Evolutionary Psychology and the Lakatosian Philosophy of Science
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Psychological Inquiry Copyright © 2000 by 2000, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1–21 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. TARGET ARTICLE Are Evolutionary Explanations Unfalsifiable? Evolutionary Psychology and the Lakatosian Philosophy of Science Timothy Ketelaar Department of Communication Studies University of California, Los Angeles Bruce J. Ellis Department of Psychology University of Canterbury Are the methods and strategies that evolutionary psychologists use to generate and test hypotheses scientifically defensible? This target article addresses this question by reviewing principles of philosophy of science that are used to construct and evaluate metatheoretical research programs and applying these principles to evaluate evolu- tionary psychology. Examples of evolutionary models of family violence, sexual jeal- ousy, and male parental investment are utilized to evaluate whether the procedures for developing and testing evolutionary psychological models are consistent with con- temporary philosophy of science. Special attention is paid to the generation of compet- ing theories and hypotheses within a single evolutionary framework. It is argued that this competition is a function of the multiple levels of scientific explanation employed by evolutionary psychologists, and that this explanatory system adheres to the Lakatosian philosophy of science. The charge that evolutionary theories and hypothe- ses are unfalsifiable is unwarranted and has its roots in a commonly accepted, but mis- taken, Popperian view of how science operates. Modern evolutionary theory meets the Lakatosian criterion of “progressivity,” based on its ability to digest apparent anom- alies and generate novel predictions and explanations. Evolutionary psychology has the hallmarks of a currently progressive research program capable of providing us with new knowledge of how the mind works. Although psychologists assume that the mind is a evolutionary psychology focuses on explicating the whole and integrated unity, no metatheory subsumes, nature of the specific information-processing problems integrates, unites, or connects the disparate pieces that encountered during human evolutionary history, and psychologists gauge with their different calipers.… on developing and testing models of the psychological An important new theoretical paradigm called “evolu- adaptations (mechanisms and behavioral strategies) tionary psychology” is emerging that offers to provide that may have evolved as solutions to these problems this metatheory. (Buss, 1995, p. 1) (Buss, 1999; Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992). Evolutionary psychology is the application of the Despite the recent emergence of evolutionary psy- principles and knowledge of evolutionary biology to chology as a promising new perspective in the behav- psychological theory and research. Its central assump- ioral sciences (see Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; tion is that the human brain is comprised of a large Buss, 1995, 1999; Pinker, 1997; Simpson & Kenrick, number of specialized mechanisms that were shaped 1997; Wright, 1994), this approach has been subject to by natural selection over vast periods of time to solve frequent criticism (e.g., Berwick, 1998; Horgan, 1995; the recurrent information-processing problems faced Lewontin, 1990; Piatelli-Palmarini, 1994). A major by our ancestors (Symons, 1995). These problems in- concern is the apparent willingness of evolutionary clude such things as choosing which foods to eat, nego- psychologists to generate a plethora of seemingly tiating social hierarchies, partitioning investment untestable and post hoc explanations for any given among offspring, and selecting mates. The field of psychological phenomenon. According to this view, KETELAAR & ELLIS evolutionary explanations are infinitely flexible “sto- these topics, we evaluate whether the procedures for ries” that can be constructed to fit any set of empirical developing and testing evolutionary models are con- observations and can neither be confirmed nor sistent with contemporary philosophy of science. Spe- disconfirmed by data. This criticism was forcefully ar- cial attention is paid to the generation of alternative or ticulated by Gould and Lewontin (1979): competing explanatory models within a single evolu- tionary framework (i.e., when different evolutionary We would not object so strenuously to the models generate opposing predictions). We argue that adaptationist program if its invocation, in any particu- this competition is a function of the multiple levels of lar case, could lead in principle to its rejection for want scientific explanation employed by evolutionary psy- of evidence. But if it could be dismissed as failing chologists, and that this explanatory system adheres to some explicit test, then alternatives could get their the well-established Lakatosian philosophy of science chance. Unfortunately, a common procedure among (Lakatos, 1970, 1978). The Lakatosian model can ac- evolutionists does not allow such definable rejection for two reasons. First, the rejection of one adaptive commodate the development and testing of alternative story usually leads to its replacement by another, rather (evolutionary) explanations within the unifying frame- than to a suspicion that a different kind of explanation work of a single (evolutionary) metatheory. might be required.… Secondly, the criteria of accep- In the second half of this target article, we examine tance of a story are so loose that they may pass without how the basic assumptions of modern evolutionary proper confirmation. Often, evolutionists use consis- theory have been evaluated. Using the problem of al- tency with the data as the sole criterion and consider truism as a case study, we argue that the criticism that their work done when they concoct a plausible story. the core assumptions of modern evolutionary theory (pp. 587–588) are untestable is not justified. Modern evolutionary theory meets the Lakatosian criterion of progressivity, The charge that evolutionary explanations are based on its ability to “digest” (successfully account unfalsifiable centers on two related claims: (1) The ba- for) apparent anomalies and generate novel predictions sic assumptions of modern evolutionary theory are and explanations. Evolutionary psychology has the said to be untestable, and (2) specific evolutionary hallmarks of a currently progressive research program models and hypotheses that are drawn from these basic capable of providing us with new knowledge of how assumptions are said to be untestable. This second the mind works. charge has taken at least two forms. Either: (2a) Spe- cific evolutionary models and hypotheses are said to be—in principle—not rejectable on the basis of evi- The Lakatosian Philosophy of Science dence; or (2b) even if specific evolutionary models and in Psychology: A Necessary Addendum hypotheses can in principle be rejected, it is said that to Popper’s Method of Falsification the standards of evidence employed by evolutionary psychologists to evaluate these models and hypotheses To provide a set of criteria for demarcating science do not adhere to established principles of philosophy from pseudoscience, the philosopher Karl Popper in- of science; or both of these forms can apply. troduced the strategy of falsificationism1 (see Popper, To address these criticisms, we review principles of 1959, esp. pp. 27–48). According to Popper, scientific contemporary philosophy of science that are used to explanations are comprised of statements that can be construct and evaluate metatheoretical research pro- empirically tested to determine whether they are veri- grams and employ these principles to evaluate evolu- fied (supported by the data) or falsified (inconsistent tionary psychology. In the first half of this article, we with the data). Popper (1959) applied this method of evaluate the criticism that specific evolutionary mod- falsification to deductive theory testing: els and hypotheses are untestable. We consider the first part of this criticism (2a) to be a nonissue: Scientists We seek a decision as regards these (and other) derived using an evolutionary perspective have clearly gener- statements by comparing them with the results of prac- ated many testable models and hypotheses that can tical applications and experiments. If this decision is be—and have been—either supported or rejected on positive, that is, if the singular conclusions turn out to the basis of data (see Betzig, 1997, for a collection of be acceptable, or verified, then the theory has, for the time being, passed its test: we have found no reason to empirical works in the field). Thus, we focus on the discard it. But if the decision is negative, or in other second part of the criticism (2b): the concern that evo- words, if the conclusions have been falsified, then their lutionary psychologists do not employ scientifically defensible criteria for evaluating theoretical models in 1 relation to the performance of their derivative hypothe- Popper, of course, introduced the strategy of falsificationism for several reasons, including his claim that falsification could provide a ses and predictions. Our treatment of this criticism cen- solution to the problem of induction (see Lakatos, 1974; Popper, ters on evolutionary models of family violence, sexual 1959). For the purpose of clarity, we focus on Popper’s discussion of jealousy, and male parental investment. Drawing on the role of falsificationism in deductive theory testing. 2 EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY falsification also falsifies the theory