man is from the beginning and how he first come into being and from what he was constructed. But I say this: as many things as have been said or written by a sophist or a doctor about nature, I believe apply less to the medical art than to painting. I think that one learns something clear about nature from no other place than the medical art.

This author argues that some doctors develop treatments from hypotheses about how man functions, and what he comes from. Healing, therefore, would return man to the state he should be in as determined by, for example, the components from which he was originally constructed. He, I would argue, does not deny this belief that healing disease returns the body to a normal state. Rather, he argues that practicing medicine, that is, returning unhealthy people to a healthy state, is what truly contributes to understanding nature, not starting from theories. Some doctors, therefore, practiced medicine from a theoretical rather than an empirical understanding of the world, such as the theories that the Presocratics produced. Not all doctors and engineers were philosophers; nevertheless, some would bring theories and ideas as they traveled the Mediterranean just as Zopyrus did. One can also expect transmission of these ideas as these craftsmen encountered other doctors and engineers as the disagreement between Hippocrates and Empedocles illustrates.49 We can argue, therefore, that a loosely bound community links scientists.

48 The treatises attributed to Hippocrates were written by a variety of individuals in the Hippocratic school (comparable to the Orphic writings, see §1.1.2 in chapter 4). For this dissertation, I will use Hippocrates for simplicity. 49 This passage suggests that Hippocrates viewed Empedocles as purely theoretical, contrary to Empedocles’ presentation of himself.

27 When ideas are shared, science advances as theories are tested and contested through others’ observation. Modern historians emphasize the competitive nature of the

Presocratics50, just as Hesiod shows the benefit of competition among people who practice the same craft – whether agriculture, pottery, or poetry – is good for men.

Οὐκ ἄρα µοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν

εἰσὶ δύω· τὴν µέν κεν ἐπαινήσειε νοήσας,

ἣ δ’ ἐπιµωµητή· διὰ δ’ ἄνδιχα θυµὸν ἔχουσιν.

…

τὴν δ’ ἑτέρην προτέρην µὲν ἐγείνατο Νὺξ ἐρεβεννή,

θῆκε δέ µιν Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος, αἰθέρι ναίων,

γαίης [τ’] ἐν ῥίζῃσι καὶ ἀνδράσι πολλὸν ἀµείνω·

ἥ τε καὶ ἀπάλαµόν περ ὁµῶς ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει·

εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τίς τε ἴδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων 20

πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει µὲν ἀρόµεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν

οἶκόν τ’ εὖ θέσθαι· ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων

εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ’· ἀγαθὴ δ’ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν.

καὶ κεραµεὺς κεραµεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, 25

καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ.

Hesiod Works and Days 10-13, 16-26

50 Scholars separate Presocratic philosophy based on geography (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983 – East vs West) and time. In all cases, each philosopher is presented sequentially from the oldest, an implicit assumption that one philosopher builds off another, although not necessarily sequentially (Burnet 1930, Guthrie 1962 and1965, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, McKirahan 1995, Graham 2006). The primary divisions are the Ionians ([Thales], Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Xenophanes), Parmenides and Zeno who respond to the Ionians, and the pluralists (Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus) who respond to Parmenides. Pythagoras is considered an outlier, as is Heraclitus (as Guthrie 1962 (416), Graham 2006 (113)). Ancient biographers presented the Presocratics as pupils of a predecessor (see above). Lloyd 1979 (chapter 2) emphasizes the rhetorical nature of the Presocratics writing as they debate one another.

28 There was not one race of Strife, but there are two upon the earth. He would praise the one if he know her, the other is worthy of blame – they are completely separate in their temper. Dark Night bore the other (Strife) first, and the high-throned son of Kronos who dwells in the air placed her in the roots of the earth and she is much better for me. And she rouses to work even the good for nothing, if one not working should see the wealth of someone who hastens to plow and plant and establish his household well. One neighbour vies with the other as he speeds to riches; this Strife is good for mortals. And potter competes against potter and carpenter against carpenter; beggar envies beggar and poet poet.

When craftsmen compete with one another, they create better products and strive to innovate so that their product is preferred. The Presocratics compete with two separate groups: the mythological explanation of how the world comes to be and functions, and other Presocratics. I will show how the Presocratics responded to each in order to show that Empedocles did not follow this pattern. He did not present himself as contributing to the tradition.

2.1.1 Presocratics Respond to Divine Explanations

Homer and Hesiod presented a mythological view of how the world came to be and continues to operate through divine intervention. Hesiod’s Theogony, for example, offers an organized picture of the world that relies almost exclusively on the gods. The birth of the gods (theogony) beginning with Gaia is the birth of the world itself (cosmogony) while the orderly rule of the gods under the direction of Zeus, the father of gods and men, is the cosmology. The Presocratics criticize such a position in a variety of ways. They either remove the gods from natural phenomena51, implicitly rejecting this model, or they criticize Hesiod directly. Anaximander, for example, replaces the justice with which

51 See n. 2 at the beginning.

29 Hesiod’s Zeus directs the world with the impersonal force of time. Later commentators52 relate that he believed the world comes to be from and is destroyed into apeiron53, a substance that is not an element such as water or air that would be recognized by these commentators. No god oversees this creation or transformation of the world, but it happens “Birth for things that exist is from these things, and destruction is into the same things ‘according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of time’” (ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν

φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς

ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν (Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.24.18-20)).

Heraclitus, on the other hand, made an ad hominem attack on Hesiod, claiming that learning did not make him knowledgeable: πολυµαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον

γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον. (Diogenes Laërtius

Lives 9.1 = DK22B40) “Much learning does not teach one to have knowledge; for it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and moreover, both Xenophanes and

Hecataeus.” Considering the individuals with whom Hesiod is connected in this fragment, Heraclitus is commenting on authors who describe how the world works:

52 Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.24.18-20 = DK 12A9, Pseudo-Plutarch Stromata 2 = DK 12A10, Hippolytus Refutatio 1.6.1-2 = DK 12A11. 53 The apeiron is something that is without limit and in this case probably also without definition. It was limitless because all things came to be from it and it was undefined as far as substance goes since it was not one of the elements but something in between. Aristotle seems to contrast Anaximander’s apeiron as an intermediate among the elements with his originating substance: οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν τούτων ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα. οὐ µὴν οὐδ’ ἄλλο τί γε παρὰ ταῦτα, οἷον µέσον τι ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος καὶ πυρός, ἀέρος µὲν παχύτερον καὶ πυρός, τῶν δὲ λεπτότερον· ἔσται γὰρ ἀὴρ καὶ πῦρ ἐκεῖνο µετ’ ἐναντιότητος· ἀλλὰ στέρησις τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων· ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται µονοῦσθαι ἐκεῖνο οὐδέποτε, ὥσπερ φασί τινες τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ περιέχον. (Aristotle de generatione et corruptione 332a19 ff.) “There is no one of these things (i.e., elements) from which everything comes. Nor indeed is there anything else besides these things, like something between air and water or air and fire, something which is thicker than air and fire and finer than the others. For that will be air and fire with opposition, but the other of the opposites is a lack, with the result that it is never possible to exist alone, as some say of the ‘infinite’ and the ‘surrounding’.”

30 Hesiod and Pythagoras used a mythological framework54 while Xenophanes and

Hecataeus were other early intellectuals who focused on cosmology and geography respectively. Presumably Heraclitus is contrasting himself with them; wisdom is to know the γνώµη – whether that is the intelligence or the plan that directs all things (ἓν τὸ

σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώµην, ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων (Diogenes Laërtius Lives

9.1 = DK 22B41) “The one wise thing (course) is to know the γνώµη which directs all things through all things.”).55 If the people listed in fragment 40 do not have the correct learning about how the world works, they do not understand the γνώµη. This becomes more clear when Heraclitus is indirectly critical of people who use Hesiod as their teacher for understanding how the world works: διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος· τοῦτον

ἐπίστανται πλεῖστα εἰδέναι, ὅστις ἡµέρην καὶ εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἕν.

(Hippolytus Refutatio 9.10.2 = DK 22B57 “The teacher of most is Hesiod: they know that he knows many things, he who did not understand day and night, for it is one.” For

Hesiod, Day was the offspring of Night.56 Heraclitus, on the other hand, who saw connections between opposites because they are interdependent, calls them one, in this case because they are different stages in a continuum. Hesiod does not possess understanding, and the people who use Hesiod as a teacher consequently are also mistaken.

54 For more on Pythagoreans writing as Orpheus and using myth and cosmogony as an allegory for the nature, origins and fate of man, the gods and the universe, see §1.1.2 in chapter 4. 55 Just as Anaximander replaced Zeus, the director of all, with time, Heraclitus replaced him with the thunderbolt (B64) which is and is not willing to be called Zeus (B32) as it sits apart from everything (B108). 56 Hesiod Theogony 123-4.

31 Parmenides also criticizes Hesiod directly, although not by name.57 He chose to write in dactylic hexameter, like Homer and Hesiod, after the previous generation of scientists had made a conscious choice to present their ideas in prose to set themselves apart from traditional literature. In Parmenides’ proem, the daughters of the Sun take Parmenides by chariot to the goddess who lives beyond the paths of Night and Day. She promises that by following this path, the one that carries the man who knows (ἣ κατὰ πάντ’ ἄστη φέρει

εἰδότα φῶτα (DK28B1.3) “[the path] which carries the knowing man over all cities”) beyond the realm of experience, that is, the regular alternation of day and night,

Parmenides will learn both the truth and mortal opinions: χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι |

ἠµὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεµὲς ἦτορ | ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.

(DK 28B1.28-30) “It is necessary that you learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-rounded Truth and mortals’ opinions in which there is no true reliance.” This challenges Hesiod who claims in the proem of Theogony that the Muses approached him and then mocked him, as a mortal, for being ignorant and incapable of distinguishing truth from falsehood in their words.

“ποιµένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,

ἴδµεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύµοισιν ὁµοῖα,

ἴδµεν δ’ εὖτ’ ἐθέλωµεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.”

Hesiod Theogony 26-28

“Boorish shepherds, base reproaches, mere bellies, we know how to tell many lies just like real things, and we know how, when we want, to utter truth.”58

57 Graham 2006 (152). 58 I discuss this passage further in §1.2.2 of chapter 4. Empedocles also approaches a Muse for her skill in language, but as an equal since he, too, is a good. See §1.2 in chapter 4.

32 Parmenides, therefore, by setting himself up as one who knows in contrast with Hesiod’s boorish shepherds, openly criticizes the mythological interpretation reported by the

Muses. The man who knows can distinguish truth and opinion in contrast to people who fail to use reason and accept uncritically the words they hear. The goddess urges

Parmenides to ignore the things he experiences and to rely instead on reason.

οὐ γὰρ µήποτε τοῦτο δαµῇ εἶναι µὴ ἐόντα·

ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόηµα

µηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,

νωµᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄµµα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν

καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον

ἐξ ἐµέθεν ῥηθέντα.

Parmenides DK 28B7

For this will never prevail – that things that are not (µὴ ἐόντα) are; but you, hold back your thought from this path of inquiry and do not let much-experienced habit force you down this path, to direct an aimless eye and echoing ear and tongue, but judge by reasoning the strife-ridden refutation spoken by me.

Parmenides then uses reason in order to show that the scientists’ explanation of the world is fundamentally flawed because what is not cannot exist, no matter what our senses have told us.

2.1.2 Presocratics Respond to Other Presocratics

The Greeks do not simply parrot their predecessors, but make innovations to the lessons they learn. Although it seems certain that theories moved with relative ease around the Mediterranean, the only evidence that remains for how the Presocratics

33 responded to one another is in the extant fragments.59 These criticisms range from ad hominem to more subtle references to specific authors, all with the intent of showing that the theories of other philosophers lack viability just as supernatural interpretations fail in their explanations.60

I have already discussed in the previous section (§2.1.1) how Heraclitus disparages the knowledge of other thinkers in fragment 40, specifically Hesiod, Pythagoras,

Xenophanes, and Hecataeus. The first sustained arguments, however, that criticize a predecessor and then present an alternative come from Parmenides. Parmenides signifies his target by means of linguistic and stylistic references.61 He also uses such linguistic and stylistic references to remind the readers of at least one fellow Presocratic,

Heraclitus.62

χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐὸν ἔµµεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,

µηδὲν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν· τά σ’ ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.

πρώτης γάρ σ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>,

αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ’ ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν

πλάττονται, δίκρανοι· ἀµηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν

στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται

59 Hippocrates (see note 48 above) gives an enticing hint of public debate among philosophers: γνοίη δ᾽ ἄν τις τόδε µάλιστα παραγενόµενος αὐτέοισιν ἀντιλέγουσιν (Hippocrates On the Nature of Man 1) “Someone would know this especially by being present when they speak against one another. I discuss this passage more fully in §2.3 in this chapter. 60 See §2.1.1. 61 I outline how Parmenides refers to Hesiod in §2.1.1. 62 I give one example for this echo; Graham 2002 discusses other parallels of language. Contra this position, Gallop 1984 (11) argues, in agreement with Stokes 1971 (109-27, 300-8), that Parmenides need not refer specifically to Heraclitus, “an abstruse Ionian intellectual.” This interpretation depends upon παντῶν being “all men”. Others argue that Parmenides is also attacking everyone who believed that things come into being, change, and are then destroyed (Guthrie 1965 (24-5), McKirahan 1994 (158)). Curd 1998 (39ff.) links Parmenides’ attacks specifically to Anaximander. The important issue is that Parmenides criticizes others’ theories and then replaces them with his own.

34 κωφοὶ ὁµῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα,

οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόµισται

κοὐ ταὐτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.117 = DK 28B6

To speak and understand what exists must necessarily exist, for existence is and (speaking and thinking) nothing is not.63 These things I urge to think upon. For I forbid you from this path of inquiry, but also then from this (path), which mortals who know nothing wander, two-headed. For helplessness in their breasts steers their wandering mind, and they are borne along both deaf and blind, astounded, unjudging tribes, for whom being and not-being are considered the same and not the same, the path of all things is backward-turning.

Parmenides believes that there are only two possible interpretations of the world, either something is and so it has to be, or it is not and so it must not exist (fragment 2).64 The two positions are mutually exclusive. People who rely on observation, therefore, to say that something is and is not at the same time are completely mistaken. Most people believe this uncritically because we see things come into being, grow, decline, and then perish. He criticizes Heraclitus in particular because the latter argued there is an underlying unity among the opposites that makes them the same, and Parmenides extends this to being and not being. The term παλίντροπός is key: οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως

διαφερόµενον ἑωυτῶι ὁµολογέει· παλίντροπος ἁρµονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης

(Hippolytus Refutatio 9.9.2 = DK 22B51) “They do not understand that the thing that differs with itself is in agreement; it is a back-turning harmony, like that of a bow or

63 My translation reflects that I believe the ἔστιν is existential (x exists), rather than predicative (x is y) or veridical (x is the case, or x is true). I choose this because Parmenides’ description of “what is” or being emphasizes its uniqueness and lack of change in contrast with what people observe. Graham 2006 (157ff.) lays out the various interpretations of ἔστιν. 64 See below.

35 lyre.”65 There are different kinds of unity66: one thing can produce different reactions, for example, salt water is toxic to people but not fish (B61); one thing may have opposite qualities, for example, writing is both straight and crooked (B59); one thing may be known only because of its opposite, for example, justice cannot be understood without acts of injustice (B23); and finally some opposites are on a continuum, for example, night and day (B57). Heraclitus, like other physikoi before Parmenides, relies on observation when he generates his theories: ὅσων ὄψις ἀκοὴ µάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιµέω

(Hippolytus Refutatio 9.9.5 = DK 22B55) “of whatever things there is sight, hearing, and experience, these things I prefer.”67

Parmenides, on the other hand, discredits this reliance on observation by means of deductive reasoning.

εἰ δ’ ἄγ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόµισαι δὲ σὺ µῦθον ἀκούσας,

αἵπερ ὁδοὶ µοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι·

ἡ µὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι µὴ εἶναι,

Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος (Ἀληθείῃ γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ),

ἡ δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι µὴ εἶναι,

τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔµµεν ἀταρπόν·

οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε µὴ ἐὸν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν)

οὔτε φράσαις.

Proclus in Timaeus 1.345 = DK 28B2

65 Kahn 1979 (195-6) defends these textual readings. 66 Guthrie 1962 (445-6). 67 Compare fragments 19, 101a, and 107.

36 Come and I will tell you – and you, having heard the tale, bring it forth – which are the only paths of inquiry to consider. The one is that it is and that it is not possible that it not exist. This is the path of Persuasion, for it attends Truth. The other is that it is not and that it must not be, this I tell you is an utterly inscrutable path – for you could not know what is not (for it is not possible) nor could you talk about it.

Parmenides uses modus tollens arguments to show that the only path is that it is. Modus tollens denies the consequent, thus showing that the original claim is untrue. Parts of the argument here are missing. If something exists, then it should be knowable and describable, as Parmenides will go on to describe “what is”68; if P, then Q. One cannot know what is unobservable since one cannot observe what is not there; not Q. “What is not”, therefore, cannot exist; not P. After he eliminates the possibility that “what is not” can exist, he shows in fragment 8, again with a series of modus tollens arguments, that

“what is” can have only certain qualities, that is, uncreated, indestructible, and unchanging, thus proving that the world we observe is not what we believe.69

Reason, therefore, appears to have demolished our understanding of the world as it is observed, and replaced it with a model that can be understood only by reason. The common opinion is that the philosophers who follow Parmenides are forced to face this logical tour de force with arguments of their own. Zeno, if he was not a follower of

Parmenides, at least follows this technique in his paradoxes of motion and his denial of plurality. Other philosophers such as Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Diogenes of

68 Compare also fragment 6. 69 For example, he denies coming into being as follows: πῆι πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὐδ’ ἐκ µὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω | φάσθαι σ’ οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν | ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. (Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.144 = DK 28B8.7-9) “In what way and from what did it increase? I will not allow you to say nor to think from what is not. For it is not to be said or thought that it is not.” In other words, if “what is” comes into being, then it comes into being from “what is not”. But Parmenides has already claimed that “what is not” cannot be because it cannot be known or declared. It follows, therefore, that “what is” has always been as it is because it cannot come into being.

37 Apollonia, it is argued, posit a plurality of elements to account for the variety we observe in the world, yet agree with Parmenides’ criticism that what is not cannot be. In the case of Empedocles, however, there is no trace of this type of clear argumentation that his predecessors and contemporaries illustrate.

2.2 EMPEDOCLES’ LESSONS

I have shown that the other Presocratics reveal their dialogue with their predecessors and contemporaries, although not always by name, through their writing. Parmenides, owing to his use of argumentation in verse to attack directly his opponents and their underlying assumptions, would be an especially important model for Empedocles. We know, moreover, that Empedocles was familiar with Parmenides’ poem. Empedocles appears to address Parmenides through verbal echoes as well; for example, in fragment 2

Empedocles refers in the first line to the road to understanding because the senses are narrow (στεινωπός is generally used of roads from Homer), an image which Parmenides also uses widely (1.2, 2.2, 4, 7.2, 8.1, 18) as he distinguishes between the path of knowing and the path of opinion. As fragment 2 continues, Empedocles establishes a new road for his readers to follow, turning away from the path that the majority follow, just as

Parmenides did.70 In addition, Empedocles accepts Parmenides’ assertion that no thing comes to be from nothing and no thing is destroyed into nothing, as we see when

Empedocles discusses the true nature of birth and death (for example, fragment 12).

While Empedocles agrees with Parmenides on this point, he implicitly counters the objections Parmenides addresses to his predecessors, that is, that all things come to be

70 See the discussion of fragment 2 below.

38 only from x, whatever x may be, by positing a plurality of material from which all things come to be and into which they are destroyed, as he explains in fragment 17 and elsewhere, for example, fragments 21, 23, and 26. He does not attempt to show why he does not believe that the world comes from “what is” as Parmenides proposes contra his predecessors in fragment 8.

2.2.1 Empedocles’ Criticism – Fragment 2

Fragment 2 suggests that Empedocles was aware of his predecessors and was actively engaged in debate with them. It appears that Empedocles intends to compare his theories with all previous theories when he says that everyone claims to understand how the world works when in fact they do not.

στεινωποὶ µὲν γὰρ παλάµαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται·

πολλὰ δὲ δείλ’ ἔµπαια, τά τ’ ἀµβλύνουσι µέριµνας.

παῦρον δ’ ἐν ζωῇσι βίου µέρος ἀθρήσαντες71

ὠκύµοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν

αὐτὸ µόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτωι προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος 5

πάντοσ’ ἐλαυνόµενοι, τὸ δ’ ὅλον <πᾶς>72 εὔχεται εὑρεῖν·

οὕτως οὔτ’ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ’ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ’ ἐπακουστά

οὔτε νόωι περιληπτά.73 σὺ δ’ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ’ ἐλιάσθης,

πεύσεαι·74 οὐ πλεῖόν γὲ75 βροτείη µῆτις ὄρωρεν.

71 Bollack 1969 (fr. 10) prints ἀθροίσαντες (having gathered, collected). 72 πᾶς was added by Bergk and printed by Diels. Bollack 1969 prints οὐδεὶς. 73 Inwood 2001 (fr. 8) separates this fragment here because Sextus inserts a comment (διασαφεῖ τοῖς προκειµένοις ἐπιφέρων “And he clarifies the point by adding this to the lines quoted above.”) before he continues with the quotation. I, along with most editors, do not feel that the separation is necessary.

39 Sextus Empiricus Against the Mathematicians 7.123-4 = DK 31B2

For narrow devices76 are poured throughout the limbs, and many wretched things, which make our concerns dull, burst in. They, having looked at a small portion of life in their lifetime, fly off in the manner of smoke when they die early, persuaded of this thing alone, at whatever each has arrived. They have been driven all over, and everyone boasts that he has discovered the whole – in this way, these things are not to be seen by men, nor heard, nor embraced with the mind. But you, since you have stepped aside, will learn. Mortal cunning, at least, has gone no further.

Why does no one know the whole, τό ὅλον?77 Each individual sense is fallible on its own with distractions that prevent getting a full picture (lines 1-2); you feel, for example, the heat of the sun, but it is tempered by a cool breeze. Sextus uses this fragment to argue that Empedocles believes that one should not trust the senses at all, only reason.78 But for

Empedocles the solution lies in using the senses together79; reason is just another sense as

Empedocles includes it in the list with seeing and hearing in lines 7-8.80 The whole (τό

ὅλον), now expressed with the general neuter plural subject τάδε, cannot be seen alone, nor heard alone, nor embraced by the mind alone. This is the mistake made by πᾶς in line

6; everyone boasts that they know the whole, but the paucity of individual senses plus the

74 The punctuation is from Bollack 1969. 75 This text is in the manuscripts. 76 Also “palm” of hand; see Bollack 1969 (3:8) for a discussion of the importance for touch and the mechanics of perception to which Empedocles seems to refer. See also §2.3.1 in chapter 4. 77 The general understanding of τὸ ὅλον is the world and, by association, how it operates. Others refer to this not as τὸ ὅλον, but τὸ πᾶν. Xenophanes DK 21B34.2; Parmenides DK 28B1.31-2, 9.3; Anaxagoras DK 59B1; Diogenes of Apollonia DK 64B2, 5. See also Plato Sophist 242d and Aristotle Metaphysics 982b17, 983b6-11, 988b22-3. 78 ἄλλοι δὲ ἦσαν οἱ λέγοντες κατὰ τὸν Ἐµπεδοκλέα κριτήριον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ τὰς αἰσθέσεις ἀλλὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον… (Sextus Empiricus Against the Mathematicians 122) “Others say that according to Empedocles the criterion of truth is not the senses, but right reason.” 79 Compare fragments 110 and 3.9-13. See §2.1.1 in chapter 4. 80 Bollack 1969 (3: 16).

40 short duration of a human life81 mean that these people do not, in fact, know the whole.

But “you”, probably Pausanias82, will learn since he has stepped aside (ἐλιάσθης). The verb, λιάζοµαι, means “to stray from the path”, and in this case Pausanias is straying from the ἀνδράσιν of line 7 – all the generic people who make the mistake of boasting that they have found the whole. Pausanias makes a conscious choice to do things differently, to not trust in one sense alone; in this way he will achieve more than people have before because he will follow Empedocles: “mortal cunning at least has gone no further” (οὐ πλεῖόν γὲ βροτείη µῆτις ὄρωρεν).83 Empedocles, therefore, disparages everyone else while praising Pausanias for choosing to follow him.

81 Empedocles emphasizes this shortcoming in men through contrast with Pythagoras who learned in only one lifetime what most could learn in ten to twenty: ὁππότε γὰρ πάσῃσιν ὀρέξαιτο πραπίδεσσιν, | ῥεῖ’ ὅ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον | καί τε δέκ’ ἀνθρώπων καί τ’ εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν (Porphyry Life of Pythagoras 30 = DK 31B129.4-6) “For wherever he reached with all his thinking organs, he perceived easily each of all the things that exist over 10 and 20 lifetimes of men.” 82 Throughout his verses, the “you”, whether indicated with a verb or pronoun, is usually Pausanias if Diogenes Laërtius’ testimony for fragment 1 is trustworthy: Παυσανίη, σὺ δὲ κλῦθι, δαΐφρονος Ἀγχίτεω υἱέ (DK 31B1) “And you, Pausanias, shining son of Anchites, listen!”; σὺ δ’ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ’ ἐλιάσθης, | πεύσεαι (DK 31B2.8-9) “You then, since you have stepped aside, will learn…”; ἀλλ᾽ ἄγ᾽ ἄθρει (DK 31B3.9) “but come, consider…”; ἔρυκε, νόει (DK 31B3.13) “[do not] curb, but understand”; γνῶθι (DK 31B4.3) “know…”; ἄκουε (DK 31B6.1) “listen…”; ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω (DK 31B8.1) “but I will tell you…”; ἀλλ’ ἄγε µύθων κλῦθι· µάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει· (DK 31B17.14) “but come, hear my words; for learning will increase your mind”; τὴν σὺ νόῳ δέρκευ, µηδ’ ὄµµασιν ἧσο τεθηπώς (DK 31B17.21) “you, perceive her with your mind, do not sit astonished with your eyes”; σὺ δ’ ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν (DK 31B17.26) “but you, hear the expedition, which is not deceiving, of my account”; ἀλλ’ ἄγε, τόνδ’ ὀάρων προτέρων ἐπιµάρτυρα δέρκευ (DK 31B21.1) “but come, look on this testimony of my earlier words”; οὕτω µή σ’ ἀπάτη φρένα καινύτω (DK 31B23.9) “do not let deception overcome you in your mind”; εἰ δ᾽ ἄγε τοι λέξω (DK 31B38.1) “but come, I will tell you”; νῦν δ᾽ ἄγ᾽… τῶνδε κλύ᾽(DK 31B62.1-3) “come now, hear these things”; εἰ δέ τί σοι περὶ τῶνδε λιπόξυλος ἔπλετο πίστις (DK 31B71.1) “and if, in some way, there is feeble conviction for you concerning these things”; εἰ γάρ … ἐποπτεύεις | ταῦτά τέ σοι µάλα πάντα δι’ αἰῶνος παρέσονται (DK 31B110.1-3) “for if you gaze on [them]…all these things will stay completely with you forever…”; εἰ δὲ σύ γ’ ἀλλοίων ἐπορέξεαι … ἦ σ’ ἄφαρ ἐκλείψουσι (DK 31B110.6-8) “but if you reach for other things…indeed they will leave you”; πεύσῃ, ἐπεὶ µούνῳ σοὶ ἐγὼ κρανέω τάδε πάντα | … παύσεις … ἢν ἐθέλῃσθα … ἐπάξεις … θήσεις … ἄξεις (DK 31B111) “you will learn, since I do all these things for you alone… you will stop…if you wish…you will bring on…you will place…you will lead…”; [δεὶ]ξω σοι (PStr a(ii)23) “I will show you”; ἔνθ᾽ ὄψει (PStr b2) “whence you will see…”. If Empedocles refers to anyone else as “you”, he uses a vocative in the same line, or very close, to identify the addressed. As it happens, the only other singular “you” is the Muse/Calliopeia, see §1.2.2 and §1.3 in chapter 4. 83 Trépanier 2004 (54-5).

41 2.2.2 Empedocles’ Criticism – Fragment 39

It is reasonable to assume that Pausanias will learn τό ὅλον, which everyone boasts to have found. I have already discussed above (§1.3) how Empedocles describes how the world works in fragment 17, and there are other verses in which he discusses the universe, for example, the creation of the world (DK 31A49A, 31A66A), the creation of animals (DK 31B35, 31B57, 31B62), and the operation of the eye (DK 31B84). From the extant evidence, whenever Empedocles discusses his own interpretation of τό ὅλον, he simply states what he believes. Even when he is critical of other theories specifically, as, for example in fragment 39, he fails to explain why they are wrong before proposing his own interpretation.

εἴπερ ἀπείρονα γῆς τε βάθη καὶ δαψιλὸς αἰθήρ,

ὡς διὰ πολλῶν δὴ γλώσσας ἐλθόντα µαταίως

ἐκκέχυται στοµάτων ὀλίγον τοῦ παντὸς ἰδόντων

Aristotle de caelo 294a 21 = DK 31B39

If indeed the depths of earth and plentiful air are limitless, as is poured out in vain going from the tongues in the mouths of many, who have seen little of the whole.

According to Empedocles, it is impossible that the earth and sky should extend without limit. The entire universe is always in the shape of a sphere. This seems surprising because the only time Empedocles refers to a spherical shape is at the time of the One.84

Commentators emphasized this feature of the One, with the result that some limit the spherical shape to the One. 85 This led other commentators to postulate that the universe

84 See §1.2 in chapter 3. 85 Eudemus, for example, refers to the time of Love’s domination when all things have been brought together as the time of the sphere (κατὰ τὸν σφαῖρον – Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1183.28), but it is difficult to say whether Eudemus himself uses the term σφαῖρος here or has been paraphrased by

42 takes on different shapes at different times, for example, egg-shaped or an oblate spheroid.86 There is evidence, however, that suggests that Empedocles thought that the universe is always spherical: 1) the path of the sun and 2) the lack of void in the universe.

The created worlds are sphere-like in shape. Aëtius comments that the sun would travel in a straight line but is prohibited: Ἐµπεδοκλὴς ὑπὸ τῆς περιεχούσης αὐτὸν

σφαίρας κωλυόµενον ἄχρι παντὸς εὐθυπορεῖν (Aëtius 2.23.2 (Dox. 353) = DK 31A58b)

“Empedocles says the sun goes straight as far as possible until prevented by the sphere surrounding it [i.e., the created world].” Several pieces of evidence contribute to the interpretation of a spherical created world. Air and fire separate initially from the mixture

Simplicius. Simplicius refers to the One as Sphere most frequently: ὥσπερ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς τὴν Φιλίαν λέγων καὶ τὸ Νεῖκος παρὰ µέρος ἐπικρατοῦντα τὴν µὲν συνάγειν τὰ πάντα εἰς ἓν καὶ φθείρειν τὸν τοῦ Νείκους κόσµον καὶ ποιεῖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸν σφαῖρον, τὸ δὲ Νεῖκος διακρίνειν πάλιν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ποιεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον κόσµον. (Simplicius de caelo CIAG 7.293.20-23) “For example, Empedocles says that Love and Strife control by turns and that the former brings together all things into One and destroys the universe of Strife and makes a Sphere from it, and that Strife separates the elements again and makes a universe like this one”; καίτοι ὑπὸ τοῦ Νείκους διακρίνοντος τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦτον λέγει γίνεσθαι τὸν κόσµον ὁ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῆς Φιλίας συναγούσης καὶ ἑνούσης αὐτὰ τὸν σφαῖρον. (Simplicius de caelo CIAG 7.528.11- 13) “And yet Empedocles says that this universe comes into being by Strife separating the elements, just as the Sphere comes into being by Love bringing together and uniting the elements”; µήποτε δέ, κἂν ἐπικρατῇ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ Νεῖκος ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σφαίρῳ ἡ Φιλία, ἀλλ’ ἄµφω ὑπ’ ἀµφοῖν λέγονται γίνεσθαι. (Simplicius de caelo CIAG 7.528.30-32) “Nevertheless, even if Strife is in control in this universe just as Love is in control in the sphere, both are said to be created by both”; Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1184.2 (quoted above). Simplicius held a neoplatonic view of Empedocles’ doctrine and believed that the Sphere was the paradigm for the universe and the world under Strife was its image: ὑπέθετο γὰρ οὗτος τόν τε νοητὸν καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσµον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων τῶν τεττάρων συνεστῶτας, τὸν µὲν παραδειγµατικῶς δηλονότι τὸν δὲ εἰκονικῶς, καὶ ποιητικὰ αἴτια τοῦ µὲν νοητοῦ τὴν Φιλίαν διὰ τῆς ἑνώσεως τὸν σφαῖρον ποιοῦσαν, ὃν καὶ θεὸν ἐπονοµάζει…, τοῦ δὲ αἰσθητοῦ τὸ Νεῖκος, ὅταν ἐπικρατῇ µὴ τελέως, διὰ τῆς διακρίσεως τὸν κόσµον τοῦτον ποιοῦν. δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κόσµῳ τήν τε ἕνωσιν ὁρᾶν καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν, τὴν µὲν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν, ὃν ἄν τις καὶ σφαῖρον καὶ θεὸν εἰκότως καλέσειε, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑπὸ σελήνην, ὃ µάλιστα τοῦ κοσµεῖσθαι δεόµενον κόσµος καλεῖται κυριώτερον. (Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1123.26-1124.7) “For he supposed that the intelligible and the perceptible universes were formed from the same four elements, the former as a paradigm and the other clearly its image. The creative cause for the intelligible is Love because she makes the sphere (which he calls god) through unification and Strife [is the creative cause] for the perceptible when he is in control, but not completely, making this universe through separation. It is possible to see both unification and separation in this universe, the former in the heaven which is rightly called Sphere and god, and the other below the moon which is most properly called the universe (κόσµος) because it is in need of arrangement (κοσµεῖσθαι).” 86 Aëtius claims that the universe is egg-shaped: κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ οὐρανοῦ µᾶλλον ἀναπεπταµένου διὰ τὸ ὠιῷ παραπλησίως τὸν κόσµον κεῖσθαι (Aëtius 2.31.4 (Dox. 363) = DK 31A50a) “for the sky is spread more widely in this direction (breadth) because the cosmos is placed very much like an egg.” Bicknell 1968 proposed that Empedocles believed the created world is an oblate spheroid owing to empirical evidence, i.e., the stars overhead appear brighter than those at the horizon.

43 of One when Strife draws near to form the sky.87 Since the One is already spherical, the air and fire moving to the edges and creating the sky form a spherical barrier that encloses the created world. The sun travels about the sky (ἀλλ’ ὁ µὲν ἁλισθεὶς µέγαν

οὐρανὸν ἀµφιπολεύει (Macrobius Saturnalia 1.17.46 = DK 31B41) “but that which was gathered together [sc. the sun] travels about the great sky”) following the orbit of the universe (Ἐµπεδοκλὴς τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου περίδροµον εἶναι περιγραφὴν τοῦ πέρατος τοῦ

κόσµου. (Aëtius 2.1.4 (Dox. 328) = DK 31A50b) “Empedocles says the circuit of the sun is the limit of the created world”). The sky, therefore, is the limit of the created world.

This interpretation depends heavily upon testimonia, but Empedocles also hints that the created world is spherical. Strife continues to influence the created world although his own period of domination has passed: οὐ γὰρ ἀµεµφέως | τῶν πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ᾽ ἔσχατα

τέρµατα κύκλου (DK 31B35.9-10) “For he (Strife) did not blamelessly stand out wholly from these [the roots] at the furthest limits of the circle.”

The universe is always spherical. Empedocles says himself that there is neither lack nor any excess of matter in the universe: οὐδέ τι τοῦ παντὸς κενεὸν πέλει οὐδὲ περισσόν.

(Aëtius 1.18.2 (Dox 316) = DK 31B13). This is normally interpreted simply that there is no void, but it also entails that matter is evenly distributed throughout the universe. If there is no void or excess, matter would stretch out equally in all directions and the universe would be spherical, just as Parmenides insists in his Way of Truth.

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύµατον, τετελεσµένον ἐστί

87 The roots do not move from their arrangement in the One until Strife approaches: πάντα γὰρ ἑξείης πελεµίζετο γυῖα θεοῖο (DK 31B31) “for all the limbs of the god begin to shake one after another”. When this occurs: ἐκ πρώτης φησὶ τῆς τῶν στοιχείων κράσεως ἀποκριθέντα τὸν ἀέρα περιχυθῆναι κύκλῳ· µετὰ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα τὸ πῦρ ἐκδραµὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔχον ἑτέραν χώραν ἄνω ἐκτρέχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα πάγου ([Plutarch] Stromata in Eusebius Preparatio Evangelica 1.8.10 = Dox. 582 = DK 31A30) “He (Empedocles) says that air was first separated off from the blend of the elements and poured about in a circle; fire, coming out with no other place to go, runs out under the solidified air.”

44 πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,

µεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ·

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.146.15-17 = DK 28B8.42-44

Since its limit is the furthest point, it is perfect from every direction, like the bulk of a spherical ball, in the middle, well matched in every respect.

The One is the element in Empedocles’ cycle that was most influenced by Parmenides.

While Empedocles’ roots do possess all the eternal characteristics of Parmenides’ “what is” – uncreated, indestructible, and unchanging, the One possesses these features most visibly in the use of the sphere as Parmenides describes in this passage. Perhaps the spherical shape was emphasized in the One as a sign of its perfection.88 Nevertheless, the universe appears to maintain its shape as a sphere since there is no void at any time and matter is evenly spread without excess or lack in any direction. Since the universe is always spherical, the Many is spherical as well.

As I have illustrated, Empedocles is critical, but at the same time he does not state explicitly his own interpretation. If Empedocles considered himself part of the “scientist” community, he would follow the patterns visible in the writings of those individuals who openly criticize the theories of their contemporaries and replace them explicitly with their own theories. Parmenides pursued this path, and if verbal echoes are indicative of familiarity, then Empedocles knew Parmenides’ poem. Despite being familiar with this pattern, Empedocles does not follow it himself. This suggests that it was not his goal to replace other theories with his own.

88 Recall too how the One is god in Empedocles’ scheme (Aristotle Metaphysics 1000b3, Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1124.1). See §1.2 in chapter 3.

45

2.2.3 A Different Focus

Although a significant portion of Empedocles’ extant verses support the interpretation that he was a scientist, he does not present himself as such, that is, he does not follow the paradigm that we see among his contemporaries. This lack of argumentation may be no more than an accident of preservation. But verses have been preserved that state explicitly what “you” will learn, and these verses suggest that Empedocles would not consider himself a scientist, that is, someone who pursues knowledge of how the world works for the sake of knowledge; he wants to control the world and that entails understanding how it works.

Diogenes Laertius quotes fragment 111 to support the statement that Empedocles practiced magic: τοῦτὸν φησιν ὁ Σάτυρος λέγειν, ὡς αὐτὸς (Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος) παρείη

τῷ Ἐµπεδοκλεῖ γοητεύοντι (Diogenes Laertius Lives 8.59) “Satyrus says that Gorgias [a student of Empedocles] said that he was present while Empedocles practiced magic.”

Although these verses are used in conjunction with fragment 112 to show that

Empedocles was a magician89, it is within these verses that Empedocles states what

Pausanias will learn.

φάρµακα δ’ ὅσσα γεγᾶσι κακῶν καὶ γήραος ἄλκαρ

πεύσῃ, ἐπεὶ µούνῳ σοὶ ἐγὼ κρανέω τάδε πάντα.

παύσεις δ’ ἀκαµάτων ἀνέµων µένος οἵ τ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν

ὀρνύµενοι πνοιαῖσι καταφθινύθουσιν ἀρούρας·

καὶ πάλιν, ἢν ἐθέλῃσθα, παλίντιτα πνεύµατ(α) ἐπάξεις·

89 Dodds 1951 (145 ff.) and Ogden 2002 use the term “shaman”, Kingsley 1995a and 1995b, Graf 1997 (33-34), Johnston 1999a (19, 104), Dickie 2001 (32-33). I will counter this in chapter 2.

46 θήσεις δ’ ἐξ ὄµβροιο κελαινοῦ καίριον αὐχµόν

ἀνθρώποις, θήσεις δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐχµοῖο θερείου

ῥεύµατα δενδρεόθρεπτα, τά τ’ αἰθέρι ναιήσονται,

ἄξεις δ’ ἐξ Ἀίδαο καταφθιµένου µένος ἀνδρός

Diogenes Laertius 8.59 = DK 31B111

You will learn as many drugs as have come into being to defend against evils and old age since I will accomplish all these things for you alone. You will stop the force of untiring winds which, rushing against the earth, kill the fields with their blasts; and again, if you wish, you will bring the winds back again. You will make after dark rain a drought timely for men, and after summer drought you will make tree-nourishing streams that dwell in the air [i.e., rain]; and you will bring from Hades the strength of a man who has died.

What will Pausanias learn? How to heal, to the point of raising the dead, and how to control the weather, specifically the wind and rain. This is definitely outside the scope of science where the primary goal is descriptive, that is, to determine why the world works as it does.

Until recently, the solution was to downplay the importance of this fragment. Some editors placed it in a postulated medical treatise to account for the teaching of cures and the raising of the dead; this limits the doctrine in Περὶ Φύσεως to the composition of the universe, but controlling the weather seems out of place in a medical treatise.90 van

Groningen (1956) eliminated the issue altogether by claiming that fragment 111 and any others referring to Empedocles’ divinity were spurious and likely the work of a comic poet lampooning his character, such as the portrayal of Socrates in Aristophanes’ Clouds.

The ring composition (cure illness and old age at beginning, conquer death by end),

90 Karsten 1838, 148; Mullach 1860, 14.

47 however, and the manner in which each action in controlling the weather is matched by its opposite – stop and start the winds, stop and start the rain – supports the authenticity of fragment 111.91 The prevalence of the future tense prompted Diels to place fragment

111 at the end of Περὶ Φύσεως since the powers will follow and are not the true message of the poem: they are allegories for the sort of influence knowledge can bring92; but the sort of poetic epilogue that he suggested did not exist at that time.93 Most editors now place fragment 111 at the front of the poem, believing that it displays the ultimate intent of the poem94, although not in the sense that Empedocles explained explicitly to

Pausanias how he would accomplish these feats; there are no indications in the extant fragments, and this would surely be of interest to preserve. The information is simply too volatile for Empedocles to pass on and is hidden from οἱ πολλοί.

Empedocles, therefore, does not completely fit the second requirement that modern scholars set for scientists, that is, to be part of a community that moves knowledge forward through active debate and criticism.95 Empedocles does criticize others, but he does not attempt to explain their shortfalls and thus elevate his own theories. Moreover, he is rarely clear about presenting his own conjectures. When one looks more closely for what Pausanias (“you”) will learn (fragment 2), it turns out not to be τὸ ὅλον, but how to control the world (fragment 111), which moves us to the realm of craft and technology.

Empedocles would not consider himself part of the presocratic scientific community

91 Bollack 1969, 3:20-21. 92 Diels 1898, 407-409 (1969 (138-140). 93 van Groningen 1958, 207-8. 94 Bollack 1969 places fragment 111 between fragments 2 and 3. Inwood 2001 (218-219) places the fragment in the proem, as do McKirahan 1994 (258), Kingsley 1995a (218), and Trépanier 2004 (66). Contra Wright 1981 (133) who leaves it at the end of the poem. 95 See §2.1 above.

48 because he does present his view of how the world operates with the purpose of proving his competitors wrong; rather, if you want to control the world, you need first to understand how the world works.

2.3 CLARITY AND PERSUASION

A scientist’s goal is to express his theories to others and to persuade them that his theories are superior. But, as Hippocrates complains in the first chapter of On the Nature of Man, “scientists” are often persuasive only in a bad sense, that is, the winner of public debate tends to be the cleverest speaker. The philosophers who argue that man is made of one thing only – whether water, fire, air, or earth – defend their assertions with evidence and proofs that are unconvincing on their own.

λέγει δ’ αὐτέων ὁ µέν τις φάσκων ἠέρα εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὸ

πᾶν, ὁ δὲ πῦρ, ὁ δὲ ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ γῆν, καὶ ἐπιλέγει ἕκαστος τῷ

ἑωυτοῦ λόγῳ µαρτύριά τε καὶ τεκµήρια, ἅ γέ ἐστιν οὐδέν. ὅτε γὰρ

τῇ µὲν αὐτέῃ γνώµῃ πάντες χρέονται, λέγουσι δ’ οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ,

δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ γινώσκουσιν αὐτά. γνοίη δ’ ἄν τις τόδε µάλιστα

παραγενόµενος αὐτέοισιν ἀντιλέγουσιν· πρὸς γὰρ ἀλλήλους

ἀντιλέγοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄνδρες τῶν αὐτέων ἐναντίον ἀκροατέων

οὐδέποτε τρὶς ἐφεξῆς ὁ αὐτὸς περιγίνεται ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ

µὲν οὗτος ἐπικρατέει, ποτὲ δὲ οὗτος, ποτὲ δὲ ᾧ ἂν τύχῃ µάλιστα ἡ

γλῶσσα ἐπιῤῥυεῖσα πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον. καίτοι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν φάντα

ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν ἀµφὶ τῶν πρηγµάτων παρέχειν αἰεὶ ἐπικρατέοντα

49 τὸν λόγον τὸν ἑωυτοῦ, εἴπερ ἐόντα γινώσκει καὶ ὀρθῶς

ἀποφαίνεται.

Hippocrates On the Nature of Man 1

Of these, one declares that this one and the whole is air, another, fire, another, water and yet another, earth. And each picks out evidence and witnesses, which is nothing, for the case itself. For when everyone uses the same piece of knowledge and they do not say the same things, it is clear that they do not know these things. Someone might learn this especially by being beside those speaking in opposition; for the same men who speak against one another in front of the same audience, the same man never prevails in his speech three times in a row, but at one time this fellow comes out on top, and at another that one, and at yet another time whoever happens to have an especially fluid tongue before the crowd. But it is just that the one who says that he knows correctly about matters should present his own argument and it will always prevail, if he knows these things and displays them correctly.

Hippocrates claims that if the theory was true and the evidence supporting it convincing, then non-philosophers would always choose that theory as the winner in these public debates. Aristotle, on the other hand, would claim that the problem is in how they express their ideas. The audience who chooses the “winner” in these debates is not learning what men are formed from, and thus they are swayed by other considerations, such as the speakers’ styles.

Aristotle argues that physikoi must explain their theories clearly with common language to ensure that they are understood because one cannot claim the highest level of knowledge unless one can teach the hypotheses to others. As the Presocratics interact with their peers and their ideas, they must present their own theories clearly and persuasively in order to sway the audience to accept them. The more clearly one can explain something the more clearly they know what they are explaining. Aristotle is

50 adamant that the whole purpose to studying physis, or any other theoretical science, is to gain knowledge of it.

Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συµβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς

µεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα

γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόµεθα γιγνώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἴτια

γνωρίσωµεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας καὶ µέχρι τῶν

στοιχείων), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήµης πειρατέον

διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

Aristotle Physics 184a10-16

Since knowing and scientific knowledge about all intellectual pursuits that have principles, causes, or elements occurs from being acquainted with them – for we think that we know each thing when we are acquainted with the first causes and the first principles as far as its elements – it is clear that one must try first to determine the principles of knowledge regarding nature (i.e., natural science).

The knowledge that each physikos should aim for, even if it may be unachievable, is the highest level of knowledge, ἐπιστήµη. If you possess this level of knowledge, then you know the causes (αἴτια) of the thing in question, whether it is a man, a tree, or a cow. In addition, however, you must recognize first that these αἴτια are the αἴτια, that is, you cannot possess this knowledge by chance, and second that the αἴτια cannot be something else than what they are.96 If you are unable to know the causes fully, then you cannot yet

96 Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόµεθ’ ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ µὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συµβεβηκός, ὅταν τήν τ’ αἰτίαν οἰώµεθα γινώσκειν δι’ ἣν τὸ πρᾶγµά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ µὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ’ ἄλλως ἔχειν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι τὸ ἐπίστασθαί ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ µὴ ἐπιστάµενοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιστάµενοι οἱ µὲν οἴονται αὐτοὶ οὕτως ἔχειν, οἱ δ’ ἐπιστάµενοι καὶ ἔχουσιν, ὥστε οὗ ἁπλῶς ἔστιν ἐπιστήµη, τοῦτ’ ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν (Aristotle Posterior Analytics 71b10-15) “We think that we know (ἐπίστασθαι) completely, but not in the sophistic way by chance, whenever we think that we both know the cause (αἰτία) for which the matter is, because it is the cause, and that it is not possible to be otherwise. It is clear, therefore, that to know is something like this. For the ones who do not know and those who do, the former think that they are

51 claim to possess the highest level of knowledge. The only way, moreover, to display that you have knowledge (ἐπιστήµη) of something is to explain it clearly to someone so that they can also gain knowledge of it: ἐπιστήµη µὲν γὰρ πᾶσα ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ

πολύ—πῶς γὰρ ἢ µαθήσεται ἢ διδάξει ἄλλον; (Aristotle Metaphysics 1027a20-22) “For all epistēmē is either of what is always or what is for the most part – for how will one learn or teach another [if you are not certain]? Science should be expressed clearly because any exchange of ideas – whether written or oral – must meet one major condition, it must make the author’s or speaker’s meaning clear: καὶ ὡρίσθω λέξεως

ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι· σηµεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν µὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον.

(Rhetoric 1404b1-3) “And let the excellence of style be defined as clarity. For the sign of this is that speech, if it is not clear, will not perform its proper function.” Knowledge and explanation, therefore, are closely bound for Aristotle and he will seek both from his predecessors if they are to be considered successful physikoi.

Aristotle believes that as long as one uses words that are common and with undisputed meaning (κύριον) it is possible to be clear and express one’s ideas to any audience. In general, words correspond simply to the impressions of things we have in our mind.

ἔστι µὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθηµάτων σύµβολα,

καὶ τὰ γραφόµενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράµµατα πᾶσι

τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν µέντοι ταῦτα σηµεῖα πρώτων,

ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθήµατα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁµοιώµατα

πράγµατα

in such a state [i.e., possessing knowledge] and the latter are in such a state, with the result that knowledge is complete and it cannot be otherwise.”

52 ἤδη ταὐτά.

Aristotle de interpretatione 16a4 ff.

The things in speech [words spoken] are σύµβολα of the experiences in the soul, and the things written (are σύµβολα) of the spoken words. And just as letters are not the same for all, nor are utterances the same. But these (experiences) of (the words spoken) are primary signs, the impressions of the soul, which are the same for everyone, as are also the things of which they are likenesses or representations.

In a political or commercial context, a σύµβολον is a physical representation of a treaty or a contract. The σύµβολον, a chip, is broken in half and each participant in the agreement keeps half.97 Aristotle intends a similar agreement when he describes the spoken word as a σύµβολον of an impression of the soul and the written word as a

σύµβολον of the spoken. The spoken work is a token, a representation, for the idea or object of which the mind has an impression. Everyone who has observed or had some other experience regarding the concept or object in question has the same idea of it. The community of speakers who share the idea therefore agrees upon the meaning of the word/token. The written word, on the other hand, is a token that represents the spoken word. The idea of white, for example, is the same for anyone who has experienced white, whether the community calls it white, blanc, or albus.98 A word, therefore, with

97Aristotle uses σύµβολον generally of a token of a contract or treaty, even when he does not refer to the physical chip. Aristotle refers to this physical representation of an agreement in other contexts: ἔστι δέ πως καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου φιλία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὀρέγεται γὰρ ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ µέσον· ὡς σύµβολα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ οὕτω γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀµφοῖν ἓν µέσον (Aristotle Eudemian Ethics 1239b30-33) “In a way, love of the opposite is love of the good. For they strive for one another through the middle, like (the two halves of) a token strive for one another, because in this way one thing comes into being in the middle from both.” Aristotle uses σύµβολον in a similar sense in scientific contexts within de generatione et corruptione 331a- 332b . 98 In Aristotle’s terminology, “white” is κύριον for speakers of English, while “blanc” and “albus” would be γλῶτται (foreign terms) to the same English speakers because, as French and Latin words respectively, they are foreign and therefore on loan. Cf. Poetics 1457b3

53 undisputed meaning is ideal for communication according to Aristotle, since there is no question regarding interpretation.99

Language, however, is naturally ambiguous because it relies on words as substitutes for the actual objects. Although words correspond with mental impressions that are common to mankind, regardless of the language spoken, a limited supply of words must be associated with a limitless world of experience. Some words, therefore, can have more than one meaning (ὁµωνοµία). The potential for ambiguity also increases with combinations of words.100 Readers, moreover, are forced to make an interpretation with their own knowledge; and the author’s intent may not match the readers’ understanding.

Since Aristotle mandates that clarity be the highest priority for scientific exposition, he opposes the use of language that is not common because it will more likely fail to pass on knowledge.

2.3.1 Aristotle on “Uncommon” Language and Science

Uncommon language may be desired in moderation in verse to entertain and educate its audience. Examples of such uncommon (ξενικοῖς) words (Poetics 1458a17ff.) include invented words, altered words, and metaphor. A good metaphor, for example, requires that the author be clear and that the audience have sufficient wisdom to grasp the underlying similarity in things that are not the same on the surface: τὸ γὰρ εὖ µεταφέρειν

τὸ τὸ ὅµοιον θεωρεῖν εἶναι (Aristotle Poetics 1459a8) “to use metaphor well is to see what is similar.” Metaphors apply to one object a word that properly belongs to

99 Struck 2004 (59-63). 100 Aristotle de Sophisticis Elenchis 165a6-14.

54 another101: µεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόµατος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ (Aristotle Poetics 1457b7)

“metaphor is the application of something else’s name” and make connections via parallels to other concepts. In Poetics 1457b8ff, Aristotle identifies four types of metaphor: replacing a specific term with a general, e.g., νηῦς δέ µοι ἥδ᾽ ἔστηκεν “my ship stands here”: ἵστηµι is a general word for standing as opposed to a word specific to ships, that is, ὁρµεῖν (“to anchor”); using a specific term instead of a general, e.g., ἦ δὴ

µυρί᾽ Ὀδυσσεύς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργεν “ten thousand good deeds Odysseus has done”: ten thousand stands for many; replacing a specific term from one context with another specific term from another context, e.g., χαλκῷ ἀπὸ ψυχὴν ἀρύσας “drawing off life with bronze”102 and ταµὼν ἀτειρέι χαλκῷ “cutting with indestructible bronze”103 can be interchanged because ἀρύσαι (to draw off (water)) and ταµεῖν (to cut) are different kinds of taking away104; and metaphor by analogy. This final type is not so much distinct from the others as it is an extension.105 It is a reciprocal exchange between each of two things of the same genus: a is to b as c is to d, e.g., old age (a) is to life (b) as evening (c) is to

101 Metaphors are one of the most popular ways to elevate and vary style: πάντες γὰρ µεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς κυρίοις, ὥστε δῆλον ὡς ἂν εὖ ποιῇ τις, ἔσται τε ξενικὸν καὶ λανθάνειν ἐνδέξεται καὶ σαφηνιεῖ (Aristotle Rhetoric 1404b34-36) “For everyone converses by means of metaphor, along with proper words and common words with the result that it is clear that if someone uses these (i.e., metaphor) well, it will be exotic and he will possibly escape detection and he will be clear.” 102 This is fragment 138 of Empedocles and refers to killing an animal. Picot 2004 argues this fragment is not Empedocles. 103 This is fragment 143 of Empedocles and refers to filling a vessel with water (κρηνάων ἄπο πέντε ταµόντ᾽<ἐν> ἀτειρέι χαλκῷ - cutting from five springs with an indestructible bronze [probably bronze cupping glasses, Picot 2004]) in order to be purified. 104 The use of two examples from Empedocles in a general discussion of metaphor confirms Aristotle’s comment on Empedocles’ use of metaphor: ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ ποιητῶν φησιν ὅτι καὶ Ὁµηρικὸς ὁ Ἐµπεκοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονεν µεταφορητικός τε ὢν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ ποιητικὴν ἐπιτεύγµασι χρώµενος (Diogenes Laertius Lives of the Philosophers 8.57 = DK 31A1) “In his Concerning the Poets, [Aristotle] says that Empedocles is Homeric and clever in his speech being both apt at metaphors and using other things successful to the poetic craft.”. The ambiguity in these two metaphors is increased further here since the adjective χαλκῷ refers to different unstated objects. 105 Davis 1992 (118). Davis goes on to suggest that metaphor could be extended indefinitely.

55 day (d); it becomes a metaphor by removing half of the analogy (e.g., the old age of day is evening, or a is to d).106 Metaphors in particular show how uncommon language can stretch the knowledge of the audience and be enjoyable at the same time because the audience must understand the relationship among all the elements of the metaphor in order to transfer their prior knowledge.107 Such metaphors are a kind of riddle, and clever riddles are especially agreeable because one learns something (τὰ εὖ ᾖνιγµένα διὰ τὸ

αὐτὸ ἡδέα· µάθησις γάρ, καὶ λέγεται µεταφορά. (Aristotle Rhetoric 1412a24-26) “good riddles are sweet for the same reason; for there is learning and a metaphor is stated.”).

Aristotle, nevertheless, believes the presence of uncommon language, and especially metaphor, in scientific explanation is inappropriate. If one uses nothing but metaphors, the author has formulated a riddle and speaks of real things by linking them to impossible combinations: ἀλλ’ ἄν τις ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσῃ, ἢ αἴνιγµα ἔσται ἢ βαρβαρισµός· ἂν

µὲν οὖν ἐκ µεταφορῶν, αἴνιγµα, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισµός. αἰνίγµατός τε γὰρ ἰδέα

αὕτη ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι (Aristotle Poetics 1458a24-27) “But if someone should compose verse entirely with such things, it will be either a riddle or a barbarism – a riddle if it is from metaphors and a barbarism if it is from loan words. For this is the very form of a riddle, to attach impossible things to reality.” The goal of the physikos is to exhibit clearly his ἐπιστήµη of how the world works, and the use of uncommon language will prevent him from reaching this goal.

106 See Nimis 1988 for a Marxist interpretation of Aristotle and analogical metaphor as a rate of exchange. 107 Aristotle emphasizes the rôle metaphor plays in education (Aristotle Rhetoric 1412a9-12). This cognitive element to Aristotelian metaphor has been picked up in more recent studies on Aristotle’s theory of metaphor (Lloyd 1987, 183-187; Marcos 1997; Kirby 1997). See also Aristotle Rhetoric 1410b10-17; cf. Aristotle Poetics 1448b8-19.

56 ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι δεῖ τό γε συλλελογίσθαι ὑπάρχειν,

οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅροις τὸ σαφές. τοῦτο δ’ ἔσται, ἐὰν διὰ τῶν καθ’

ἕκαστον εἰληµµένων ᾖ τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει ὁρίζεσθαι χωρίς … καὶ

οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν βαδίζειν, εὐλαβούµενον µὴ ὁµωνυµίᾳ ἐντύχῃ.

εἰ δὲ µὴ διαλέγεσθαι δεῖ µεταφοραῖς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ’ ὁρίζεσθαι

οὔτε µεταφοραῖς οὔτε ὅσα λέγεται µεταφοραῖς· διαλέγεσθαι γὰρ

ἀνάγκη ἔσται µεταφοραῖς.

Aristotle Analytica Posteriora 97b30ff.

Just as in demonstrations it is necessary that there be collection, so too there must be clarity in the definition. This will happen if there should be a separate definition in each class through the common features established in each circumstance…and in this way to arrive at a common definition, taking care not to use terms that can have different meanings (ὁµωνυµία). If it is necessary that we not argue by means of metaphor, then it is clear that one does not make a definition either by metaphors or by metaphorical expressions. Otherwise it will be necessary to make arguments by metaphor.

Demonstrations and definitions of nature must refer only to the object of knowledge at hand. A definition reveals in a clear and precise fashion a universal attribute that will apply to all specific instances and is uncovered through careful observation of these same specific instances.108 Metaphor is inappropriate since it is the application of something else’s name; one can use metaphor neither in definition nor in demonstrations because the proof would no longer apply to the object of knowledge in question. A general definition is preferred because this principle can be applied to any specific example.109 Aristotle, therefore, expects the physikoi to make demonstrations and definitions of how the world

108 Aristotle Analytica Posteriora 97b7ff. 109 Aristotle Analytica Posteriora 85b4ff.

57 works as clearly as possible in order to explain their theories to any audience. They will do this primarily through common language because then everyone will understand what the physikos is explaining.

By examining Empedocles’ theory of why the sea is salty, Aristotle demonstrates how the use of metaphor can be inappropriate for teaching because the reader may select an interpretation that is viable on the basis of the word’s meaning, but does not reflect the author’s original intent.

ὁµοίως δὲ γελοῖον καὶ εἴ τις εἰπὼν ἱδρῶτα τῆς γῆς εἶναι τὴν

θάλατταν οἴεταί τι σαφὲς εἰρηκέναι, καθάπερ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς· πρὸς

ποίησιν µὲν γὰρ οὕτως εἰπὼν ἴσως εἴρηκεν ἱκανῶς (ἡ γὰρ

µεταφορὰ ποιητικόν), πρὸς δὲ τὸ γνῶναι τὴν φύσιν οὐχ ἱκανῶς·

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα δῆλον πῶς ἐκ γλυκέος τοῦ πόµατος ἁλµυρὸς

γίγνεται ὁ ἱδρώς, πότερον ἀπελθόντος τινὸς µόνον οἷον τοῦ

γλυκυτάτου, ἢ συµµειχθέντος τινός, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τῆς

τέφρας ἠθουµένοις ὕδασιν.

Aristotle Meteorologica 357a24-31 = DK 31A25d

Similarly it is laughable if someone, saying that the sea is the sweat of the earth, thinks he has said something clever as Empedocles did; for by speaking in this way perhaps he has spoken sufficiently for poetry (for metaphor is poetic), but he has not spoken sufficiently for understanding nature. For it is in no way clear how bitter sweat arises from a sweet drink, whether only something is lost, e.g., the sweetest part, or something has been mixed in, as happens with water strained through ashes.

By comparing the sea to sweat and adding further that it comes from the earth,

Empedocles has evoked a powerful image of salty water that emerges owing to the action of the sun’s heat on the surface of the earth. Aristotle argues that the metaphor is

58 inappropriate because Empedocles uses an analogy rather than a demonstration.

Empedocles has merely generated more questions; he has not explained why seawater is salty rather than sweet.110 In this analogy, Empedocles exploits underlying similarities to make the example more vivid for the reader; but he has failed to clarify the nature of salt water because the saltiness of sweat is not understood any better than that of seawater.

The metaphor creates ambiguity, or it reveals that Empedocles did not understand the mechanism behind salt water.111 If Empedocles had used common language, assuming that his theory was sound, his readers would understand why the sea is salty.

2.4 EMPEDOCLES’ INTENT

Aristotle’s comments on clarity and ambiguity seem to respond to the misuse of language that he sees as widespread in Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

Sophists boasted that they could teach others how to use language to make the worse appear better.112 The phenomenon was common and the emphasis on public speaking in the political and judicial arenas of Athens led to exploitation of language’s ambiguity:

Aristotle complains τὰ µὲν οὖν ἆθλα σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων οὗτοι λαµβάνοθσιν, ... καὶ

110 ἐν δὲ τῇ γῇ τίνα τρόπον ὑπῆρχε, λεκτέον. ὅλως δὲ πῶς οἷόν τε τοσοῦτον ὕδατος πλῆθος ξηραινοµένης καὶ θερµαινοµένης ἐκκριθῆναι; πολλοστὸν γὰρ δεῖ µέρος αὐτὸ τοῦ λειφθέντος εἶναι ἐν τῇ γῇ. ἔτι διὰ τί οὐ καὶ νῦν ὅταν ξηραινοµένη τύχῃ γῆ, εἴτε πλείων εἴτε ἐλάττων, ἰδίει; (Aristotle Meteorologica 357b10-14) “One must say what process occurred in the earth. And in general, how is it possible that when the earth is dried and heated that so great an amount of water is produced? For it is necessary that this be a very small portion of the water left in the earth. Moreover, why doesn’t the earth even now, whenever it happens to dry out, sweat either to a greater or lesser extent?” 111 Aristotle makes the same point with Empedocles’ description of milk: τὸ γὰρ γάλα πεπεµµένον αἷµά ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διεφθαρµένον. Ἐµπεδοκλῆς δ’ ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπελάµβανεν ἢ οὐκ εὖ µετήνεγκε ποιήσας ὡς τὸ αἷµα “µηνὸς ἐν ὀγδοάτου δεκάτηι πύον ἔπλετο λευκόν”. (Aristotle de generatione animalium 777a7 (=31B68)) “For milk is concocted blood, but not corrupted. Empedocles either did not understand correctly or he made a bad metaphor when he wrote that “a white pus was formed on the tenth day of the eighth month.” 112 Aristotle Rhetoric 1402a23.

59 κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἀγῶνας διὰ τὴν µοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν (Aristotle Rhetoric

1403b31-35) “These skills [volume of voice, harmony, rhythm] carry off most of the prizes in dramatic contests….so, too in political contests owing to the corruption of the government.” Ambiguity was a consistent feature in rhetoric considering the emphasis contemporary literature placed on the problem of sophistic elenchus (Plato Apology,

Aristophanes Clouds). Aristotle, however, does not consider a context in which the object of the communication is too important to state plainly and should be concealed from the general populace, for example, the skills in fragment 111 that Empedocles promises

Pausanias will learn.113

Although Diogenes Laertius claims that Aristotle praised Empedocles for his use of metaphor114, Aristotle is generally critical of Empedocles’ choice to write in verse and use metaphor, as in §2.3.1 above. He also charged Empedocles with attempting to deceive his listeners by saying things that can be interpreted in any number of ways to hide the fact that he does not understand what he himself is saying.

τρίτον µὴ ἀµφιβόλοις· ταῦτα δ’ ἂν µὴ τἀναντία προαιρῆται, ὅπερ

ποιοῦσιν ὅταν µηδὲν µὲν ἔχωσι λέγειν, προσποιῶνται δέ τι λέγειν·

οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἐν ποιήσει λέγουσιν ταῦτα, οἷον Ἐµπεδοκλῆς·

φενακίζει γὰρ τὸ κύκλῳ πολὺ ὄν, καὶ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκροαταὶ ὅπερ

113 See §2.2.3 above. 114 ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ ποιητῶν φησιν ὅτι καὶ Ὁµηρικὸς ὁ Ἐµπεκοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονεν µεταφορητικός τε ὢν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ ποιητικὴν ἐπιτεύγµασι χρώµενος (Diogenes Laertius Lives of the Philosophers 8.57 = DK 31A1) “In his Concerning the Poets, [Aristotle] says that Empedocles is Homeric and clever in his speech being both apt at metaphors and using other things successful to the poetic craft.” When Aristotle praises Empedocles for his use of metaphor, it is probably because he describes inanimate things as though they were animate, as Homer did (Aristotle Rhetoric 1411b31-32). Aristotle’s presentation in Poetics 1457b8 ff. (see §2.3.1 above) of various metaphors that Empedocles wrote seems to be the only praise – if it really is. Davis 1992 (117) points out the ambiguous presentation linked to specific examples.

60 οἱ πολλοὶ παρὰ τοῖς µάντεσιν· ὅταν γὰρ λέγωσιν ἀµφίβολα,

συµπαρανεύουσιν— Κροῖσος Ἅλυν διαβὰς µεγάλην ἀρχὴν

καταλύσει

Aristotle Rhetoric 1407a31-7 = DK 31A25c

The third [way to use proper Greek] is not to use ambiguous statements. Unless, of course, one prefers the opposite course [i.e., ambiguity] – which is what they do when they are able to say nothing but pretend they can say something. For such men say these things [i.e., their nothings] in poetry, like Empedocles. For the long, round- about expression deceives the audience, and they (the audience) experience what most people experience at the hands of prophets. For whenever they (the prophets) speak ambiguities, they (the audience) nod assent, approving, e.g., “When Croesus will cross the Halys, he will destroy a great empire.”

A speaker/author either has something to say or nothing. If he has something to say,

Aristotle assumes he wants the audience to understand his message; hence there is a need for clarity of expression. Those with nothing to say attempt to conceal this by using ambiguous statements that can be interpreted in different ways.115

If a speaker or author chooses an ambiguous style over a clear one, therefore,

Aristotle believes that they do not have a message worth conveying, or in the case of physikoi, they do not understand their own theories sufficiently to teach them to another.

Aristotle illustrates that Empedocles has not passed on the finer points of his theory when he comments in Metaphysics 985a21-b3 on Empedocles’ inconsistent use of Love, Strife, and the roots116; Aristotle, through no fault of his own, fails to learn what Empedocles is trying to teach. Empedocles’ writing forces Aristotle to develop his own interpretation: εἰ

γάρ τις ἀκολουθοίη καὶ λαµβάνοι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ µὴ πρὸς ἅ ψελλίζεται λέγων

115 Aristotle is generally hostile to metaphor. 116 See §1.1 above.

61 Ἐµπεδοκλῆς, εὑρήσει… Metaphysics 985a3-4 “For if someone were to follow and take it with a view to his intent and not with a view to the things Empedocles stammers as he speaks, one would find…”117 Aristotle recognized that Empedocles had a message for his readers despite the ambiguity and that it must be drawn out of the text; he did not draw out the correct interpretation owing to his own preconceptions.118

On the other hand, by comparing Empedocles to the oracle at Delphi, Aristotle inadvertently explains why Empedocles writes ambiguously. Although it appears at first sight as I demonstrated in part 1 of this chapter that Empedocles deserves to be called a physikos, I have also shown in §2.2.3 in this chapter that explaining how the world works is in fact not his goal, but that Pausanias will learn how to control the world. It is not the aim of oracles to spell out the future to just anyone. Empedocles may have a similar goal, that is, to obscure something that should not be widely broadcast to the general public.

Empedocles’ ambiguity was a cue to the careful reader that attention must be paid to this text. The reader should take account of every possible interpretation and in this way proceed to an informed analysis. Perhaps Empedocles intended to deceive those unworthy of hearing his message, but for others he emphasized through ambiguity a novel concept that required careful examination. Gods, moreover, who speak through an oracle, do not want the Truth, to which they alone have access, to come to the ears of anyone who has not earned the privilege.119 Ambiguity, therefore, need not be negative; there was also a positive tradition of ambiguity, which I discuss in greater detail below in chapter 4.

117 Compare also what Aristotle says at Metaphysics 985b3: λάβοι δ᾽ἄν τις αὐτὸ θεωρῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐπῶν. “One may conclude this by reflection on his verses.” 118 See chapter 5 for my interpretation of Empedocles’ cosmology. 119 See chapter 3.

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Empedocles, therefore, is not a physikos, despite the superficial similarities set out in part 1 of this chapter. Aristotle criticizes Empedocles because he does not write as a physikos should, according to Aristotle: Empedocles is ambiguous and writes in verse; he uses metaphor and analogy. Empedocles does address his contemporaries’ theories; but he has another goal. Fragment 111 seems to confirm this; Pausanias, who has turned aside from the common path (fragment 2), will learn not how the world works from these verses, but how to control the world. Such sensitive lessons, moreover, explain why

Empedocles is a poet who followed the contemporary tradition of ambiguity associated with oracles; he cannot use common language as Aristotle demands of physikoi or everyone would learn how to control the world.

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Chapter 2 – Empedocles the Magician

In the first chapter, I illustrated how Empedocles is called a scientist on the basis of what he writes in his verses, but he does not present himself as one. The lessons that

Pausanias has come to Empedocles to learn (fragment 2.8-9) are not simply to understand how the world works, but to have power over the world (fragment 111): curing disease, raising the dead, and controlling the wind and the rain. On the basis of this, Empedocles has also been identified as a magician. Gorgias claims he witnessed Empedocles performing the activities of a γόης: τοῦτόν φησιν ὁ Σάτυρος λέγειν, ὡς αὐτὸς (Γοργίας ὁ

Λεοντῖνος) παρείη τῷ Ἐµπεδοκλεῖ γοητεύοντι. (Diogenes Laertius Lives 8.59) “Satyrus says that Gorgias [a student of Empedocles] said that he was present while Empedocles practiced magic.” Pliny the Elder said that Empedocles traveled to study with the magi1;

Philostratus also says that Empedocles spent time with the magi.2 Such statements may be backed up by, or have their origin in, a story that Empedocles wrote about Xerxes’ expedition3; Herodotus (book 7) writes about the magi who traveled with Xerxes and his army.

1 certe Pythagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, Plato ad hanc [sc. magicen] discendam navigavere exsiliis verius quam peregrinationibus susceptis. hanc reversi praedicavere, hanc in arcanis habuere. (Pliny Natural History 30.1.9) “Certainly Pythagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, and Plato sailed to learn the magic art, undertaking an exile rather than a trip. Once they returned, they announced this skill, but they kept it (i.e., the details) secret.” 2 Ἐµπεδοκλῆς τε γὰρ καὶ Πυθαγόρας αὐτὸς καὶ Δηµόκριτος ὁµιλήσαντες µάγοις καὶ πολλὰ δαιµόνια εἰπόντες οὔπω ὑπήχθησαν τῇ τέχνῃ. (Philostratus Life of Apollonius 8.7.8) “For Empedocles, Pythagoras himself, and Democritus kept company with magi, said many divine things, but never made use of the craft.” 3 ἄλλα ποιήµατα τήν τε Ξέρξου διάβασιν καὶ προοίµιον εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα (Diogenes Laërtius Lives 8.57) “[He wrote] other poems, an expedition of Xerxes and a hymn to Apollo.”

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Did, however, Empedocles present himself as a magician? This chapter will examine the evidence for the activities associated with magicians and how they claimed to do what they did. A magician could 1) atone for unjust acts committed by the living or the dead,

2) bewitch people by sending the dead against them, 3) cure disease and madness whether it was caused by the gods or magic, and 4) affect the environment. Magicians did not profess to do any of these things through their own power; they are agents who persuade chthonic gods or other supernatural intermediaries to act on their behalf.

Empedocles appears to be a magician since he claims that he will teach Pausanias to cure disease to the point of raising the dead and controlling weather. But he does not accomplish these feats by persuading the gods; he intends to teach Pausanias how to do these things for himself – as a god.

Part 1: Why Magic?

The gods were one possible cause for events, especially those that were out of mortal control4, as was magic, which was effected by a human medium through the gods.

Burkert 1996 (102-28) explores the use of magic and religion to dispel the effects of disease and other sufferings, e.g., famine, not only in Greek culture, but also Roman,

Jewish, and more modern examples in other cultures. Collins 2003 (29-37) explains how some Greeks believed that magic was another cause.5 1) The effects that magic produces with, for example, curse tablets and wax dolls, are indistinguishable from what gods can cause. Whenever someone failed to respect the gods or their space, or someone or

4 Dover 1974 (133 ff.). 5 Collins 2008 (44-9) expands on his earlier article.

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something that the gods protect, such as oaths or suppliants, divine vengeance followed.6

He has acted unjustly and polluted himself, and the pollution can spread to others through contact.7 People who believed that they were suffering from divine retribution or bewitching may experience illness or other negative effects. 2) Magic acts from a distance in time and/ or space, just as the gods do. Even if there were other possible proximate causes, such as coming into contact with another sick person, magic is never an implausible option, and as #1 points, the effects cannot be distinguished from one cause or another; the result is the same.8 Finally, 3) magic happens because someone wants it to happen. A consumer approaches the magician, and the magician wants to persuade people that magicians have this power to help and to hinder.

ἄλλη δὲ ἣ µαγγανείαις τέ τισιν καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς καὶ καταδέσεσι

λεγοµέναις πείθει τοὺς µὲν τολµῶντας βλάπτειν αὐτούς, ὡς

δύνανται τὸ τοιοῦτον, τοὺς δ’ ὡς παντὸς µᾶλλον ὑπὸ τούτων

δυναµένων γοητεύειν βλάπτονται. ταῦτ’ οὖν καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα

σύµπαντα οὔτε ῥᾴδιον ὅπως ποτὲ πέφυκεν γιγνώσκειν, οὔτ’ εἴ τις

γνοίη, πείθειν εὐπετὲς ἑτέρους· ταῖς δὲ ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων

δυσωπουµένους πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἄξιον

6 Parker 1983 (chapter 5). 7 Parker 1983 discusses the various ways of becoming polluted and how to become purified. 8 For example, when a young man had been killed by a javelin, Pericles and Protagoras supposedly debated whether the javelin itself, the thrower of the javelin or the judges of the contest were to blame (Plutarch Pericles 36.5). In another case, Herodotus (6.75) claimed that the madness and subsequent suicide of Cleomenes were clear-cut cases of divine retribution for sacrilege. He listed three possible causes, all relating to some transgression against the gods: 1) Cleomenes forced the Pythia to state Demaratus was not the son of Ariston, 2) he invaded the Eleusinion, or 3) he desecrated the temple of Argos. Although one non-divine reason was given (the Spartans believed his madness arose when he became a drinker of strong wine (ἀκρητοπότην γενέσθαι) after he associated with the Scythians too much (6.84)), Herodotus does not accept it: ἐµοὶ δὲ δοκέει τίσιν ταύτην ὁ Κλεοµένης Δηµαρήτῳ ἐκτῖσαι (Histories 6.84) “Cleomenes seems to me to have paid this penalty for his actions to Demaratus.”

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ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν, ἄν ποτε ἄρα ἴδωσί που κήρινα µιµήµατα

πεπλασµένα, εἴτ’ ἐπὶ θύραις εἴτ’ ἐπὶ τριόδοις εἴτ’ ἐπὶ µνήµασι

γονέων αὐτῶν τινες, ὀλιγωρεῖν πάντων τῶν τοιούτων

διακελεύεσθαι µὴ σαφὲς ἔχουσι δόγµα περὶ αὐτῶν.

Plato Laws 933a-b

Another form, by means of certain trickeries and incantations and so-called spells, persuades those who dare to harm others that they are capable of such a thing and (persuades) the others that they are wholly harmed by those who are able to bewitch them. Regarding all such things, it is not easy to know how it is by nature, nor even if someone should know is it easy to persuade others; and it is not worthwhile to try to persuade those who are suspicious towards one another in their souls, to order them to think little of all such things if anyone should ever see some waxen molded image whether in the door or at a crossroads or at the grave of ancestors since there is no secure belief about them.

The belief that magic works is found in the magicians and in the clients, although Plato focuses his harshest criticism on magicians for the act of persuading the victims. Yet the victims would never be persuaded if they did not already believe in the possibility.

Ultimately, magic requires a believing audience.9

There is an audience, therefore, among the Greeks ready to believe that magic is a possible cause for events. The first uses of the Greek terms translated as “magician”, that is, µάγος and γόης, are in the fifth century and rhetorically charged; they are used to attack individuals to whom the authors are ideologically opposed.10 Graf 1995 argues that the category of magic did not come into being in Greece until the Greeks named it and that, moreover, it was defined by its distinction from religion as characterized by Plato

9 Tambiah 1985 emphasizes the performative aspect of ritual. 10 Segal 1981 (351), Braarvig 1999 (28).

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and scientific medicine as championed by the Hippocratic school, both opposed to the uses of magic they attack. If this is the case, it is reasonable to look at those terms alone, that is, µάγος and γόης11, as Dickie 2001 does in his study of the magician as an individual in society. I, however, agree with Collins 2008 (27) that the category existed before there were special terms and was taken for granted until there was specific opposition. Hippocrates and Plato both espoused views that varied from what hoi polloi traditionally believed.12

Even when an author uses one of the terms we now translate as “magician”, that is,

µάγος or γόης, the magician is connected with other religious specialists who provide similar services for clients. Religious specialists could be associated with a particular place, as we see with the Pythia (a µάντις) at Delphi or the physicians (καθάρται) at the temple of Asclepius, or they could be itinerant craftsmen who take advantage of their mobility to ply their craft.13 Hippocrates (On the Sacred Disease 10) links µάγοι to purifiers (καθάρται), beggar-priests (ἀγύρται), and charlatans (ἀλαζόνες). Teiresias is a divine seer (θεῖον µάντιν – Sophocles OT 298) until Oedipus believes that Creon bribed

Teiresias to implicate him in the murder of Laius and then he calls him a magician who forms crafty plans (µάγον µηχανορράφον – line 387) and a tricky beggar-priest (δόλιον

ἀγύρτην – line 388).14 Plato also calls the practitioners of magic µάντεις and ἀγύρται

11 Other terms include φαρµακεύς and φαρµακίς. 12 As I say in chapter 1 in n. 48, by Hippocrates, I mean an individual from the Hippocratic school. 13 See §2.1 in chapter 1. τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν | ἄλλον γ’, εἰ µὴ τῶν, οἳ δηµιοεργοὶ ἔασι | µάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων, | ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὅ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἀείδων. | οὗτοι γὰρ κλητοί γε βροτῶν ἐπ’ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν· (Homer Odyssey 17.382-6) “For who invites a stranger from somewhere else, except one of those who are skilled craftsmen – a prophet or healer of ills or a builder of beams or even a divine singer who delights with song? For these men are invited all over the earth.” 14 Johnston 2008 (chapter 5) discusses the links between magicians and µάντεις.

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(Republic 364b). All these professionals, whether bound to one place or not, can be called on the solve problems. Since causes could vary from the gods to magic to more mundane things, it was important to uncover first why the victim was suffering from illness or bad luck. The gods could say why something was happening, and any of the religious specialists could be an intermediary between the victim and the god. The primary features that distinguish magicians from the other specialists according to their critics are 1) working for fees and 2) wandering from community to community.15 Magicians claim specifically to 1) atone for wrongs of both the living and the dead, 2) bewitch enemies, 3) cure disease, and 4) affect the environment.

1.1 ATONING FOR WRONGS

The gods protect suppliants and the murdered, who were unavenged, from those who abuse their power.16 Unjust acts such as abuse of xenia, breaking an oath or swearing a false oath17, failing to protect the young and the old18, theft19, and other similar acts

15 Collins 2008 (49-52). 16 For these unavenged souls, see Johnston 1999, especially chapter 4. 17 Sommerstein 2007 examines the notion of oaths that are not really oaths (based on texts to 322 B.C.), and concludes that “even in the case of informal oaths uttered by characters in comedy, there remained, in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, a significant degree of reluctance to attach an oath-formula to a false or insincere statement, and an even stronger degree of reluctance to show such an action as being successful to the detriment of others.” (137). 18 The dead also continue to protect their family, especially orphans: εἶτα τὰς τῶν κεκµηκότων ψυχάς, αἷς ἐστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν αὑτῶν ἐκγόνων κήδεσθαι διαφερόντως καὶ τιµῶσίν τε αὐτοὺς εὐµενεῖς εἶναι καὶ ἀτιµάζουσιν δυσµενεῖς (Plato Laws 927b1-4) “Next [the guardians will fear] the souls of those who have died, in whose nature it is to care especially for their descendents, to honour those who are kindly (to them) and hostile to those who are not.” 19 Theognis refers to such punishment: Χρῆµα δ’ ὃ µὲν Διόθεν καὶ σὺν δίκηι ἀνδρὶ γένηται | καὶ καθαρῶς, αἰεὶ παρµόνιµον τελέθει. | εἰ δ’ ἀδίκως παρὰ καιρὸν ἀνὴρ φιλοκερδέι θυµῷ | κτήσεται, εἴθ’ ὅρκῳ πὰρ τὸ δίκαιον ἑλών, | αὐτίκα µέν τι φέρειν κέρδος δοκεῖ, ἐς δὲ τελευτή | αὖθις ἔγεντο κακόν, θεῶν δ’ ὑπερέσχε νόος. Theognis 197-202 “A possession that comes from Zeus with a just man and purely always exists steadfastly. But if a man should acquire it unjustly and out of season with a heart that is greedy for gain, or if having seized it with an oath outside of justice, at first he seems to carry off some profit, but it becomes bad and the mind of the gods has prevailed.”

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threaten the stability of the community and may draw the negative attention of the gods if retribution is not made.

ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα µετὰ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσι

καί νυ Δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ’ ἐπιλήθεο πάµπαν.

τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόµον διέταξε Κρονίων,

ἰχθύσι µὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς

ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ µετ’ αὐτοῖς·

ἀνθρώποισι δ’ ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη

γίνεται·

Hesiod Works and Days 274-280

But you, Perses, set these things with your wits, listen to Justice and forget everything about force. For the son of Kronos arranged this law for men, he granted to fish, beasts and winged birds to eat one another since justice is not among them, but to men he granted justice which is best by far.

Zeus will overlook the violent and unjust actions of animals, but he will not tolerate the same from men, especially those who are in a position of power. This is Hesiod’s point in particular; he attacks the bribe-eating judges who granted to Perses a larger portion of the land inherited by both Hesiod and his brother. The point is true in general, too; acting justly sets man apart, and is the basis for human civilization in a harsh world. While those who operate within the boundaries of δίκη will prosper, those who do not will face punishment: οἷ αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεύχων, | ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ

βουλεύσαντι κακίστη. (Works and Days 265-6) “The man fashioning evil for another fashions evil for himself; the evil plan is most evil for the one planning it.”

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The gods were the ultimate arbiters of justice since they alone were omniscient. They may derive retribution directly through the natural world by means of disease (including madness20 and infertility) or natural disaster (storm, flood), or indirectly through other agents and even economic hardship or other bad luck. Magicians, therefore, offered to atone for wrongs that have led to divine retribution. Since the original act may be separate from the present suffering in both time and place, the magicians first determine the cause and atone for the wrong, and then they alleviate the symptoms.

τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυµασιώτατοι

λέγονται, ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς µὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυχίας τε καὶ

βίον κακὸν ἔνειµαν, τοῖς δ’ ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν µοῖραν. ἀγύρται δὲ

καὶ µάντεις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ

σφίσι δύναµις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζοµένη θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς, εἴτε τι

ἀδίκηµά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων, ἀκεῖσθαι µεθ’ ἡδονῶν τε

καὶ ἑορτῶν, ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πηµῆναι ἐθέλῃ, µετὰ σµικρῶν

δαπανῶν ὁµοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψει ἐπαγωγαῖς τισιν καὶ

καταδέσµοις, τοὺς θεούς, ὥς φασιν, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν.

τούτοις δὲ πᾶσιν τοῖς λόγοις µάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται …

βίβλων δὲ ὅµαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης τε

καὶ Μουσῶν ἐκγόνων, ὥς φασι, καθ’ ἃς θυηπολοῦσιν, πείθοντες

οὐ µόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρµοὶ

ἀδικηµάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσι µὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ

20 Madness was considered an extreme manifestation of disease (Burkert 1992 (57-59)).

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δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν

ἀπολύουσιν ἡµᾶς, µὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιµένει.

Plato Republic 364a-365a

But the strangest of all these speeches are the things they say about the gods and virtue, how so it is that the gods themselves assign to many good men misfortunes and an evil life but to their opposites a contrary lot; and begging priests and seers go to rich men's doors and make them believe that they by means of sacrifices and incantations have accumulated a treasure of power from the gods that can expiate and cure with pleasures and festivals any misdeed of a man or his ancestors, and that if a man wishes to harm an enemy, at slight cost he will injure just and unjust alike with certain hauntings (sendings) and bindings, persuading the gods, as they say, to serve them. And for all these sayings they cite the poets as witnesses … And they produce a bushel of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and of the Muses, as they affirm, and these books they use in their ritual, and make not only ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice, by means of sacrifice and pleasant sport for the living, and that there are also special rites for the dead, which they call teletai, that deliver us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice.

This passage illustrates the belief that misfortunes (δυστυχίας) come from the gods, even to good people, on account of the unjust actions (ἀδίκηµα) of an individual or his ancestors (προγόνων). The magicians (here µάντεις and ἀγύρται) have gained powers owing to the special relationship they have developed with the gods from making sacrifices and reciting incantations (θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς). With this power, they can atone for unjust acts with pleasures and festivals (ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν), which they learned from their books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, on behalf of private individuals and states. They offer a similar service to the dead.

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1.1.1 Repercussions for Unavenged Murder

While any unjust act including sacrilege may lead to divine retribution, historical examples of paying a penalty to the gods for unavenged murder better illustrate the role of a magician purifying the victim of divine retribution.21 Cylon, for example, who intended to establish a tyranny in Athens just as his father-in-law, Theagenes, had in

Megara, and his supporters sought Athena’s protection from Megacles in the late 7th century.

Τὸ δὲ Κυλώνειον ἄγος ἤδη µὲν ἐκ πολλοῦ διετάραττε τὴν πόλιν, ἐξ

οὗ τοὺς συνωµότας τοῦ Κύλωνος ἱκετεύοντας τὴν θεὸν Μεγακλῆς

ὁ ἄρχων ἐπὶ δίκῃ κατελθεῖν ἔπεισεν, ἐξάψαντας δὲ τοῦ ἕδους

κρόκην κλωστὴν καὶ ταύτης ἐχοµένους, ὡς ἐγένοντο περὶ τὰς

Σεµνὰς θεὰς καταβαίνοντες, αὐτοµάτως τῆς κρόκης ῥαγείσης,

ὥρµησε συλλαµβάνειν ὁ Μεγακλῆς καὶ οἱ συνάρχοντες, ὡς τῆς

21 Antiphon’s Second Tetraology connects the two. The prosecutor argues in his second speech that the javelin thrower should be punished whether it was a simple mistake or if these acts were associated with divine retribution for some other act (of himself or an ancestor); it is incumbant on the jurors to ensure that he pay the penalty: Οὐ δίκαιος δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν ἐστι διὰ τὴν ἀτυχίαν τῆς ἁµαρτίας. Εἰ µὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ µηδεµιᾶς ἐπιµελείας τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ἀτυχία γίγνεται, ἁµάρτηµα οὖσα, τῷ ἁµαρτόντι συµφορὰ δικαία γενέσθαι ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ δὴ θεία κηλὶς τῷ δράσαντι προσπίπτει ἀσεβοῦντι, οὐ δίκαιον τὰς θείας προσβολὰς διακωλύειν γίγνεσθαι. (3.3.8) “Nor is it just to acquit him because of the misfortune of an error. For if the misfortune occurs by no divine commission, as a simple error it is just that there be consequences for the one who errs. But if divine defilement falls on one who has acted impiously, it is not just to hinder divine attacks.” As the prosecutor continues in section 11, if the jurors do not find the javelin-thrower guilty, they will be acting impiously and will also be held responsible by the gods for an unavenged murder: Ἐκ δὲ τῆς αὐτῶν τῶν ἀπολογουµένων ἀπολογίας µετόχου τοῦ µειρακίου τοῦ φόνου ὄντος, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως οὐδὲ ὁσίως ἀπολύοιτε αὐτόν. Οὔτε γὰρ ἡµεῖς, οἱ διὰ τὴν τούτων ἁµαρτίαν διαφθαρέντες, αὐθένται καταγνωσθέντες ὅσια ἀλλ’ ἀνόσι’ ἂν πάθοιµεν ὑφ’ ὑµῶν· οὔθ’ οἱ θανατώσαντες ἡµᾶς µὴ εἰργόµενοι τῶν οὐ προσηκόντων εὐσεβοῖντ’ ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπολυσάντων τοὺς ἀνοσίους. Πάσης δ’ ὑπὲρ πάντων τῆς κηλῖδος εἰς ὑµᾶς ἀναφεροµένης, πολλὴ εὐλάβεια ὑµῖν τούτων ποιητέα ἐστί· καταλαβόντες µὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ εἴρξαντες ὧν ὁ νόµος εἴργει καθαροὶ τῶν ἐγκληµάτων ἔσεσθε, ἀπολύσαντες δὲ ὑπαίτιοι καθίστασθε. “Since the young man is an accomplice in murder according to the speech of the defendants, you would acquit him neither justly nor piously. For we, the one destroyed utterly by this mistake, would not endure pious things, but impious at our hands if we were charged as the murdeers. If those who killed us were not held back from things that are not fitting, they would not live piously on account of those who acquit the unholy. With every blemish taken onto yourselves concerning all these things, much discretion must be made by you for these things. If you seize him and keep him from the things that law keeps him from, you will be pure from charges, but if you acquit you are held responsible.” See Sewell-Rutter 2007.

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θεοῦ τὴν ἱκεσίαν ἀπολεγοµένης, καὶ τοὺς µὲν ἔξω κατέλευσαν, οἱ

δὲ τοῖς βωµοῖς προσφυγόντες ἀπεσφάγησαν, µόνοι δ’ ἀφείθησαν

οἱ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν ἱκετεύσαντες.

Plutarch Solon 12.1-2

Now the Cylonian pollution had for a long time agitated the city, ever since Megacles the archon had persuaded Cylon and his fellow-conspirators, who had taken sanctuary in the temple of Athena, to come down and stand their trial. They fastened a braided thread to the image of the goddess and kept hold of it, but when they reached the shrine of the Erinyes on their way down, the thread broke of its own accord, upon which Megacles and his fellow-archons rushed to seize them, on the plea that the goddess refused them the rights of suppliants. Those who were outside of sacred precincts were stoned to death, and those who took refuge at the altars were slaughtered there; only those were spared who made supplications to the wives of the archons.

The gods were believed to grant protection to anyone seeking it. The only requirement was physical proximity to the sacred space of the gods; this is why Cylon and his supporters maintained their connection with the altar of Athena by descending on a rope tied to the altar. When the rope broke, however, their protection was severed, as the

Alcmaeonids clearly argued. Megacles killed not only those who landed outside the precinct of the Erinyes, who would also extend protection to suppliants, but also those who took refuge at the altars.

Megacles, the Alcmaeonids, and all Athenians by proximity, were punished. Athens soon suffered from various woes: Diogenes Laërtius (1.110) limits the woes to pestilence;

Plutarch refers to military losses at the hands of the Megarians and other phenomena, specifically superstitious fears and apparitions (φόβοι τινὲς ἐκ δεισιδαιµονίας ἅµα καὶ

φάσµατα κατεῖχε τὴν πόλιν (Plutarch Solon 12.3)). The Athenians learned (from either

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seers, µάντεις (Plutarch Solon 12.3), or the Pythia (Diogenes Laërtius 1.110)) that the cause was the murder of Cylon and his supporters. Plutarch’s version is especially interesting. Although Solon convinced the polluted party to undergo trial and then expelled both the living and the dead, the stain had already infected Athens so much that further purification steps were required to appease the gods and return Athens to justice.22

The Athenians were told to summon Epimenides to purify Athens of this pollution; he founded a temple to the Semnai Theai or the Erinyes, at whose altar the men were killed, in addition to making numerous sheep sacrifices throughout Athens and Attica wherever each sheep lay down.23

λαβὼν πρόβατα µελανά τε καὶ λευκὰ ἤγαγε πρὸς τὸν Ἄρειον

πάγον. κἀκεῖθεν εἴασεν ἰέναι οἷ βούλοιντο, προστάξας τοῖς

ἀκολούθοις ἔνθα ἂν κατακλίνοι αὐτῶν ἕκαστον, θύειν τῷ

προσήκοντι θεῷ·

Diogenes Laërtius Lives 1.110

He took sheep, some black and others white, and brought them to the Areopagus; and there he let them go whither they pleased, instructing those who followed them to mark the spot where each sheep lay down and offer a sacrifice to the local divinity.

22 [ὁ Σόλων] ἔπεισε τοὺς ἐναγεῖς λεγοµένους δίκην ὑποσχεῖν καὶ κριθῆναι τριακοσίων ἀριστίνδην δικαζόντων. Μύρωνος δὲ τοῦ Φλυέως κατηγοροῦντος ἑάλωσαν οἱ ἄνδρες, καὶ µετέστησαν οἱ ζῶντες, τῶν δ’ ἀποθανόντων τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀνορύξαντες ἐξέρριψαν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ὅρους. (Plutarch Solon 12.3-4) “Solon persuaded the men who were called polluted to submit to a trial, and to abide by the decision of 300 jurors selected from the nobility. With Myron of Phlya accusing, the men were convicted; the living were expelled, and having dug up the corpses of the dead they cast them beyond the borders.” 23 Ogden 2002 includes Epimenides in his list of “shamans” with Pythagoras and Empedocles. Johnston 1999 (279-87) connects the propitiation of the Semnai Theai here to that of the Erinyes by Athena in Aeschylus’ Eumenides. These goddesses mediate relations between the living and the dead.

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Magicians, therefore, can atone for the wrongs that individuals have committed, thus restoring justice and then erase the pollution that has led to retribution on the suffering and those in contact with them by means of ritual.24

Hippocrates links the actions of those who claim to cure the sacred disease to the actions of purifying pollution and eliminating bewitchment.

καθαρµοῖσί τε χρέονται καὶ ἐπαοιδῇσι, καὶ ἀνοσιώτατόν γε καὶ

ἀθεώτατον ποιέουσιν, ὡς ἔµοιγε δοκέει. καθαίρουσι γὰρ τοὺς

ἐχοµένους τῇ νούσῳ αἵµατί τε καὶ ἄλλοισι τοιούτοισιν ὥσπερ

µίασµά τι ἔχοντας, ἢ ἀλάστορας, ἢ πεφαρµαγµένους ὑπὸ

ἀνθρώπων, ἤ τι ἔργον ἀνόσιον εἰργασµένους.

Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.39-40 (Grensemann)

They use both purifications and incantations, and they do this thing that is both most unholy and ungodly, as it seems to me. For they purify those with the disease and other such things as though they have some pollution or avenging ghosts or have been bewitched by men or have done some unholy deed.

Hippocrates attacks the magicians for purifying those who suffer epilepsy with a technique that should be used only to cure people who are polluted or suffer from a similar affliction. Hippocrates does not claim that this technique never works, but that it does not apply here because the gods are not responsible for this disease, although they are responsible for the consequences of pollution.25 But the purifiers do believe that the

24 Thucydides (1.134) also relates how the Spartans also suffered retribution in the form of an unspecified curse when they barricaded Pausanias, because he was a traitor, in the temple of Athena of the Brazen House as he sought refuge. They left him there and he almost starved to death; when they removed him so that his death would not pollute the temple, he died immediately and they buried him outside the city. The oracle at Delphi, however, advised them to bury Pausanias where he died and set up two bronze statues as compensation to Athena to abate the curse. 25 Οὐ µέντοι ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἀνθρώπου σῶµα µιαίνεσθαι, τὸ ἐπικηρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁγνοτάτου· ἀλλὰ κἢν τυγχάνῃ ὑπὸ ἑτέρου µεµιασµένον ἤ τι πεπονθὸς, ἐθέλοι ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καθαίρεσθαι καὶ ἁγνίζεσθαι

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disease arises from pollution or an attack from the gods or other super-worldly entities; their clients believe this as well or the purifiers would have no business. As Hippocrates points out here, if a magician’s bewitchment (πεφαρµαγµένους ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων) or avenging ghosts (ἀλάστορας) caused the victim’s disease, purification is the correct treatment.

Purification by blood is the ritual that Hippocrates describes as most unholy and ungodly (ἀνοσιώτατόν γε καὶ ἀθεώτατον). Heraclitus described the purification rites that are linked to early magicians such as Epimenides and Melampus.

καθαίρονται δ’ ἄλλως αἵµατι µιαινόµενοι οἷον εἴ τις εἰς πηλὸν

ἐµβὰς πηλῶι ἀπονίζοιτο. µαίνεσθαι δ’ ἂν δοκοίη, εἴ τις αὐτὸν

ἀνθρώπων ἐπιφράσαιτο οὕτω ποιέοντα.

Aristocritus Theosophia 68 = DK 22B5

Polluted, they purify themselves in vain with blood like someone washing mud from himself by going into the mud. He would seem mad if some man should notice him acting in this way.

Heraclitus argues that it makes no sense to wash off blood with more bloodshed – it is like removing mud with more mud; he is critical of the religious rationale. Purifying

µᾶλλον ἢ µιαίνεσθαι. Τὰ γοῦν µέγιστα τῶν ἁµαρτηµάτων καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα τὸ θεῖόν ἐστι τὸ καθαῖρον καὶ ἁγνίζον καὶ ῥύµµα γινόµενον ἡµῖν, αὐτοί τε ὅρους τοῖσι θεοῖσι τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν τεµενέων ἀποδεικνύµενοι, ὡς ἂν µηδεὶς ὑπερβαίνῃ ἢν µὴ ἁγνεύῃ, εἰσιόντες τε ἡµεῖς περιῤῥαινόµεθα οὐχ ὡς µιαινόµενοι, ἀλλ’ εἴ τι καὶ πρότερον ἔχοµεν µύσος, τοῦτο ἀφαγνιούµενοι. Καὶ περὶ µὲν τῶν καθαρµῶν οὕτω µοι δοκέει ἔχειν. Τὸ δὲ νούσηµα τοῦτο οὐδέν τί µοι δοκέει θειότερον εἶναι τῶν λοιπῶν, ἀλλὰ φύσιν µὲν ἔχει ἣν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα νουσήµατα, καὶ πρόφασιν ὅθεν ἕκαστα γίνεται· (Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.44-2.1) “I do not believe that the body of man is polluted by a god, the most corruptible by the most holy; but if it should happen to be polluted or suffer something by another, it would be more likely to be purified and sanctified by a god rather than polluted. And so the divine is what purifies, sanctifies and is a soap for us with respect to our greatest and most unholy sins; we, having fixed boundaries for the gods in their sanctuaries and precincts in order that no one should cross unless he is pure, and we sprinkle ourselves as we enter not as defiling, but purifying it if we should have some previous pollution. This is how it seems to me about purifications. But this disease seems to me to be no more divine than the others, but it has a nature like other diseases, and a cause when each comes.”

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agents fall into two categories. One absorbs the pollution through attraction because they are impure themselves, especially blood.26 The Canicattini crater shows Melampus purifying the daughters of Proetus with blood.27 Other examples illustrate the use of a blood sacrifice such as Orestes carried out after he murdered his mother: ἄφθογγον εἶναι

τὸν παλαµναῖον νόµος, | ἔστ’ ἂν πρὸς ἀνδρὸς αἵµατος καθαρσίου | σφαγαὶ καθαιµάξωσι

νεοθηλοῦς βοτοῦ. | πάλαι πρὸς ἄλλοις ταῦτ’ ἀφιερώµεθα | οἴκοισι καὶ βοτοῖσι καὶ ῥυτοῖς

πόροις. (Aeschylus Eumenides 448-452) “There is a law that a murderer be speechless until someone with the power to purify has besprinkled him with the blood of a young beast. I have been purified long ago with respect to these things at other houses, both by beasts and running rivers.” The other category of purifying agents is already pure, such as water, and washes away the pollution, for example, when the Greek army purifies itself of the plague incurred by Agamemnon’s failure to return Chryseis: λαοὺς δ’ Ἀτρεΐδης

ἀπολυµαίνεσθαι ἄνωγεν· | οἳ δ’ ἀπελυµαίνοντο καὶ εἰς ἅλα λύµατα βάλλον (Homer Iliad

1.313-14) “The son of Atreus ordered the troops to cleanse themselves by bathing, and they bathed themselves and cast the off-scourings into the sea.” This can be in lieu of or in addition to purification by blood.28 The other part of the ritual, according to

26 Parker 1983 (230-1) adds mud, bran mash, eggs, puppies, and wool to the list of agents that absorb pollution. Appendix 6 (pp. 370-374) in Parker 1983 discusses possible origins of the practice. 27 G. Scheider-Herrmann, “Das Geheimnis der Artemis in Etrurien” Antike Kunst 13 (1970) 67, fig. 1. 28 Strabo (8.3.19.346 ff.) preserves a version of Melampus’ purification of the Proetids where he uses water from the Anigrus. According to Bacchylides (11.95-110), Melampus cured the young women in the temple of Artemis Hemera at Lousoi where there was a pool. Orestes also assures Athena that he has been purified by sacrifice and the water of clear-running streams.

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Hippocrates, is to recite an incantation during the physical purification.29 The pollution must then be carefully disposed so that others do not come into contact with it.30

1.1.2 Helping the Souls of the Dead

Punishment for unjust acts can also occur after death as Pindar’s Olympian 2 illustrates: θανόντων µὲν ἐν|θάδ’ αὐτίκ’ ἀπάλαµνοι φρένες | ποινὰς ἔτεισαν—τὰ δ’ ἐν

τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ | ἀλιτˈρὰ κατὰ γᾶς δικάζει τις ἐχθρᾷ | λόγον φράσαις ἀνάγκᾳ· (Pindar

Olympian 2.57-60) “The helpless spirits of those who have died, some have paid the penalty here straightaway, someone beneath the earth passes judgment on other sins in this realm of Zeus, declaring a statement with hateful necessity.”31 Again the magicians offer to perform rites for souls: εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἳ τῶν

ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡµᾶς, µὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιµένει. (Plato Republic 365a)

“there are also special rites for the dead, which they call teletai, that release us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who did not sacrifice.” The Derveni

29 For examples, see R. Heim Incantamenta magica graeca latina Teubner (1892). 30 καθαίρουσι δὲ καὶ τὰ µὲν τῶν καθαρµῶν γῇ κρύπτουσι, τὰ δὲ ἐς θάλασσαν ἐµβάλλουσι, τὰ δὲ ἐς τὰ οὔρεα ἀποφέρουσιν, ὅπη µηδεὶς ἅψεται µηδὲ ἐπιβήσεται. (Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.42) “They purify them and some of the purifications they bury in the earth, some they cast into the sea, and others they carry off to the mountains where no one will touch them nor come upon them.” Parker 1983 (229 n.130) lists other references to this practice. 31 Compare Pindar fragment 130 of the Threnoi: ἡ δὲ τρίτη τῶν ἀνοσίως βεβιωκότων καὶ παρανόµως ὁδός ἐστιν, εἰς ἔρεβός τι καὶ βάραθρον ὠθοῦσα τὰς ψυχάς, ἔνθεν τὸν ἄπειρον ἐρεύγονται σκότον | βληχροὶ δνοφερᾶς νυκτὸς ποταµοὶ “The third path is for those who have lived profanely and lawlessly, thrusting the souls into a certain darkness and pit: ‘there the sluggish rivers of gloomy night belch out limitless darkness.’”

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papyrus32 preserves fragments of an unnamed cosmogony by Orpheus and provides a less critical interpretation of this service that magicians33 offer.

………….εὐ]χ̣αὶ καὶ θυσ[ί]α̣ι µ[ειλ]ί̣σ̣σ̣ο̣υσι τ̣ὰ̣[ς ψυχάς.

ἐπ[ωιδὴ δ]ὲ̣ µάγων δύν[α]ται δ̣αίµονας ἐµ[ποδὼν

γι̣[νοµένο]υς µεθιστάναι. δαίµον̣ες ἐµπο[δὼν δ εἰσὶ

ψ[υχαῖς ἐχθ]ρ̣οί· τὴν θυσ[ίη]ν̣ τούτου̣ ἕνεκε[µ] π̣[οιοῦσ]ι̣[ν

οἱ µά̣[γο]ι̣, ὡ̣σ̣περεὶ ποινὴν̣ ἀποδιδόντες. τοῖ<ς> δὲ

ἱεροῖ[ς] ἐπισπένδουσιν ὕ[δω]ρ καὶ γάλα, ἐξ ὧνπερ καὶ τὰς

χοὰς ποιοῦσι. ἀνάριθµα̣ [κα]ὶ̣ πολυόµφαλα τὰ πόπανα

θύουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ψυχα[ὶ ἀν]ά̣ριθµοί̣ ε̣ἰσι. Μύσται

Εὐµεν̣ίσι προθύουσι κ[ατὰ τὰ] α̣ὐτὰ µ̣ά̣γοις· Εὐµενίδες γὰρ

ψυχαί εἰσιν.

PDerv. column VI.1-10

… prayers and sacrifices placate souls. An incantation by the magoi can dislodge daimones that are in the way. Daimones that are in the way are vengeful to souls – for this reason the magoi make sacrifice, as though paying a blood price. Onto the offerings they pour libations of water and milk from which they make drink- offerings. And they sacrifice cakes that are countless and many-humped because even the souls are countless. The initiates sacrifice to the Eumenides just as the magoi do, for the Eumenides are souls.

The first six columns of the papyrus are dedicated to eschatology and understanding the nature of the Erinyes, who traditionally have two roles: avengers of the dead or punishers

32 The Derveni papyrus was discovered in 1962 in northern Greece. Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou published the text in 2006. They date the papyrus to 340-20 B.C. on the basis of the script and Burkert (1968, 1970, 1986) dates the text to c. 420-400 B.C. 33 Tsantsanoglou (1997) prefers to see the magoi as Persian ‘priests’, “venerable paradigms of piety and wisdom” (p. 99), although he admits that this choice stems from a lack of positive attitude towards magicians in the sources (p. 110, n. 25).

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of the dead. Column VI describes the ritual that either keeps away or changes the daimones, the vengeful souls that prevent something unidentified from happening. The commentator (or the poet) argues that these daimones are the Eumenides, or the Erinyes mentioned in column II, and that they keep other souls from reaching the pleasant part of

Hades.34 The rituals of the magoi, therefore, aid the souls of the dead by paying their blood price to the Eumenides, that is, they liberate the souls who have sinned from the terrible things that await them by performing initiation rites for them to avoid the punishments of Hades. I believe that the Derveni author argues that the magician does this only for the dead who can no longer act on their own behalf since the mystery initiates who seek a blessed afterlife make these sacrifices for themselves ‘as the magoi do’.35 As one initiate says in a gold tablet: ποινὰν δ᾽ ἀνταπέτεισ᾽ ἔργων <ἕνεκ᾽> οὔτι

δικαίων (A3.4 Zuntz) “I have paid the penalty for unjust deeds.”36 Magicians petition the gods by means of ritual on behalf of their clients to remove pollution.

1.2 BEWITCHING PEOPLE

Hippocrates points out that solving problems by magic has a corollary – you can create problems by magic: Ὅστις γὰρ οἷός τε περικαθαίρων ἐστὶ καὶ µαγεύων ἀπάγειν

τοιοῦτον πάθος, οὗτος κἂν ἐπάγοι ἕτερα τεχνησάµενος (Hippocrates On the Sacred

34 Tsantsanoglou 1997 (99-100). Johnston 1999 argues that the vengeful souls are not the Erinyes, but the restless spirits that inhabit the underworld. They threaten the newly dead soul (134, 137-8, 276-77). The commentator, on the other hand, may have a different (or incorrect) interpretation of who these souls were. 35 The mysteries promise a better afterlife if the soul can remember what it learned from initiation. The magician who claims to understand the details of the underworld, such as the gold tablets describe (see next footnote), can also help the living prepare for their journey (Johnston 1999 (106ff.)). 36 See Zuntz 1971 for text and commentary of some tablets; the Hipponion tablet published in 1974 is analyzed in Cole 1980. The most recent edition of these tablets in English and an analysis of their importance for mystery religions can be found in Graf and Johnston 2007. Parker 1983 (291-307) argues that the Orphics and the Pythagoreans achieved this through an ascetic lifestyle.

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Disease 1.25) “For whoever is able to lead away such a disease by purifying and performing magic, he is also able to bring on others things by skillful execution.” The magicians contribute in two ways to bewitching: 1) they bewitch people themselves, and

2) they can remove a bewitchment. Plato provides evidence that magicians, in addition to the gods, can be responsible for the bad things that happen to people.

ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πηµῆναι ἐθέλῃ, µετὰ σµικρῶν δαπανῶν ὁµοίως

δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψει ἐπαγωγαῖς τισιν καὶ καταδέσµοις, τοὺς

θεούς, ὥς φασιν, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν.

Plato Republic 364c

And [these begging priests and seers make rich men believe] that if a man wishes to harm an enemy, at slight cost he will injure just and unjust alike with hauntings (sendings) and bindings, persuading the gods, as they say, to serve them.37

The bewitching occurs in two related ways. The magicians allege they send the dead against their victims (ἐπαγωγαῖς). Those who did not receive appropriate burial rites could not be completely assimilated among the dead. Just as ritual marked the transition from childhood to adolescence and from adolescence to adulthood and then parenthood, the rituals surrounding death, for example, burial and lamentations (γόοι), marked the final transition as the individual left the living family to join family who had already died.

If the dead should be unburied or do not receive burial rites, they linger between the

37 Compare: ὅσοι δ’ ἂν θηριώδεις γένωνται πρὸς τῷ θεοὺς µὴ νοµίζειν ἢ ἀµελεῖς ἢ παραιτητοὺς εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαγωγῶσι µὲν πολλοὺς τῶν ζώντων, τοὺς δὲ τεθνεῶτας φάσκοντες ψυχαγωγεῖν καὶ θεοὺς ὑπισχνούµενοι πείθειν, ὡς θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς γοητεύοντες, ἰδιώτας τε καὶ ὅλας οἰκίας καὶ πόλεις χρηµάτων χάριν ἐπιχειρῶσιν κατ’ ἄκρας ἐξαιρεῖν… (Plato Laws 909a-b) “As many as become beast-like with respect to thinking that the gods are uncaring or susceptible to bribe, because they hate men they charm the souls of many of the living, declaring that they lead up the souls of the dead and promising to persuade the gods by bewitching them, as it were, with sacrifices, prayers, and incantations and they attempt to ruin completely both private individuals and whole families and cities for the sake of money.”

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living and the dead.38 The same principles apply to those who die young – brides, unmarried men, and virgins – and who have not received honour because they failed to live complete lives, that is, they did not produce children, and are thus unable to cross into a new community.39 Unless they receive honour in the form of ritual, those who fail to honour this category of restless souls will also incur the wrath of the gods. Those who are violently murdered are another grouping of souls that the magicians could call on; they also do not have rest because they seek vengeance. The other technique is binding

(καταδέσµοις). We see this phenomenon in the archaeological record with curse tablets or binding spells (κατάδεσµοι or defixiones), which were common all over the ancient world in wells or graves, sanctuaries of chthonic deities, or where the intended victim will be.40

They were written on small sheets of lead, probably for the written invocation to be spoken over and over again41, and then folded or rolled and pierced with a nail to mimic the binding of the spell. In both cases, the chthonic gods, usually Hecate, Hermes (in his role as psychagogos), or Persephone, are asked by the magician to enact the spell, persuading souls who were not completely integrated into the world of the dead to carry out the act of binding the rival, whether in the law court or in business, against whom the curse was directed.42 The dead prevents the victims from acting of their free will, and compels them to the will of the person who paid the magician for the curse.

38 van Gennep 1960 (146-65); Bremmer 1983 (89-94). 39 Johnston 1999 (152-3), Bremmer 1983 (100-104). 40 See Bernand 1991 (107-30), Faraone 1991, Gager 1992, Graf 1997, Giordano 1999, Johnston 1999: chapters 2 (71 ff.) and 3, Ogden 1999, Versnell 1999 and various individual editions of curse tablets. 41 Frankfurter 1994: 195-6. 42 Another common binding spell that magicians performed for others were love spells, as Theocritus’ Idyll 2 describes the actions of Simaetha to bring Delphis back to her; compare Virgil Eclogue 2 or Jason’s use of the iunx to seduce Medea as instructed by Aphrodite (Pindar Pythian 4.211-50). Women usually worked such spells, however, through sympathetic magic, not through the dead. Faraone 1999.

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Magicians also offer to remove the effects of bewitchment.

καθαρµοῖσί τε χρέονται καὶ ἐπαοιδῇσι, καὶ ἀνοσιώτατόν γε καὶ

ἀθεώτατον ποιέουσιν, ὡς ἔµοιγε δοκέει. καθαίρουσι γὰρ τοὺς

ἐχοµένους τῇ νούσῳ αἵµατί τε καὶ ἄλλοισι τοιούτοισιν ὥσπερ

µίασµά τι ἔχοντας, ἢ ἀλάστορας, ἢ πεφαρµαγµένους ὑπὸ

ἀνθρώπων, ἤ τι ἔργον ἀνόσιον εἰργασµένους.

Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.39-40 (Grensemann)

They use both purifications and incantations, and they do this thing that is both most unholy and ungodly, as it seems to me. For they purify those with the disease and other such things as though they have some pollution or avenging ghosts or have been bewitched by men or have done some unholy deed.

As Hippocrates links the two together, there seems to be little difference between removing the effects of a god’s displeasure and a bewitchment. As I showed above, some

Greeks believed that magic was a plausible cause for an effect because both magic and the gods operated at a distance in time and space. Magicians, therefore, can both solve and create problems with their skills.

1.3 CURING DISEASE

Hippocrates’ On the Sacred Disease attacks the techniques magicians use to cure disease. They are the same as those used to atone souls for their wrongs, that is, purifications and incantations.

ἐµοὶ δὲ δοκέουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι τοῦτο τὸ νόσηµα ἱερώσαντες τοιοῦτοι

εἶναι ἄνθρωποι οἷοι καὶ νῦν εἰσι µάγοι τε καὶ καθάρται καὶ ἀγύρται

καὶ ἀλαζόνες, ὁκόσοι δὴ προσποιέονται σφόδρα θεοσεβέες εἶναι

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καὶ πλέον τι εἰδέναι. οὗτοι τοίνυν παραµπεχόµενοι καὶ

προβαλλόµενοι τὸ θεῖον τῆς ἀµηχανίης τοῦ µὴ ἔχειν ὅ τι

προσενέγκαντες ὠφελήσουσιν καὶ ὡς µὴ κατάδηλοι ἔωσιν οὐδὲν

ἐπιστάµενοι, ἱρὸν ἐνόµισαν τοῦτο τὸ πάθος εἶναι, καὶ λόγους

ἐπιλέξαντες ἐπιτηδείους τὴν ἴησιν κατεστήσαντο ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς

σφίσιν αὐτοῖσι καθαρµοὺς προσφέροντες καὶ ἐπαοιδὰς, λουτρῶν

τε ἀπέχεσθαι κελεύοντες καὶ ἐδεσµάτων πολλῶν καὶ ἀνεπιτηδείων

ἀνθρώποισι νοσέουσιν ἐσθίειν·

Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.10-12 (Grensemann)

The first men who called this disease sacred, as it seems to me, were such men as the present day magicians (µάγοι), purifiers (καθάρται), beggar priests (ἀγύρται), and charlatans (ἀλαζόνες), as many as pretend to be exceedingly pious and to know something more. They hold up and allege the divine as a pretext for their ignorance of not having something which, having applied it, will help and in order that they do not reveal that they know nothing, they declare that this disease is sacred, and saying appropriate words in connection with this, they establish a cure that is safe for themselves, applying purifications and incantations, ordering they avoid baths and many foods unfit for sick men to eat.

The primary goal of Hippocrates’ treatise was to show that epilepsy was no more divine than any other disease, contrary to the claims of magicians.43 Gods, according to

Hippocrates, do not cause disease, nature does; since nature, however, is full of the divine, all disease is divine.44 One should not treat epilepsy, therefore, any differently

43 οὐδέν τί µοι δοκέει τῶν ἄλλων θειοτέρη εἶναι νούσων οὐδὲ ἱερωτέρη … οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐνόµισαν θεῖόν τι πρῆγµα εἶναι ὑπὸ ἀπειρίης καὶ θαυµασιότητος, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν ἑτέρῃσι νούσοισιν (Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.2-3 (Grensemann)) “It does not seem to me in any way to be more divine or sacred than other diseases... Men believed it was something divine owing to difficulty and its amazing character, because it was similar in no way to other diseases.” 44 αὕτη δὲ ἡ νοῦσος ἡ ἱερὴ καλεοµένη ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν προφασίων γίνεται ἀφ’ ὧν καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προσιόντων καὶ ἀπιόντων, καὶ ψύχεος, ἡλίου, πνευµάτων µεταβαλλοµένων τε καὶ µηδέποτε ἀτρεµιζόντων.

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than any other disease, as Hippocrates goes on to demonstrate. But the very fact that

Hippocrates addresses the magicians illustrates that his views on this were in the minority.45 Many Greeks believed that magicians could cure them through purifications

(καθαρµοί) and incantations (ἐπαοιδαί).

Illness may be a symptom of something else. Since symptoms were varied and onset unpredictable, the Greeks believed the gods were one possible source.46 In Mesopotamia, the healers, ashipu, associated with temples, observed the symptoms of the patient, determined which divine agent was responsible since in the near east, as well as in

Greece, divinity was everywhere, and then prescribed a treatment (Scurlock 2005). If the gods are the cause, the sickness may be the retribution for some unjust act committed by the victim or someone close to him. It is also possible that restless souls – those who die violently, young, or without proper burial – are stirred up by the gods and affect the living with plague or madness as the Cylonian pollution or the plague suffered by the

Spartans with the murder of Pausanias illustrate.47 Other common sources for disease include poisoning (harmful φάρµακα) or bewitchment. With all these plausible causes, the magician, and the religious specialist, needs to figure out what is happening.

ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ θεῖα, ὥστε µηδὲν διακρίνοντα τὸ νούσηµα θειότερον τῶν λοιπῶν νουσηµάτων νοµίζειν, ἀλλὰ πάντα θεῖα καὶ πάντα ἀνθρώπινα (Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 18.1-2 (Grensemann)) “This disease called sacred comes from the same causes as the others: from things that come and go (from the body), and cold and sun and winds that change and never (ἀτρεµιζόντων). These things are divine with the result that it is not necessary to consider that the (ἀποκρίνοντα) disease is more divine than the rest, but all are divine and all are human.” 45 Lloyd 1979 (16ff.) notes the similarities between Hippocrates and early anthropologists describing the magical beliefs of so-called primitive cultures or Christian historians discussing witchcraft. As Graf 1995 points out, therefore, the dichotomy between magic and science is present from the beginning for the Greeks. Laskaris 2002 (73-124) argues that On the Sacred Disease is a rhetorical work designed to lure clients from the magicians, et al., to whom most people go in such circumstances. 46 Parker 1983 (chapter 8). 47 See §1.1.1 above.

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Addressing the cause (if distant) that ultimately underlies disease does not preclude treating the disease symptoms as well. The early healers/magicians understood how roots and plants could treat wounds. They passed this information to their apprentices orally, for example, Patroclus, trained by Achilles whom Cheiron taught in turn (Iliad 11.829-

832), knew which root would stop the bleeding of Eurypylus’ wound: ἐπὶ δὲ ῥίζαν βάλε

πικρὴν | χερσὶ διατρίψας, ὀδυνήφατον, ἥ οἱ ἁπάσας | ἔσχ᾽ ὀδύνας· τὸ µὲν ἕλκος ἐτέρσετο,

παύσατο δ᾽ αἷµα. (Iliad 11.846-8) “He put onto it (the wound) a bitter root, having rubbed it with his hands, a painkiller, which took all the pain from it; the wound dried and the blood stopped.”48 In addition to healing φάρµακα, healers used incantation:

Odysseus’ grandfather, Autolycus, healed the wound Odysseus received from a boar by binding it and chanting a spell over it (Odyssey 19.456-8). Another of Cheiron’s students,

Asclepius (Iliad 4.218-19), was known for his use of φάρµακα.

καί ῥά νιν Μάγνητι φέρων πόρε Κενταύρῳ διδάξαι

πολυπήµονας ἀνθρώποισιν ἰᾶσθαι νόσους.

τοὺς µὲν ὦν, ὅσσοι µόλον αὐτοφύτων

ἑλκέων ξυνάονες, ἢ πολιῷ χαλκῷ µέλη τετˈρωµένοι

ἢ χερµάδι τηλεβόλῳ,

ἢ θερινῷ πυρὶ περθόµενοι δέµας ἢ

χειµῶνι, λύσαις ἄλλον ἀλλοίων ἀχέων

ἔξαγεν, τοὺς µὲν µαλακαῖς ἐπαοιδαῖς ἀµφέπων,

48 The φάρµακα could be beneficial or harmful. Both Helen and Circe had a φάρµακον to make men forget their troubles (Odyssey 4.219-232, 10.236); Hermes gives µῶλυ to Odysseus (Odyssey 10.301-6) to counter the effects of Circe’s φάρµακον. Medea is another mythological character known for her skills with φάρµακα. Sophocles’ play, Root-cutters ( ῾Ριζοτοµοί), probably retells the story of Medea (Pearson 1917 II, pp. 172-7); the scene in Argonautica 3.844-66 where Medea harvests the drug that will defend Jason against the fire-breathing serpents illustrates the techniques of the root-cutters. See Raven 1990, Lloyd 1983, and Scarborough 1991 for more on the root-cutters.

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τοὺς δὲ προσανέα πί‑

νοντας, ἢ γυίοις περάπτων πάντοθεν

φάρµακα, τοὺς δὲ τοµαῖς ἔστασεν ὀρθούς·

Pindar Pythian 3.45-53

He (Apollo) carrying him (Asclepius) took him to the Magnesian Centaur (Cheiron) to learn to heal diseases baneful for men. All who came to him afflicted with natural sores or with limbs wounded by gray bronze or by a far-flung stone, or with bodies wracked by summer fever or winter chill, he relieved their various ills and restored them; some he tended with gentle incantations, while other drank soothing potions, or he applied φάρµακα to all parts of their bodies; still others he raised up with surgery.

Asclepius used his φάρµακα on both wounds and disease. The emphasis on incantation, therefore, in treating pollution and the disease’s symptoms illustrates why magicians like other religious specialists were sought to treat disease.

1.4 AFFECTING THE ENVIRONMENT

The same individuals, whom Hippocrates criticizes for treating the sacred disease as though it comes from the gods, claim to influence the physical world.

Εἰ γὰρ σελήνην τε καθάγειν καὶ ἥλιον ἀφανίζειν καὶ χειµῶνά τε

καὶ εὐδίην ποιέειν καὶ ὄµβρους καὶ αὐχµοὺς καὶ θάλασσαν ἄφορον

καὶ γῆν καὶ τἄλλα τὰ τοιουτότροπα πάντα ὑποδέχονται

ἐπίστασθαι…

Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.29 (Grensemann)

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For if they (magicians, etc.) claim that they know how to bring down the moon49, to hide the sun, and to make storm and fair weather, showers and drought, the sea without passage and the earth barren, and all other such things…

The magicians do not accomplish alone the feats that Hippocrates lists, but persuade the gods to do it for them through rites (τελέτων 1.29) or sacrifice (θύων 1.31); as

Hippocrates complains: τοῦ θείου ἡ δύναµις ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου γνώµης κρατέεται καὶ

δεδούλωται (1.31) “The power of the gods is overcome by human ingenuity and enslaved.”50 No source explains why the magicians claim this power, but they may allege either to reverse other punishments outside of disease the gods bring for unjust acts or arise from curses, or they offer these services to others for a fee – or they may assert both.

The magicians emphasize their piety and superior knowledge (προσποέονται σφόδρα

θεοσεβέες εἶναι καὶ πλέον τι εἰδέναι. (Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 10) “They pretend to be exceedingly pious and to know something more.”), that is, they claim to understand how divinity operates and how to prevail upon the gods to do as they ask through purifications, incantations, and sacrifice. Plato confirms this attitude:

ἐπαγωγαῖς τισιν καὶ καταδέσµοις, τοὺς θεούς, ὥς φασιν, πείθοντές

σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν. … οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς

τὸν Ὅµηρον µαρτύρονται, ὅτι καὶ ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν—

λιστοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,

49 Compare Aristophanes Clouds where Strepsiades proposes a scheme for getting out of paying interest on a loan. Since interest is determined on a monthly basis, hiding the moon should put an end to calculating interest: γυναῖκα φαρµακίδ᾽ εἰ πριάµενος Θετταλὴν | καθέλοιµι νύκτωρ τὴν σελήνην (Clouds 749-50) “Suppose I, having bought a Thessalian witch, should draw down the moon at night…” Women would draw down the moon for erotic attraction magic (Lucian Philopseudes 14) or to collect magical herbs (Bicknell 1984 67-8.) 50 Hippocrates, therefore, seems to believe with οἱ πολλοί that the gods were responsible for such events (Collins 2003).

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καὶ τοὺς µὲν θυσίαισι καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγαναῖσιν

λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ’ ἄνθρωποι

λισσόµενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁµάρτῃ.51

Plato Republic 364c-e

[Magicians persuade rich men and cities that they can atone for wrongs and harm enemies], persuading them that the gods, as they say, serve them by means of certain incantations and bindings… Other (magicians) provide Homer as a witness of the persuasion of the gods by men, because even he said: “And the gods themselves are moved by prayer, and men beseeching (the gods) turn them away by sacrifice and gentle prayers and libation and the savour of sacrifice, whenever they sin and overstep their bounds.”

The magicians, therefore, argue that they have power through the divine because of their greater piety. To Hippocrates, the magicians’ claims to piety are impious because their actions suggest that they defeat and enslave divine power to their will: οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγέ τι

θεῖον νοµίσαιµι τούτων εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἀνθρώπινον, εἰ δὴ τοῦ θείου ἡ δύναµις ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου

γνώµης κρατέεται καὶ δεδούλωται. (Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.31) “I, at any rate, would consider not one of these things divine but human, if indeed the divine power is overcome and enslaved by human ingenuity.” The magicians, however, do not present themselves as controlling the divine, but asking the divine to accomplish something at their request.

Magicians, therefore, claim to 1) atone for wrongs, 2) bewitch other people, 3) cure disease and 4) affect the environment, through their connection with the divine.

51 Homer Iliad 9.497 ff, adapted.

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Part 2: Was Empedocles a Magician?

It is natural that Empedocles is included among the magicians by ancient and more modern commentators.52 Magicians claimed to atone for wrongs, bewitch people (or reverse bewitchment), cure disease, and affect the weather. Empedocles claims in his own verses to cure disease, to affect the weather, and to lead back the dead (fragment

111). Testimonia support or provide even more evidence of such magical activity:

Empedocles raised a woman from the dead (A1 §61), cured a plague (A1 §70), redirected winds (A1 §60; A14), and prevented a young man from killing his host by reciting a

Homeric verse (A15). He wandered from community to community and, although he does not approach people, they seek out his help to cure disease and in other situations

(fragment 112). Pliny the Elder and Philostratus claim that he travelled to the magi to study with them; Gorgias says that he witnessed Empedocles practicing γοητεία.53

The question of Empedocles considering himself a magician is similar to the issue of whether he considered himself a physikos. On the one hand, he claims to do some of the activities associated with magicians, yet he does not do others. More important, however, he claims to be a god (B23.11). This concept is so important to understanding

Empedocles that chapter 3 focuses on his notion of divinity. This point also emphasizes the distinctions between how he presents himself and how others perceive him. By claiming to be a god, he sets himself apart from religious specialists, including µάγοι and

µάντεις, whose power comes from the gods; they are intermediaries between their clients and the gods, Empedocles is the real deal. But since his idea of divinity varies from that

52 A brief sample: Kingsley 1995a (and others), Graf 1997, Ankarloo and Clark 1999, Johnston 1999, Dickie 2001, Ogden 2002, Collins 2008, Edmonds 2008. 53 These passages are quoted in the introduction to this chapter.

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of hoi polloi, his presentation of himself as a god confuses later and even roughly contemporary commentators. While Empedocles portrays himself as a successful initiate into a mystery, that is, becoming a god, into which he is now willing to initiate others, testimonia emphasize his wonder-working and mock those, including Empedocles, who believed he was a god; they present him as a charlatan, taking on the tone of those who attack magicians on account of ideological differences as described in part 1 of this chapter. I will examine his claims and contrast them with those of contemporary magicians and then I will contrast his presentation with the testimonia.

2.1 EMPEDOCLES’ CLAIMS AGAINST MAGICIANS’ CLAIMS

Evidence for linking Empedocles to magic comes from fragments 111 and 112; fragment 111 states what Pausanias will learn from Empedocles.54

φάρµακα δ’ ὅσσα γεγᾶσι κακῶν καὶ γήραος ἄλκαρ

πεύσῃ, ἐπεὶ µούνῳ σοὶ ἐγὼ κρανέω τάδε πάντα.

παύσεις δ’ ἀκαµάτων ἀνέµων µένος οἵ τ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν

ὀρνύµενοι πνοιαῖσι καταφθινύθουσιν ἀρούρας·

καὶ πάλιν, ἢν ἐθέλῃσθα, παλίντιτα πνεύµατ(α) ἐπάξεις·

θήσεις δ’ ἐξ ὄµβροιο κελαινοῦ καίριον αὐχµόν

ἀνθρώποις, θήσεις δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐχµοῖο θερείου

ῥεύµατα δενδρεόθρεπτα, τά τ’ αἰθέρι ναιήσονται,

ἄξεις δ’ ἐξ Ἀίδαο καταφθιµένου µένος ἀνδρός

Diogenes Laertius 8.59 = DK 31B111

54 In §2.2.3 of chapter 1, I outline the history of scholars’ reaction to this fragment, from questioning its authenticity to its present acceptance.

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You will learn as many drugs as have come into being to defend against evils and old age since I will accomplish all these things for you alone. You will stop the force of untiring winds which, rushing against the earth, kill the fields with their blasts; and again, if you wish, you will bring the winds back again. You will make after dark rain a drought timely for men, and after summer drought you will make tree-nourishing streams that dwell in the air [i.e., rain]; and you will bring from Hades the strength of a man who has died.

When we compare Empedocles to what contemporary magicians claimed, there are some parallels. Magicians 1) atoned for wrongs, 2) bewitched people, 3) cured disease, and 4) affected the weather; Empedocles, on the other hand and in the order presented, cured disease (and old age), affected the weather, and brought back the dead. Since some curses are accomplished by compelling the spirits of the restless dead to harass the living, this may be the parallel to bewitching people.55 Empedocles, therefore, does 2, 3, and 4 listed above, but he does not atone for wrongs. But I will show how he does not realize these feats in the same way as magicians. He claims elsewhere to be a god (fragment 23.11 and

112) and fragment 111 supports this interpretation.

2.1.1 Atoning for Wrongs

Empedocles does not claim to atone for wrongs. His conception of divinity as I describe in chapter 3, precludes it. First, Empedocles’ gods are not the Olympians who punish people for committing unjust acts; the only immortal gods for Empedocles are the roots – fire, water, earth, and air – and Love and Strife.56 There is no need, therefore, to atone for wrongs as magicians present them because there are no gods who punish unjust

55 See §1.2 above. This is contrary to what Kingsley 1995a (225-6) argues; he says that Empedocles claims to make the trip himself to the Underworld as shamans did. 56 See §1.1 in chapter 3. Empedocles is a mortal god; see §1.2 in chapter 3.

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acts. Second, atoning for wrongs appears to be a personal responsibility according to

Empedocles’ words on living a pure life.57 The price for not living a pure life is continued wretched existence on the cycle of transmigration. Nowhere does Empedocles offer to intercede as an intermediary to allow people to become pure. If an individual wants to escape the cycle of transmigration and become a mortal god, the ultimate goal of being pure, then it is necessary to make particular lifestyle choices, for example, not eating meat since such an act perpetuates the cycle of violence that Strife brings about.58

Empedocles is a mortal god, as chapter 3 explains, and as such he is pure and wise.

He can show other people how to achieve sufficient purity and wisdom to follow in his footsteps, but he will not atone for other people’s wrongs.

2.1.2 Bewitching People

The last thing in fragment 111 Empedocles promises Pausanias will do is to lead back the dead: ἄξεις δ’ ἐξ Ἀίδαο καταφθιµένου µένος ἀνδρός (fragment 111.9) “you will bring from Hades the strength of a man who has died.” Why would someone lead back the dead? For an audience familiar with the claims of magicians, the restless dead can harass the living and this can be used to bewitch people.59 Magicians, however, claim they accomplish this through incantations and sacrifices to the gods; Empedocles says that

Pausanias himself will do this through his use of the second singular future verb, ἄξεις.

Kingsley 1995a interprets the verb ἄξεις as an actual descent to the underworld as opposed to an invocation (225-6), thus linking Empedocles even more closely to the

57 See §2.2.1 in chapter 3. 58 See §1.2 and §2.2 in chapter 3. 59 See §1.2 above.

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Persian magi.60 Kingsley emphasizes the promise of controlling death in conjunction with controlling life and manipulating our environment as real magical knowledge that

Pausanias will be able to control, but on the basis on how magicians claim to do these things, whether Pausanias will actually descend does not matter as much as he will do this with own power as a god. Empedocles is not a magician nor does he promise

Pausanias will become one – this is something a god can do successfully.

2.1.3 Curing Disease

Pausansias will also learn about drugs.

φάρµακα δ’ ὅσσα γεγᾶσι κακῶν καὶ γήραος ἄλκαρ

πεύσῃ, ἐπεὶ µούνῳ σοὶ ἐγὼ κρανέω τάδε πάντα.

Diogenes Laertius 8.59 = DK 31B111.1-2

You will learn as many drugs as have come into being to defend against evils and old age since I will accomplish all these things for you alone.

It is natural to make a connection to magicians because they, too, use φάρµακα to treat the symptoms of disease.61 Kingsley 1995a (222-3) points to how Empedocles claims to use φάρµακα not only against evils but also as a defence against old age (γήραος ἄλκαρ).

Mortality is one thing that separates humans from gods, and Empedocles appears to address the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, which describes men as ζώουσ’ ἀφραδέες καὶ

ἀµήχανοι, οὐδὲ δύνανται | εὑρέµεναι θανάτοιό τ’ ἄκος καὶ γήραος ἄλκαρ (HHymn to

Apollo 192-3) “They live witless and helpless, nor are they able to find a cure for death or a defense against old age.” Although Kingsley goes on to cite Greek familiarity with

60 See also Kingsley 1994b and 1995b. 61 See §1.3 above.

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drugs that claim to stop old age62, it seems more likely, in conjunction with the other things that Empdocles claims, that he emphasizes the skills that have come with his divinity. He is more like Cheiron who taught Achilles (Homer Iliad 11.829-32) and

Asclepius (Pindar Pythian 3.45-6) how to use φάρμακα.63

2.1.4 Affecting Weather

In addition to learning the φάρµακα, Empedocles promises Pausanias that he will control the environment.

παύσεις δ’ ἀκαµάτων ἀνέµων µένος οἵ τ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν

ὀρνύµενοι πνοιαῖσι καταφθινύθουσιν ἀρούρας·

καὶ πάλιν, ἢν ἐθέληισθα, παλίντιτα πνεύµατ(α) ἐπάξεις·

θήσεις δ’ ἐξ ὄµβροιο κελαινοῦ καίριον αὐχµόν

ἀνθρώποις, θήσεις δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐχµοῖο θερείου

ῥεύµατα δενδρεόθρεπτα, τά τ’ αἰθέρι ναιήσονται…

Diogenes Laertius 8.59 = DK 31B111.3-8

You will stop the force of untiring winds which, rushing against the earth, kill the fields with their blasts; and again, if you wish, you will bring the winds back again. You will make after dark rain a drought timely for men, and after summer drought you will make tree-nourishing streams that dwell in the air…

Empedocles focuses on having power over the wind and the rain, made notable through his use of the second person future: παύσεις (“you will stop” line 3), ἐπάξεις

(“you will bring back” line 5), and θήσεις (“you will make” lines 6 and 7). This is the same pattern I have pointed to before: Empdocles emphasizes that Pausanias will

62 Kingsley 1995a 223n20. 63 See §1.3 in this chapter.

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accomplish these things, while magicians claim to have curried favour with the gods who then do it on the magicians’ behalf.64 The phrase, ἢν ἐθέληισθα (“if you want” line 5), elucidates that this can be done at Pausanias’ will. The future more vivid conditional echoes Hesiod’s Muses who claim to tell the truth or lies whenever they want, εὖτ᾽

ἐθέλωµεν (Hesiod Theogony 28); a common way to stress that a god’s power is not restricted.65

Empedocles, therefore, does not accomplish any of these feats as a magician does, but as a god.

2.2 EMPEDOCLES’ PRESENTATION AND OTHERS’ PERCEPTIONS

When Empdocles calls himself a god, the reaction varies depending on the audience.

There are three reactions: 1) they believe he is a god and as φίλοι of Empedocles, they know what his claim entails. Φίλοι belong to the same community. They have, therefore the same context and understand one another better than individuals who are not φίλοι.66

They also 2) treat him as a magician, or 3) they rationalize Empedocles’ claims by treating him as a civil engineer who generates natural solutions and attacking him as a charlatan.

Fragment 112 describes Empedocles as he wanders from community to community and what people seek from him.

ὦ φίλοι, οἳ µέγα ἄστυ κατὰ ξανθοῦ Ἀκράγαντος

64 See §1.4 above. 65 See West 1966 (163) for other examples in Hesiod and Homer of the gods’ powers described in this way. This passage in Hesiod is discussed in more detail below (see §1.2.2 in chapter 4). 66 Nagy 1990. See §1.1.2 in chapter 4.

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ναίετ’ ἀν’ ἄκρα πόλεος, ἀγαθῶν µελεδήµονες ἔργων,

ξείνων αἰδοῖοι λιµένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι,

χαίρετ’· ἐγὼ δ’ ὑµῖν θεὸς ἄµβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός

πωλεῦµαι µετὰ πᾶσι τετιµένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα, 5

ταινίαις τε περίστεπτος στέφεσίν τε θαλείοις.

τοῖσιν † ἅµ’ † ἂν ἵκωµαι ἄστεα τηλεθάοντα,

ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξί, σεβίζοµαι· οἱ δ’ ἅµ’ ἕπονται

µυρίοι ἐξερέοντες, ὅπῃ πρὸς κέρδος ἀταρπός,

οἱ µὲν µαντοσυνέων κεχρηµένοι, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ νούσων 10

παντοίων ἐπύθοντο κλυεῖν εὐηκέα βάξιν,

δηρὸν δὴ χαλεπῆισι πεπαρµένοι <ἀµφ’ ὀδύνηισιν>.

Diogenes Laërtius Lives of the Philosophers 8.6267 = DK 31B112

Friends, who inhabit the great city by the yellow Acragas in the high parts of the city, caring for good deeds, harbours that show kindness to strangers, unacquainted with evil, greetings! I, in your eyes a divine god, no longer mortal, go among all, honoured, just as I should, adorned with both ribbons and festive garlands. Whenever I arrive in thriving cities I am revered by all, men and women. And they follow straightaway, in their ten thousands, asking where is the path to prosperity, some asking for divinations, others in all sorts of diseases sought to hear a healing oracle, having been pierced for a long time.

In other verses, Empedocles identifies himself as a god: ἀλλὰ τορῶς ταῦτ’ ἴσθι, θεοῦ

πάρα µῦθον ἀκούσας (DK 31B23.11) “But know these things plainly, having heard them from a god.”68 But in these verses, the citizens of Acragas, of whom he is one and so he

67 Diodorus Siculus 13.83.2 supplies verse 3 and verses 10-12 are also found in Clement Stromata 6.30. 68 Nestlé 1906 (545-7); Trépanier 2004 (38) also agrees with this reading. Contra Wright 1981 (181) who argues that the god to whom Empedocles refers is the Muse because “the µύθος of the physical poem

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addresses them as φίλοι (ὅτι δ’ ἦν Ἀκραγαντῖνος ἐκ Σικελίας αὐτὸς ἐναρχόµενος τῶν

Καθαρµῶν (Lives of the Philosophers 8.54) “That he was an Akragantine from Sicily, he says himself when he begins the Καθαρµοί”69), recognize that he is a god (ἐγὼ δ’ ὑµῖν

θεὸς ἄµβροτος), and so he is honoured (τετιµένος). Empedocles dresses as a successful initiate (ταινίαις τε περίστεπτος στέφεσίν τε θαλείοις (line 6) “adorned with both ribbons and festive garlands”) as Theon of Smyrna describes: τετάρτη δέ, ὅ δὴ καὶ τέλος τὴς

ἐποπτείας, ἀνάδεσις καὶ στεµµάτων ἐπίθεσις, ὥστε καὶ ἑτέροις, ἅς τις παρέλαβε τελετάς,

παραδοῦναι δύνασθαι, δᾳδουχίας τυχόντα ἢ ἱεροφαντίας ἤ τινος ἄλλης ἱερωσύνης·

(Theon of Smyrna de utilitate mathematicae 15.1-5 (ed. Hiller)) “The fourth step, which is also the end of the revelation, is the binding of the head and placement of garlands so that whoever has completed the rites can pass them on to others as well, whether through the torch bearing ceremony (δᾳδουχία), the interpretation of sacred things (ἱεροφαντία) or some other priestly work.”70 For the people of Acragas, they recognize that he has successfully become a god (οὐκέτι θνητός), and they know what this entails.

In other communities (ἄστεα τηλεθάοντα) he is worshipped or revered (σεβίζοµαι).

Trusting his power, they ask that Empedocles solve their problems whether to reverse bad luck (ὅπῃ πρὸς κέρδος ἀταρπός), tell the future (µαντοσυνέων κεχρηµένοι), or cure disease (ἐπὶ νούσων | παντοίων ἐπύθοντο κλυεῖν εὐηκέα βάξιν). These people want to know why they are suffering, with the assumption that only a god or his (her) intermediary would know the answer; they seek a βάξις (oracle) as opposed to treatment comes from the Muse”, as we see in fragment 3, and Bollack 1969 (1:265 n.2, 310) who argues that the god in question is Aphrodite/Love. 69 Editors, therefore, print this fragment as the opening for the Καθαρµοί, whether they see the Καθαρµοί as a distinct poem from the Περὶ Φυσέως (for example, Wright 1981, Kingsley 1995a, 1996, 2002 and Bollack 2003), or not (for example, Osborne 1987, Inwood 2001, and Trépanier 2004). 70 See also the beginning of part 2 in chapter 3.

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of the symptoms with φάρµακα. 71 The phrase µαντοσυνέων κεχρηµένοι (“asking for divinations”) is curious in conjunction with the βάξις. The verb χράω in the middle is used of people who consult a god or an oracle. There is little difference with how the people in thriving cities treat Empedocles on the one hand and magicians on the other who wander from community to community.72 Does Empedocles consider himself a magician, therefore? The first part of the fragment suggests that Empedocles may be contrasting the people outside of Acragas with those in Acragas who know him as a

φίλος and therefore understand what it means when he says he is a god, and have shown themselves to be exceptionally pure.73 The citizens of Acragas understand his message; the others do not.

The testimonia, on the other hand, mock both the claims that Empedocles is a god and the people who believe it. If sources do not outright mock Empedocles, they rationalize his claims. It is reported that Empdocles was called κωλυσανέµα (the wind-stopper, compare B111.3-5) because he prevented winds from blowing through a region.

καὶ γὰρ ἐτησίων ποτὲ σφοδρῶς πνευσάντων ὡς τοὺς καρποὺς

λυµῆναι, κελεύσας ὄνους ἐκδαρῆναι καὶ ἀσκοὺς ποιῆσαι περὶ τοὺς

λόφους καὶ τὰς ἀκρωρείας διέτεινε πρὸς τὸ συλλαβεῖν τὸ πνεῦµα·

λήξαντος δὲ κωλυσανέµαν κληθῆναι.

Diogenes Laërtius 8.60 = DK 31A1

When the Etesian winds were blowing very strongly, he ordered that asses be skinned and bags be made of their hides which he stretched about the ridges and mountain tops to catch the wind. When it ceased, he was called ‘wind-stopper’.

71 See §1.1 above. 72 See part 1 of this chapter. 73 See beginning of part 2 in chapter 3.

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This is not presented as a magical feat, but as an engineering marvel. Although impressive, it is not divinely related and this undercuts his claims to divinity.74

Sources also mock how he dresses. He dresses as a successful initiate (ταινίαις τε

περίστεπτος στέφεσίν τε θαλείοις (B111.6) “adorned with both ribbons and festive garlands”), but sources portray him as wearing a costume. Diodorus of Ephesus describes him as τραγικὸν ἀσκῶν τῦφον καὶ σεµνὴν ἀναλαβὼν ἐσθῆτα. (Diogenes Laërtius 8.70)

“practicing a theatrical disguise and wearing solemn robes.” Rather than a meaningful symbol, Empedocles’ comportment is reduced to a gimmick: Ἐµπεδοκλῆς µὲν γὰρ καὶ

στρόφιον τῶν ἁλουργοτάτων περὶ αὐτὴν [sc. τὴν κόµην] ἁρµόσας ἐσόβει περὶ τὰς τῶν

Ἑλλήνων ἀγυιὰς ὕµνους ξυντιθείς, ὡς θεὸς ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἔσοιτο. (Philostratus Life of

Apollonius 8.76 = DK 31A18b) “Empedocles even put a headband of the brightest purple in his hair and swaggered around the streets of Greece composing hymns that said he would be a god instead of a man.”75

Reports of Empedocles’ death are tied to various examples of his wonder-working, and portray him as a charlatan who seeks to substantiate what people believe.76 At

74 Compare other reports of this feat: ὁ δὲ φυσικὸς Ἐµπεδοκλῆς ὄρους τινὰ διασφάγα βαρὺν καὶ νοσώδη κατὰ τῶν πεδίων τὸν νότον ἐµπνέουσαν ἐµφράξας λοιµὸν ἔδοξεν ἐκκλεῖσαι τῆς χώρας. (Plutarch On Being a Busybody 515c = DK 31A14a) “The natural philosopher Empedocles, by stopping up a gorge in a mountain which discharged a heavy and pestilential south wind onto the plains, seems to have shut out a plague from the region.” τήν τε χώραν ἀπήλλαξεν ἀκαρπίας καὶ λοιµοῦ διασφάγας ὄρους ἀποτειχίσας δι’ ὧν ὁ νότος εἰς τὸ πεδίον ὑπερέβαλλε. (Plutarch Reply to Colotes 1126b = DK 31A14b) “(Empedocles) rid the region of crop failure and plague by walling up gorges in the mountain through which the south wind poured over into the plain.” Ἐµπεδοκλῆς τε ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος κωλυσανέµας ἐπεκλήθη. λέγεται οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀκράγαντος ὄρους πνέοντός ποτε ἀνέµου βαρὺ καὶ νοσῶδες τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶν αὐτῶν ἀγονίας αἰτίου γινοµένου παῦσαι τὸν ἄνεµον. (Clement Stromata 6.30) “Empedocles of Acragas was called the ‘wind-stopper’. For, when a wind, serious and full of ill for the natives and causing sterility in the women, blew down from the mountain of Acragas, he is said to have stopped the wind.” 75 Compare also Ἐµπεδοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος ἁλουργεῖ ἐχρήσατο καὶ ὑποδήµασι χαλκοῖς. (Aelian Miscellaneous History 12.32 = DK 31A18a) “Empedocles of Acragas wore purple clothes and bronze shoes.” 76 Chitwood 1986.

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Selinus, for example, he cured a plague with what is presented as another engineering marvel.

τοῖς Σελινουντίοις ἐµπεσόντος λοιµοῦ διὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ

παρακειµένου ποταµοῦ δυσωδίας, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοὺς φθείρεσθαι καὶ

τὰς γυναῖκας δυστοκεῖν, ἐπινοῆσαι τὸν Ἐµπεδοκλέα καὶ δύο τινὰς

ποταµοὺς τῶν σύνεγγυς ἐπαγαγεῖν ἰδίαις δαπάναις· καὶ

καταµίξαντα γλυκῆναι τὰ ῥεύµατα. οὕτω δὴ λήξαντος τοῦ λοιµοῦ

καὶ τῶν Σελινουντίων εὐωχουµένων ποτὲ παρὰ τῷ ποταµῷ,

ἐπιφανῆναι τὸν Ἐµπεδοκλέα· τοὺς δ’ ἐξαναστάντας προσκυνεῖν

καὶ προσεύχεσθαι καθαπερεὶ θεῷ. ταύτην οὖν θέλοντα βεβαιῶσαι

τὴν διάληψιν εἰς τὸ πῦρ ἐναλέσθαι.

Diogenes Laërtius 8.70 = DK 31A1

A plague once afflicted the people of Selinus, because of the foul odours from the adjacent river, so that they died and their wives miscarried; Empedocles got the idea of diverting, at this own exprense, two of the nearby rivers; thus by mingling their waters with those of the first river he sweetened the stream. After the plague had been stopped in this fashion, and the people of Selinus were feasting by the river bank, Empedocles appeared (like a god). They got up and bowed before him praying to him as though to a god. Empedocles leaped into the fire, wishing to secure their belief.

When the citizens bowed down before him he threw himself into the fire to prove them right. Diodorus of Ephesus, the source for this story, clearly believed that Empedocles was a charlatan, describing as he does Empedocles’ action as an act of engineering rather than one accomplished by a god. Timaeus supports this interpretation elsewhere calling

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Empedocles an ἀλαζόνα (charlatan) and a φίλαυτον (egotist) for calling himself a god in his own verses (fragment 112).77

Even the stories that he threw himself into Mount Etna to prove his divinity undercut his claims.

Ἱππόβοτος δέ φησιν ἐξαναστάντα αὐτὸν ὡδευκέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν

Αἴτνην, εἶτα παραγενόµενον ἐπὶ τοὺς κρατῆρας τοῦ πυρὸς

ἐναλέσθαι καὶ ἀφανισθῆναι, βουλόµενον τὴν περὶ αὑτοῦ φήµην

βεβαιῶσαι ὅτι γεγόνοι θεός, ὕστερον δὲ γνωσθῆναι,

ἀναρριπισθείσης αὐτοῦ µιᾶς τῶν κρηπίδων· χαλκᾶς γὰρ εἴθιστο

ὑποδεῖσθαι. πρὸς τοῦθ’ ὁ Παυσανίας ἀντέλεγε.

Diogenes Laërtius 8.69 = DK 31A1

Hippobotos says that he [Empedocles] got up and traveled to Mt. Etna, and having arrived he leaped into the craters of fire and disappeared, wishing to secure the report that he had become a god. He was recognized later because one of his sandals was thrown back out, for he was in the habit of wearing bronze shoes. Pausanias spoke against these things.

Kingsley 1995a (part III) traces the significance on the intersection between jumping into

Mount Etna, the bronze sandal and the golden thigh as Empedocles’ presentation as a shaman. But the poem was addressed to Pausanias; he was a φίλος who, presumably, understood Empedocles’ message of divinity. That he disputes the story is surely important. These heroic interpretations of Empedocles burning off his mortal shell illustrate that Empedocles’ near contemporaries did not understand his divinity, but

77 Diogenes Laërtius 8.66 = DK 31A1.

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interpreted his claims with their own beliefs in what becoming a god entailed. His detractors show that they are not φίλοι.

Although Empedocles appears to do many of the same things that magicians do such as affecting weather, he does not accomplish the feats he claims in fragment 111 as a magician would. A magician asks the gods to do these things on his behalf by means of sacrifices and incantations (part 1); Empedocles claims that he does (and Pausanias will do) them through his own divine power. Empedocles’ view of divinity, however, varies from what many believe, as the next chapter illustrates.

104 Chapter 3 – Empedocles the God

The first two chapters have shown that although the evidence suggests that

Empedocles can be called a scientist or a magician on the basis of what he asserts in his verses or is written about him in the testimonia, he does not present himself as one. He claims that he is a god, as everyone around him confirms (fragment 112) owing to the feats he can accomplish (fragment 111). Although it is not uncommon for scholars to downplay Empedocles’ claim to be a god or deny it altogether1, I believe we should approach the text with the understanding that Empedocles considered himself a god.2

Divinity as Empedocles conceives it for himself, however, is not that of the Homeric gods; it is a state of perfect Harmony that can be achieved by hard work and patience.

Empedocles himself was not always a god, but is a successful model for his audience.

According to testimonia, he jumped into Mt. Etna to prove he had become a god:

Ἱππόβοτος δέ φησιν ἐξαναστάντα αὐτὸν ὡδευκέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Αἴτνην, εἶτα

παραγενόµενον ἐπὶ τοὺς κρατῆρας τοῦ πυρὸς ἐναλέσθαι καὶ ἀφανισθῆναι, βουλόµενον

τὴν περὶ αὑτοῦ φήµην βεβαιῶσαι ὅτι γεγόνοι θεός… (Diogenes Laërtius Lives of the

Philosophers 8.69) “Hippobotos says that he [Empedocles] got up and traveled to Mt.

Etna, and having arrived he leaped into the craters of fire and disappeared, wishing to secure the report that he had become a god.”3 It is possible to escape the cycle of

1 For example, van der Ben 1975 (22-25), Wright 1981 (181, 266), McKirahan 1994 (258-9). 2 This position is taken by Zuntz 1971, Inwood 2001, and Trépanier 2004. 3 Compare also the story in chapter 70 of Lives of the Philosophers where he jumps into a fire to prove the same thing to the people of Selinus: οὕτω δὴ λήξαντος τοῦ λοιµοῦ καὶ τῶν Σελινουντίων εὐωχουµένων

105 transmigration that coincides with the cosmological cycle, and if the readers are successful in learning Empedocles’ lessons, they, too, will become gods.

Part 1: What are the Gods?

What does Empedocles mean by god? He clearly has a different idea from the

Olympians, whose existence as gods he denies: οὐδέ τις ἦν κείνοισιν Ἄρης θεὸς οὐδὲ

Κυδοιµός | οὐδὲ Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς οὐδὲ Κρόνος οὐδὲ Ποσειδῶν, | ἀλλὰ Κύπρις βασίλεια.

(DK 31B128.1-3) “Nor was there some god Ares for them, nor Battle-Uproar, nor Zeus the king nor Kronos nor Poseidon, but Kypris the queen.” He does use the names of gods, but for a different purpose. Sometimes he seems to use the names in order to dispel some of the common beliefs that men hold, for example, the very existence of the Olympians as fragment 128 illustrates. At other times, he is using the names to exploit connections his audience already holds, for example, the riddle in fragment 6.4 As he says when he applies the terms coming into being (γενέσθαι) and wretched fate (δυσδαίµονα πότµον), that is, destruction, people use the terms incorrectly, but he will follow the convention: οὐ

θέµις ᾗ καλέουσι, νόµῳ δ᾽ ἐπίφηµι καὶ αὐτὸς (DK 31B9.4) “It is not right how they call them, but even I follow the convention.”

Empedocles refers to two types of gods. The first are the roots and Love and Strife, which are unchanging and immortal. These characteristics automatically make them divine. The second type of god is a compound like any other created thing. Empedocles

ποτὲ παρὰ τῷ ποταµῷ, ἐπιφανῆναι τὸν Ἐµπεδοκλέα· τοὺς δ’ ἐξαναστάντας προσκυνεῖν καὶ προσεύχεσθαι καθαπερεὶ θεῷ. ταύτην οὖν θέλοντα βεβαιῶσαι τὴν διάληψιν εἰς τὸ πῦρ ἐναλέσθαι. “When the plague stopped in this way and the people of Selinus were feasting by the river, Empedocles appeared. Getting up, they bowed to him and prayed to him as though he were a god. Wishing to secure this impression, he jumped into the fire.” 4 See §1.1.1 below.

106 lists these gods with other mortal things such as plants, animals, and men. It is to this group of gods that Empedocles belongs.

1.1 UNCHANGING AND IMMORTAL

The first category of the divine includes the roots, Love, and Strife. These are the elements of Empedocles’ universe that always were, are, and will be. Empedocles explains that he will reveal a good discourse about the gods: εὐχοµένῳ νῦν αὖτε

παρίστασο, Καλλιόπεια, | ἀµφὶ θεῶν µακάρων ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἐµφαίνοντι. (DK 31B131.3-

4) “stand now beside (me) as I pray again, Kalliope, as I reveal a good story about the blessed gods”) and anyone who holds an incorrect opinion (σκοτόεσσα δόξα “shadowy opinion”) about them is wretched (fragment 132). Diels-Kranz placed these fragments in the “Purifications” poem owing to the reference to the gods. Wright 1981 (159) places this fragment at the beginning of Physics, arguing that the θεοί Empedocles will describe are his new mortal gods, as does Inwood 2001 since he places it immediately before fragment 115, which describes the process of transmigration – in other words, the process of becoming a mortal god. I, however, believe these verses refer to and thus were placed before the introduction of the roots, Love, and Strife. Physics intends to describe how the world works; and those gods play an integral part. Empedocles uses the names of gods to refer to the roots in fragment 6 and he also calls Love by a variety of names associated with Aphrodite.

107 1.1.1 The Roots

In fragment 6, Empedocles does not identify the roots plainly, but by the names of familiar gods, so that the readers can determine by means of clues the character of these components. He compels his readers to solve the riddle.

τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώµατα πρῶτον ἄκουε·

Ζεὺς ἀργὴς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ’ Ἀιδωνεύς

Νῆστίς θ’, ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωµα βρότειον.

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 10.315 = DK 31B6

For hear in the first place the four roots of all things: shining Zeus, life-giving Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis who wets the mortal spring with her tears.

The readers will be told the lesson, but they already know from previous warnings that no one sense is adequate to learn the truth.5 It is important to listen (ἄκουε), but listening is insufficient as the readers learn from what follows; the information has been presented in the form of a metaphor by analogy that must be solved. To learn the lesson presented in the metaphor, one must fill out the analogy: the roots of all things are to x as Zeus, Hera,

Aidoneus, Nestis are to y.6 As Kingsley (1995, 362) argues, “[i]n typical oracular mode he is neither explicit nor simply silent; instead he adopts a middle course, providing the seeds of the solution for the discriminating hearer” that will lead to “‘growth of understanding’.”7

Fragment 17, in addition to containing the most explicit account of the cosmological cycle, describes the immortal nature of the roots in lines 9-13.

5 See §2.2.1 in chapter 1 above for a brief introduction to this idea in my discussion of fragment 2. It is discussed in more detail in §2.3 in chapter 4 below. 6 See my discussion on Aristotle and metaphor in §2.3.1 chapter 1. 7 I discuss the solution to this fragment in §2.2.1 in chapter 4.

108 <οὕτως ᾗ µὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων µεµάθηκε φύεσθαι>8

ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἑνὸς πλέον’ ἐκτελέθουσι,9

τῇ µὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφισιν ἔµπεδος αἰών·

ᾗ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαµπερὲς οὐδαµὰ λήγει,

ταύτῃ δ’ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.9-12 = DK 31B17.9-13

In this way, insofar as they have learned to become One from Many and they end up as Many when the One is divided again, in this respect they come into being and there is no secure life for them. But in another way they never stop changing constantly and in this respect they are always unchanged in a cycle.

The roots come into being (γίγνονται) and do not have a secure life, that is, they seem to be subject to birth and destruction. This appears to contradict what Empedocles states elsewhere on the nature of the roots. The terminology Empedocles uses, however, is ambiguous.10 Greek uses γίγνεσθαι in two distinct ways11: 1) coming into being for the first time either a) from nothing at all (that is, creation ex nihilo) or b) from some other thing or 2) arriving at a different state or becoming.

Other fragments clarify Empedocles’ intent. Empedocles emphasizes that no thing comes into being from nothing nor does any thing perish into nothing: νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ

8 Aristotle quotes these lines separately in his Physics (250b30 ff) to illustrate Empedocles' use of rest and motion. The first line he quotes (here, line 9) is not present in Simplicius, but he may have been thinking about another fragment, that is, B26.8-12 quoted in full by Simplicius (Physics CIAG 9.33). Diels-Kranz (B17), Bignone 1963 (404), Wright 1981 (fr. 8), and Inwood 2001 (fr. 25) include this line; Bollack 1969 (fr. 31) and Martin and Primavesi 1999 (127) do not. The µέν seems required to balance the δέ of the following line. 9 The neuter plural subject frequently has a singular verb (Smyth 1956 (§958)), but it may also be followed by a plural verb if the author wants to stress that the subject is made up of several parts (Smyth 1956 (§959)). 10 Compare Millerd 1908 (39-40), who claims that Empedocles was not specific, that he used the “undefined idea of ordinary experience” when he employed the term γίγνεσθαι. 11 Inwood 2001 (32-3) discusses this problem and includes a fourth interpretation.

109 σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι µέριµναι, | οἳ δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν | ἤ τι

καταθνήισκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἁπάντῃ. (Plutarch Reply to Colotes 1113c = DK

31B11) “Fools, for their meditations are not long-lasting, are those who expect that what previously was not comes to be or that anything dies and is utterly destroyed.”12 Creation from nothing (meaning 1a), therefore, is impossible. Moreover, the roots do not come into being for the first time from something else (meaning 1b) because nothing else exists in addition to or besides the roots (and Love and Strife): καὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὔτ’ ἄρ τι

ἐπιγίνεται οὐδ’ ἀπολήγει· | εἴτε γὰρ ἐφθείροντο διαµπερές, οὐκέτ’ ἂν ἦσαν· | τοῦτο δ’

ἐπαυξήσειε τὸ πᾶν τί κε; καὶ πόθεν ἐλθόν; | πῇ δέ κε κἠξαπόλοιτο, ἐπεὶ τῶνδ’ οὐδὲν

ἔρηµον; (Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.29-159.2 = DK 31B17.30-33) “And in addition to them nothing comes into being nor ceases [to be]; for if they constantly perished they would no longer be. And what would increase this totality, and whence would it come?

And how would it also be destroyed, since nothing is bereft of them?” Since the roots do not ever come into being for the first time, they must arrive into a different state or become something (meaning 2). Empedocles clearly has this in mind for the roots.

The roots become compounds. The compound – whether One, Many, or mortal thing

– comes into being for the first time – from something else (meaning 1b) as opposed to from nothing (meaning 1a)– but the roots that make up these compounds are in a perpetual state of becoming (meaning 2) as Love and Strife manipulate the parts of the

12 Compare also fragment 12: ἔκ τε γὰρ οὐδάµ’ ἐόντος ἀµήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι | καί τ’ ἐὸν ἐξαπολέσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄπυστον· | αἰεὶ γὰρ τῇ γ’ ἔσται, ὅπῃ κέ τις αἰὲν ἐρείδη. ([Aristotle] de Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia 975b2-5 = DK 31B12) “For it is impossible that there should be coming to be from what is not, and it cannot be accomplished and is unheard of that what is should be destroyed; for it will always be there, wherever one may push it on any occasion.”

110 roots because they are becoming different things.13 In this way, the roots come into being and have no secure life: γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφισιν ἔµπεδος αἰών. This process of becoming and perishing never comes to an end as the cycle goes around because the roots continually become – from Many to a host of mortal things, to One, and then through yet another host of mortal things until the Many is formed again. The roots “become” through their participation in various compounds and they change again when the compounds are destroyed.14 They themselves, however, are immortal. Since the roots do not stop changing as Love and Strife manipulate their parts throughout the cycle, they achieve a certain kind of changelessness (ᾗ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαµπερὲς οὐδαµὰ λήγει, |

ταύτῃ δ’ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον).

Empedocles continues his account of the roots in more detail in fragment 17 at line 27 after a brief interlude to hymn Philotes (Love).

ταῦτα γὰρ ἶσά τε πάντα καὶ ἥλικα γένναν ἔασι,

τιµῆς δ’ ἄλλης ἄλλο µέδει, πάρα δ’ ἦθος ἑκάστῳ,

ἐν δὲ µέρει κρατέουσι περιπλοµένοιο χρόνοιο.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.26-28 = DK 31B17.27-29

13 Compare Plutarch Reply to Colotes 1111f (= DK 31B8): ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω· φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἁπάντων | θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλοµένου θανάτοιο τελευτή, | ἀλλὰ µόνον µίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε µιγέντων | ἔστι, φύσις δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνοµάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν. “I will tell you another thing – there is no birth of any of all mortal things, nor is there any end of destructive death, but there is only mixture and exchange of mixed things. Birth is the name given by men.” Although the use is incorrect, Empedocles will use it himself: τότε µὲν τό<δε φασι> γενέσθαι, | εὖτε δ’ ἀποκρινθῶσι, τὸ δ’ αὖ δυσδαίµονα πότµον· | ἣ θέµις <οὐ> καλέουσι, νόµωι δ’ ἐπίφηµι καὶ αὐτός. (Plutarch Reply to Colotes 1113a = DK 31B9.3-5) “at that time they say this is coming to be and when they are separated they call this miserable fate. It is not right to call them this, but even I assent to the convention.” Empedocles recognizes that the term is ambiguous, but there is nothing he can do to change the language. Compare a similar sentiment in Lucretius DRN 1.136-45. 14 Compare line 14 of fragment 35 where “things that had learned to be immortal became mortal”: αἶψα δὲ θνήτ᾽ ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν µάθον ἀθάνατ᾽εἶναι.

111 For all these things [roots] are equal and of like age in their birth, but one rules over one privilege and another another and each has its own character and they dominate in turn as time circles around.

Since the elements are equal and of like age, there is no hierarchic distinction of one element over another.15 Each also has its own τιµή and its own character that does not change, thus ensuring that the plurality among the roots is more than a number. The roots are a limited plurality: they do not change, they are not born, nor are they destroyed. By creating a world through combination of the roots, their integrity is not compromised.

1.1.2 Love and Strife

Love is also assigned Olympian names throughout the verses. Empedocles uses a variety of names for Love according primarily to context. When he describes the cosmological cycle in general terms, her refers to her as Φιλότης.16 When Love plays an active role in the creation of mortal things, he applies names that emphasize this aspect of her character. Empedocles uses Ἀφροδίτη frequently, especially in the context of creating compounds of mortal things: DK 31B22.5 (ἀλλήλοις ἔστερκται ὁµοιωθέντ᾽ Ἀφροδίτῃ -

15 The question of what Empedocles means by “equality” is interesting, but lies outside the scope of the problem at hand. The roots are probably equal to one another in quantity, age, and power; they rule without injustice despite variations in character. Vlastos 1947 (especially 158-61). Cf. Jaeger 1947, O’Brien 1969 (136), Wright 1981 (22ff., 167). 16 Φιλότητι συνερχόµεν᾽ εἰς ἓν ἃπαντα (DK 31B17.7 = DK 31B20.2) “all things come together into One by Love”; καὶ Φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν (DK 31B17.20) “Love is with the roots”; σὺν δ᾽ ἔβη ἐν Φιλότητι (DK 31B21.8) “the roots come together in Love”; ἄλλοτε µὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόµεν᾽ (DK 31B26.5) “the roots come together through Love”; ἐν δέ µέσῃ Φιλότης στροφάλιγγι γένηται (DK 31B35.4) “Love comes to be in the middle of the whirl”, cf. PStrasbourg a(ii)19; τόσον αἰὲν ἐπήιει … Φιλότητος … ὁρµή (DK 31B35.12-13) “as far as Strife goes out, Love follows.” Plutarch uses this name once without context: DK 31B19 (σχεδὺνην Φιλότητα – clinging Love). Plutarch also points out a parallel term – Φιλίη – which Empedocles uses rarely: it shows up only in ensemble d of the Strasbourg papyrus: Φιλίην δὲ [καὶ Ε]ὐ̣ν̣[οίη]ν̣ νῦν ἔχουσιν “now they have Love and harmonious thought.” It is, however, the term preferred by commentators – Φιλίη is used by commentators 46 times as opposed to 10 uses of Φιλότης (the preferred term by Aristotle). There are three uses of Ἁρµονίη in the commentators (all uses then repeated in the accompanying fragment) and two uses of Ἀφροδίτη.

112 the roots cling together in a compound once they have been made like by Aphrodite), DK

31B66 (σχιστοὺς λειµῶνας … Ἀφροδίτης – agricultural imagery is used of creation), DK

31B71.4 (ὅσα νῦν γεγάασι συναρµοσθέντ᾽ Ἀφροδίτῃ - as many compounds as now exist that have been joined by Aphrodite), DK 31B86 (ἐξ ὧν ὤµµατ᾽ ἔπηξεν ἀτειρέα δῖ᾽

Ἀφροδίτη – Aphrodite fashioned the eyes), DK 31B87 (γόµφοις ἀσκήσασα καταστόργοις

Ἀφροδίτη – Aphrodite formed (the eye) with dowels of love).17 Kypris (Κύπρις), another name for Aphrodite also creates compounds: DK 31B73 (ὡς δὲ τότε χθόνα Κύπρις, ἐπεί

τ’ ἐδίηνεν ἐν ὄµβρῳ, | εἴδεα ποιπνύουσα θοῷ πυρὶ δῶκε κρατῦναι ... - Kypris made compounds from the roots), DK 31B75.2 (Κύπριδος ἐν παλάµῃσι – the differences in animals arise from the work of Kypris), DK 31B95 (Κύπριδος ἐν παλάµῃσιν ὅτε ξὺµ

πρῶτ’ ἐφύοντο – eyes grew together from the work of Kypris), DK 31B98.3 (Κύπριδος

ὁρµισθεῖσα τελείοις ἐν λιµένεσσιν – the roots come together to be fastened “in the perfect harbours of Kypris”).18

The terms for Strife that Empedocles uses are limited compared to Love, and they are not Olympian names. Νεῖκος is the most frequent term used for Strife: DK 31B17.8

(ἄλλοτε δ᾽ αὖ δίχ᾽ ἕκαστα φορεύµενα Nείκεος ἔχθει – at another time each is borne apart by the hatred of Strife), DK 31B17.19 (Νεῖκός τ’ οὐλόµενον δίχα τῶν – Strife is apart from the roots), DK 31B26.6 (= DK 31B17.8), DK 31B30.1 (αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ µέγα Νεὶκος ἐνὶ

µελέεσιν ἐθρέφθη – Strife comes to power again at the appointed time), DK 31B35.3

(ἐπεὶ Νεῖκος µὲν ἐνέρτατον ἵκετο βένθος | δίνης – Strife moves to the outer edge of the

17 Empedocles always uses Ἀφροδίτη line final, but the emphasis is always on her creative power. 18 Empedocles links Ἁρµονίη, too, to the mixture of mortal things: (DK 31B96.3-4 … τὰ δ’ ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο | Ἁρµονίης κόλλῃσιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίηθεν – bones come to be once the roots have been fixed by “the divine glue of Harmony” (cf. DK 31B23.4)) and the One (DK 31B27 οὕτως Ἁρµονίης πυκινῷ κρύφῳ ἐστήρικται | σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς… - the roots are fixed into a circular sphere by the dense obscurity of Harmony).

113 whirl; cf. PStrasbourg a(ii)18), DK 31B35.9 (ὅσσ᾽ ἔτι Νεῖκος ἔρυκε µετάρσιον – Strife holds some roots back from union), DK 31B36 (τῶν δὲ συνερχοµένων ἐξ ἔσχατον ἵστατο

Νεῖκος – while the roots come together, Strife moves to the edge), DK 31B109 (νεῖκος δέ

τε νείκει λυγρῷ - we see Strife by means of Strife). Other terms include Κότος (DK

31B21.7: ἐν δὲ Κότῳ διάµορφα καὶ ἄνδιχα πάντα πέλονται – all things are separate in

Strife), Ἔριδος (DK 31B20.4: ἄλλοτε δ᾽αὖτε κακῇσι διατµηθέντ᾽ Ἐρίδεσσι – the roots are separated by evil quarrels (cf. DK 31B124 and DK 31B145)) and δῆρις (DK 31B122:

Δῆρίς θ᾽ αἱµατόεσσα – bloody Battle is in the cave with Ἁρµονίη who is also Love).19

Love and Strife are the agents of change in Empedocles’ cosmological cycle. Both are corporeal. The best reconstruction places Love at the centre of the roots and Strife on the outside.20 When Love dominates, she is spread throughout the roots and Strife is at the edge until he begins to exert his influence again. On the other hand, when Strife dominates he extends through the roots and keeps Love in the centre.

… ἐπεὶ Νεῖκος µὲν ἐνέρτατον ἵκετο βένθος

δίνης, ἐν δὲ µέσῃ Φιλότης στροφάλιγγι γένηται,

ἐν τῇ δὴ τάδε πάντα συνέρχεται ἓν µόνον εἶναι, 5

οὐκ ἄφαρ, ἀλλὰ θεληµὰ συνιστάµεν’ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα.

τῶν δέ τε µισγοµένων χεῖτ’ ἔθνεα µυρία θνητῶν·

πολλὰ δ’ ἄµεικτ’ ἔστηκε κεραιοµένοισιν ἐναλλάξ,

ὅσσ’ ἔτι Νεῖκος ἔρυκε µετάρσιον· οὐ γὰρ ἀµεµφέως

τῶν πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ’ ἔσχατα τέρµατα κύκλου, 10

19 Although δῆρίς is also used in DK31B27a (οὐ στάσις οὐδέ τε δῆρις ἀναίσιµος ἐν µελέεσσιν – no discord nor battle in his limbs), its translation as Strife is contested since this is not a cosmological context. See §2.2.2 below. 20 O’Brien 1969, chapter 5.

114 ἀλλὰ τὰ µέν τ’ ἐνέµιµνε µελέων τὰ δέ τ’ ἐξεβεβήκει.

ὅσσον δ’ αἰὲν ὑπεκπροθέοι, τόσον αἰὲν ἐπήιει

ἠπιόφρων Φιλότητος ἀµεµφέος ἄµβροτος ὁρµή·

Simplicius De Caelo CIAG 7.529.3-13 = DK 31B35.3-13

When Strife arrived at the lowest depth of the eddy and Love gets to the middle of the whirl, in this place all these things come to be one alone, not suddenly, but coming together willingly, one from one direction and another from another. As they were being mixed, ten thousand tribes of mortal things poured forth, but many stood unmixed alternating with mixed things, as many as Strife, still above, held back. For it has not wholly stood out from these at the edges of the circle, but some of its limbs remain inside and some have gone out. And as far as it (Strife) moved out, so far did the immortal and gentle stream of blameless Love come forward.

The first lines emphasize the distinction between Many and the One following

Empedocles’ established pattern: during the Many, Strife reaches throughout everything, that is, to the lowest depth, while Love is in the centre. Next Empedocles contrasts the

One where everything comes together. Until that point, however, Love does not yet completely dominate and Strife continues to have some influence, that is, some of his limbs are still among the root parts while others have already left. Likewise, one expects

Love’s “limbs” still to be among the roots influencing their behaviour while Strife marches forward to dominate between the One and the Many. Since they are always present with the roots, it follows that they, too, are immortal and unchanging.

The only immortal gods in Empedocles’ system, therefore, are the roots, Love, and

Strife.

115 1.2 EMPEDOCLES’ MORTAL GODS

There are times, however, when Empedocles refers to gods and he does not mean the immortal and unchanging elements of his universe, nor the Homeric gods that hoi polloi tell stories about. Some gods are described as long-lived and linked to men, animals, and plants.

ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἦν ὅσα τ’ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται,

δένδρεά τ’ ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες,

θῆρές τ’ οἰωνοί τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέµµονες ἰχθῦς,

καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιµῇσι φέριστοι.

DK 31B21.9-1221

From these (the roots) all things have sprung – as many as were, as many as are and will be hereafter: trees and men and women, and beasts and birds and water-dwelling fish, and even the long-lived gods, greatest in honours.22

All of the things listed are a variety of compounds of the four roots. The epithet,

δολιχαίωνες, that Empedocles applies to these θεοί reveals the greatest difference between their divinity and that of the roots and Love and Strife – they are not immortal.23

Every compound is subject to dissolution, and the gods whom Empedocles includes in

21 These lines are repeated verbatim in the new Strasbourg papyrus (a(1)8-a(ii)2) and in a slightly different context in fragment 23, which describes the objects in a painted picture as an analogy for the creation of compounds. 22 Regarding this epithet (τιµῇσι φέριστοι), compare the reaction of crowds to Empedocles in fragment 112. This illustrates the extent of the honours offered to him. 23 Primavesi 2005 and 2008 argue that the only gods, including these long-lived ones, are the roots at the time of the One – the sphere – and the Many – the four concentric spheres. He argues the “long-lived” is emphasized owing to the Florentine scholia on Aristotle Physics 250b26-29 (Laur. 87.7) published by Rashed 2001 and Primavesi 2006. According to this scholia, the time of the One and the Many each last 60 time-units or 6000 years. This interpretation fails to take the context of Empedocles’ words into account since the other things listed are compounds in the world we live in.

116 this list of mortal compounds are no different.24 When Empedocles says that he is an immortal god (ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὑµῖν θεὸς ἄµβροτος B112.4), the emphasis should be on the ethic dative (ὑµῖν); the people of Acragas believe he is immortal, but they do not yet understand what Empedocles’ divinity entails.

1.2.1 Empedocles’ model for the long-lived gods

Empedocles’ description of the Sphere, also known as the One, is his example in the verses for a long-lived god. Fragment 31 tells us that the limbs of the god are shaken:

πάντα γὰρ ἐξείης πελεµίζετο γυῖα θεοῖο. From the context of this fragment, we know that the god whose limbs are shaken is the Sphere when Strife begins to approach (ἀρξαµένου

δὲ πάλιν τοῦ Νείκους ἐπικρατεῖν τότε πάλιν κίνησις ἐν τῷ σφαίρῳ γίνεται (Simplicius

CIAG Physics 1184.2) “when strife began again to dominate, at that time motion again occurred in the sphere”), and the only time that Strife is apart from the roots is when

Love is in complete control.25 The sphere, therefore, is the One and is also god. Aristotle, moreover, confirms that the Sphere is the only compound that Love creates on her own

(δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ τοῦτο γεννᾶν ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐκ τούτου τἆλλά

ἐστι πλὴν ὁ θεός (Aristotle Metaphysics 1000a27) “but nevertheless he [Strife] seems to create (all things) outside of the One; for all other things except god proceed from him.”).

The Sphere/ god does not resemble the anthropomorphic gods as other authors describe

24 Compare the Epicurean gods who hide in the large spaces of void among the worlds in order to avoid being dissolved by random blows from the swerves of atoms (Lucretius DRN 1.44-49, 5.146-55). 25 See §1.1.2 above.

117 them26, nor is it winged as one might expect of a compound linked with Eros, that is, a child of Aphrodite/Love.

οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι ἀίσσονται,

οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γοῦν(α), οὐ µήδεα γεννήεντα,

ἀλλ’ ὅ γε πάντοθεν ἶσος <ἑοῖ> καὶ πάµπαν ἀπείρων

σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς µονίῃ περιηγέι γαίων. 27

For two branches do not spring from his back, he has no feet, no swift knees, no organs of reproduction, but he is equal to himself in every direction, without any beginning or end, a rounded sphere, rejoicing in encircling stillness.

The sphere/god is in perfect Harmony, rounded and alone, the most perfect and orderly arrangement of the roots possible as I show below.

Despite the perfection of this divine compound, even it does not last forever. Love and Strife have sworn oaths that neither should be in complete control of the roots forever:

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ µέγα νεῖκος ἐνὶ µελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη

ἐς τιµάς τ’ ἀνόρουσε τελειοµένοιο χρόνοιο,

ὅς σφιν ἀµοιβαῖος πλατέος παρ’ ἐλήλαται ὅρκου

(Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1184.14-16 = DK 31B30)

26 Ammonius quotes fragment 134, claiming that it describes Apollo and divinity in general: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδροµέῃ κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυῖα κέκασται, | οὐ µὲν ἀπαὶ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι ἀίσσονται, | οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γοῦν(α), οὐ µήδεα λαχνήεντα, | ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο µοῦνον, | φροντίσι κόσµον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θοῇσιν. “For he is not fitted out in his limbs with a human head, nor do two branches dart from his back nor feet, nor swift knees nor shaggy genitals; but he is only a sacred and ineffable thought organ darting through the entire cosmos with swift thoughts.” Primavesi 2008 (255-59) argues that the One and the four roots are long-lived gods since they all have Olympian names. 27 Wright 1981 (fragment 22) collates Hippolytus Refutatio 7.92.15 (= DK 31B29) and Stobaeus 1.15.2 (= DK 31B28) as one fragment because Hippolytus gives an unmetrical summary of Stobaeus (189); Inwood 2001 (fragment 34) follows Wright and prints the same text.

118 But when Strife had been nourished great within its limbs, and leapt up to its honours as the time was completed, the time which has been established for each in turn by a broad oath.28

Strife must return; the Sphere must break up; and this leads to the creation of the daimones and the world, as we know it, in this period of increasing Strife.

1.2.2 The Composition of the Sphere

The most important part of the long-lived god’s perfection lies in the blend of root parts that combine to form it; the other long-lived gods cannot be the only thing existing in the universe as we find in the period of the One. In forming the One, Love mixes the parts of the roots together until they can be mixed no further. Since the One is the culmination of Love’s work, the root parts must be arranged in such a way that no like part lies next to another.29 The One is wholly and evenly balanced with respect to its parts. The first line of fragment 2730 confirms this interpretation: ἔνθ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἠελίοιο

διείδεται ὠκέα γυῖα “there the swift limbs of the sun are no longer discerned.”

Empedocles uses ἥλιος in two distinct ways. At times he refers to the sun itself. In fragment 38, Empedocles promises to describe for the reader how the universe we see around us came into being: εἰ δ’ ἄγε τοι λέξω πρῶθ’ ἐξ ὧν ἥλιος ἀρχήν, | τἆλλα τε δῆλ’

ἐγένοντο τὰ νῦν ἐσορῶµεν ἅπαντα, | γαῖά τε καὶ πόντος πολυκύµων ἠδ’ ὑγρὸς ἀήρ | Τιτὰν

28 See n. 56 below. 29 As I discuss with evidence in chapter 5 below, the main function of Love is to overcome the roots’ natural inclination of attracting like to like. When Love is in complete control, therefore, no fire will be next to fire, no water to water, etc. Compare Curd 1998 (162-63). 30 Eudemus says this describes the Sphere: Εὔδηµος δὲ τὴν ἀκινησίαν ἐν τῇ τῆς Φιλίας ἐπικρατείᾳ κατὰ τὸν Σφαῖρον ἐκδέχεται, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαντα συγκριθῇ (Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1183.28-9) “But Eudemus says that motionlessness occurs in the domination by Love at the time of the Sphere, when all things have been combined”; but Plutarch (de facie in orbe lunae 926d) also uses it to describe the Many. See §2.3.2 in chapter 5.

119 ἠδ’ αἰθὴρ σφίγγων περὶ κύκλον ἅπαντα. (Clement Stromata 5.48 = DK 31B38; ἥλιος

Wright 1981, ἥλιον mss; τἆλλα Wright 1981, ἐξ ὧν mss) “Come now, I shall tell you first from what the sun, in the beginning, and all the other things which we see now have clearly come into being – earth and swelling sea and the moist air and the Titan aither surrounding all things about in a circle.”31 Empedocles contrasts the sun with the moon:

Ἥλιος ὀξυβελὴς ἠδ’ ἱλάειρα Σελήνη (Plutarch de facie in orbe lunae 920c = DK 31B40)

“sharp-arrowed sun and gentle moon”. Salt is formed by the action of the sun on salt water: ἃλς ἐπάγη ῥιπῇσιν ἐωσµένος ἠελίοιο (Hephaestion Handbook 1.3, p. 2.13-14 =

DK 31B56) “salt became fixed, pushed by the blows of the sun”. During the cycle of reincarnation, the daimon wanders from life form to life form: αἰθέριον µὲν γάρ σφε

µένος πόντονδε διώκει, | πόντος δ’ ἐς χθονὸς οὖδας ἀπέπτυσε, γαῖα δ’ ἐς αὐγὰς | ἠελίου

φαέθοντος, ὁ δ’ αἰθέρος ἔµβαλε δίναις (DK 31B115.9-11) “For the strength of the air pursues him into the sea, and the sea spits him onto the threshold of the earth and the earth into the beams of the shining sun and it casts him into the eddies of air.”

At other times, Empedocles uses ἥλιος to represent the root fire because the sun represents the most obvious natural accumulation of fiery parts. In fragment 21,

Empedocles lists the roots (one per verse) and then refers to their arrangement in the following lines: ἠέλιον µὲν λευκὸν ὁρᾶν καὶ θερµὸν ἁπάντῃ, | … | ἐν δὲ Κότῳ διάµορφα

καὶ ἄνδιχα πάντα πέλονται, | σὺν δ’ ἔβη ἐν Φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται. (Simplicius

Physics CIAG 9.159.15, 19-20 = DK 31B21.3, 7-8) “the sun bright to look upon and warm in every respect … In Strife all are spatially distinct and apart, and in Love they come together and desire one another.” We know that Empedocles refers to the roots as

31 For a concise description on the nature and formation of Empedocles’ sun, see Kingsley 1994a.

120 opposed to the sun because Love and Strife do not mix parts of the sun with rain and earth. In fragment 71, Aphrodite mixes the roots to create compounds: εἰ δέ τί σοι περὶ

τῶνδε λιπόξυλος ἔπλετο πίστις, | πῶς ὕδατος γαίης τε καὶ αἰθέρος ἠελίου τε | κιρναµένων

εἴδη τε γενοίατο χροῖά τε θνητῶν | τόσσ’, ὅσα νῦν γεγάασι συναρµοσθέντ’ Ἀφροδίτῃ

(Simplicius de caelo CIAG.7.530.1-4 = DK 31B71) “If your faith concerning these things is in any way lacking, how from water, earth, air and sun (=fire) mixing such forms and colours of mortal things come into being such as now exist having been joined together by Aphrodite…”

It is more likely that Empedocles refers here to the sun as an accumulation of the root fire because Empedocles always uses γυῖα to indicate the parts of a larger body.

Empedocles frequently uses γυῖα of the limbs of a man or animal32; he also uses them of gods.33 Since, however, Empedocles’ gods are not anthropomorphic, γυῖα seem to be a smaller part of the whole as opposed to simply the limbs of an animal. “The swift limbs of the sun can no longer be discerned” because there are no concentrations of any one root. When Love has mixed unlike roots as much as possible, there will be no collection

32στεινωποὶ µὲν γὰρ παλάµαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται (DK 31B2.1) an individual’s senses cannot be trusted because “narrow powers are spread throughout the limbs”; µήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσηι πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι, | γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ’ ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον (DK 31B3.12-13) all individuals are urged to follow the information presented by their senses, “do not prevent trust in any of the other limbs where there is a parth to understanding; understand each in the way it is clear”; ἄλλοτε µὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόµεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα | γυῖα, τὰ σῶµα λέλογχε (DK 31B20.2-3) the body of a mortal thing is fashioned parallel to the universe, “at another time, all the limbs which have chanced upon a body come together by Love into one” [Ensemble c in the Strasbourg Papyrus reads συνερχόµεθ᾽ instead of the participle. Although this has generated much speculation about whether the first plural is the correct reading, for example Laks 2002, it does not affect interpretation here.]; σκιεροῖς ἠσκηµένα γυίοις (DK 31B61.4) early animals that did not survive ultimately were “outfitted with shadowy limbs”; ἐπιχώριον ἀνδράσι γυῖον (DK 31B62.8) the first men pushed up from the earth by fire did not show “the limb (part) unique to men”; τέρεν αἷµα κλαδασσόµενον διὰ γυίων (DK 31B100.22) “smooth blood rushes through the limbs” like water in a klepsydra; εὖτέ τις ἀµπλακίῃσι φόβῳ φίλα γυῖα µιήνῃ (DK 31B115.3) “whenever someone stains his own limbs with sins and fear [see n.45 below for my choice of this reading]” he is condemned to wander for 30 000 years; ἐ<ν>έδµεναι ἠέα γυῖα (DK 31B128.10) the greatest sin of man was “to eat their limbs.” 33 πάντα γὰρ ἑξείης πελεµίζετο γυῖα θεοῖο (DK 31B31) “when Strife approaches the One, all the parts of god begin to tremble one after another”; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδροµέῃ κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυῖα κέκασται (DK 31B134.1) “for he is not fitted out with a human head throughout his parts.”

121 of like root parts anywhere in the One. Although the sun represents an accumulation of fire, Empedocles does not intend to show that the formation of the One has destroyed the created world and by consequence the sun.34 The emphasis lies in the arrangement of the

One as opposed to the effects of its creation.

Empedocles confirms this interpretation of an even and balanced compound when he calls the One a κόσµος.

αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι’ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα

γίνοντ(αι) ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα θηρῶν

ἄλλοτε µὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόµεν’ εἰς ἕνα κόσµον35,

ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορούµενα Νείκεος ἔχθει

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.33.21-24 = DK 31B26.3-6

These very things exist, and running through one another they become men and tribes of other creatures, beasts, at one time coming together into one cosmos by Love and at another each carried apart by the enmity of Strife…

The word κόσµος is a presocratic term for their new vision of the world, a structured system that displays order.36 The later sense of “created world” has coloured the interpretation of all presocratic passages and created the subsequent interpretation of linking “world” with the word’s primary sense of “order”.37 This interpretation does not fit with Empedocles’ use of the word; cosmology has been imposed on Empedocles’

34 Longrigg 1967 (4). 35 This phrase has also appeared in ensemble a of the Strasbourg papyrus which is a continuation of fragment 17. Although much of the fragment has been reconstructed, the readings are likely and κόσµον is clear. [ἀλλ᾽ ἐν µὲν Φιλότητι συνερχό]µεθ᾽ εἰς ἕνα κό̣σµον, | [ἐν δ᾽ Ἔχθρηι γε πάλιν διέφθ πλέ]ον᾽ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι. (Strasbourg Papyrus ensemble a(i)6 – a(i)7) “But under Love we unite together to form a single ordered whole, whereas under Strife, in turn it (i.e., τὸ ἕν) grew apart, to become Many out of One.” 36 See §1.2 in chapter 1. 37 See Finkelberg 1998 (especially 103-106) for a full discussion of the previous scholarship and some of the issues surrounding it.

122 vision of mixture. This passage repeats the message of fragment 17 insofar as it emphasizes the alternation from Many to One and then back to Many.38 Κόσµος cannot be a world in this context because Empedocles does not describe the creation of mortal creatures in this line, but the coming together of the One. The One would be the ultimate expression of order since it is a complete and perfect mixture of the four roots. Κόσµος, therefore, is a balanced and ordered arrangement of the roots that can occur only once in the cosmic cycle, at the time of the One. The roots are in complete agreement despite their contrary natures owing to the power of Love.

In sum, Empedocles refers to two types of gods: one immortal and the other mortal. Each is perfect, but in different ways. The immortal gods, that is, the roots, Love, and Strife, are immortal and unchanging. The mortal gods are long-lived, and therefore not immortal, but they are in perfect harmony with an even balance of the roots, that is, there is no discord in the mortal gods. Empedocles is one of these mortal gods.

Part 2: Becoming a god

In the rhetorical setting of fragment 112, Empedocles is before his friends (χαίρετ᾽), an exclusive group from the citizens of Acragas39, who have gathered to learn his lessons.40 He has returned, like the hero in an archetypal folktale, with a lesson that will

38 Wright 1981 (183), Finkelberg 1998 (111). 39 Although the audience is thus limited, it is probably only a rhetorical stance since Diogenes Laërtius (Lives of the Philosophers 8.63) tells us that Cleomenes recited the purifications at the Olympic Games. Trépanier 2004 (47) suggests that, as Empedocles’ friends, they must listen to him. Primavesi 2005 and 2008 argues that the god who speaks elsewhere in Empedocles’ verses is Apollo, but the easier reading, since it is addressed to friends in Acragas by someone who is no longer mortal, is that this is Empedocles. 40 Contra Zuntz 1971 (189) who argues that he does not write from Acragas but sends it to his friends from abroad. Trépanier 2004 (48) argues that the tone is too vivid for an open letter.

123 save them: any man who makes the effort to purify his daily life and means of thinking will be able to find the truth himself and become a god.

ὦ φίλοι, οἳ µέγα ἄστυ κατὰ ξανθοῦ Ἀκράγαντος

ναίετ’ ἀν’ ἄκρα πόλεος, ἀγαθῶν µελεδήµονες ἔργων,

ξείνων αἰδοῖοι λιµένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι,41

χαίρετ’· ἐγὼ δ’ ὑµῖν θεὸς ἄµβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός

πωλεῦµαι µετὰ πᾶσι τετιµένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα, 5

ταινίαις τε περίστεπτος στέφεσίν τε θαλείοις.

πᾶσι δ᾽ ἅµ᾽εὖτ᾽ ἂν42 ἵκωµαι ἄστεα τηλεθάοντα,

ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξί, σεβίζοµαι·

Diogenes Laërtius Lives of the Philosophers 8.6243 = DK 31B112.1-8

Friends, who inhabit the great city by the yellow Acragas in the high parts of the city, caring for good deeds, harbours that show kindness to strangers, unacquainted with evil, greetings! I, in your eyes a divine god, no longer mortal, go among all, honoured, just as I should, adorned with both ribbons and festive garlands. Whenever I arrive in thriving cities I am revered by all, men and women.

Everyone has the potential to become a god, as Empedocles claims for himself, because even he has not always been a god. His ascension to divinity is relatively recent since he describes himself as no longer mortal (οὐκέτι θνητός, line 4).44

41 Diodorus Siculus 13.83.2 supplies verse 3. Some scholars claim this line is “excessive”. Zuntz 1971 argues that Diogenes Laërtius would not have omitted the line if it were important, and he believes the fragment is “satisfactory and complete without it” (187); Trépanier 2004 (48) argues that it serves simply to inform a wider readership about Acragas, just as Hesiod tells Perses about their father and hometown in Works and Days. 42 Wright 1981 (266). 43 Verses 10-12 are also found in Clement Stromata 6.30. 44 Heracles is another individual who became immortal and was a benefactor to men upon his apotheosis. Kinglsey 1995a (252-8) discusses more fully the parallel between the reports of Empedocles’ death in fire and Heracles’ apotheosis on the pyre.

124 His adornment with ribbons and wreaths is reminiscent of a successful initiation into a mystery.45 Theon of Smyrna sets out all five steps; the fourth is the wearing of garlands.46 Once the revelation (the ἐποπτεία is the third step at Eleusis) is made to the initiate, the initiate has earned the right of wearing the garlands and thus is recognized as someone who can teach others about the mystery: τετάρτη δέ, ὅ δὴ καὶ τέλος τὴς

ἐποπτείας, ἀνάδεσις καὶ στεµµάτων ἐπίθεσις, ὥστε καὶ ἑτέροις, ἅς τις παρέλαβε τελετάς,

παραδοῦναι δύνασθαι, δᾳδουχίας τυχόντα ἢ ἱεροφαντίας ἤ τινος ἄλλης ἱερωσύνης·

(Theon of Smyrna de utilitate mathematicae 15.1-5 (ed. Hiller)) “The fourth step, which is also the end of the revelation, is the binding of the head and placement of garlands so that whoever has completed the rites can pass them on to others as well, whether through the torch bearing ceremony (δᾳδουχία), the interpretation of sacred things (ἱεροφαντία) or some other priestly work.” I will illustrate below in chapter 4 how Empedocles believes that the way to become a god, in his particular view, and thence to manipulate nature, is to imitate a mystery’s initiation. Empedocles’ authority to teach how to accomplish divine feats to his φίλοι, therefore, derives ultimately from his unique position of having gone through the process himself.

Empedocles’ description of his friends (ἀγαθῶν µελεδήµονες ἔργων, | ξείνων αἰδοῖοι

λιµένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι “caring for good deeds, harbours that show kindness to strangers, unacquainted with evil”) emphasizes their special status, especially that they are unacquainted with evil, because they are better prepared for the lessons he will impart than many others are. Others who hear these verses and fit this description should take

45 The blessed in Pindar’s depiction of the underworld also wear garlands (ὅρµοισι τῶν χέρας ἀναπˈλέκοντι καὶ στεφάνους | βουλαῖς ἐν ὀρθαῖσι Ῥαδαµάνθυος (Ol. 2.74-5) “they have entwined their hands with chains of these (flowers) and wreaths according to the upright judgments of Rhadamanthys.”). 46 These steps of initiation are discussed in part 2 of chapter 4.

125 comfort in knowing that salvation is possible for them as well.47 Each body, like

Empedocles, possesses a daimon, which is propelled unwillingly through a series of transmigrations, which last for the whole period of Strife. But it is also by participating in this cycle that becoming a god is possible. Once we recognize this divine potential within ourselves, we will be able to move with purpose through the cycle of transmigration.

2.1 TRANSMIGRATION

Transmigration begins when the One/god breaks up with the return of Strife. One consequence of the One’s dissolution is the creation of long-lived daimones, who go from life to life, from one compound to another.

ἔστιν Ἀνάγκης χρῆµα, θεῶν ψήφισµα παλαιόν,

ἀίδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισµένον ὅρκοις·

εὖτέ τις ἀµπλακίῃσι φόβῳ φίλα γυῖα µιήνῃ48,

†ὅς καὶ† ἐπίορκον ἁµαρτήσας ἐποµόσσῃ49,

δαίµονες οἵτε µακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο, 5

τρίς µιν µυρίας ὧρας ἀπὸ µακάρων ἀλάλησθαι,

φυοµένον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα θνητῶν

ἀργαλέας βιότοιο µεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.

47 Osborne 1987 (34-5) argues the opposite; that in conjunction with fragment 114, which emphasizes that the truth is hard to persuade people of, fragment 112 illustrates that the citizens of Acragas are not as good as they think, that they are, very much, ignorant of (true) evil (κακότητος ἄπειροι (line 3)). But this assumes that the good deeds they show care for include typical pious acts towards the gods such as sacrifice, which, according to Empedocles, is not pious at all (cf. fragments 136 and 137) – and there is no clear evidence to support this inclusion. 48 The text from the Plutarch MSS, the only source for this line, prints φόβῳ φίλα γυῖα µιν. Stephanus (1572) printed φόνῳ φίλα γυῖα µιήνῃ “[someone] should stain his dear limbs with bloodshed”, and most subsequent editors print this text. Panzerbieter 1844 (2*) proposed ἀµπλακίαισι φρενῶν (cf. Pindar Pythian 3.24) “in the errors of his φρήν” because of the two datives side by side. 49 Zuntz 1971 (194-6) argues that the line is spurious.

126 αἰθέριον µὲν γάρ σφε µένος πόντονδε διώκει,

πόντος δ’ ἐς χθονὸς οὖδας ἀπέπτυσε, γαῖα δ’ ἐς αὐγὰς 10

ἠελίου φαέθοντος, ὁ δ’ αἰθέρος ἔµβαλε δίναις·

ἄλλος δ’ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες.

τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰµι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης,

νείκεϊ µαινοµένῳ πίσυνος.

DK 31B11550

It is an affair51 of Necessity, an ancient decree of the gods, eternal, sealed with broad oaths that whenever someone, in his errors, should stain his dear limbs out of fear … [the text is corrupt] by misdeed swears falsely, [someone, that is,] the daimones52 who have won long-lasting life, he wanders for thrice ten thousand seasons away from the blessed ones, growing to be all sorts of forms of mortal things through time, interchanging the hard paths of life. For the strength of aither pursues him into the sea, and the sea spits [him] onto the surface of the earth and earth into the beams of the blazing sun, and it throws him into the eddies of the air; and one after another receives [him], but all hate [him]. I too am now one of these, an exile from the gods and a wanderer, trusting in mad strife.

Transmigration is an affair (χρῆµα) of Necessity. The gods have agreed by majority

(ψήφισµα) that someone (µιν – line 6) will wander for a long time53 apart from the gods

(µακάρων), going from body to body: from air to water to earth to fire and back to air.

Transmigration was a commonly known doctrine in the Acragas of Empedocles’ youth as

50 The lines that Hippolytus Refutatio 7.29.14 ff. preserves begin at the end of the fragment as it has been assembled: 13, 14, 4-12 (with commentary interspersed), 1-2. Plutarch On Exile 607c prints 1, 3, 5, 6, 13 as a continuous section. Other authors preserve only individual lines. 51 Most translators render χρῆµα as “oracle”, but Empedocles would be the only author to use it in this way. 52 Editors print δαίµονες instead of δαιµόνων, which would be a partitive genitive with τις, because the latter does not fit the line metrically. It is, therefore, construed as being in apposition to the τις. That all daimones undergo this transformation may also account for the plural. 53 Thirty thousand seasons (whether 30 000 years or 10 000 years since the year is broken into three ὥραι) is simply a length of time that seems impossible to imagine. The Byzantine scholia in an Aristotelian manuscript published by Rashed 2001 and Primavesi 2005 state that the cycle is of a specific length.

127 Pindar’s Olympian ode to Theron supports (Ol. 2.56-80), in which transmigration is the lot for those souls who were not sufficiently pure to attain a blessed place in the underworld.54 It is so fundamental to Empedocles’ system that the decree has been sealed by broad oaths. Breaking an oath is one of the most serious offences a Greek can commit, as Empedocles’ readers would recognize. Whether someone swears that a statement is true or guarantees a future action, oaths are a form of sympathetic magic as a binding spell; when an oath is not kept, a curse comes down upon the oath breaker.55 The oath, therefore, emphasizes the weight of transmigration.56

2.1.1 The daimones

The µιν who travels from body to body and from life to life is a daimon. These daimones are one group of the many things that Strife generates with the destruction of the One.57 Fragment 124 describes how the race of mortal things – and everything but the roots and Love and Strife is mortal – comes into being through acts of conflict: ὢ πόποι,

ὢ δειλὸν θνητῶν γένος, ὢ δυσάνολβον, | τοίων ἔκ τ’ ἐρίδων ἔκ τε στοναχῶν ἐγένεσθε.

54 Whether Empedocles’ doctrine of transmigration matches Pindar’s (or Theron’s) is impossible to ascertain; Demand 1975 argues that Theron’s beliefs (and by consequence, those of Acragas) were unique to this city and that these are the basis for Empedocles’ beliefs. 55 Faraone 1993. The oath sworn by the gods in Hesiod’s Theogony is the classic example: ὅς κεν τὴν ἐπίορκον ἀπολλείψας ἐποµόσσῃ | ἀθανάτων οἳ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύµπου, | κεῖται νήυτµος τετελεσµένον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν· (Hesiod Theogony 793-5) “If someone of the gods who hold the peaks of snowy Olympus should swear a false oath having poured a libation [of this portion of the Styx that flows from stone], he lies breathless for a full year” and faces exile from the other gods for another nine years afterwards. A recent collection of essays (Sommerstein and Fletcher 2007) studies the phenomenon of oaths in Greek society. 56 The oath (in fragment 115) does not refer to the sanctity of life, as van der Ben 1975 (128-9) argues. The oaths, moreover, that seal the exchange of domination between Love and Strife in the cosmological cycle (DK 31B30) and the cycle of transmigration are not the same oaths, they simply guarantee that these actions must occur as any promissory oath would. 57 The traditional use of the term daimon is to refer to a god; Primavesi 2008 (259) sets out how Homer, Hesiod, and Parmenides – all important models for Empedocles – use the word.

128 (Clement Stromata 3.14.2) “Oh woe! oh wretched, oh unhappy race of mortals – from such quarrels and groans you have come to be.” Strife is not named explicitly, but he encourages such behaviour in individuals, and Aristotle identifies him as an agent of creation: δόξειε δ’ ἂν οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ τοῦτο γεννᾶν ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐκ τούτου

τἆλλά ἐστι πλὴν ὁ θεός (Aristotle Metaphysics 1000a27) “but nevertheless he [Strife] seems to create (all things) outside of the One; for all other things except god proceed from him.” As I show below, Strife creates by dissolving the natural attraction of like to like.58 Strife, therefore, allows for the existence of individuals through a destructive act, and they now wander alone, apart from the perfect communion with the other roots in the

One: φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης (DK 31B115.13).59

Empedocles’ other use of daimon occurs in fragment 59.

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ µεῖζον ἐµίσγετο δαίµονι δαίµων,

ταῦτά τε συµπίπτεσκον, ὅπῃ συνέκυρσεν ἕκαστα,

ἄλλα τε πρὸς τοῖς πολλὰ διηνεκῆ ἐξεγένοντο.

Simplicius de caelo CIAG 7.587.30, 32-3 = DK 31B59

“But when daimon mingled more with daimon, and these things fell together where each met together, and many other things in addition to these were always coming into being.”

In the context of this quotation, Simplicius says these verses describe the second stage of zoogony when isolated limbs wander about and form bodies, seemingly at random. Who are the daimones at this stage? I believe they are the same individuals from fragment 115.

The isolated limbs have been created by Strife separating the perfect union of the roots

58 See §2.3.1 in chapter 5. 59 To say that Strife is the “mortal enemy” of the daimon exaggerates their relationship (Kahn 1974 (443)); rather, it is a “sorrow” to be separated from the perfection of the One, a necessary one (Inwood 2001 (62)).

129 found in the One. Although they do not yet resemble what we now see in the world, they are part of the evolution of living things. It follows, therefore, that if every living thing that Strife generates has a daimon, then the isolated limbs would have a daimon as well.

Once bodies are formed from isolated limbs, the next stage of zoogony is sexual reproduction and then each new created thing would also have an individual daimon.60

Strife is an integral component of the daimon; he maintains its status as an individual and it is his presence that is hated by the roots and forces the daimon from body to body.

Each daimon also has a blend of the four roots since that is required to perceive (γαίῃ µὲν

γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαµεν, ὕδατι δ’ ὕδωρ, | αἰθέρι δ’ αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀίδηλον, |

στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ. DK 31B109 “For we see earth by earth, water by water, shining air by air, but blazing fire by fire, love by love and strife by hateful strife”) and think (αἵµατος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραµµένη ἀντιθορόντος, | τῇ τε νόηµα

µάλιστα κικλήσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν· | αἷµα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόηµα. DK

31B105 “nurtured in seas of blood [according to fragment 98, blood is an equal blend of the roots] leaping back and forth, and there especially it is called thought for men, for men’s thought is the blood around the heart.”). Love is probably also in the daimon: ἥτις

καὶ θνητοῖσι νοµίζεται ἔµφυτος ἄρθροις (DK 31B17.22) “she [Love] is acknowledged even by mortals to be in-born in their limbs.”61

60 Wright 1981 (212) argues that the daimones here are the roots, but there is no problem in using the term daimon for the roots and the individual that transmigrates. They are both gods; the roots are eternal gods while the compound gods are not immortal. Primavesi 2008 (260) agrees that the only thing the daimones could be here are the individual roots that make up the isolated limbs because if the daimones are in the isolated limbs, then the first and second lines would repeat the same process. It is primarily owing to fragment 59 that Primavesi argues that the daimones and gods are only the roots during the time of the One (the Sphere, which he identifies as Apollo according to Ammonius who quotes fragment 134) and the time of the Many (he uses fragment 6 to illustrate their divine names at that time, and that time only). 61 Inwood 2001 (59-60). Others, for example, Kahn 1974 (443 ff.) and Curd 2005 (143), limit the composition to the four roots. The earlier theory propounded by Cornford 1930 (563-69) and accepted by O’Brien 1969 (325) that the daimon is a bundle of pure Love seems unlikely owing to the need for thinking

130 The daimon lives for a long time (µακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο (DK 31B115.5)), probably for the duration of the period of Strife. Fragment 15 chastises anyone with wits who would not believe that each person lived as an individual before this life and will live other lives after this one.

οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ µαντεύσαιτο,

ὡς ὄφρα µέν τε βιῶσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι,

τόφρα µὲν οὖν εἰσίν, καί σφιν πάρα δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά,

πρὶν δὲ πάγεν τε βροτοὶ καὶ <ἐπεὶ> λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ’ εἰσιν.

Plutarch Reply to Colotes 1113d = DK 31B15

A man wise in his thoughts would not divine such things: that so long as they live – what they call life – for that time they exist, and have good and evil things, but before they are formed as mortals and they are dissolved, they are nothing.

The daimon, therefore, is the part of each creature that transmigrates.62 A female, probably Necessity since it is by her χρῆµα that transmigration occurs, carries out the transmigration: ἀλλάσσει δὲ ἡ φύσις ἅπαντα καὶ µετοικίζει· σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι

περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι (Plutarch On the eating of flesh 998c =DK 31B126) “Nature changes and changes the dwelling for everything: cloaking [it] in a foreign garment of flesh.” The alien garment represents a way of life that is different from what the daimon knew before as part of the One.63 Every person, plant and animal contains a daimon: ἤδη

γάρ ποτ’ ἐγὼ γενόµην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε | θάµνος τ’ οἰωνός τε καὶ ἔξαλος †ἔµπορος†

(as fragment 134 supports), which therefore implies all four roots). Darcus 1977 (187-90) argues that the daimon, like the god/ φρήν is not composed of the roots or Love or Strife; this seems unlikely since Empedocles emphasizes there is nothing outside of these things (fragment 17.30-32). 62 Sources that discuss the daimon call it a ψύχη, soul, for example, Plutarch On the eating of flesh 998c, On Exile 607c-d; Porphyry in Stobaeus Eclogae 1.49.60. Owing to the baggage that accompanies the term “soul” (Kahn 1974 (436-7)), it is better simply to refer to the daimon as an individual. 63 Wright 1981 (277).

131 ἰχθύς. (Diogenes Laërtius Lives of the Philosophers 8.77 = DK 31B117) “For I have already become a boy and a girl and a bush and a bird and a [corrupt text] fish from the sea.” Empedocles also relates in verse 10 of fragment 110 that all things have thought and understanding: πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώµατος αἶσαν.

2.1.2 The Necessity of Transmigration

The daimon has no choice but to undergo transmigration. Empedocles describes himself as a wanderer and trusting in mad Strife (τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰµι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ

ἀλήτης, | νείκεϊ µαινοµένῳ πίσυνος. DK 31B115.13-14). Strife’s influence pervades everything. Transmigration begins whenever someone defiles his limbs out of fear (line

3)64 or swears a false oath. This does not describe a particular instance of sin by an individual daimon65, but what happens whenever Strife operates (εὖτε + subjunctive). Just as Strife is not named explicitly in fragment 124 as the agent in creating mortals (see above), but by the types of acts he inspires, here in fragment 115, too, lines 3 and 4 refer generally to the period of Strife’s influence. In other words, there is a χρῆµα of Necessity that the daimones will wander from body to body whenever Strife acts, a time that is recognized by the sorts of things he encourages in individuals (τις, δαίµονες).

When the daimon trusts in Strife, he unconsciously participates in the acts that Strife perpetuates. Plants and animals are incapable of avoiding these acts: plants because those

64 Or murder, see n. 48 above. 65 Contra Osborne 1987 (36-7), Laks 2005 (172-3), Garani 2007 (192-3). Zuntz 1971 (196-7, 240) and van der Ben 1975 (56-9) argue a similar but different interpretation: the Καθαρµοί is a myth of personal κατάβασις and the daimon’s eventual triumphant return to grace, owing to fragment 115 in combination with other fragments (fragments 117-121) that describe the terrifying experiences of an “I”. These interpretations seem to be unconsciously influenced by the Judeo-Christian belief in original sin.

132 compounds do not possess any organs of thought (a φρήν or πραπίδες)66 and animals because they, even less than men, cannot control their instincts born from Strife to spill blood. The lion, notably the best animal on the ladder of transmigration (ἐν θήρεσσι

λέοντες ὀρειλεχέες χαµαιεῦναι | γίγνονται (Aelian On Animals 12.7 = DK 31B127)

“Among beasts they become mountain-dwelling lions with lairs on the ground”), is, for example, a carnivore. Empedocles, however, has a message of hope for his audience, the cycle of trusting in Strife can be broken and the time of exile can come to an end. Men can avoid these urges, and the ultimate goal Empedocles has in these verses is to make his audience aware of their true nature as daimones, avoid the acts of Strife67, and thereby transcend the cycle of transmigration by making themselves less hated by the roots and becoming a god as he claims for himself.

2.2 ESCAPING THE CYCLE?

The daimon goes from life to life without any discernible pattern. The daimon of a boy who has died, for example, in fragment 137, finds itself in a sacrificial animal, about to be killed by the boy’s father. Those who do not understand the nature of transmigration are doomed to continue wandering until the present world is completely destroyed by the domination of Strife. It is possible, however, for people who are wise and pure to escape this cycle and become long-lived gods.

εἰς δὲ τέλος µάντεις τε καὶ ὑµνοπόλοι καὶ ἰητροί

καὶ πρόµοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται,

ἔνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιµῇσι φέριστοι.

66 Although it is hard to imagine what a plant could do that would associate it with the acts of Strife. 67 Curd 2005 (141) also suggests that this is the purpose of Καθαρµοί.

133 Clement Stromata 4.150 = DK 31B146

And finally they become prophets and singers and doctors and leaders among men who dwell on earth; thence they sprout up as gods, first in their prerogatives.

Empedocles has already become a god, having proven his purity and wisdom by fulfilling each of these roles successfully: he is a prophet since people approach him seeking divinations (οἱ µὲν µαντοσυνέων κεχρηµενοί – B112.10); as a poet he is a singer; he cures all sorts of diseases according to his claims in fragment 111; and his popularity among the people of various cities in fragment 112 illustrates his leadership. It is not sufficient, however, simply to be a doctor, prophet, singer or leader and from there to become a god in the daimon’s next incarnation, you must understand how transmigration works and prepare yourself to be as pure and wise as possible. Each of these roles require purity and wisdom; according to tradition you must be pure since all these individuals are dear to the gods, and you must be wise in order to fulfill these roles successfully.

2.2.1 Being Pure

The gold tablets found in Timpone Piccolo (series A1-3 in Zuntz 1971), for example, support the interpretation that living a pure life is a necessary precondition of moving on to the next level because they emphasize the purity of the initiate’s soul (ἔρχοµαι ἐκ

καθαρῶν καθαρά (line 1) “I (the soul) come pure from pure (souls)”) and its readiness to move to the next level since it is already one of the gods (γένος εὔχοµαι ὄλβιον εἶναι (line

3) “I boast to be the blessed race”). Empedocles shared some of these directions with the

Pythagoreans who follow a series of rules called the akousmata – heard things68, notably

68 Burkert 1972 (166-92).

134 the prohibitions against killing animals and eating them, stripping trees, eating beans, and sexual intercourse (Hippolytus Refutatio 7.29.22).

The way to become pure is to avoid the acts of Strife. Empedocles’ verses emphasize one way above all the others: avoid bloodshed. In fragment 128, he describes it as the

“greatest abomination”.

ταύρων δ’ ἀκρήτοισι φόνοις οὐ δεύετο βωµός,

ἀλλὰ µύσος τοῦτ’ ἔσκεν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι µέγιστον,

θυµὸν ἀπορραίσαντας ἐ<ν>έδµεναι ἠέα γυῖα.

DK 31B128.8-10

[Aphrodite’s] altar is not wetted with the unmixed blood of bulls, but this was the greatest abomination among men, having ripped out their life-breath and eat their goodly limbs.

Killing animals is the greatest sin that mankind commits because each individual – plant, animal, and man – contains a daimon.69 It is also for this reason that Empedocles insists that laurels not be stripped: δάφνης φύλλων ἄπο πάµπαν ἔχεσθαι (DK 31B140) “keep away altogether from the leaves of the laurel”; and beans be avoided: δειλοί, πάνδειλοι,

κυάµων ἄπο χεῖρας ἔχεσθαι (DK 31B141) “Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands from beans.”70 This act perpetuates the cycle of acts that Strife encourages. If man can refrain from killing and eating animals, he separates himself from Strife, and this makes him more pure.

69 Compare fragment 136, 137, and 139. 70 The laurel is the highest plant just as the lion is the highest animal (fragment 127) and prophets, singers, doctors, and leaders are highest among men (fragment 146). Beans, according to the Pythagoreans, must be avoided because they are like genitals, or the gates of Hades, or destructive, or like the nature of the universe, or are oligarchical (Diogenes Laërtius Lives of the Philosophers 8.34)

135 2.2.2 Being Wise

Part of becoming a god and escaping the cycle of transmigration is learning to master the universe. The roots, Love, and Strife all have their timai, their powers. For the mortal gods, the powers gained include curing disease, raising the dead, and affecting the environment (fragment 111). Before one can master one's environment, one must understand how it functions; the long-lived gods must learn to manipulate the roots, since they are the building blocks of everything in the world, just as Love and Strife do.

Knowledge of the universe leads to control over it; these two lessons work in tandem.71

Hippocrates criticized Empedocles for believing that one can practice medicine, one of the functions a person must master on the way to becoming a god, only by understanding how the universe works and consequently what man is and how he came to be.

λέγουσι δέ τινες ἰητροὶ καὶ σοφισταί, ὡς οὐκ εἴη δυνατὸν ἰητρικὴν

εἰδέναι ὅστις µὴ οἶδεν ὅ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δεῖ

καταµαθεῖν τὸν µέλλοντα ὀρθῶς θεραπεύσειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

τείνει δὲ αὐτοῖς ὁ λόγος ἐς φιλοσοφίην, καθάπερ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς ἢ

ἄλλοι, οἳ περὶ φύσιος γεγράφασιν, <φασίν>, ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ τί ἐστιν

ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον καὶ ὁπόθεν συνεπάγη· ἐγὼ δὲ

τοῦτο µέν, ὅσα τινὶ εἴρηται ἢ σοφιστῇ ἢ ἰητρῷ ἢ γέγραπται περὶ

φύσιος, ἧσσον νοµίζω τῇ ἰητρικῇ τέχνῃ προσήκειν ἢ τῇ γραφικῇ.

νοµίζω δὲ περὶ φύσιος γνῶναί τι σαφὲς οὐδαµόθεν ἄλλοθεν εἶναι ἢ

ἐξ ἰητρικῆς.

71 Mauss 1950 [2001] (176-78). Nestle 1906 (548) and Kingsley 1995a (229) link Empedocles specifically to this belief. See chapter 5 below.

136 Hippocrates On Ancient Medicine 20.1 = DK 31A71

Some doctors and sophists say that whoever does not know what man is is not able to understand the medical art, but that the man who intends to treat men correctly must understand this (i.e., what man is). Their argument extends into philosophy just as Empedocles or the others who have written about nature and discuss from the beginning what man is and how he first came to be and from what he was put together. But I believe that as many things as have been said by a sophist or a doctor or written by a doctor about nature is less fitting for medicine than for painting. Moreover I believe that one learns nothing clear concerning nature from any other source than from medicine.

In order to treat man, one must understand the nature of man – his origins and his development; by analogy, control over the universe comes from knowing the essence of the universe – where it came from and how it got this way. When the student of the universe has synthesized this knowledge, he will have power over the universe and can affect it at his will. Empedocles uses cosmology as a tool: through describing the universe in his verses he brings to the readers the information they need to manipulate it.72 Cosmology is not the end, but the means to achieve the end. Empedocles’ own claims to success serve as evidence of his own power and knowledge. If one wants to become a god, one must learn how the universe functions.

Learning the correct things and then keeping one’s thought focused on them leads to understanding even more about nature and the universe because these thoughts build upon one another.73 It is through learning that man becomes self-aware. Empedocles does not simply explain how to control the universe. The readers will acquire these abilities from their own synthesis of the material. Knowledge can be attained through careful

72 Kingsley 1995a (218). 73 See §2.2 in chapter 4 below.

137 attention of the senses in conjunction with application of the mind. Empedocles recognizes the necessity of reading his poem carefully and exhorts the readers to learn the ultimate message on their own (fragment 110). The discovery requires two steps – first the readers must interpret successfully Empedocles’ use of language, literary structure and rhetorical devices to determine how the universe truly functions and then they must internalize the lesson to gain the ability to manipulate their environment. With further reflection comes deeper understanding and eventually true knowledge. In other words, careful study of the poem might lead the readers to acquire the awareness needed to manipulate their environment.

God is the wisest and purest thing of all since it is only thought (ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ

ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο µοῦνον, | φροντίσι κόσµον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θοῇσιν. (Ammonius de interpretatione 249.1 = DK 31B134.4-5) “but it/he is only a sacred and ineffable thought organ darting through the entire cosmos with swift thoughts”) with no Strife to pollute it, as the paradigm (the One) shows; Strife is outside the One. In order for a daimon, therefore, to move up the ladder, he must live a pure life and he must be wise so that Strife is no longer part of him. Empedocles emphasizes the necessity of wisdom when he criticizes people who are ignorant – whether of their personal nature (DK

31B137) or of the universe (DK 31B11) – for being νήπιοι (fools), and the former by calling δειλοί (wretched) those who do not live purely (B141, for failing to avoid beans in one’s diet). Empedocles reserves praise for those who do understand their nature as daimones (DK 31B15) or how nature operates (DK 31B132) as wise (σοφός) or blessed

(ὄλβιος).

138 Plutarch preserves a fragment that describes such a harmonious arrangement. Editors attribute this description to the Sphere, but it may instead provide the link between the

One/sphere/god and Empedocles’ vision of the long-lived god in the form of a man.74

ὁ µὲν γὰρ εἰς ἀρετὴν διὰ φιλοσοφίας τελευτῶν σύµφωνον ἑαυτῷ

καὶ ἄµεµπτον ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ µεστὸν εἰρήνης καὶ φιλοφροσύνης

τῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀεὶ παρέχεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον

οὐ στάσις οὐδέ τε δῆρις ἀναίσιµος ἐν µελέεσσιν.

Plutarch Moralia 777d = DK 31B27a

For he, who, through philosophy, finally attains virtue always makes a man who is in tune with himself, unblamed by himself and full of peace and loving thoughts towards himself: there is no discord nor unseemly war in his limbs.

Although Plutarch does not associate Empedocles by name with this fragment, it bears many resemblances with his vocabulary, for example ἐν µελέεσσιν of fragment DK

31B30 and δῆρις of fragment DK 31B122 in contrast with ἁρµονίη. If an individual can observe how the universe works and attempt to live a pure life by following the precepts, he will be successful in keeping strife from his person because he will imitate the actions of Love, and thus come to resemble more closely the divinity of the One.

The paradigm for this is Pythagoras. He was so wise that he was wiser than anyone before or after him.

ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς,

ὃς δὴ µήκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,

παντοίων τε µάλιστα σοφῶν <τ’> ἐπιήρανος ἔργων·

ὁππότε γὰρ πάσῃσιν ὀρέξαιτο πραπίδεσσιν,

74 Wright 1981 (255-6).

139 ῥεῖ’ ὅ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον

καί τε δέκ’ ἀνθρώπων καί τ’ εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν.

Porphyry Life of Pythagoras 30 = DK 31B129

There was among them a man of exceptional knowledge, who indeed obtained the greatest wealth in his thinking organs, master of all kinds of particularly wise deeds; for whenever he reached out with all his thinking organs he easily saw each of all the things which are in ten or twenty human lifetimes.

Pythagoras’ name was a byword for the concept of transmigration with a number of anecdotes attached to him. For example, Xenophanes (fragment 7) relates how he once stopped someone beating a puppy because he claimed to recognize his friend’s voice.

Pythagoras was also connected to a series of prescriptions for living purely – the akousmata – which helped prepare the soul for its journey after death.75

The connections between Pythagoras and Empedocles and Empedocles’ emphasis on gaining knowledge and living purely confirm how Empedocles was able to become a god; and Empedocles shares this knowledge, but not explicitly with his audience since it is too volatile for hoi polloi.

75 See §2.2.1 above.

140 Chapter 4 – Empedocles’ Mystery

Empedocles presents himself not as a scientist or as a magician, but as a god. The divinity that he attributes to himself is not the divinity of the Homeric gods, but the divinity that comes from pure living and true knowledge; with this, Empedocles can raise the dead, cure disease, and affect the environment (fragment 111). He claims, moreover, that Pausanias, and any other reader of his verses, will learn how to do these things as well by reading the poem and following Empedocles’ path rather than clinging to the traditional ways. The readers, therefore, can realize the potential of their daimones and become gods such as he is and, as a result, manipulate the universe as he can. But such skills are too dangerous for just anyone; Empedocles cannot state simply how to control the weather and raise the dead. He makes a conscious choice, therefore, to write ambiguously, not because he has nothing to say as Aristotle argues, but in the tradition of oracles and mystery religions. The gods never give the unvarnished truth to mortals who must figure out the gods’ message to show they are worthy to receive it. Empedocles subscribes to the raison d’être of the tradition of ambiguity and tells the readers explicitly that they should not expect a complete account or a clear one. He does not, however, leave his audience without a solution. He passes along the techniques for interpretation that the reader must exploit to arrive at the same point he has.

Part 1: Ambiguity

As chapter 1 discusses, Aristotle complained that Empedocles wrote ambiguously.

141 τρίτον µὴ ἀµφιβόλοις· ταῦτα δέ, ἂν µὴ τἀναντία προαιρῆται, ὅπερ

ποιοῦσιν ὅταν µηθὲν µὲν ἔχωσι λέγειν, προσποιῶνται δέ τι λέγειν.

οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἐν ποιήσει λέγουσιν ταῦτα οἷον Ἐµπεδοκλῆς.

φενακίζει γὰρ τὸ κύκλῳ πολὺ ὄν, καὶ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκροαταὶ ὅπερ

οἱ πολλοὶ παρὰ τοῖς µάντεσιν. ὅταν γὰρ λέγωσιν ἀµφίβολα,

συµπαρανεύουσιν ‘Κροῖσος Ἅλυν διαβὰς µεγάλην ἀρχὴν

καταλύσει’.

Aristotle Rhetoric 1407a31-7 = DK 31A25c

The third [way to use proper Greek] is not to use ambiguous statements. Unless, of course, one prefers the opposite course [i.e., ambiguity] – which is what they do when they are able to say nothing but pretend they can say something. For such men say these things [i.e., their nothings] in poetry, like Empedocles. For the long, round- about expression deceives the audience, and they (the audience) experience what most people experience at the hands of prophets. For whenever they (the prophets) speak ambiguities, they (the audience) nod assent, approving, e.g., “When Croesus will cross the Halys, he will destroy a great empire.”

For Aristotle, ambiguity in communication is negative because in his period people have used ambiguity deliberately in order to deceive, especially in law courts, the political arena, and business. He is suspicious, therefore, that people who do not speak or write clearly do not truly understand what they themselves mean. This is unacceptable for people who study the nature of the world around them since the entire purpose of that endeavour, Aristotle believes, is to gain knowledge and understand; if one cannot explain clearly, perhaps one does not, in fact, understand. Ambiguity, however, is not always treated with suspicion.

142 1.1 A TRADITION OF AMBIGUITY

Aristotle’s choice to compare Empedocles with the oracle at Delphi reveals one reason why ambiguity may have positive uses. When people traveled to Delphi, or any other oracular site, it was generally to ask the gods about the future; mortals are not meant, however, to know such things. The gods’ answers, therefore, are couched in ambiguous language. Another source of ambiguity occurs when the message is intended only for a select audience. The ultimate revelation of the mysteries, for example, is disclosed in allegory and also requires interpretation.

πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπονοούµενον φοβερώτερον, καὶ ἄλλος εἰκάζει ἄλλο

τι· ὃ δὲ σαφὲς καὶ φανερόν, καταφρονεῖσθαι εἰκός, ὥσπερ τοὺς

ἀποδεδυµένους. διὸ καὶ τὰ µυστήρια ἐν ἀλληγορίαις λέγεται πρὸς

ἔκπληξιν καὶ φρίκην, ὥσπερ ἐν σκότῳ καὶ νυκτί. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ

ἀλληγορία τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῇ νυκτί. φυλάττεσθαι µέντοι κἀπὶ ταύτης

τὸ συνεχές, ὡς µὴ αἴνιγµα ὁ λόγος ἡµῖν γένηται…

Demetrius On Style 100-102

What is implied always strikes more terror, and one person likens it to one thing and another to another, whereas what is clear and plain is apt to be despised, like men who are stripped of their clothes. This is why mysteries are revealed in allegories, to inspire the shuddering and awe associated with darkness and night. In fact allegory is not unlike darkness and night. Here again in the case of allegory we should avoid a succession of them, or our words become a riddle.1

If the gods reveal their knowledge promptly, it will no longer have special status and, as

Demetrius phrases it, is apt to be despised (καταφρονεῖσθαι εἰκός). The revelation is

1 This text and translation comes from the Loeb edition (Doreen C. Innes, 1995).

143 concealed, therefore, in allegory, which is an appropriate mode of communication for gods since the meaning is not readily apparent.

To interpret ambiguous utterances successfully, one must determine the underlying meaning rather than rely on the words themselves. The message is not concealed so completely, however, that it cannot be resolved. In the cases of the oracles and the revelation of the mysteries, it is uncertain whether the members of the audience will make the correct analysis, especially since each reader approaches the text with varying assumptions and knowledge. While such a situation was untenable for Aristotle, his contemporaries were clearly less incensed over the matter since allegory – both interpretation and composition – continued to be popular for the Stoics and later the

Neoplatonists.2 The primary goal behind this tradition was to conceal the underlying message from those who were not part of the interpretive community.

1.1.1 Oracles and Ambiguous Language

Aristotle links the ambiguity Empedocles practices to the ambiguity of Delphic oracle:

φενακίζει γὰρ τὸ κύκλῳ πολὺ ὄν, καὶ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκροαταὶ ὅπερ

οἱ πολλοὶ παρὰ τοῖς µάντεσιν. ὅταν γὰρ λέγωσιν ἀµφίβολα,

συµπαρανεύουσιν ‘Κροῖσος Ἅλυν διαβὰς µεγάλην ἀρχὴν

καταλύσει’.

Aristotle Rhetoric 1407a33

For the long, round-about expression deceives the audience, and they (the audience) experience what most people experience at the hands of prophets. For whenever they

2 Struck 2004 outlines the history of allegorical interpretation and the symbol in poetry.

144 (the prophets) speak ambiguities, they (the audience) nod assent, approving, e.g., ‘When Croesus will cross the Halys, he will destroy a great empire.’

Aristotle, however, fails to see the connection in the use of ambiguity between

Empedocles and the oracle since Aristotle believes that clarity is always the best course.

Oracles, whether from Apollo at Delphi or Ammon at Siwa, are deliberately ambiguous.

The gods, by their nature, have more knowledge than mortals and it is appropriate that men must interpret the god’s oracle since it provides information about the future, which is special knowledge and not intended for men. Priests at Delphi transcribe Apollo’s response through the Pythia, if it is not yes or no, into verses of dactylic hexameter that require further interpretation. Ambiguous language plays a vital role in fashioning the oracle. Herodotus (Histories 1.53ff.) discusses in detail the example to which Aristotle refers in Rhetoric 1407a33. Croesus believed that he would destroy the empire of the

Persians when he crossed the Halys, but in fact he destroyed his own. If the ambiguity were removed, that is, if the empire to be destroyed had been identified by name, the statement would no longer be ambiguous and the meaning would be transparent to all who heard it. Oracles, therefore, omit details that must be filled in by the recipient, just as

Aristotle complains about poor science writing with metaphor.3

Clear knowledge of the future is the prerogative of the gods. The oracle is not, however, without solution. Heraclitus refers to the riddling mode in which Apollo delivers his oracles: ὁ ἄναξ, οὗ τὸ µαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει

ἀλλὰ σηµαίνει (Plutarch de Pythiae oraculis 404d = DK 22B93) “The lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither declares nor conceals, but makes a sign.” It is not Apollo’s intent to state outright the answer to the seeker nor to conceal it on purpose, but to point the

3 See §2.3.1 in chapter 1.

145 questioner in the proper direction. It is for the questioner to devise his own interpretation and determine how best to take the god’s response.4 The individual must prove he is worthy and capable of receiving knowledge that should not be revealed to everyone. The recipient achieves this through interpreting the ambiguous statement; and, if this is done correctly, he will have access to special information (although, in the case of the oracle, it cannot be proven until the event has passed).

1.1.2 Allegory and Mystery Religion

The other tradition of ambiguity lies in the application of allegory. As an extended metaphor, allegory requires interpretation because the author intends that the story represent something other than what it says. Ancient authors used allegory to conceal information intentionally, in part to prevent information from coming to the wrong audience and in part to confirm the identity of the community through shared (and special) knowledge. Each allegory, therefore, could have a minimum of two interpretations – a literal one based solely on the level of the story and a hidden one that is designed for the reader who has special knowledge. The latter is intended for only a small audience who will understand the message. The reader of the allegory, therefore, must decipher the author’s meaning just as the recipient of an oracle must determine the sense of the god’s message. It may be ambiguous but it is explicable in its context, whether poetic or social, to a specific audience. The readers’ special knowledge may come from shared references with the author owing to birth (ἀγαθοί) or from belonging

4 See, for example, the anthropological analysis of divination within the Yoruba religion and culture in W. Bascom Ifa Divination: Communication Between Gods and Men in West Africa (Indiana 1969).

146 to the same community (φίλοι) and therefore with access to an interpreter. Alternatively, the readers may determine the message through their own wisdom (σοφοί).5

This practice is prevalent in the texts of archaic authors. It is an old tradition in Greek literature to use the αἶνος as a lesson that required analysis on the part of the reader.6

These tales were written to pass a message only to those who have the background knowledge to decipher them. Hesiod, for example, introduces his fable of the hawk and the nightingale with the words: νῦν δ᾽αἶνον βασιλεῦσιν ἐρέω φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς

(Works and Days 202) “now I will tell a tale for the kings, aware as they are.” Hesiod targets his audience, the kings, and indicates that if they have the tools they will be able to interpret the message.7 For other readers, they can become αἰνίγµατα, riddles, unless the readers are wise or have help from another source. Theognis, for example, uses the image of the ship of state (667-80) to complain that the ἀγαθοί (nobility) are doing little to prevent political disaster. The αἶνος of the ship of state is a tale that must be interpreted: ταῦτά µοι ᾐνίχθω κεκρυµµένα τοῖσ’ ἀγαθοῖσιν· | γινώσκοι δ’ ἄν τις καὶ

κακόν8, ἂν σοφὸς ᾖ. (Theognis 681-682) “Let these things be riddled by me, hidden for the nobility: but anyone might recognize the actual calamity, if he is wise.” The answer is not given explicitly, but the author claims to provide enough information for the reader to solve the αἶνος on his own or with the aid of an interpreter.

5 Nagy 1990 (148). 6 Nagy has explored the use of the αἶνος in archaic literature (Nagy 1979 (chapter 1), Nagy 1990 (chapter 6)). 7 Hesiod emphasizes that the kings, along with poets, are blessed with the Muses’ gift of communication (Hesiod Theogony 80 ff.). 8 If Brunck’s emendation of κακός is accepted, the translation would be: “but even a base man can recognize (the meaning of my words) if he is clever.” This emphasizes the failing of the ἀγαθοί.

147 The Derveni papyrus provides more evidence for the use of allegory in the αἶνος tradition and illustrates how one reader approaches a text when an underlying meaning is assumed. Although many scholars disparage the quality of the commentary and malign the commentator’s tools, it allows us to examine the approach of a fifth or fourth century commentator.9 The goal of the author was to preserve one’s faith through allegorical interpretation of myth as well as ritual: he presents himself as a priest (col. V) who interprets dreams (col. V), ritual (col. VI and XX), and myth (col. VII). He also believes that this Orphic cosmogony is riddling on purpose, not simply to confuse the reader, but to conceal the truth from those who do not have the determination and drive to discover what lies beneath the literal meaning of the words.

. . ὕ]µνον̣ [ὑγ]ι̣ῆ καὶ θεµ[ι]τ̣ὰ λέγο[ντα· ἱερολογεῖ]τ̣ο γὰρ

τ]ῆ̣ι ποιήσει, καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐχ οἷον τ᾽[ἦν τὴν τῶν ὀ]νοµάτων

θέ]σιγ καὶ τ[ὰ] ῤῥηθέντα. ἔστι δέ ξ[ένη τις ἡ] πόησις

καὶ ἀνθρώ[ποις] αἰνι̣[γµ]ατώδης. [ὁ δ]ὲ̣ [Ὀρφεὺ]ς̣ αὐτο̣[ὶς

ἄ]πιστ᾽ αἰν[ίγµα]τα οὐ̣κ ἤ̣θελε λέγειν, [ἐν αἰν]ίγµασ̣[ι]ν δὲ

µε]γάλα ἱερ[ολογ]ε̣ῖ̣ται µὲν οὖγ καὶ ἀ̣[πὸ το]ῦ πρώτου

ἀεὶ] µέχρι <τ>οῦ̣ [τελε]υτ̣α̣ί̣ου ῥήµατος, ὡ̣[ς δηλοῖ] καὶ ἐν τῶι

εὐθ]ρυλήτω[ι ἔπει. θ]ύ̣ρ̣ας γὰρ ἐπιθέσ[θαι κελ]εύσας τοὶ̣ς

ὠσὶ]ν αὐτ[οὺς οὔ τι νοµο]θ̣ε̣τ̣εῖµ φη[σι τοῖς] πολλοῖς,

ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν τοὺς τὴ]ν ἀκοὴν [ἀγνεύ]οντας, κατ̣[ὰ

9 Modern scholars argue that the commentator’s interpretations are generally poor and contrary to the grammar and meaning of the text: Merkelbach 1967; West 1983 (79); Henry 1986. As for the commentator, there are affinities to Anaxagoras (Burkert 1970) and to Diogenes (Janko 1997), but the author does not subscribe completely to either, but blends the two approaches (Laks 1997). Janko 2001 (6-15) identifies the author as Diagoras of Melos and proposes this treatise may be ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι. Other suggestions for authorship include Epigenes (Kapsomenos 1964), Euthryphro (Kahn 1997), and Stesimbrotus of Thasos (Burkert 1986).

148 P. Derv. Column VII.

(I shall also prove that Orpheus composed a)10 hymn relating sound and permissible things. For he was allegorizing with his poetry, and he was not able to state the application of his words and what was meant. The poem is a strange one and riddling for men. But Orpheus did not want to relate unbelievable11 riddles, but great things in riddles. Indeed he tells a sacred tale12 from the first word right up to the last, as he makes clear in the well-known13 verse. For when he has ordered them to shut doors on their ears, he denies that he makes laws for the majority, but he teaches the pure with respect to their hearing…

The Derveni author emphasizes that the people with access to the texts, that is, the priests, often do not understand the hidden meaning behind the words or the ritual.14 The

Derveni author has preserved his own faith because he interprets religion allegorically just as he claims Heraclitus and Orpheus do.15 Within this column is a statement that was previously connected with the Orphics: θύρας γὰρ ἐπιθέσθαι κελεύσας τοῖς ὠσὶν “having ordered them to put doors to their ears.” This statement, alluded to by Plato, refers to the custom that those who are not part of the group, that is, who are not φίλοι, must exclude

10 Janko 2001 (21n.95) restores the missing sense thus. See also Janko 2002 (15). 11 Janko 2001 (21n.100, cf. Janko 2002 (14)) prints ἄ]πιστ᾽ (unbelievable), changing the ρ of the papyrus to π because he argues the treatise emphasizes the tenet that the gods should be believable. He also suggests the reading ὕβ]ριστ᾽ (outrageous) which maintains the ρ. Tsantsanoglou 1997 (95) prints ἐ]ριστ᾽ (contentious). 12 See Tsantsanoglou 1997 (122-123). Tsantsanoglou claims “[w]e see that the connotation of obscurity and unclarity is added to the basic sense of ‘speech on holy matters’.” (p. 123). 13 Janko 2001 (21n.102) prints εὐθ]ρυλήτω[ι because he argues that the phrase was already commonly associated with the Orphics. See also Janko 2002 (14). Tsantsanoglou 1997 (95, 124) prints εὐκ]ρινήτω[ι, arguing that the author uses the phrase since he deliberately does not quote a passage. 14 τα]ῦτα τὰ ἔπη ὑπερβατὰ ἐό[ν]τ̣α λανθ̣ά̣[νει. (PDerv. VIII.6) “That these verses are transposed has not been noticed”, οἱ δὲ οὐ γινώσκον[τες | τὰ λεγό[µεν]α δοκοῦσι̣… (PDerv. IX.2-3) “Those who do not comprehend what is meant suppose...”, compare PDerv. XVIII.14, XXVI.8; τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος πα̣̣[ρα]γωγὸµ πεπόηται, καὶ το[ῖς] µὲ̣ ν | πολλ̣οὶς ἄδηλόν ἐστι, τοῖς δὲ ὀρθῶς γινώσκοθσιν | εὔδηλον ὅτι… (PDerv. XXIII.1-3) “This verse has been composed in a misleading way, and is unclear to most people, but to those who know correctly it is clear that...” 15 Heraclitus is called an allegorist in column IV.

149 themselves because secret things (ἀπόρρητα) are about to be revealed.16 According to the author, this phrase should alert the reader that the myth conceals secret things meant solely for those in the group.17 The Derveni author believes that if the readers interpret the theogony correctly, they will maintain their faith and relieve their concerns about death.18

The commentator, therefore, views himself as an interpreter for his fellow φίλοι since he interprets dreams, rituals, and myth, just like the wise men and women Plato describes in

Meno 81a: Οἱ µὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσοις µεµέληκε περὶ ὧν

µεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἵοις τ’ εἶναι διδόναι “the speakers were the priests and priestesses who find it important to be able to explain what they practice.”

A variety of other texts attributed to Orpheus are attested to have been in circulation by the fourth century B.C.19 and illustrate further the observations of the Derveni papyrus.

…τὸν Κρατῆρα δὲ τὸν Ὀρφέως Ζωπύρου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου τήν τε

Εἰς Ἅιδου κατάβασιν Προδίκου τοῦ Σαµίου. Ἴων δὲ ὁ Χῖος ἐν τοῖς

Τριαγµοῖς καὶ Πυθαγόραν εἰς Ὀρφέα ἀνενεγκεῖν τινα ἱστορεῖ.

Ἐπιγένης δὲ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τῆς εἰς Ὀρφέα ποιήσεως Κέρκωπος εἶναι

16 πάντες γὰρ κεκοινωνήκατε τῆς φιλοσόφου µανίας τε καὶ βακχείας—διὸ πάντες ἀκούσεσθε· συγγνώσεσθε γὰρ τοῖς τε τότε πραχθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς νῦν λεγοµένοις. οἱ δὲ οἰκέται, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐστὶν βέβηλός τε καὶ ἄγροικος, πύλας πάνυ µεγάλας τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐπίθεσθε. (Plato Symposium 218b) “For all of you have shared in the philosophical madness and frenzy, wherefore everyone will listen. For you will recognize the things done then and the things said now. But the servants, and if there is anyone else uninitiated and rustic, shut very large doors over your ears.” 17 Tsantsanoglou 1997 (124-26). 18 Since this soldier had the papyrus burned with him, he was convinced of it, too. See Most 1997 (131-35) for a proposal as to how the Derveni author believed his interpretation would alleviate fears of death. 19 Ion was active in the 5th century B.C. in Athens and wrote in a wide variety of genres - tragedy, dithyrambic poetry, elegies, hymns and more, in addition to prose works (West 1985). The identity and date of Epigenes is uncertain. In the Hellenistic period, some, e.g., Callimachus (fr. 449), believed that he wrote the Triagmoi attributed to Ion of Chios, but West 1983 (9n.15) argues that Περὶ τῆς εἰς Ὀρφέα ποιήσεως is not a monograph per se, but a commentary on Ion’s Triagmoi and any statements will be an amplification of Ion. Linforth 1941 (114ff.) linked this Epigenes to the companion of Socrates who was present at his death, but Jacoby (FGrHist IIIb Komm (noten) 131n.108) disagrees. Certainly he can be dated to a pre-Hellenistic period.

150 λέγει τοῦ Πυθαγορείου τὴν Εἰς Ἅιδου κατάβασιν καὶ τὸν Ἱερὸν

λόγον, τὸν δὲ Πέπλον καὶ τὰ Φυσικὰ Βροντίνου.

Clement Stromata 1.21.131.3-5

[They say] the Krater of Orpheus is by Zopyrus20 of Heraclea and the Descent to Hades is by Prodikos of Samos. Ion the Chian, in the Triads, says that having written some things in verse, he (Pythagoras) attributed them to Orpheus. Epigenes, in his Concerning the Poetry of Orpheus, says that the Descent to Hades and the Hieros Logos are by Cercops the Pythagorean and the Robe and Physics are by Brontinos.21

Although bare titles are the primary remains, they are evocative of allegorical composition, especially Krater, Net, and Robe, all of which Clement assigned to Zopyrus of Heraclea (Kern OF 179). The literal level of the Orphic poem could be consumed by the largely ignorant public; but for those in the know, or for those who could get interpretative aid from someone else, there was another level to the myth. Krater suggests a cosmic principle where things like and unlike are mixed together since a krater is a mixing bowl for wine and water.22 Aristotle was familiar with Net: the creation of an animal was likened to the weaving of a net, different strands knit together to form a whole.23 As for Robe, Epigenes interpreted various expressions of weaving used by

Orpheus as referring to agriculture. The embroidery on the robe, therefore, may represent the annual process of growth, harvest and subsequent decay24: οὐχὶ καὶ Ἐπιγένης ἐν τῷ

20 See §2.1 in chapter 1 for Zopyrus’ role as a mechanical engineer. 21 See Bernabé 2004 for a collection of testimonia and fragments of these Orphic texts. 22 Plato’s demiurge mixed souls in a krater (Timaeus 35, 41d). Compare Plato Phaedo 111e6-112b1 where the rivers come together in a large crater and are mixed. 23 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς καλουµένοις Ὀρφέως ἔπεσιν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁµοίως φησὶ γίγνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον τῇ τοῦ δικτύου πλοκῇ (Aristotle de generatione animalium 734a16f.) “Just as in the so-called verses of Orpheus: for there he says the animal is born like the weaving of a net.” Cf. Plato Timaeus 78b ff. where the spaces between the ropes of a net is a parallel for the soul in the body. 24 In the later Rhapsodies, Persephone is weaving a flowery robe when Hades abducts her (Kern OF 192).

151 περὶ τῆς Ὀρφέως ποιήσεως τὰ ἰδιάζοντα παρ’ Ὀρφεῖ ἐκτιθέµενός φησι «κερκίσι

καµπυλόχρωσι» τοῖς ἀρότροις µηνύεσθαι, «στήµοσι» δὲ τοῖς αὔλαξι· «µίτον» δὲ τὸ

σπέρµα ἀλληγορεῖσθαι, καὶ «δάκρυα Διὸς» τὸν ὄµβρον δηλοῦν (Clement Stromata

5.8.49.3) “Does not even Epigenes make clear in his Concerning the Poetry of Orpheus, setting out the peculiarities in Orpheus, that by “crooked rods of the loom” he means ploughs, by “warp (in loom)” furrows, “thread (of the warp)” is an allegory for seed, and

“the tears of Zeus” is rain?”

The custom of justifying their ritual practices on the basis of books linked to Orpheus was a distinguishing feature of certain priests in the mystery religions. For example, in

Euripides’ Hippolytus when Theseus attacks his son, Hippolytus, he links his pious lifestyle to books and the mysteries of Orpheus.25 Plato also refers to wandering priests

(ἀγύρται) who claim to base the purification rites they perform on books written by

Musaios and Orpheus.26 Since later Orphic literature focused on the figure and death of

Persephone, it is likely that these texts served as sacred narratives for initiates, especially in the West where Pythagoreans were priests and priestesses in Persephone’s mysteries.27

They share not only Orpheus as an authority, but also a similar theme: the nature, origins, and fate of man, the gods, and the universe. It may seem unusual that these stories which

25 ἤδη νυν αὔχει καὶ δι’ ἀψύχου βορᾶς | σίτοις καπήλευ’ Ὀρφέα τ’ ἄνακτ’ ἔχων | βάκχευε πολλῶν γραµµάτων τιµῶν καπνούς· (Euripides Hippolytus 952-954) “Boast now then and peddle your trade in meatless meals and be a bacchant with Orpheus as a lord and honouring the smoke of many writings.” Graf 1974 connects the persona of Orpheus to the Eleusinian mysteries as a ‘founder of rites.’ 26 See §1.3.1 in chapter 2. βίβλων δὲ ὅµαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐκγόνων, ὥς φασι, καθ’ ἃς θυηπολοῦσιν, πείθοντες οὐ µόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρµοὶ ἀδικηµάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσι µὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡµᾶς… (Plato Republic 364e-365a) “And they produce a hubbub of books of Musaios and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and the Muses, as they say, according to which they perform rites, persuading not only private citizens but also cities that there are remissions of and purification for sins through sacrifice and games of pleasure not only for the living but also for the dead which they call rites which release us from the evils of the other world…” 27 Burkert 1982 (17-18).

152 were clearly mythic (as understood from the scanty evidence) should be used in rites, but the use of myth in ritual is attested in Near Eastern practice: for example, the priest- dentist (“The Worm and the Toothache” in Akkadian literature28) would first recite a cosmogony explaining where toothaches come from (the gods granted the food stuck between a person’s teeth to the worm) and then perform the rite to cure the toothache in question. While the Akkadian priest-dentist focused on the physical condition of the patient as the text reflects, the mysteries concentrate on giving the initiates a better afterlife based on information from the gods.

If the titles of these stories, therefore, can be any indication, the message is delivered through a story that explains the nature of man, the gods, and the universe. Sacred narratives, therefore, lend themselves naturally to allegorical composition with multiple layers of meaning. The text is designed primarily for initiates, but owing to the prohibition against speaking of the mysteries openly29, they must be disguised in allegory.

This keeps the uninitiated from the lessons contained in the stories.

1.2 EMPEDOCLES’ AMBIGUITY

Not only is there a tradition of ambiguity for Empedocles to draw upon, but in fragment 3, he also alerts his readers that he writes ambiguously, although not in so many words; he is ambiguous about his ambiguity. He asks the gods to be his partner as he reveals the lessons in order to preserve the distinction between mortal and divine knowledge. Empedocles also approaches a Muse to aid his composition, to pass on the

28 R. Campbell Thompson published a reproduction of the tablet in Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets, &c., in the British Museum 17 (1903), pl. 50. Heidel publishes a translation in Babylonian Genesis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 72-73. 29 See note 71 below.

153 Muses’ skills in using language because he realizes that ordinary mortals should not know everything.30 The readers should understand from the beginning, therefore, that not everything they would like to know will be addressed. Rather, they should re-examine the world around them, applying their senses as designed, but not relying on them exclusively. If they hear one thing, for example, since they now expect that the account will be neither full nor clear, they should apply as much as possible from other sources in order to arrive at the truth. Empedocles boasts of what Aristotle blames him for.31

1.2.1 Not a Tell-All

Empedocles criticizes those who boast that they understand how the whole universe works when they really only know a part of the whole (fragment 2).32 As he continues, it is not their fault that they do not know everything since mortals by their very nature simply cannot know all. Only gods (like Empedocles and Pythagoras (fragment 129)) can know everything.33 But as Empedocles says to Pausanias, since he has come to

Empedocles for enlightenment, he will have the opportunity to go further than what mortal wisdom has acquired (σὺ δ’ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ’ ἐλιάσθης, | πεύσεαι· οὐ πλεῖόν γε

βροτείη µῆτις ὄρωρεν. (DK 31B2.8-9) “But you will learn, since you have stopped.

Mortal wisdom has not gone further at least.”).34

30 I discuss Hesiod’s Muses (Theogony 26-28) who know how to lie and tell the truth in §1.2.2 below. 31 Mansfield 1995 discusses the intentional ambiguity of Empedocles’ verses, but limits his investigation to fragment 6 in the proem. 32 See §2.2.1 in chapter 1. 33 See §2.2.2 in chapter 3. 34 Trépanier 2004 (54-55).

154 Continuing with fragment 3, Empedocles alerts his readers that they are not to expect a full and complete account, and there is little reason to look for clarity, either. When

Empedocles first addresses the immortal gods in fragment 3, he asks for help in revealing the truth to his audience.

ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν µὲν µανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,

ἐκ δ’ ὁσίων στοµάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγήν

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.125 = DK31B3.1-2

But gods turn their madness from my tongue and pour forth a pure stream from holy mouths.

Considering Empedocles’ context, the gods to whom he prays are the immortal gods, that is, the four roots to whom he assigns the names of Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis in fragment 6.35 He asks that they keep someone’s madness from his tongue and pour forth a pure source from his holy mouth. The chiastic juxtaposition of these images – γλώσσης, |

ἐκ δ’ ὁσίων στοµάτων , specifically the tongue and mouth – illustrates that the madness is one of speech. Kahn 1974 (n. 10) identifies this madness as saying more than is lawful for mortals to hear, looking forward in the fragment to the next lines.36 I believe, with

Bollack 1969 (3.26), that Empedocles refers primarily to the madness of those who boast in fragment 2 that they understand how the world works. Sextus Empiricus says that

Empedocles directs these verses as a criticism against those who claim to know more

(τοῖς πλέον ἐπαγγελλοµένοις γιγνώσκειν). These are the same people that Empedocles denigrates in fragment 2, thus reinforcing Sextus Empiricus’ claim that the verses

35 Bollack 1969 (3.26). 36 Wright 1981 (157) follows this interpretation as well. Trépanier 2004 (58) argues that the madness that Empedocles wants to avoid arises from the sin of ritual sacrifice.

155 identified as fragment 3 follow those of fragment 2; the τῶν refers back to them. They say that they know more than anyone else, when in fact they do not. Empedocles, by contrast, asks the gods, about whom he talks, to ensure that what he says – although he will only say as much as is right – is true.

Empedocles’ opponents do not understand how the world really works because 1) men are limited by imperfect sensory perception and a short lifespan, and 2) they fail to recognize these limits. Fragment 39 confirms this interpretation as it echoes the sentiment.

εἴπερ ἀπείρονα γῆς τε βάθη καὶ δαψιλὸς αἰθήρ,

ὡς διὰ πολλῶν δὴ γλώσσας ἐλθόντα µαταίως

ἐκκέχυται στοµάτων ὀλίγον τοῦ παντὸς ἰδόντων

Aristotle de caelo 294a26-28 = DK 31B39

if indeed the depths of earth and abundant aither are unbounded, as is poured out in vain from mouths, coming from the tongues of many, who have seen little of the whole.

Those men who argue that the earth and air are without limit speak in vain because they have seen little of the universe, and further research would prove their claims incorrect.37

Their mistakes lie in what they say. Relating false doxa in this case, however, is aggravated by boasting that they have seen the whole (τὸ δ’ ὅλον <πᾶς> εὔχεται εὑρεῖν –

DK 31B2.6) and are therefore reliable sources. Pindar in Olympian 9 equates such boasting out of turn with madness (τὸ καυχᾶσθαι παρὰ καιρὸν | µανίαισιν ὑποκρέκει – lines 38-39) when he outlines Heracles’ various feats of defeating the gods but prevents himself from elaborating further because to speak ill (λοιδορῆσαι – line 37) of the gods,

37 See §2.2.2 in chapter 1.

156 in this case that a mortal was able to overpower them, is a hateful skill (ἐχθρὰ σοφία – line 38), hateful to the gods.38 As one expects with Pindar, he does not explicitly state what he means by this; the sentiment, however, is reminiscent of the conversation between Solon and Croesus (Herodotus 1.30-32) about fortune. According to Solon, no man should be considered fortunate unless he remains so up to the moment of death;

Croesus, boasting of his good fortune too early, ended up losing it all.39 It is madness, therefore, to boast out of turn about things that are not certain, such as mortal wisdom about how the world works.

Empedocles contrasts their madness with the pure source from his holy mouth. He is not asking the gods to tell him what to say because he does not know the truth himself, as

Homer, for example, does when he seeks help with lists.40 Rather, Empedocles presents himself as a divine teacher (ἀλλὰ τορῶς ταῦτ’ ἴσθι, θεοῦ πάρα µῦθον ἀκούσας (DK

31B23.11) “But know these things plainly, having heard them from a god”), one who already knows the lessons and can teach others.41 Empedocles, therefore, approaches the gods as a partner to show his readers that the information is correct and to ensure that he provides information that preserves the distinction between divine and human knowledge. The purity of Empedocles’ knowledge emphasizes its credibility, in addition to his own divine status (ὁσίων στοµάτων).

38 Bollack 1969 (3:27). 39 Compare also Aeschylus Agamemnon 928-9. 40 Before Homer begins the so-called catalogue of ships (Iliad 2.484 ff.), he calls for the Muses’ aid; “I could not recount nor name the number, not even if I had ten tongues and ten mouths, an unbreakable voice and a heart of bronze, if the Olympian Muses, the daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus, did not remind me how many came under Ilion.” (πληθὺν δ’ οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ µυθήσοµαι οὐδ’ ὀνοµήνω, | οὐδ’ εἴ µοι δέκα µὲν γλῶσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόµατ’ εἶεν, | φωνὴ δ’ ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεον δέ µοι ἦτορ ἐνείη, | εἰ µὴ Ὀλυµπιάδες Μοῦσαι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο | θυγατέρες µνησαίαθ’ ὅσοι ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον Iliad 2.488-492). Compare also Homer Iliad 2.761- 2, 11.218-20, 14.508-10, 16.112-13. 41 Compare the successful initiate Theon portrays (see the beginning of part 2 in chapter 3).

157

1.2.2 A Desire to Obscure

After Empedocles addresses the gods, he turns to a muse, Calliopeia, if she is the same Muse we find in fragment 131.42

καὶ σέ, πολυµνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,

ἄντοµαι, ὧν θέµις ἐστὶν ἐφηµερίοισιν ἀκούειν,

πέµπε παρ’ Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ’ εὐήνιον ἅρµα.

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.125 = DK31B3.3-5

And I beseech you, much-remembering white-armed maiden Muse, send what is right for mortal creatures to hear, driving your well-reined chariot from (the halls of) Piety.

Empedocles asks the Muse to come herself to him, driving her chariot43 from the halls of

Piety44 and bringing information that is θέµις , divinely ordained, for mortals to hear.

Since her chariot is well-reined (εὐήνιον), she will restrict her revelation.45 Not only should the readers, mortals (ἐφηµέριοι) who should not know everything, not expect an explicit report of how to control the world, but the reference to the Muses also alerts the audience to the skillful use of language that they impart to their favourites as comparison with Hesiod shows.46

When Empedocles asks the Muse to come with information, he does not ask that she tell him the story, although the epithet πολυµνήστη, “much-remembering”, reminds the

42 See below. 43 Wright 1981 (156) provides a succinct survey of scholarship regarding possession of the chariot. 44 This will suggest to his readers that Empedocles wishes to be reverent to the gods he beseeches in line 1. 45 Kahn 1974 (431). 46 See the discussion of the αἶνος in §1.1.2 above.

158 reader that the Muse is the ideal source for information.47 He already knows because he is a god, in opposition to his mortal audience. Contrast with fragment 131 reveals what

Empedocles seeks.48 In this fragment, Empedocles asks Calliopeia to stand by him, just as he asks in fragment 3 that she come in her chariot.

εἰ γὰρ ἐφηµερίων ἕνεκέν τινος, ἄµβροτε Μοῦσα,

ἡµετέρας µελέτας <ἅδε τοι> διὰ φροντίδος ἐλθεῖν,

εὐχοµένῳ νῦν αὖτε παρίστασο, Καλλιόπεια,

ἀµφὶ θεῶν µακάρων ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἐµφαίνοντι.

Hippolytus Refutatio 7.31.4 = DK 31B131

For if, immortal Muse, for the sake of any mortal, it has pleased you that our concerns come to your thought, stand now, Calliopeia, by me praying again as I reveal a good discourse about the blessed gods.

Empedocles, here, does not pray to Calliopeia asking for information. Although

Empedocles seems to include himself with the ἐφηµέριοι with the possessive adjective

ἡµετέρας, he in fact contrasts the ἐφηµερίων, that is, if even mortal concerns draw your attention, then please stand by me, a fellow god, as I relate this tale.49 He emphasizes this gulf between himself and mortals in fragment 113: ἀλλὰ τί τοῖσδ’ ἐπίκειµ’ ὡσεὶ µέγα

χρῆµά τι πράσσων, | εἰ θνητῶν περίειµι πολυφθερέων ἀνθρώπων; “Why do I press these things as if I were doing some great thing, if I surpass mortal men who are destroyed many times?”

47 Bollack 1969 (3:28-29). 48 Trépanier 2004 (57-59) emphasizes the parallels with Bacchylides V 176-8 (λευκώλενε, Καλλιόπα, and ἅρµα) as a connection between fragments 3 and 131. Wright (and Inwood) places fragment 131 after line 5 of fragment 3 because she begins a new fragment with line 6 of fragment 3. I do not believe this is necessary since Empedocles could conceivably repeat the same sentiment elsewhere. 49 Empedocles uses ἡµέτερος for men in general in fragment 133 as well (Wright 1981 (159)).

159 Rather than asking for information, he states plainly that he intends to reveal

(ἐµφαίνω) a λόγος about the gods.50 He already knows what this λόγος is, and that it is a good one as well. He wants her to impart the same skills to him through inspiration as the

Muses grant to Hesiod on Mount Helicon.51 When the Muses give Hesiod the scepter of laurel to represent their authority and a divine voice to compose and perform songs for men, they remind him of the vast gulf that lies between men and gods with respect to knowledge.

“ποιµένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,

ἴδµεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύµοισιν ὁµοῖα,

ἴδµεν δ’ εὖτ’ ἐθέλωµεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.”

Hesiod Theogony 26-28

“Boorish shepherds, base reproaches, mere bellies, we know how to tell many lies just like real things and we know how, when we want, to utter truth.”

The Muses can sing two types of song: one is false and the other true. The true songs

(ἀληθέα) are thoroughly true, emphasizing that the Muses exist outside time and human experience and can “recount perfect knowledge perfectly scrupulously.”52 The false songs

(ψεύδεα), on the other hand, which can include lies, omissions (inadvertent or purposeful), and exaggerations53, are impossible to differentiate from those that are

50 I argue above in chapter 3 (§1.1) that these gods are the roots, Love, and Strife. 51 Poets frequently request inspiration since poetic ability was a gift granted (or denied) by the gods. Various divinities (Zeus, Muses, Apollo) are credited with giving the gift to Demodocus (Homer Odyssey 8.44-5, 62-6, 479-81, 488, 496-8), minstrels in general (Odyssey 17.518-20), and the son of Terpes (Odyssey 22.347-8). Thamyris learned that the Muses can take away the gift when he boasted that he could out-sing them according to Iliad 2.591-600. 52 Wheeler 2002 (34-5). 53 Levet 1976 (201-14).

160 authentic. The Muses do not comment on the truth of their words54; they emphasize their superior oratorical skills. They can weave together songs such that men cannot distinguish what is false from what is true. Other examples of the phrase, ψεύδεα

ἐτύµοισιν ὁµοῖα, illustrate this. When Odysseus, for example, posing as Aethon of Crete, tells Penelope how he knows Odysseus, ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύµοισιν ὁµοῖα

(Odyssey 19.203) “Telling many lies, he made them like real things (ἐτύµοισιν).” It is the plausibility of Odysseus’ tale that counts; since the beggar’s description of Odysseus matches what Penelope knows as real and unchangeable, the remainder of the tale is plausible to the best of her knowledge.55 Odysseus’ knowledge allows him to spin a tale indistinguishable from reality. The Muses’ false songs, therefore, also seem credible.

Empedocles, like the Muses, possesses divine knowledge that sets him apart from mortals, and he wants the Muse of fragment 3, therefore, to stand by him and share her superior oratorical skill with him, not so that he can lie but to obscure his message in such a way that the readers for whom this message is intended can still learn, just as the Muses do in Hesiod. He recognizes that the path to learning these lessons through his text will be difficult.

ὦ φίλοι56, οἶδα µὲν οὕνεκ’ ἀληθείη πάρα µύθοις,

οὓς ἐγὼ ἐξερέω· µάλα δ’ ἀργαλέη γε τέτυκται

ἀνδράσι καὶ δύσζηλος ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὁρµή.

54 The Muses do not promise to tell Hesiod the truth, and Hesiod cannot guarantee the truth of what he says. Clay 2003 (60 ff.) discusses the importance of this ambiguity on the part of the Muses to emphasize the distinction between mortal and divine. 55 Clay 2003 (62). 56 Because of the use of a plural addressee, some editors place this fragment in Καθαρµοί. For the purpose of discussing ambiguity, however, the placement of these verses is not important since I believe that everything Empedocles wrote shares this ambiguous style.

161 Clement Stromata 5.1.9.1 = DK 31B114

Oh friends, I know that truth is present for the words that I will speak. But the onslaught of persuasion against the mind happens to be very difficult and exceedingly jealous for men.

Empedocles must persuade the readers because everyone, perhaps even those who understand that they must set aside their preconceived notions of how the world works, is already convinced that they know how the world operates. Persuasion will also be more challenging for Empedocles here because he cannot reveal the truth plainly.

One way to conceal his message is through allegory. Hesiod displays this skill in the

Works and Days in the αἶνος he relates to the kings as outlined above.57 Notably Hesiod also speaks to those who received the same ability from the Muses; the Muses pour sweet dew (γλυκερὴν ἐέρσην (Theogony 83)) onto their favourites’ tongues – both poets and kings, although the kings have used it inappropriately for personal gain58, and Hesiod expects that owing to this ability they will not be confused but be able to interpret correctly the message that is intended for them (νῦν δ᾽αἶνον βασιλεῦσιν ἐρέω φρονέουσι

καὶ αὐτοῖς (line 202) “now I will tell a tale for the kings who themselves understand”).

Empedocles plans to use this technique for his readers as well; the targeted community will understand the intent of his verses while the average reader will not. I will show below how Empedocles, by asking the Muse to come to him, seeks the skills that will allow him to write ambiguously and permit him to reveal what is right for his audience.

57 See §1.1.2 in this chapter. 58 ἄλλα τε πολλὰ | ἁρπάζων ἐφόρεις µέγα κυδαίνων βασιλῆας | δωροφάγους, οἳ τήνδε δίκην ἐθέλουσι δικάσσαι (Works and Days 37-39) “but you [Perses], snatching up the greater portion [of our inheritance], carry it off, greatly flattering gift-eating kings who wish to judge such a case.” When the kings and poets apply their proficiency with words in a positive way, kings give straight judgments and end disputes (Theogony 84-93), while poets and lyre players can dissolve a man’s cares, making him joyful again (Theogony 96-103); they distract men from their troubles (Clay 2003 (69-70)).

162

1.3 EMPEDOCLES’ SECRET

Empedocles has told Pausanias in fragment 111 that Pausanias will learn how to control the universe just as Empedocles can because he is a god. Such lessons, however, should not be given explicitly or clearly owing to the potential abuse of power. By seeking the Muse’s help in the first part of fragment 3, Empedocles consciously wrote in an ambiguous way – just as they do according to Hesiod – to ensure that only the right audience got the accurate message, provided that they interpret Empedocles’ verses correctly. The gods and a Muse will be his partners to guarantee that he does not tell the whole truth, revealing only what is right for mortals to hear, and to grant him the skillful use of language that will enable him to conceal his message from those who are unworthy to learn and convey it to those who are worthy.

As fragment 3 continues, Empedocles repeats the idea that the truth is not for ordinary mortals.

µηδέ σέ γ’ εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιµῆς

πρὸς θνητῶν ἀνελέσθαι, ἐφ’ ᾧ θ’ ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν

θάρσεϊ, καὶ τάδε τοι59 σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θοάζειν.

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.125 = DK31B3.6-8

Do not let the blossoms60 of fair-seeming honour compel61 you to take (them) from mortals on the condition that you both say more than is holy out of rashness and that you dispatch these things upon the peaks of wisdom.

59 Diels-Kranz, Bollack 1969 (2:11), Wright 1981 (95), and Inwood 2001 (216) print τότε δὴ. I choose the reading from Proclus’ text (On Timaeus 106e20) τάδε τοι. The verb θοάζειν is most commonly used as a transitive verb meaning “to dispatch”. Empedocles is the primary entry in LSJ for θοάζω “to sit.” This reading preserves more closely the interpretation Proclus provides for this passage. He contrasts Plato’s comment in Timaeus 29d that men cannot explain the gods accurately with Heraclitus, Empedocles, and the Stoics. Empedocles is bold, on the other hand, and, according to Proclus, “claims that he announces truth itself” (αὐτὴν ἐπαγγέλλεται παραδώσειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν).

163 Empedocles exhorts the addressed not to be enticed into telling more than is holy to those who offer prizes of honour, nor to dispatch these things (those that are more than holy) upon the peaks of wisdom. The addressed, therefore, possesses the truth, that is, more than what is right for mortals to know, and is cautioned against revealing it to those who do not have it. The only way that mortals can bridge the gap between human and divine knowledge is by personally taking the journey that Empedocles has set out. Men want to control their environment, as the vigorous business enjoyed by magicians in the ancient world illustrates62; and Empedocles warns against those who would like to acquire his lessons without going through the learning process.

Who is urged not to accept the blossoms of fair-seeming honour in return for telling more than is holy and sending it forth upon the peaks of wisdom? One candidate, if the fragment is a continuous section of text, should be the Muse since she is the most recent

“you” addressed.63 There are a few arguments, however, against this interpretation. First, it should not be necessary to remind a god about maintaining the gap between mortal and divine knowledge, considering how the Muses’ characters are portrayed, especially in

Hesiod. Fair-seeming (εὐδόξοιο) honour should not tempt the Muse, since she already

60 The verb βιάοµαι is never used impersonally, so either there is a lacuna in the text that contains the subject, as Wright 1981 (161) argues, or the subject is ἄνθεα (DK). I believe the latter is the correct interpretation since the flowers here represent the enticement of fame, which Empedocles points out only seems fair (εὐδόξοιο), in contrast perhaps with the true fame that comes from the wreaths one receives with a successful initiation (see note 10 above in this chapter). 61 The use of µή + future indicative for the subjunctive in prohibitions has Homeric precedence in Iliad 20.301 and Odyssey 24.544. See Shipp 1972 (144). 62 See chapter 2. 63 Trépanier 2004 (57-65, 70) argues that these lines are addressed to the Muse, but his reading of these lines varies greatly from my own since he reconstructs and interprets the entire proem around Empedocles’ exile in fragment 115 (50, 58).

164 has the genuine article.64 Proclus, moreover, uses line 8 to illustrate the shortcomings of human wisdom.65 Finally, the tone seems to change from asking for the Muse’s aid

(ἄντοµαι), even as a partner in the enterprise, to a command, an attitude that seems inappropriate, even for a fellow god.

The only other “you” to whom Empedocles could be speaking is Pausanias; Diogenes

Laërtius says the verses on nature were addressed to him: ἦν δ’ ὁ Παυσανίας ... ᾧ δὴ καὶ

τὰ Περὶ φύσεως προσπεφώνηκεν οὕτως· Παυσανίη, σὺ δὲ κλῦθι, δαΐφρονος Ἀγχίτεω υἱέ

(Diogenes Laërtius Lives of the Philosophers 8.60 = DK 31Β1) “It was Pausanias to whom he addressed “On Nature” in this way: Pausanias, son of wise Anchites, listen.”

Throughout his verses, if the “you”, whether indicated with a verb or pronoun, varies from Pausanias (or the general reader whom Empedocles addresses), Empedocles uses a vocative in the same line, or very close, to identify the addressed. 66 As it happens, the only other singular “you” is the Muse/Calliopeia: καὶ σέ, πολυµνήστη λευκώλενε

παρθένε Μοῦσα, | ἄντοµαι, ὧν θέµις ἐστὶν ἐφηµερίοισιν ἀκούειν, | πέµπε (DK 31B3.3-5)

“And I beseech you, much-remembering white-armed maiden Muse, send what is right for mortal creatures to hear”; and εἰ γὰρ ἐφηµερίων ἕνεκέν τινος, ἄµβροτε Μοῦσα, |

ἡµετέρας µελέτας <ἅδε τοι> διὰ φροντίδος ἐλθεῖν, | εὐχοµένῳ νῦν αὖτε παρίστασο,

Καλλιόπεια, | ἀµφὶ θεῶν µακάρων ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἐµφαίνοντι. (DK 31B131) “For if, immortal Muse, for the sake of any mortal, it has pleased you that our concerns come to

64 Clement uses these lines to distinguish opinion from genuine fame and truth: ἴσως δὲ καὶ τὸ διττὸν ἐκεῖνο εἶδος τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου, τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔνδοξόν τε καὶ ἐπιστηµονικὸν καλούµενον, οὐκ ἀπήλλακται <τοῦ> διαιρεῖν δόξαν ἀπό τε εὐκλείας καὶ ἀληθείας. (Stromata 5.9.59.2) “And perhaps even the two-fold group, which is called in their writings ‘resting on opinion’ and ‘scientific’, of those from the Peripatetic school are not far from dividing opinion from fame and truth: ” 65 See note 59 above. 66 See n. 82 in chapter 1 for the other uses of “you” that refer to Pausanias.

165 your thought, stand now by me praying again as I reveal a good discourse about the blessed gods.” To accommodate this, various scholars argue that there is a lacuna in the text.67 I do not believe the lines should be split up, however, because the verses work as a cohesive whole together with fragment 2.

If there is no gap in the text, how does Empedocles designate this change of subject?

The use of the particles (µηδέ σέ γ’ line 6) may signify a change in addressed. Denniston

1954 notes that δέ γε68 connects what will follow to an earlier statement, that is, it introduces a successive point (154). In fragment 2, Empedocles complains that most people do not understand how the world really works, although they believe they do.

Man’s senses are limited (fragment 2.1: στεινωποὶ µὲν γὰρ παλάµαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται

“For narrow devices are poured throughout the limbs”), a situation aggravated by an excess of information to be taken in through the senses (fragment 2.2: πολλὰ δὲ δείλ’

ἔµπαια, τά τ’ ἀµβλύνουσι µέριµνας “and many wretched things, which make our concerns dull, burst in”). And individual’s life span is, moreover, too short to experience everything (fragment 2.3-4: παῦρον δ’ ἐν ζωῆισι βίου µέρος ἀθρήσαντες | ὠκύµοροι

καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν “They, having looked at a small portion of life in their lifetime, fly off in the manner of smoke when they die early”) Pausanias, who has stopped, will learn the truth, therefore going beyond human understanding (fragment 2.8-

9: σὺ δ’ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ’ ἐλιάσθης, | πεύσεαι οὐ πλέον ἠὲ βροτείη µῆτις ὄρωρεν “But you, since you have stepped aside, will learn. Mortal cunning, at least, has gone no further.”).69

67 Wright and Inwood begin a new fragment (#5 and #14 respectively) at line 6. Karsten postulated a lacuna after εἰπεῖν and prints θάρσει and θοάσσεις. 68 An author will use δὲ … γε if required by metre (Denniston 152); the negative can be οὐδέ or µηδέ, as here (Denniston 156). 69 See §2.2.1 in chapter 1.

166 After verse 8 in fragment 3, Empedocles urges the addressed to trust in the senses, but only as far as each is designed, and in concert with one another.

ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ ἄθρει πάσῃ παλάµῃ, πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον,

µήτε τιν’ ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ’ ἀκουήν

ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώµατα γλώσσης,

µήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσηι πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι,

γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ’ ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον.

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.125 = DK 31B3.9-13

Come, consider by means of every device, in the way each is clear, not holding any vision with more faith than something from hearing, nor echoing hearing over the clarities of the tongue, do not curb trusting in any of the other limbs, wherever there is a path to understanding, but consider each thing in the way it is clear.

If my interpretation is correct, therefore, Empedocles returns full circle to the role of the senses in understanding the world, even repeating παλάµη from line 1 of fragment 2.

They are limited (fragment 2), but they do give correct information within those limitations. But when Pausanias has learned by re-evaluating what he perceives70 he cannot share this information with regular mortals (fragment 3.6-8). Plutarch confirms this sentiment: καὶ τὸν ὁµώνυµον ἐµοὶ τῷ Παυσανίᾳ Πυθαγορικῶς παραινεῖν τὰ δόγµατα

‘στεγάσαι φρενὸς ἔλλοπος εἴσω’ (Table Talk 728e) “And (he [Tyndares] said) that he who shared my name [i.e., Empedocles] recommended to Pausanias in a Pythagorean way to ‘conceal’ his teachings ‘within a mute thought organ.’” Pausanias must preserve the distinction between divine and mortal knowledge and keep this information secret because he is, essentially, an initiate in the mysteries that Empedocles offers. Mystery

70 See §2.3.1 below in this chapter.

167 religions, such as the Eleusinian rites, were well known for the secrecy surrounding their initiation.71 The secrecy attached to the rite and the revelation served a number of related purposes. First, it treated the divinity with the sort of respect it deserved: ἥ τε κρύψις ἡ

µυστικὴ τῶν ἱερῶν σεµνοποιεῖ τὸ θεῖον, µιµουµένη τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ φεύγουσαν ἡµῶν

τὴν αἴσθησιν (Strabo Geography 10.3.9) “The mystery’s secrecy about the rites increases the reverence for the divine because it imitates the nature of the divine that flees from our perception of it.” It is not in the nature of men to understand the gods; secrecy, therefore, duplicates the unknowable nature of the divine. There are, however, some things known to gods that man can come to learn as well if they are properly trained and prepared.

Secrecy, therefore, also emphasizes the distinction between initiates and those who are not part of the community, just as Empedocles hopes to differentiate here between those who follow his precepts to the truth and those who do not.

The first five lines of fragment 3, therefore, disrupt the flow of Empedocles’ argument; the δέ … γε returns to his primary point of these verses – that he will show

Pausanias the way to the truth, but Pausanias must conceal it from others.72 Empedocles uses this same construction in fragment 110 without an interruption between his two points. In those verses, Empedocles’ first point (lines 1-5) is that concentration on his

71 This effort at secrecy was successful since we still do not fully understand what happened in the practice of the mysteries. The artistic sources are more forthcoming; see Clinton 1992. See Simmel 1906 for the classic study on the sociology of secrecy. That which Demeter revealed to the leaders of Eleusis, for example, was not to be spoken of or violated: ἡ δὲ κιοῦσα θεµιστοπόλοις βασιλεῦσι | δ[εῖξε,] … δρησµοσύνην θ’ ἱερῶν καὶ ἐπέφραδεν ὄργια πᾶσι, … σεµνά, τά τ’ οὔ πως ἔστι παρεξ[ίµ]εν [οὔτε πυθέσθαι,] | οὔτ’ ἀχέειν· µέγα γάρ τι θεῶν σέβας ἰσχάνει αὐδήν. (Homeric Hymn to Demeter 473-479) “Going to the kings who grant justice, (Demeter) showed the service of her rites and she taught the mysteries to all, holy ones which are not able in any way to be violated nor inquired about nor spoken of – for a great reverence for the gods holds back the voice.” 72 Denniston provides Plato Charmides 159d as an example. In his discussion of temperance (σωφροσύνη) with Charmides, Socrates discusses a list of τέχναι that are also καλὸς; when he returns to temperance, he says: ἡ δέ γε σωφροσύνη καλόν τι ἦν; (Plato Charmides 159d). Compare also Gorgias 497a, 498e, 506e, Euthydemus 301d, 302e, Meno 96c, Lysis 215b.

168 lessons will lead ultimately to the truth. But, for his second point (lines 6-10), if the reader fails to concentrate (εἰ δὲ σύ γ’ ἀλλοίων ἐπορέξεαι… (line 6) “but if you reach out for other things”), then no lesson will stay.

Part 2: Empedocles’ Initiation

As a god, Empedocles consciously adopts an ambiguous style to mimic how the gods disclose oracles and revelations in mystery religions, preserving the distinction between human and divine knowledge. An individual becomes an initiate in order to gain access to special knowledge that the gods share with mortals with the result that the members of the community have knowledge that non-initiates do not. For mystery religions, this special knowledge sets the initiates apart from other men in life and death.73 In the case of

Empedocles’ verses, he intends that his readers follow the same process as an initiate in order to earn the privilege of knowing information that the gods know and of becoming gods themselves.

Theon of Smyrna describes the three steps of an initiation in his comparison of philosophy and initiation.

καὶ γὰρ αὖ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν µύησιν φαίη τις ἂν ἀληθοῦς τελετῆς

καὶ τῶν ὄντων ὡς ἀληθῶς µυστηρίων παράδοσιν. µυήσεως δὲ µέρη

73 Isocrates describes the benefits of becoming an initiate in the Eleusinian mysteries: Δήµητρος γὰρ ἀφικοµένης εἰς τὴν χώραν, ὅτ’ ἐπλανήθη τῆς Κόρης ἁρπασθείσης, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς προγόνους ἡµῶν εὐµενῶς διατεθείσης ἐκ τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν, ἃς οὐχ οἷόν τ’ ἄλλοις ἢ τοῖς µεµυηµένοις ἀκούειν, καὶ δούσης δωρεὰς διττὰς, αἵπερ µέγισται τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, τούς τε καρποὺς, οἳ τοῦ µὴ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἡµᾶς αἴτιοι γεγόνασιν, καὶ τὴν τελετὴν, ἧς οἱ µετασχόντες περί τε τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς καὶ τοῦ σύµπαντος αἰῶνος ἡδίους τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν… (Isocrates Panegyric 28) “When Demeter came to our land as she wandered when Kore was snatched away, she looked kindly upon our ancestors through benefits which others are not able to hear, only the initiates. She gave two gifts that are the greatest in the world – grain, which is responsible for our not living as beasts, and the rite, from which the participants have sweeter hopes concerning the end of life and the whole of life…” Compare the various gold tablets found buried with initiates of other mystery religions. A brief bibliography: Zuntz 1971, Cole 1980, Cole 1993, Graf 1991, 1993, Burkert 1998.

169 πέντε. τὸ µὲν προηγούµενον καθαρµός· οὔτε γὰρ ἅπασι τοῖς

βουλοµένοις µετουσία µυστηρίων ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ εἰσὶν οὓς αὐτῶν

εἴργεσθαι προαγορεύεται, οἷον τοὺς χεῖρας µὴ καθαρὰς καὶ φωνὴν

ἀξύνετον ἔχοντας, καὶ αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς µὴ εἰργοµένους ἀνάγκη

καθαρµοῦ τινος πρότερον τυχεῖν. µετὰ δὲ τὴν κάθαρσιν δευτέρα

ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς τελετῆς παράδοσις· τρίτη δὲ <ἡ> ἐπονοµαζοµένη

ἐποπτεία·…

Theon of Smyrna de utilitate mathematicae 14.18 ff. (ed. Hiller)

For someone might say that philosophy is the initiation of true mystery rite and the transmission of the true mysteries. There are five parts to initiation. The first part is the purification (καθαρµός), for there is not participation in the mysteries for all who want it, but there are some whom it is declared beforehand will be shut out, e.g., those who do not have clean [i.e., of murder] hands and are foolish in their speech. Moreover, it is necessary that those who are not shut out have some sort of purification beforehand. After the purification, the second part is the transmission (παράδοσις) of the rite. The third is the so-called revelation (ἐποπτεία). …

The purification of the initiate (καθαρµός) was required because it was a common step that preceded any interaction with the gods. The gods will not interact with anyone who is unclean.74 The information regarding the nature of the rite (παράδοσις) was reserved for initiates and was, therefore, shrouded in secrecy, as was the final revelation

(ἐποπτεία) that will come once the initiate is fully prepared.

Clement provides more information about these three steps, including a fuller description of what the παράδοσις and the ἐποπτεία entail.

74 Purification is also one of the services that magicians offer. See §1.3.1 in chapter 2 above.

170 οὐκ ἀπεικότως ἄρα καὶ τῶν µυστηρίων τῶν παρ’ Ἕλλησιν ἄρχει

µὲν τὰ καθάρσια, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ λουτρόν. µετὰ

ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ µικρὰ µυστήρια διδασκαλίας τινὰ ὑπόθεσιν ἔχοντα

καὶ προπαρασκευῆς τῶν µελλόντων, τὰ δὲ µεγάλα περὶ τῶν

συµπάντων, οὗ µανθάνειν <οὐκ>έτι ὑπολείπεται, ἐποπτεύειν δὲ καὶ

περινοεῖν τήν τε φύσιν καὶ τὰ πράγµατα.

Clement Stromateis 5.11.71

It is not unreasonable that purifications begin the mysteries among the Greeks, just like the bath for the barbarians. After this are the little mysteries which provide a foundation for the things taught and for the preparation of the things to come, and the great mysteries are concerning the remainder, where there is no longer anything left to learn, to look upon and consider nature and reality.

In this description of the Eleusinian rites, the little mysteries are the παράδοσις; the initiates are taught by those who have already witnessed the revelation what they need to know to prepare themselves for the ἐποπτεία. They learn that life and death does not necessarily function as they believed; they will need to look at the world in a new way and this grooms them for the special divine knowledge that they are about to receive.

With the ἐποπτεία, the final revelation, the initiates of the mysteries will now live the remainder of their days with this new knowledge and it will affect everything that they experience in the world from that point forward.

171 2.1 THE JOURNEY OF INITIATION

Empedocles presents his text and the interpretation of text as a journey and a form of initiation to understand how the world truly works and from there to manipulate it.75 The anthropological analysis by van Gennep (1909) of the steps undertaken by initiates as they transition from one status within a social group to another emphasizes the parallels between initiation and interpretation of ambiguous text. First the initiates are separated from the group of which they were members previously. In the phases of the mysteries outlined above by Theon and Clement, this is the καθαρµός where the initiates step from the mundane and the secular. Empedocles’ readers are told in fragment 2 that most people believe that they know how the world works, but in fact they have experienced too little to understand truly. But those who have stepped aside will have an opportunity to get closer to the truth than normal mortals can: σὺ δ’ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ’ ἐλιάσθης, | πεύσεαι οὐ

πλέον ἠὲ βροτείη µῆτις ὄρωρεν (DK 31B2.8-9) “But you, since you have stepped aside, will learn. Mortal cunning, at least, has gone no further.” The initiate is literally taking steps as they step over the threshold into a new phase of life and understanding. In the period of liminality, when the initiates belong to neither group, they receive training for their new roles in the community from the priests and others who have already been initiated (παράδοσις). Empedocles’ readers must learn to reinterpret what their senses tell them. During the liminal phase, the audience is aware of various interpretations, although they are not ready to commit to one (fragments 2 and 3). Finally, the initiates are reintegrated into the community in their new role once the meaning of the mysteries has been revealed (ἐποπτεία). With the resolution of the ambiguous text comes the attainment

75 Kingsley 1995a (365-70) argues persuasively that Empedocles’ two poems together represent an initiation. Compare Kahn 1974 (429 ff.).

172 of true knowledge; Empedocles’ readers will at that time understand how to manipulate the universe and will be capable of the magical feats that Empedocles promises to teach in fragment 111. All the initiates move from ignorance in their previous state to a new level of awareness and knowledge.

2.1.1 Fragment 110

In fragment 110, Empedocles describes how he expects Pausanias to learn from his verses: if you focus and continue to reflect, you will learn even more lessons, but if you do not, you will not learn anything further. He draws an implicit parallel between working out the truth and initiation into a mystery religion, using words that should remind the careful reader of the steps an initiate undertakes. They can arrive at their ultimate destination – becoming a god and controlling the universe – only by following the pattern of initiation: καθαρµός, παράδοσις, and ἐποπτεία.

εἰ γάρ κέν σφ’ ἀδινῇσιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας

εὐµενέως καθαρῇσιν ἐποπτεύσῃς76 µελέτῃσιν,

ταῦτά τέ σοι µάλα πάντα δι’ αἰῶνος παρέσονται,

ἄλλα τε πόλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶνδ’ ἐκτήσεαι· αὐτὰ γὰρ αὔξει

ταῦτ’ εἰς ἦθος ἕκαστον, ὅπη φύσις ἐστὶν ἑκάστωι.

Hippolytus Refutatio 7.29 = DK 31B110.1-5

For if, having planted these things (σφέ) under your close-packed diaphragm/mind, you look upon them kindly with pure meditations, every last one of these things will

76 The text as printed here is Diels’ version with κεν and an aorist subjunctive for a future more vivid construction. Bollack (fr. 699) prints καὶ for κεν (MS authority) and present tense – ἐποπτεύεις, for a simple conditional statement: “if you do look upon…, these things will be present.” Wright (fr. 100) and Inwood (fr. 16) also print καὶ for κεν and future tense – ἐποπτεύσεις, for a simple conditional statement in future time: “if you will look upon…, these things will be present.” This verb is connected to the noun ἐποπτεία, which is the third stage of the initiation.

173 be with you forever and you will acquire many other things from these, for these things themselves will grow into each character, according to its own nature.

Readers must focus their attention on Empedocles’ verses (σφέ) “with pure meditations”

(καθαρῇσιν µελέτῃσιν). The concept of approaching with purity is parallel to the

καθαρµός of mystery religions. The knowledge that Empedocles shares is a mystery to which only the purified (καθαρῇσιν µελέτῃσιν) can enter. If Kingsley’s interpretation that the Καθαρµοί would prepare the wider pool of potential initiates for the teaching, then the emphasis would be to avoid eating souls, or daimones. The readers should already be undergoing purification in their efforts to rid Strife from their own daimones.77

The Φύσικα addressed to Pausanias, therefore, would be the instruction preparing the individual initiate for the revelation, that is, the παράδοσις. Not only is Empedocles ambiguous in his style, but he also provided only a starting point. Empedocles has not told Pausanias everything he needs to know, but he can show him how to get there.

Empedocles has telegraphed his own ambiguity, but he also describes himself in fragment 112 wearing ribbons and garlands, that is, dressed as a successful initiate who was now able to guide others on their own initiation.78 Learning is a journey that involves multiple readings and careful examination of what the readers observe in the world. As

Empedocles says in fragment 25, “for it is noble to say twice what one must” (καὶ δὶς

γάρ, ὃ δεῖ, καλόν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν). Not only does Empedocles emphasize important lessons through repetition, but he also does not provide all the details in one passage, forcing the readers of these verses to collect lessons on their own: κορυφὰς ἑτέρας

ἑτέρῃσι προσάπτων | µύθων µὴ τελέειν ἀτραπὸν µίαν (Plutarch The Obsolence of Oracles

77 See part 2 of chapter 3. 78 See the beginning of part 2 in chapter 3.

174 418c = DK 31B24 “by attaching some high points to others, not to finish one path of my stories.” If Pausanias focuses on the lessons in these verses, Empedocles promises that

Pausanias will learn more things.

As Pausanias reads the verses that explain how the world works, he is asked to fix them under his heart where thinking occurs (ἀδινῇσιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας) and reflect upon (ἐποπτεύειν) them. The verb ἐποπτεύω can be used of gods or the dead looking down on mortals; in other words, they exist on a level that gives them special knowledge and power, and enables them to overlook in a protective sense.79 In fragment

110, however, the addressed is not a god; ἐποπτεύω, when applied to a human, refers to someone who has been initiated into the mysteries, for example, at Eleusis, and has earned the right to look upon the revelation of the god.80 This privilege seems to put the individual onto a higher plain of knowledge, thus making him better in that sphere of influence than his fellow mortals.81 The readers must focus on the lessons and acquire new ones as a consequence; then they will be on a higher plain and ready to receive more fantastic powers, for example, the power to control weather and raise the dead (DK

31B111), powers that seem beyond the ability of mortals; the initiates, therefore, will have received their revelation. In other words, the individual who has achieved this state will appear god-like to his fellow man, as Empedocles claims for himself in fragment

112: ἐγὼ δ’ ὑµῖν θεὸς ἄµβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός | πωλεῦµαι µετὰ πᾶσι τετιµένος (DK

79 Gods: Aeschylus Agamemnon 1270, 1579, Choephori 1, 583, 985, 1063, Eumenides 220, 224; Pindar Olympian 7.11; Bacchylides Anth. Pal. 6.313.3; Callimachus in Delum 62. Dead: Aeschylus Choephori 489. 80 Plato Symposium 210a1, Phaedrus 250c4, Epistula VII 333e4; Philochorus 69-70 (Jacoby 3b, 328, F69- 70). 81 Cf. Plato Leges 951d where the inspector, having proven his worth, shall become a member of a board of overseers of the laws (τὸν σύλλογον τὸν τῶν περὶ νόµους ἐποπτευόντων).

175 31B112.4-5) “But I am an immortal god to you, no longer mortal I wander, honoured by all.” This final step of the revelation, the ἐποπτεία, does not occur within the poem; it is the result of the poem. It is only through following Empedocles’ direction for interpretation that the readers have any opportunity to understand the nature of the universe. You will learn how to manipulate the world because you will have the knowledge and purity required to become a god yourself.

2.2 THE παράδοσις IN EMPEDOCLES’ TEXT

Empedocles intends that the careful readers will follow the process of initiation with the text and base their interpretation on the stages of initiation leading up to the revelation. Demetrius points out that both initiation and allegory are connected to darkness and night: διὸ καὶ τὰ µυστήρια ἐν ἀλληγορίαις λέγεται πρὸς ἔκπληξιν καὶ

φρίκην, ὥσπερ ἐν σκότῳ καὶ νυκτί. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλληγορία τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῇ νυκτί.

(Demetrius On Style 101) “This is why mysteries are revealed in allegories, to inspire the shuddering and awe associated with darkness and night. In fact allegory is not unlike darkness and night.” The mysteries are associated with darkness in two ways: 1) literally, as mystery rites are performed at night or at least in darkness with the disclosure scheduled for dawn or revealed in a flash of light, and 2) metaphorically, since the initiates are in the darkness of ignorance in their previous state and then proceed to the light of knowledge when they enter a new phase of life; so, too, with allegory. Before resolution, the readers are uncertain of its meaning and are therefore in the dark; after a

176 solution is found, the readers enter into the light of knowledge.82 The process of interpretation is the παράδοσις.

When an ambiguous text is first presented, there is confusion regarding its true interpretation; this emphasizes the separation between those who can understand skillful use of language and those who cannot. But Empedocles intends that his readers follow a process of reading and interpretation that will lead to understanding. When Empedocles identifies in fragment 17 the four roots, Love, and Strife, he pauses with an aside to

Pausanias: σὺ δ’ ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν (line 26) “but you, hear the expedition, which is not deceptive, of my account.” A στόλος, derived from στέλλω, is a dynamic process83; it is the steps that the readers must take in order to arrive at the

“truth.” On the surface, to say that the expedition is not deceptive seems to counter my claim that Empedocles intends to deceive. Empedocles uses this process to ensure that this potentially dangerous ability of manipulating the world does not come into the wrong person’s possession84; the dynamic process, therefore, that Empedocles’ verses require of their readers is to interpret the ambiguous writing and fill in the incomplete accounts

Empedocles provides. Is it paradoxical to describe an ambiguous account as οὐκ

ἀπατηλόν? In the context of this statement, Empedocles pauses in the middle of a passage that is vital to understanding (and from there, controlling) the universe. To the average reader, the account will not be deceptive because Empedocles is relating a tale that is

82 Seaford 1981 (255). 83 Nünlist 2005, contrasting Empedocles’ dynamic metaphors with Parmenides’ (and others’) κόσµος ἐπέων, examines the poetalogical images which Empedocles uses to describe his program. 84 Contra Nünlist 2005 who argues that Empedocles does not focus on the aesthetic beauty (κόσµος) of his composition in stark contrast with his predecessors and contemporaries, because he fears the readers may lose their self-control (81).

177 indistinguishable from reality; just as Odysseus’ tale to Penelope is plausible85, the average readers will accept the account. But for those who have stepped aside to learn (as

Pausanias has) the process that Empedocles sets out for a successful journey, they will understand that the account is deceptive, but the course they follow will enable them to avoid deception.

Stanley Fish’s Reader-Response theory, first presented in Surprised by Sin: the

Reader in Paradise Lost (1967), is similar to this process. Fish calls this “effective stylistics”; the text is meant to produce an effect or an alteration in the reader. Fish argues that Milton forced the readers of Paradise Lost to choose an interpretation by means of various literary techniques and then led them to realize that this interpretation was mistaken. The theory, therefore, emphasizes the response of the readers to the text as they travel in a linear fashion through each word, sentence, paragraph, and chapter in turn, constantly revising their interpretation as they continue. Reading is a chronological process that all readers enter with a set of presumptions that influences their interpretation, and each interpretive community86 will develop its own interpretation of the text and follow the same path of discovery. Empedocles takes his readers on a similar journey, from the darkness of ignorance to the light of revelation.

2.2.1 Fragment 6 – An Example

Empedocles uses a riddle in fragment 6 to emphasize the value of the roots. The context of this fragment suggests that Empedocles presents the roots before the cosmic cycle as a prologue. Diels, for example, placed fragment 6 before fragment 17 in his

85 See §1.2.2 above in this chapter. 86 Stanley Fish 1980.

178 collection because πρῶτον implies that it was one of the first lessons. Tzetzes places the fragment in the first book of the Physics (ἀκούσατε µικρὸν κἀκ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν Φυσικῶν

Ἐµπεδοκλέους (Tzetzes Exegesis in Homeri Iliadem 53.23) “hear a little bit from the first book of the Physics…”). The readers must solve the riddle, and the process of coming up with a solution makes the lesson resonate more than simply being told what the roots are.

As Empedocles points out in fragment 114, persuasion can be difficult when people cling to their preconceptions87, but in fragment 4, Empedocles suggests a path.

ἀλλὰ κακοῖς µὲν κάρτα µέλει κρατέουσιν ἀπιστεῖν·

ὡς δὲ παρ’ ἡµετέρης κέλεται πιστώµατα Μούσης,

γνῶθι διατµηθέντος ἐνὶ σπλάγχνοισι λόγοιο.

Clement Stromata 5.18.4 = DK 31B4

But for bad men it is especially important not to be convinced by the strong. But as the convictions of our muse compel, understand when the discourse has been broken up in your thinking organs.

The reference to “our muse” (ἡµετέρης Μούσης) draws the reader to fragment 3.88 If

Empedocles does indeed establish his ambiguous style in that fragment, the readers will know that they must approach the text carefully and interpret it. But Empedocles assures success (γνῶθι) as long as the text (λόγοιο) is analyzed (broken up – διατµηθέντος) where thinking occurs, ἐνὶ σπλάγχνοισι, just as Empedocles prescribes in fragment 110

(ἀδινῇσιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν).

87 See §1.2.2 above. 88 See §1.2 above.

179 Most contexts present this fragment as an introduction to the roots, which all the sources call στοιχεῖα (“elements”).89

τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώµατα πρῶτον ἄκουε·

Ζεὺς ἀργὴς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ’ Ἀιδωνεύς

Νῆστίς θ’, ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωµα βρότειον.

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 10.315 = DK 31B6

For hear in the first place the four roots of all things: shining Zeus, life-giving Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis who wets the mortal spring with her tears.

The readers will learn about the four roots of all things (πάντων ῥιζώµατα). Roots are most obviously connected to plants; they make plants stable and are the source of a plant’s growth. Hidden below the surface of the earth, roots stabilize the plant, making it difficult to remove from the earth: αἵ τ’ ἄνεµον µίµνουσι καὶ ὑετὸν ἤµατα πάντα | ῥίζῃσιν

µεγάλῃσι διηνεκέεσσ’ ἀραρυῖαι (Iliad 12.133-134) “(oaks) which endure the wind and rain every day, fixed firmly with great and long roots.” This image of the roots’ stability can also be used metaphorically. In this passage, Homer compares two men standing their ground in a gate to oaks. Roots are also a source of growth as plants grow up and out of the ground away from the roots: τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ ῥίζης ἑκατὸν κάρα ἐξεπεφύκει (Homeric

89 Aëtius 1.3.20 (=Diels 286-7): Ἐµπεδοκλῆς … τέτταρα µὲν λέγει στοιχεῖα…; Sextus Empiricus Adv. math. 9.362: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐµπεδολκέα … γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ <τὰ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα> “Those connected to Empedocles [say that the elements of existing things] are earth, water, air and fire”; Stobaeus 1.10.11 (= DK 31A33b): ἐκ τεσσάρων οὖν στοιχείων τὸ πᾶν “all things derive from four elements”; Eusebius praep. evan. 14.14.6 (= Aëtius 1.3.20); Probus Verg. Buc. 11.4: omnem igitur hanc rerum naturae formam tenui primum et … refert in quattuor elementa concretam “Therefore I have held this entire shape of the nature of things foremost and it happens that it is formed from four elements”; Diogenes Laertius Vitae 8.76 (= DK 31A1): ἐδόκει δ᾽αὐτῷ τάδε· στοιχεῖα µὲν εἶναι τέτταρα, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, γῆν, ἀέρα; Hippolytus Ref. 7.29.4 (= DK 31A33c): οὗτός φησιν εἶναι τὰ πάντα στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσµος συνέστηκε καὶ ἔστιν; Philoponus Physics CIAG 16.88.4: ὁ δὲ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς τέσσαρα ὑπετίθετο τὰ ὑλικὰ αἴτια· ταῦτα δῆ τὰ πολυθρύλητα στοιχεῖα “Empedocles hypothesized four material causes and these are the famous elements.”

180 Hymn to Demeter 12) “and from its root 100 blossoms grew” (describing the narcissus which led to Persephone's abduction).

Hesiod used ῥίζαι to describe the earth and sea where they extend into the underworld.

τὸν πέρι χάλκεον ἕρκος ἐλήλαται· ἀµφὶ δέ µιν νὺξ

τριστοιχὶ κέχυται περὶ δειρήν· αὐτὰρ ὕπερθε

γῆς ῥίζαι πεφύασι καὶ ἀτρυγέτοιο θαλάσσης.

Hesiod Theogony 726-728

Around it (Tartaros) is a bronze fence and around this night is poured about the neck in three rows; but over this the roots of the earth and barren sea grow

The image of the roots stretching into Tartaros is primarily one of stability, nevertheless there are hints of growth. The roots grow down, but one expects this growth to work both ways as plants also grow up from the roots.90 Hesiod expands the image of the roots of earth and sea, but instead of ῥίζαι, he calls them πηγαὶ and πείρατα.91

ἔνθα δὲ γῆς δνοφερῆς καὶ ταρτάρου ἠερόεντος

πόντου τ’ ἀτρυγέτοιο καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος

ἑξείης πάντων πηγαὶ καὶ πείρατ’ ἔασιν,

ἀργαλέ’ εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοί περ·

Hesiod Theogony 736-739

90 Aeschylus also uses the image of root both as source of growth and stability. Source of growth: σπαρτῶν δ’ ἀπ’ ἀνδρῶν, ὧν Ἄρης ἐφείσατο, | ῥίζωµ’ ἀνεῖται, κάρτα δ’ ἔστ’ ἐγχώριος, | Μελάνιππος· (Aeschylus Seven Against Thebes 412-414) “His root comes from the sown men whom Ares spared, Melanippus is truly of this land” (explaining Melanippus' worth to stand against Tydeus at the Proetid Gate). Stability: χθόνα δ’ ἐκ πυθµένων | αὐταῖς ῥίζαις πνεῦµα κραδαίνοι (Aeschylus Prometheus Bound 1046-47) “Let the hurricane wind shake the earth to its very roots.” 91 Empedocles describes fragment 17 as the πείρατα µυθῶν (line 15). See §1.3 in chapter 1.

181 Here are dark earth and misty Tartaros and barren sea and starry sky, the sources and limits of all these are in a row, troublesome and dank, which even the gods detest.

These πηγαὶ have a clear cosmogonic link as other early examples show.92 Not every scholar believes ῥίζαι can be linked to πηγαὶ 93, but as a metaphor it is not impossible.

The two terms correspond in meaning and when Hesiod repeats lines 736-739 at lines

807-810, he goes on to describe the source and foundation of Tartaros as roots.94

Empedocles’ ῥιζώµατα, therefore, act as a source for all things, but also provide stability.

In the context of Empedocles’ verses, these as yet unidentified sources provide stability for the universe and provide its source of growth. Kingsley 1995a (6) argues further that the roots are fundamental to Empedocles’ entire system.

Beyond other poets’ use of “roots” as an image of origins and stability, the readers might be reminded of the ῥιζοτοµοί, root cutters, a class of doctors who followed an arcane set of rules in order to expose roots and use them as cures for particular ailments.95

Sophocles’ play οἱ ῥιζοτοµοί, related to the story of Medea, illustrates how the profession was well known to the Greeks.96 The ῥιζοτοµοί required special knowledge such as that

92 Solmsen 1950 (242-3) supported this reading without evidence. Stokes 1962 (25-33) lays out evidence to support the interpretation that the πηγαὶ are cosmogonic in response to Kirk 1956-57 (10), e.g., ναρθηκοπλήρωτον δὲ θηρῶµαι πυρὸς | πηγὴν κλοπαίαν, ἣ διδάσκαλος τέχνης | πάσης βροτοῖς πέφηνε καὶ µέγας πόρος. (Aeschylus Prometheus Bound 109-11) “I hunted out and stored in fennel the stolen source of fire which has been a teacher of all crafts to men and a great path (to an ends).” Scholars continue to follow the traditional interpretation: West 1966 (363), Longrigg 1976 (425), Miller 1977 (447), Johnson 1999 (25ff.). 93 Kirk 1956-57 (11), Stokes 1962 (15), Johnson 1999 (15). 94 ἔνθα δὲ γῆς δνοφερῆς καὶ ταρτάρου ἠερόεντος | πόντου τ’ ἀτρυγέτοιο καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος | ἑξείης πάντων πηγαὶ καὶ πείρατ’ ἔασιν, | ἀργαλέ’ εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοί περ. | ἔνθα δὲ µαρµάρεαί τε πύλαι καὶ χάλκεος οὐδός, | ἀστεµφὲς ῥίζῃσι διηνεκέεσσιν ἀρηρώς, | αὐτοφυής (Hesiod Theogony 807-814) “Here dark earth and misty Tartaros and barren sea and starry sky, the sources and limits of all these are in a row, troublesome and dank, which even the gods detest. Here are the shining gates and the bronze threshold, fixed unmovingly with long roots, self-growing.” 95 Kingsley 1995a (299). For general information on the root-cutters, see Raven 1990 (169-172). 96 Pearson 1917 (2:172-177).

182 found in the manuals used by the ashipu97 (although there is no evidence that the root- cutters maintained a library until the centuries after Empedocles; they relied rather on the apprentice model to pass on their lore) and they guarded this information jealously. The profession maintained this secret collection of rules that served to maintain an aura of mystery around them. They also recognized that the properties of some of these plants were potent and possibly dangerous, and thus kept them from others.98 In a sense, the readers are ῥιζοτοµοί for the duration of the poem as they build up secret knowledge through their initiation to understand the universe and then conceal it themselves from others.

To solve the riddle successfully, the reader must correctly associate Nestis, Hera,

Zeus, and Aidoneus with one of air, earth, water or fire. The variety of possible solutions proposed in the ancient world alone proves that Empedocles did not provide his own answer.99 Everyone agrees that Nestis is linked to water because she “wets the mortal spring with her tears (δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωµα βρότειον).100 Life-giving Hera (Ἥρη …

φερέσβιος) probably refers to earth because the epithet φερέσβιος describes the earth in the Homeric Hymns and Hesiod.101 The adjective φερέσβιος is also used of grain, which

97 See §1.2.1 in chapter 2. 98 Theophrastus, our best source for the precepts preserved by the root-cutters, criticizes some of their practices, but he admits to the wisdom of others. Lloyd 1983 (122-126). 99 Kingsley 1995a (362). 100 Kingsley 1995a (ch. 22) explores full the identity of Nestis and her connection with Aidoneus. 101 εἰς δ’ ἄρα Ῥάριον ἷξε, φερέσβιον οὖθαρ ἀρούρης | τὸ πρίν, ἀτὰρ τότε γ’ οὔ τι φερέσβιον, ἀλλὰ ἕκηλον | ἑστήκει πανάφυλλον (Homeric Hymn to Demeter 450-452) “She came to Rharus, once the richest life- bearing land, but at that time it was no longer life-giving but it stood idle and wholly leafless.” κινήθη δ’ ἄρα γαῖα φερέσβιος (Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo (3) 341) “And the life-giving earth was moved.” βρίθει µέν σφιν ἄρουρα φερέσβιος (Homeric Hymn to Earth Mother of All (30) 9) “The life-giving earth was heavy for them…”; ἀµφὶ δὲ γαῖα φερέσβιος ἐσµαράγιζε | καιοµένη (Theogony 693-4) “The life-giving earth crashed all about as she burned.”

183 is a product of the earth’s fertility.102 The Homeric allegorists support this interpretation103; the Theophrastean school, on the other hand, says that Hera is air.104

Ἥρα is an anagram for ἀήρ, according to Plato Cratylus 404c, and since breath is necessary for life, Empedocles may have transferred the epithet φερέσβιος to air. The

“Theophrastus” interpretation has received more favour from modern scholars because

Diels argued in Doxographi Graeci (89 ff.) that this interpretation dates earlier than the

Homeric allegorists and should be, therefore, more reliable.105 It seems best, however, to stick with the traditional interpretation of φερέσβιος since Empedocles’ goal is to be interpreted, not to confuse his audience.

The identification of Zeus and Aidoneus (Hades) is less straightforward. The

“Theophrastus” school links Aidoneus with earth because it is natural to connect the underworld and the earth beneath our feet. If we choose the natural link for the adjective

φερέσβιος, however, this interpretation is not viable. The Homeric allegorists say that

Aidoneus is air, using an etymology of Hades meaning ‘the invisible one’: as Hippolytus argues, πάντα δι᾽ αὐτοῦ βλέποντες µόνον αὐτὸν οὐ καθορῶµεν (Refutatio 7.29)

“although we look at everything through him, we do not see him alone.” Another interpretation of Aidoneus as air emphasizes the darkness of Hades and how it lacks its own light, a property of air (Stobaeus Eclogae 1.10.11b = 31A33b DK). This would leave

Zeus to be associated with fire.

102 α[ἶψα δὲ κα]ρπὸν ἄεξε φερέσβιον ἀνθρώποισιν (Homeric Hymn to Demeter (2) 469) “Increase for men straightaway the life-giving grain (or grain that is life-giving for men).” 103 Stobaeus (1.10.11b (= DK 31A33b)), Diogenes Laertius (Vitae 8.76 (= DK 31A1)), Hippolytus (Refutatio 7.29.4 (= DK 31A33c), [Heraclitus] (Allegory 24, 41). 104 Aëtius (1.3.20 (= DG 286-287)), Eusebius (praep. evan. 14.4.6). 105 Bignone 1963 (542-44), Millerd 1908 (30-32), Guthrie 1965 (144-46), Bollack 1969 (3:170-71), Wright 1981 (165), McKirahan 1994 (259).

184 This interpretation by the Homeric allegorists is unacceptable as well. Kingsley has revived a 19th century interpretation106 of the riddle that assigns fire to Aidoneus and air to

Zeus by addressing the charges concerning the use of ἀήρ and αἰθήρ in Empedocles.107

Aither was used of atmospheric air at the time Empedocles was writing while aer was heavy mist. Since Zeus is a sky god, it is natural to associate him with atmospheric air.108

As far as the connection between Aidoneus/Hades and fire, the Sicilians were quite aware of the presence of fire under the earth owing to the prevalence of hot springs and other volcanic activity in the area. Therefore, it seems best to link Nestis with water, Hera with earth, Zeus with air, and Aidoneus with fire. By working through such a riddle about roots, the readers have become root-cutters with special knowledge.

2.3 THE REST OF THE JOURNEY – THE ἐποπτεῖα

Reading the text is only the beginning of the initiates’ journey. It is the responsibility of each reader to draw the proper conclusions and hence learn further lessons. The readers must take what they have learned and observe the world through their senses.

Empedocles has not taught everything required to understand the universe, only the basics (ἄλλα τε πόλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶνδ’ ἐκτήσεαι - DK 31B110.4 “You will acquire many other things from these”). Knowledge is physical growth: πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ µῆτις ἀέξεται

ἀνθρώποισιν. (Aristotle de anima 427a22ff. = DK 31B106) “For men’s cunning increases in relation to what is present.” When the initiates gain confirmation about the lessons they have learned and they draw further conclusions, the lessons take root and bloom in

106 Knatz 1891, Thiele 1897, Burnet 1930 (229n.3). 107 See note 31 in chapter 1. 108 Kingsley 1995c (26-9); 1995a (part 1).

185 the initiate as B17.14 confirms: µάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει “for learning will increase your mind.” Once the readers have internalized these lessons and remain attuned with them, they will be able to take on more lessons and receive the ultimate revelation. As fragment 110 continues, Empedocles reminds the readers of the consequences of not focusing on these lessons:

εἰ δὲ σύ γ’ ἀλλοίων ἐπορέξεαι, οἷα κατ’ ἄνδρας

µυρία δειλὰ πέλονται ἅ τ’ ἀµβλύνουσι µερίµνας,

ἦ σ’ ἄφαρ ἐκλείψουσι περιπλοµένοιο χρόνοιο

σφῶν αὐτῶν ποθέοντα φίλην ἐπὶ γένναν ἱκέσθαι·

πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώµατος αἶσαν.

Hippolytus Refutatio 7.29 = DK 31B110.6-10

If, on the other hand, you will reach for different things, as many thousands of terrible things come among men which blunt their meditations, straightway the former will leave you as time comes around, desiring to reach their own dear kind; for know that all things have thought and a portion of mind.

The lessons that are learned must be concentrated upon in the real world through observation. The initiates no longer look at the world in the same way, and further lessons will come as they increase in purity and wisdom.109 If they fail to focus, the lessons will leave of their own accord and the initiates will not escape the mortal coil of transmigration.

109 Compare Clement Stromata 5.11.71 at the beginning of part 2.

186 2.3.1 Sensation

Empedocles describes sensation as a direct physical process. Each object gives off effluences, something that flows off of something else (πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορροαί, ὅσσ’

ἐγένοντο (Plutarch Natural Phenomena 916d = DK 31B89) “All things, as many as have come into being, have effluences”) that come into contact with certain passages/ pores

(πόροι) that every object contains (Ἐµπεδοκλῆς δὲ περὶ ἁπασῶν ὁµοίως λέγει καί φησι

τῷ ἐναρµόττειν εἰς τοὺς πόρους τοὺς ἑκάστης αἰσθάνεσθαι (Theophrastus de sensu 7 =

DK 31A86) “Empedocles says the same thing concerning all (the senses) and claims that perception occurs by (things) fitting into the pores of each (sense)”).110 The ἀπορροαί and

πόροι react only if there is symmetry between them. Sounds, for example, cannot be picked up by the eyes; the effluences that sound creates do not fit into the pores of the eye.

διὸ καὶ οὐ δύνασθαι τὰ ἀλλήλων κρίνειν, ὅτι τῶν µὲν εὐρύτεροί

πως, τῶν δὲ στενώτεροι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ πόροι πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν,

ὡς τὰ µὲν οὐχ ἁπτόµενα διευτονεῖν τὰ δ’ ὅλως εἰσελθεῖν οὐ

δύνασθαι.

Theophrastus de sensu 7 = DK 31A86

And it is for this reason that (the senses) are not able to perceive the (effluences) of one another; because some pores happen to be wider and others more narrow with respect to the object perceived, the result is that the things that do not touch pass through and others are not able to enter at all.

If the pore is too large for the effluence with the result that the effluences pass through the pore without contact, there will be no perception. If the effluences are too large for

110 This connection between effluences and pores accounts not only for sensation but also for magnetism (DK 31A89), reflections in mirrors (DK 31A88), and physical growth (DK 31B37).

187 the pore with the result that they cannot even enter, there will be no perception at that time either. Perception is dependent upon the proper fit between ἀπορροαί and πόροι –

ἀλλὰ καὶ µείγνυσθαί φησιν, ὅσων οἱ πόροι σύµµετροι πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰσίν (Aristotle de generatione et corruptione 324b32 ff = 31A87a) “he says that only things whose pores are symmetrical mix.” Perception, therefore, occurs by means of contact, on the one hand, but also by means of like things. As Empedocles says,

γαίῃ µὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαµεν, ὕδατι δ’ ὕδωρ,

αἰθέρι δ’ αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀίδηλον,

στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ.

Aristotle de anima 404b8 = DK 31B109

For we see earth by means of earth, water by water, divine air by air, destructive fire by fire, love by love and strife by hateful strife.

The effluence will be perceived only if the pores that receive it contain the same roots that the effluence is made up of. Each root can perceive only its like.

Empedocles’ description of the eye illustrates the importance of physical contact for perception as well as the role each root plays in the process.

ὡς δ’ ὅτε τις πρόοδον νοέων ὡπλίσσατο λύχνον

χειµερίην διὰ νύκτα, πυρὸς σέλας αἰθοµένοιο,

ἅψας παντοίων ἀνέµων λαµπτῆρας ἀµοργούς,

οἵ τ’ ἀνέµων µὲν πνεῦµα διασκιδνᾶσιν ἀέντων,

φῶς δ’ ἔξω διαθρῶισκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν, 5

λάµπεσκεν κατὰ βηλὸν ἀτειρέσιν ἀκτίνεσσιν·

ὣς δὲ τότ’ ἐν µήνιγξιν ἐεργµένον ὠγύγιον πῦρ

188 λεπτῇσίν <τ’> ὀθόνῃσι λοχάζετο κύκλοπα κούρην,111

<αἳ> χοάνηισι δίαντα τετρήατο θεσπεσίηισιν·

αἳ δ’ ὕδατος µὲν βένθος ἀπέστεγον ἀµφιναέντος,

πῦρ δ’ ἔξω διίεσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν. 10

Aristotle de sensu 437b23 = DK 31B84

As when someone has planned a journey through the winter night and prepared a lamp, with the gleam of fire blazing forth, by fastening linen grates against all sorts of winds to scatter the wind of the blowing breezes, the light leapt forth, as much as was finer, and shone across the threshold with tireless beams; in just the same way primal fire at that time conceals itself112 with respect to the pupil in the eye, enclosed in the membranes and fine linens. And [the linens] covered the depth of the surrounding water, and they sent forth the fire, as much as was finer.

The description of the eye comes in the second part of the fragment. All four roots are present: fire is the most important part, emphasized by its prominent position; water surrounds the pupil; and, the membranes that protect the fire from the water are comprised of earth and air. I argue that these membranes (µήνιγξιν) are made of earth and air because linen is a material with a loose weave. There is no mention of pores or passages per se, but the description of how the eye works implies their existence.

Aristotle quotes this passage to show the inconsistency of Empedocles’ description of how the eye operates, that is, sometimes we see on account of effluences (ταῖς

ἀπορροίαις ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρωµένων) and at others because light goes out from the eye

(ἐξίοντος τοῦ φωτός). The contrast Empedocles makes in this passage, however, is the

111 DK include after line 8 a line of text, which Blass included from a reading in P of line 5 (<αἲ> χοάνῃσι δίαντα τετρήατο θεσπεσίῃσιν “which are pierced right through with marvelous funnels”). I have excluded it on account of the syntax of the relative pronoun that Bollack 1969 (3:326-7) and Wright 1981 (241) point out. 112 See Wright 1981 (240-41).

189 function of the screen on the lantern to protect the flame from breezes and the membranes that shield the fire in the eye from the surrounding water.113 Empedocles does not claim that we see on account of beams of light coming from our eyes, despite the phrase ἔξω

διίεσκον. Rather, as Long argues, the light penetrates the other roots, which permits the effluences to be received on the eye and then perceived by all the roots. Fire is vital to vision because it is the proportion of internal light in the eye and external light that dictates what is seen.114

Since sense perception is purely a physical process, it faces significant drawbacks.

The largest one is the constant barrage of effluences striking the pores.115

στεινωποὶ µὲν γὰρ παλάµαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται·

πολλὰ δὲ δείλ’ ἔµπαια, τά τ’ ἀµβλύνουσι µέριµνας.

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.122-4 = DK 31B2.1-2

For the powers spread throughout the limbs are narrow and many worthless things burst in which dull their concerns.

These pores, called παλάµαι, passages, in this fragment, are everywhere in the body. It is by these means that sensory information is received; but the passages are narrow and can process only so much information at one time. Owing to the abundance of effluences, it is difficult for the passages to collect the data proper to it. This keeps the average person from concentrating on what is important, thus leading to a misinterpretation of the

113 It is possible that Empedocles was familiar with the structure of the eye owing to dissection. See Wright 1981 (241-42). 114 Long 1966 (262-64). 115 See §1.3 in this chapter and §2.2.1 in chapter 1.

190 information received. The senses, however, are reliable as long as one uses each sense as it was designed, as Empedocles points out in fragment 3.116

ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ ἄθρει πάσῃ παλάµῃ, πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον,

µήτε τιν’ ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ’ ἀκουήν

ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώµατα γλώσσης,

µήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσηι πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι,

γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ’ ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον.

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.125 = DK 31B3.9-13

But come, consider by every passage how each thing is clear, not holding any vision as more reliable than what you hear, nor the echoes of hearing than the piercings of the tongue, and do not in any way curb the reliability of the other limbs by which there is a passage for understanding, but understand each thing in the way it is clear.

Each sense receives dependable information, but to interpret that data correctly and not rely on it to the exclusion of other senses is vital. A stick in the water illustrates what

Empedocles means. To look at the stick, it appears bent; but when you explore further with touch, it becomes clear that it is straighter, and smaller, than it looks. In this case, information from touch is more reliable and should take precedence over sight.

2.3.2 Thinking

The five senses are still insufficient. One must also reflect upon what one perceives in order to come to the correct conclusions. Ensemble a of the Strasbourg Papyrus reinforces this idea.

………………… δ᾽ ὅπως µὴ µοῦνον ἀν᾽ οὔατα…………

116 See §1.3 above.

191 …… µευ ἀµφὶς ἐό̣ντα κλύων [ν]η̣µερτ[έα] ………………

[δεί]ξ̣ω σοι καὶ ἀν᾽ ὄσσ᾽ ἵνα µείζονι σώµα̣τι…………..

[π]ρῶτον µὲν ξύνοδόν τε διάπτυξίν τ̣[ε] ………………

….

ἐκ τῶν ἀψευδῆ κόµισαι φρενὶ δείγµατα µ[ύθων]·

ὄψει γὰρ ξύνοδόν τε διάπτυξίν τε γενέθλη̣[ς].

Strasbourg Papyrus a(ii)21-24, a(ii)29-30

… so that not the ears alone…hearing me about true things… I will show you as many things with a larger body… first the coming together and the unfolding… From these stories carry proofs that are not false to your mind; for you will see the coming together and unfolding of offspring.

Empedocles emphasizes hearing at first, because reading was generally performative. The readers, therefore, hear Empedocles as he tells them how the world works in his verses.

Next the readers will see things through their own eyes as they observe the world around them. Finally the readers will present all the collected evidence to the mind (φρενὶ). As

Empedocles urges his readers in the first five lines of fragment 110, if they focus on the lessons they learn, the lessons will remain with the readers forever and they will learn more. With the greater knowledge that sets Empedocles’ readers apart from οἱ πολλοί, they must think in addition to perceive their way to the next level.

Thinking is as much a physical process as sensation is.

ὡσαύτως δὲ λέγει καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀγνοίας. τὸ µὲν γὰρ

φρονεῖν εἶναι τοῖς ὁµοίοις, τὸ δ’ ἀγνοεῖν τοῖς ἀνοµοίοις, ὡς ἢ

ταὐτὸν ἢ παραπλήσιον ὂν τῇ αἰσθήσει τὴν φρόνησιν.

διαριθµησάµενος γάρ, ὡς ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ γνωρίζοµεν, ἐπὶ τέλει

192 προσέθηκεν ὡς ἐκ τούτων ‘πάντα πεπήγασιν ἀρµοσθέντα | καὶ

τούτοις φρονέουσι καὶ ἥδοντ᾽ ἠδ᾽ ἀνιῶνται’ [B 107]. διὸ καὶ τῷ

αἵµατι µάλιστα φρονεῖν· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ µάλιστα κεκρᾶσθαι <ἴσα117>

τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν µερῶν.

Theophrastus de sensibus 9-10 = DK 31A86

He speaks in this same way about thought and ignorance. For thinking is by means of like things and ignorance by unlike things, as though thought is the same as or similar to perception. For, having enumerated how we recognize each thing by each [a reference to B109], he adds at the end that from these things “all things have been fitted together and by means of these things they think and take delight and feel pain.” Wherefore thinking is especially by means of blood; for in this especially it is accomplished where the elements of the parts are equal.

Since thinking is similar to sense perception, thoughts must have a physical nature just as effluences are physical in order to be perceived by the sense organs. The organ for thinking is blood as Theophrastus states. An extant fragment confirms this claim:

αἵµατος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραµµένη ἀντιθορόντος,

τῇ τε νόηµα µάλιστα κικλήσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν·

αἷµα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόηµα.

Stobaeus Eclogues 1.49.53 = DK 31B105

[the heart] nourished in seas of blood that leaps back and forth; in this place especially it is called thought by men, for men’s thought is the blood around the heart.

The noun with τεθραµµένη is not specified; most editors understand ἡ κραδία since this organ is formed first in the embryo: Empedocles, quem in hoc Aristoteles secutus est, ante omnia cor iudicavit increscere, quod hominis vitam maxime contineat. (Censorinus

117 A. Frenkian proposed this emendation in “Theophrast de sensu Kap. 10” Philologus 107 (1963) 313.

193 6.1 = DK 31A84) “Empedocles, whom Aristotle followed in this, believed that the heart, which especially contains the life of man, grew before all things.”

Theophrastus emphasizes the role of like things in thinking and knowledge. Since one finds all four roots in the organs of perception as Empedocles’ description of the eye illustrates, one would therefore expect that all four roots are in blood in order to perceive the thought. Empedocles’ words corroborate this. On the one hand, blood possesses the most even mix of the roots.

ἡ δὲ χθὼν τούτοισιν ἴση συνέκυρσε µάλιστα

Ἡφαίστῳ τ’ ὄµβρῳ τε καὶ αἰθέρι παµφανόωντι,

Κύπριδος ὁρµισθεῖσα τελείοις ἐν λιµένεσσιν,

εἴτ’ ὀλίγον µείζων εἴτε πλεόνεσσιν ἐλάσσων·

ἐκ τῶν αἷµά τ᾽ ἔγεντο καὶ ἄλλης εἴδεα σαρκός.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.32.6-10 = DK 31B98

And earth happened to meet with these most equally, Hephaistos and rain and all- gleaming aither, anchored in the perfect harbours of Kypris, whether a little more or less among the more. From these blood came into being and other forms of flesh.118

Blood also goes everywhere in the body, including the surface of the skin where the senses pick up effluences (πᾶσι λίφαιµοι | σαρκῶν σύριγγες πύµατον κατὰ σῶµα τέτανται

(DK 31B100.1-2) “they all have channels of flesh, which the blood leaves, stretched over the surface of the body”). This allows blood to pick up thoughts everywhere and bring them back to the heart.

Although Empedocles does not explicitly link information derived from the senses and from thought119, Empedocles’ examples of concepts that cannot be understood by

118 Compare Theophrastus de sensibus 10

194 sensation alone suggest that thinking was required to make up for situations where the senses provide no or only partial information, or to determine which sense’s information should take precedence. Not only can thinking compensate for the potential shortcomings of senses, but it can also help the readers of Empedocles’ verses who face too short a lifetime to perceive everything (fragment 2). By thinking about the data with guidance from one who knows, that is, Empedocles, the reader will be able to overcome the deficiency of a short lifespan and link together the seemingly incongruent information from the senses. The totality of being is too vast for an individual to grasp. Yet

Empedocles can show the readers how the universe works if they focus on the lessons he provides. The mind overarches the other senses.

At the same time, thought is required to perceive things that the senses cannot.

οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι ἐν ὀφθαλµοῖσιν ἐφικτόν

ἡµετέροις ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ᾗπέρ τε µεγίστη

πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἁµαξιτὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει.

Clement Stromata 5.81 = DK 31B133

It is not possible to approach [the divine] with the reach of our eyes nor to take it up in our hands, by means of which the greatest road to persuasion for men leads to the mind.

Although the senses like sight and touch are the most persuasive for men, they are not capable of perceiving everything. Clement cites this passage as evidence, for example, that the divine is invisible. The only way that insensible things can be understood is through the mind. In fragment 17, for example, Empedocles emphasizes that the only way the readers can perceive Love is by focusing their thoughts on her.

119 Solmsen 1961 (157).

195 τὴν σὺ νόῳ δέρκευ, µηδ’ ὄµµασιν ἧσο τεθηπώς·

ἥτις καὶ θνητοῖσι νοµίζεται ἔµφυτος ἄρθροις,

τῇ τε φίλα φρονέουσι καὶ ἄρθµια ἔργα τελοῦσι,

Γηθοσύνην καλέοντες ἐπώνυµον ἠδ’ Ἀφροδίτην·

τὴν οὔ τις µετὰ τοῖσιν ἑλισσοµένην δεδάηκε

θνητὸς ἀνήρ· σὺ δ’ ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.20-25 = DK 31B17.21-26

But you, gaze on her (Love) with your understanding and do not sit stunned with eyes. For she is deemed even by mortals to be inborn in [their] joints and by her they think loving thoughts and accomplish works of unity calling her by the names Joy and Aphrodite. No mortal man has perceived her whirling among them. But you (contrary to θνητὸς ἀνήρ), hear the true expedition of my account.

An individual may not be able to perceive such things with their senses, but they are able to perceive the effects that they produce. Love may not be visible, but she affects men.

Drawing conclusions from the effect will lead to an understanding of Love and her rôle in the cosmic cycle. By paying attention to Empedocles’ account and applying their mind at the same time, the reader has an opportunity to understand Love. It is also only through the mind, for example, that an individual can understand how birth and death operate.

People who rely primarily on their senses and believe, for example, that things are utterly destroyed at death, are described as νήπιοι (“fools” – DK 31B11) because, in fact, if everything were completely destroyed nothing new could come into being. Death is simply dissolution into the roots, or component parts, just as birth is the mixture of the roots (DK 31B8). People, on the other hand, who accept as true that death is not utter annihilation, are σοφοὶ φρεσί (“wise in their wits” – DK 31B15).

196 Empedocles’ readers, therefore, must take the appropriate information from the various sensations of the sensible world and interpret it correctly. In this way they will look beyond the surface impressions that appear to contradict one another to the underlying nature of the world that is actually consistent. Once the readers come to understand all things in the universe (τὸ ὅλον) according to Empedocles’ lessons, they will know more than the others who brag that they themselves understand (fragment 2).

In concert with the purification from following the precepts in Καθαρµοί and becoming wise from understanding how the world really works, the readers can become gods like

Empedocles and manipulate the world.

197 Chapter 5 – The Revelation

If Pausanias and others hope to become initiated in the techniques of controlling the world, they must first read Empedocles’ verses and resolve his ambiguous writing. It will soon become apparent to them that the key to controlling the universe as a god is to understand how it functions. It is not Empedocles’ intention to contribute to the open discussion about how the world works (chapter 1) or to act as an intermediary between the gods and men (chapter 2), but to use language and literary techniques to conceal his lessons from everyone except those who are sufficiently wise and pure to become gods and thence to manipulate the world (chapters 3 and 4). Empedocles expects the readers will deduce how the world functions from these verses and learn further lessons from their continued observations. Love and Strife manipulate the parts of the roots in a never- ending cycle from Many to created world to One to created world and back to Many; then the cycle continues. If the readers, therefore, seek to control the world as gods, they must act like the immortal gods – Love and Strife. I will show below how Love and Strife are constrained by the oaths they take to function within this cosmic cycle and by the principle of like to like attraction.

It becomes clear as one reads the extant verses of Empedocles that the cosmic cycle as a whole and the individual players in it are emphasized – various phases of the universe repeatedly come into being and are destroyed. Empedocles emphasizes this aspect when he describes the cosmic cycle, returning repeatedly to the motif and maintaining its basic structure each time – mixture into One followed by separation into

198 Many.1 This unification and division, therefore, is the most important lesson to be learned from the cosmic cycle. Empedocles introduces the four roots – fire, water, air, and earth – in a riddle at the beginning of Physics in fragment 6. Not only does this riddle reveal their role as immortal gods in his interpretation of the world2, but it also emphasizes

Empedocles’ technique of ambiguity to challenge his readers to uncover the true nature of the roots.3 And although Empedocles does not solve for the reader the riddle in his verses, the identity of the roots is made clear in later fragments. The other eternal components – and immortal gods – in Empedocles’ system are Love and Strife. Their role, as Empedocles emphasizes through the literary technique of repetition, is to combine and separate the roots into the various components of the universe.4 Each time that Empedocles reveals that Love unites the roots into One and Strife separates them into

Many, the readers pass through the cycle themselves. And over many verses the readers experience the cycle many times, and the nature of the cycle becomes more clear with each reading.

Part 1: The Nature of the Cosmic Cycle

Although the very nature of a recurring cycle invalidates the question of a starting point, in the fragments that outline the general cycle Empedocles himself always begins with the Many as it unites into One: the roots combine into One and then they separate into Many. Although it is possible to draw together evidence that established how

1 See §1.3 in chapter 1 with fragment 17, but see below also. 2 See §1.1 in chapter 3. 3 See §2.2.1 in chapter 4. 4 Graham 1988; Michelini 1993, Trépanier 2003, Primavesi 2005. See §1.1 below.

199 Empedocles envisioned the world, this evidence is either widespread throughout the verses or missing altogether and is postulated in the assumption that the symmetry of the cycle means that opposite phases have opposite processes. Empedocles does not appear to have packaged his theories neatly for the readers, thus confirming my argument in chapter 1 about Empedocles’ self-presentation.

During the phase of Many which I describe more fully below in §2.3.2, Strife is at the peak of its influence and spread throughout the roots, which are arranged in concentric spheres with earth at the core, then water, air, and finally fire as the lightest of the roots, and Love is confined to the centre.5

Fragment 35 describes the phase when Love begins to manipulate the roots again, but

Strife has not completely left.

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ παλίνορσος ἐλεύσοµαι ἐς πόρον ὕµνων,

τὸν πρότερον κατέλεξα, λόγου λόγον ἐξοχετεύων,

κεῖνον· ἐπεὶ Νεῖκος µὲν ἐνέρτατον ἵκετο βένθος

δίνης, ἐν δὲ µέσηι Φιλότης στροφάλιγγι γένηται,

ἐν τῆι δὴ τάδε πάντα συνέρχεται ἓν µόνον εἶναι,

οὐκ ἄφαρ, ἀλλὰ θεληµὰ συνιστάµεν’ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα.

τῶν δέ τε µισγοµένων χεῖτ’ ἔθνεα µυρία θνητῶν·

πολλὰ δ’ ἄµεικτ’ ἔστηκε κεραιοµένοισιν ἐναλλάξ,

ὅσσ’ ἔτι Νεῖκος ἔρυκε µετάρσιον· οὐ γὰρ ἀµεµφέως

τῶν πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ’ ἔσχατα τέρµατα κύκλου,

ἀλλὰ τὰ µέν τ’ ἐνέµιµνε µελέων τὰ δέ τ’ ἐξεβεβήκει.

5 See §1.1.2 in chapter 3.

200 ὅσσον δ’ αἰὲν ὑπεκπροθέοι, τόσον αἰὲν ἐπήιει

ἠπιόφρων Φιλότητος ἀµεµφέος ἄµβροτος ὁρµή·

αἶψα δὲ θνήτ’ ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν µάθον ἀθάνατ’ εἶναι,

ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους.

τῶν δέ τε µισγοµένων χεῖτ’ ἔθνεα µυρία θνητῶν,

παντοίαις ἰδέηισιν ἀρηρότα, θαῦµα ἰδέσθαι.

Simplicius De Caelo CIAG 7.529.1-15 = DK 31B35

But I will go back to the passage of songs that I told before, channeling that account to another. When Strife arrived at the lowest depth of the eddy and Love gets to the middle of the whirl, in this place all these things come to be one alone, not suddenly, but coming together willingly, one from one direction and another from another. As they were being mixed, ten thousand tribes of mortals things poured forth, but many stood unmixed alternating with mixed things, as many as Strife, still above, held back. For it has not wholly stood out from these at the edges of the circle, but some of its limbs remain inside and some have gone out. And as far as it (Strife) moved out, so far did the immortal and gentle stream of blameless Love come forward. And straightaway things grew mortal that had learned before to be immortal and things were mixed which were unmixed before, changing paths. As they were mixed, ten thousand tribes of mortal things, fitted together in all sorts of forms, a wonder to behold.

Love’s power is on the increase while Strife’s is waning; Strife, nevertheless, does not retreat immediately, but continues to influence the roots. This contact leads to the making of mortal things. At the same time, Strife’s influence, especially while it is greater closer to the Many, will continue to allow unlike things to be separate as line 8 reveals: πολλὰ

δ’ ἄµεικτ’ ἔστηκε κεραιοµένοισιν ἐναλλάξ “many stood unmixed alternating with mixed things.”

201 There is little scholarly consensus on what the physical world looked like at this time while the roots were in the process of coming together into One from Many since

Empedocles’ words on the beginning of this stage have not survived6, if they even existed in the first place. Aristotle complains that Empedocles did not describe a cosmogony in the period following the Many because he could not.

ἐκ διεστώτων δὲ καὶ κινουµένων οὐκ εὔλογον ποιεῖν τὴν γένεσιν. διὸ

καὶ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς παραλείπει τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς Φιλότητος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν

ἠδύνατο συστῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐκ κεχωρισµένων µὲν

κατασκευάζων, σύγκρισιν δὲ ποιῶν διὰ τὴν Φιλότητα· ἐκ

διακεκριµένων γὰρ συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσµος τῶν στοιχείων. ὥστ’

ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ συγκεκριµένου.

Aristotle de caelo 301a14-20 = DK 31A42a

It is not sensible to produce creation from things that are separate and in motion. It is for this reason that Empedocles omits creation in the period of Love. For he was not able to form the sky, fashioning it on the one hand from separated things and on the other producing a compound through Love. The (present) world has been formed from separated elements, with the result that it [the world] had to come into being from one combined thing.

I would argue that simply because Empedocles did not describe such a cosmogony does not mean that he could not. It is not his goal to give a clear description of the universe as

Aristotle expects him to. A world is created, nevertheless, and is soon populated with a variety of creatures owing to the interaction of root parts as Love and Strife compete.

6 Although Empedocles does not describe a cosmogony here (if Aristotle’s testimony in de caelo 301a14- 20 is correct), the ordering of the Many, as outlined in §2.3.2 below, would be a perfect springboard for the world since earth is likely at the centre of the concentric spheres, followed by water, air, and fire.

202 Although a model with only one created world was popular in the 1960s and 1970s7,

Empedocles’ use of δοίη in fragment 17 supports the model with two worlds.

δίπλ’ ἐρέω· τοτὲ µὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη µόνον εἶναι

ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ’ αὖ διέφυ πλέον’ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι.

δοιὴ δὲ θνητῶν γένεσις, δοιὴ δ’ ἀπόλειψις·

τὴν µὲν γὰρ πάντων σύνοδος τίκτει τ’ ὀλέκει τε,

ἡ δὲ πάλιν διαφυοµένων θρεφθεῖσα διέπτη.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.1-5 = DK 31B17.1-5

I will say two-fold things: for at one time, [they] grew to be One alone from Many and at another time, moreover, they grew apart to be Many from One. Double is the birth of mortal things and double their passing away, for on the one hand the coming together of all both creates and destroys the one and on the other, the other, having been nurtured, flies off when [all] separate again.

The word δοίη can either be a noun meaning “doubt” or an adjective from δοιοί -αί -ά

“double.” From the context, δοίη is not a noun, for birth is not doubt, nor is destruction.8

7 Despite the variations in their models, each scholar argues that there is only one zoogony and one cosmogony. Bollack 1965 (1:95-122) argued that since the powers of Love and Strife are inherently opposite, it is impossible that each should create a world. Only Love can create a world (after the Many) and her ultimate goal is to return the elements to the One. Solmsen 1965 claimed that our world is created in two stages: Strife creates the physical frame of the universe (Earth proper) while Love is responsible for its zoogony. Hölscher 1965 posited that our world is created after the destruction of the sphere and never returns to that state. The struggle between Love and Strife manifests itself in the lifecycle of animals. van der Ben 1984 follows Hölscher closely, adding that it is nonsense that Love would desire to return to the One since this would destroy her handiwork. Barnes 1979, Mansfeld 1972, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1982, and Brown 1984 all agree with this linear cycle of creation. 8 Bollack 1969 (3:52) argues that the two δοίη of line 3 do not refer to a double creation and destruction, but each birth and death are ambivalent. By being born, both Many (i.e., anything that is not One) and a mortal being are created; by dying there is death of the mortal and death of the Many through the return to the unity of the Sphere. On this see also Mansfeld 1972. Bollack also prints another text, δρυφθεῖσ᾽ ἀποδρύπτει, thus eliminating the reference to birth (θρεφθεῖσα) and replacing it with a mere decline of mortal things. Long 1974 (402 ff.) emphasizes the ambiguous nature of birth and death as well. The θνητῶν in question, according to Long, are not the creatures formed by Love (men, trees, races of beasts and various monsters), but solely the roots as well as Love and Strife as described in lines 18-20. He argues that the nature of the double birth and double death of θνητῶν is simply the growth (φύεσθαι) of One from Many and the coming to be (ἐκτελέθουσι) of Many from One. Each birth is at the same time death: Many comes into being and the One dies and when the One is born, the Many is destroyed. With the cycle

203 δοίη is an adjective, therefore, but the use of the singular is rare considering the meaning9; before this passage it does not occur and there are few extant examples afterward.10 Nevertheless, this is the best way of reading the text since two creations of mortal things align with the symmetrical antithesis of unification and separation.11

The recent publication of the Strasbourg papyrus confirms the double creation model.

There is a passage in ensemble a that follows the pattern of fragment 21 where a creation of mortal things follows immediately on a description of the One (see below), but it mentions Strife as opposed to Love immediately before the creation of mortal things.

[ἀλλ᾽ ἐν µὲν Φιλότητι συνερχό]µεθ᾽ εἰς ἕνα κό̣σµον,

[ἐν δ᾽ Ἔχθρηι γε πάλιν διέφυ πλέ]ον᾽ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι

[ἐξ ὦν πάντ(α) ὅσα τ᾽ ἦν ὅσα τ᾽ ἐστ(ὶ) ὅ]σα τ᾽ ἔσσετ᾽ὀπί̣σσω

[δένδρεά τ᾽ ἐβλάστησε καί ἀνέρες] ἠδέ γυναῖκες,

[θ]ῆρές τ᾽οἰωνο̣ί̣ [τε καὶ] ὑ̣δατοθρ[έµµονες ἰχθῦς]

[κ]αί τε θεοί δολιχα[ίων]ες τιµῆισ[ι φέριστοι.]12

Strasbourg Papyrus a(i)6 – a(ii)2 (Martin and Primavesi) alternating between One and Many ceaselessly, Long describes this as a mortal (his italics) condition (402) since birth and death are in reality mixture and separation. 9 Hölscher 1965 (202 ff.), therefore, sees in Empedocles only the two processes of coming together and growing apart. In creating mortal things, the sphere is destroyed; the destruction of mortal things through separation will lead to reconstitution of the Sphere. He does not see that these processes are merely the context for birth and death of mortal things. 10 Simias Grammaticus Epigrammata 6.113: Πρόσθε µὲν ἀγραύλοιο δασύτριχος ἰξάλου αἰγὸς | δοιὸν ὅπλον χλωροῖς ἐστεφόµαν πετάλοις· “As the second horn of a wild thick-haired bounding goat (ibex), I was formerly garlanded with green leaves.” Callimachus Epigrammata 7.89: Ἄττα γέρον, δοιός µε καλεῖ γάµος· ἡ µία µὲν δὴ | νύµφη καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ γενεῇ κατ’ ἐµέ, | ἡ δ’ ἑτέρη προβέβηκε. “Dear sir, two marriages call me – one bride is equal to me in wealth and birth, the other surpasses me;” Moschus Europa 48-9: δοιοῦ δ’ ἕστασαν ὑψοῦ ἐπ’ ὀφρύσιν αἰγιαλοῖο | φῶτες ἀολλήδην θηεῦντο δὲ ποντοπόρον βοῦν. “They stood aloft upon the brows of the double strand and in a crowd the men watch the sea-traveling bull.” Second century A.D. grammarian Aelius Herodianus links δοιός with διπλοῦς (Partitiones 24.14, 216.8) and δοιάζω “to consider in two ways” (Περὶ παθῶν vol. 3.2, 280.20). 11 Graham 1988 (306). See §1.1.1 below. 12 These verses are supplemented on the basis of parallels in fragment 21.

204 But under Love we come together into a single ordered whole, whereas under Strife, in turn it (i.e., τὸ ἕν) grew apart, to become Many out of One, out of which (i.e., πλέον᾽) come all beings that were and that are and that will be hereafter: trees sprang forth and men and women, and beasts and birds and fishes nurtured in water, and also long-lived gods, preeminent in their honours.

Although the wording of the second line is only postulated, it seems certain that it refers to Strife owing to the context of the line, that is, something is from the One, a phrase common to Empedocles to describe the formation of Many, for example, τοτὲ δ’ αὖ διέφυ

πλέον’ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι (DK 31B17.2). If the placement of Love is fragment 21 is significant, then the same interpretation must be applied here, that is, that there are two created worlds, one under the influence of Love and another under Strife after the One begins to dissipate (Martin and Primavesi 1999, 180-182). This is supported, moreover, by one so-called context for fragment 21, although I argue below that Aristotle may be quoting from the lines that the papyrus adds to fragment 17.

τίθησι µὲν γὰρ ἀρχήν τινα αἰτίαν τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ νεῖκος, δόξειε δ’

ἂν οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ τοῦτο γεννᾶν ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐκ

τούτου τἆλλά ἐστι πλὴν ὁ θεός. λέγει γοῦν·

ἐξ ὧν πάνθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἦν ὅσα τ’ ἔσθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἔσται ὀπίσσω,

δένδρεά τ’ ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες,

θῆρές τ’ οἰωνοί τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέµµονες ἰχθῦς,

καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες

Aristotle Metaphysics 1000a27ff.

For he (Empedocles) establishes strife as a principle cause of destruction, but it seems, nevertheless, to produce this (i.e., everything) outside of the One; for all other things except God comes from this: at any rate he says: “all things are from these, as many as were, as many as are and as many as will be hereafter. Trees sprout up and

205 men and women and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish and the long-lived gods.”

It has been assumed that Aristotle here was quoting part of fragment 21 and misunderstood Empedocles’ intent and, in addition, misquoted the first line (Cherniss

1935, 231n62). Some editors, for example, Inwood, replaced the line transmitted in the manuscripts with the line quoted by Aristotle. The discovery of this papyrus, however, shows that Aristotle did not twist Empedocles' words to fit his own interpretation – a(i)8 and the parallel with Aristotle shows that this excerpt from ensemble a may have been the passage Aristotle quoted.13

The mixing continues until Love has complete influence as she permeates the roots and Strife is spread out over the edge of the circumference, at the lowest depth of the eddy. She has arranged the root parts into the One, which I describe more fully in

§2.2.214, a sphere that is whole and perfect in its harmony.

Once Strife begins to exert influence again, he initiates motion in the Sphere (πάντα

γὰρ ἑξείης πελεµίζετο γυῖα θεοῖο (DK 31B31) “for one after another all the limbs of the god were shaken”) at a time predicted by an oath (fragment 30).15 As Strife’s influence over the roots increases, another world is created.

Ἐµπεδοκλῆς τὸν µὲν αἰθέρα πρῶτον διακριθῆναι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ

πῦρ, ἐφ’ ὧι τὴν γῆν, ἐξ ἧς ἄγαν περισφιγγοµένης τῆι ῥύµηι τῆς

περιφορᾶς ἀναβλύσαι τὸ ὕδωρ· ἐξ οὗ θυµιαθῆναι τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ

13 It is ironic that Aristotle would quote a passage that supports what he says cannot happen in de caelo 301a14-20. 14 See also §1.2.2 in chapter 3. 15 I discuss the role of the oath in §1.2 and the question of rest and motion during the One in §2.2.2.

206 γενέσθαι τὸν µὲν οὐρανὸν ἐκ τοῦ αἰθέρος, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ἐκ τοῦ

πυρός, πιληθῆναι δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ περίγεια.

Aëtius 2.6.3 (Dox 334) = DK 31A49b

Empedocles says that aither was separated first, then fire and then earth from which water sprang forth as it was squeezed out by the force of the rotation. From water, air16 was vapourized and the sky came into being from the aither, the sun from fire and the things about the earth were condensed from the others.

The emphasis in this passage is on the separation (διακριθῆναι) of the roots as they come together into masses of like root parts. It is the motion that Strife introduces and is described by Aëtius as rotation (περιφορᾶς) that brings about this separation. It is more likely that the first motion is shaking (compare fragment 30 above) and that rotation begins with the creation of the sun.17 It is also evident from this passage that this centrifugal force separates the lightest roots, aither and fire, first while earth and water remain in the middle. Plants and animals are also created in this phase of the cycle.

ἐν δὲ Κότῳ διάµορφα καὶ ἄνδιχα πάντα πέλονται,

σὺν δ’ ἔβη ἐν Φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται.

ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἦν ὅσα τ’ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται,

δένδρεά τ’ ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες, 10

θῆρές τ’ οἰωνοί τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέµµονες ἰχθῦς,

καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιµῆισι φέριστοι.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.159.19-24 = DK 31B21.7-12

In Wrath all things are separate and apart, and they come together in Love and desire one another. From these are all things – as many as were, as many as are and will be,

16 See note 31 in chapter 1 for the distinction between aer and aither. 17 Kingsley 1994a.

207 trees come forth and men and women and beasts and birds and water-nurtured fish and long-lived gods, preeminent in their honours.

As I argue above, the mention of the One immediately before this creation suggests that this world is fashioned at that time. The cycle continues until Strife’s control over the roots is complete and the Many is formed; the cycle begins again.

1.1 REPETITION IN THE CYCLE

Empedocles uses repetition within fragment 17 and among various other points in the poem to emphasize for the readers the importance of the cosmic cycle for his doctrine. As

Graham 1988 first noted, the cyclic repetition of Empedocles’ verses and words that mimic the nature of Empedocles’ cosmological cycle is another representation of this journey that the readers take. Empedocles expects that the readers will have to go over his verses many times in order to resolve ambiguities and he refuses to give a full and complete lesson at any one moment. He acquaints the reader with the cycle gradually in order to aid with interpretation, thus following his own precept (fragment 110) discussed in chapter 4 that the lesson should grow within the reader. He declares, moreover, his intent to move the reader in a circular fashion throughout the poem: κορυφὰς ἑτέρας

ἑτέρῃσι προσάπτων | µύθων µὴ τελέειν ἀτραπὸν µίαν (DK 31B24) “linking different high points to others with the result that I don't complete one path of my story.” Repetition emphasizes important points and when used on a larger scale, that is, over very many lines, brings the reader back to the original point to emphasize it anew. As Empedocles says, it is good to repeat a point more than once: καὶ δὶς γάρ, ὃ δεῖ, καλόν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν

(DK 31B25) “For it is a good thing to say twice what one must.”

208 1.1.1 Fragment 17

Fragment 17, now continued by ensemble a of the Strasbourg Papyrus, is the most explicit description of the cosmic cycle.18

δίπλ’ ἐρέω· τοτὲ µὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη µόνον εἶναι

ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ’ αὖ διέφυ πλέον’ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι.

δοιὴ δὲ θνητῶν γένεσις, δοιὴ δ’ ἀπόλειψις·

τὴν µὲν γὰρ πάντων σύνοδος τίκτει τ’ ὀλέκει τε,

ἡ δὲ πάλιν διαφυοµένων θρεφθεῖσα διέπτη.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.1-5 = DK 31B17.1-5

I will say two-fold things: for at one time, [they] grew to be One alone from Many and at another time, moreover, they grew apart to be Many from One. Double is the birth of mortal things and double their passing away, for on the one hand the coming together of all both creates and destroys the one and on the other, the other, having been nurtured, flies off when [all] separate again.

Beginning with Many, the cycle moves to One, and then the cycle goes from One to

Many. Between Many and One, there are mortal creatures and between One and Many there are other mortal creatures – the birth and destruction of mortal creatures is double.

The symmetry of the cycle as initially established requires a matching balance in the mortal things.

The unification and separation of the roots is expressed twice in the first five lines. In line 1 they grow together to be One (ἓν ηὐξήθη µόνον εἶναι); Empedocles matches this in line 2 with their separation: διέφυ πλέον’ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι.19 The use of αὖ in line 2 also emphasizes that this separation from One to Many has happened before. After a brief

18 See also §1.3 in chapter 1. 19 These lines are repeated in lines 16-17.

209 interlude to include the creation and destruction of mortal things in line 3, Empedocles returns to the unification of the roots into One in line 4 (πάντων σύνοδος) and their separation into Many in line 5 (διαφυοµένων (a genitive absolute with a substantive such as πάντων or τουτῶν understood)). The variations in how Empedocles expresses it each time may indicate further that the created worlds are different each time.20 As fragment 17 continues, the cycle repeats a number of times in a variety of ways. This emphasizes that the cycle happens over and over.

καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀλλάσσοντα διαµπερὲς οὐδαµὰ λήγει,

ἄλλοτε µὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόµεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,

ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύµενα Νείκεος ἔχθει.

<οὕτως ἧι µὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων µεµάθηκε φύεσθαι>

ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἑνὸς πλέον’ ἐκτελέθουσι,

τῆι µὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφισιν ἔµπεδος αἰών·

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.6-10 = DK 31B17.6-11

And these things never cease from constantly alternating, at one time, all things coming together into One through Love and at another each thing being carried apart by the enmity of Strife. In this way, insofar as they have learned to become One from Many and they end up as Many when the One is divided again, in this respect they come into being and there is no secure life for them.

Although Empedocles varies the expressions of unification and separation, the pattern of unification of the roots into One, presumably from a state of Many, followed by their separation into Many remains consistent. Empedocles emphasizes by means of verbs the process of how Love and Strife influence the roots rather than the states of One and

20 Owing to the nature of Love’s influence in the One and the nature of the roots in the Many, the One and the Many will always take the same form. The various root parts, however, will be in different positions.

210 Many. The continuation of One to Many to One to Many also emphasizes the variable consistency Empedocles points out in lines 12-13: ᾗ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαµπερὲς οὐδαµὰ

λήγει, | ταύτῃ δ’ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον. “But insofar as they never stop changing constantly, in this respect they are always unchanged in a cycle.”

After Empedocles tells the readers again in lines 16 and 17 that the roots combine into One and separate into Many, he goes on to describe the nature of the roots, Love, and

Strife. But the cycle is not far from Empedocles’ mind because, with the lines that the

Strasbourg Papyrus now provide, the motifs of unification and separation continue.

[ἀλλ᾽ ἐν µὲν Φιλότητι συνερχό]µεθ᾽ εἰς ἕνα κό̣σµον,

[ἐν δ᾽ Ἔχθρηι γε πάλιν διέφυ πλέ]ον᾽ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι

Strasbourg Papyrus a(i)6-a(i)8 (Martin and Primavesi)

But under Love we come together into a single ordered whole, whereas under Strife, in turn it (i.e., τὸ ἕν) grew apart, to become Many out of One

The papyrus describes the creation of the world and animals as the roots interact after the formation of the Many (a(i)8 and following) until they finally come together to form the

One (a(ii)15-a(ii)20). Empedocles promises to match what is essentially an expansion of the motif of the roots eventually combining into One with an account of their separation into Many through another created world: [π]ρῶτον µὲν ξύνοδόν τε διάπτυξίν τ̣[ε] ……|

ὅ̣σ̣[σ]α τε νῦν ἔτι λοιπὰ πέλει τούτοιο τ[. (Strasbourg Papyrus a(ii) 24-5) “First the coming together and the unfolding…and as many as now still remain of this…”

211 1.1.2 Fragment 26

Fragment 26 focuses on the roots, but the emphasis lies more within the cosmological cycle as a whole rather than in the created worlds as was seen in fragment 17 and ensemble a.

ἐν δὲ µέρει κρατέουσι περιπλοµένοιο κύκλοιο,

καὶ φθίνει εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ αὔξεται ἐν µέρει αἴσης.

αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι’ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα

γίνοντ(αι) ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα θηρῶν

ἄλλοτε µὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόµεν’ εἰς ἕνα κόσµον, 5

ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορούµενα Νείκεος ἔχθει,

εἰσόκεν ἓν συµφύντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται.

οὕτως ἧι µὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων µεµάθηκε φύεσθαι

ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἑνὸς πλέον’ ἐκτελέθουσι,

τῆι µὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφισιν ἔµπεδος αἰών· 10

ἧι δὲ τάδ’ ἀλλάσσοντα διαµπερὲς οὐδαµὰ λήγει,

ταύτηι δ’ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.33.19-34.3 = DK 31B26

And in turn they dominate as the cycle turns about, and they wane into one another and they increase according to the turn of the lot. For these things are, running through one another they become men and tribes of other beasts, at one time coming together in Love into one ordered whole, and at another time each carried apart by the enmity of Strife, until growing together as One the whole becomes subordinated. In this way they learn to grow into One from Many and when the One grows apart again they end up as Many, in this respect they come into being and life is not secure for them; but as these things never cease in the constant interchanging, in this way they are always unchanged in the cycle.

212 The roots begin this fragment as line 3 indicates: it is the roots that make up compounds.

This may refer to times closer to the One and the Many as the roots look less like the created world with which we are familiar, especially since in line 4 there may be a fresh emphasis on how they become mortal things.

Fragment 26 repeats almost verbatim lines 7-10 from fragment 17. This continues the emphasis on unification and separation; variations in the text, however, are significant.

Line 5 of fragment 26 repeats line 7 of fragment 17, except the unification here is εἰϛ ἓνα

κόσµον, thus emphasizing the ordered nature of the One21, as opposed to the focus on all things coming into One – εἰϛ ἓν ἅπαντα – that we see in fragment 17. This introduces a new point to consider for careful readers, and gives insight into the nature of the One. As fragment 26 continues the motifs of separation and into unification again, Empedocles inserts: εἰσόκεν ἓν συµφύντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται (line 7) “until growing together as

One the whole becomes subordinated.” Just as describing the One as a κόσµος in line 5 alerts the readers to the nature of the One, this emphasizes that the nature of the roots have become completely dominated by the influence of Love.22

Once again, the roots are the foundation of this cycle as it returns to them. They participate without rest: part of created things; coming together into the One; separating again to form the created world until they have wholly come apart into the Many. And so the cycle continues through the phases without stopping.

21 See §1.2.2 in chapter 3. 22 See §2.2.2 below.

213 1.2 THE NECESSITY OF THE CYCLE

Love and Strife have sworn an oath to one another that no one of them would dominate the roots forever. As Empedocles describes, in Strife’s time he takes up his honours, which are mentioned in fragment 17: τιµῆς δ’ ἄλλης ἄλλο µέδει, πάρα δ’ ἦθος

ἑκάστῳ, | ἐν δὲ µέρει κρατέουσι περιπλοµένοιο χρόνοιο. (lines 28-9) “one rules over one honour and another another, each has its character, and they rule in turn as time circles around.”

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ µέγα νεῖκος ἐνὶ µελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη

ἐς τιµάς τ’ ἀνόρουσε τελειοµένοιο χρόνοιο,

ὅς σφιν ἀµοιβαῖος πλατέος παρ’ ἐλήλαται ὅρκου

Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1184.14-16 = DK 31B30

But when Strife had been nourished great within its limbs, and leapt up to its honours as the time was completed, an equal time that has been established for each by a broad oath.

The honours that Love and Strife have are the control over the roots; Love brings together roots that are unlike to create compounds as her power increases until the One is formed23 and Strife separates the roots so that like root parts can follow their natural attraction to one another until the Many is generated.24 That an oath maintains this alternation of influence emphasizes how important this concept is for the cycle.25 When

Aristotle introduces this fragment, he emphasizes the necessity of this back and forth between Love and Strife: καὶ ἅµα δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς µεταβολῆς αἴτιον οὐθὲν λέγει ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅτι

οὕτως πέφυκεν: B30 (Aristotle Metaphysics 1000b12) “And at the same time he gives no

23 See §2.2 below. 24 See §2.3 below. 25 Transmigration is similarly important and is also kept by an oath. See §2.1 in chapter 3.

214 cause for this change except that it happens in this way by nature.” This alternation between Love and Strife is as important for the readers to understand as the attraction of like root parts that I describe below.

Part 2: How the Cosmic Cycle Operates

Empedocles provides the outline for the cosmic cycle many times, even within the extant verses, and in a variety of ways to show that the cycle remains consistent in essence, but the details are open to variation. The most consistent part of the cycle is that which Empedocles identifies as the immortal gods – Love, Strife, and the four roots.

Love and Strife manipulate the four roots to create the world as well as the phases called

One and Many.

ἀλλ’ ἄγε, τόνδ’ ὀάρων προτέρων ἐπιµάρτυρα δέρκευ,

εἴ τι καὶ ἐν προτέροισι λιπόξυλον ἔπλετο µορφῇ,

ἠέλιον µὲν λευκὸν ὁρᾶν καὶ θερµὸν ἁπάντῃ,

ἄµβροτα δ’ ὅσσ’ εἴδει τε καὶ ἀργέτι δεύεται αὐγῇ,

ὄµβρον δ’ ἐν πᾶσι δνοφόεντά τε ῥιγαλέον τε· 5

ἐκ δ’ αἴης προρέουσι θελεµνά τε καὶ στερεωπά.

ἐν δὲ Κότῳ διάµορφα καὶ ἄνδιχα πάντα πέλονται,

σὺν δ’ ἔβη ἐν Φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται.

ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἦν ὅσα τ’ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται,

δένδρεά τ’ ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες, 10

θῆρές τ’ οἰωνοί τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέµµονες ἰχθῦς,

καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιµῆισι φέριστοι.

215 αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι’ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα

γίγνεται ἀλλοιωπά· τόσον διὰ κρῆσις ἀµείβει.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.159.13-26 = DK 31B21

But come, gaze upon this witness of my earlier words, if something was lacking in form in the earlier (words) – the sun, bright to look upon and warm in every respect, and as many immortals as are drenched in heat and shining light, and rain both dark and chilling in everything; and from the earth flows forth dense and solid things. In Wrath all things are separate and apart, and they come together in Love and desire one another. From these are all things – as many as were, as many as are and will be, trees come forth and men and women and beasts and birds and water-nurtured fish and long-lived gods, preeminent in their honours. For these things are, running through one another they become different things – for the blending changes them.

This fragment focuses on the role of the roots within the cycle and how they interact with one another as the fragment begins and ends with the roots in compounds, as Simplicius excerpted it. The roots are described with their qualities: fire (the sun) is warm, air is bright26, water is cold, and earth is solid. They are fundamentally different from one another. The nature of the roots themselves, moreover, is reflected in the character of the compounds they are part of. Lines 7 and 8 return to the poles of the cycle – the Many and the One. While Empedocles’ description of the cycle, especially in fragments 17 and 26, focuses on the process of becoming One and then becoming Many, here he emphasizes the states of the Many and the One; it only appears, therefore, that he has switched the order I pointed out above, that is, uniting into One and then separating into Many.27 Under the influence of Wrath (Strife), all things, specifically all the roots just described, are separate, that is, Many. Under the influence of Love, on the other hand, all these same

26 See note 31 in chapter 1 on the distinction between aither and the heavy and wet aer. 27 See §1.1 above.

216 things come together and desire one another as the One. As the fragment continues, when the created worlds come into being, all that we see around us is made up of the roots in varying patterns to account for the diversity of life and landscape. It has happened in the past, is happening now, and it will happen in the future. The cycle continues.

If the readers hope to control the world, they must understand the properties of the players before they attempt to mimic the actions of Love and Strife over the roots.

2.1 THE ROOTS

The roots, as we have already seen briefly in the fragments that focus on the cosmological cycle, are the players that are manipulated throughout the phases into varying configurations, whether beast or landscape while worlds are created, into distinct categories during the Many, or united together when the One has been formed. They are four in number and called air, earth, water, and fire. For the roots, however, to become a part of a compound, whether the One, the Many, or any number of created things, they must consist of smaller parts, contrary to the continuous nature of Parmenides’ “what is.”

ἄρθµια µὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ἑαυτῶν πάντα µέρεσσιν,

ἠλέκτωρ τε χθών τε καὶ οὐρανὸς ἠδὲ θάλασσα,

ὅσσα φιν ἐν θνητοῖσιν ἀποπλαχθέντα πέφυκεν.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 160.28-161.1 = DK 31B22.1-3

For all these things – sun and earth and sky and sea – are united with their own parts, as many as were born in mortal things once they had been separated.

Root parts are clearly what comes together to form compounds; bone, for example, is composed of two parts earth, two parts water and four parts fire (ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν

εὐστέρνοις χοάνοισι | τὼ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ µερέων λάχε Νήστιδος αἴγλης, | τέσσαρα δ’

217 Ἡφαίστοιο· τὰ δ’ ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο | Ἁρµονίης κόλληισιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίῃσιν

(Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.300.21-24 = DK 31B96) “And pleasant earth in her well- built channels received two parts of gleaming Nestis out of the eight and four of

Hephaistos. And they become white bones fitted together with the divine glues of

Harmony.”).

Empedocles, however, never states how small these parts are.28 Aëtius links

Empedocles to Anaxagoras, the atomists, and Epicureans, saying that the roots can be separated into homoiomerous parts, that is, into smaller parts whose nature is consistent throughout (Ἐµπεδοκλῆς ἔφη πρὸ τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων θραύσµατα ἐλάχιστα οἱονεὶ

στοιχεῖα πρὸ τῶν στοιχείων ὁµοιοµερῆ. (Aëtius 1.13.1 = Doxographi graeci 312 = DK

31A43b) “Empedocles said that prior to the four elements there were very small pieces, as though there were elements like to each other and the whole prior to the elements.”) and that these parts are very small (Ἐµπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἐκ µικροτέρων ὄγκων

τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα καὶ οἱονεὶ στοιχεῖα στοιχείων. (Aëtius 1.17.3

= Doxographi Graeci 315 = DK 31A43c) “Xenocrates and Empedocles join the elements from very small masses which are minimal and, as it were, elements of elements.”).

Unlike the atomists, however, Empedocles does not say there is a point beyond which the roots cannot become smaller, nor does he specify that there will always be a smaller part as Anaxagoras does (οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ σµικροῦ ἐστι τό γε ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλ’ ἔλασσον ἀεί (τὸ

γὰρ ἐὸν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ µὴ οὐκ εἶναι)—ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ µεγάλου ἀεί ἐστι µεῖζον. καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ

τῷ σµικρῷ πλῆθος, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ µέγα καὶ σµικρόν. (Simplicius

Physics CIAG 9.164.17-20 = DK 59B3) “There is no smallest part of the small, but there

28 Sorabji 1988 (66).

218 is always a smaller part (for it is not possible that what is should not be). But there is always something bigger than even the large, and its number is equal to the small, and with respect to itself each thing is big and small.”) Rather, as Aristotle concludes,

Empedocles implies that they could be divided in theory, but in practice they are not: εἰ

δὲ στήσεται ἡ διάλυσις, ἤτοι ἄτοµον ἔσται τὸ σῶµα ἐν ὧι ἵσταται ἢ διαιρετὸν µέν, οὐ

µέντοι διαιρεθησόµενον οὐδέποτε, καθάπερ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς βούλεται λέγειν. (Aristotle de caelo 305a1-4 = DK 31A43Aa) “And if the division stops, either the body at which it stops will be indivisible (i.e., atomic) or it will be divisible but it will never be divided, as

Empedocles wishes to say.”

The roots, therefore, address many of the shortcomings that plagued Parmenides’ predecessors as they attempted to combine the change we perceive in the world with the permanence of a material source for all things although Empedocles does not present them as a solution. They exist permanently without change to their nature.

ἀλλ’ αὐτ(ὰ) ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι’ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα

γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁµοῖα.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.159.3-4 = DK 31B17.34-35

But these things [roots] are real, and running through each other they become different things at different times and are always, perpetually alike.

The roots exist as they are (αὔτ᾽ ἔστιν ταῦτα29), yet they become different things at different times (γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα). I discuss the various connotations of becoming for the roots in §1.1.1 in chapter 3. Empedocles tells us that the roots become different things (meaning 2) or change as the result of mixture (γίγνεται ἀλλοιωπά· τόσον διὰ

κρῆσις ἀµείβει (DK 31B21.14) “they become different in appearance, so much does the

29 Compare DK 31B21.13 (=DK 31B26.3) αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα.

219 mixture change them”) as they become compounds and mortal things such as men and tribes of other creatures (γίγνοντ᾽ ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα θηρῶν (DK 31B26.4)).

Becoming, therefore, is an external transformation, as the roots become compounds.30 At all times the roots themselves remain internally consistent because the roots are always the same throughout: ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁµοῖα. Each root preserves its character despite the changes it undergoes through the process of becoming something else.31

2.1.1 How the Root Parts Fit Together

Although Empedocles does state that root parts make up compounds, he does not specify the nature of these parts nor how they form compounds. It is vital, however, that the parts not lose their unique characteristics in the process since the components must be capable of later reuse once the compound is wholly broken.32 Empedocles describes how root parts come together to form compounds in two ways: 1) they run through one another (δι’ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα (DK 31B17.34, 31B21.13, 31B26.3)) and 2) they are fitted together (ὅσα νῦν γεγάασι συναρµοσθέντ’ Ἀφροδίτῃ (DK 31B71.4) “as many things as now exist, having been fitted together by Aphrodite”).

The image of root parts running through one another brings to mind the description of how sensation and thinking work, that is, by means of symmetry between the sensor and the sensed.33 Testimonia clearly link pores to compounds, but there is no evidence to

30 The compounds, on the other hand, come into being from something else (meaning 1b). Nothing comes into being from nothing (meaning 1a). See §1.1.1 in chapter 3. 31 Guthrie 1965, 147; Wright 1981, 172; Inwood 2001, 26. Bollack 1969 (3:79), on the other hand, interprets the sameness as the creation of the same different things as the cycle repeats. 32 Curd 2002 (147-153). 33 Theophrastus de sensu 7ff. (= Doxographi Graeci 500); Long 1966. See §2.3 in chapter 4 above.

220 associate pores with the parts of roots themselves. Philoponus provides a passage from

Empedocles to illustrate how mixture depends upon symmetry among the things about to be blended.

καὶ ὧν µέν εἰσι τὰ ναστὰ καὶ οἱ πόροι, τουτέστι τὰ κοῖλα καὶ πυκνὰ

σύµµετρα, ὥστε δι’ ἀλλήλων χωρεῖν, τούτων ἔφασκεν εἶναι µῖξιν

καὶ κρᾶσιν, οἷον ὕδατος καὶ οἴνου, ὧν δὲ ἀσύµµετρα, ἄµικτα ταῦτα

ἔφασκεν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἔλαιον καὶ ὕδωρ· φησὶ γὰρ ὕδωρ

‘οἴνῳ µᾶλλον ἐναρίθµιον, αὐτὰρ ἐλαίῳ οὐκ ἐθέλει’.

ταῦτα λέγων κατὰ παντὸς σώµατος τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ἡµιόνων

ἀτεκνίας ἀπεδίδου

Philoponus de generatione animalium CIAG 14(3).123.16-21

Empedocles claimed that there is mixture and blending of those things whose solid parts and pores, i.e., hollows and dense parts, are symmetrical with the result they go through one another; for example, water and wine. But he claimed that things in which they are asymmetrical are unmixed, for example, oil and water. For he says that water ‘is more easily fitted to wine, but with oil it does not want [to mix].’ He says this about every body and gives it as the cause of the sterility of mules.

Even this passage relates to mixing of compounds: water is the visible body most closely associated with the root but here is probably not purely root; wine and oil are also compounds. It is important, moreover, because it is an example beyond those of sensation. There is no reason, however, to believe that this passage illustrates that mixture occurs because of pores in compounds as Philoponus claims. The natural attraction of like for like, which is discussed below in part 2.1.2, is a better candidate. Water and wine, for example, mix well because of the high proportion of water parts in both. Water and oil, on the other hand, do not mix because there are few water parts in oil and there is,

221 therefore, no attraction of parts. Although pores and dense bits would both fit together and appear to run through one another, there is insufficient evidence to support the existence of pores in the roots.

Empedocles also describes the formation of compounds as the fitting together of root parts. In every instance where Empedocles uses this image, Love is the agent and she acts upon the parts as a carpenter would.34 Compounds are made up of unlike parts, which are not naturally attracted to one another and are fit together by Love whose influence then remains within the compound. Compounds, therefore, are not formed of parts that come together under their own power.35 Aristotle’s description of how compounds are formed illustrates well the particulate nature of the roots. His account, however, is flawed owing to the lack of a passage from Empedocles to support it.

ἐκείνοις τε γὰρ τοῖς λέγουσιν ὡς Ἐµπεδοκλῆς τίς ἔσται τρόπος;

ἀνάγκη γὰρ σύνθεσιν εἶναι καθάπερ ἐκ πλίνθων καὶ λίθων τοῖχος·

καὶ τὸ µεῖγµα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ σῳζοµένων µὲν ἔσται τῶν στοιχείων, κατὰ

µικρὰ δὲ παρ’ ἄλληλα συγκειµένων· οὕτω δὴ σὰρξ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

ἕκαστον.

Aristotle de generatione et corruptione 334a26 ff. = DK 31A43a

What will be the manner [of coming to be for compounds] for those who speak as Empedocles? It is necessary that there be a combination, like a wall from bricks and stones, and this mixture will be from elements that have been preserved in small bits and lying close by one another. In this way there is flesh and every other thing.

34 See §2.2.1 below. 35 Love takes on such an active role in order to overcome the natural attraction of like to like. See §2.1.2 below.

222 The comparison of parts in a compound to bricks in a wall illustrates a particulate structure. Each root part will retain its unique characteristics and when Love’s influence has left the compound, each part will be free to join another compound. Further, each part will be so small that the compound does not seem to be a mass of root parts sitting side by side: ἄν δ’ ᾖ κατὰ µικρὰ σύνθεσις ἡ µίξις, οὐθὲν συµβήσεται τούτων, ἀλλὰ µόνον

µεµιγµένα πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν· (καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ µὲν µεµιγµένον, ἐὰν µὴ βλέπῃ ὀξύ, τῷ

Λυγκεῖ δ’ οὐθὲν µεµιγµένον (Aristotle de generatione et corruptione 328a12-16) “But if mixing is a composition of small particles, none of these things will happen [i.e., the mixture will not be uniform throughout so that any part of the mixture is the same as the whole], but the ingredients will only be mixed according to the standard of sense perception, and the same thing will be a mixture to one man, if he has not sharp sight, but to the eyes of Lynceus will not be mixed”.

2.1.2 The Attraction of Like to Like

The natural attraction of like root parts lies at the heart of Empedocles’ theory of mixture and separation; the tradition of this attraction can be seen at the very beginning of Greek literature from Homer onwards.36 The affinity of like for like is mentioned in the

Odyssey: νῦν µὲν δὴ µάλα πάγχυ κακὸς κακὸν ἡγηλάζει, | ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁµοῖον ἄγει θεὸς

ὡς τὸν ὁµοῖον. (Odyssey 17.217-218) “Now indeed the vile leads the vile, just as the god always leads like to like.” Plato indicates that this point of view was common and associates it with early philosophers:

36 Müller 1965 studies the history of the concept of like to like in philosophical authors from the Milesians to the sophists.

223 Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγράµµασιν ἐντετύχηκας

ταῦτα αὐτὰ λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ὅµοιον τῷ ὁµοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ φίλον

εἶναι; εἰσὶν δέ που οὗτοι οἱ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου

διαλεγόµενοι καὶ γράφοντες.

Plato Lysis 214b

And isn’t it also the case with the writings of those very wise men which tell the same story, namely that it is necessary that like be dear to like? They are, I believe, the ones who talk and write on the nature of the universe.

For Empedocles, this attraction occurs on the level of the parts of the roots. Aristotle relates an anecdote about the attraction of a dog to one particular tile that not only underscores Empedocles’ conviction in the attraction of like to like but also reveals the cause for it.

οἱ φυσιολόγοι καὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν διακοσµοῦσιν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες

τὸ τὸ ὅµοιον ἰέναι πρὸς τὸ ὅµοιον, διὸ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὴν κύν’

ἔφη καθῆσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς κεραµῖδος διὰ τὸ ἔχειν πλεῖστον ὅµοιον.

Aristotle Eudemian Ethics 1235a10-12 = DK 31A20Aa

The natural philosophers also arrange the whole of nature taking as a principle that like goes to like; that is why Empedocles said that the bitch sat on the tile, because it had the greatest similarity.37

A different version of the same anecdote builds on the similarity that attracted the dog to the tile.38 How can two things that seem so different – one is alive, the other inanimate;

37 For a discussion of those passages in Aristotle that scholars have used to deny Empedocles’ belief in this principle (de generatione et corruptione 323b1-12 and de anima 410a21-26), see O’Brien 1969 (301-04). 38 φασὶν δὲ καὶ κυνός ποτε ἀεὶ καθευδούσης ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κεραµῖδος, ἐρωτηθέντα τὸν Ἐµπεδοκλέα, διὰ τί ποτε ἡ κύων ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κεραµῖδος καθεύδει, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔχει τι τῇ κεραµῖδι ὅµοιον ἡ κύων, ὡς διὰ τὸ ὅµοιον τὴν κύνα φοιτῶσαν. ([Aristotle] Magna Moralia 1208b11-15) “There was once a bitch that always

224 the one is soft, the other hard – have anything in common that would attract them? Only roots and being composed of them connect the dog and the tile. The attraction, therefore, must lie in the roots. This attraction goes beyond conscious choice. Aristotle, discussing the nature of friendship, links the principle of like to like to Empedocles again.

διαµφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἳ µὲν γὰρ ὁµοιότητά

τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁµοίους φίλους, ὅθεν τὸν ὅµοιόν

φασιν ὡς τὸν ὅµοιον, καὶ κολοιὸν ποτὶ κολοιόν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· …

ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὅµοιον τοῦ ὁµοίου ἐφίεσθαι.

Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1155a32-b8

But there is much difference of opinion as to the nature of friendship. Some define it as a matter of similarity; they say that we love those who are like ourselves, whence the proverbs “like finds like” and “birds of a feather flock together” and so on. … Empedocles especially declares that like seeks after like.

Like actively seeks like for its own sake, not at the impetus of another force whether

Love or Strife.

Empedocles confirms that neither Love nor Strife is responsible for the attraction of like to like when he expresses elsewhere this general principle without specifying an external agent. Thinking and perception by senses both depend on similarity between received and receptor as outlined in §2.3 of chapter 4. The mixture of liquids described by Philoponus above (fragment 91) also appears to operate on this notion. The principle

slept on the same tile, and Empedocles, when he was asked why the dog slept on the same tile, said that the dog had something similar to the tile, as though the dog were going on account of the similarity.”

225 of like to like participates in the initial creation of mortals: fire pushes the first mortal things after the One out of the earth in its desire to join with other parts of fire.39

οὐλοφυεῖς µὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον,

ἀµφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ εἴδεος αἶσαν ἔχοντες·

τοὺς µὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεµπε θέλον πρὸς ὁµοῖον ἱκέσθαι …

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.381.34-382.1= DK 31B62.4-6

first there came whole-natured outlines from the earth, having a share of water and heat both – fire sent them up wishing to reach its like.

Growth also depends on the attraction of like parts: αὔξει δὲ χθὼν µὲν σφέτερον δέµας,

αἰθέρα δ’ αἰθήρ (DK 31B37) “and earth expands its own bulk and aither (expands) aither”, as does nutrition: ὣς γλυκὺ µὲν γλυκὺ µάρπτε, πικρὸν δ’ ἐπὶ πικρὸν ὄρουσεν, |

ὀξὺ δ’ ἐπ’ ὀξὺ ἔβη, δαερὸν δ’ ἐποχεῖτο δαηρῷ (DK 31B90) “thus sweet grasped sweet and bitter rushed to bitter, sharp went to sharp and hot mated with hot.” In each of these examples like actively seeks out like. Empedocles identifies no other agent responsible for bringing likes together. The attraction of like root parts, therefore, seems to be a natural process that lies beyond the powers of Love and Strife. They must operate, therefore, within the confines of the roots’ innate properties; if the readers hope to emulate Love and Strife, they must understand these properties as well.

2.2 LOVE

In the overall view of the cycle, Love brings the root parts together to form the One while Strife separates them to form the Many. Empedocles illustrates Love’s influence

39 Since fire is described earlier in the same fragment as κρινόµενον (line 2) ‘separating’, O’Brien 1969 (204, 312-13) argues that fire here represents Strife. The pushing out of the first living things, however, seems rather a by-product of fire going forth to unite with fire.

226 with συν- compounds: συνέρχοµαι (DK 31B17.7, 31B26.5, PStr. a(ii)20), συµβαίνω (DK

31B21.8), and σύνοδος (DK 31B17.4). On the other hand, δια- compounds mark the influence of Strife: διαφύοµαι (DK 31B17.2, 5, 10, 17, 31B26.9) and δίχα (DK 31B17.8,

31B26.6). Some argue, therefore, that at all times Love unites all root parts to one another, and that Strife separates all roots parts from one another.40 Such an interpretation is possible only because Empedocles does not specify here what Love unites and what

Strife separates. Love unites root parts that are unlike because the attraction of like to like is the roots’ natural movement41; the role of Strife is to break up this natural attraction so that other compounds can be created.

2.2.1 Love Combines Unlike Things

Empedocles’ depictions of Love and her interaction with the roots emphasize her creative role. Not only does Love unite the four roots into the One, but she is also responsible for the union of this limited variety of roots into the limitless variety of compounds with the same terms that Empedocles used with the general outline of the cosmic cycle: συνέρχοµαι (DK 31B20.2) and συγκυρέω (DK 31B98.1, 31B104). I have shown above in §1.1 of chapter 3 how Empedocles frequently calls Love Aphrodite or

Kypris, especially when emphasizing this productive aspect of her role in the cosmic cycle. In Empedocles’ vision of the universe, Love makes the unlike root parts desire one another (σὺν δ’ ἔβη ἐν Φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται (DK 31B21.8) “they [the roots] come together in Love and desire one another”), by making them like (ἀλλήλοις

40 Bollack 1965 (1:48-52), Hölscher 1965 (7-8), Solmsen 1965 (112-18), Müller 1965 (31), Long 1974 (415-16). 41 See §2.1.2 above.

227 ἔστερκται ὁµοιωθέντ’ Ἀφροδίτῃ (DK 31B22.5) “they [the roots] cling to one another having been made like by Aphrodite”).

Empedocles also compares Love to a variety of craftsmen where each craft involves mixing things in order to create something that seems wholly new. In the clearest example, Empedocles likens Love to a potter.

ὡς δὲ τότε χθόνα Κύπρις, ἐπεί τ’ ἐδίηνεν ἐν ὄµβρῳ,

εἴδεα ποιπνύουσα θοῷ πυρὶ δῶκε κρατῦναι

Simplicius de caelo CIAG 7.530.6-7 = DK 31B73

As at that time Kypris, when she moistened earth in the rain, gave it to fierce fire to strengthen, while preparing shapes…

Earth, water, and fire are three of the four roots, yet with these three elements, Love, like a potter, can create an indefinite number of forms. The creation of vases or terracotta figures relies on the mixture of clay (earth) and water and the further application of intense heat (fire). The use of three of the four roots also emphasizes how Love brings together things that are not homogenous, and indeed not harmonious, to create things.

Empedocles also appears to compare Love to a painter.

ὡς δ’ ὁπόταν γραφέες ἀναθήµατα ποικίλλωσιν

ἀνέρες ἀµφὶ τέχνης ὑπὸ µήτιος εὖ δεδαῶτε,

οἵτ’ ἐπεὶ οὖν µάρψωσι πολύχροα φάρµακα χερσίν,

ἁρµονίῃ µείξαντε τὰ µὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ’ ἐλάσσω,

ἐκ τῶν εἴδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι,

δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας

θῆράς τ’ οἰωνούς τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέµµονας ἰχθῦς

καί τε θεοὺς δολιχαίωνας τιµῇσι φερίστους·

228 οὕτω µή σ’ ἀπάτη φρένα καινύτω ἄλλοθεν εἶναι

θνητῶν, ὅσσα γε δῆλα γεγάκασιν ἄσπετα, πηγήν,

ἀλλὰ τορῶς ταῦτ’ ἴσθι, θεοῦ πάρα µῦθον ἀκούσας.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.160.1-11 = DK 31B23

As when painters embellish votive offerings, men well-learned in their craft because of cunning; and so when they have taken hold of the many coloured paints in their hands, having mixed in harmony some colours more and others less, they prepare from them forms resembling all things, fashioning trees and men and women and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish and long-lived gods first in their prerogatives. In this way let not deceit surpass you in your thinking (by convincing you) that the source of mortal things, as unspeakably many as have clearly come to be, is from some other thing [than the elements], but know these things clearly, having heard the story from a god.”

Although Love is not named explicitly, the mention of ἁρµονίη in line 4 and the consistent linking of Love to the creation of plants and animals in fragment 71 and elsewhere suggest that that this interpretation is valid. Painting, although the techniques of Empedocles’ period are poorly understood42, produces a multitude of forms and images with only a limited palette, just as pottery does. This passage also emphasizes the varying ratios of root parts that make up various things since some colours would be used more and others less.

Finally, Empedocles associates Love with the crafts of carpentry and cheese-making.

Carpentry depends upon joining unlike parts together: γόµφοις ἀσκήσασα καταστόργοις

Ἀφροδίτη (DK 31B87) “Aphrodite fashioned [eyes, according to the context] with dowels of love.” Love also juxtaposes unlike root parts and fits them together: τῶν δέ τε

42 Painters may have applied thin layers of wash to achieve the desired colour and shade (Wright 1981, 38- 9), but at any rate, there could be no blending of the colours beforehand, as this would make the analogy less effective (Mourelatos 1987, 141).

229 µισγοµένων χεῖτ’ ἔθνεα µυρία θνητῶν, | παντοίαις ἰδέηισιν ἀρηρότα (DK 31B35.16-17)

“as they (roots) were mixed, a great many tribes of mortal things poured forth, fitted together in all sorts of forms”; ἐκ τούτων <γὰρ> πάντα πεπήγασιν ἁρµοσθέντα (DK

31B107) “for from these things (i.e., roots), all things having been fit together are fixed”;

ὅσα νῦν γεγάασι συναρµοσθέντ’ Ἀφροδίτῃ (DK 31B71.4) “as many as have now come to be having been fitted together by Aphrodite”; ἐξ ὧν ὄµµατ’ ἔπηξεν ἀτειρέα δῖ’ Ἀφροδίτη

(DK 31B86) “from which divine Aphrodite fixed together tireless eyes”; πρὶν δὲ πάγεν τε

βροτοὶ καὶ <ἐπεὶ> λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ’ εἰσιν (DK 31B15.4) “Before they are fixed as mortals and after they are dissolved, they are nothing.” Empedocles expands upon the image of joining; not only does Love use dowels, but her influence is compared to glue (τὰ δ’

ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο | Ἁρµονίης κόλλῃσιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίῃσιν (DK 31B96.3-4) “And they become white bones fitted together with the divine glues of harmony;” compare DK

31B34: ἄλφιτον ὕδατι κολλήσας “gluing barley meal with water”) and the rennet that makes cheese (ὡς δ’ ὅτ’ ὀπὸς γάλα λευκὸν ἐγόµφωσεν καὶ ἔδησε (DK 31B33) “as when rennet riveted white milk and bound it…43”).

The effects from Love’s uniting power appear to remain within the compound: ἥτις

καὶ θνητοῖσι νοµίζεται ἔµφυτος ἄρθροις, | τῇ τε φίλα φρονέουσι καὶ ἄρθµια ἔργα τελοῦσι

(DK 31B17.22-3) “she (Love) is thought by mortals to be inborn in their limbs, by whom they think loving thoughts and accomplish works of unity”. This last image brings to the fore Love’s most potent influence over mortal things and reinforces the analogy with

43 Although the context of this fragment discusses the unity that arises from friendship, this effect is ultimately produced by Love.

230 Aphrodite: sex. Once successful compounds are produced, sex takes over the construction of mortals.44

Ἐµπεδοκλῆς τὰς πρώτας γενέσεις τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν µηδαµῶς

ὁλοκλήρους γενέσθαι, ἀσυµφυέσι δὲ τοῖς µορίοις διεζευγµένας,

τὰς δὲ δευτέρας συµφυοµένων τῶν µερῶν εἰδωλοφανεῖς, τὰς δὲ

τρίτας τῶν ὁλοφυῶν, τὰς δὲ τετάρτας οὐκέτι ἐκ τῶν ὁµοίων οἷον

ἐκ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀλλήλων ἤδη, τοῖς µὲν πυκνωθείσης

τῆς τροφῆς, τοῖς δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐµορφίας τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπερεθισµὸν

τοῦ σπερµατικοῦ κινήµατος ἐµποιησάσης

Aëtius 5.19.5 (Dox. Gr. 430) = DK 31A72a

Empedocles says that the first generation of animals and plants were in no way complete, but separate with parts not growing together. The second was of dream images with parts growing together. The third was of whole-shaped things and the fourth generation was no longer from similar things, e.g., from earth and water, but was produced through one another, for some by the compression of nourishment and for others the shapeliness of women produced stimulation of the movement of the seed.

Such production requires a male and a female of the same species, thus emphasizing the way that Love brings together things that are not homogenous to create a greater variety of things. Fragment 64 also illustrates this final stage of the zoogony: τῷ δ’ ἐπὶ καὶ πόθος

εἶσι δι’ ὄψιος ἀµµίσγεσθαι (Plutarch Natural Phenomena 917c = DK 31B64) “And desire comes upon him too, through sight, for intercourse.”

44 There is disagreement as to whether all stages set out by Aëtius occur in a single phase of the cycle or over the whole. O’Brien 1969 (ch. 9) outlines possible interpretations of the evidence.

231 2.2.2 The One

The One is the final result of Love mixing the root parts45 until she eventually creates the One, a mixture of root parts that can be mixed no further. The One, therefore, is the greatest compound in the cycle of creation because the entire universe is a single compound at that time. We possess Empedocles’ own description of the universe when

Love dominates the cycle of creation.

Εὔδηµος δὲ τὴν ἀκινησίαν ἐν τῆι τῆς Φιλίας ἐπικρατείᾳ κατὰ τὸν

Σφαῖρον ἐκδέχεται, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαντα συγκριθῇ

ἔνθ’ οὔτ’ ἠελίοιο διείδεται ὠκέα γυῖα

ἀλλ’ ὥς φησιν

οὕτως Ἁρµονίης πυκινῷ κρύφῳ ἐστήρικται

Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς µονίῃ περιηγέι γαίων.46

Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1183.28-1184.1

But Eudemus47 says that motionlessness occurs in the domination by Love at the time of the Sphere, when all things have been combined “when the swift limbs of the sun can no longer be distinguished”, but, as he says, “the circular Sphere has been made

45 See §2.1.1 above. 46 Diels and Kranz 1951 (31B27) following Panzerbieter 1844 (27) and Millerd 1908 (60n3) conflates this passage from Simplicius with a passage quoted by Plutarch in de facie in orbe lunae 926d owing to partial repetition of the first line: ἔνθ’ οὔτ’ ἠελίοιο δεδίσκεται ἀγλαὸν εἶδος, | οὐδὲ µὲν οὐδ’ αἴης λάσιον γένος, οὐδὲ θάλασσα “there the shining form of the sun is not discerned nor indeed the shaggy might of earth nor the sea.” The two contexts, however, are polar opposites: the lines preserved in Simplicius refer to the period when Love dominates, that is, the One, and those quoted by Plutarch refer to the phase when Strife’s influence is at its peak, that is, the Many. Most editors and translators have separated the two texts - Karsten 1838 (92, 96), Bignone 1963 (599-605), Bollack 1969 (fr. 92, fr. 171), O’Brien 1969 (149ff), Wright 1981 (fr. 19, fr. 21), Inwood 2001 (fr. 31, fr. 33). 47 Eudemus was a student and friend of Aristotle and apparently a candidate to succeed Aristotle as head of the Lyceum.

232 fast in the well-constructed obscurity48 of Harmony, rejoicing in his circular solitude.”

There are three things to note about the One from this passage. First, the One is spherical in shape and Empedocles emphasizes this characteristic with κυκλοτερής and

περιηγέι.49 Next, the universe is at rest while Love controls the roots without interference from Strife. Finally, Love has arranged the parts of the roots in such a way that the individual characteristics can no longer be discerned. The state of rest and the arrangement of the root parts are closely linked.

Descriptions of the One in fragment 26 confirm this picture of a compound that is wholly ordered: ἄλλοτε µὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόµεν’ εἰς ἕνα κόσµον (line 5) with the root parts arranged 1:1:1:1.50 Empedocles also describes the One as a state where everything becomes subordinated into the One: εἰσόκεν ἓν συµφύντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται (line

7). Aristotle describes the One.

ἅµα µὲν γὰρ οὔ φησιν ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου γίνεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων

οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τἆλλα πάντα ἐκ τούτων, ἅµα δ’ ὅταν εἰς ἓν συναγάγῃ

τὴν ἅπασαν φύσιν πλὴν τοῦ νείκους, ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς γίνεσθαι πάλιν

ἕκαστον. ὥστ’ ἐξ ἑνός τινος δῆλον ὅτι διαφοραῖς τισι χωριζοµένων

καὶ πάθεσιν ἐγένετο τὸ µὲν ὕδωρ τὸ δὲ πῦρ…

Aristotle de generatione et corruptione 315a4ff.

For (Empedocles) says that no one of the elements comes into being one from another, but that all other things come into being from them, but at the same time when she (Love) brings together all nature except Strife, he says that each thing

48 This translation is discussed below. 49 See §2.2.2 in chapter 1 for my discussion that the universe is always spherical. 50 See §1.2.2 in chapter 3.

233 comes into being again from the One. The result clearly is that when things were separated on account of certain differences and qualities out of a certain One, one thing became water and another fire…

The verb γίγνεσθαι has two distinct meanings in Greek: 1) to come into being for the first time ((a) from nothing or (b) from something else) and 2) to arrive at a different state, to become.51 Here, Aristotle understands that one root cannot come into being from another root (οὔ φησιν ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου γίνεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων οὐδέν). When Aristotle claims that each root comes into being (γίνεσθαι) when the One separates again, the roots do not come into being (meaning 1), but they do become something different when they mix in different compounds (meaning 2). It is the mortal things that come into being when the

One begins to separate. The One, therefore, does not represent a phase of the cycle where the elements return to some primordial state. Rather, it is the ultimate mixture of root parts that do not lose any of their innate qualities.

When Aristotle considers the question of rest and movement in the universe, he uses

Empedocles as a model for alternating periods of rest and motion:

ἢ ὡς Ἐµπεδοκλῆς ἐν µέρει κινεῖσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἠρεµεῖν, κινεῖσθαι

µὲν ὅταν ἡ φιλία ἐκ πολλῶν ποιῇ τὸ ἓν ἢ τὸ νεῖκος πολλὰ ἐξ ἑνός,

ἠρεµεῖν δ’ ἐν τοῖς µεταξὺ χρόνοις

Aristotle Physics 250b24ff.

Or as Empedocles says, there is motion and then rest again in turn – there is motion whenever Love produces the one from many or when Strife makes many from one and there is no motion in the in-between times.

51 See §1.1.1 in chapter 3.

234 It is generally accepted that the One is at rest.52 Eudemus states as much and the passage he quotes reinforces this interpretation – the circular sphere is fixed fast (ἐστήρικται).

The passive of στηρίζω indicates that the internal parts of the One are held together.

Simplicius supports that there is no motion while Love is in complete control over the roots until Strife restores his influence: ἀρξαµένου δὲ πάλιν τοῦ Νείκους ἐπικρατεῖν τότε

πάλιν κίνησις ἐν τῷ σφαίρῳ γίνεται (Physics CIAG 10.1184.2) “when Strife begins again to assert control, at that time motion begins again in the sphere.” Although the whole could rotate, one piece of testimony suggests that the whole does not begin to rotate until the sun is formed53: τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως συµβῆναι ἀπὸ τοῦ τετυχηκέναι κατά <τι>

τὸν ἀθροισµὸν ἐπιβρίσαντος τοῦ πυρός. (Eusebius in praep. evang. 1.8.10 = DK 31A30)

“The beginning of the motion occurs because the aggregation meets with the downward pressure of fire .”54

52 Contra Trépanier 2002 who proposes that Empedocles is part of the tradition that posits continuous motion in the universe. When Aristotle uses Empedocles as an example of rest and motion alternating throughout the cosmic cycles, Aristotle treats Empedocles’ theory as though they share underlying assumptions regarding the nature of motion. Aristotle associates rest with unity and movement with plurality and thus believes that the universe is always in motion. Even if Empedocles does not share Aristotle’s assumption about the nature of motion, the concept of rest may be elsewhere in Empedocles’ verses and hence picked up by Aristotle. There is certainly no mention of rest in fragment 17 which sets out the most important doctrine, that is, the ongoing alternation of mixture and separation from Many to One and from One to Many. Trépanier 2002 (350) argues that “the cumulative force [of statements on continual motion, i.e., DK 31B17.5 (cf. DK 31B17.12, Strasbourg papyrus ensemble a(ii)3 and a(ii)8, DK 31B26.12) and DK 31B17.34-35 (cf. DK 31B21.13 and DK 31B26.3)] must be taken into account.” Motion is the mark of forming both the One and the Many because the roots are moving into and out of compounds. Empedocles’ account in fragment 17 emphasizes the processes of mixture and separation (cf. especially lines 7-8), not the states of One and Many except insofar as One is the ultimate mixture and Many the ultimate division. These statements of continual motion refer to the action of the roots as they mix and separate to form various compounds through the whole of the cosmic cycle. The status of the One and the Many with respect to motion must be determined elsewhere. 53 O’Brien 1969, 21; Kingsley 1994a, 321. 54 Scholars have traditionally used µονίῃ to mean ‘stillness’ as well, deriving the noun from the verb µένειν. Guthrie 1965 (169n3) summarizes the history of the dispute between deriving an interpretation from µόνος (alone) or µένειν (rest). Bollack 1969 (3:137) and Wright 1981 (111) argue that Empedocles intends both meanings. Slings 1994 (413), however, points out that µονίη can derive only from µόνος owing to an ironclad rule of word formation, that is, “to derive an action noun from a one-syllable stem the suffix -ά is compulsory if the derivation is a simplex word; if it is a compound, one must use -ία.” Καµµονίη in Homer

235 Empedocles also describes the sphere as held fast πυκινῷ κρύφῳ. Κρύφος has been translated as a further metaphor for stillness; for example, Diels (DK 31B27) translates it as dungeon (Verließ) and Bignone 1916 (421) as fort (ricetto).55 Wright 1981 (188) cites

Parmenides’ description of the bonds of Necessity holding his sphere of Being in place as parallel.

αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον µεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσµῶν

ἔστιν ἄναρχον ἄπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος

τῆλε µάλ’ ἐπλάχθησαν, ἀπῶσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής.

ταὐτόν τ’ ἐν ταὐτῷ τε µένον καθ’ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται

χοὔτως ἔµπεδον αὖθι µένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη

πείρατος ἐν δεσµοῖσιν ἔχει, τό µιν ἀµφὶς ἐέργει.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.145.27-146.4 = DK 28B8.26-31

But changeless within the limits of great bonds it exists without beginning or ceasing, since coming to be and perishing have wandered very far away, and true conviction has thrust them off. Remaining the same and in the same place it lies on its own and thus fixed it will remain. For strong Necessity holds it within the bonds of a limit, which keeps it in on every side.

Parmenides’ own use of language supports Diels’ and Bignone’s translations.

Parmenides’ sphere is held still by means of bonds, δεσµοί. This suggests that the sphere is not held in place willingly, especially since strong Necessity, κρατερὴ Ἀνάγκη, holds it there.

(Iliad 22.257, 23.661), which means perseverance or steadfastness, comes from µένειν whereas µονίη cannot. Μονίη means, therefore, that the One is alone in the universe, or rather, the One is the universe. 55 Since Wright 1981 (188) does not approve of such metaphors of constraint for the “rejoicing, intelligent god”, she translates κρύφος as ‘covering’.

236 It is not the case, however, that the One holds still because Love constrains it; rather, the stillness results from Love’s influence over the roots. Love has mixed the parts of the roots so perfectly that combination can go no further. In this state, further mixture, hence movement, is not possible until Strife comes forward again. Κρύφος does not refer to stillness as much as the obscurity of the true nature of the compound. Comparison to

Pindar illustrates this.56

… ἀλλ’ αἶνον ἐπέβα κόρος,

οὐ δίκᾳ συναντόµενος, ἀλλὰ µάργων ὑπ’ ἀνδρῶν,

τὸ λαλαγῆσαι θέλον κρυφὸν τιθέµεν ἐσλῶν καλοῖς

ἔργοις,

Pindar Olympian 2.95-98

But tedious excess, which does not accompany justice but wishes to babble because of greedy men, sets upon praise and places obscurity upon the good deeds of good men.

Pindar’s goal is to praise Theron of Akragas who won the chariot race in the Olympian games of 476 B.C. and thus illuminate Theron’s victory. The unjust behaviour of others who tire of hearing Theron’s acclaim, however, attacks praise. When praise cannot come forth, good deeds are obscured. In Pindar, it is the lack of praise that results in obscurity.

In Empedocles, on the other hand, the circumstances that created the obscurity results also in the stillness of the sphere. The mixing of Love has two final results. On the one hand, the root parts can no longer move since they can be mixed no further, at least by

Love’s influence. At the same time, this unique mixture of the roots arranged so that no like part lies beside another has the effect of obscuring the nature of the One. It is not a

56Bollack 1969 (3:135).

237 visible obscurity as much as logical or intellectual, such as led Parmenides to his conclusions on the world of change and seeming. The parts of the roots do not lose their qualities but they are indiscernible because no single part can be united with any other.

The adjective πυκινός emphasizes the inability of the One to move. Πυκινός does not entail that the roots in the One are arranged more densely than at any other point in the cycle. This is not possible because there is no void in the universe (οὐδέ τι τοῦ παντὸς

κενεὸν πέλει οὐδὲ περισσόν (Aëtius 1.18.2 (Dox. 316.1) = DK 31B13) “nor is any of the whole empty nor in excess”) and a variable density among the root parts implies the existence of void that has been expelled. Rather, Love holds together the whole, spread through all the parts since the universe is one compound, as opposed to other phases where at least some like roots are attracted naturally to one another. The One, therefore, is not “close” so much as it is “well-built” or “well-mixed”, as one would expect from an artificial union.57 The parts of the roots are held motionless as a result of Love’s unification that has led to a strongly constructed compound.

Not only can the root parts no longer move, but the nature of the roots can also no longer be observed because the roots are arranged in a ratio of 1:1:1:1.58 It is the perfection of the mix that obscures the nature of the One. The characteristics of each root are visible only when there is sufficient accumulation. Empedocles was not specific about how small the parts of the roots were59, but they must be very small since one sees only the compound, for example, bone, not the parts of the roots that make up the compound.

57 Cf. Iliad 10.267: Αὐτόλυκος πυκινὸν δόµον ἀντιτορήσας “Autolykos, having broken into the well-built home…” and Odyssey 10.283: Odysseus’ companions are ὥς τε σύες πυκινοὺς κευθµῶνας ἔχοντες “like pigs held in well-built pens.” 58 See §1.2.2 in chapter 3. 59 See §2.1 above.

238 With this arrangement, that is, no collection of like root parts, the nature of the One is obscured because it cannot be seen. This situation is aggravated by no accumulation of fire (cf. ἔνθ᾽ ὄυτ᾽ ἠελίοιο διείδεται ὠκέα γυῖα), the only root capable of producing light when gathered together. The obscurity of the One is achieved through this evenly balanced disposition of the root parts.

When Empedocles first introduces the outline of the cosmic cycle in fragment 17, the

One represents the best example of Love’s interaction with the parts of the roots. Since it is the terminus of Love’s uniting activity, the One is the greatest mixture Love can achieve. By seeing how far mixture can be carried, readers have a better idea of how mixture occurs although Empedocles has yet to describe how other compounds come into being.

2.3 STRIFE

Strife does not play as prominent a role as Love in the extant fragments. Owing to the emphasis that Empedocles places on separation as I described above in §2.2, it seems a reasonable assumption that Strife would be an agent solely of destruction. This pattern of separation persists as well on the level of compounds: δίχα (DK 31B20.5), δίεχω (DK

31B22.5) and διατέµνω (DK 31B20.4). But Aristotle complains that Empedocles is not consistent with his use of Love and Strife, thus suggesting that the manipulation of the various roots by Love and Strife is more complicated.

239 2.3.1 Strife Separates Unlike Roots

I have already shown above how Love unites roots that are unlike. Aristotle states that when Strife creates the Many by separating the roots, he also unites them.

πολλαχοῦ γοῦν αὐτῷ ἡ µὲν Φιλία διακρίνει, τὸ δὲ Νεῖκος

συγκρίνει. ὅταν µὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα διίστηται τὸ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ

Νείκους, τό τε πῦρ εἰς ἓν συγκρίνεται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων

ἕκαστον· ὅταν δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ τῆς Φιλίας συνίωσιν εἰς τὸ ἕν,

ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ἑκάστου τὰ µόρια διακρίνεσθαι πάλιν.

Aristotle Metaphysics 985a24-29 = DK 31A37

Many times, according to him (Empedocles), Love separates and Strife unites. For on the one hand, whenever the universe is separated into the elements (i.e., roots), fire and each of the other elements is united into one. And whenever they come together because of Love, it is necessary that the parts be separated again from each.

Aristotle misunderstands Empedocles. Aristotle considers the formation of the One and the Many from the viewpoint of the roots, but Empedocles looks at the actions of Love and Strife because they are who the potential gods have to emulate. When the Many is formed while Strife is in complete control of the cycle, all the fire roots are united, all the water is united, and so on.60 It appears from the roots’ point of view, therefore, that Strife has united the roots because they have come together when Strife is at the height of its influence, but Empedocles says that Strife separates them. With the formation of the One, on the other hand, the various root parts separate so that no two like parts are together; according to this point of view, therefore, Love appears to separate the roots because they are not united (with their likes) when Love is most powerful. Careful study of what

60 See §2.3.2 below.

240 Empedocles does say about the unification and separation processes in the general outline reveals the answer. Empedocles focuses on the actions of Love and Strife in the formation of One and Many, as opposed to the reactions of the roots in the same. Love, therefore, unites the roots to form One and Strife separates them to produce the Many.

Unification and separation are two sides of the same coin and mutually inclusive: for unlike to unite, especially to the point where no like root is side by side (One), like must separate from like; for unlike to separate until no unlike roots are together (Many), like will unite to like. It does not follow, however, that separation and unification are active powers at the same time. Strife actively separates unlike roots, but does not actively unite like roots because like to like is a natural attraction as I describe above.61 Aristotle misinterprets Empedocles because Aristotle fails to give sufficient credit to the role of the natural attraction of likes. Since Empedocles wants the mortal gods to emulate the actions of Love and Strife if they want to control the world, he focuses on what they do, rather than what the roots do on their own power. The gods have to counter the roots’ natural tendencies. Strife only separates, therefore, contrary to Aristotle’s statement, and he only separates unlike root parts. Empedocles emphasizes Love’s powers of unification to balance Strife. Strife separates unlike while Love unites unlike.

Aristotle, however, claims that Strife also is a creative force and that the universe would always be One if there were no Strife. Here, Aristotle puts forward his interpretation of what Empedocles meant (δόξειε ἂν).

τίθησι µὲν γὰρ ἀρχήν τινα αἰτίαν τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ νεῖκος, δόξειε δ’

ἂν οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ τοῦτο γεννᾶν ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐκ

61 Inwood 2001 (50) argues that Strife actively separates and works with the natural attraction of like to like.

241 τούτου τἆλλά ἐστι πλὴν ὁ θεός. ... εἰ γὰρ µὴ ἐνῆν τὸ Νεῖκος ἐν τοῖς

πράγµασιν, ἓν ἂν ἦν ἅπαντα

Aristotle Metaphysics 1000a26-b1

He (Empedocles) sets Strife as a principle that is the cause of destruction, but nevertheless he seems to create all things outside of the One; for everything except god proceeds from him. … For if Strife were not present in things, all would be one.

Strife, however, is not directly responsible for the creation of all things.62 The formation of most compounds requires the combination of roots that are unlike and Strife is incapable of such an act. Uniting unlike roots, as shown above, is the primary function of

Love. Strife’s primary function is to separate what Love has joined.

ἄρθµια µὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ἑαυτῶν πάντα µέρεσσιν,

ἠλέκτωρ τε χθών τε καὶ οὐρανὸς ἠδὲ θάλασσα,

ὅσσα φιν ἐν θνητοῖσιν ἀποπλαχθέντα πέφυκεν.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 160.28-161.1 = DK 31B22.1-3

For all these things – sun and earth and sky and sea – are united with their own parts, as many as were born in mortal things once they had been separated.

Compounds cannot be formed until the parts are available. This fragment describes in general Strife’s role with the roots. He separates the parts, which are then free to be born in mortal things, from their compounds whether it is the One or plant or animal. The role of Strife, if his limited mentions in the extant fragments are indicative of meaning, is a passive one. He does separate unlike roots, but he does not in turn unite like ones. Strife, therefore, is responsible for creation only in the sense of splitting up compounds so that new ones can be produced. Fragment 124 reinforces how Strife destroys for something to

62 See also §2.1.1 in chapter 4.

242 be created: ὢ πόποι, ὢ δειλὸν θνητῶν γένος, ὢ δυσάνολβον, | τοίων ἔκ τ’ ἐρίδων ἔκ τε

στοναχῶν ἐγένεσθε. “Oh shame, or wretched race of mortals, oh unfortunate (race), from what strife and from what groanings have you come into being.” The connection of Strife to the creation of mortal things emphasizes their lack of perfection.

2.3.2 Strife’s Ultimate Goal – The Many

Lines 1-3 of fragment 22 also describes the formation of the Many when Strife is ascendant and has no more compounds to separate since the root parts have been united with their own parts. The Many may be the starting point for the cosmic cycle since

Empedocles emphasizes it by usually beginning his narrative from that point. The Many is also the natural state of the roots since Empedocles defines the Many as the four roots: air, earth, water and fire:

δίπλ’ ἐρέω· τοτὲ µὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη µόνον εἶναι

ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ’ αὖ διέφυ πλέον’ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι,

πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἠέρος ἄπλετον ὕψος.

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.15-17 = DK 31B17.16-18

I will tell two-fold things: for at one time, [they] were increased to be One alone from Many and at another time, moreover, they grew apart to be Many from One – fire and water and earth and the boundless height of air…

Empedocles establishes in fragment 17 how the process of forming the One is matched by an equal but opposite process of forming the Many. Since the One is a distinct phase, the Many is separate as well. Description of the Many, however, is limited and depends heavily on commentators’ interpretation and contrast with the One. On the one hand,

Love mixes the parts of the roots together until they unite into a perfect mixture. Strife,

243 on the other hand, separates the roots until they can be separated no further. This separation does not resemble a chaotic tohu-bohu of unlinked root parts.63 Rather, all the like root parts collect together into individual masses, that is, all the parts of fire are together and so on for each root. This is the true opposite of One. The One is a single compound of all four roots arranged so that no like root lies by another; the Many is four

(many) compounds, one for each root.

Since neither the One nor the Many are the worlds of mortal compound beings, they share characteristics that set them apart. At the same time, they differ greatly from one another. The One and the Many lie opposite one another in the cosmic cycle. Only Love has power in the One; Strife rules the Many alone. Description of the One focuses on a passage preserved by Eudemus; all three features that characterize the One are included – evenly balanced mixture, at rest, and spherical.64 Other passages reinforce these characteristics, but Empedocles covers the essence of the One in three lines. No extant passage describes the Many as efficiently. Interpretation depends mainly upon the

Many’s relationship with the One. The three main qualities of the One are matched in the

Many. 1) Since Love can combine the root parts no further, the internal arrangement of the One is one part of fire to one of air to one of water to one of earth. Strife, on the other hand, separates the root parts so that no unlike root parts are together – all the fire parts are united, all the water parts, etc. 2) The One is wholly at rest; the parts of the roots no longer move under Love’s power owing to the perfection of the mixture. The evidence suggests that the root parts are still in motion during the Many. 3) The only similarity

63 Long 1974, 414-15. 64 See §2.2.2 above.

244 between the One and the Many lies in their shape – both are spherical because the universe is always spherical.65

Plutarch preserves the only passage that securely describes the Many. In the dialogue de facie in orbe lunae, Lamprias uses the state of total Strife to attack Apollonides who argues with the Aristotelians and Stoics that there are ‘natural’ places for the various roots. Strife destroys the created world when he returns the roots to their “natural” positions.

ὥσθ’ ὅρα καὶ σκόπει, δαιµόνιε, µὴ µεθιστὰς καὶ ἀπάγων ἕκαστον,

ὅπου πέφυκεν εἶναι, διάλυσίν τινα κόσµου φιλοσοφῇς καὶ τὸ

νεῖκος ἐπάγῃς τὸ Ἐµπεδοκλέους τοῖς πράγµασι …

ἔνθ’ οὔτ’ ἠελίοιο δεδίσκεται ἀγλαὸν εἶδος,

οὐδὲ µὲν οὐδ’ αἴης λάσιον γένος, οὐδὲ θάλασσα,

ὥς φησιν Ἐµπεδοκλῆς, οὐ γῆ θερµότητος µετεῖχεν, οὐχ ὕδωρ

πνεύµατος, οὐκ ἄνω τι τῶν βαρέων, οὐ κάτω τι τῶν κούφων· ἀλλ’

ἄκρατοι καὶ ἄστοργοι καὶ µονάδες αἱ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχαί, µὴ

προσιέµεναι σύγκρισιν ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον µηδὲ κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ

φεύγουσαι καὶ ἀποστρεφόµεναι καὶ φερόµεναι φορὰς ἰδίας καὶ

αὐθάδεις οὕτως εἶχον ὡς ἔχει πᾶν οὗ θεὸς ἄπεστι κατὰ Πλάτωνα,

τουτέστιν, ὡς ἔχει τὰ σώµατα νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπολιπούσης.

Plutarch de facie in orbe lunae 926d-f

So, good sir, look out and see to it that you do not, by moving and transferring each thing to its natural place, produce in your philosophy a dissolution of the cosmos and

65 See §2.2.2 in chapter 1.

245 bring Empedocles’ strife to bear on things … “There the shining form of the sun is not discerned nor indeed the shaggy might of earth nor the sea”, as Empedocles says. Earth had no share in warmth, nor water any share in breath; none of the heavy things was up nor any of the light things down; but the principles of the universe – unblended, unloving and solitary, not desiring combination or communion with one another; fleeing and not admitting of blending or communion with one another, turning away and executing their separate and self-willed movements – were just as everything is when god is absent, according to Plato, i.e., they have bodies with mind and soul missing.

This passage repeats half a line of those Eudemus used to describe the One.66 Not only does this emphasize the parallel nature of the One and the Many owing to their similar status in the cosmic cycle, that is, neither is a created world, but also how they differ. In the passage describing the One, ἔνθ᾽ ὄυτ᾽ ἠελίοιο διείδεται ὠκέα γυῖα, the sun refers to the root fire and γυῖα to the parts of it. 67 In this passage, however, the sun is the sun of the created world, that is, one of the more visible manifestations of the root fire. It is the shining form of the sun that cannot be seen, nor earth nor sea. They cannot be discerned when Strife controls all the roots because all the fire, earth and water parts are together.

The sun, for example, is visible primarily because of the contrast between the sun and its surroundings. The sun, as a close manifestation of the root fire, would not be seen in the

Many because it would be indistinct from the aggregate of the root.

Plutarch goes on to paraphrase Empedocles – the roots are not mixed together with unlikes, fire is not mixed with earth nor is air combined with water. The Many, therefore, is arranged so that no unlike root parts are together. As Plutarch says, the roots are

66 See above (note 46) for a discussion on how some editors conflate the lines preserved by Eudemus and Simplicius. 67 See §1.2.2 in chapter 3.

246 unblended (ἄκρατοι), without love (ἄστοργοι68) and solitary (µονάδες). They are unblended because they are not linked to roots unlike them; they are without love because love forces the roots into combinations with roots unlike themselves; they are solitary because they are alone with their likes. Aristotle also supports this interpretation: ὅταν

µὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα διίστηται τὸ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Νείκους, τό τε πῦρ εἰς ἓν συγκρίνεται

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων ἕκαστον· (Aristotle Metaphysics 985a25-27) “For whenever the universe is separated into the elements by Strife, fire is gathered into one as is each of the other elements.”

There is no direct evidence for the structure of the roots during the Many. Since, however, the roots are arranged in a sphere and each root is distinct, the roots are probably sorted in concentric spheres.69 The passage from Plutarch hints at the arrangement of the roots: οὐκ ἄνω τι τῶν βαρέων, οὐ κάτω τι τῶν κούφων (Plutarch de facie 926e) “nothing of the heavy things was up and nothing of the light things down.”

Up and down are relative terms that require definition before they have meaning. There are two ways to examine a sphere. If the sphere rests or rotates on a fixed axis, one can describe a specific point on the circumference as up or down, but this depends on a fixed external point of reference. Up and down change according to the point of view. To describe a sphere along its radius, that is, from the inside out or from our point of view as we stand of the surface of the earth, does not require an external point of reference. Since there is nothing outside the sphere of matter, this is the best way to view the sphere. The centre, equidistant from the edge in every direction is down; the edge, by contrast is up.

68 Στοργή is a word used for Love in fragment 109: στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκει λυγρῷ. (line 4) “(we see) Love by means of Love, and Strife by mournful Strife.” 69 Millerd 1908 (56), Bignone 1963 (223, 562n3), Bollack 1965 (1:165-169), Guthrie 1965 (177), O’Brien 1969 (chapter 7), Wright 1981 (43-45), Inwood 2001 (52).

247 The spheres, therefore, were probably arranged by weight with earth at the centre as the heaviest, followed by water, air and fire at the edge as the lightest. Hints scattered throughout the fragments support such an interpretation. Fire, for example strives to move upward to reach the fire already aloft.70

οὐλοφυεῖς µὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον,

ἀµφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ εἴδεος αἶσαν ἔχοντες·

τοὺς µὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεµπε θέλον πρὸς ὁµοῖον ἱκέσθαι

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.381.34-382.1 = DK 31B62.4-6

First came up from the earth whole-natured outlines having a share of both water and heat; fire sent them up, wanting to reach its like…

The formation of the created world also shows how the lighter roots move to the edge and the heavier settle at the centre.

Ἐµπεδοκλῆς τὸν µὲν αἰθέρα πρῶτον διακριθῆναι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ

πῦρ, ἐφ’ ᾧ τὴν γῆν, ἐξ ἧς ἄγαν περισφιγγοµένης τῆι ῥύµῃ τῆς

περιφορᾶς ἀναβλύσαι τὸ ὕδωρ·

Aëtius de placita 2.6.3 (Doxographi graeci 334) = DK 31A49b

Empedocles says that aither is separated first and second is fire after which the earth. From the earth, squeezed all about by the force of the revolution, water gushes forth.71

70 Eustathius, Commentary on Odyssey 1.321: ἀνόπαια· οἱ µὲν ἀφανῆ, τινὲς δὲ τὸ ἄνω φἐρεσθαι. Ἐµπεδοκλῆς· καρπαλἰµως δὲ ἀνόπεαν ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς. “ἀνόπαια: some say ‘invisible’, others ‘to be borne upwards’. Empedocles says in the case of fire ‘carried swiftly upwards’.” As creation after the One continues, Strife separates the roots until fire is no longer under the earth: πολλὰ δ’ ἔνερθ(ε) οὔδεος πυρὰ καίεται (DK 31B52) “Many fires burn below the earth.” 71 Pseudo-Plutarch confirms this description: ἐκ πρώτης φησὶ τῆς τῶν στοιχείων κράσεως ἀποκριθέντα τὸν ἀέρα περιχυθῆναι κύκλωι· µετὰ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα τὸ πῦρ ἐκδραµὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔχον ἑτέραν χώραν ἄνω ἐκτρέχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα πάγου. ([Plutarch] Stromateis §10 (Doxographi graeci 582) = DK 31A30) “[Empedocles] says that from the first mixture of the elements that air, once it was separated, poured about

248 Strife, therefore, separates the elements into natural positions as Plutarch states. The heaviest roots settle at the centre and the lighter move to the edge of the sphere. The roots do not communicate with one another, that is, different roots do not mix.

Whether the Many is at rest or in motion is a controversial issue owing to a lack of direct evidence from Empedocles and the evidence from the commentators can be contradictory.72 On the one hand, Plutarch states that the roots are in motion when Strife is in total control:

ἀλλ’ ἄκρατοι καὶ ἄστοργοι καὶ µονάδες αἱ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχαί, µὴ

προσιέµεναι σύγκρισιν ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον µηδὲ κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ

φεύγουσαι καὶ ἀποστρεφόµεναι καὶ φερόµεναι φορὰς ἰδίας καὶ

αὐθάδεις

Plutarch de facie in orbe lunae 926e-f

The principles of the universe were unblended, unloving and solitary, not desiring combination or communion with one another, but fleeing and turning away and carried in their personal and self-willed passages.

This may describe the roots as they move towards the state of Many. Simplicius, on the other, says that there is rest between opposite motions: τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων κινήσεων

ἠρεµία µεταξύ ἐστιν (Physics CIAG 10.1183.27), that is, the One is at rest before the motion changes from unification (from Many to One) to separation (from One to Many) and the Many should be at rest when the motion switches again from separation to unification. The contradiction lies in not understanding Strife’s motion: it varies from the motion that Love and Strife display as they mix and separate the roots. in a circle. After air, fire runs out [from the mixture] and not having another place runs upward under the solid part around the air.” 72 O’Brien 1969 (chapter 2) and 1995 (405-16) discuss all the evidence in depth.

249 Simplicius based his interpretation on statements made by Aristotle. Aristotle emphasizes the motion of the roots during the processes of unification and separation. At one point, Aristotle says: ἢ ὡς Ἐµπεδοκλῆς ἐν µέρει κινεῖσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἠρεµεῖν,

κινεῖσθαι µὲν ὅταν ἡ φιλία ἐκ πολλῶν ποιῇ τὸ ἓν ἢ τὸ νεῖκος πολλὰ ἐξ ἑνός, ἠρεµεῖν δ’ ἐν

τοῖς µεταξὺ χρόνοις (Physics 250b24) “ Or as Empedocles says, there is motion and then rest again in turn – there is motion whenever Love produces the One from Many or when

Strife makes Many from One and there is no motion in the in-between times.” When

Aristotle addresses the question of rest and motion again, he states: τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ κινεῖν

ἐν µέρει τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγµασιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἠρεµεῖν δὲ τὸν

µεταξὺ χρόνον (Physics 252a7) “Love and Strife have control over things and move them out of necessity and the in-between time is at rest.” The controversy focuses on the differences between these statements, that is, Aristotle first uses a plural and then a singular for the between time. Each position can use this evidence to support itself. If one seeks to prove that there is more than one rest period in a cycle73, the plural in-between times is read as multiple (two) periods of rest in a cycle and the singular as each in- between time in a cycle, that is, more than one in a cycle. If, on the other hand, one supports only one rest period per cycle74, the singular indicates one period of rest in a cycle, specifically when Love dominates the cycle, and the plural reveals that over numerous cycles, there will be many periods of rest since the One will be formed many times. Resolution depends on other evidence.

73 Millerd 1908 (53-4), Wright 1981 (42-3), McKirahan 1994 (269f.), Inwood 2001 (51). 74 von Arnim 1902 (17-18), Bignone 1963 (604), O’Brien 1969 (chapter 2) and 1995 (405-16), Martin and Primavesi 1999 (71-74).

250 Plutarch is not the only commentator to argue that the roots are in motion during the

Many. Simplicius distinguishes his own interpretation of two periods of rest in a cycle with that of Eudemus. The δὲ which introduces Eudemus (Simplicius Physics CIAG

10.1183.27-28) diverges from Simplicius’ own interpretation of Aristotle: τῶν γὰρ

ἐναντίων κινήσεων ἠρεµία µεταξύ ἐστιν. Εὔδηµος δὲ τὴν ἀκινησίαν ἐν τῆι τῆς Φιλίας

ἐπικρατείᾳ κατὰ τὸν Σφαῖρον ἐκδέχεται. The context clearly compares the issue of motion and rest in Empedocles’ cosmic cycle and the way in which Simplicius introduces

Eudemus implies that Eudemus stated there was only one period of rest during the cycle, that is, when Love dominates.

Moreover, despite the contradictory ways that Aristotle’s statements above can be interpreted, Aristotle himself comments on the motion of the roots during the Many. Not only are the roots separate from one another but they are in some sort of motion.

ἐκ διεστώτων δὲ καὶ κινουµένων οὐκ εὔλογον ποιεῖν τὴν γένεσιν.

διὸ καὶ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς παραλείπει τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς Φιλότητος (sc. τοῦ

οὐρανοῦ γένεσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἠδύνατο συστῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐκ

κεχωρισµένων µὲν κατασκευάζων, σύγκρισιν δὲ ποιῶν διὰ τὴν

Φιλότητα· ἐκ διακεκριµένων γὰρ συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσµος τῶν

στοιχείων. ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ συγκεκριµένου.

Aristotle de caelo 301a14-20

It is not reasonable to produce creation from things separate and moving. That is why Empedocles omits (creation of sky) in the time of Love. For he was not able to form heaven from the separated roots, making a combination through Love. The created world is composed of separated elements so that it must have come into being from One and combination.

251 Aristotle claims that Empedocles did not describe the creation of the world – sky, earth, and so on, in the time of increasing Love, that is, from Many to One, because he could not. According to Aristotle, creation can occur only when the roots begin from a state of rest and unity, that is, from the One. Aristotle, therefore, clearly believed that the roots were in motion during the Many.

The solution lies in determining the sorts of motion within each phase of the cycle.

Aristotle distinguishes clearly between the times when Love and Strife are both active, that is, during the phases of the created worlds, and the times when each dominates, that is, the One and the Many respectively. The roots are at rest in the One; Love has mixed the parts until they can be mixed no further and they do not move again until Strife approaches with his ability to separate the parts from one another. The root parts are in motion during the created worlds as mortal things come into being and then pass away.

The motion arises from the endless alternation of mixing and separating on the microcosmic, that is, individual, level. The Many is not subject to such motion during the dominance of Strife since the root parts no longer mix with unlike parts. The motion is of a different sort. Plutarch compares the motion of the root parts to the action of the universe when Plato’s demiurge is absent: καὶ τὸ µὲν δὴ πρὸ τούτου πάντα ταῦτ’ εἶχεν

ἀλόγως καὶ ἀµέτρως (Plato Timaeus 53a) “before that time (i.e., when the universe was organized), all these things were is a state devoid of reason or measure.” Together with

Aristotle’s statement that the roots are separate and moving, it seems likely that the roots are in motion, but not in the same way motion occurs elsewhere in the cosmic cycle.

Wright 1981 (186) proposes that the root parts vibrate, but no hypothesis can be proven without direct evidence from Empedocles.

252

If the readers intend to learn how to control the world, they must learn first how the world works. When Empedocles’ verses are read, the audience should notice how important the motifs of unification and separation are. Love and Strife unite and separate respectively the roots through a never-ending cycle from Many when Strife has complete control over the roots to One when Love dominates and back to Many. Between these phases Love and Strife both influence and manipulate the roots into the created world and various compounds such as plants, animals, and men. During these in-between phases,

Empedocles argues in fragment 111 that the mortal gods are able to manipulate the world just as Love and Strife, the immortal gods do.

253 Conclusion

Empedocles, therefore, does not present himself as a scientist (chapter 1) or a magician (chapter 2). He describes how the world works, but he does not do so systematically or without ambiguity. He also claims the ability to perform miraculous feats such as controlling the weather, but he does not accomplish them as an intermediary between men and gods as the magicians do. He accomplishes them as a god (chapter 3).

Anyone who is sufficiently pure and sufficiently wise can escape the cycle of transmigration that all daimones must undergo; once the cycle is escaped, you become a mortal god yourself and can do what Empedocles promises in fragment 111.

Not everyone, however, is ready for the skills Empedocles promises to impart. He exploits the model of initiation into a mystery to exclude people who are not part of his community or who are not wise enough to learn the lessons set out in his verses (chapter

4). First the initiates to godhead must undergo purification. Next they must learn how the world really works, so that they can manipulate it. Since these lessons have the potential to be dangerous, this explains the ambiguity that Empedocles employs in his verses. He seeks to ensure that only those who are sufficiently wise receive the lessons. Empedocles expects his audience to decode the lessons and, in addition, to continue further exploration of the world to receive the ultimate revelation, that is, control over the world.

Empedocles never provides a full answer to how one will control the world (chapter

5). What can be determined is the nature of the cosmic cycle as Love and Strife combine and separate the roots – fire, air, water, and earth – into various phases: from the Many to

254 a world that supports life, to the One, to another living world, and then back to the Many to begin again. The secret to controlling the world is to mimic the actions of Love and

Strife since they are the only active agents of change. Unfortunately for us, Empedocles never says how the mortal gods can act like them.

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