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Yale University Library Digital Repository Collection Name: Henry A. Kissinger papers, part II Series Title: Series III. Post-Government Career Box: 695 Folder: 23 Folder Title: Interview on Communiqué, National Public Radio (NPR), Apr 16, 1982 Persistent URL: http://yul-fi-prd1.library.yale.internal/catalog/digcoll:558671 Repository: Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library Contact Information Phone: (203) 432-1735 Email: [email protected] Mail: Manuscripts and Archives Sterling Memorial Library Sterling Memorial Library P.O. Box 208240 New Haven, CT 06520 Your use of Yale University Library Digital Repository indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use http://guides.library.yale.edu/about/policies/copyright Find additional works at: http://yul-fi-prd1.library.yale.internal NATIONAL PUBLICRADIO MAN 41982. AK. u 1982 April 21, 1982 Mrs Selden Sutton Publicity Department Little, Brown and Co. 747 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017 Dear Mrs. Sutton, We have just received the rush copy of the transcript of our COMMUNIQUE program on the latest volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs. As you can see, we covered a great deal of ground, and spoke with a number of top authorities on U.S. foreign policy and the Kissinger era. The program enjoys a wide and diverse audience on most of the 260 NPR stations around the country. We have already started to receive a fairly large mail response for the transcripts, which we distribute to interested listeners. Perhaps in a future discussion with Dr. Kissinger, you might mention to him that we had produced this overview of the book and its times. Maybe, he might find a few minutes in his busy schedule to talk with us for a program in the near future. By the way, segments of this COMMUNIQUE were also used on the NPR daily program MORNING EDITION, broadcast April 19. Please let me know if you would like to receive a cassette of the programs. Sincerely, cfra144 b//J f Rosenber Senior Producer International Affairs/ 2025 M Street NW Washington DC 20036 Telephone 202 822-2000 i RADIO TV REPORTS, INC. 4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE MARYLAND 20015 656-4068 KA NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO PROGRAM Communique STATION Vi U— FM NPR Network DATE April 16, 1982 10:05 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C. SUBJECT Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval ANNOUNCER: From National Public Radio, this is Com— munique. PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON: ...to fight through the months ahead for my personal vindication would almost totally absorb the time and attention of both the President and the Congress. There— fore, 1 shall resign the presidency effective at noon tomorrow. Vice President •Ford will be sworn in as President at that hour. HENRY KISSINGER: Needless to say, here was a man who all his life had geared himself to become President, organized his personality in that direction. And suddenly, within the space of three months after one of the greatest electoral triumphs in electoral history, when everything seemed to be going his way in foreign policy, it all came crumbling down in circumstances, largely due to actions his associates and maybe he had taken. Put still, it was a crushing experience. ANNOUNCER: Henry . Kissinger served as Richard Nixon's Secretary of State- and National Security Adviser during the turbu— lent second term, 1972 through 1 74, as the Watergate scandal grew in size and scope, forcing Mixon from office. How, Kissinger has published the second volume of his memoirs, titled "Years of Upheaval," detailing his version of the controversial issues and events surrounding the presidency and the making of U.S. foreign policy. On this edition, Communique examines his latest book. Our host is Peter Osnos, National Editor of the Wash— ington Post. CITIES OFRCES IN: WASHINGTON DC. • NEW YORK • LOS ANGELES • CHICAGO • DETROIT • AND OTHER PRINCIPAL ostronoratecl or INN:AWL Material Kopiiicl by Radio IV Peports. Inc. way b. mod br IUD ad reftwerce Purizen onIYAI troy nct be rocroduciKL sold Œploicty 0-0 2 PETER OSNOS: The second volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs, like the first, is a remarkable record of a remarkable public career. The latest book covers a period that began with Richard Nixon's gala second inaugural and ended with his resigna- tion in disgrace. Those two years, 1973 and 1 7d, witnessed one major event after another: war in the Middle East, the rise of OPEC, two Soviet-American summits, the bloody coup in Chile, just to name a few. In the midst 8f it all, Kissinger was elevated to the rank of Secretary of State, while continuing to serve as National Security Adviser, thereby amassina more personal authority in the field of foreign policy than any other figure in our age. Kissinger's goals and ambitions were massive. He sought to forge an era of detente with the Soviet Union and simultaneously open relations with Peking. He attempted to secure peace in Indo- china and failed. But he was able to bring about the first: tenta- tive steps toward peace in the Middle East. Over all of this hung the shadow of Watergate. Richard Nixon was crippled and then destroyed as President. Yet Kissinger escaled the fate of other Nixon aides. He earned accolades for diplomatic skill that shined all the more brightly next to the ignominy that befell others in the Administration. Yet Kissinger does not seem untainted. There is a strong undertone of doubt about the morality of policy in those years. Not just the wiretaps of aides and reporters, but a general abuse of executive powers. In much of the second volume, Kissinger is arguing against that stigma. Certainly among the most far-reaching of his initiatives was detente, an effort to transform the hostilities of the Cold War into a new superpower relationship. In October 1973, Kissinger explained the approach in a speech to a conference in Washington. KISSINGER: This Administration has never had any illu- sions'about the Soviet system. we have always insisted that pro- gress in technical fields, such as trade, had to follow and reflect progress toward more stable international relations. Ve have in- sisted that disarmament had to be mutual. We have judged movement in our relations with the Soviet Union not by atmospherics, but by how well concrete problems are resolved, and whether there Is res- ponsible international conduct. OSNOS: Kissinger's vision of detente never quite took hold. And one explanation was Nixon's diminished ability to take bold risks in dealing with Moscow, another Watergate side effect. One of Kissinger's closest aides was William Hyland, a Soviet specialist, now a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment 00 3 for International Peace. WILLIAM HYLAND: 1 think, yeah, Henry believes +hat Wateraate is one of the root causes of what happened to relations w ith the Russians. It's that Watergate was so pervasive and it weekend the Executive, Mixon in particular, so much that the rather complicated game plan that 'Kissinger wanted to carry out after /72 became Increasingly impossible, because it required -- I think he says in the book -- it required a strong President to force through some agreements that were controversial, also to keep control over the process, which way it was going. OSNOS: Is it your sense that the Kissinger approach, the carrot-and-stick notion, was that doable, in retrospect? Was that an achievable goal, given American attitudes towards dealing w ith the Soviets? HYLAND: I'm inclined to think it was. But I'm preju- diced, obviously, 'cause I was involved in it. The big unknown, I think, that was not foreseen, in addition to Watergate, was the Vietnam collapse. I think that was a telling psychological blow which almost ended active for- e ign policy. Prior to that, I don't know. I think it was still doable. But again you get back to this, that you had to have a President who could face down Jackson on the Jackson-Vanik Amend- ment. OSNOS: Which would have restricted trade and immigra- t ion. Kissinger implies in the book that it was already run- n ing down by the time of the 1974 summit. Do you remember it as being a period of disappointment, of frustration over detente? HYLAtor: Oh, I think so. I think all of us who were at the '74 summit left there very depressed. It was the first summit in which there was no major step forward, either in poli- tics, economics, or stra+egy. There were agreements. Sut every- one, I think, recognized that the agreements were almost pro forma, and that the big agreement that we had hoped for was -- e luded us, which was some breakthrough on SALT. And what was so frustrating about that meeting is that you could almost feel that agreement. it was within reach. And you could also feel the Russians pulling back and the American side not wanting to make that last kind of concession, for fear that we would walk out of the summit and then people would say, "Well, this is even worse. I mean here is Nixon making a deal with the Russians at the last minute." OSNOS: To save his rear end. 0-0 4 HYLAND: To save his presidency and so forth. OSNOS: It's very hard to, obviously, read the Soviets' mind. But do you think that they were prepared for the sort of relationship that Kissinger envisioned? HYLAND: I think Brezhnev was. Whether the whole Soviet apparat was is different. But I think the high point was '73. Some of his speeches, I thought, had a tone in that period that were different than the ordinary Pravda-like recitations.