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Using comparative studies of primate and canid social cognition to model our Miocene minds A thesis presented by Brian Alexander Hare to The Department of Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Anthropology Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts January 2004 1 © 2004 – Brian Alexander Hare 2 Table of contents Abstract pp. iv Acknowledgements pp. v Introduction Part I: Comparative studies of human cognitive evolution: The future of anthropology? pp. 1 Identifying derived features of hominin cognition Part II: Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? pp. 22 Part III: Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding pp. 54 Evidence for selection pressures on social cognition Part IV: Do capuchin monkeys know what conspecifics can and cannot see? pp. 89 Part V: Chimpanzees are more skillful in competitive than cooperative cognitive tasks pp. 99 Part VI: The domestication of social cognition in dogs pp. 132 The future of comparative studies on human cognitive evolution Part VII: Can competitive paradigms increase the validity of experiments on primate social cognition? pp. 140 Part VIII: Tempering Darwin’s greatest difficulty: How, when, and why did the human mind evolve? pp. 173 References pp. 208 3 4 Brian Alexander Hare Using comparative studies of primate and canid social cognition to model our Miocene minds Thesis Advisors: Professors Richard Wrangham, Marc Hauser, and Michael Tomasello Abstract The greatest challenge facing anthropology is in explaining the evolution of human cognition. The evolution of unique social problem solving skills likely explain much of what is unique about our phenotype including language and culture. However, before we can test such hypotheses for the evolution of human cognition, we must first establish what cognitive abilities were derived during human evolution. Therefore, for my dissertation research I conducted experiments with chimpanzees to identifying which social cognitive traits our species inherited and which traits have arisen since our split with our last common ancestor with chimpanzees and bonobos. Contrary to previous research, the current results suggest that the earliest hominins already possessed an incipient mind, which at the very least allowed them to calculate how others perceived the world visually. Future work will continue to improve our ability to travel into our Miocene mind using increasingly sophisticated comparative methodology. 5 Acknowledgments As with any other dissertation, mine is not the product of one individual’s labor alone. Instead, this dissertation represents yet another example of how our species prospers largely as a result of our unique social cognition and temperament. My parents have always believed in me far more than I deserved, but I’m sure even they would have enjoyed the joke, especially after I almost failed out of second grade, if anyone had ever suggested I would finish a Ph.D. – much less from a school anyone had ever heard of. However, despite my inevitable future as a bus boy, countless people worked tirelessly and selflessly to educate and inspire me to be the best I could be. If it wasn’t for their intolerance for anything but excellence my academic path, without question, would have been much abridged. I have a long way to go, but I can say with confidence, my dissertation, for better or worse, exists only because so many others have not only shared ideas and knowledge with me, but also because they did so with unbridled passion, persistence, and patience. I can only hope, therefore, the sincerity of my gratitude will not be in doubt as I try to thank the troop of steadfast family, friends, and teachers who never tire of pushing me up hill as I chase my own selfish dreams. It is impossible for me to thank my parents in words. Without an understanding of evolutionary theory, I would question their sanity. Why would anyone forfeit so many of life’s pleasures and comforts, as they always have, in favor of unmitigated investment in the education of four snot-nosed little brats – myself included? And invest they did, whether it was reading stories, coaching our sports teams, or discussing religion and politics, my parents always, always had time and energy for their kids. Of all the lessons learned from my parents so far, the most valuable are not the ones they taught but instead 6 the ones they infected me with. My mom never got tired of reminding me that it was the “lack of my own imagination” anytime I found myself bored. As a child, their was no defense from her inexhaustible imagination and insatiable desire to learn. How much fun we had finding out about bugs, frogs, bats and every other kind of creature moms do not normally tolerate, much less enjoy learning about. It cannot be anything but this that led me, a kid living in a sterile Atlanta suburb, to grow up wanting to learn everything about wildlife. What other mother would not only have allowed, but also encouraged her son to build his cockroach “farm”? Meanwhile, failure has never been an option for my Dad. Whenever I was frustrated and ready to throw up my hands, he was quick to remind me that, “Can’t never did anything!” My dad knows that winning is fun and his championship attitude assures that he has his fair share of victories. Having my padre as my coach, more than anything, showed me that success requires faith in ones abilities even when they don’t seem to be up to the task. However, my education required more than my parent’s time and inspiration; it also required resources. My parents funded 18 years of private education. In deciding what college to attend, instead of pressuring me to accept scholarships at schools that did not offer the program of study I thought I might be of interest, they encouraged me to go to Emory so that I might be able to study primates – even if it meant they would scrimp and save to foot the bill. In no way am I the one who made the greatest sacrifices to see that this dissertation was completed. Thank you Mom and Dad for all your love! I know it wasn’t easy. However my parents were not alone. My grandparents were right there beside them in helping to encourage and teach. I can remember Mimi being insistent that my old childhood dog’s plate had to be cleaned so that it looked shiny new – even if it was a 7 dawg dish. She told me animals deserve to be treated with dignity and respect just as much as people. Da was never put-off by the fact that we never caught anything when we went fishing every July. The only thing of import was to be outdoors, appreciate the beauty of nature, and eat a cold watermelon. Grandma was my biggest fan. It didn’t matter that she hated my pet snakes (she always promised to get me a potbellied pig if I got rid of them, but unfortunately mom wouldn’t let her!); she never failed to fully support my crazy interests. The summers my parents couldn’t afford to send me to “nature camp”, she made sure I got to go, and that I was buried in letters from Grandma and Da. Given that they were the first in their families to go to college, education was a serious matter to my grandparents. They made sure, using the most positive strategies possible, that I understood this also. They may not believe it, but I’m thankful to my older siblings Burke and Alicia - especially for being the pioneers. I learned a lot about how to behave from watching them grow up. Much of my confidence came from the knowledge that they had succeeded. As for little my little brother Kevin, he might not remember, but we had a ton of fun together. Does blowing up stuff ever get old? Don’t worry kido your gonna win your race. My parents’ willingness to invest so heavily in my education meant that during my lifetime as a student I have been taught by some unbelievably talented teachers. It started at The Lovett School: Helen Letts who somehow taught me how to read in third grade; Chatty White who made it cool to love nature; Lynn Eliot who tutored me on her own time at New York Pizza Exchange before my first middle school exams; Tom Bartelt with his vicious red pen finally taught me how to write a sentence and a paragraph 8 in high school; Ken Rau who somehow got me through three years of Latin; Geo Presely- Brooks who gave me the power to beat Joe Bloggs and the SAT. Most significant, perhaps, was Mr. Braddy who introduced me to biology, Darwin, and even his finches on the Galapagos. No doubt he is the best biologist who has ever taught high school. At Emory, my professor quickly had me sold on human psychology and its evolution. Harold Gouzoules, Phillippe Rochat, Neil Smith and Frans de Waal all played key roles in turning me onto studying cognitive evolution, although it was Mike Tomasello who gave me my big break. He let me do science! From the moment I walked into his door, I was a teammate whose opinion and contribution were valued. He couldn’t have done anything to make it more fun. Equally important was Josep Call, who introduced me to the chimpanzees. Poor Josep spent countless hours fielding an endless barrage of questions – sometimes at two in the morning, when I would hyperactively call and wake him up. He may have been tired, but he never refused to answer and make sure I understood his patient explanation.
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