1 Introduction 2 the Evolution of UN Peacekeeping

Notes

1 Introduction

1. In much of the peacekeeping literature, ‘peace operation’ has replaced ‘peacekeeping operation’. I follow this usage because the former term better captures the range of activities undertaken in the context of contemporary operations. 2. Other than in the case of East Timor, and different from many other multidimensional peace operations, the UN was barely involved in the run-up to the Security Council decision on Kosovo. It was not the UN and its Secu- rity Council but the Bosnia Contact Group, NATO and the Group of Eight that dealt with the political and security crisis in Kosovo (Heinbecker 2004). The UN was tasked with administering Kosovo ‘unexpectedly and at regret- tably short notice’ (Grifﬁn and Jones 2000: 78). In addition, three non-UN organisations also played substantial roles in the ﬁeld: the EU was responsible for the economic reconstruction, the Organization for Security and Cooper- ation in Europe was responsible for institution-building, and the NATO-led international Kosovo-Force provided security.

2 The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Towards the Emergence of a 21st-Century Peacekeeping Model

1. Today the operation is called UNEF I because it had a successor operation named UNEF II, deployed after the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Ghali 1993b). 2. The League of Nations had deployed civilian and military personnel in the Saar Basin, in Vilna, in Danzig and Upper Silesia in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles (Chesterman 2004: 18–25). The UN began to experiment as early as 1947 with sending fact-finders and unarmed observers to the Balkans, later the Middle East, and India (Durch 1993b). 3. See interviews with the key actors, UN Oral History project, http://www.un. org/Depts/dhl/dag/oralhist.htm, accessed 08.08.2012. 4. Not only was the Secretariat requested to propose a plan for the force, including its functions, composition and guiding principles, but it was also asked to negotiate with member states about force contributions, to advise the force commander in the field, and to issue regulations and instructions essential to the functioning of the force – for instance, with regard to the financial modalities or legal liabilities. The General Assembly furthermore authorised the Secretary-General to pave the way for the deployment of the force, to negotiate with the conflict parties in order to reach a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops, and to enter into agreements with regard to the status of force (Cohen 1957).

237 238 Notes

5. The UN peace operation deployed in the Congo (ONUC, 1960–4) was an exception. After the Congo’s independence in 1960, almost immediately widespread civil unrest occurred, followed by a collapse of civil services, the attempt of the secession of the resource-rich Katanga province and a military intervention by the former colonial power, Belgium. ONUC was established to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the government in maintaining law and order, and to provide technical assistance. Initially a traditional peace operation, ONUC later used considerable force (including a UN air force provided by India and Sweden). It basically took over a country that had collapsed (Durch 1993f ; Urquhart 1991: 145–70). It evolved into the ‘UN’s Vietnam’ (Durch 1993b: 8), not only because of the large number of casualties but also because of the political rifts that it created among the Western allies, and between the West and the Soviet Union. 6. In the early 1990s the UN and member states experimented with peace enforcement under UN command. In Somalia (1993–5) and in Bosnia- Herzegovina (1994–5), blue helmets engaged in war-fighting operations and lost their impartiality. These experiments led to widely acknowledged and analysed failures, and a broad consensus emerged that UN peace operations were not suitable for high-intensity warfare. For an excellent study of the evolution of the use of force in UN peacekeeping, see Findlay (2002). 7. Chapter VII of the UN Charter contains the provisions relevant to enforcement actions by the Security Council. If the Security Council authorises a peace operation under Chapter VII, it usually specifies the conditions. The mission-specific rules of engagement determine when, where and how force should be used. 8. While regular civilian police officers are individually recruited and deployed, and they perform monitoring, training and advisory tasks, formed or stability police units are robust, armed police units that are capable of performing specialised law-enforcement and public-order functions, and are contributed by member states in larger units, similar to military forces (Dziedzic and Stark 2006; Hansen 2002: 70–3). 9. After the end of the Cold War, industrialised states initially became heav- ily involved as troop contributors, particularly but not exclusively to the UN operation in the Former Yugoslavia. Their contingents made up roughly 41 per cent of troops and police in the largest UN operations outside Europe (1993) and for Europe itself (1995) (Durch and Berkman 2006b: 41). 10. As of June 2013, only Italy (19) is among the top-20 contributors to peace operations. The United Kingdom holds position 44, before Germany (47). The United States is in position 62 (see UN DPKO homepage, accessed 18.07.2013). 11. Already by 1961 the International Court of Justice had confirmed that peacekeeping was consistent with the goals of the organisation, and that its costs therefore should be borne by all member states. In spite of this decision a group of countries led by France and the Soviet Union did not to pay their share for selected operations. In 1965 the United States attempted to evoke Article 19 of the UN Charter, which entails the loss of voting power in the General Assembly should a country accumulate high arrearages. The crisis brought about a lame-duck session of the General Assembly in 1964–5 Notes 239

when all votes had to be avoided. The acute crisis was eventually dissolved when the United States backed down from its demands, yet disagreements on how to ﬁnance peace operations continued (Durch 1993e). 12. Six operations involved fewer than 1,000 soldiers, two operations fewer than 2,000, and four operations had a maximum deployment of between 6,000 and 7,000 uniformed personnel. The operation in the Congo (roughly 20,000) serves as the only exception (Jacobsen 2005: Appendix 3). 13. After the success of UNEF I, establishing a UN standing army became a popular idea. The purpose of this army was peacekeeping, not peace enforcement, as foreseen in the Charter (Kinloch-Pinat 2004: 72–100). Proposals ranged from standing forces of varying sizes, through permanent, rapidly deployable headquarters, to standby forces earmarked for UN peacekeeping, at the service of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General or the Security Council. In the light of the Congo experiences in 1960, the Secretary- General, Hammarskjöld, explicitly rejected the idea of a standing force as an ‘unnecessary and impractical measure’. His successor, U Thant, conﬁrmed this position in 1963, yet highlighted that ‘the world should eventually have an international police force’ (Kinloch-Pinat 2004: 93, 95, emphasis added). 14. In 2004 the Secretariat developed proposals for a strategic reserve force and presented it to member states. Acting as crisis response force to temporarily strengthen already operating peace operations, the strategic reserve would have consisted of a number of taskforces of some 1,250 troops, each contributed by a range of countries. To enable a speedy dispatch, each of the troop contributors would have secured prior political and legislative agreement to deploy its forces for predetermined missions. Upon completion the taskforces would return to their countries of origin (UN Secretary-General 2004a: §13–18). The strategic reserve concept did not receive the blessing of heads of states and government at the World Summit in 2005.

3 The Inﬂuence of International Bureaucracies: A Framework for Analysis

1. At a later stage, Ernst and Peter Haas attempted to reconceptualise international bureaucracies as creators and administrators of knowledge, and explored their role in organisational change and learning (Haas 1990; Haas and Haas 1995). 2. Cox (1969: 207) provided a taxonomy of enabling or constraining factors for executive heads of international organisations. He distinguished between idiosyncratic, legal-institutional, ethical-normative and other factors. Idiosyncratic aspects include the personality, leadership style, professional background or even the intelligence of the incumbent. Legal- institutional factors consist of the legal powers entrusted to an executive head, their formal standing in the organisation, and the like. Ethical- normative factors comprise the moral authority, the impersonation of neutrality and the international values credibly embodied by the executive head. In addition, other factors carry weight, such as the relations that an executive head maintains with key member states, his or her standing within the international bureaucracy, the material resources that he does or does not 240 Notes

command, his or her control over information and knowledge, or situational factors such as (un)animity between member states in a given situation. 3. Be it for reasons of linguistic elegance, simplification or the focus on preventive diplomacy, many scholars working on the UN still do not bother to differentiate between the Secretariat, higher-ranking UN officials and the Secretary-General. 4. In 1922, Max Weber wrote about the peculiar character of bureaucratic rule that is based on a special form of authority – namely, rational-legal authority. Instead of obeying a leader because of their charisma or because of traditions that put them in a position of power, people follow the rules of bureaucracies because they seem rational, formally correct and therefore legitimate (Weber 1972: 124–30). 5. The P-A model is also applied to courts or regulatory agencies (Alter 1998; Büthe 2008; Goldstein and Steinberg 2008). 6. Their definition of authority is the following: ‘By authority we understand the ability of one actor to use institutional and discursive resources to induce deference from others’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 5). 7. Their definition of power reads as follows: ‘the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 29). 8. For scholars of regime effectiveness, by contrast, to have international officials only do what states want them to do can be an interesting object of study (Miles et al. 2002; Young 1999). 9. Even states possess highly different degrees of autonomy, although – at least in theory – they meet on an equal footing: they are all sovereign, dispose of territory and are protected by international law’s guarantee of non-interference (Krasner 1999). 10. For variations in the autonomy, see Pollack (1997), who makes this point for the European Commission, or Haftel and Thompson (2006), who develop a framework for measuring the independence of international organisations. 11. Haftel and Thompson (2006) conceptualise the independence of international organisations to be made up by three elements: autonomy – insulation from the control of other actors; neutrality – preferences that are neutral or impartial with respect to other actors; delegation – the degree of authority and discretion that an international bureaucracy possesses. The authors focus on international organisations, and their understanding of independence comes close to what I consider to be the influence of international organisations. According to these authors, the mere existence of an international bureaucracy is already an indicator of the independence of international organisations. Therefore their conceptualisation is only partially helpful here. 12. In line with the debate in the 1970s, Cox et al. (1973) furthermore considered power to refer to capabilities – that is, to material resources, but also authority. Power in this sense may thus be converted into influence, but there may also be situations in which this will not be the case. 13. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change initiated by bureaucrats at the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organisation helped to make existing knowledge accessible to policy-makers and external stakeholders. This knowledge on the state of global warming Notes 241

was in turn disseminated by the international bureaucracies of the UN EP and the Secretariat of the Climate Convention through websites, brochures, information packages and workshops, especially in developing countries (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009c: 320). 14. Biermann et al. (2009: 41) also suggest differentiating between the output, the outcome and the impact. Their take on the categorisation differs from mine in one important respect: they see the international bureaucracy itself as source of output, outcome and impact, while I use the term in reference to the respective international organisation. 15. That international bureaucracies may exert influence on state actors is based upon the assumption that the preferences of states may be altered in inter- actions at the international level. I do not take sides in the debate whether such a modification is strategically motivated or whether it mirrors a more fundamental change of the state identity and in turn its interests and preferences. 16. According to Anderson (1975: 3), the complete policy cycle consists of agenda-setting, policy formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation. Because the study is merely interested in the influence of the Secre- tariat within the international organisation itself, the last two phases are omitted. 17. The policy cycle model has been challenged on various accounts (for a good overview, see Héritier 1994; Jann and Wegrich 2003). At a conceptual level, criticism was raised with regard to the theoretical status of the model that did not provide for an explaining variable concerning the transition from one phase to the other. At a descriptive level, the empirical validity of the model was questioned; it was argued that the application of such a model leads to an oversimplified and unrealistic understanding of policy-making. In addition, the inherent logic of consecutiveness is challenged, for instance, by proponents of the garbage-can model which assume a more or less independent coexistence of so-called streams of problems, solutions, participants and situations (March and Olsen 1986; for an application to the UN and peacekeeping, see Lipson 2007). Notwithstanding the policy cycle model’s shortcomings, its value for research on policy processes remains high (Jann and Wegrich 2003: 97–9).

4 The UN Secretariat’s Capacities for Autonomous Action

1. There is a general service track (clerical, administrative) and a professional track in the Secretariat. The professional track comprises five grades (P-1 to P-5), namely two director levels (D-1 and D-2), as well as the levels of Assis- tant Secretary-General and Under-Secretary-General. For details, see Göthel (2002) and the homepage of the international civil service commission. 2. Author’s interviews with UN officials, April 2204 and July 2006, UN Head- quarters, New York; Author’s interviews with state representatives, June 2006, Permanent Missions, New York. 3. To equip peace operations with risk-assessment and field-intelligence capacities gained more acceptance after the bombing of UN premises in Iraq in 2003 (Shetler-Jones 2008: 518–20). 242 Notes

4. The Soviet Union contended that there were neutral countries, but no neutral men, forcing its employees to live in a special compound and handover a considerable portion of their salary. The Secretariat reacted by building a par- allel structure that essentially circumvented some of the departments headed by Soviet officials. However, it was not only the East that infringed the Sec- retariat’s independence: for 33 years until 1986, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation scrutinised the political loyalties of American candidates and presented the result to the Secretary-General, who, for mid-level positions upwards, ‘would do well to ignore certain candidates and respond favourably to others’ (Gordenker 2005: 24). 5. Gordenker (2005: 24) notes many reasons for governments to exert pressure for appointments, or motives of individuals to ask for such a favour: capping a diplomatic career with an attractive post in New York, Geneva or Vienna; getting out from under a dictatorial regime; a successful ploy for getting rid of a now useless national servant or politician; providing for a feckless relative; waiting with a good salary until a better post in national service comes free; spying; rewards by the home government for good service in otherwise nasty circumstances; rescuing a colleague from a national ‘reduction-in-force’; and just plainly getting a better salary than the home economy offers. 6. Only a few Secretariat officials were involved in the UN’s biggest scandal concerning the Oil-for-Food Programme that the UN administered between 1995 and 2003 to alleviate the hardship of the Iraqi people caused by UN- imposed sanctions. The Secretariat’s misdoings were marginal compared with those of some of the other actors involved (J. Gordon 2007). 7. Article 7 establishes the Secretariat as one of the six primary organs of the organisation, and articles 97–101 lay out the duties, the regulations for the selection of staff, and the modalities for the election of the Secretary-General. See also the comprehensive Charter commentary edited by Simma (2002). 8. In 2006, in the wake of the World Summit, the Secretariat initiated a mandate-review process with the intention of reducing the overall number of mandates. It compiled an electronic inventory that contained about 9,000 mandates, over 6,900 of which were older than five years. The General Assembly was responsible for about 80 per cent of the total mandates. The General Assembly and the ECOSOC often specified neither a date nor a con- dition under which a delegated task could be considered fulfilled; overlaps and duplications within and between their mandates existed. The debate became highly politicised between the North and the South. In the end, states agreed only on the termination of very few mandates (Swart 2010: 90–2). 9. See the homepage of the Global Public Policy Forum and Hüfner (2003a) for exact figures. 10. For the biennium 2012–13, the general budget amounted to USD 5,152 billion (UN Department of Management 2012a). 11. The UN’s modest incomes include earnings from the post service, gift shops and fees for renting out assets to specialised agencies. For an introduction to the complex UN budget procedures, see Gordenker (2005: 28–34), Hüfner (2003a; b) and Laurentidi (2004). Notes 243

12. Under heavy pressure from the United States, which had unilaterally decreased its share of the budget to 25 per cent in 1995, the assessment scale was formalised in 2000 and the American share was reduced from 31 to 27 per cent (Hüfner 2003b; Laurentidi 2004: 298–9). 13. The ACABQ is a standing committee of the General Assembly that is com- posed of 16 individual experts chosen on the basis of personal qualifications and broad geographical representation. 14. As proposed by Boutros-Ghali in the ‘Agenda for Peace’, in 1992 a peacekeeping reserve fund was established at a level of USD 150 million as a cashflow mechanism to ensure a rapid response for peace operations. How- ever, faced with increased demands for peacekeeping as well as peacemaking and other diplomatic activities, this sum was quickly used up and again limited the Secretariat’s means for independent action or reaction (Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001). 15. While in the past only the Soviet Union had enjoyed this sort of special treat- ment, after the end of the Cold War, other permanent members developed a claim over offices. France has been in charge of peacekeeping since the mid- 1990s; the United Kingdom held the top position in the UN DPA but lost it not long ago to the United States, which has claims over the Department of Management (Cunliffe 2009: 328–29; Myint-U and Scott 2007: 122). 16. Author’s interview with a UN official, June 2006, UN Headquarters, New York. 17. While the Security Council, dominated by Western interests – and, some argue, by the United States – has greatly enlarged its competences and powers since the end of the Cold War (Wallensteen and Johansson 2004), the General Assembly has been on the decline since the 1980s (Smouts 2000: 46–8). Attempts to revitalise it have so far not been crowned with success (Peterson 2006: 122–47). 18. For the most part, the People’s Republic of China remained passive through- out the 1990s, playing a supine role on the Security Council. It protected its own national interests where necessary and did not stand in the way of other developments. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has played a more proactive peacekeeping role. It has voted in favour of most of the resolutions that authorised new missions and has begun to significantly contribute personnel (He 2007). In a similar vein, Russia has rarely played a proactive role in the Security Council unless its direct national interests have been at stake. 19. Initially, the Special Committee was authorised ‘to undertake ...acompre- hensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the Organization’, and to report thereupon to the General Assembly (UN General Assembly 1965). 20. The Special Committee produces an annual report that includes recommendations directed towards the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. This section has become longer and increasingly detailed over the last ten years – a reason for concern and reform of the working methods of the committee (see IPI and CIC 2011). The committee meets for a few weeks in February and March. After a general debate where member states articulate their priorities and positions, the committee breaks into a ‘working group format’ – the 244 Notes

same actors, yet less formal – to negotiate a consensus report. It then reconvenes and adopts the report; its chairman presents the report to the Fourth Committee, which debates peacekeeping, usually in the autumn. The Fourth Committee usually endorses the report and renews the committee’s mandate. 21. Author’s interview with a UN ofﬁcial, March 2007, UN Headquarters, New York. 22. The power asymmetries and struggles in the international system affect the dynamics between the UN organs. In the 1950s, for example, a more powerful General Assembly was in the interest of the United States because Western states held the majority there, while the Security Council was paralysed by the great power antagonism. The United States also favoured a more powerful Secretary-General, which went together well with Dag Hammerskjöld’s vision of his ofﬁce. The decolonisation waves that shifted the power in the General Assembly in favour of the developing world changed the United States’ attitude towards this UN body (Prantl 2006: 45–69).

5 The Operational Dimension: The Peace Operation in East Timor

1. The UN’s engagement in East Timor continued until 2012. The succeeding peace operation, UNMISET, was mandated to assist the newly independent East Timor until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the East Timor authorities, and to permit the new nation to attain self- sufficiency. After the withdrawal of UMISET (May 2005), a political mission, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) remained in the country to support the development of critical state institutions and the police, and to provide democratic governance and human rights training. In spring 2006 a political, humanitarian and security crisis erupted and ultimately led to the establishment of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). This was drawn down at the end of 2012. 2. The Secretary-General’s personal representative, Marker (2003), offers a detailed account of the mediation process. Samuel (2003) gives a pointed analysis from a UN insider’s perspective. Martin (2001), head of UNAMET, complements this with a view from the field, as do Smith and Dee (2003); Smith was deputy force commander for INTERFET and later UNTAET. The diplomatic process in the Security Council was covered by the former British ambassador, Eldon (2004). 3. With hindsight, observers attribute Habibie’s sudden change of mind mostly to his personality; the mounting international reform pressure on Indonesia by the United States, the World Bank and the IMF allegedly also played a role (Smith and Dee 2006: 395). In addition, Indonesia lost the support of Australia. In a letter, the Australian prime minister, Howard, proposed that Habibie should allow an act of self-determination in East Timor. The text of the famous ‘Howard Letter’ is included in Fischer (2000: 10–13). 4. While his whole cabinet supported Habibie in his decision, the military, which continued to be a powerful force in Indonesia and in East Timor, opposed his initiative. They feared that other provinces would follow the Notes 245

East Timorese example. Both the military and the Indonesian police wanted to retain the province; they had suffered many casualties over the years there and East Timor was the source of considerable economic benefits for some senior leaders (Lloyd 2003: 85). 5. The Indonesian view was that since East Timor had already been integrated into Indonesia in 1978 by the decision of the Indonesian People’s Consulta- tive Assembly, any changes to its status would necessitate another decision by that assembly. 6. A group of friends can be described as an ‘ad hoc, informal, issue-specific mini-coalition of states or intergovernmental organizations that become involved in and provide support for resolving conflicts and implementing peace agreements’ (Whitfield 2007: 9). 7. At the reiterated insistence of the Indonesian government, the maintenance of law and order, including the responsibility for the security of UN personnel, was made the sole responsibility of the Indonesian police and military. Several of those involved argue that further insistence on the part of the UN or member states that Indonesia should accept a peacekeeping force would have made the Indonesians walk out, and the window of opportunity for East Timorese self-determination would have been closed (Eldon 2004; Marker 2003; Samuel 2003). 8. Author’s interviews with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin, and with a state representative, September 2008, Brussels. 9. As the Dutch diplomat van Walsum (2002) described, there was a sense of a ‘Kosovo hangover’ in the Security Council stemming from the unautho- rised military air strikes four months earlier: ‘All countries wanted to avoid another humanitarian intervention without a Security Council mandate, but all of them also knew full well that such an intervention had taken place and could eventually take place again.’ 10. Author’s interview with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin. 11. The building of the momentum for intervention is covered in numerous publications. See Greenlees and Garran 2002: 232–50; Jago 2010; Martin 2001: 103–12; Pour 1999; Quarterman 2003; Wheeler and Dunne 2001. 12. The Secretary-General alone made 111 phone calls between 3 and 15 September 1999 concerning East Timor, just less than a quarter of which were to Habibie (Pour 1999). 13. Negotiating the INTERFET resolution proved highly controversial. Even though all countries – even Indonesia’s staunchest friends – consented to authorise a multinational force, there was much debate with regard to the wording, the degree (or lack) of criticism towards Indonesia and the question of whether INTERFET should have a Chapter VI or Chapter VII mandate (Martin 2001: 112–13). 14. Already in 1983 the East Timorese had proposed a set of measures to the Indonesian government that included a UN peacekeeping force. At that time, Indonesia did not want the conflict to become internationalised and the idea was rejected (Dunn 2002: 295). 15. The initial plans prepared by the Secretariat and tabled in April 1999 proposed verifiable disarmament of both pro- and anti-independence paramilitary and militia forces before the preparations for the referendum were to begin; a verifiable reduction of the Indonesian military presence, as well as 246 Notes

confinement of Indonesians military and fighters of the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor to designated areas one month before the ballot (Martin 2001: 29–35). 16. There were several proponents to establish a neutral force. In June 1998 a meeting of East Timorese in Dili had formulated the demand that the Indonesian military should withdraw and be replaced by a UN peace operation (ETAN 1998). In November 1998 the UN-sponsored all-inclusive East Timorese dialogue forum also requested the deployment of a UN peace operation with peacekeeping functions. In the Australian press, as early as March 1999, experts advocated pressure on Indonesia to accept a neutral security force as part of any agreement (Maley 2000: 70). 17. While some actors in the American State Department were in principle open to the idea of a UN force, Australia was apparently much more reluctant. See Conflict, Security and Development Group (2003, FN 13). 18. Author’s interview with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin. 19. The only military contingency planning that took place concerned the evacuation of UN personnel. In the run-up to the ballot, the UN DPKO held talks mainly with Australia and the United States about the evacuation of UNAMET mission personnel (Breen 2003: 208). 20. Author’s interview with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin. 21. In the context of INTERFET, Australia deployed about one-third of its entire ground force to East Timor, and paid operational costs equivalent to its entire annual defence budget of the previous year (Durch and Berkman 2006b: 77–80). 22. At that time the UN DPKO had a heavy workload. The department was involved in deploying a mission to Sierra Leone and planning for a mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On top of this it had not yet recovered from the loss of gratis personnel seconded by Western member states, a practice that was brought to an end in 1997. 23. Precisely at the time when the Secretariat was finalising its own plans, the World Bank together with East Timorese representatives, UN agencies and donors undertook a joint mission to assess the situation in East Timor. The IMF undertook a concurrent mission to assess the macroeconomic framework. The UNDP prepared a conceptual framework for reconstruction, recovery and development. The UN DPKO actors did not participate in the mission, nor did they initially incorporate these findings into their own plan (Cliffe and Rohland 2003; Conflict, Security and Development Group 2003: §142–3). 24. Author’s interviews with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin, and with a state representative, September 2008, Brussels. 25. Author’s interviews with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin. 26. At the end of October 1999, more than 8,200 INTERFET troops were deployed in East Timor; the maximum deployment number totalled almost 10,000 troops from 22 states, with Australia’s share being around 5,400 (Smith and Dee 2006: 417). For a detailed assessment of INTERFET, see Dee (2001); Smith and Dee (2006: 409–22). 27. The Secretary-General subsequently asked another member of the UN’s ‘A-team’ (Traub 2000: 82), the Brazilian Vieira de Mello, who not only spoke fluent Portuguese and had experience in Asia, but had also gained Notes 247

the support of the US administration after his work in Kosovo (Power 2008: 301). 28. Also author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters. 29. Initial peacebuilding ideas had included plans to earmark posts for World Bank staff who were to generate ideas about how to implement sustainable development programmes within UNTAET (Conflict, Security and Develop- ment Group 2003: §26–8). 30. The United States wanted to keep the costs of the assessed budget for UNTAET as low as possible. Therefore a voluntary trust fund was to cover the expenses for socioeconomic rehabilitation and other reconstruction measures, as well as training measures and part of the institution-building measures. 31. For instance, it was proposed to recognise the CNRT as a legitimate partner and grant this umbrella organisation of political forces for independence a role alongside UNTAET. In addition, the establishment of consultation mechanisms between UNTAET and the East Timorese organisations, as well as a dual-desk structure, were contemplated. Such a structure would have matched international officials with East Timorese staff to allow on-the-job training and co-decision-making (Conflict, Security and Development Group 2003: 25–7). 32. Author’s interview with a state representative, September 2008, Brussels. 33. There had been diverging opinions about the timeframe within which the transition should take place. Among East Timorese leaders, views ranged from a decade or longer to a very short time (Goldstone 2004: 87–8). In fact, East Timor became a sovereign state not more than two-and-a-half years after UNTAET began its operation. 34. Members of the Security Council, especially the American delegation, made it clear that the mission was to be of short duration (Steele 2002: 76). 35. A cursory analysis of the budget documents reveals that for the first seven months the Secretariat received nearly all of the money it deemed necessary, a substantial sum of USD 350 million. The Secretariat had requested an additional USD 30 million but had already reduced its own estimates by USD 20 million because of slippages in deployment (UN General Assembly 1999b: 21). In total, over its two-and-a-half years of existence, UNTAET’s budget amounted to approximately USD 1,280 million. This was roughly 70 per cent of the total international funding for East Timor. The money was primarily used for expenses related to peacekeeping troops and civilian UN staff. Humanitarian and reconstruction aid was channelled through five other funding streams. In general, East Timor received an unusually large amount of aid per capita; a wider range of governments than usual made contributions (Cliffe and Rohland 2003: 109–10). 36. Brazil, Canada, France, Namibia, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted the draft resolution and were joined by Argentina, France, Portugal and the Russian Federation as sponsors (UN Security Council 1999a). 37. The 15-day notification requirement was introduced by the republican- controlled Congress in the second Clinton administration. It forced the government to brief key congressional committees and identify the funding sources (Holt and Mackinnon 2008: 21–2). 248 Notes

38. Author’s interview with a state representative, September 2008, Brussels. 39. According to Security Council standard practices, the resolution did not authorise the size of the UNTAET civil governance administration. The speciﬁcation of the size (and the costs) of the civilian components took place in the General Assembly at a later stage of the decision-making process. 40. At that time the US administration was ﬁghting with Congress over the release of accumulated arrears in assessed contributions mainly to the UN peacekeeping budgets. There was a risk that at the end of 1999 the United States would lose its vote in the General Assembly. In fact, regardless of the American vote in the Security Council, Congress would later withhold payment also for the operation in East Timor (Holt and Mackinnon 2008: 23). Already in May 2000 the American ambassador would call for a reduction in the peacekeeping force that had taken over from INTERFET only three months earlier. 41. Author’s interview with a state representative, September 2008, Brussels. 42. Indonesia and its allies had made it very clear that they wanted non-Western candidates especially for the position of force commander, and they had lobbied the international bureaucracy to choose a Southeast Asian candi- date. Western countries preferred the force commander to be Australian because the country continued to provide the largest component of troops and because the trust in Australia was greater than in an Asian commander (Richardson 1999b). When Malaysia made known its aspirations for the post, the East Timorese leaders informed the Secretary-General of their opposition. In the end, the Secretary-General settled the dispute by convincing the reluctant Philippines to staff the post of the force commander, having an Australian as a deputy (Dupont 2000: 169). 43. In INTERFET the United States deliberately played the junior partner to Australia: it did not provide combat troops but helped with intelligence, logistics and other support functions. Furthermore, it stationed a warship on the Timorese coastline (Orr 2001). 44. See also Ian Martin (2004: 571–4), who based his assessment on the analysis of the Security Council’s decision-making on East Timor, including the early downsizing of UNTAET, the early independence of what became Timor Leste, as well as the neglect of following up on the requested human-rights investigations. 45. In the early days of UNTAET which are analysed in this chapter, member states were generous and the Secretariat received nearly all of the resources that it requested. This support should quickly wane.

6 The Conceptual Dimension: The Decisions to Reform UN Peacekeeping and Instigate Doctrine Development

1. Between 1995 and 1999 the Security Council authorised one robust operation in eastern Croatia and a police mission in Bosnia; all other missions were small military observer missions (in Georgia, Tajikistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone) or political missions. 2. Beginning in 1996 the US Congress refused to authorise the full payment of the United States’ dues in order to force UN compliance with American Notes 249

reform requests, as well as a reduction in the American share of peacekeeping costs from more than 30 to 25 per cent. At the end of 1999 the United States had lost its seat in the financial watchdog ACABQ and was under threat of losing its vote in the General Assembly. 3. Jamaica, for instance, argued in the Special Committee’s general debate that peacekeeping operations were under threat of extinction, given their gradual reduction over the years, and that it was paradoxical that the UN’s capacity had been underutilised. Every effort should be made to revive the political will to mount peacekeeping operations (United Nations 1999c). 4. By February 1999 the UN DPKO hat lost most of its institutional memory for military and logistic planning. Gratis officers had previously made up approximately 85 per cent of the logistic and military planning staff and nearly a quarter of the UN DPKO’s total staffing. Even before the number of missions increased, the Secretariat had presented a plan to manage the transition from gratis personnel to international civil servants funded by the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budget. In the light of the fallen number of peacekeepers, governments were reluctant to authorise the necessary resources and approve the UN DPKO’s new organisational structure (McClure and Orlov 1999; UN Secretary-General 1996). 5. In December 1999 the General Assembly approved 67 additional posts that due to the UN’s complicated administrative procedures were only beginning to be filled by spring 2000 (Durch et al. 2003: 52). 6. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters. 7. The Millennium Development Goals are eight specific, measurable objectives that range from the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger over, through the reduction of child mortality and the improvement of maternal health to the development of a global partnership for development. The international community has vowed to implement these goals, which are operationalised by various subgoals and targets, by 2015 (Hulme 2009). 8. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters. 9. In addition to Brahimi, the members of the panel were Brian Atwood (United States), former head of the US Agency for International Development; Colin Granderson (Trinidad and Tobago), former head of the Organisation of American States/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti; Ann Hercus (New Zealand), former Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Cyprus; Richard Monk (United Kingdom), former Police Commissioner of the International Police Task Force; Klaus Naumann (Germany), former Chief of the German defence staff and former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO; Hisako Shimura (Japan), President of Tsuda College in Japan and former official in the UN DPKO; Vladimir Shustov (Russian Federation), former Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federa- tion to the UN; Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe), former Force Commander of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III; and Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland), former President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (UN Secretary-General 2000a). 10. The report ‘We the Nations’ elaborates with regard to the high-level panel: To bring greater clarity to where we stand and how we can hope to progress with regard to United Nations peace operations, I have established a high-level panel, which will review all aspects of peace 250 Notes

operations, from the doctrinal to the logistical. It will suggest ways forward that are acceptable politically and make sense operationally. I expect that the panel’s report will be completed in time to enable the Millennium Assembly to consider its recommendations. (UN Secretary-General 2000d: §227) 11. Author’s interviews with state officials, July 2007, UN headquarters, New York, and September 2008, Brussels; author’s interview with a UN official, June 2007, Konstanz. 12. This demand echoed the calls for more specific, time-bound and measurable goals in the area of development (Hulme 2007). 13. The mandate was ‘to undertake a thorough review of United Nations peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future’ (UN Secretary-General 2000a: 1). 14. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York; author’s interview with a UN expert, February 2007, Washington, DC. 15. Author’s interview with a UN expert, February 2007, Washington, DC. 16. Author’s interview with a UN expert, February 2007, Washington, DC. 17. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York; author’s interview with a UN expert, February 2007, Washington, DC. 18. Author’s interview with a UN expert, February 2007, Washington, DC. 19. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York. 20. For a more in-depth analysis and assessment of the Brahimi Report’s recommendation, see Bratt and Gionet 2001; Gray 2001; and Kühne 2003. 21. Author’s interview with a state representative, July 2006, New York. 22. Author’s interview with a state representative, July 2006, New York. 23. The Security Council encouraged the Secretary-General to begin consultations with potential troop contributors ‘well in advance of the establishment of peacekeeping operations’; it agreed to ‘assist the Secretary-General, wher- ever appropriate, with specific planning mandates’; and promised to ‘request formally that the Secretary-General proceed to the implementation phase of the mandate’ after receipt of ‘sufficient numbers of adequately trained and equipped troops and other critical mission support elements’ (UN Security Council 2000b). 24. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York. 25. See FN 20, Chapter 4. 26. The Fifth Committee is very labour-intensive; it meets more frequently than other committees, and the delegates are faced with a large number of issues that not only need to be dealt with simultaneously but also are highly technical and require detailed documentation. Its session usually culminates in negotiation marathons that are infamous for the amount of haggling and horse-trading done behind the scenes (Swart and Martinetti 2007). In addition, many of the Fifth Committee’s members consist of junior diplomats with little management experience; ambassadors usually only get involved Notes 251

when important issues, such as the scale of assessment or the deletion of budgetary items, are at stake. 27. The external management consultants highlighted that ‘over 30 per cent or 161 of the Department’s staff work on average of 50 to 60 hours per week, and 60 staff average a work week of 60 hours or more’, and argued that the UN DPKO should consist of roughly 650 staff, meaning approximately 150 officials more given the level of operations at that time (UN Secretary- General 2001: §187, 185). 28. Strengthening the General Assembly remains an important concern. In June 2010 it held its first-ever thematic debate on peacekeeping. The debate was organised on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Brahimi Report. 29. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York. 30. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York.

7 The Institutional Dimension: The Creation of the Standing Police Capacity

1. Formed police units are robust, paramilitary-like forces that are deployed with their own equipment (Dziedzic and Stark 2006; Hansen 2002: 70–3). 2. Only formed police units are provided by member states as a group (Perito 2004). 3. The Netherlands proposed establishing a standing international all- volunteer ‘ﬁre brigade’ made up of individually recruited soldiers. The brigade would be under the direct control of the Security Council. It would be used for preventive deployment, to be sent in advance of, and in preparation for, a peace operation. Its purpose would also be to undertake stop-gap measures when a crisis was imminent, hence possibly preventing the repe- tition of a Rwanda-like situation where governments were not prepared to intervene (Kinloch-Pinat 2004: 152–6). The ambitious proposal prompted an international debate but overall it was met with opposition. Only a few member states supported the Dutch initiative; ‘the majority were opposed to any standing UN force, and even the modest expenditures outlined’ (Langille 2000: 223). 4. The Danish proposal built on supporting the UNSAS, which had been introduced shortly before. Denmark, together with 13 other states, explored the creation of a common multinational rapid deployment force that would be available for deployment at short notice and for a limited timeframe. This led to the establishment of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) in 1996, which was declared operational in 2000. The focus of SHIRBRIG has been purely on military resources (Varwick and Koops 2008). 5. While several governments had pledged money and promised to supply personnel for the RDMHs, the planned trust fund did not attract sufﬁcient funding. The idea to rely partly on gratis personnel brought up the question of the equitable representation of developing countries (Langille 2000: 234, FN 74). In addition, the NAM countries were suspicious of the friends of rapid deployment who were accused of ‘operating without legitimacy, 252 Notes

and having half-baked ideas developed without broad consultations with the countries most concerned’ (Pakistani Ambassador Kamal 1996, cited in Langille 2000: 226). 6. As in many other areas, the report’s recommendation on police recruitment and training were not absolute novelties. Between 1998 and 2000, the UN DPKO had convened three seminars with police-contributing states that ended in similar recommendations with regard to the recruitment and training of UN police; see Serafino (2004: 11–12). 7. A similar on-call list for military personnel and a roster of civilian experts who were deployable at short notice should complement the police on-call list. In essence, once implemented, the on-call lists and the roster would put the UN in a position to assemble mission-specific, rapidly deployable headquarters similar to the ones proposed in the Canadian vanguard concept. This would provide the Secretary-General with a dependable supply of military and police forces, and enable a more rapid and effective start-up of peace operations. The ambitious goal of the Brahimi panel was to put the UN in a position to deploy a traditional peace operation within 30 days, and a complex one within 60 days. 8. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York. 9. The Iraq War began on 20 March 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by a multinational force led by troops from the United States and the United Kingdom. Prior to the invasion the United States and the United Kingdom asserted that the possibility of Iraq employing weapons of mass destruction threat- ened their security and that of their regional allies. They did not succeed in their attempt to have the Security Council approve a resolution that authorised the use of force (Einsiedel and Chesterman 2003; Zacklin 2010: 135–54). 10. For instance, the United States withheld its support for the French-backed peace operation to Côte d’Ivoire for several weeks, seemingly to pay France back for its stand on the Iraq issue. 11. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York. 12. In 2007 only Argentina, Australia, Jordan, Nigeria, Norway, Spain and Sweden had police advisors based at their permanent missions. This number was dwarfed by at least 85 countries that had military advisers (and usually deputy advisers) based in New York (Greener 2009: 109). 13. This indifference at the UN stands somewhat in contrast with developments at the national and European levels where states dedicated more atten- tion to bolstering their capacity for international police deployments. For instance, at the Feira Summit in 2000, European member states commit- ted to being able to deploy up to 5,000 police to international operations by 2003 (Weinlich 2003); in early 2004, Australia established the Interna- tional Development Group, a standing unit of 500 police officers who were available at short notice (Peake and Brown 2005). 14. Zimbabwe, Croatia, Australia, Switzerland, Brazil, Poland and Mozambique, as well as New Zealand, Greece (speaking on behalf of the EU), Ukraine, Malaysia, Pakistan and Nepal made reference to policing issues in the Special Notes 253

Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and in the Fourth Committee (United Nations 2003b;c; UN General Assembly 2003b; c). 15. In February 2004 it became known that the Oil-for-Food programme had been corrupted by the Iraqi regime. The alleged beneficiaries included a senior UN official who oversaw the programme. Annan asked the Secu- rity Council to establish an investigative body, which became the Volcker Commission named after its chairman, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker (J. Gordon 2007). 16. In the 18 months between September 2003 and March 2005, the Security Council authorised roughly 3,000 individual civilian police officers and a dozen formed police units (Smith et al. 2007a: Annex II, xvi). 17. Three months after the peace operation to Liberia had been authorised, less than 10 per cent of civilian police officers were deployed; similarly, only 14 per cent had been deployed to Côte d’Ivoire, 26 per cent to Haiti, 29 per cent to Burundi and less than 10 per cent to Sudan (Smith et al. 2007a: Annex II). 18. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York. 19. Ahmed had been part of the Brahimi team; already during the preparations of the Brahimi Report, the idea had been contemplated to create a standing unit of 500 civilian police officers available for immediate deployment. At that time the idea was set aside because it was considered too expensive (Lewis et al. 2002: 8). 20. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York. 21. Instead the HLP settled on recommending improvements with regard to the standby arrangements. Member states, especially developed countries, were urged to establish feasible rapid-reaction capabilities and place them at the disposal of the UN (UN Secretary-General 2004b: §218). 22. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York; Author’s interview with a state representative, March 2007, New York. 26. Author’s interview with a state representative, March 2007, New York. 27. Author’s interview with a state representative, January 2009, by telephone. 28. Ibid. 29. The Secretariat undertook minor changes and translated the concept into internal doctrine and guidance documents for the members of the SPC and their activities (Rotmann 2007: 66). In May 2006, Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno approved the revised version as an internal document on the ‘Establishment, Functions, and Organisation of the United Nations Standing Police Capacity (SPC)’ (UN DPKO 2006). 30. While Germany as part of the ‘gang of four’ together with Japan, India and Brazil aspired to a permanent seat on the Security Council, Italy was a key member of the counter-movement ‘Uniting for Consensus’ that opted to 254 Notes

create a new class of longer-term members instead of new permanent ones (Traub 2006: 314). 31. Author’s interview with state representatives, March 2007, New York; author’s interview with a UN official, UN headquarters, March 2007. 32. Author’s interview with a state representative, March 2007. 33. Author’s interview with state representatives, September 2009, by telephone. 34. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007. 35. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters; Author’s interview with a state representative, March 2007, New York. 36. In fact, already in October 2006, before the SPC had received its financial authorisation, when the recruitment was only just under way, the international bureaucracy floated the idea among states to expand the SPC’s initial operating capacity (Guéhenno 2006). In February 2007, Under-Secretary- General Guéhenno repeated this proposal in front of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations; the police advisor followed with a letter to members, explaining in more detail the need for an initial operating capacity of 50 (UN DPKO 2007). The proposal ran into opposition and was rejected in the budgetary process. 37. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York. 38. The Italian Foreign Ministry commented on the selection of Brindisi by issuing the following statement on 3 November 2006: The choice of Brindisi is a major success for Italy, following only a few days upon its election to the Security Council, and a significant acknowl- edgement of our country’s commitment to maintaining peace. As a result of our growing role in peacekeeping operations, one of Italy’s priorities will be to foster the reinforcement and expansion of the Brindisi base, which performs a function essential to the preparation and logistical management of all the UN’s peacekeeping operations. (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006) 39. Author’s interview with a state delegate, April 2007, New York. 40. The draft outcome documents can be accessed at http://www.globalpolicy. org/msummit/millenni/m5outcomedocindex.htm, accessed 05.02.2013. In all places, emphasis is added by the author. 41. The Secretary-General proposed the creation of 27 new posts, financed by the support account, and requested an initial sum of USD2,122,700 for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, the already running financial period for the peacekeeping budgets (UN Secretary-General 2005a: §147–56). 42. Author’s interview with a state representative, March 2007, New York. 43. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters, New York. 44. Ibid. 45. The SPC’s cousin, the strategic military reserve, offers an interesting lesson. Here, the Secretariat followed the ‘old’ model. After some informal consultations beforehand, a more or less elaborate proposal was presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. It immediately came under fire from various corners; the majority of member states did not back the proposal in the summit negotiations. When asked, member state respondents Notes 255

independently assessed that it was more the way of presenting the proposal that caused concern than the actual idea of establishing a military strategic reserve, which in principle was thought to be worth considering by the EU, NAM and CANZ.

8 The Shaping Powers of the UN Secretariat: Conclusions and Future Prospects for Studying the Role of International Bureaucracies

1. Author’s interview with a UN expert, July 2006, New York. 2. Author’s interview with a UN official, July 2006, New York. 3. Author’s interview with a UN official, July 2006, UN headquarters, New York. 4. In recent years it has arguably been only the new operation in the Middle East that has been of greater interest to many countries, including Western countries. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) was established as a means to end the war between Israel and the Hezbollah in 2006. At the insistence of Lebanon, an already existing UN peace operation was modified. In turn, European states insisted on establishing and staffing a strategic military cell within the UN DPKO to increase their oversight and control. For the first time in the new century, they contributed troops to a UN-led operation on a large scale and made their participation contingent upon working around existing UN structures (Mattelaer 2009). 5. Of course, the superimposition of extraneous issues can also obstruct the real- isation of the Secretariat’s policy recommendations. The Brahimi case study shows that policy issues easily become politicised and fall hostage to the omnipresent North–South dynamics. The intervention in Kosovo and the sub- sequent debate on humanitarian interventions both had a great impact on the climate in which the General Assembly discussed recommendations such as the establishment of the ISAS. 6. Author’s interview with a UN expert, July 2006, New York. 7. Author’s interview with a UN official, July 2007, New York. Bibliography

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Africa Bolton, John, 1, 202–3, 210 and peace operations, 22, 24, 25, Boutros–Ghali, Boutros, 28, 46, 129, 139, 140 80, 180 and peacekeeping structures, 24, Brahimi, Lakhdar, 29, 121, 136, 147–8, 139, 150, 185, 205 152–4, 159, 162, 166, 175 Ahmed, Salman, 147, 148, 153, Brahimi Panel, 6–7, 29, 136, 147–9, 154, 190 152, 154 Annan, Kofi, 168, 203 Brahimi Report and East Timor, 92, 96, 104, 107, contents of, 155–8, 182 108, 132, 134 implementation of, 29, 136–8, and peacekeeping 72, 143, 149–50, 154–60, 161–72 145–50, 164 origins of, 145–8 Agenda for Peace, 28, 147, 180 writing of, 147–9, 152–4 ASEAN states, see East Timor, ASEAN States China, 78, 149, 227 assessed contributions, 20, 77–8, 81–2 and East Timor, 90, 93, 94, 106, 108, Australia 112, 123, 127–8 and conflict over East Timor, Cox, Robert, 40–1, 57–8 90–2, 95 constructivism, 9–10, 11, 45–7, 50–1, and referendum preparations, 232–3 102–3, 105, 109–10 and SPC, 195, 201, 208 Durch, William, 148 and UNTAET decision–making, 125, Department of Peacekeeping 126, 130, 131 Operations (DPKO), see UN and UNTAET planning, 114–8, Department of Peacekeeping 120–1 Operations (UN DPKO) see also International Force East Timor (INTERFET) East Timor authority, 49, 53–4, 233–4 and ASEAN states, 91, 94, 95–6 autonomy conflict over, 90–3 and East Timor, see East Timor, and and core group, see and group of tripartite talks friends and international bureaucracies, 3, and group of friends, 93, 99, 102–4, 4, 10, 12, 43, 46, 50, 52–3, 54, 108, 116, 118, 126 55–7, 68, 76, 79, 124, 176, and human rights, 92, 94–6, 98, 179, 230 107, 108–9, 127–8, 133–4, 225 see also UN Secretariat, and and independence movement, 93, autonomy 117, 121, 123 and May 5 agreements, 104–5, 108, Ban, Ki–Moon, 33, 85 111–16, 126 Barnett, Michael, 49, 50, 51, 52–3, 56, and referendum, 98–9, 101–2, 73, 233 104–7, 110–11, 132, 134

286 Index 287

and self–determination, 90, 91, 95, and Security Council, 112, 116, 96, 101, 102 126–7 and tripartite talks, 91–2, 96, 98–9, and UN Assistance Mission in East 100–5, 109–11 Timor (UNAMET), 110–11, 223 and UN peacekeeping, see UN see also East Timor, Habibie, Assistance Mission in East Bacharuddin Jusuf; Suharto, Timor (UNAMET); UN Haji Mohamed Transitional Administration in influence East Timor (UNTAET) and autonomy, 10, 12, 40–1, 51–2, and violence, 92, 99, 105, 106, 107, 55–7, 234 127, 133 definition, 57–60 see also Australia, Indonesia, pathways of influence, 13–4, 226–9 International Force East Timor international bureaucracies (INTERFET); Portugal and executive head, 4, 40–1, 43–4 ideals of, 71–2 Finnemore, Martha, 49, 50, 51, 52–3, influence of, see influence 56, 233 tasks of, 1–2, 20–1 framework of analysis, integrated, 11, see also UN Secretariat 55–61 institutionalism, sociological, 9–10, application of, 62–7 11, 45–8, 50, 54, 232–3 France international organisation 45–6, 48–9 and East Timor, 95 and international bureaucracies, and peacekeeping, 27, 72, 81, 83, 1–5, 9–11, 12, 39, 49–51 84, 139, 149, 195 International Force East Timor and Suez Crisis, 18–9 (INTERFET), 99, 109, 112, 115, 117, 129 Group of 77 (G-77), 86, 162, 203, 226 and UNTAET, 117, 118, 120–1, 130 Guéhenno, Jean–Marie, 154, 155, 163, 174, 189, 191, 193, 194, 198, Iraq War, 183–6 208–9 Gusmão, Xanana, 92, 101, 107 Kroeker, Mark, 179, 193, 194, 200

Habibie, Bacharuddin Jusuf, 98–102, Managers of Global Change Project, 108–9, 132, 134, 223 46, 58–9 see also East Timor, Indonesia Martin, Ian, 105, 106 Hammarskjöld, Dag, 5, 19–20, 34, 71 Marker, Jamsheed, 92, 101, 104, High–Level Panel on Threats, 105, 106 Challenges and Change (HLP), May 5 Agreements, see East Timor, and 188–9, 190–1, 193, 194, 198, 201, May 5 Agreements 211, 212, 214, 233 Millennium Development Goals, 146–7, 189 India, 19, 20, 25, 78, 86, 139, 141, Millennium Summit, 136, 145–7, 164, 167, 169, 175, 226, 236 149–50, 174–5, 188, 222, 224, 233 Indonesia and conﬂict over East Timor, 90–3, 98, 99, 126 National Council of Timor Resistance and INTERFET, 108–9, 117, 223 (CNRT), 93, 101, 117, 123 and tripartite talks, 92, 100–2, 104, see also East Timor, and 113, 116, 123 independence movement 288 Index

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Portugal (NATO), 43, 70, 122, 139, and conﬂict over East Timor, 140, 234 90–5,126 neoliberal institutionalism, 41–2 and tripartite talks, 92, 100–2, neorealism, 41–2, 56 104–5, 107, 110, 113 Non–aligned Movement (NAM), 64, process tracing, 63–4 85, 91, 93, 106, 126, 129, 147, principal–agent approach (P–A 162, 169, 181, 197, 226 approach), 10–11, 47–50, 52, 54, non–governmental organisations 79, 230–2 (NGOs), 45, 54, 92–3, 95, 96, 107, policy–cycle model, 64 133–4, 160, 200, 219, 225 North–South divide, 85–6, 88, 165, regime theory, 42–3, 54 170, 175–6, 184–5, 211, 217–18, Russian Federation, 106, 108, 112, 220, 231, 236 123, 140, 149, 227 see also Soviet Union Rwanda, 28–9, 73, 96, 107, 138, ONUC (Opération des Nations Unies 140, 146 au Congo), 27, 33, 35, 83, 179 Samuel, Tamrat, 92, 114 Panel on UN Peace Operations, see Sierra Leone, 86, 129, 139, 148, 164 Brahimi Panel Soviet Union, 19, 20, 27, 32, 71–2, peacebuilding, 8, 26, 29, 137, 157, 81, 90 164, 172, 220, 221, 234 Standing Police Capacity (SPC) peace enforcement, 8, 18, 24, 27, 29, characteristics of, 9, 36, 178, 30, 107, 108, 143, 180 197–200 peacekeeping establishment of, 188–24 origins of, 186–92 civilian personnel in, 35–6 Suharto, Haji Mohamed, 93, 100, 132 doctrine, 8, 26–30, 136–7, 138–43, 148, 157, 159, 161, 164, 171, transitional administration, 7, 18, 26, 172, 173, 175–7, 220 121, 157, 159, 172 force generation, 33–35 see also UN Mission in Kosovo functions, 23–5 (UNMIK), UN Transitional institutional structures, 9, 31–3, Administration in East Timor 69–71, 76, 178–83, see also UN (UNTAET) Department of Peacekeeping triangulation, 12 Operations (UN DPKO) Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), models of, 6, 18 20, 23, 25, 34–5, 85–6, 141–2, and Nordic states, 27, 34, 170, 229 163, 167, 176 objectives of, 7, 23, 25 see also peacekeeping origins of, 18–20 and police, 25, 36, 179–80, UN Advisory Committee on 182–3, 189 Administrative and Budgetary and robust mandates, 7, 24, 29, 31, Questions (ACABQ) 86, 136, 137, 138, 143, 157, and budget process, 78–9, 80, 84 159, 164, 171–2 and peacekeeping reforms, 142, 161, and seconded personnel, 32, 69–70, 167, 168, 181, 208–10 72, 179 UN Assistance Mission in East Timor Pearson, Lester, 19 (UNAMET), 99, 105–6, 110–11 Index 289

UN Charter UN Secretariat and peacekeeping, 20, 30, 33, 82, and autonomy, 6, 62, 76, 87–8, 134, 121, 142, 184 161, 214, 216–18, 231 and UN Secretariat, 71, 72, 74–5 as a bureaucracy, 73, 232–3 UN Department of Field Support and control mechanisms, 79–86, 88, (UNDFS), 33, 70 235–6 see also UN Secretariat and financial resources, 76–9, UN Department of Peacekeeping 142, 216 Operations (UN DPKO) as a hard case, 5, 6, 87 and East Timor, 114–18, 120–4, and independence, 71–3, 74, 131–5 87, 218 institutional characteristics of, 33, and influence, 62–6, 218–29 69–70, 72, 75–76, 171, 178, and mandate, 62, 74–6, 87, 116, 181, 186, 217, 230 216, 229–30, 234 and peacekeeping reforms, 28, 29, size of, 68–71, 87 35, 36, 136, 137, 141, 142, 160, staffing of, 69–73, 80, 87, 217–18, 163, 169, 188, 189 see also peacekeeping, and and SPC, 178, 183, 186, 190–1, seconded personnel 193–7, 199–200, 208–9, see also peacekeeping, institutional 211–14 structures; UN Department of see also UN Secretariat Peacekeeping Operations (UN UN Department of Political Affairs DPKO); UN Department of (UN DPA), 33, 70, 190 Political Affairs (UN DPA) and East Timor, 92, 103, 115–17, UN Secretary–General, 4, 20–1, 43–4, 131–5 74–6 see also UN Secretariat see also Annan, Kofi, Ban, Ki–Moon, UN Emergency Force (UNEF), 18–21, Boutros–Ghali, Boutros, 26, 32, 76 Hammarskjöld, Dag UN General Assembly UN Security Council control and oversight by, 21, 64, 72, and Brahimi Report, 149–50, 153, 75, 76, 78, 79–82, 84–6, 88, 156, 162–4, 169, 173 169, 208 control and oversight by, 80, 83–4, and East Timor, 90, 91 88, 235 and peacekeeping reforms, 136–7, and East Timor, 90, 105–6, 108–9, 142, 147–9, 154, 161–2, 164–8, 112, 125–31, 132 172, 175 and peacekeeping reform, 27, 136–7 and SPC, 187, 190, 194, 199, permanent members of, 72, 83, 88, 209–10 157–8, 217 and Suez Crisis, 19, 20 and SPC, 197, 227, 229 and World Summit negotiations and Suez crisis 19–20 201–4 UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 7, see also Millennium Summit, UN 121–2, 125, 140, 153 Special Committee on UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping, World Summit Peacekeeping Operations (2005) mandate of, 27, 85–6, 209 UN Information and Strategic Analysis and peacekeeping reforms, 138, 141, Secretariat (ISAS), 158–9, 160, 142–3, 153, 165, 166, 169–72 169–70, 223 and rapid deployment, 181, 183 290 Index

UN Special Committee United States, 86 on Peacekeeping and Brahimi Report, 149, 157–8, Operations – continued 175, 161 and SPC, 189, 184–5, 192, 194, and East Timor, 90, 91, 95, 101, 196–7, 200 103–4, 106, 108, 110, 112, 122, UN Transitional Administration in 123, 126, 129–30, 134 East Timor (UNTAET) and Iraq War, 184–6 establishment of, 6, 63, 98–131 and peacekeeping, 27, 72, 83, mandate of, 7, 119–20, 125–31 139–40, 170, 175, 185, 222, planning for, 114–25, 221, 222 226, 229 and robust mandate, 112, 128, and SPC, 195, 196 129, 130 and Suez crisis, 19–20 United Kingdom and UN funding, 27, 78, 82, 139, and Brahimi Report, 149, 162, 156, 169 170, 175 and World Summit, 202–4 and East Timor, 95–6, 101, 103–4, 123, 125, 127, 131 Vendrell, Francis, 92, 103 and peacekeeping, 64, 72, 83, 84, 139, 148 World Bank, 4, 43, 93, 108, 118, 223 and SPC, 195 World Summit (2005), 178, 187, and Suez Crisis, 18–19 188–9, 201–4, 208, 221, 226, 229, and World Summit, 203 233–4