GLOBALdialogue An international affairs review published by the institute for Global Dialogue Volume 12.1 • April 2007

Can the ‘developmental state’ C o n t e n t s Trust is key to UN reform 2 save southern Africa? Page 6 ❯ Nhamo Samasuwo

AFRICOM bodes ill for Africa 4

Michele Ruiters

Can the ‘developmental state’ 6 save southern Africa?

Stefan Andreasson

Doha Round back on track 11

Brendan Vickers

Interview: Zwelakhe Sisulu 14

Che Ajulu

SADC Parliamentary Forum 17

Elling Tjønneland

Conflict in Somalia 19

Timothy Othieno

North Korean nuclear deal 21

Garth Shelton

Cuba at the crossroads 24

Lyal White

Debate on Middle East 27

Victor Gordon, Aslam Farouk-Alli

Season of hope for SA 31

Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka

The problem with biofuels 32

Annie Sugrue

Book review: AIDS in Africa 34

Siphamandla Zondi

Book review: The UN at 60 35 Nuclear deal in North Korea Succession in Cuba Paul-Henri Bischoff Page 21 ❯ Page 24 ❯ E d i t o r i a l

Trust is key to UN reform

Nhamo Samasuwo

HE Four Nations Initiative on UN Management and Govern- More importantly, the report stated very clearly that all Tance Reform (4NI) was conceived towards the end of 2005 reform efforts required active and not just reactive participa- by four UN member states: Chile, SA, Sweden and Thailand. tion by the member states. It therefore invited member states By providing their perspective on the issues at hand, the 4NI to provide their own perspectives on UN reform, and the 4NI countries are seeking to enhance efforts by the UN Secretariat is a response to this call. Encouragingly, right from the start, and other member states to reform the UN system. this initiative managed to secure the close collaboration of Since most of the issues on the currently stalled reform the secretariat not only during the last part of Annan’s term in agenda have emerged from Secretariat reports that many believe office, but also under his successor, Ban Ki-moon. to be self-serving, the 4NI hopes to produce recommendations Although the 4NI is led by four countries from different for reform by member states themselves. The initiative was regions of the world, it is far from being an exclusive club. It inspired by the experiences of a previous member state initia- has already started a broad and transparent process of con- tive, the Nordic UN project, which presented its final report in sultations with all interested member states, experts and other 1991 and became a starting point for successful reforms of the parties as well as with UN Secretariat staff. The four countries management and governance of UN funds and programmes involved see themselves as initiators of a project or arena for implemented from the early 1990s onwards. further discussion and dialogue that will hopefully contribute to new thinking about the introduction of a new governance Governance and management and management compact on UN reform. They also hope that other member states will buy into these new ideas or options. The 4NI focuses on the governance and management of the UN Although the 4NI is expected to come up with recommendations secretariat, and the relationship between these two concepts by September 2007, its initiators agreed from the outset that its and practices. The rationale for this is that better governance findings would not necessarily bind any government. improves management, and that governance is the responsibility of member states. The initiators of this project have also taken Three studies cognisance of the fact that management is the responsibility of the secretary-general and his staff. Hence, rather than focus on After being launched in early 2006, the 4NI divided its work into the overall challenges facing the UN system, the 4NI seeks to pay two main phases. The first phase involved the commissioning greater attention to how the secretariat is governed and man- of three studies focusing on the following areas: mandate and aged, as seen from a member state perspective. However, the roles; governance, accountability and transparency; and budget idea is to contribute reform proposals that will complement the and finance. During the second phase, the findings of these current reform agenda decided on by member states as set out in commissioned studies were analysed and narrowed down into the the document entitled 2005 World a shortened consultation document, Summit Outcome and thereafter car- Building Trust for Improved Govern- ried out by the secretariat under the Better governance improves ance and Management: Towards a former secretary-general, Kofi Annan. management, and governance is the Compact, which emphasises the need The 2005 World Summit Outcome for: clearly identified a number of reform responsibility of member states • building trust as a prerequisite for areas, including a call on the secretary- broad-based agreement on reform; general to submit proposals for management reform in the first • improved governance and management involving a funda- quarter of 2006. Consequently, on 7 March 2006, the secretary- mental division of responsibilities; general presented his report, Investing in the United Nations, • greater accountability and transparency as tools for build- to the general assembly. While this report was less specific on ing trust; issues of governance and finance, the 4NI steering committee felt • decision-making, overview and evaluation involving all the that the report should be warmly welcomed as its demonstrated major interfaces between governors (member states) and the extent of some of the challenges surrounding the secretariat, managers (secretariat); and and the degree to which a negative management culture had • establishing arenas for informal and transparent contact become ingrained in the UN system as a whole. For example, between member states and the secretariat. the report clearly showed that relations between the secretariat Since its publication in January 2007, Building Trust for and member states are characterised by deep mistrust and Improved Governance and Management has been widely cir- cumbersome and time-consuming procedures, which represent culated as part of a broad consultation process involving not serious obstacles to the UN’s ability to deliver on its mandate. only the secretariat but also various groupings of the UN such

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 •  An anti-UN protest in Lahore, Pakistan … according to the 4NI, the UN should become far more accountable and responsive to member states. AP Photo/K M Chaudary

as the Group of 77 and China as well as the EU and US. A standing among member states that the different challenges number of meetings and seminars involving the representatives facing the UN can only be overcome via a widely accepted of the new secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, his deputy, Dr Asha and transparent reform process, including the modernisation Migiro, the president of the UN general assembly and, more of the UN’s archaic governance and management systems. The importantly, the current chair of the G77 and China, Ambas- problems involved are not just about specific issues; they are sador Munir Akram, have also been held to discuss the issues about devising processes for managing and developing trust outlined in the document. among various actors. There is obviously an urgent need for a broad-based compromise between the major stakeholders in Divergent views order to create ownership of the reform process. It has to be acknowledged that there is no ‘quick fix’ for the UN’s problems, The initiative has been widely welcomed by UN members, and even if some symptoms could be addressed in the short term. even by the secretariat itself. The chair of the G77 and China The UN is a unique organisation. However, this does not mean has closely followed the activities of the 4NI since its launch, that it cannot learn from experiences elsewhere. and the G77 accepted an offer of a separate briefing on the In the end, the 4NI’s contribution to the reform process 4NI. As there is some pessimism among member countries in will depend on the co-operation of all member states. It is general, this is an encouraging sign. However, given the widely necessary to analyse the rights and responsibilities of member divergent views of the various groupings within the UN, there states, and the channels through which they can and should is still need for caution about the degree to which the 4NI and exercise influence as well as those that should not be used. its proposals will be accepted and supported. At the same time, it is not enough for the secretariat itself to In the light of the above, the 4NI may find it difficult to address these problems. come up with recommendations that appeal to all member While these internal efforts to reform the secretariat are states. From the outset, most member state delegates consulted welcome, it is not obvious that an internal perspective would wanted to know how any ‘new’ recommendations would be identify the same sorts of problems and opportunities as a inserted into the current process of UN reform. This is important, member states’ perspective would. Although the agenda for because most reform suggestions thus far have run into a wall reform set out in 2005 World Summit Outcome seems largely of resistance simply because of the way in which they were bogged down for now, it is important for the 4NI to focus its inserted into the reform debates. Among other things, reports attention on the bigger picture. In fact, the arrival of the new sent to the secretariat have been mysteriously leaked to a select secretary-general, changes in the delegations of key member group of countries within the security council before other UN states and political shifts in those delegations, the growing members gained access to them. If this were to happen to the sense of wariness derived from general assembly confrontations 4NI’s report, its recommendations would be dead on arrival. over the last two years, and the flickering but renewed realisa- Already, the G77 and China have warned against the adop- tion of the importance of multilateralism in addresssing global tion of recommendations that show a heavy imprint of the problems may provide a propitious setting for the proposals foreign policies of some dominant countries in the UN. This that will emerge out of the 4NI in 2007. n factor alone poses the most serious challenge to the 4NI and the acceptability of its findings whenever they are tabled. Dr Nhamo Samasuwo is programme director: multilateral of the IGD, What is encouraging is the existence of a broad under- and a member of the steering committee of the 4NI.

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 •  l e a d S t o r Y : A F r i C A

AFRICOM bodes ill for Africa

The US government’s decision to create a new military and security command centre in Africa has provoked intense debate in Africa and elsewhere. Michele Ruiters argues that, despite the extravagant promises of US policy-makers, AFRICOM is likely to have a negative impact on host countries and the continent as a whole

he notion of realpolitik is often As pointed out in various US gov- tion of AFRICOM had been motivated by Temployed to describe and support ernment media releases on AFRICOM, Africa’s growing ‘strategic, diplomatic and government decisions to act or respond the Defense Department uses a series economic importance’. in particular ways. The announcement of regional commands to co-ordinate AFRICOM would focus mainly on by the US government that it intends its military activities worldwide. Until humanitarian assistance, disaster relief to establish a new military and security now, control of US military involvement and crisis response missions, Moeller said. command centre in Africa has provoked in Africa has been shared among the The purpose of the command would be widespread debate about why it has US European Command, the US Central to ‘prevent conflicts or other problems opted to increase its military and by strengthening the region’. security presence on the continent, By creating AFRICOM, the Defense what exactly it intends to do, and Information released by the US Department would be able to better what this portends for the continent. government has been cryptic, couched co-ordinate its own activities in Africa One of the problems is that rela- as well as help to co-ordinate the tively little is known about the ini- in rhetoric, and often ambiguous work of other US government agen- tiative, and the information released cies, particularly the State Department by the US government has been cryptic, Command, and the US Pacific Command. and USAID. couched in rhetoric, and often ambiguous. US Central Command is responsible for ‘We want to work with our African Before examining the implications of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, partners on building their capacity to be this initiative, it might therefore be helpful Somalia and Kenya. US European Com- able to deal with some of the many chal- to review the US government’s announce- mand is responsible for the rest of the lenges that they face across the continent,’ ments thus far. On 6 February this year, countries nations on the African main- Moeller said. ‘By having one command President George Bush stated that he land. US Pacific Command is responsible that is focused on the entire continent, had decided to create a new US Africa for Madagascar, the Seychelles and the we believe we can address those issues Command, and had ordered the Defence Indian Ocean area off the African coast. and those challenges much more coher- Department to do so by end September Except for Egypt, which will con- ently than with the three existing com- 2008 ( the end of the US fiscal year). He tinue to fall under US Central Command, mands.’ said the new command would ‘strengthen AFRICOM will assume control over the Moeller said the Department of US security co-operation with Africa’, and entire continent of Africa as well as the Defense ‘would work closely with other create new opportunities to bolster the Atlantic Ocean islands of Cape Verde, US government agencies and African capabilities of its African partners. Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tomé and nations’ while developing the new com- Príncipe, and the Indian Ocean islands mand. Some of its eventual missions ‘Peace and security’ of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and might be driven by input from African the Seychelles. nations. He claimed that African countries ‘Africa Command,’ he declared, ‘will In an appearance before the Senate had long requested a separate US com- enhance our efforts to bring peace and Armed Services Committee on 6 February, mand focused on African issues. security to the people of Africa, and pro- Defense Secretary Robert Gates described According to Moeller, the transition mote our common goals of development, the current divided responsibility for team was temporarily based in Stutt- health, education, democracy, and eco- Africa as ‘an outdated arrangement left gart, Germany, home of US European nomic growth.’ over from the Cold War’. AFRICOM would Command. However, it would like to be He added that his administration enable the US to adopt a ‘more effective located in an African country. Officials would consult African leaders on how and integrated’ approach to Africa. were beginning to discuss possible loca- AFRICOM should respond to ‘security According to the US media releases, tions and to determine what kinds of challenges and opportunities in Africa’. It AFRICOM is being set up by a ‘transition military forces, ‘if any’, would be assigned would also work closely with its African team’ headed by a senior navy officer, permanently to AFRICOM. partners to determine an appropriate Rear Admiral Robert Moeller. They However, as numerous analysts have location for the new command. quoted Moeller as saying that the crea- pointed out, AFRICOM – or the African

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 •  Combatant Command, to give it its full and security command centre in Africa volatile Horn, also marked as havens for title in US military parlance – essentially improve these aspects of life on the con- ‘terrorists’. AFRICOM’s presence in Ethio- remains a military command centre, part tinent? In fact, the ‘war against terror’ has pia would raise its profile internationally, of the US security network covering the proven once again that military might but jeopardise that country’s relations entire globe, and its presence in Africa does not necessarily produce compliance with its immediate neighbours and the can certainly be expected to facilitate or acquiescence in a region or country, rest of the continent. rather than inhibit US military action on and that military interventions do not AFRICOM’s stated ideals are com- the continent. create conditions conducive to democ- mendable but have been unilaterally It is generally accepted that govern- racy. Much has been done in the name determined, and their linkage to a mili- ments act to protect their interests in of democracy that has resulted in the tary presence or institutional framework various ways, and it could be argued that, destabilisation and destruction of the leaves much to be desired. Military activi- in increasing its military and security host country, a process that is not easily ties, whether foreign or local, create mili- presence in Africa, this is what the US is reversed. tarised communities. As Cynthia Enloe doing. Rational decisions about access argues in Maneuvers: The International to oil resources and geostrategic regions Oil interests Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives such as the Horn and the Middle East (2000), militarisation is a process through dominate US foreign policy decisions in In fact, AFRICOM will probably exacer- which something becomes controlled by, a post 9/11 world, while the continent bate rather than resolve many of Africa’s dependent on, or derives its value from which has to host AFRICOM is vulnerable problems. The US decision to base a mili- the military as an institution. to economic and political globalisation tary command centre in Africa – possibly Despite recent indications by US offi- and identity politics. in Addis Ababa – is probably a counter- cials that AFRICOM will not house a per- In this context, the US claims that point to China’s economic expansion on manent military force, it will certainly AFRICOM will work to promote democ- the continent, inducing déjà vu about house some military personnel – and the racy, health, education, economic growth, Cold War tensions in Africa. US oil inter- possibility that it may turn into a military and development. However, it is disturb- ests and the ‘war on terror’ lie behind the base in the future can obviously not be ing to note that these values are being most recent plans, as an AFRICOM base discounted. The presence of any military tied to a military presence. in Ethiopia would provide the US with a Why – and how – would a US military launch pad into the Middle East and the Continued on page 38

A US Marine walks past vehicles destroyed in the bomb blast at the US embassy in Dar es Salaam in August 1998 ... AFRICOM will play a key role in the US ‘war on terror’ in Africa. AP Photo/Brennan Linsley

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 •  S p e C i a l F e a t u r e

Analysts and others are increasingly punting the notion of the ‘developmental state’ as the best way of digging southern Africa out of its socioeconomic quagmire; however, argues Stefan Andreasson, this notion must be assessed in context, and southern African states largely lack the social preconditions that enabled these states in Europe and East Asia Can the ‘developmental state’ save southern Africa?

OPE FOR a way out of the current quagmire of underde- if they are to draw significantly on previous historical experi- Hvelopment in southern Africa is generally vested in the ences, a key question is whether they will rely primarily on notion of the ‘developmental state’ – ie, a national, society-wide democratic or authoritarian principles. transformation in the direction of broad-based development Leaders in southern Africa have been tempted to ‘look East’ loosely based on the post-World War 2 experiences of conti- for examples of how to successfully pursue development (and nental European social democracies and, more specifically, the not merely to look for new sources of patronage, as in the case developmental trajectories of the East Asian ‘tigers’. of the Zimbabwean government’s recent dealings with China). It has been suggested that countries such as SA, character- Corporatist context ised by uneven development and an economically powerful ethnic minority, can learn important lessons from the ways in Importantly, the European developmental project emerged in which, for example, Malaysia’s majority Malay population (the a democratic corporatist context, and the East Asian develop- Bumiputras) managed to create an embryonic developmental mental trajectory (initially) in an authoritarian corporatist one. state by securing political control following independence and If developmental states are to emerge in southern Africa, and harnessing economic resources previously in the hands of the

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 •  A squatter camp and high-tech power station in Soweto … SA has a relatively well-developed economy, but lacks the social cohesion needed for a developmental state. Henner Frankenfeld/PictureNET Africa

– while lacking their substance (ie, societal peace and cohesion, paternalism, and a particular historical context). On the other hand, given the great material (not to mention emotional, spiritual, and environmental) needs in the region, there may be no acceptable alternative to a belief in the pos- sibility of the developmental state. Indeed, some would argue that it is immoral to deny, or even cast doubt upon, the possibil- ity of creating such a state. This amounts to an exhortation to believe in something simply because it is desirable, irrespective of whether or not it is achievable in practice. Whatever position one takes on this issue, one must reach a decision on whether the developmental trajectories of post-war Europe and East Asia hold lessons for southern African countries today. And, if not, are there grounds for believing that a distinctly African developmental state can emerge?

Three countries

Reflecting on existing research, including my own, on state– market relations in southern Africa, I will seek to make a few generalisations about prospects for development in the region as well as wager a few more specific predictions about pros- pects for creating the foundations for development (or lack thereof) in three disparate southern African countries. In particular, I wish to outline and contrast the post-liberation/ independence experiences of Botswana, SA, and Zimbabwe, in order to establish whether either Botswana, despite much recent criticism of its status as an African ‘success story’, or SA, given its internationally acclaimed post-apartheid trajectory, provide some pointers towards broad-based development in other countries in the region. Can the ‘developmental state’ save southern Africa? A discussion document entitled ‘A developmental state for SA?’ drafted by COSATU’s central committee in 2005 notes that the notion of a developmental state emerged out of a ‘specific ethnic Chinese minority. The resurgence of Chinese influence effort to generalise about the industrialising states of Asia, in Africa also suggests lessons to be learnt, and pitfalls to be especially Japan and Korea’. Referring to Chalmers Johnson’s avoided, by (southern) African countries attempting to emulate hugely influential MITI and the Japanese Miracle (1982), the China’s developmental ‘success’, as the recent IGD publications document notes that the most important characteristic of the China in Africa (2006) and Enter the Dragon (2005) show. developmental state is not necessarily its economic policies, Before considering actual strategies and policies for develop- but rather its ‘ability to mobilise the nation around economic ment, it is important to ask whether a developmental state is development within the capitalist system’. The need for national actually possible in contemporary southern Africa (there are mobilisation is crucial, and certainly problematic in the southern no real examples of a developmental state in Africa, although African context given historical domestic divisions that include some claim this in the case of Botswana). Are the expectations large-scale violence and an uneasy post-independence consen- realistic, or does hope vested in an African developmental state sus on economic policy (this is most obviously a problem in risk degenerating into some form of ‘cargo cult’? In this case, Zimbabwe, and least so in Botswana). the cult would consist of would-be imitators creating super- Accepting that development must be pursued within the ficial copies of East Asian developmental states – including confines of a capitalist world economy makes the discussion corporatist institutions and developmentally oriented ministries more complex, and is a prominent bone of contention between

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 •  S p e C i a l F e a t u r e

‘left’ and ‘right’ within SA’s ideologically incoherent tripartite in the same report ranks developing regions from best in East alliance. Indeed, given that at least some factions in the SA Com- Asia at 24 to worst in Sub-Saharan Africa at 56, with SA near munist Party (SACP) and COSATU still advocate socialism, but the bottom at 52). that government economic policy is now entirely market-driven, That consensual social relations, let alone some kind of recent debate on this issue has become hopelessly muddled. benevolent paternalism, can emerge under such conditions of Perhaps the Chinese experiment in combining an official ideol- consistent global and local pressures on workers’ rights and ogy of communism with an effectively capitalist economy – now benefits – especially in Zimbabwe, where trade unions and including the establishment of private property rights that will government are in outright conflict, and SA, where serious entrench economic inequalities – provides alliance ideologues differences of opinion exist between COSATU and leading on the left with a good lesson in rhetorical acrobatics. liberalisers in government – is not a feasible expectation in a Be that as it may, in the orthodox account of the develop- socially heterogeneous society, at least not within the confines mental state, successful mobilisation and state-led development of democracy. in East Asia is contrasted with disappointing outcomes in Latin America and Africa, where – as Meredith Woo-Cummings notes Local dynamics – instead of a developmental state, post-independence govern- ments pursued ‘”showcase modernity”, aimed not at self-sustain- In 1963 the English development economist Dudley Seers criti- ing development but at reaching a set of elite consumption pat- cised modernisation theory for attempting to graft models of terns appropriate for developed countries … [leading to, among development based on the ‘special case’ of industrialised and other things] a consistent pattern of exuberant consumption, consumerist western societies on to the ‘general case’ of the heavily skewed in favour of urban elite groups at the expense developing world, in which persistent underdevelopment was of the rural and low-income majorities’. This is certainly one a fact of life for most people. Instead, he argued, those wishing obviously dysfunctional consequence of the current liberal to think productively about development ought to emphasise growth strategy in SA, on which critiques of the last decade’s the particular dynamics of, and impediments to, development developmental trajectory has focused. in poor countries where quasi-feudal land tenure systems and the fact of economic and political dependency constituted the Labour relations actual social context. When we ponder on possibilities for development in south- The COSATU document effectively captures the general consen- ern Africa today, we again need to ask ourselves whether the sus on what the developmental state entails by arguing further ‘special case’ of a few developmental states in East Asia can be that it was ‘defined by both its class structure and its economic applied to the ‘general case’ of persistent underdevelopment policy’. A key aspect of these class and policy dimensions, it elsewhere. notes, was the ability of states to be closely allied to business Most developing countries have not been able to forge interests, yet maintain some degree of autonomy. Moreover, developmental states resembling those of the East Asian ‘tigers’, the maintenance of ‘paternalistic labour relations’ within large leading to broad-based socioeconomic development. African companies featured prominently in nurturing social stability and countries in particular have remained mired in poverty and a degree of accommodation between underdevelopment, which in terms state, business and labour without of some indicators, notably health, which national mobilisation would Most developing countries have not have actually worsened in the post- be seriously hampered. been able to forge developmental independence era. In his 1972 article Clearly, such paternalism is not ‘What are we trying to measure?, Seers compatible with increasingly liber- states resembling those of the East argued that ‘[t]he questions to ask alised labour legislation. If anything, Asian ‘tigers’, leading to broad- about a country’s development are business–labour relations in both SA based socioeconomic development therefore: What has been happening and Zimbabwe became increasingly to poverty? What has been happening fraught as a consequence of the neo- to unemployment? What has been liberal reforms that emerged in various guises throughout the happening to inequality? If all three of these have become less 1990s. Even in Botswana, a country hardly noted for its vigor- severe, then beyond doubt this has been a period of develop- ous civil society, paternalistic relations built on conservative ment for the country concerned.’ tradition, deference to authority, and a link between modern At that time, European social democracies and emerging government and traditional authority seem more fragile now developmental states in East Asia could point to sustained than in the past. improvements across all these dimensions of development. In And international financial institutions are still singling southern Africa today, no such comprehensive success can be out ‘inflexible labour legislation’ in SA as a major remaining identified, nor does current evidence suggest that such devel- constraint on economic growth by what is conceded to be an opments are imminent. otherwise compliant regime. The IMF’s 2005 Country Report Thus the emergence of a developmental state would be a on SA notes that SA labour laws remain inflexible, particularly truly novel occurrence in Africa. This also suggests that we as regards hiring and firing (a ‘Rigidity of Employment Index’ should not underestimate the vast differences in socio-cultural,

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 •  impediment to national unity and any possibility of creating a developmental state than similar racial and ethnic divisions in SA, or minimal ones in Botswana. Such divisions, exacerbated by a violent struggle for liberation where, in contrast with SA (but similar to Namibia), an actual war of liberation was fought, have resulted in serious political and societal volatility in post- independence Zimbabwe. Insofar as Zimbabwe constitutes an example for the region, it is a negative one, showing that even a country with some developmental advantages can be undermined by a combination of domestic divisions, global economic pressures, and an ero- sion of accountable governance. Therefore, rather than merely pursuing economic growth, its neighbours ought to think about how to create the social cohesion necessary for the national mobilisation that is key to the developmental state.

Regional solution

Moreover, social stability does not confine itself to national bor- ders, and thus a greater effort must be made to find a regional solution to Zimbabwe’s problems, rather than simply insisting, as SA government spokespersons continue to do in the face of increasingly brutal political repression in Zimbabwe, that its problems ‘should be resolved by the people of Zimbabwe’ Harare residents queue for food outside a supermarket … alone. In terms of obstructing development, nothing can be preconditions for a developmental state in Zimbabwe have more fatal than what has happened in Zimbabwe. been steadily eroded. Joao Silva/PictureNET Africa Following SA’s transition to democracy, its ANC govern- ment has presided over the most powerful economy and most sophisticated economic and technological infrastructure in economic and political developments that have produced wel- Africa. To some degree, it has also drawn on the expertise of fare states in Europe, ‘tigers’ in East Asia, and nothing of the well-educated and experienced elites, a substantial number of sort in Africa. Discussions of development in the global South whom were persuaded to turn their efforts from maintaining often note that Korea and Ghana were similarly underdevel- apartheid during the difficult years of international sanctions oped and dependent countries on the eve of independence, and isolation to building a developmental state. However, the whereas Ghana is still poor, and South Korea is now a mem- persistence of what President Thabo Mbeki calls ‘two nations’, ber of the OECD. However, the obvious point is that events one rich and white and the other black and poor, despite a in Africa over the last half-century or so have – unsurprisingly degree of ‘deracialisation’ at the top, means that social consen- – resembled Ghana’s post-independence trajectory rather than sus across the racial divide remains tenuous. that of South Korea. The consequences of the government’s macroeconomic Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy remain Tragedy in Zimbabwe hotly contested. Economic growth has accelerated, but is still not reducing unacceptably high levels of unemployment and There is really no way to put a positive spin on the tragedy inequality. Moreover, it is still too soon to predict whether the that has been unfolding in Zimbabwe since the late 1990s. Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for SA (AsgiSA) will The embryonic developmental project of the 1980s could not eventually relax some of the fiscal and monetary stringencies survive mounting indebtedness, mismanagement, and global associated with GEAR, thereby facilitating more broadly based pressures for economic reforms (structural adjustment) in the development. 1990s. The meltdown of Zimbabwe’s economy and any pre- Given the dire legacy of apartheid, and an unforgiving global tence to democratic rule makes it the obvious southern African economic context, the ANC government has done better than candidate for ‘failed state’ status (and, unlike Mozambique, this expected (especially by liberal western analysts), and its man- is a failure of the government’s own creation). This is a tragic agement of Africa’s most important and high-profile economy turn of events for a country with a previously well-function- is more closely scrutinised than any other on the continent. ing agricultural sector, a relatively high degree of economic Nevertheless, neither its political will nor its superior capacity diversification, and, following independence, one of the better and resources as compared to the rest of Africa has allowed educated and more democratically inclined populations in the it to transcend the volatile mix of social ills that plague the region. Social divisions, not only between black and white but region thus far. also between Shona and Ndebele, constitute a more serious Despite consistently high levels of income inequality, extreme

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 •  S p e C i a l F e a t u r e

poverty among the most marginalised, and a rampant AIDS environmentally – and the foundations for a developmental state epidemic, conventional development literature depicts Botswana are lacking (or at least very weak), where to from here? as the one ‘success story’ in sub-Saharan Africa. Is this an indi- In The History of Development: from Western Origins to Glo- cator of genuinely impressive developments in that country, or bal Faith (2002), Gilbert Rist argues that, given the limits to how is the fact that a few decades of high economic growth from much industrialisation and mass consumption our biosphere a very low baseline and a relatively stable democratic order can accommodate, and the narrowly distributive nature of the count as a developmental success (certainly not according to global economy, the promise of conventional (ie growth and Seers’s previously noted indicators) simply a sad reflection of consumption-driven) ‘development for all’ is unattainable. Yet the desperate conditions on the rest of the continent? we persist with promoting this myth – what the development Botswana’s kgotla tradition, however imperfect, and the thinker Majid Rahnema calls a ‘deceitful mirage’ – because fact that the country did not undergo a violent and divisive facing up to the possibility that we cannot all be lifted out of struggle for independence have contributed to a high degree poverty and enjoy a decent life, at least without some form of government legitimacy among Batswana. The ruling elite, of revolutionary change to the capitalist and industrial global exemplified by the internationally respected Ministry of Finance society, seems too dangerous to contemplate. Too dangerous, and Development Planning (sometimes hubristically likened to that is, for those who benefit from the status quo given what Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry) has pro- the ‘losers’ in the current global order may do if their last ray vided a stable environment for policy-makers, and the country of hope for a better future is extinguished. has been more successful at using the proceeds of extensive diamond deposits for developmental purposes than other Severe inequality African countries rich in natural resources. Whatever the final verdict on Botswana’s development may be, and despite con- Scholars, activists, and politicians across southern Africa con- cerns about elitist tendencies, excessive deference to authority, cerned with actively promoting development will discount some and an increasing intolerance of opposition, a higher degree of or even most of the doubts expressed here. Instead, they will government legitimacy than elsewhere in Africa (due to greater continue analysing policy-related problems in various insight- continuities between pre- and post-independence governments) ful ways, and forge ahead with new proposals and plans for has provided more of a social base for a developmental state development. If so, they will hopefully emphasise ways in than elsewhere in the region. which southern African economies and societies are different, and operate under different global constraints, from those in Social cohesion East Asia, where developmental states initially emerged. In particular, policy-makers and their support networks will need In sum, foundations for a developmental state have been to gain an understanding of how national mobilisation and washed away in the years of deepening conflict and oppres- the channelling of growth-related dividends into broad-based sion in Zimbabwe and, as a result, its future seems bleak development can best be promoted and sustained in a context indeed. Certain aspects of Botswa- of severe inequality, a widespread na’s and SA’s economy and society lack of skills, serious illnesses (HIV/ hold some promise for promoting If the developmental state is AIDS and TB), and a legacy of social the developmental state. In Botswana, unlikely in southern Africa, division and violence. these include a relatively high level Attempting to find answers to of social cohesion, combined with what are the alternatives? seemingly insoluble problems is what a stronger link to pre-independ- optimistic individuals driven by an ence forms of legitimate rule, and relatively competent urge to accomplish something concrete are bound to do, and post-independence policy-making. However, it has failed to that they should do so is entirely laudable. The remarks in this diversify away from diamond exports, and thus has little in article about the weak foundations for development in south- common with the industrialising patterns of the Asian ‘tigers’. ern Africa should not be interpreted as an argument for the In SA there is less to build on in terms of social cohesion and futility of pursuing development. If the fundamental problems stability, which makes national mobilisation far more difficult. identified here can become part of a wider consideration of the The extent of the challenge to social stability is underlined by developmental dilemma (including its historical, ideological, and its very high rates of violent crime (its murder rate is more environmental dimensions) by decision-makers and thinkers than 30 times higher than in the UK, for example). It does have alike, and if such considerations can lead to more innovative a relatively diversified economy, and segments of its industry, approaches to development that move beyond conventional services and finance sectors are globally competitive. However, ways of thinking about archaic developmental models, the neither Botswana nor SA display the combination of social and daunting task of creating a better future out of very difficult economic characteristics that made the developmental state conditions will become a little easier. n possible and so effective in East Asia. If the developmental state is unlikely in southern Africa, Dr Stefan Andreasson lectures in comparative politics in the what are the alternatives? If the status quo in the region is School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy of unacceptable – morally, socially, politically, economically and Queen’s University Belfast.

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 1 0 G l o b a l E C O N O MY

Doha Round back on track

The Doha Round of trade talks has been revived. Brendan Vickers argues that, despite suggestions to the contrary, developing countries should continue to demand a solid developmental outcome

N JANUARY this year, 30 trade min- Iisters attending the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, agreed to revive the Doha Round of trade negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organisa- tion (WTO) which had been suspended since July last year. Launched in the Qatari capital in November 2001, the Doha Round pur- ports to place the interests and concerns of developing countries at the centre of its ambitious negotiating agenda. This reflects a growing appreciation that the ‘grand bargain’ of the Uruguay Round, in which developing countries accepted unprecedented trade and trade-related commitments from the developed north, turned out to be a ‘bum deal’ for the poor. Pascal Lamy, director-general of the WTO, addresses a seminar on ‘Saving Doha and However, six years after the launch of Delivering on Development’ in New Delhi, India ... the Round’s revival has sparked the Doha Round – including two major hopes for a positive outcome. AP Photo/Saurabh Das ministerial meetings at Cancún in 2003 and Hong Kong in 2005 – little progress has been made in delivering on the san- important to review the state of these meeting in 2003, has played an important guine promises of a more balanced and multilateral trade talks, and highlight key role in trying to navigate a compromise. equitable global trading regime. Instead, issues around how to reclaim the devel- On market access for agricultural goods, contrary to the spirit and letter of the opment trajectory of the Round. the G20 has proposed an average tariff Doha development agenda, the negotia- reduction of 54% for developed countries, tions have been marred by rancorous pol- Agricultural negotiations and 36% for developing countries. itics and trenchant brinkmanship around Agricultural market access is the key three key issues. These are: agricultural The agricultural negotiations are pre- defensive interest for the EU. The 2007 tariffs and domestic farm support in the sented as the centrepiece of the Doha Trade Policy Review of the European North (with the EU and US especially at development agenda, since this reflects Communities confirms that, notwith- loggerheads), and the further liberalisa- the comparative advantage of many standing reform under the 2003 Common tion of industrial goods in the South, par- poorer, underdeveloped nations in the Agricultural Policy (CAP), agriculture ticularly in larger developing countries global economy. These negotiations remains protected by a complex tariff such as India, Brazil and SA. In addition, have been the most fraught, with both structure, high tariffs and tariff quotas developed countries, particularly the EU, developed and developing countries (with unfilled quotas), and benefits are demanding more access to global entrenched in their positions. The talks from high levels of domestic support services markets. These differences led to have also been criticised for focusing and export subsidies. Whereas the EU a suspension of the Round in July 2006, inordinately on expanding global mar- intends to eliminate export subsidies ironically after G8 leaders meeting in St kets for exporters from developed and by 2013, it faces stronger political con- Petersburg had pledged their political some developing nations, rather than straints – particularly from the French, support for an ambitious conclusion to addressing the growing rural crisis in now gripped with presidential elections the trade talks. many countries around the world. – on tariff reduction. In October 2005 the With the negotiating juggernaut hav- The G20 coalition on agriculture, EU tabled an offer of a 39 per cent tariff ing been set in motion once again, it is formed around the Cancún ministerial cut. Since then its trade commissioner,

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 1 1 G l o b a l E C O N O MY

Peter Mandelson, has intimated that Brus- in complying with WTO dispute panel rul- it is curious that SA has chosen to not sels may be prepared to move closer to ings. In 2004 the dispute panel ruled that join the G33, but supports its demands the G20 position. US cotton subsidies were harming Brazil’s through the G20. On domestic support, the G20 frame- industry by suppressing world prices. The Some developed countries have simi- work proposes to limit US domestic US was given until 1 July 2005 to comply larly demanded the right to protect their support to $13bn, with disciplines to with the ruling, but has yet to fully do so. own ‘sensitive products’. It has been esti- limit shifting support between different Brazil has now formally requested a new mated that exempting just 2% of tariff products as world market prices change. WTO dispute panel to force the US into lines as sensitive could block new trade The Bush administration’s October 2005 full compliance. Furthermore, Canada flows in products of export interest proposal – characterised by the US trade has now requested consultations on US unless some market-opening arrangement representative as ‘bold’, ‘ambitious’ and corn subsidies (accounting for about 45% – such as expanding tariff rate quotas – is ‘substantial’ – largely involved the recate- of total payments) – an action which SA agreed on those products. gorising of subsidy payments from the and Mexico may reportedly join. If industrialised countries have their restricted ‘amber box’ to the less restricted way, the non-agricultural market access ‘blue box’. This would leave actual spend- Special products (NAMA) negotiations will result in a dras- ing virtually unchanged. An economic tic reduction of tariffs on industrial goods, simulation of the US proposal indeed con- Besides this, US negotiators are opposed as well as mining, forestry, fisheries and firmed that its legally permissible amount to the ‘Group of 33 Proposal’, co-ordi- other natural resources. In terms of the of domestic spending would increase to nated by Indonesia, to establish a Special July 2004 framework, a Swiss formula $22,5bn a year, from current levels of Products and Special Safeguard Mecha- will be used to cut each individual tar- actual spending estimated at $19,6bn. nism. This proposal, supported by a broad iff line and bring individual high tariffs Reflecting this protectionist domestic alliance of more than 100 WTO member down, rather than reducing the average. mood, the Democratic Congress in the US countries, is based on established food The differentiated coefficients whereby is finalising its new Farm Bill – expected and livelihood security and rural develop- rich and poor countries will have to pare in October 2007 – with little reference to ment criteria. It would define appropriate their industrial tariffs are being intensely Doha ambitions or outcomes. Indeed, the mechanisms for developing countries to contested. chair of the House Agriculture Commit- safeguard the majority of their popula- Developed countries, including the tee, Colin Peterson, has intimated that ‘I tions – who are mainly farmers – from US and EU, are proposing coefficients want to write a Farm Bill that’s good for the distortions that would result from of 10 and 15 for developed and develop- agriculture. If somebody wants to sue us, the Doha Round rules. The refrain ‘All ing countries respectively. This proposal we’ve got a lot of lawyers in Washington.’ products are special products’ has now translates into a 23–25% cut in bound Trade litigation is now increasingly become a familiar rallying cry in many tariffs in the North as against a drastic deployed against US intransigence, developing countries seeking to safe- cut of 60–70% in the South, where 30-odd although Washington has been lethargic guard their small-scale farmers. Moreover, ‘advanced developing countries’ would undergo formula cuts. Although there are limited flexibilities for sensitive prod- Figure 1: Doha benefits vs NAMA tariff losses ucts, the adjustment costs of further lib- eralisation – including social dislocation, ‘Likely’ benefits (World Bank) NAMA tariff losses (UNCTAD) unemployment, and deindustrialisation – would certainly be heaviest among the (US$2001bn) (US$2001bn) latter countries. Developed 79.9 38.0 Developing countries have responded Developing 16.1 63.4 defensively. At the Hong Kong minis- Selected developing regions terial in 2005, they formed the NAMA- 11 coalition co-ordinated by SA (which, Middle East and North Africa –0.6 7.0 incidentally, is drafting a new national Sub-Saharan Africa 0.4 1.7 industrial policy). The group’s position Latin America and Caribbean 7.9 10.7 is that any further NAMA cuts should be consistent with the principles of Selected countries ‘special and differential treatment’ and Brazil 3.6 3.1 ‘less-than-full reciprocity’ (in the effect India 2.2 7.9 of the reduction, not the number of the formula); be ‘balanced’; and undertaken Mexico –0.9 0.4 in a ‘proportionate manner’. Such a deal Bangladesh –0.1 0.04 would settle around a coefficient of 5 Source: Kevin P Gallagher, ‘Measuring the Cost of Lost Policy Space at the WTO’, for industrialised countries and 25 for IRC Americas Program Policy Brief, 20 March 2007. developing countries (a coefficient of 6

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 1 2 and 30 would evenly split industrial tariff $832bn globally through $287bn to a oping countries. At this point, however, cuts on both sides). modest $96bn. Developing countries can the requisite political will appears to be In March 2007, in a historic move that expect an uneven distribution of $16bn. in short supply. Developing countries has hiked the pressure on rich countries, Moreover, recent studies – by the World have indicated that they are prepared trade unions from the NAMA-11 countries Bank, the Carnegie Endowment, the to make concessions, but not at an – including the Confederation of SA Trade European Commission, and the Food inordinate price that would jeopardise Unions (COSATU) and Brazil’s Central and Agriculture Organisation – also sug- their future economic development and Unica dos Trabalhadores (CUT) – formed gest that the majority of Africa’s poorest diversification. a transnational trade union alliance to nations stand to lose substantially from In addition, negotiators are often por- defend their manufacturing industries the liberalisation of both agricultural and trayed as chasing the clock: the US Trade and employment. industrial goods. Promotion Authority – which allows The NAMA negotiations directly target This article has focused mainly on Congress to vote only up or down, not the ‘policy space’ for countries at different the ‘golden triangle’ of agricultural mar- amend trade agreements – expires on levels of development to optimally com- ket access, domestic farm support, and 30 June 2007. Some Washington-based bine the best mix of industrial, trade and NAMA, as these outcomes will determine groups have already celebrated Doha’s technological policies to diversify their the pace of the broader negotiations and demise. Under fast-track rules, the Bush economies, develop their manufacturing unlock the Round. But there are other administration is required to give 90 days’ capacities and upgrade their technologi- areas of contention too. notice of intent to sign an agreement after cal capabilities. it has been finalised. The 1 April dead- The UN Conference on Trade and Ambitious outcome line for this notification has effectively Development (UNCTAD) as well as other passed. This means that the current fast prestige UN panels – notably the former Services are a case in point. In Hong track can no longer apply to a potential Zedillo commission – are at the fore- Kong, trade ministers paved the way for Doha conclusion. In addition, the current front of a shifting global policy mood in plurilateral negotiations, which started grant of fast track cannot be extended. favour of greater flexibilities for develop- last year. The Mexican chair of the serv- A short-term, WTO-specific ‘fast-track’ ing countries. This is not unimportant; as ices negotiations has convened various delegation would only be possible if US- UNCTAD noted in its headline report of ‘enchilada’ discussions in Geneva to move based multinationals receive expanded last year, ‘The development of a strong these negotiations towards an ambitious market access concessions from other manufacturing sector has been at the core outcome, and members will soon table countries and the Bush administration of all successful catch-up experiences their revised offers. Developed countries, agrees to Democrats’ demands to change over the past 250 years’. Indeed, there is particularly the EU, have strongly pur- Washington’s free trade agreements (with arguably no example of modern indus- sued the further liberalisation, privatisa- Colombia, Peru and others). trialisation based on the laissez-faire tion and deregulation of global services Some liberal trade analysts caution approach peddled by economic ortho- markets. This would provide commercial that developing countries should temper doxy and its disciplinary agents today. opportunities for their multinational cor- their demands, since a collapse of the Contrary to claims that nations can porations to profit from the provision Doha Round would herald a world of circumvent the WTO to promote develop- of basic public services such as water, predatory bilateral and regional trade ment, new research by Kevin P Gallagher energy, health, and education. Some pacts between rich and poor. This is a and Alisa Dicaprio has found that not developing countries, such as India, have real possibility, as recent Oxfam publi- only do many of the rules negotiated in also been on the offensive, particularly cations confirm. According to the latter, the Uruguay Round constrict the ability for mode 4 services provision through around 25 developing countries have of countries to put in place aggressive the temporary movement of persons. now signed free trade agreements with development policies, but that these rules But the complex Doha agenda extends developed countries, and more than 100 have been strictly enforced by WTO dis- well beyond these areas to rules on are engaged in negotiations. On aver- pute panels. Indeed, more than 25% of anti-dumping, trade facilitation, intel- age, two bilateral investment treaties are all WTO cases between 1995 and 2005 lectual property rights, regional trade signed every week. dealt with dismantling policy space in arrangements, the environment, and a However, we easily forget that the developing countries. set of cross-cutting developmental issues majors – particularly the EU and US – do Given the small gains projected to (including Aid for Trade, preference ero- need the multilateral system; it is not arise from a likely Doha deal (see figure sion, and provisions for least-developed simply an irritation to their bilateral and 1), developing nations should exercise countries). These issues will all constitute regional impulses. This should give devel- great caution in negotiating measures part of a final Doha package. oping countries some leeway in demand- that further restrict their policy space. It The principal challenge for trade nego- ing a solid developmental outcome. n is significant that even before the Hong tiators is to ensure that this package is Kong ministerial meeting in 2005, the indeed crafted with strong developmental Brendan Vickers is senior researcher: World Bank massaged down its estimates contours that rebalance the global trad- multilateral trade at the IGD. of global gains from this Round from ing system in favour of poorer devel-

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 1 3 I N t e r V i e W

Zwelakhe Sisulu

After a career in the SA media and corporate sector, Zwelakhe Zizulu has spent the past few years pursuing business opportunities in Africa. He spoke to Che Ajulu about SA investment in Africa and its potential contribution to the continent’s development

opment thus far. This basically forms the given its emerging stability. For example, Zwelakhe Sisulu started his career in 1975 two pillars of SA economic diplomacy, the successful political transition in the as a trainee journalist for the Rand Daily with government and business leading DRC has opened new doors and oppor- Mail. In 1986 he became founding edi- the charge. tunities. These changes in the political tor of New Nation, and in 1989 its chief I believe the SA corporate sector has landscape have all taken place largely executive. He was the founding president not been as aggressive as it could have due to the important role that the SA of the Writers Association of South Africa been on the continent, with the result government has played in the continental (WASA) and founding president of the that it is losing business opportunities. A peace agenda. Media Workers Association of South case in point is Angola, where the hesi- In terms of government and its eco- Africa (MWASA). Sisulu was a member of tation of SA business has led to signifi- nomic diplomacy on the continent, I am the Release Mandela Committee – Media cant Chinese business penetration and complimentary about what government and the Mandela Reception Committee. In dominance to a point where it is very had done so far, especially on the issue 1990 he was appointed as personal assist- difficult for continental players to enter of funding. The government has freed up ant to Nelson Mandela. that market. This shows that, where SA funding institutions such as the Indus- In 1994 he was appointed group chief has not taken up opportunities to occupy trial Development Corporation (IDC) executive of the SABC. In 1998 he became a particular business space, other players and the PIC to support projects on the deputy chairman of New Africa Investments – particularly Europeans, Chinese and continent. Limited (NAIL), in 1999 executive chairman Americans – will do so. Be that as it may, there definitely needs of New Africa Media Holdings (NAM), to be a change of style in SA’s conduct and in 2001 chairman of NAIL. He has What are the linkages and parallels on the continent. As I mentioned earlier, spent the last few years pursuing business between SA’s foreign policy and corpo- it should move away from the ‘quick- opportunities in Africa and has acquired rate activity on the continent and what, if return’ approach, which reflects a lack business interests in the media and any, influence does the government have of co-ordination and a common strategy. telecoms, agribusiness, manufacturing, and over the conduct of the SA corporate Most operations on the continent are run mineral and energy sectors. elsewhere? as individual units with a narrow focus, Sisulu studied at Harvard University, resulting in ‘parachute’ business activities. and is a Nieman Fellow. He also SA business does not seem to have a clear Had SA business developed a continental completed an Advanced Management view of, or strategy for, what it wants strategy based on a long-term view, it Programme at the Insead Institute in Paris. to do on the continent. As a result, we would have addressed some of the politi- He has received numerous national and have piecemeal and isolated efforts by cal tension that has emerged around its international awards for journalism and individual businesses to invest elsewhere business conduct. Efforts are being made human rights. in Africa which are not as effective as to co-ordinate a business strategy on they would have been if they had been the continent, but nothing coherent has collective efforts. Hence I am very critical emerged as yet. We also have to under- What are your views on SA’s economic of the slow response of SA business to stand that this is the nature of business. diplomacy and its role on the continent? opportunities on the continent. I am also Businesses seldom work collectively; they critical of our businesses because where are driven by narrow interests, and they SA business – especially the mining sec- they have begun to operate elsewhere will never act in the same way as govern- tor – has made very significant headway in Africa they they have gone for quick ment. This is not to suggest that business in investing elsewhere on the continent. returns. To use an old cliché, they have should not act responsibly, but rather an As far as the government is concerned, gone in for the ‘low-hanging fruit’. acknowledgement that business does not the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) I can understand this from a share- understand the African terrain as well as is spearheading a programme of con- holders’ point of view. However, a the government does. As a result, there solidating African pension funds so that medium- to long-term view of invest- needs to be some form of co-operation these can be mobilised for infrastructure ment, will eventually yield better returns. between SA business and government, development, the lack of which has been SA business can now afford to make and, increasingly, with African businesses a major obstacle to the continent’s devel- long-term investments on the continent, and African governments as well.

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 1 4 I believe it is not beyond the scope of SADC to begin to influence some of the business outcomes in the region. Broadly speaking, government should draw up the agenda and facilitate the entry of SA business on the continent, but should steer away from trying to control this process. From a broad empowerment point of view, SA businesses need to be sensitive to empowerment and ensure that they focus on building and empower- ing local partners. We seem to be sensi- tive to our own empowerment needs, but conveniently ignore these principles in other African countries.

Is SA business providing the much-needed Zwelakhe Sisulu (left) … ‘SA corporate sector is losing business opportunities in Africa’. impetus for development on the continent? Sunday Times/Sydney Seshibedi

I don’t think SA business has added much value, but there are several reasons for opportunities for development in Africa. stability, and on our ability to establish this. Firstly, during the first ten years of Unfortunately, there have been different beneficial partnerships. In the political democracy SA business was preoccupied responses within the continent to the context, we need to ensure the deep- with it own internal dynamics, which Chinese presence. The view of China as a ening of democracy by strengthening took long to shape. threat to Africa is part of a colonial legacy, democratic institutions, and cultivating Secondly, we need to recognise that and creates the impression of Africans as a culture of transparency and respect for political instability on the continent has passive players who are likely to fall prey the law. From a business perspective, the been a major obstacle to SA business. to exploitation. entrenchment of democratic institutions However, given the current emerging I believe that China should be seen forms the basis for greater mobility and stability and democracy on the conti- as an opportunity rather than a threat. predictability within the markets. nent, the doors are opening now. For Importantly, China’s need for natural Africa’s has vast resources, and the example, even though companies could resources provides perfect opportuni- challenge facing us is to efficiently man- do business in the DRC, it is only now ties for Africans to maximise and reap the age our resources and use the revenues that conditions are suitable from a gov- benefits. If we want to exploit opportuni- derived from this to diversify our mar- ernance point of view to effectively do ties presented by China, African govern- kets. This can only be achieved if we business and have your business interest ments need to develop a co-ordinated establish beneficial partnerships and take protected by law. approach to resource management, and advantage of the opportunities presented Thirdly, the lack of a coherent and use their resources as a negotiating tool by China’s presence on the continent, co-ordinated strategy has limited the to maximise the benefits in their relation- especially in the mining sector and oil impact of SA business on the continent. ship with China. exploration. The growth of the private As I mentioned earlier, SA business has The revenues from our resources sector largely depends on our ability to seemingly adopted a short-term view of should form the foundation for contin- diversify our economies, develop skills, investment in Africa. Unfortunately, this ued economic growth on the continent. create jobs, and improve earning capac- approach, combined with the other fac- The effective and efficient management ity, which will stimulate the desire for tors mentioned above, has hindered SA’s of African resources will therefore pro- consumer goods. ability to provide the impetus for devel- vide the continent with the much-needed As far as the private sector is con- opment on the continent. The impact of revenue for diversifying our economies, cerned, there is an urgent need to create SA business on the continent should be developing infrastructure, creating jobs, indigenous African multinationals; for- understood in this broader context. and developing skills. malise African business across the board; improve tax services and business regula- Economic growth in Africa was close to What can be done to promote the expan- tion by making it easier to do business; 5% for 2006, mainly due to commodity sion of markets and growth of the private establish platforms for efficient trade; and demand, especially from China. How do sector in Africa? support small businesses by funding initi- you view this development? atives that would allow them trade easily. The expansion of African markets and China has become a very importantly growth of the private sector depends What role can SA business play in strength- player globally and a source of great on whether we can guarantee political ening the India-Brazil-SA process?

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 1 5 I N t e r V i e W

I have not formed of the IBSA busi- has worked since its inception. My view The major limitation of BEE is that we ness forum, and can’t provide detailed is that AsgiSA is only beginning to deliver. have attempted to define an outcome feedback with regard to progress of the We also have to remember that AsgiSA instead of defining the capacity given. forum. was always going to deliver as long as What I mean by this is that as long as However, I believe we need to focus there was growth. A closer look at the there are no funding institutions to on consolidating the Africa agenda. economy shows growth and significant empower black people to enter business, This is not to suggest that IBSA is not job creation. In this context, I believe you will not have a satisfactory outcome. an important forum, but it is important AsgiSA has been vindicated. It is pointless talking about the outcomes to pay more attention to initiatives that It is important to realise that economic because they are dependent on the good- will contribute directly to building busi- policies are formulated in the context will of SA business. Therefore, I would ness on the continent. Multiple initiatives of the tripartite alliance. Within the alli- argue that the manipulation is not cre- have only led to more confusion about ance, there are certain dynamics that ated by the black elite or by government exactly what business is doing, especially keep unfolding and certain tensions The manipulation of the system comes in Africa, where we have a competitive that exist, and the policy debates and from white SA business, because they advantage. We need to focus on build- their outcomes are informed by these decide who they will partner with and ing African multinationals. As long as factors. Indeed, I do think that AsgiSA how that partnership will be structured. we don’t have a solid business base or a is a phase that we are going through, They can afford to do that because they co-ordinated business strategy, we can- and its evolution and our assessment of are basically funding the majority of not take advantage of opportunities on it will be largely informed by our rate these transactions. the continent, opportunities provided by of economic growth over the next five Assuming we had a different strategy China, and even opportunities provided years, and whether it will increase or whereby the IDC or even the PIC were by the IBSA process. decrease. This is likely to be the decid- much more aggressive in funding the ing factor in assessing the success and entry of black busines people into the There is continuing debate about the poten- failure of AsgiSA. economy, the terrain would be very dif- tial of the Accelerated and Shared Growth In general, the economic terminol- ferent, and we would not be complaining Initiative (AsgiSA) to create jobs. What ogy might change but the objectives and about elitism. For as long as we leave the is your view of AsgiSA as an strategy for the content (job creation and economic choice of partners and funding to white employment creation, skills development, development) will remain constant. The business, we will not be able to control and sustained economic growth? content and objectives will not change, the process and get rid the culture of elit- irrespective of whether you are on the ism. At the moment, the process is elitist Broadly speaking, there are two dynam- left, center or right. Against this back- –- a look at the players clearly illustrates ics that largely explain SA’s situation in ground, I don’t believe that if we have a the elitist nature of empowerment deals. respect of job creation and skills devel- new President there will be substantial I believe we should be more concerned opment. Firstly, apartheid laws laid the change; I will need to be persuaded that about funding models rather than BEE foundation for the labour crisis that we that would be the case. codes and quotas. are currently experiencing. Emerging That said, our economic growth has The future of BEE looks bleak. This is out of apartheid, it was evident that we also exposed immediate challenges in the mainly because the issue of funding for were going to face a job creation and energy sector. As Johannesburg slowly black business is not regarded as urgent, skills crisis. emerges as the centre of business on the to an extent that there is no discussion Secondly, I believe we all misread our continent, the power cuts clearly illustrate or debate on how best this problem potential for economic growth and, to a the need to expedite the development can be addressed. Given this situation, I large degree, held a pessimistic view of of our energy capacity. To this end, I believe that the government should be economic growth. As a result, we were believe SA needs a regional strategy to more proactive in pushing the issues of more focused on job creation as an imme- address its energy needs because its eco- funding. I also think the Department of diate social problem, and it was therefore nomic growth will have an impact on the Trade and Industry has failed to provide not surprising that we ended up without region’s energy pool. A regional strategy leadership on this issue. I don’t think an intensive skills development plan. That would ensure the rapid development of the function of government is to formu- said, I think we still have great opportuni- the Inga Dam, which should play a major late empowerment codes that exacerbate ties, and we must take advantage of the role in meeting the energy needs of our the problem and don’t address the core period between now and 2010 for skills growing economy. issues of BEE. If this situation persists, it development and job creation. is unlikely that the situation surrounding Against this background, to talk about Black economic empowerment (BEE) in SA BEE will change soon, and I fear that AsgiSA in general terms is not particularly has been criticised as an elite-driven proc- unless new funding models are put in helpful: it needs to be located in the con- ess. What do you think about this, and place we might even see a deepening of text of what is happening at the moment. what can be done to ensure that BEE pro- elitism. n Therefore, the question is not whether vides a platform for broad-based empow- AsgiSA will work, but rather whether it erment and wealth distribution?

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 1 6 S o u t H e r N A F r i C A

From the outside looking in

The SADC Parliamentary Forum could play a major role in advancing constitutional democracy in southern Africa – but needs to strengthen its ability to support member parliaments and forge closer ties with SADC itself, writes Elling Tjønneland

HE SADC Parliamentary Forum was assembly in June 2006, identifies four important regional institution. But how Tset up in the late 1990s to involve main activities or strategic interven- relevant and effective is it? In assessing southern African parliaments and par- tions. The first is to improve institutions its contribution to the regional project, liamentarians in regional co-operation of democratic governance in the SADC it is useful to assess the organisation in and integration efforts, and to promote region. The key priorities here are vari- three respects: its role as a forum for democracy and respect for the rule of ous activities to strengthen democratic parliamentarians; its role in providing law. election laws, regulations and practices, support to member parliaments; and its All SADC parliaments except Mada- and gender equality. role in advancing regional co-operation gascar’s are members of the forum. How- The second is to help accelerate the and integration. ever, it is constituted as an autonomous implementation of regional integration Some southern African democracies institution, and there are no formal links initiatives, focusing largely on the imple- have been significantly consolidated in between it and official SADC structures. mentation of SADC‘s protocols and poli- recent years. However, national parlia- The daily management and opera- ments in most countries are still rela- tion of the forum is handled by a sec- tively weak institutions. The one-party retariat in Windhoek, headed by a In most member countries, legacy; the dominance of executive secretary-general. The forum’s plenary knowledge of the forum is restricted branches of government; and an assembly meets twice a year, and is environment haunted by patriarchy, the main policy-making and delibera- to the few members of parliament patrimonial relations, and discrimi- tive body. It consists of five members taking part in its activities nation against women remain major of each member parliament, including obstacles. their presiding officers. Significantly, The achievements of the forum in electing the other four representa- cies, and establishing the forum as a par- have to be measured against this back- tives each parliament must ensure that liamentary assembly under SADC. ground. It performs a very important women and political parties are equitably The third intervention is to improve function in providing parliamentarians represented. This emphasis on including the performance of members of parlia- from SADC member states with a place representatives of opposition parties has ment and parliamentary staff. This largely to meet and exchange information and become a trademark of the forum. comprises training courses delivered by knowledge. However, more needs to be the forum’s new Parliamentary Leader- done to ensure that that the debates and Standing committees ship Centre. discussions in and around the plenary The final area is the development of assembly and standing committees filter The plenary assembly also elects an exec- strategic partnerships and alliances in down to member parliaments. In most utive committee that manages the affairs order to strengthen parliamentary co- member countries, knowledge of the of the forum, and directs the secretariat. operation. This includes co-operation forum is restricted to the few members of The plenary assembly appoints standing with a range of parliamentary bodies parliament taking part in its activities. committees which act as ‘think-tanks’ or and associations. ‘clearing houses’ for the forum. There The forum receives some core fund- New centre are currently five such committees: on ing from member parliaments, but the democratisation, governance and gender bulk of its income is provided by foreign The forum has emphasised the need to quality; regional co-operation and inte- donors, notably USAID (election pro- strengthen the competence and capaci- gration; inter-parliamentary co-operation gramme), Sweden (gender programme), ties of both members of parliament and and capacity development; HIV and AIDS; Norway (election programme), and the parliamentary staff. Thus far it has it has and the regional women’s parliamentary African Capacity Building Foundation introduced few projects or activities that caucus. The work of these standing com- (training programme). Others smaller directly address these issues, but this is mittees usually flows from meetings of donors include the Open Society Ini- now changing following the establish- the plenary assembly. tiative for Southern Africa (information ment in 2006 of the Parliamentary Lead- The forum’s current (2006-2010) technology, website). ership and Development Centre. Based strategic plan, approved by the plenary The forum is widely regarded as an in Windhoek, it presents both regional

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 1 7 The Botswana National Assembly in Gaborone … improving the performance of members of parliaments in SADC member states is a key role of the forum. Henner Frankenfeld/PictureNET Africa

and national courses, and is regarded and focus its efforts to develop regional ducted in an increasingly professional as one of the forum’s most important training courses. Above all, it is impor- manner. Team members arrive, receive initiatives. tant to avoid a situation where a number proper orientation and training, meet dif- The centre’s training programme and of institutions deliver similar training ferent stakeholders and the main political other activities are still being developed. courses in an ad hoc and unco-ordinated parties, issue a statement, deploy in all or However, it is keen to develop orientation manner. most parts of the country, and observe programmes or introductory courses for the elections according to a checklist. new members of parliaments and parlia- Election guide The team is guided by a code of con- mentary staff. These courses will focus on duct, debriefs after deployment, issues issues such as the roles and responsibili- The bulk of the forum’s activities have an interim statement and subsequently a ties of members of parliament, lawmak- been in the area of promoting regional co- major report that lists best practices, and ing, oversight, representation, and gender. operation and integration, especially in presents recommendations for improve- It also intends to present workshops on respect of gender issues and the develop- ments. In a few cases – notably the 2002 regional co-operation and integration; ment of regional frameworks and norms elections in Zimbabwe – the forum has subjects are expected to include the and standards for elections. Its election- issued highly critical reports. role of SADC protocols, transboundary related activities in particular have been The SADC forum has also successfully resources, anti-corruption issues, poverty extensive. In 2001 the forum adopted established itself as an arena for debate reduction, HIV/AIDS, gender, and peace the Norms and Standards for Elections about the consolidation of democracy, and security. in the SADC Region, which has become the exchange of information on election The forum is in a position to make the leading guide to assessing elections best practice, and establishing a peer an important contribution in this area. It in SADC member countries. review mechanism for the conduct of enjoys strong legitimacy among national A major activity has been the deploy- free and fair elections. It has not yet suc- parliaments, and it has the financial ment of election observer missions in ceeded in boosting efforts by member resources needed to implement such a member countries. The observer teams parliaments to improve legislation and programme. However, there are many are quite large and comprise MPs from create a political climate conducive to organisations delivering training courses member countries, including opposition free and fair elections. It has also not in this area, both nationally and region- MPs, support staff from the PF secretariat, been successful in influencing the SADC ally. If the forum is to succeed, and and staff from member parliaments. The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security make a real difference, it must design forum has observed nearly all national Cooperation and its effort to formulate and deliver a training programme tai- elections in member countries in recent guidelines for democratic elections. lored to the specific needs of individual years. parliaments. It also needs to prioritise The observer missions have been con- Continued on page 37

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Somalia needs genuine reconciliation process

Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia has set back hopes of a domestic settlement. Timothy Othieno examines the options for resolving this intractable conflict, which is threatening to destabilise the entire region

HE PROTRACTED crisis in Somalia in which dozens of people were killed. own interests. For example, Ethiopia’s Tseems to have entered a new phase: This act further muddled the waters and interest lies in protecting its valuable an armed struggle for control of the internationalised the conflict. access to the sea, while Kenya is con- country between Ethiopian and Somali Although the TFG has been formally cerned that the Somali conflict could Transitional Federal Government (TFG) reinstalled in power, the situation in engulf its northern and eastern provinces. forces on the one side and the Islamist Somalia is again characterised by con- Djibouti is trying to prevent the Somali militant umbrella group the Union of tinued fighting and low-intensity warfare, conflict from spilling over into its own Islamic Courts (UIC) and other affiliated mainly in Mogadishu. But regardless of territory. Somaliland, which used to be militias on the other. what one regards as the cause of the cur- a part of Somalia, wants to maintain its On 25 December 2006 Ethiopia rent crisis – the removal of the popular ‘independence’, with Ethiopia’s support, declared war on the UIC on the grounds but strict UIC from Mogadishu or the while helping to safeguard Ethiopia’s that the latter posed a direct threat to its presence of the unpopular and weak but access to the sea, and protect its north own borders, and that Addis Ababa eastern border from UIC elements. had a right to protect its sovereignty. These neighbouring states will proba- Ethiopia subsequently invaded Soma- Ethiopia fears that the rise of the UIC bly keep on trying to influence devel- lia three days later. This move had will spread radical Islam throughout opments in Somalia, particularly since its roots in May 2006 when the UIC the TFG in Mogadishu seems to be captured Mogadishu and continued Ethiopia’s large Muslim community, receptive to their interventions. attempts to assume control of the and cut off its access to the sea Since its return, the TFG has been country, which came into conflict heavily attacked by elements of the with Ethiopia’s interests. internationally recognised TFG, backed UIC based around the capital. The UIC Ethiopia fears that the rise of the UIC by the Ethiopian government – one needs fighters form part of the 3 000 UIC fight- will spread radical Islam throughout to acknowledge the impact of the Soma- ers who melted away when Ethiopian Ethiopia’s large Muslim community, and lia crisis on the Horn of Africa and East troops entered the capital. The fighting cut off its access to the sea. In addition, Africa. This article will analyse this impact between the TFG and the UIC and their the UIC is being financially and militarily and draw some conclusions about a pos- allies in Mogadishu threatens to escalate supported by Eritrea, Ethiopia’s long-time sible resolution of the Somali crisis. into a wider conflict with the potential to foe. Hence it came as no surprise that The involvement of neighbouring consume the entire Somalia, destabilise the situation in Somalia also created an states in the crisis has had a negative peaceful territories such as Somaliland opportunity for Eritrea to get involved in impact on the evolution of the Somali and Puntland, and cause terrorist attacks a proxy war with Ethiopia. state. Their support for certain Somali in neighbouring countries. clans has contributed to internal tensions The support given to the UIC insur- Islamist fighters flee in Somalia. The Ethiopian government has gency can be attributed to the movement’s been the major supporter of the Darod, role in bringing a semblance of peace As Ethiopian troops entered Mogadishu who inhabit vast areas of the Ogaden to Somalia between June and Decem- in mid-January, the Islamist fighters fled region. The Darod also dominate the TFG ber 2006. With grass-roots support, the the city and retreated south towards – led by President Abdulahi Yusuf, who is UIC was able to remove weapons from their stronghold in Kismayo and later a Darodian. The Hawiye, who inhabit vast the streets and curb violence within and entrenched themselves around the small areas of north-eastern Kenya, have strong among clans. The UIC’s popularity also town of Ras Komboni on the Kenyan support from the Kenyan government stems from the fact that their nemesis, the border. because of their influential role within TFG, was brought back to power with the Ethiopia, however, has not been the Kenya’s military structures. The Isaak are help of Ethiopia. The AU, on the other only non-Muslim country interested in the dominant clan in Somaliland, while hand, is seen as propping up an ille- the course of events in Somalia: in Janu- the Issa are dominant in Djibouti. gitimate government. Some reports have ary 2007 the US sent AC-130 gunships to These countries’ support for these even suggested that the UIC received attack Islamist positions at Ras Komboni, clans are aimed purely at advancing their material support from Eritrea, Ethiopia’s

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 1 9 A camp for displaced persons in Mogadishu … according to the WFP, about 1,5m people displaced by the conflict need food relief. AP Photo/Guy Calaf

sworn enemy in the region. If this is true, in the form of increased insecurity and Ethiopia currently seems to hold most of the Somali conflict could be turned into requirements for water, food, shelter, and the cards on this issue. an international crisis and a proxy of the sanitation. Some western countries – notably the ongoing Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict. US – have depicted the involvement of Against the wishes of President Abdu- Major challenge Ethiopian-backed troops in Somalia as lahi Yusuf, the TFG is under tremendous the ‘liberation of Somalia’ from Islamic pressure from the US and EU to negotiate One of the major challenges facing the terrorism. It seems as if the willingness with moderate Islamists in the UIC over a TFG at this stage is the issue of how of Ethiopia to tackle Islamic forces in national reconciliation process that would to reunify Somalia. Since 1991 various Somalia has also prompted the US to end the violence and instability in Soma- regions in Somalia have declared them- open another front on its ‘war on terror’. lia. The EU, for instance, has stated that it selves independent and become autono- Since December 2006 it has emerged that will not disburse any funds for a peace- mous – for example, Somaliland has been the US has assisted Somali, Ethiopian keeping force unless the TFG is prepared operating as a de facto independent state, and Kenyan forces with intelligence on to engage with moderate Islamists about although it remains unrecognised inter- the UIC. Other reports suggest that the a government of national unity and an nationally. According to the Transitional US also provided advisors before con- inclusive national reconciliation process. Federal Charter, the Somali Republic ducting limited military strikes against However, little progress has been made in includes Somaliland. the UIC from bases in Ethiopia, Kenya this regard as the UIC was forced under- The TFG’s inconclusive struggle to and Djibouti, and funded the AMISOM ground by the Ethiopian invasion. establish control over the capital and (the AU mission in Somalia) in support The TFG’s return to Mogadishu has country has not helped matters in of the TFG. also triggered off a massive flow of refu- other regions in the Horn. In a desper- In the clashes at Ras Kamboni in Janu- gees to Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, ate attempt to establish control, the ary 2007 the US used AC-130 gunships and thousands more people have been TFG declared a state of emergency and against suspected Al Qaeda operatives internally displaced. Many of this new imposed a curfew that included the self- thought to be embedded within UIC wave of refugees need emergency aid. ruling Somaliland territory. However, this forces. It also emerged that the US had According to the World Food Programme complicated its relations with Somaliland. been secretly training Ethiopian soldiers (WFP), about 1,5 million people (563 000 Relations between the TFG and Somali- for several years in camps near the Ethio- Kenyans and 100 000 Somali refugees land also have implications for the Horn pia-Somalia border, and that many of in Kenya, 455 000 people in Somalia, of Africa since Somaliland’s chief backer, these soldiers had participated in the and 362 000 in Ethiopia) need assist- Ethiopia, is also the TFG’s principal sup- Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. The same ance. These refugees have placed a heavy porter. Thus the TFG is effectively held additional burden on recipient countries hostage by Ethiopian machinations, and Continued on page 39

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 2 0 A S i a

North Korean nuclear deal improves peace prospects

Despite obvious weaknesses, the Six-Party Agreement for managing nuclear power in North Korea offers real prospects for greater peace and stability in North East Asia, writes Garth Shelton

EGIONAL critics have questioned policy provoked both North Korea and definition of ‘disabled,’ suggesting that Rthe Six-Party Agreement on North Iran into escalating their own nuclear its long-term view of the process differs Korea’s nuclear programme concluded and defence programmes. sharply from Washington’s perspective. on 13 February this year. In terms of Critics have raised a number of issues this deal, North Korea will receive oil for relating to the nuclear agreement, point- Escalation of sanctions energy generation in exchange for shut- ing out that the deal brokered by the ting down its Yongbyon nuclear facility. Clinton administration 13 years ago went A former US Ambassador to the UN, John In terms of the so-called Framework further than the present compromise. The Bolton, has strongly criticised the deal, Agreement concluded in 1994, North agreement essentially facilitates the shut- suggesting that it sends the wrong signal Korea agreed to rejoin the Nuclear Non- down of North Korea’s plutonium pro- to would-be proliferators. According to Proliferation Treaty (NPT), effectively duction and separation programme, but Bolton, holding out long enough at the requiring it to dismantle its entire nuclear there is no clarity on a permanent closure negotiating table and making threats will programme, in return for two elec- eventually be ‘rewarded’. Bolton has tricity-generating light-water nuclear instead called for an escalation of reactors. However, the Clinton admin- The IAEA has broadly welcomed sanctions against North Korea and a istration delayed implementation of the agreement, but the role of IAEA comprehensive isolation of the coun- the deal and the Bush White House try. However, the US has largely fol- refused to honour it. Instead, Presi- inspectors remains ambiguous lowed this approach for the past six dent George Bush identified the Dem- year with no success. ocratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) of the facility. Pyongyang’s official news The participants in Six-Party Talks as the third element in an ‘Axis of Evil’ agency has referred to the ‘suspension’ (South Korea, North Korea, Japan, China, posing a ‘clear and present danger’ to the of nuclear activities, while Washington Russia and the US) have been united US in the post-9/11 global system. clearly has a more permanent arrange- by a desire to promote security and sta- ment in mind. bility in North East Asia, but differing Clandestine programme The latest agreement does not deal national interests have impacted on the with North Korea’s alleged uranium process and outcomes of the negotiation Late in 2002 US officials claimed that enrichment programme, which operates process. South Korea has for the past North Korea was pursuing a clandes- separately from the plutonium process, decade followed a policy of engagement tine nuclear weapons programme in and is believed to be capable of pro- towards North Korea, seeking through contravention of NPT undertakings. In ducing highly enriched uranium (HEU) the so-called ‘Sunshine policy’ to moder- response, Pyongyang removed seals and for nuclear weapons. Also absent from ate North Korea’s security concerns while surveillance equipment from the Yong- the discussions has been North Korea’s advancing a process of gradual economic byon plant and expelled International arsenal of nuclear weapons, believed to reform. South Korean economic engage- Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspec- number at least a dozen. ment, through the Gaesong Industrial tors from the country. Washington’s new The IAEA has broadly welcomed the Complex, the Mount Goumgang tourism national security policy, announced on agreement, but the role of IAEA inspec- venture and the re-connection of railroads 17 September 2002, shifted US defence tors remains ambiguous, with Pyongyang has significantly advanced inter-Korean strategy to ‘pre-emption’ and ‘prevention’ able to limit their access as long as it trade and cross-border co-operation. For as opposed to the traditional Cold War stays outside the NPT. In exchange for Seoul, the key objective has been to avoid doctrine of deterrence. Both North Korea shutting down its nuclear reactor, North war at all costs, given the so-called ‘tyr- and Iran, the prime targets of the new Korea will receive 50 000 metric tonnes anny of proximity’ between the front line security policy, responded by accelerat- of fuel oil, while a further 950 000 tonnes of possible military confrontation and ing their nuclear programmes. In effect, will be provided upon confirmation that South Korea’s population centres. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech and the new the Yongbyon nuclear reactor has been The Republic of Korea (ROK) has a post- 9/11 aggressive national security ‘disabled.’ Pyongyang has questioned the long-term vision of gradual economic and

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 2 1 A S i a

then political reform in the DPRK, leading of Japanese citizens by North Korean The former USSR was a key Cold War to the eventual unification of the Korean authorities, apparently for information- ally of the DPRK, but has since been peninsula under a federal system. gathering purposes, has provoked an replaced by China. Moreover, Russia’s North Korea has participated in the emotional response from the general lack of financial muscle and the decline Six-Party Talks with a view to improv- public. Tokyo has refused to back the of its military presence in East Asia has ing its security and avoiding a possible latest deal financially until the abduction undermined Moscow’s ability to exert confrontation with the US. The failure issue has been fully resolved. its influence in the region. But Russia to formally conclude the Korean War retains a keen interest in the economic through a comprehensive peace treaty Economic crisis development of the Korean peninsula has left the DPRK exposed to a hostile with the possibility of benefiting signifi- US, encamped in South Korea for the China’s interest in advancing a negotiated cantly from new rail links from the trans- past 54 years. The talks have also offered settlement has been driven by a desire to Siberian railway via North Korea to the Pyongyang the opportunity to bargain for stabilise the North East Asian region and dynamic economic hub in South Korea. concessions from the West in exchange prevent any economic crisis in the DPRK Reducing regional tensions in favour of for a moderation or final termination of which could create a major refugee prob- greater economic prosperity also clearly its nuclear programme. Given its limited lem. Moreover, China and North Korea top Moscow’s agenda at the Six-Party options and restricted diplomatic alter- have a long history of co-operation dat- exchanges. natives, North Korea has been forced to ing back to the Korean War. Beijing has The US initially avoided the Six-Party use the Six-Party Talks as a mechanism played an incereasingly important role in process in favour of advancing more to advance its national interests. facilitating the Six-Party Talks and provid- confrontational approaches based on Japan has sought to address a per- ing the political framework for negotia- ‘regime change’ or surgical air strike ceived threat from North Korea’s ongoing tion. As a friend and ally of Pyongyang, options. US commentators have predicted military preparations and missile tests Beijing has been a key mediator, offering the ‘imminent collapse’ of North Korea in the Sea of Japan. On 5 July 2006 the realistic alternatives for a way out of the since 1992, only to be repeatedly disap- DPRK tested seven medium-range mis- impasse. China consistently warned the pointed. Regime change without a mas- siles and one long-range missile (Taepo- DPRK not to test a nuclear device and sive US military intervention is clearly dong 2) over a 14-hour period. This was was clearly angered by the 9 October not a viable option in this context. At preceded in August 1998 by a missile 2006 nuclear explosion. Beijing conse- the same time, given their high level of test conducted over Japan itself. Histori- quently voted in favour of UN Security protection, any attempt to destroy the cal animosities, born of Japan’s colonial Council resolution 1718 on 14 October DPRK’s nuclear facilities with surgical occupation of Korea from 1910 to 1945 2006, imposing a broad range of sanc- air strikes would probably fail, and also and events in World War 2, also con- tions on North Korea. This was the first unleash a devastating counterattack by tinue to impact negatively on present-day time China (and Russia) voted in favour North Korea on its southern neighbour. relations. The kidnapping of a number of the imposition of UN sanctions. Disagreement between hawks and doves in the Bush White House prevented a clear policy line on North Korea. The US eventually endorsed the Six-Party process with the stated objective of a ‘complete, verified and irreversibly eliminated’ North Korean nuclear programme. Washing- ton sought this objective through threats, sanctions and an internationally imposed isolation, all of which were brought into sharp focus when Pyongyang tested its first nuclear weapon.

Weapons test

The obvious failure of US policy became evident immediately after Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons test on 9 October last year. Along with a looming nuclear armed Iran, Washington began to reassess its policy of pre-emption and prevention. IAEA director-general Mohamed El Baradei talks to journalists before leaving for China The outcome of this reassessment has and North Korea in March this year ... the role of IAEA inspectors remains unclear. been a significant US policy shift and a AP Photo/Hans Punz major softening of demands at the Six-

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 2 2 South Korean activists with petitions opposing North Korea’s nuclear programme a week after the Six-Party Agreement ... the agreement does not deal with some aspects of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability. AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon

Party negotiating table. The US has aban- us’. Thereafter, Washington moved to an softer diplomacy offers the opportunity doned its demand for a verified perma- even more aggressive stance, described for a comprehensive and positive restruc- nent termination of North Korea’s nuclear as the ‘trigger-happy sheriff’, with the turing of East Asian regional security. programme in favour of a more ambigu- invasion of Iraq and Vice-President Dick The agreement is based on an innova- ous long-term goal of ‘disablement.’ Cheney’s declaration that in the context tive ‘action for action’ concept, suggesting Moreover, the package of US conces- of North Korea the US ‘does not negotiate that Pyongyang will be systematically sions has gone far further than even the with evil, we destroy it.’ rewarded for steps towards contain- most optimistic observer would have pre- ing its nuclear programme. But, more dicted. Washington has agreed to bilateral Policy shift importantly, it has produced five new interaction with Pyongyang, the DPRK is negotiating subcommittees that will deal to be removed from the US state terror- The significant and sudden policy shift on with the following issues: denuclearisa- ist list, future diplomatic relations are to North Korea signals a new mood in the tion (the central focus of the process); be discussed, and a peace treaty finally Bush White House and an apparent move energy (rewards for North Korea); the ending the Korean war is under consid- back towards a more moderate position of normalisation of North Korea – Japan eration. As an added immediate incen- global leadership. With no military option relations; the normalisation of North tive, Washington agreed to the lifting of available to Bush in reversing nuclear Korea–US relations; and the establish- financial sanctions, freeing North Korean proliferation in North Korea or Iran, and ment of a permanent North East Asian accounts in a Macao bank. the failure of sanctions against the DPRK security mechanism. Thus the strategic The sudden US change of course on (and predicted failure in the case of Iran), vision of the agreement, coupled with the the North Korean issue suggests a major along with no end in sight for the war new US approach, offers the prospect of alteration in the thinking of key policy- in Iraq, Washington has no other option a lasting peace in East Asia. makers in the Bush White House. The but to return to the Cold War policies of The full implementation of this vision US has begun a major strategic realign- deterrence and massive retaliation rather will not come without difficulties and ment that will shape its foreign policy than pre-emption and prevention. setbacks, but the stage has been set for for years to come. Under Clinton, the Despite the obvious weaknesses of a more peaceful East Asian region. It is US was widely regarded as the ‘benign the Six-Party Agreement, a framework up to the key actors, especially the US, to hegemon’ as Washington navigated inter- is in place for progress towards greater play their part in advancing a successful national relations in concert with allies peace and stability in North East Asia. conclusion to this chapter of history. n and multilateral institutions. Immediately The agreement is essentially a mecha- post-9/11 Bush adopted what was widely nism for managing a nuclear armed North Garth Shelton is associate professor of regarded a ‘rogue state’ approach, declar- Korea, rather than reversing nuclear pro- international relations at the University ing that you are ‘either for us or against liferation. At the same time, Washington’s of the Witwatersrand

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 2 3 l a t i N A M e r i C A

Cuba at the crossroads

Fidel Castro’s withdrawal from power has sparked off a new round of speculation about Cuba’s future. Will his successors try to perpetuate the revolution, or go the reformist route? By Lyal White

RNEST HEMINGWAY, whose spirit both sides of the ideological spectrum tinued with a severe economic decline Elives on in Havana and who was in Latin America, resulting from the vari- in the 1990s – ironically called ‘the Spe- a personal friend of Fidel Castro, once ous kinds of dictatorships that gripped cial Period’ – and a new phase of glo- said, ‘A man can be destroyed, but not the region and redefined its political balisation. He managed to do so largely defeated.’ These words are resonating in environment from the 1960s onwards. because of his charisma, which has held Cuba where the current political debate Two archetypes of this type of leadership Cuba together for all these years. increasingly centres on whether the revo- – albeit on opposing sides – were Fidel Raul Castro, Fidel’s younger brother lution will die with Fidel. Castro and the late Augosto Pinochet and the latter’s choice as successor, lacks of Chile. this key attribute. Unfortunately, it is not Chosen heir Michael Shifter of Inter-American Dia- a characteristic that can be passed on logue recently described them as two from one leader to the next. While the After nearly five decades in power, and leaders who have defined the political communist ideology is well-entrenched at the age of 80, Castro is no longer at history of Latin America, and moulded in Cuba, Raul lacks his brother’s abil- the helm. Whether he is indeed termi- the landscape and agenda according to ity to muster and retain the loyalty of nally ill – which the Cuban government their ideals – in the case of Fidel, social the masses. Fidel tapped into the hopes vehemently denies – or recovering slowly, equality; in the case of Pinochet, a relent- and beliefs of the people, and galvanised few will gainsay that Cuba is entering a less pursuit of market forces. Both are them in pursuit of his vision of a better new phase of leadership, and that Raul idolised by their followers but despised future. Castro (Fidel’s younger brother) is the by their critics. And both have delivered But while Raul has been eclipsed by chosen heir to the throne. some good to their people. Pinochet set his brother for all these years, and rela- These changes, and Castro’s ailing in motion liberal reforms that have trans- tively little is still known about him, he is, condition, have placed the island under formed Chile into the most successful for now, the undisputed leader of Cuba. the spotlight yet again. No other Whether Fidel is terminally ill or busy country stirs up as much emotion, recovering from illness, this opportu- or commands as disproportionate a Raul lacks his brother’s ability to muster nity has been used to place Raul in degree of leverage and influence in and retain the loyalty of the masses the seat of power and to give him the the international arena. Anti-Castro necessary public exposure. He has groups and Fidelistas alike are debat- long been vice-president, and head ing the future of Cuba and the legacy of economy in the region, while Fidel has of the armed forces, but is now 75 him- a man and system that many believe is a delivered socioeconomic equality and a self, and most critics believe he will be a relic of the Cold War, while others insist high level of human development in an transitional leader who will either usher that the Cuban model is one of the most otherwise poorly endowed environment. in a process of liberal reform and plural successful social experiments to emerge But both sacrificed human rights in order democracy, or wait for a new generation from that period. to achieve their goals and political ambi- of revolutionary leaders to organise them- Castro epitomises the messianic style tions. Fidel has justified his actions in the selves and then relinquish control. of leadership that has come to charac- name of the overarching revolution, while terise Latin America and the Caribbean. Pinochet felt democracy was misplaced Human rights abuses This is based less on competence than in Chile, and chose to crush it through on personality and charisma. Leaders coercion. The Cuban revolution has been praised like Fidel inspire an abiding confidence The difference lies in the way in which for its social development and elimination in their abilities. In this way, Fidel has each managed the changing global order of inequality. But critics argue that the come to symbolise not only the Cuban and the wave of democratisation that costs of achieving this ‘utopian dream’, revolution, but an ideology and belief swept across Latin America in the 1980s. which include a dismal economic record, that has had strongly influenced Latin Pinochet was voted out in 1989; Fidel undemocratic governance, and severe America and the rest of the world for the retained his grip on power despite a human rights abuses, far outweigh the past 50 years. series of dramatic changes that started gains. Ultimately, the real question is This style of leadership emerged on with the end of the Cold War, and con- whether Castro’s revolutionary model

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 2 4 Raul Castro greets Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez at the Havana airport ... Venezuela’s economic support has given Chavez unprecedented leverage over Cuba’s transition. AP Photo/Alfonso Ocanda

truly benefited the Cuban people, and, Credible economic data about Cuba is high as 90 000), and the Cuban govern- if it did, still does so today. difficult to come by. While it has one of ment has provided considerable grounds Cuba’s social indicators are among the fastest growing economies in Latin for criticism by influential groups such the best in the world. It is one of the top America – 8-11 per cent in 2005 and 2006 as Amnesty International and Human five developing countries on the Human – this has followed the ‘Special Period’, Rights Watch. Development Index, and ranks among an eight-year period of economic decline Where does Raul Castro stand on all the top developed countries in respect of that resulted in widespread food short- these issues? As one of the staunchest life expectancy and literacy. It is widely ages, and halted housing and infrastruc- proponents of the communist ideals recognised that the revolution brought ture development. that underpin the Cuban revolution, he equality, education, and health care to the has earned a reputation of being a strict masses. It has also prevented Cuba from Repressive policies enforcer of the revolution and the rules becoming yet another Caribbean basket and policies associated with it – even to case or a backwater of American organ- The Cuban economy is about 20 per cent the detriment of personal freedoms and ised crime and unsavoury tourism, a role smaller today than in 1985, and the coun- internationally accepted human rights. prevalent in the Caribbean today. try has yet to reach the living standards But when it comes to the economy, Cuba is held in high regard by a many it enjoyed in 1989. Per capita income is Raul has expressed a slightly different members of the international community estimated at $10-$15 a month, which has perspective, and has shown a keen inter- (especially the developing world). It has boosted crime and prostitution. est in the Chinese model of economic shared its expertise and progress – espe- Repressive policies and human rights liberalisation. Over the past 25 years, cially in health care – with less developed abuses provide Cuba’s critics with more China has introduced a staggered set of countries around the world. Today more solid ammunition. Even those in favour economic reforms aimed at promoting than 30 000 Cuban doctors are practising of the Cuban model have pleaded with free trade and investment, privatisation, abroad, mostly in Latin America. the Castro government to address these and less state intervention in economic Its greatest asset is human capital. issues, but with little success. More than affairs. As a result, its economy has grown Cubans are hard-working, and thanks two million Cubans have been forced by an average of nearly 10 per cent a to the revolution they are disciplined, into exile (nearly 1,5 million are in the year over this period – the highest level well-educated, and service-oriented. But US), 77 800 have been reported dead or of growth of any economy in the world. there is much that needs to be done (or lost on rafts at sea (trying to escape from Despite this, the Chinese Communist changed) in Cuba if its entrepreneurial Cuba), and the Castro regime has carried Party has retained political control. spirit, which formally contradicts the rev- out 5 700 executions. Add to this the long There is a great deal of speculation olutionary ideals originally spelled out in list of political prisoners (the government about whether Raul will take Cuba down 1959, is to be fully harnessed. admits to 20 000, but estimates are as the Chinese path. But the Chinese and

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been described as the bedrock of the Cuban economy. To date, Venezuela has subsidised the Cuban economy by an estimated $2bn. Through an ‘oil for doc- tors’ agreement, Cuba receives 90 000 barrels of Venezuelan crude a day at favourable rates in return for doctors and various related projects and operations. Bilateral trade has rocketed to $2,5bn, $1,8bn of this in the form of Venezuelan oil exports. In terms of strategic co-opera- tion and security, Cuba and Venezuela have signed various bilateral agreements, and have championed an alliance of like- minded countries in the region (including Bolivia and Ecuador) which they call a ‘coalition of friends’ against US imperial dominance. Its members have large (or potentially large) oil, gas, and hydrocar- bon reserves.

Unofficial mouthpiece Fidel Castro with his brother Raul ... Raul has long served as vice-president, but lacks his brother’s charisma. AP Photo/Cristobal Herrera Led by Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has quickly become Cuba’s most important partner. Chavez’s affinity with Castro Cuban economies are worlds apart. Most and billions of dollars spent to displace and his effective use of oil diplomacy importantly, Cuba is closely watched by him. But despite their countries’ geo- in Cuba and across the region has given the US. History has shown that if Cuba graphical proximity, and the 1,5 million him unprecedented leverage in Cuba’s changes its economic regime, the US will Cuban exiles currently in the US, many transition. The visual images of Chavez try to influence and even control this Cubans remain will strongly oppose any beside a bedridden Castro, not to men- process. This reality will make the new US involvement in a post-Castro transi- tion his role as the unofficial mouthpiece Cuban leaders more reluctant to imple- tion. Even if a shift takes place towards of the great leader in delivering messages ment economic reforms, especially if the greater personal freedom and democracy, of recovery to the rest of the world, are economy is booming and they are able Cubans will probably resist the imposi- very significant. to rely on allies for strategic commodities tion of American-style ideals, and choose However, the relationship between such as oil, energy and food. a transitional path of their own. Even Raul and Chavez is still unclear. While after the US congressional visit to the they may share the same ideological Trade embargo island at the end of 2006 – the first since point of departure, Raul certainly does Castro came to power – Cuba and the not seem to share Chavez’s abrasive style Cuban–US relations have oscillated US are as far apart as ever before, and and confrontational tactics. Raul has, after between bad and worse since 1960. increasing moral and economic support all, been in this game far longer, is accus- The 40-year-old US trade embargo (the from regional allies will ensure that Raul tomed to staying out of the limelight, Cubans prefer to call it a blockade) has or any other leader will maintain this and has successfully avoided becoming severed the latter country from its clos- position, at least in the short term. a lightning rod for criticism. est and most important trading partner, Ignacio Ramonet, editor of Le Monde Under Raul, Cuba is likely to remain and until recently an extension of this Diplomatique and an ardent supporter close to Venezuela. This makes economic blockade – introduced by the Helms- of Castro, recently commented: ‘For the sense. Chavez will continue with his out- Burton Act – also isolated Cuba from first time in its history, this country [Cuba] spoken crusade and no doubt absorb much of the international community. The does not depend on a preferred partner, much of the criticism directed at the radi- embargo has never been assessed for its as it depended, successively, on Spain, cal left in Latin America, while Raul con- effectiveness or its success in initiating the US, and the Soviet Union. It is more tinues to focus on the internal dynamics democratic change in Cuba. independent than ever.’ in Cuba and its gradual integration with US policy toward Cuba has been dra- Surely Ramonet failed to notice Cuba’s the global political economy. matically internalised over the years. Fidel increasingly close relationship with and Most analysts and observers have Castro has outlived nine US presidents, growing dependence on Venezuela. despite various outrageous attempts Cuba’s relations with Venezuela have Continued on page 37

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 2 6 M i d d l e e a S T

In the previous issue of Global Dialogue (September 2006), Aslam Farouk-Alli examined the mid-2006 Israeli incursions into Gaza and Lebanon in the context of a broader historical narrative about Zionism. Victor Gordon of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies offers a critique of Farouk-Alli’s article, to which the latter responds

History behind history ignored

Victor Gordon

HEN 23-year-old Gadi Goldwasser recently visited SA to the kidnapping was ‘not the real issue’ behind her reaction, Wurge anyone with a modicum of influence to help secure it was undoubtedly the point of no return – the proverbial the release of his brother Udi, kidnapped in July by Hezbollah last straw that broke the camel’s back; the single event that fighters on the Lebanon border, he predictably faced a variety of sparked a chain of events similar to so many other ‘sparks’ that reactions that varied from sympathetic to downright hostile. have changed history in the past; pivotal points that are only When he appeared as a guest on a Johannesburg-based radio recognised for their importance with hindsight, sometimes station the lines were jammed by angry callers who asked why years later. two Israeli soldiers were more significant than the hundreds of Consider the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand which Lebanese victims of the recent war. As anticipated, Israel’s action resulted in the catastrophic World War 1, or the infamous in this 34-day-long conflict was unreservedly condemned. Dreyfus trial that provided the seed for the Zionist movement Goldwasser’s answers were predicable. He cared about and the ultimate establishment of the state of Israel. Of course, his brother and would do whatever he could to, if not secure history provides many other examples. his release, at least obtain information about his well-being When one considers the reasons behind Israel’s reaction a – or whether he was even still alive. His visit had no political deeper examination is essential to achieve any real understand- motive. ing of a matter wrought with complexity, so much of which is often debated devoid of any essential context. Such is the case Fateful abduction when viewing the weight of the kidnapping against Israel’s ultimate decision to wage all-out war against Hezbollah, the Gadi is no politician. He has no answers but he has some proxy of Iran and Syria. pressing questions. They are of a personal family nature. ‘Is It is simply dishonest to ignore the history behind the his- my brother alive? How is he? How is he being treated? What tory outlined by Islam Farouk-Alli in his article ‘History weighs can be done to bring him home?’ heavily on Middle East’ (Global Dialogue, September 2006). I am reminded of how well-known film stars or dubious Predictably, Farouk-Alli writes from an Arab perspective which celebrities are sometimes asked for would be quite acceptable had he their opinions on worldly matters included in his overview of the his- simply because of who they are, not ‘A true understanding can only toric events that resulted in the recent what they know. In Gadi’s case there be achieved when one looks war a single reference from the Israeli is little he could add to the ferocious viewpoint. In a conflict as long and debate about the way in which Israel at both sides of the story’ complex as this, surely a true under- reacted to that fateful abduction. It standing can only be achieved when happened as a direct result of a decision taken by Hezbollah, one looks at both sides of the story and places such events in probably at the behest of Iran and/or Syria, with consequences some sort of valid context. But Alli-Farouk makes no attempt that were tragic for all those – both Israelis and Lebanese – who to attain this balance, and simply ignores the cause and effect found themselves in the firing line. These are the consequences of the events under review. of war about which the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, One cannot, for example, simply overlook the cause and admitted that had he anticipated the scale of Israel’s reaction effect of anti-Semitism as it has been practised throughout he would not have instigated the war to start with. Too little, Europe and the Middle East, not for decades but for centuries. too late. One cannot simply dismiss the fact that Jews were continually While certain spokesmen within Israel have claimed that and systematically thrown out of one country after the other,

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 2 7 Israeli soldiers at the funeral of a comrade, Oren Lifshitz, at Kibbutz Gazit near Afula, 9 August 2006. Reuters/Yonathan Weitzman

persecuted, tortured, murdered in their millions, reduced to not because Jews took a decision to ‘rob’ Arabs of their land. second-class citizens, or robbed of any form of citizenship at In fact, anyone with the honesty to face the facts knows full all while still managing to survive and continue the practice well that the area historically known as Judea and Samaria has of their faith. been Jewish land as far back as Abraham, no matter how much What other nation has had to endure such degradation this history is distorted to suit another argument. and still be expected to uphold values dictated by a hostile The Balfour Declaration recognised this fact, as the UN when world but without similar expectations from any other nation? it voted for partition in 1947. The wheel had turned full circle, There has always been one standard for Israel and another for and justice was finally done. everyone else. Farouk-Alli suggests that the Jews alone mounted a ‘bloody The 700-plus UN resolutions passed against Israel since 1948 guerrilla campaign against the British administrators and the bear testimony to this claim when one considers that less than a local Arab population’ prior to the declaration of the state of handful have been passed against all the Arab states combined. Israel in 1948. No mention is made of the Arab riots against Are we expected to believe that the latter are simply beyond the unarmed Jewish civilian population, the massacre of Yes- reproach, while Israel can simply do no right? hiva students at Hebron, and the open support that the Arabs enjoyed from the British forces in occupation. Neither is there Anti-Semitism any reference to the desperation of survivors of the Holocaust, generally unwelcome in most countries as they languished in Having said this, Farouk-Alli’s assertion that the motive for the filthy refugee camps in Cyprus or drowned as the rusty and birth of the Zionist movement was nothing more than a desire unseaworthy boats they had hired to take them to Palestine to create an exclusive Jewish state for no reason beyond that sank after being turned away by the British blockade. ignores 2000 years of documented history. I often wonder what Worst of all were those sent back to Germany by the Brit- the attitude would be if the positions were reversed and a minor- ish where they had nothing left to return to, sometimes to be ity Arab people, hounded incessantly by a hostile world, had murdered for simply having had the audacity to survive the nowhere to find sanctuary and safety. One only has to listen gas chambers. Can Farouk-Alli possibly get his mind around to the protestations of Muslims who suddenly find themselves the magnitude of this catastrophe? It appears not. The callous- under a hostile spotlight following 9/11 (and numerous other ness of the British in this situation in the interests of Arab oil terrorist actions by radical elements of their faith), and who is well known and, under the circumstances, beyond compre- now feel the unpleasant effects of discrimination – and gas hension. chambers are not even part of the equation. Indeed, the refugee problem created by successive wars The truth is that Theodore Hertzl’s inspiration to find a is tragic and enormous. However, contrary to Farouk-Alli’s homeland for persecuted Jews stemmed directly from the contention, it is not Israel’s responsibility alone. Neither is the injustice and resultant anti-Semitism of the Dreyfus case and solution, which, if one were to accept the latter’s reasoning,

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 2 8 would result in the eradication of the very resonne de’ etre for have been made by all parties. Israel does not claim perfection. the establishment of the state in the first instance: the creation However, what other country has been at a continual state of of a safe haven for Jews who are still under threat no matter war ever since its birth? How does that effect the psyche of a where they live. One only has to consider the extreme levels people? How are you left seeing the world knowing that you of anti-Semitism that currently exist in Europe, the UK, Canada are forever surrounded by millions who have been indoctrinated and the US to appreciate that were this threat not a reality there to hate you and work towards your destruction from their very would not be a pressing need for an exclusive Jewish state in childhood? How do you understand and cope with the hostility the first place. you face daily for simply daring to exist – and the demands Every Arab knows that the refugee problem could have been that are made of you which never apply to others? eradicated had the Arabs accepted partition in 1948 (as did the If any lesson can be learnt from the SA experience it is not Israelis); had President Abdel Nasser not closed the Straits of the simplistic application of the sharing of common land. It Tiran, thus precipitating the Six Day War; had President Anwar is the benefits that arise from the sensible accommodation of Sadat not attacked Israel in 1973 (resulting in a hard-won Israeli people with diverse cultures, outlooks, beliefs and backgrounds victory, contrary to Farouk-Alli’s misleading claim that Egypt who recognise and enjoy the benefits of moving beyond ideo- emerged victorious); and had the Palestinians been encouraged logical hatred to rather capitalise on the sharing of expertise, to stop their incessant attacks on Israel and enjoy the benefits experience and co-operation for the common good. of peace and co-operation instead. I ask Farouk-Alli to give this some thought and to try and One has to ask oneself why there was no attempt by Egypt incorporate it into his analysis of a situation made tragic and and Jordan to establish a state for the unfortunate Palestinians insoluble by the lack of flexibility of all parties, but aimed while these two powers had full control over Gaza and the disproportionately at Israel alone. n West Bank from 1948 till 1967. Israel’s invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and again in 1982 are Victor Gordon chairs the Pretoria Branch of the SA Jewish Board all linked to this long chain of events. Along the way mistakes of Deputies and is a member of Media Team Israel.

Propaganda masquerading as scholarship

Aslam Farouk-Alli

espite his grave academic invocation of the ‘history behind thereby attempting to blind them to the consequences of a Dthe history’, Victor Gordon’s response to my article is war in which more than 1 200 Lebanese civilians lost their nothing more than propaganda masquerading as informed lives and almost one million people were displaced from scholarship. Gordon would like his readers to believe that my their homes. article is ‘predictably’ flawed because I write from an ‘Arab 2. He invokes anti-Semitism as a justification for the establish- perspective’, and am consequently guilty of ignoring ‘the Israeli ment of a Jewish state, thereby attempting to legitimise the viewpoint’. expropriation of Palestinian land and the expulsion of its Such logic can only be the product of a mind afflicted indigenous Arab population. by a severe bout of binary thinking: it clearly implies that if 3. He also sweeps under the carpet more than 60 years of one is not in the Israeli camp then one must be in the Arab Israeli atrocities by blaming the victims: he would have us camp. Nothing could be further from believe that the Palestinian refugee the truth; by grounding my article problem is not a creation of Israel and in historical reality, I had sought to ‘Only in Israel can nationalist mythology therefore ‘not Israel’s responsibility steer away from the kind of ideologi- be so convincingly passed off as history’ alone’. cal partisanship so clearly evident in 4. Gordon attempts to pass religious Gordon’s response. In light of Gor- myth as incontrovertible fact by laying don’s diatribe, one would be well justified in adding that only biblical claims to the land, thereby effectively ignoring the in Israel can nationalist mythology be so convincingly passed historical truth that the Arab presence in Palestine stretches off as history. back by almost 1 200 years. A careful reading of Gordon’s response reveals all the ele- His indiscretions are far more comprehensive than suggested ments of Zionist propaganda. A few examples should suffice by the few examples above, but the constraints placed upon the to make my point: length of this response do not allow a detailed analysis. 1. Gordon’s highly emotive introduction elevates Jewish suffer- Fortunately, such disparities in the Zionist narrative are being ing over human suffering by drawing his readers’ attention pointed out by scholars not only writing from an ‘Arab’ point to the plight of three Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah, of view. There is a growing body of Israeli and Jewish scholars

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 2 9 M i d d l e e a S T

writing from a revisionist perspective with the specific aim of gated the Israeli government’s failures during the month-long debunking the established, authoritative master narrative that attack. It suggests that Olmert had begun to plan the invasion is fundamentally flawed in so many ways. Social scientists and of Lebanon four months before the soldiers were abducted. historians such as Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappe, Tom Segev, Benny Unfortunately, Gordon’s response is bereft of the nuance Morris, Simha Flapan and Gershon Shafir have all written schol- prevalent in debates concerning the Israeli–Palestinian con- arly works grounded in archival research which refute much of flict so prominent within Israel itself: one only needs to page the slanted propaganda that Gordon tries to pass off as history. through an Israeli daily newspaper such as Ha’aretz to get a (In this regard the following are relevant: Avi Schlaim, Collusion sense of this. Gordon seems content to pass fundamentalist across the Jordan and The Iron Wall; Ilan Pappe, The Making judgements from the SA periphery while remaining totally of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, A History of Modern Palestine and oblivious to what is being said at the centre. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine; Tom Segev, 1949: The First In light of Gordon’s passionate espousal of the official Israeli Israelis and One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the narrative, I find it perplexing that a ‘committed’ Zionist such as Palestine Mandate; Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian himself would seemingly lack the courage of his convictions Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 and Righteous Victims: A History by sticking it out here in SA. One would have expected him of the Zionist-Arab Conflict; Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: to have made aaliya (immigrated to Israel) a long time ago. Myths and Realities; and Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor and the His failure is lamentable on two accounts: firstly, it puts into Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914.) question his commitment to the liberation struggle in our own It is perhaps prudent at this point to also mention a recent country by his lame attempts to defend Israel’s apartheid poli- article by Jonathan Cook – a writer and journalist based in cies; and, secondly, it denies him the opportunity to develop Nazareth – that challenges Gordon’s assertion that the Lebanon a fresher perspective by being exposed to the rich debate cur- war was triggered by Hezbollah’s abduction of three Israeli rently being waged in Israel itself. n soldiers. Cook’s article (http://electronicintifada.net) outlines leaked testimony from the Wingrod Committee which investi- Aslam Farouk-Ali is an independent political analyst.

A woman is carried from the rubble of the Bent Jbail, a small town in southern Lebanon that was virtually destroyed in fighting between Israeli and Hezbollah fighters, 31 July 2006. Reuters/Shannon Stapleton

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 3 0 O FF I C i a l V i e W

A season of hope

Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka

A HAS entered an age of hope – not How could we use it to bring the one Svain hope, but hope based on firm third of the population who were mar- foundations. For the past three years our ginalised from economic benefits into economy has grown at about 5% a year. the mainstream, to both reduce severe Over the past five years, income per per- inequalities and feed future economic son has risen from less than US$3 000 growth? a year to more than $5 000 a year. Over The key constraints, we found, were the same period we have cut taxes sev- the relative volatility of the currency; eral times, reduced the budget deficit to the cost, efficiency, and capacity of the virtually zero, reduced government debt national logistics system; shortages of to one of the lowest levels in the world, suitably skilled labour; barriers to entry, reduced inflation to 3–6%, and reduced limits to competition, and limited new poverty through a system of social grants investment opportunities; a overly restric- that now reaches more than 11 million tive regulatory environment, excessively beneficiaries. For three years in succes- burdening small and medium businesses; sion we have created more than 500 000 and deficiencies in state organisation, jobs a year. capacity, and leadership. We have come a long way since 1993, For each of these constraints we com- the year before our first democratic elec- piled a set of actions in relevant catego- tions. In that year, the budget deficit was ries: macroeconomic issues; infrastructure nearly 10% of GDP, government debt programmes; sector investment strategies was approaching unsustainable levels, advancing sustained as well as shared (or industrial strategies); skills and educa- and economic growth was at a standstill. economic growth. In doing so, it reso- tion initiatives, second-economy interven- Real incomes per person had declined by nates with our objective to institutionalise tions (including small business support); 15% over the previous decade. The last a strong and socially responsive demo- and public administration issues. decade of apartheid was characterised cratic developmental state in SA. by economic stagnation and misman- We borrowed the concept of ‘binding First annual reports agement. constraints’ on the economy from promi- nent development economists based at Recently, we were pleased to present the New challenge Harvard University to organise our ideas first annual reports on AsgiSA and the and strategy. This approach targets the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisi- The first economic challenges after 1994 most binding constraints and bottlenecks tion (JIPSA) to the SA public. Both reports were those of stabilising the economy in order to stimulate economic growth. indicate that we are on track towards and building a foundation for growth Overall, we found that our commodity achieving our key targets. However, in and development. This we did success- sector was reasonably strong and that some areas –particularly industrial, sec- fully, sometimes at great cost. However, our non-tradable sectors – retail, services, tor, and second-economy strategies, and great social and economic challenges construction, and so on – were steaming efforts to improve state capacity – much remained. As employment began to rise ahead, as reflected in increased employ- is still needed before AsgiSA can claim in 2003, and evidence suggested that ment and disposable incomes. However, success. Let me briefly highlight some of poverty rates were beginning to decline, our manufactures and tradable services the key achievements of the past year. the focus shifted. The new challenge is to were relatively weak. Without a stronger Macroeconomic management contin- sustain higher rates of economic growth, non-commodity tradable sector our suc- ues to be exemplary. The budget deficit ensure that this growth is shared, and ay cess would remain fragile, and subject to was reduced to 0,3% in 2005–6, with a the groundwork for a further increase the vagaries of international commodity small surplus likely for 2006–7. A budget in growth at the end of this decade, if prices. surplus of 0,6% is planned for 2007–8. not earlier. The key question became: how could This helps to contain consumption To this end, the government has we use this period of strong demand for expenditure and the balance of payments adopted the Accelerated and Shared our natural resources (gold, platinum, deficit, as well as eliminate government Growth Initiative of SA, or AsgiSA. This coal, iron and steel, and so on) to build programme has the dual purpose of foundations for more sustainable growth? Continued on page 38

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 3 1 T H E E NV i r o NM E N T

The problem with biofuels

Despite popular impressions, biofuels are not a cure-all for the world’s energy problems, writes Annie Sugrue, and SA should consult widely before formulating a sound, environmentally friendly and pro-poor bioenergy programme

OSSIL fuels are non-renewable ers of plants do absorb about the same salination in soils, and industrial farming Fenergy sources that will eventually amount of carbon when they grow as chemicals to leach into soils and run into run out. Some argue that oil production they release when they are burnt, such rivers. A major biofuel programme will has already peaked, meaning that we will simplified assessments omit to include result in agricultural intensification that not be able to sustain current production the energy used by modern industrial will exacerbate the environmental issues levels. Given current market forces, fossil farming to produce the energy crop in related to this sector. fuel prices will probably rise further; we the first place. There is significant embod- have already seen oil prices rise consider- ied energy in mechanised farming equip- Environmental impacts ably in recent times. Furthermore, scien- ment, in transporting farming inputs and tists report that global climate change is outputs, and in direct farming inputs such It should be kept in mind that plants are taking place as a direct result of the burn- as fertilisers and pesticides. poor transducers of sun energy, and thus ing of fossil fuels. In order to stop global Detractors of biofuels use the energy to harvest a lot of sun energy in the form climate change, humans will have to find balance argument to highlight the fact of biofuels requires energy crops to grow alternatives to the burning of fossil fuels. that most biofuels are not carbon-neu- intensively. The biggest criticism of US These issues have major implications for tral, and that many energy crops barely President George W Bush’s latest ten-year global energy security. produce more energy than they use. The plan is that to increase biofuel produc- energy balance of a crop consists of all tion will require more corn than the total Biofuel myths the fossil and other energy (except sun amount currently grown in the US. energy) used to produce it, and drive Biofuels are seen as one of the most the manufacturing process. The energy promising alternatives to fossil fuels. equivalent potential of the crop itself is What could be more natural and environ- then calculated, and the ratio between mentally sustainable than growing crops the two is the energy balance. A ratio and using the byproducts to fuel our of 1:1 means that you are getting no net cars? They are renewable so long as the energy benefit from the process. A ratio sun shines, and there is sufficient water. of 1:3 or 4 is considered a good energy Supporters of biofuels point out that we balance. Energy balances vary widely need to seek alternatives to fossil fuels, from one crop to another. Crops such as not only because they are non-renew- maize, for instance, have energy balances able and will therefore run out, but also of between 1:1.1 and 1:1.7, which means because burning fossil fuels is causing that they only produce about 10–70% climate change. Biofuels are thus seen more energy than it takes to produce as the answer or panacea to the indus- them. However, sugar cane has as a good trial world’s transport problems with its energy balance at 1:8. rising costs and increasing pressure to The second myth is that biofuels are reduce emissions. But there are many good for the environment. Firstly, let us issues surrounding the sustainability of acknowledge that all industrially based biofuels that need to be addressed and commercial farming is environmentally investigated. These include environmen- unfriendly, and that if we criticise mod- tal risks, food security, impacts on the ern industrial biofuels production we socioeconomics of rural communities, should also criticise all industrial food and, of course, conservation. production. Agriculture uses 51% of all There are several myths about biofu- SA’s water resources, and conservative els. The first is that they produce no – or estimates from a recent study show that far less – carbon emissions than fossil it consumes about 12% of the country’s fuels; in other words, that they are ‘car- energy as well. On top of that, irrigation bon-neutral’. While the stalks and flow- coupled with the use of chemicals causes Maize under irrigation on SA’s eastern highveld ... maize crops produce little more energy than it takes to produce them.

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 3 2 The potential environmental impacts Indonesia recently called on rich ensure that whatever is imported into the of biofuel production are already visible nations to pay developing nations to pre- EU is grown sustainably. Many say that in Indonesia and Malaysia, where palms serve their rain forests, a justified call in this is unworkable and almost impossible are grown for oil. There is no doubt that the face of economic hardship that drives to implement; others suggest that this is in these countries the growing of palm poor nations into unsustainable biofuel a new kind of trade barrier, or that it will oil is creating a major environmental practices that contribute to global climate infringe trade law. problem, as large tracts of rain forest change. Although SA might be spared the The potential impact of biofuels on are being cleared to make way for cultiva- palm oil debacle because there is limited food security adds another dimension to tion. Already 2m ha of land in Indonesia growth potential here for this crop, we this complex debate. The Bush admin- and 1,2m ha of land in Malaysia have could extend the analysis to the use of istration has announced its intention to been cleared for palm oil production. In our conservation areas for cultivation, increase biofuel production to 35bn gal- 2006 Friends of the Earth reported that resulting in a loss of biodiversity as well lons a year by 2017. This is in the face of between 1985 and 2000 the development as the loss of at least some of our remain- serious reactions to increased corn prices of oil palm plantations was responsible ing pristine grasslands and indigenous that are badly affecting the poor in Mex- for an estimated 87% of deforestation in forests. ico; 75 000 people marched in Mexico Malaysia. As the plantations extend into City in January this year to object to the the swamp areas, the land is being dried Certification rising price of corn. Mexico imports most out for cultivation, releasing carbon as it of its corn for its staple food – tortillos oxidises. Consider also that large tracts of The EU recently announced its intention – from the US, and prices have increased the rain forest are burnt down, releasing to increase the biofuel target in liquid by 400% in recent months, largely blamed years of accumulated stored carbon from fuels for transport from 5,7% by 2010 to on the biofuels-driven demand for corn. massive trees that are being replaced 10% by 2020. This has outraged environ- US farmers themselves have complained with less vegetation. This shows up the mental groups in the EU, as it is the same of the difficulty of getting corn for feed- irony of biofuels being promoted as good palm oil from Indonesia and Malaysia stock, and prices of meat have also esca- for climate change on the grounds that that has provided much of the feed stock lated. This shows that biofuels can impact they generate less carbon, while during for Europe to date. The EU has countered significantly on food security, and we production they release far more than if this argument by starting a process to fossil fuels were burnt. look at the certification of biofuels to Continued on page 36

Maize under irrigation on SA’s eastern highveld ... maize crops produce little more energy than it takes to produce them.

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 3 3 b o o K r e V i e W

Gripping account of AIDS in Africa

Siphamandla Zondi reviews a comprehensive new history of HIV and AIDS in Africa that helps to balance out west-centric accounts

HISTORY of HIV and AIDS – espe- impact are discussed in chapter 5. Good A cially in Africa, where the epidemic transport systems, high levels of urban has hit the hardest – could help to stimu- – rural migration, and the wide wealth late innovative thinking about its con- gap emerge as causal factors in each tainment. This volume, by a historian southern African country discussed. at Cambridge University specialising in In contrast with equatorial, eastern Africa, is a welcome contribution in this and southern Africa, the spread of HIV regard. It is a difficult history to write, and the emergence of AIDS in West Africa given the sensitivities and stigma sur- were gradual and more limited. Iliffe rounding the pandemic, the fact that it ascribes this to low mobility, widespread is an unfolding phenomenon, and the circumcision, strict Islamic moral codes, problem of finding adequate sources. Yet and the low prevalence of HSV-2 associ- The African AIDS Epidemic blends an ated with AIDS virulence. intelligent use of primary and secondary literature and insights into the general Environmental factors history of epidemics to provide the most comprehensive history of HIV and AIDS The African AIDS Epidemic: A History In chapter 7 the author enters a tricky thus far. It covers the entire continent and John Iliffe terrain: an attempt to explain why the the entire known chronology of HIV, and (Double Storey, Cape Town, 2006) African AIDS epidemic is particularly extensively reflects views from below. catastrophic and stubborn. Knowing that In the first chapter, the author under- this is a risky subject, and understanding takes the difficult task of piecing together forested environments. The observations the limitations of existing records, Iliffe various perspectives, some controver- of a Congolese physician lead the author offers a complex but lucid explanation sial, on the origins of AIDS, to conclude to ascribe the transition from low-level in the form of an interplay between the that AIDS is indeed an African epidemic. infection to virulent epidemic to the rapid character of the virus and Africa’s dis- Readers will find his ability to simplify expansion of Kinshasa in the 1970s. The ease environment, political economy, and otherwise inaccessible medical data and virus was then carried to East Africa. demography. Many will find the explana- science without sacrificing credibility In chapter 4, the author demonstrates tion inadequate, and some may even find particularly useful. He turns the scientific how the natural and social environments it evasive, but it is a useful basis to build analysis of the evolution of the HI virus in parts of East Africa accelerated the upon as we search for explanations of and its transmission to humans into a spread of the epidemic in the Lake Vic- the African AIDS epidemic. compelling account, which shows, cru- toria basin and major cities in the region. No history of an epidemic or any other cially, that this transmission could not The impact of rapid urbanisation; chang- catastrophe can be complete without have been natural. From this point the ing lifestyles, including sexual adventur- analysing the responses to it. Indeed, in story unfolds to the end of the book. ism; gender disparities; and improved chapters 8 and 9, Iliffe analyses responses communications on the expansion of the from above and below. He reduces moun- From HIV to AIDS epidemic is demonstrated. This chapter tain of records on this subject to only contains a wealth of anecdotal material two chapters with great skill and clarity. The answer to the question of just how as well as accounts by East African medi- Interesting insights emerge on general the epidemic travelled from western equa- cal personnel, which help to balance out trends in state and multilateral responses torial Africa to the rest of the continent western literature. to the epidemic, chief of which is their begins in chapter 3. In this chapter, the Although HIV only spread to south- slow pace. But the author also success- author discusses the appearance of AIDS ern Africa at a later stage, its AIDS epi- fully airs the voices of ordinary Africans, in the 1970s after HIV had been recorded demic soon surpassed those of regions especially AIDS sufferers and their rela- in the region for 20 years. It explains why further north where it had been present tives, demonstrating the diversity and it took this long for the HIV to lead to for decades. The evolution of the epi- complexity of the responses of ordinary AIDS, citing among other reasons, poor demic in southern Africa, the reasons communications, sparse populations, and for its explosion, and its devastating Continued on page 40

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 3 4 b o o K r e V i e W

The UN at 60

Paul-Henri Bischoff reviews a new volume that records and advances the renewed debate around UN reform, particularly from the perspective of Africa and the rest of the developing world

OMPRISING 13 chapters arranged the adoption of ‘Chapter 9 bankruptcy Cin six parts, this edited work seeks proceedings’ as practised in the US is to do justice to the question of how best put forward as a democratic and humane the UN can be made more relevant and alternative (p 74). Similarly, when adopt- effective at a time when the memories of ing performance-based grants these its gestation and the reasoning behind its came to override social justice concerns composition and decision-making struc- to reproduce the top-down process for tures in 1946 are either dimming or no development coming from the North (pp longer make geopolitical or functional 78, 77). Instead, suggestions are made for sense. alternative, less state-centric structures Reform in and around the UN seems based on social equity and accountability. particularly pressing for Africa (which This in order to put the UN rather than currently takes up three quarters of the the US at the centre of the debate on time of the Security Council (p 9)) and development and, with inclusiveness in other elements of the developing world. mind, to transcend conventional multilat- This text in part seeks to address this eralism (p 78). In transcending state-cen- concern. The UN at 60: New Spin on an Old Hub tred multilateralism, global civil society Garth le Pere and Nhamo Samasuwo (eds) and the historical origins of its participa- ‘Impulse for reform’ (Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, tion in global UN norm- and policy-set- 2006) ting conferences allow one to posit that The book is informed by a ‘current irre- the parameters of action developed by sistible impulse for reform’ (p 14), caused the overriding issues of status and influ- contemporary civil society can serve as a by a number of shifts in international ence that ultimately determine outcomes means to overcome the ‘divorce between politics and the global economy, as well (p 58). economic growth and society’ (p 102). as various shortcomings in the jurisdic- Reform seems to start with present cir- tion of the UN. One is the emergence cumstances: for years, Africa insisted on Economic debate of ‘multiple centres of power’, includ- using its special status to justify prefer- ing Germany and Japan; nuclear powers ential market access and was as such not The UN, it is held, must regain ground outside the permanent membership of used to ‘cutting deals’ (p 84). It now can in shaping the economic debate. In the the Security Council; social movement gain under an ‘appropriately managed’ early 1990s the UN Economic Commis- actors; middle-level economic powers; WTO regime that allows Africans to be sion for Europe (ECE) with its gradualist and a new global security architecture drawn into the kinds of coalition politics approach for changing planned econo- that includes the AU (p 19). A second which could do much to ‘…accelerate mies was sidelined. But, in the wake of is the looming presence of economic nascent development processes…’(p 85). economic recessions and the huge social inequalities and the growth in human Overall, though, and against the back- costs incurred (p 124), the UN returned to insecurity which, it is argued, cannot be ground of structural adjustment and the the centre of international policy-making addressed by existing UN structures since funding gap for developing countries, the with its Human Development Reports decisions on key aspects of global and need for more incisive and deep-seated and the Millennium Development Goals economic governance are simply taken reform remains a pre-eminent concern. (MDGs) that show its usefulness in the ‘elsewhere’ out of the reach of African Even though the structural adjustment economic and social development field and developing states (p 21). policies of the 1980s were to some extent (p 125). In this context, two perspectives on correct, they ‘totally overshot in the end’, On the security front too the UN reform are presented (p 22), and an and became counterproductive (p 111). remains a truly global security institu- explanation given of why the most recent However, the funding gap for poorer tion which has shown that it can work reform proposals in 2005 did not succeed countries addressed by the IMF ‘effec- (p 146). Alongside the UN’s interstate (p 55). Importantly, we are told, Africa, tively gave up on a pre-emptive solution focus, peacekeeping as an institution to on the basis of its numbers, argued for to sovereign insolvency and financial deal with subnational challenges to secu- equality without necessarily considering crisis’ (p 74). Jubilee 2000’s argument for rity has become an important new role.

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 3 5 However, on collective security and its macy in particular a significant policy presence on the continent (p 273). enforcement at the interstate level, the gap remains. This is compounded by In conclusion, the book treats some advent of ‘subcontracting’ to ‘coalitions of the challenge of whether or not to give themes in far greater depth than oth- the willing’ outside formal UN structures precedence to the norm of non-interfer- ers. Four of the six thematic parts are poses questions about the relevance of ence (p 165). As such, there is no guar- much shorter than the remaining two. the Security Council (p 135). This body antee that the UN could as yet prevent Most weight is given to ‘Perspectives is caught in the nexus of (improbable) another Rwandan-type genocide (p 50). on the future of global peacekeeping reform (p 144). Overall, subsidiarity (the regionalisation and the African dimension’ (Part 5) and Notwithstanding the issue of a lack of security) is not necessarily the be-all ‘Towards a global consensus on develop- of political will (vide current events in and end-all – also for Africa – it has been ment’ (Part 4). Darfur, and the UN Secretariat being held held out to be (p 172). Similarly, the book could also have hostage by those members who matter been more vigorously edited; contribu- (p 143)), shared understandings in and Globalisation tions vary from a spirited and overtly around ‘the international responsibility subjective tour de force by a former prac- to protect’ on multilateral interventions Overall, the current ‘deficit’ in global titioner who talks of having lived through in subnational conflicts have begun to governance produced by the social fall- ten years of ‘futility’ at the UN (p 60), emerge (p 132). Here the recent creation out from globalisation needs to be fixed. through chapters comprising a few pages of the UN Peacebuilding Commission Here the UN as an important normative of cursory analysis, to those peppered provides a plan for innovatively creating actor should be given more space as a co- with bulleted policy recommendations, strategies for post-conflict peace-building ordinator in the economic sphere to lend as well as more academic and more thor- and recovery (p 142). the necessary weight to implementing oughly researched contributions. The Special Tribunals idea put in place the norms it has helped establish in non- However, the text is of interest to a for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda economic areas (p 247). The book ends wide audience of students and practition- also serves the goal of societal security with brief glimpses of the relationship ers of international and African political (p 164). As seen in the past experiences between the UN and the AU, as well as of economy, international relations, and of Africa – also to do with peacekeeping the history of and issues surrounding UN international organisation. n (pp 190-1) – the UN has both supported peacekeeping in Africa. While problems and detracted from African security (p are pointed out, there nonetheless seems Paul-Henri Bischoff is professor of 211). At the level of preventive diplo- to be a tangible need for a continued UN international studies at Rhodes University.

The problem with biofuels – continued from page 33 should not forget that maize is the staple petrol tank will increasingly place pres- of the Millennium Development Goals. diet of most South Africans. sure on global food prices, meaning the Energy requirements in these homes SA can perhaps learn from Ghana. The poorest will go hungry.’ are not just for cooking, space heating National Land Commission was asked Biofuel energy crops create more and water heating. These women also for permission for jatropha curcas to be jobs than any other form of energy pro- need productive energy sources so that grown on 1m ha of land. The commis- duction, even other renewable energy they can produce goods and services sioner denied the application, and asked technologies. From a rural development for the local community and outlying for further studies to assess the impacts perspective, this is good news. But the areas. Biofuels can penetrate poverty in of such plantations on food security, and kind of jobs that an industrial commercial this sector in ways that other renewable explore whether or not the crop could biofuel programme will create are more energy technologies cannot, as most of be grown on non-arable land instead. In of the low-paid farm labour type rather these homes have small plots of land other words, Ghana is adopting a more than what could be achieved if the pro- allocated to them on which they can careful approach, recognising that there grammes were designed differently. Such grow energy crops. Even if the land is are a multitude of issues that need to programmes need to focus on the impact degraded or non-arable, there are many be addressed and that this cannot be that biofuels could have on rural com- successful crops that can withstand such rushed. munities and homes. Most rural homes conditions, such as Jatropha Curcas, the Considering the push for increased are without modern energy services, are Moringa tree, and indigenous plums, and targets in the EU, EU countries will prob- predominately women-headed, and face algae can be grown anywhere. If rural ably be looking for more suppliers in the severe economic challenges that nowa- women grow oil-producing crops such near future, and Africa is looking very days are coupled with health challenges as these, they will be more self-sufficient attractive. A Green Party MP from the EU, such as HIV/AIDS. A biofuel programme in respect of energy, and may even have Friedrich Wilhelm Graefe Zu Baringdorf, aimed at this target group would focus a surplus to sell. recently stated: ‘Diverting scarce food attention on getting energy services to But this will not happen without gov- resources from the dinner table to the these homes and achieving the objectives ernment support. Sadly, the SA industrial

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 3 6 strategy being formulated at present does negative impacts on the environment, need to ask questions about who gets not address this sector. Specific policies and results in a greatly reduced usage the opportunity that biofuels bring, for and regulatory mechanisms and strategies of agricultural-related energy. Choice of what ultimate objective, and how this is need to be designed for this sector if they energy crop can also have a big impact balanced against risks and environmental are to be at all useful to the rural poor, on sustainability, with perennial crops damage. and not simply tagged on to the exist- being more favourable than annual SA could benefit greatly from greater ing strategy. A pro-poor strategy will go crops, such as maize. New energy crops and more meaningful consultation with a long way towards meeting the AsgiSA whose impacts are quite small – such the many groups involved in biofuels, biofuel objective of bridging the gap as algae – are being developed, and the from conservation and energy organisa- between the first and the second econo- second generation of biofuels also bring tions to those involved with poverty and mies. But this is not an easy task, and improved energy balances and efficiency. rural development, to name a few. They will take years of dedicated and applied But many of these technologies still need can all contribute to the development of research and commitment. to be developed further. a sound, environmentally friendly and Growing biofuels in a sustainable way There is considerable merit in going pro-poor bioenergy programme for SA. is another consideration. Researchers the biofuels route, but it also raises This is not an impossible aim, but it will at the Agriculture Research Centre in important questions. Some of them have take commitment and effort on the part Pietermaritzburg have been developing been addressed here, but there are many of all role players. n methods for sustainable farming practice more, and each group and sector has called conservation agriculture. Describ- its own view. How you grow the energy Annie Sugrue is the Southern African ing these technologies in any detail is crops, where you grow them, and what co-ordinator for Citizens United for beyond the scope of this article, but crops you grow have a big impact on the Renewable Energy and Sustainability conservation agriculture has far fewer sustainability of the end product. We also (www.cures-network.org).

Cuba at the crossroads – continued from page 26 misinterpreted the ‘opening up’ of Cuba and especially among Cuban exiles, this unlikely given the cyclical nature of oil versus maintaining the current status will probably not be either immediate or diplomacy and the multitude of other quo as a zero-sum game. This is simply dramatic. There will be some continuity role players in the game. not the case, and once again it is the under Raul as well as other core lead- Most importantly, reform will only be experience of China that reassures us ers. But, due to internal and external introduced by a secure regime that is otherwise. pressures, this will probably give way confident of its political control. Such Fidel Castro’s state of health has to some gradual changes, and with the control will not emanate from the sym- brought Cuba to a timely and historic involvement of the international commu- bolism associated with Fidel Castro. crossroads. The revolution desperately nity Cuba will become increasingly inte- Rather, it will emanate from exercising needs a refreshing change, or even grated into the global economy. This will true attributes of leadership in a way drastic reform. Following Fidel’s abrupt ultimately bring about political reform. appropriate to a new era. n withdrawal from power (and his unlikely Obviously, the influence of Chavez return), Cuba has entered a period and Cuba’s dependency on Venezuelan Lyal White lectures in international political defined by a new leadership that will oil suggests an alternative outcome – a economy at the University of Cape Town, bring with it some political and economic more radical line in Cuba, or the rise of SA. He is currently a visiting scholar at the alternatives. a Chavez-supported radical leadership Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at Contrary to popular belief in the US, outside of Raul’s inner core. But this is the University of California, Berkeley.

From the outside looking in – continued from page 18

The forum may have to focus more deciding which elections to observe and its ability to assist and support member on pre- and post-election activities and where to intervene. parliaments. This applies to training and interventions and downplay the current The forum is an important institu- capacity-building as well as to specific emphasis on election observation. This tion, and is well placed to advance the issues such as improving national frame- also implies that it should consider giving role of parliaments in southern Africa. It works for elections. more emphasis to providing assistance enjoys strong legitimacy as an institution The second concerns its ability to to national parliaments in addressing bringing together national parliaments advance SADC’s regional co-operation these issues. In addition, the forum may and MPs representing both ruling and and integration programme. It must have to reduce the number of election opposition parties. It faces two main chal- establish good working relations with observations and be more selective in lenges. The first is the need to strengthen SADC. This will not only strengthen the

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 3 7 implementation of SADC’s programme corresponding to the role of the Pan Afri- Politics, Defence and Security Co-opera- of action, but may also increase popular can Parliament in relation to the AU, or tion, although relations have recently participation and democratic control of the East African Parliament in relation improved. n the integration agenda. Currently, there to the East African Community. How- are no formal relations or links between ever, in 2004 the SADC summit rejected Elling N Tjønneland is a senior researcher the forum and official SADC structures. such a proposal. Furthermore, the forum of the Chr Michelsen Institute in Norway. The forum’s long-term ambition is to has not managed to develop close rela- become a SADC parliamentary assembly, tions with SADC or the SADC Organ on

AFRICOM bodes ill for Africa – continued from page 

or security personnel affects the way in lar ways that exacerbate these differences. should oppose the expansion of US mili- which civilians interact with their own As a result, a political culture emerges tary power on the continent. The Ameri- and foreign governments. Therefore, the where a country resorts to conflict reso- cans have responded to African critiques only option open to communities near lution through military means, where of AFRICOM by arguing that its main such centres are to interact with the latter masculinity in the military is favoured, feature will not be the establishment of a on their own terms. and where women become vulnerable military base or military power, but rather Therefore, the only option open to as a result of the increased presence of improved intelligence about and access communities near military bases are the military and militaristic ideals and to the continent. Debates have emerged to interact with the latter on their own practices in their country. about AFRICOM’s interests, manoeuvres terms. Military bases in Asia and South Military bases also bring unsustainable and probable outcomes, but we should America have produced a culture and economic development to the areas in also examine its potential social, eco- economy focused on serving and serv- which they are established. In countries nomic and political destabilisation of an icing that base. Local women and men where unemployment is rife and where already vulnerable continent. become militarised as they seek to find most of the unemployed are women, sex The AU and the its Peace and Security ways and means of making a living from work becomes a necessity when women Council were established to entrench the presence of the military base. Closer and men need to feed their families. This democracy, promote economic devel- to home, SA was hyper-militarised during results in local women and men becom- opment, and monitor and secure peace, the apartheid period, and is still trying to ing more vulnerable and dependent on a but have not been allowed to develop shake off its legacy of violent and aggres- patriarchal system for their daily subsist- to a point where it could deal with the sive political and social relations. ence. A service-oriented economy does continent’s problems. Africa does not Militarisation also tends to entrench not necessarily deliver development and need more American involvement aimed unequal relations between women and economic growth, as these are usually at ‘promoting’ peace and development. men. The military and its business are independently owned small businesses AFRICOM would further destabilise an hypermasculine, hetero-normative, and that have been established to feed a small already fragile continent, which would be feature power-wielding institutions that community or a family. Women and chil- forced to engage with American interests support the military apparatus. Patri- dren are the most vulnerable and should formulated in military terms. n archal cultural practices disadvantage therefore be protected, but this becomes women in all spheres of their lives, and more difficult in a military-based or mili- Dr Michele Ruiters is a senior IGD women’s and men’s lives are structured to tary-oriented economy. researcher. support the military institution in particu- In the light of the above, Africans

A Season of Hope – continued from page 31

dissaving, all of which enhance monetary growth in the money supply. Medium Term Expenditure Framework policy stability. AsgiSA recognises that infrastructure budget represents an average annual In addition, we have made progress investment is a key vector for sustain- growth rate of 14%. Improving govern- in reducing the volatility of the rand. ing higher rates of economic growth. In ment capacity, particularly at the provin- Foreign reserves have been accumulated 2006 fixed investment continued to climb cial and municipal level, to implement to reduce exchange rate risks. US dollar- towards the target of 25% of GDP, reach- infrastructure investment programmes denominated gross reserves held by the ing over 19% in the third quarter of 2006, was prioritised in 2006, and continues SA Reserve Bank increased from below – the highest level since 1991. Between in 2007. US$8bn in early 2004 to US$25,6bn at 2003–4 and 2006–7, overall public sec- JIPSA was launched on 27 March 2006 the end of 2006, supported by National tor infrastructure expenditure increased with the objective to create short-term Treasury funding to prevent excessive by 15,8% a year. The planned R415,8bn but sustainable interventions to address

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 3 8 the skills shortages in our economy. We ment, and competition for foreign invest- programme, and support for micro enter- have made significant progress in defin- ment on the basis of initial incentives. prises and entry into formal employment ing the challenges, aligning stakeholders, The Department of Trade and Industry is – the fact remains that they are insuf- and identifying appropriate resources to working with the National Treasury and ficient, and critical challenges remain. respond to these skills shortages. In its the departments of Labour and Commu- Public employment programmes and first year, JIPSA focused on town and nications to address these issues. support for micro enterprises have gen- regional planners, engineers, technolo- As we prepare to host the 2010 Soc- erated various employment opportunities. gists, artisans, ICT skills, and placing cer World Cup and show our beautiful According to the Labour Force Survey unemployed graduates. Initial consulta- country to the world, we recognise the for March 2005 and 2006, about 300 tions about planning and management need for an integrated tourism strategy. 000 people had participated in public skills for the public health system started This strategy accordingly includes an employment programmes. However, the at the end of 2006. The remaining focus airlift programme; improving safety and programmes most likely to address rural areas will be address in 2007. In addi- security for tourists; building a skills part- poverty are still in the initial planning tion, government is providing ongoing nership; support for SMMEs (to date, over phase, and have not reported any targets. support to improve the quality of schools 250 enterprises have been assisted); a In addition, we will have to work much and teaching, and substantially increase sectoral BEE Charter; and customised harder to ensure that programmes reach the number of learners, particularly from incentives. marginalised youths, who comprise the previously disadvantaged groups, passing Cabinet has also approved a draft bio- majority of the unemployed. mathematics and science in the higher fuels industry strategy. It predicts that Finally, AsgiSA targets governance grade. biofuels – based predominantly on maize, and state capacity issues. To strengthen On industrial and sector strategies, with some sugar and other inputs – will the government´s economic function, progress has been made in respect of contribute 4.5% of petroleum require- the Department of Public Service and Business Process Outsourcing (BPO), ments by 2013 and create 55 000 jobs, Administration investigated its ´s capacity tourism, biofuels, and the National Indus- mostly in small-scale maize production. to implement AsgiSA. We are implement- trial Policy Framework (NIPF). Over the The NIPF will be launched in early ing its recommendations, particularly past year, we made substantial progress 2007. It seeks to ensure more effective in respect of public transport strategy, in defining the main constraints in all and co-ordinated sectoral interventions. microfinance initiatives, and the issuing three top priority sectors, and address- It identifies – as core aims of economic of minerals and petroleum licences. We ing them effectively. All sectors now policy – the diversification of the econ- also recognise that services in all three have clearly defined policy frameworks, omy beyond traditional dependence on spheres of government need to continue approved by the responsible departments commodity exports, moving towards a to improve. and Cabinet. However, more needs to be more knowledge-based economy, and Overall, there is no doubt that AsgiSA done if they are to contribute as expected the promotion of more labour-absorbing has had a considerable impact. The pros- to shared growth. and inclusive growth. pects of achieving all the objectives look A five-year strategy for BPO, approved Although we have made substantial brighter every day, and AsgiSA will con- by Cabinet in December 2006, identified progress in identifying and initiating tinue to illuminate the way forward. n the main constraints as telecommunica- programmes for the second economy tions costs, the need for skills develop- – including an expanded public works

Somalia needs genuine reconciliation process – continued from page 39 media reports also quoted unnamed US new norm in peacekeeping or conflict gateway for Middle Eastern oil. Somalia government officials as saying that the prevention, the UN is in danger of being has huge untapped oil resources, and US training programme and other support marginalised. control over the Horn would also fall in for Ethiopia’s government had gained Although the US has stated that its line with its overall strategy to establish a momentum following the failure of a CIA involvement in Somalia is part of its military presence in areas rich in natural effort to arm and finance Somali warlords wider ‘war on terror’, its real motives resources. in early 2006. may be broader geostrategic ones. It Somalia clearly requires major politi- These initiatives seem to form part of may be preparing the Horn of Africa cal, economic and social rehabilitation. the new thinking in Washington in which and Somalia in particular as a launch One of the most effective ways of healing specially trained or ‘hybrid’ forces are pad for an invasion of Iran and Sudan. this country would be a process of recon- to be used wherever the UN is ‘unable’ A stable Somalia will form the regional ciliation among the Somalis themselves to act. In terms of this new approach, base for the new US Africa Command that would produce guidelines for the lead states provide troops while the US (AFRICOM – see article, page 4), and reconstruction of the Somali state, and provides money, equipment and training. could also be a base for operations to heighten the legitimacy of the TFG. This If such arrangements are to become the protect the Strait of Hormuz, the primary should involve the creation of a genuine

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 3 9 government of national unity, with wide ment because of the Ethiopian inva- Global Dialogue is published by the grass-roots support. This would have the sion and questions over the legitimacy Institute for Global Dialogue blessing of clan elders, who have thus of the TFG. Consequently, Ethiopians IGD House, Block 12 far been left out of most reconciliation remain on Somali soil, heightening ten- Thornhill Office Park processes. sions in Somalia. These issues need to be Bekker Street The question is whether the TFG is the addressed soon, or the violence is likely Vorna Valley, Midrand most appropriate vehicle for such a proc- to escalate. SA ess. Only an internal process will yield The TFG faces overwhelming chal- positive results; history shows amply that lenges, and only an international sup- p o Box 32571, Braamfontein 2017 attempted military solutions have always port effort has any chance of restoring worsened the situation in Somalia. If the peace to this troubled country. The TFG Executive director UN feels that the TFG should be used as urgently needs to announce a credible Dr Garth le Pere a vehicle for this, then US involvement programme of action and a timetable should be ruled out as this will not only for elections. Multilateral analysis bring back dark memories but also bol- As things stand, no one knows how it Director: Dr Nhamo Samasuwo ster the widespread view within Somalia intends to resolve the crisis. In the mean- Senior researchers: Dr Michele that the TFG are puppets of the US. Also, time, neighbouring states need to take Ruiters, Michelle Pressend, any use of Somali territory to attack tar- a back seat in order to allow the UN to Brendan Vickers gets in the Middle East will generate a assist. One possible solution would be to massively adverse reaction from many establish UN trusteeship over Somaliland, Africa research groups in this volatile region. as in the case of East Timor, that will pave Director: Dr Siphamandla Zondi The support of the local popula- the way for transparent elections involv- Senior researchers: Che Ajulu, tion and clan elders for the TFG is also ing all Somalis. n Dr Francis Ikome, Dr Timothy Othieno important for other reasons. For example, AU member states are reluctant to back Dr Timothy Othieno is senior researcher: Finance and administration AMISOM and embark on peace enforce- Africa at the IGD. Director: Pieter du Preez Manager: Namhla Tshetu

Personal assistant Book review: AIDS in Africa – continued from page 34 Cynthia Sinclair

Africans to this devastating phenomenon, to ensure a co-ordinated donor and state Administrative assistant which has made death all too familiar to response by establishing theme groups Nomfundo Tshabalala the African family. Iliffe also discusses at the national level and developing best the evolution of care for sufferers and practices at the global level, and cham- Tel (011) 315 1299 the role of NGOs. However, the extended pioning the ‘multisectoral developmental Fax (011) 315 1249 family and indigenous social networks approach’ in policy responses. But the e-mail: [email protected] have played a bigger role than is reflected actual impact of this development can be www.igd.org.za in this chapter. exaggerated, and confused with contain- Analysts commonly argue that the ment, as Iliffe seems to do. This thinking IsSn: 1560-8743 AIDS epidemic reached its climax in the allows Iliffe to end on a positive note, 1990s, relying on data that indicates a even though he admits that the worst All rights reserved. The material in this drop in new infections, general preva- may yet be to come. publication may not be reproduced, stored or transmitted without the prior permission of the lence, and deaths. In chapter 12, Iliffe This book is essential reading for copyright holder. Short extracts may be argues that the epidemic has in fact scholars of social and historical aspects quoted, provided the source is fully matured, perhaps as a consequence of of HIV/AIDS, and disease in general. acknowledged. multifaceted responses, greater popular Despite its harrowing subject it is rela- AP photographs provided by awareness and behavioural change – or tively easy to read, thus also making it PictureNET Africa simply the decimation of the most vulner- accessible to learners and concerned Reuters photographs provided by able segment of the population. This is lay readers in Africa who wish – as they The Bigger Picture a contested terrain, and opposing views should – to gain a better understanding of Produced by are given equal space. this phenomenon that is irrevocably and Acumen Publishing Solutions (011) 482 2823 Some would argue that the epidemic fundamentally reshaping their world. n has declined because of the role played by Printed by The Bureau, international institutions, led by UNAIDS. Dr Siphamandla Zondi is programme Johannesburg This perspective is considered in chapter director: Africa of the IGD. 13, and shows how UNAIDS has helped

Global dialo g u e A pril 2007 • 4 0