Announcements A Primer on Final Exam, Friday June 8, 8:30-11:30 Water in Annenberg Allocation
Next lecture (Wednesday): Sustainability, Part I
The World’s Water Resources
Gaining Streams: Losing Streams: Aquifer Feeds Surface Water Surface Water Feeds Aquifer
1 Issue # 1: How Should the Issue # 1: Competing Uses Government Allocate Water?
Issue # 2: Water Imbalance Water Allocation
What are the characteristics of a good water allocation system?
Riparian Rights System Prior Appropriation System
Water must be: Water must be:
Used on land that boarders the water source Unappropriated (“First come, first served”) Used within the watershed Diverted Put to “reasonable” use Put to “reasonable and beneficial” use (No waste) Permitted
2 A prior appropriation permit specifies: Prior Appropriation Doctrine: The Basic Western Law
How much water will be diverted No Fee Where it will be diverted Does Not Matter Where Used What water will be used for “Reasonable and Beneficial Use” Where it will be used No waste When it will be used First Come, First Served No Quantitative Limit Historically Difficult to Transfer
20 10 20 0 B B 30 cfs 30 cfs 10 A 10 A 10 cfs 10 cfs 10 5 5
0 0 Drought
D Allocation D 5 5 C 50 cfs C 50 cfs 20 cfs 20 cfs
So What Do You Think of The Importance of Prior Appropriation? Water Organizations
Encourages early and large withdrawals Municipal Suppliers Little likelihood that water will go to the most efficient use City agencies Public utilities Little incentive to conserve Agricultural Suppliers Inefficient allocation of water during droughts Agricultural Suppliers A & D keep all their water Irrigation districts B loses all of its water Water districts But 1st units of water probably more valuable than last
3 How Should a Water Supplier Typical Pricing Structure Price Its Water? Virtually always average cost Never marginal cost E.g., if existing water costs $200 per af and adding 25% more will cost $400 per af … All will be charged $240 (.8 x $200) + (.2 x $400) Often flat rate No metering Often subsidized E.g., property taxes
Susidies: Susidies: Federal Reclamation Program Federal Reclamation Program 50 year, zero-interest 50 year, zero-interest loan loan Cross subsidization Cross subsidization Irrigation $35 million Irrigation Flood control $50 million Flood control Recreation $15 million Recreation Energy subsidies
Total Cost: $100 million Final price < 20% real cost
Environmental Externalities: Changing the Hydroscape
4 Consequences: Damage to Salt Lakes Damage to Estuaries
Public Policy Responses to the Fish Loss Environmental Externalities
Judicial Responses Public trust doctrine Mono Lake Regulatory Responses “Public interest” test in issuing permits “Withdrawals” Endangered Species Act Taxes
Allocating Groundwater: The Problems of Overdrafting A Renewable/Depletable Resource Groundwater Depletion Salt Water Intrusion
5 The Problems of Overdrafting The Problems of Overdrafting
Groundwater Depletion Groundwater Depletion Salt Water Intrusion Salt Water Intrusion Lower Water Tables Lower Water Tables Increased energy costs Increased energy costs Surface Subsidence
The Problems The Problems of Overdrafting of Overdrafting Groundwater Depletion Groundwater Depletion Salt Water Intrusion Salt Water Intrusion Lower Water Tables Lower Water Tables Increased energy costs Increased energy costs Surface Subsidence Surface Subsidence Desertification Desertification Oases Oases Surface water loss
The Problems How Would You Allocate? of Overdrafting Groundwater Depletion Salt Water Intrusion Lower Water Tables Increased energy costs Surface Subsidence Desertification Oases Surface water loss Biodiversity loss
6 The Result: Groundwater Allocation Systems Groundwater Depletion Rules with No Limitations on Overdrafts Rule of Absolute Ownership Rule of Reasonable Use National Groundwater Resources Rules with Caps Recharge: 60 bgd Prior Appropriation Extraction: 75 bgd California 25% of Western Aquifers Being Mined But No Effective Enforcement
Groundwater Depletion Solving the Problem of Groundwater Is A National Problem Overdrafting Import Water California’s Central Valley Project Directly Restrict Groundwater Withdrawals Edwards Aquifer Authority Endangered Species Act Taxes and Subsidies
Meeting the Water Needs of the Options Nation’s Growing Cities
New Supplies Traditional sources Surface streams Groundwater New sources Desalination Recycled water Demand Management Water Marketing
7 Voluntary Conservation Dispersing Technology
Can be quite effective in Domestic distribution and domestic settings subsidy programs are very effective at reducing use But Low flow toilets: 10-11% Voluntary campaigns Voluntary campaigns Showerheads: 6-10% often require significant Household irrigation effort technology: 11% Effectiveness falls off And also cost effective over time But addresses only part of Unlikely to be enough for efficiency the “waste” problem
Government Mandates Price Changes
Can be extremely effective during an emergency Prices do affect use Metering High rate of compliance High rate of compliance 30% decline Examples: Price increases Goleta, California Southern California experience: Santa Barbara: 10% Maximum allotments Goleta: 26% Reduced use 30% Estimated elasticity: Santa Barbara, California -0.3 to -.05 Limited landscape Conservation is efficient irrigation But again means poor conserve Reduced use 15% more than rich Perceived as equitable Low income: 5.3% decline Middle income: 2.2% But often inefficient High income: 1.1% And high administrative And politically very unpopular costs in the long run
Popularity of Alternative Water Markets Conservation Approaches
3.5 Most Water Is in Agricultural Use 3 Today Water Markets Encourage 2.5 Conservation 100 90 Positive incentive 80 2 Provides needed capital 70 U.S. 60 Adjusts automatically to changes 1.5 Colorado Adjusts automatically to changes 50 % use in consumptive value of water 40 1 California And Can Reallocate Water 30 And Can Reallocate Water 20 Voluntarily to Urban Regions 10 0.5 Also used to reallocate water 0 among farmers Domestic Irrigation Mining Electric 0 And used by environmental Voluntary Get More Restrict Use Raises groups to reallocate water to Prices rivers
8 Water Markets The Legal Difficulties with Water Markets: But significant political Water Markets: opposition Markets benefit most profligate users Imperial Irrigation District – Water users often San Diego County Water Authority “hoard” Endowment effect Water Transfer Fear of changes in rules
Problem # 1: The Law – Problem # 2: Rent Seeking --How Can IID Transfer Conserved Water? Should Revenues Be Allocated?
Poorly defined water rights State water law Farmers Federal contracts and Traditionally “allocation reclamation law on demand” Special Colorado River law Other voters within the Junior claims Junior claims IID IID has been “wasting” water Conflict between markets and Other residents of regulation Imperial County
9 Problem # 3: Potential Community Problem #4: Is Any Water Really Being Concerns “Conserved”? Conservation versus Fallowing Economic Studies Short-term transfers generally have small impact Transfers of <20% water supplies generally have small impact
Approaches to Water Policy Problem #5: Currently 75 bgd flows from CA rivers. Of this, 25 bgd is withdrawn The Transportation Monopoly 1. New Supplies Traditional Sources (surface streams, groundwater) New Sources $800-1400 / af How Do You Get the Desalination Water to San Diego? Recycled water $600-1000 / af Colorado River 2. Decrease Use (Demand Management) Urge voluntary conservation Overall Aqueduct Government mandates Use Owned by MWD Rationing Problem Required conservation equipment Worried about losing customers in 3. Improve Allocation of Existing Supply Allocation Water Markets Southern California Problem
Water Subsidies and the Overall Water Subsidies and the Overall Use Problem Use Problem
MC MC mec soc mec soc MC MC
pag pag D D
qi*qi qi*qi Ag District i Ag District i
10 Allocation Problem
The Allocation Problem
Private Sector Participation Types of PSP arrangements
Service/management contract Different balances of: Lease Concession Asset ownership Build-operate-transfer Responsibility for capital investment Independent services providers Burden of commercial risk
11 Differences in To Privatize or Not Water Privatization Country/Region Percent Privatized (1997) Market failure vs. Government failure Western Europe 20 United States 14 5 Central/East Europe 4 Latin America 3 Africa 1 Asia
Davis, J. Annual Reviews 2005
Conclusions
1. Overall, water markets will help some.
but political/physical limits to these markets imply that allocation problem will remain significant. and they don’t address the overall use problem
2. Some trends: Gradual increase in metering. Slow trend to move from AC pricing to MC pricing. A few new water markets. More invoking/establishment of laws to support government’s role in protecting instream needs for water (biodiversity, ecosystem function, recreation.
12