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Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience Cognitive Neuroscience Michael S MD DALIM #870693 9/24/06 GREEN PURPLE Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience Cognitive Neuroscience Michael S. Gazzaniga, editor Gary Lynch, Synapses, Circuits, and the Beginning of Memory Barry E. Stein and M. Alex Meredith, The Merging of the Senses Richard B. Ivry and Lynn C. Robertson, The Two Sides of Perception Steven J. Luck, An Introduction to the Event-Related Potential Technique Roberto Cabeza and Alan Kingstone, eds., Handbook of Functional Neuroimaging of Cognition Carl Senior, Tamara Russell, and Michael S. Gazzaniga, eds., Methods in Mind Steven M. Platek, Julian Paul Keenan, and Todd K. Shackelford, eds., Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience Edited by Steven M. Platek, Julian Paul Keenan, and Todd K. Shackelford The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England © 2007 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or informa- tion storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. MIT Press books may be purchased at special quantity discounts for business or sales promotional use. For information, please email special_sales@mitpress. mit.edu or write to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142. This book printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Evolutionary cognitive neuroscience / edited by Steven M. Platek, Julian Paul Keenan, and Todd K. Shackelford. p. cm.—(Cognitive neuroscience) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 13: 978-0-262-16241-8 ISBN 10: 0-262-16241-5 1. Cognitive neuroscience. 2. Brain–Evolution. 3. Evolutionary psychology. I. Platek, Steven M. II. Keenan, Julian Paul. III. Shackelford, Todd K. IV. Series. QP360.5.E97 2006 612.8′233–dc22 2006048171 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contents Contributors ix Preface xiii I Introduction and Overview 1 1 Introduction to Evolutionary Theory and Its Modern Application to Human Behavior and Cognition 5 Aaron T. Goetz and Todd K. Shackelford 2 Brain and Cognition in Evolutionary Perspective 21 Robin I. M. Dunbar 3 Introduction to Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience Methods 47 Shilpa Patel, Katie L. Rodak, Euginia Mamikonyan, Kyra Singh, and Steven M. Platek II Neuroanatomy: Ontogeny and Phylogeny 63 4 The Evolution of Ontogeny and Human Cognitive Uniqueness: Selection for Extended Brain Development in the Hominid Line 65 Valerie E. Stone 5 Hemispheric Specialization in Chimpanzees: Evolution of Hand and Brain 95 William D. Hopkins 6 The Evolution of Brain Size and Intelligence 121 J. Philippe Rushton and C. Davison Ankney vi Contents 7 The Evolution of the Brain and Cognition in Cetaceans 163 Lori Marino III Reproduction and Kin Selection 195 8 The Social Control of Reproduction: Physiological, Cellular, and Molecular Consequences of Social Status 197 Russell D. Fernald 9 Neural Correlates of Facial Resemblance 221 Steven M. Platek and Jaime W. Thomson 10 Lust, Romance, Attachment: Do the Side Effects of Serotonin-Enhancing Antidepressants Jeopardize Romantic Love, Marriage, and Fertility? 245 Helen E. Fisher and J. Anderson Thomson, Jr. 11 Self-Perceived Survival and Reproductive Fitness Theory: Substance Use Disorders, Evolutionary Game Theory, and the Brain 285 David B. Newlin IV Spatial Cognition and Language 327 12 Sex Differences in Spatial Ability: Evolution, Hormones, and the Brain 329 David Andrew Puts, Steven J. C. Gaulin, and S. Marc Breedlove 13 The Evolution of Sex Differences in Spatial Cognition 381 Ruben C. Gur, Sarah L. Levin, Farzin Irani, Ivan S. Panyavin, Jaime W. Thomson, and Steven M. Platek 14 The Evolution of Language: From Hand to Mouth 403 Michael C. Corballis V Self-Awareness and Social Cognition 431 15 The Evolution of Human Mindreading: How Nonhuman Primates Can Inform Social Cognitive Neuroscience 433 Laurie R. Santos, Jonathan I. Flombaum, and Webb Phillips vii Contents 16 Social Cognition and the Evolution of Self-Awareness 457 Farah Focquaert and Steven M. Platek 17 The Assortative Mating Theory of Autism 499 Simon Baron-Cohen 18 Deception, Evolution, and the Brain 517 Sean T. Stevens, Kevin Guise, William Christiana, Monisha Kumar, and Julian Paul Keenan 19 On the Evolution of Human Motivation: The Role of Social Prosthetic Systems 541 Stephen M. Kosslyn VI Theoretical, Ethical, and Future Implications for Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience 555 20 Philosophical, Ethical, and Social Considerations of Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience 559 Michael B. Kimberly and Paul Root Wolpe 21 Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience 579 Julian Paul Keenan, Austen L. Krill, Steven M. Platek, and Todd K. Shackelford Index 587 Contributors Editors: Steven M. Platek, PhD, Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Julian Paul Keenan, PhD, Associate Professor, Director, Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, New Jersey Todd K. Shackelford, PhD, Director, Evolutionary Psychology Lab, Department of Psychology, Florida Atlantic University, Davie, Florida Chapter Contributors: C. Davison Ankney, PhD, Professor Emeritus of Biology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada Simon Baron-Cohen, PhD, Director, Autism Research Centre (ARC), Cambridge University, Cambridge, United Kingdom S. Marc Breedlove, PhD, Neuroscience Program, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan William Christiana, BA, Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, New Jersey Michael C. Corballis, PhD, Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Robin I. M. Dunbar, PhD, School of Biological Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Russell D. Fernald, PhD, Professor of Biological Sciences, Psychology Department, Program in Human Biology, Neuroscience Program, Stanford University, Stanford, California Helen E. Fisher, PhD, Visiting Research Professor, Department of Anthropology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey Jonathan Flombaum, Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut x Contributors Farah Focquaert, Department of Philosophy, Universiteit Gent, Belgium Steven J. C. Gaulin, PhD, Professor, Department of Anthropology, Center for Evolutionary Psychology, University of California–Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California Aaron T. Goetz, MA, Department of Psychology, Florida Atlantic University, Davie, Florida Kevin Guise, Department of Psychology, Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, New Jersey Ruben C. Gur, PhD, Professor, Departments of Psychiatry and Neurology, School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania William D. Hopkins, PhD, Regular Faculty, Living Links Center, Research Associate, Yerkes National Primate Research Center; Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, Berry College, Mount Berry, Georgia Farzin Irani, MA, Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Michael B. Kimberly, Department of Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Stephen M. Kosslyn, PhD, Professor, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts Austen L. Krill, Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Monisha Kumar, BA, Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, New Jersey Sarah L. Levin, Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Euginia Mamikonyan, Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Lori Marino, PhD, Faculty Affiliate, Living Links Center, Yerkes National Primate Research Center; Senior Lecturer in Neuroscience and Behavioral Biology, Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia David B. Newlin, PhD, National Institutes of Health–National Institute on Drug Abuse, Baltimore, Maryland Ivan S. Panyavin, MA, Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Shilpa Patel, Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Webb Phillips, Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut xi Contributors David Andrew Puts, PhD, Neuroscience Program, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan Katie Rodak, MS, Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania J. Philippe Rushton, PhD, Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada Laurie Santos, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut Kyra Singh, Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Sean T. Stevens, Department of Psychology, Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, New Jersey Valerie E. Stone, PhD, Adjunct Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado J. Anderson Thomson, Jr., MD, Staff Psychiatrist, Counseling and Psychological Services, University of Virginia Student Health Services; Staff Psychiatrist, Institute of Law, Psychiatry, and Public Policy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia Jaime W. Thomson, MS, Adjunct Research Professor, Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Paul Root Wolpe, PhD, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, Faculty Associate, Center for Bioethics, Chief, Bioethics and Human Subjects Protections, NASA,
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