1 the Politics of IO Performance

The Politics of IO Performance: How the Interests of Donors and IO Staff Shape Performance in the Developing World Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Erin R. Graham, B.A. Graduate Program in Political Science The Ohio State University 2011 Dissertation Committee: Alexander Thompson, Advisor Randall Schweller Craig Volden 1 Copyright by Erin R. Graham 2011 2 Abstract The role of international organizations (IOs) in world politics has evolved from one primarily consumed by facilitating cooperation between states to one that includes providing public goods and services within states. In this latter role, IOs are mandated to build domestic capacity in developing countries. Today‘s IOs train police, scientists, and teachers, build health clinics, administer vaccines, disarm combatants, and design irrigation systems, roads, and constitutions, to name but a few among countless tasks. The persistence of severe economic inequality across states suggests that the IO role in solving domestic incapacity problems is likely to continue despite the fact that the record of IO performance can only be described as mixed. What factors explain IO performance in solving domestic incapacity problems (DIPs)? Previous studies emphasize the importance of conditions on the ground in recipient countries in explaining IO performance. I argue that the IO response to domestic incapacity problems is inhibited not only by factors on the ground but also by the interests and incentives of both IO staff and the member states that serve as the primary financiers of IO activities. I develop a theoretical framework to explain when member state donors and IO staff will put their best foot forward in attempting to solve domestic incapacity problems and draw attention to the importance of the tenuous relationship between IO staff and their wealthiest member states. ii Efforts to solve DIPs intend to produce benefits for recipient states, not donors. This makes support contingent on donors holding political interests that complement the cause. When support is withheld, it not only hurts performance, but it also damages IO interests. Due to their reliance on donor states, IOs have incentives to prioritize activities that appeal to donors. As a result, IO staff might simultaneously be faithful agents to their donor states, but fail to fulfill mandates to solve domestic incapacity problems. Importantly, however, the likelihood that IO staff will respond to these incentives depends on actors inside the IO. I break from common treatments to treat the IO bureaucracy as a plural, rather than unitary, actor. Competing interests among departments and offices can inhibit a coherent organizational response to donor state incentives and have interesting effects on performance. The performance of the World Health Organization‘s in building health systems capacity in developing countries between 1980 and 2010 provides a first test of the theory. The case demonstrates how easily donor states‘ political interests can intervene to prevent support for DIP activities and illustrates the complexity and influence of IO bureaucracy; conflict between WHO offices inhibited performance early on and reforms to alleviate conflict improved performance. The climate change activities of the Global Environmental Facility provide a second testing ground. A comparison between donor state support for mitigation and adaptation activities confirms donor states‘ preference for IO projects that produce global benefits. Competition between three GEF implementing agencies—the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP—serves both to motivate their involvement and prevent collaboration, producing mixed effects on performance. iii Acknowledgements The rigors of graduate school might be survived without the support of good friends and colleagues, but I would not like to be the one to test such a theory. My work has benefitted from the feedback of many talented graduate student colleagues. Among this group, Bentley Allan, Austin Carson, and Eric Grynaviski deserve special mention for their insightful feedback. My time at Ohio State would have been far poorer without my good friends and running partners, including Emilie Becault, Sarah Bryner, Lea Fortmann, Tahseen Kazi, Emily Lynch, Eleonora Mattiacci and Katy Powers. Chryl Laird deserves special mention as my reliable friend and compatriot from math camp through graduation. I have been fortunate to have the support of several faculty members. Randy Schweller provided some of the earliest feedback and support for my dissertation and Alex Wendt challenged my ideas in ways that shaped the project it its early phases. Craig Volden has helped to sharpen the dissertation‘s arguments and clarify its contributions and his support at a critical juncture was (and continues to be) greatly appreciated. My greatest debt is undoubtedly to my advisor, Alex Thompson. Few have a critical eye that is more discriminating or persistent. Throughout the dissertation process, Alex was generous with his time and feedback. Perhaps most importantly, he always pushed me to rethink and revise once more when I might otherwise have settled for what I had. He is the kind of academic I would like to be. iv In the years before my arrival at Ohio State I was taught by a number of people to whom I owe a great debt. My interest in international relations was spawned in high school, in an AP US History course taught by Greg Schultz. That interest was solidified while I was an undergraduate at Boston University, and especially as a result of courses taught by Michael Corgan and Erik Goldstein. I began my pursuit of graduate study at the University of Oregon. In my two years there, Ron Mitchell managed to teach me most of what I know about IR and to show me the ropes of the profession. His criticism made my work better and his support built my confidence. Ron‘s mentorship has been both incredibly helpful and meant a great deal to me personally. Most of all, I would like to acknowledge my family. My parents, Connie and Dave Graham have been a constant source of support. Not a week goes by that I don‘t look forward to my Wednesday and Sunday phone calls from Mom, who is always there to listen, make me laugh, and assure me all will turn out fine in the end. My sister Ashley has been a friend throughout the process and I am grateful to my grandparents, Anna Mae and Bob Graham for having supported my education, particularly in my BU days. Finally, I owe the most to Zoltán Búzás. Zoltán has been with me as the dissertation evolved from its earliest phases—one of our first conversations revolved around a ―causal schemes‖ paper for the project. Since then he has enriched my life in ways that are difficult to adequately describe but might be summed up with ―everything is better.‖ Throughout the process of writing the dissertation, he has experienced all my frustrations, celebrated each success, and lent his critical eye whenever I asked. But perhaps most v importantly, he held my hand whenever non-academic life intervened to present a challenge. vi Vita 2003……………………………..B.A. Political Science and International Relations, Boston University 2006-present……………………Graduate Student Associate, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University Field of Study Major Field: Political Science vii List of Tables Table 1.1: Domestic Incapacity Problems and IOs……………………………………….6 Table 1.2: Problem Type and IO Tasks…………………………………………………...8 Table 2.1: Explaining IO Performance Outcomes……………………………………….55 Table 3.1: Explaining WHO Health Systems Performance, 1980-1997……………….105 Table 4.1: WHO Budget Growth, 2000-2005…………………………………………..121 Table 4.2: Explaining WHO Health Systems Performance, 1998-2010……………….141 Table 5.1: Eligible LDCs and LDCF Donors, 2011……………………………………165 Table 5.2: Completed NAPAs by GEF Agency………………………………………..177 Table 5.3: Statements on Coordination across GEF Agencies…………………………181 Table 5.4: Statements on Capacity Building by LDCs…………………………………190 Table 5.5: Adaptation Fund Board of Constituencies and Current Representatives.......193 viii List of Figures Figure 2.1: Donor State Preferences over Political and DIP Mandate Outcomes………43 Figure 2.2: IO Preferences over Organizational and DIP Mandate Outcomes………….47 Figure 3.1: The Structure of the World Health Organization……………………………75 Figure 3.2: WHO Regular Budget Assessments, 1998-1999……………………………79 Figure 3.3: Growth in WHO Regular Budget Assessments and Extra Budgetary Funds over Time………………………………………………………………………………...86 Figure 3.4: Official Development Assistance for Global Health by Multilateral Organization, 1997…………………………………………………………………........92 Figure 3.5: Portion of the Regular Budget Allocated to Health Systems, 1986-1993…..95 Figure 4.1: WHO Regular Budget, 2008……………………………………………….111 Figure 4.2: WHO Extra-Budgetary Funds, 2007-2008…………………………………112 Figure 4.3: WHO Voluntary Fund for Health Promotion, 1990-2003…………………120 Figure 4.4: WHO Expenditures by Area of Work, 2002-2003…………………………126 Figure 5.1: Governance Structure of the Least Developed Countries Fund……………163 ix Figure 5.2: Contributions to the LDCF, 2010…………………………………………166 Figure 5.3: Contributions to the GEF for Mitigation and Adaptation…………………172 Figure 5.4 LDCF Contributions and Contributors over time…………………………..174 x Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………….ii Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………...iv Vita……………………………………………………………………………………….v List

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