DOCSLIB.ORG

Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Volume 1. History and Interpretation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Volume 1. History and Interpretation Book Reviews / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 6 (2012) 219-249 235 Plato’s Parmenides and Its Heritage. Volume 1. History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism. Volume 2. Its Reception in Neopla- tonic, Jewish and Christian Texts/Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neo- platonic Texts. Edited by John D. Turner and Kevin Corrigan, Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature 2010. The two volumes “Plato’s Parmenides and Its Heritage” collect the work of twenty- two scholars presented during the six meetings of the seminar ‘Rethinking Plato’s Parmenides and Its Platonic, Gnostic and Patristic Reception’ of the Society of Biblical Literature (2001-2006). As the title indicates, the topic of these two volumes is Plato’s Parmenides and its reception and interpretation up through late Antiquity, from the Old Academy until Dionysius the Areopagite. The topic is interesting, beyond doubt. How to understand and to interpret Plato’s Parmenides has always been a hotly disputed topic. While some readers considered it to be a logical exercise others defended the idea that it presents a metaphysical or theological doctrine (cf. the fijirst article by K. Corrigan which presents the wide range of interpretations). As it is impossible to summarise all the articles in detail in this review, I would like to refer to the table of contents (see below) and to the introduction by J. D. Turner and K. Corrigan which presents the topic of the volumes and of all the contributions in a detailed way. In the following I would like to give an overview of and to draw attention to some of the main topics in these two volumes. The articles included in the fijirst volume are concerned with the interpretation of the Parmenides from the Old Academy until the beginning of Neo platonism. This volume is intended to question the common interpretation based on Proclus that “there was no metaphysical interpretation of the Parmenides before Plotinus in the third century C.E.” (Introd., p. 1). The articles in the fijirst section (Plato, From the Old Academy to Middle Platonism) focus on Plato himself and the Middle Platonic Philosophers. The second section (Middle Platonic and Gnostic Texts) includes articles on Gnostic and Middle Platonic authors and gives particular attention to the Anonymous Commentary. The second volume is also divided into two sections. The fijirst section (Parmenides Interpretation from Plotinus to Damascius) is a continuation of the fijirst section of the fijirst volume. This section regroups articles on Plotinus and other Neoplatonists up through Damascius and Simplicius. The second section (The Hidden Influence of the Parmenides in Philo, Origen, and Later Patristic Thought) is concerned with impact that the Par- menides had on the writings of Philo of Alexandria and various Christian thinkers from Clemens of Alexandria and Origen to Dionysius the Areopagite. The articles in the fijirst section of the fijirst volume show that the reception of the Parmenides before Plotinus is not at all uniform. Some articles reflect on the © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI: 10.1163/18725473-12341244 236 Book Reviews / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 6 (2012) 219-249 interpretation of Speusippus, Plato’s nephew, others on those of Sextus Empiri- cus, Ammonius, Plutarch and Moderatus. In his article on Moderatus, Hubler criticises Dodds’ thesis that Moderatus “had anticipated the celebrated emana- tion system of Plotinus” (Hubler, Vol. I, p. 115) by showing that the passage in Simplicius on which Dodds’ thesis is based does not present Moderatus’ theory but a Neoplatonic revision of it. Although it is clear that the Parmenides was considered to be primarily, but not only, a logical exercise before Plotinus, it is also clear that the dialogue gains importance in Neoplatonism. The fijirst section of the second volume deals with Neoplatonists from Plotinus to Damascius and Simplicius who consider this dialogue to be ontological and who present diffferent interpretations of its meaning. One of the most important topics addressed in the two volumes is the Anony- mous Commentary on the Parmenides. The authorship of this commentary is dis- puted. It was attributed to Porphyry by Pierre Hadot, but this attribution was questioned by other authors who suggested that the author was pre-Plotinian. The various articles in these two volumes present diffferent interpretations of authorship. Four articles by Luc Brisson comment on diffferent columns of the commentary. According to him its author is post-Plotinian. Alain Lernould dis- cusses the question of negative theology and purifijication; he agrees with Brisson in thinking that the author must be post-Plotinian. Bechtle presents some remarks on the relation between the commentary and Aristotle’s Categories. In his view, this commentary is middle Platonic. After presenting the state of the debate on the authorship of the Anonymous Commentary, following Hadot’s thesis Tuomas Rasimus argues for a Sethian Gnostic authorship. Mark Edwards analyses the use of the expression “arrêtos kai akatonomastos” suggesting a Christian background for the author (“not so much that the author was a Christian as that he occupied an intellectual hinterland [. .] in which free trade between pagan and Christian was the norm”, Vol. 2, p. 197). The editors themselves are clearly in favour of the thesis that the author is middle Platonic, either a Gnostic or a Christian (cf. Introd., p. 12s; 18). At the very least, then, we have to reassess Hadot’s theory and the role of the Sethian Gnostics in the development of Neoplatonism, since the evidence shows that it was the Sethian Gnostics rather than Porphyry who were the innovators. Is such a thesis really defensible? Certainly, the preponderance of evidence supports it. Furthermore, if it is possible for Victorinus or Plotinus to read Gnostic texts and not become Gnostics, then it is even more plausi- ble for a Gnostic of considerable sophistication, and perhaps with intimate knowledge of a school such as that of Plotinus, to write a commentary for a .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • On Christian Asceticism Spiritual Exercises in Saint Augustine's
    Studies in Spirituality 25, 21-43. doi: 10.2143/SIS.25.0.3112887 © 2015 by Studies in Spirituality. All rights reserved. JOSEPH GRABAU ON CHRISTIAN ASCETICISM Spiritual Exercises in Saint Augustine’s Confessions* SUMMARY – The present article seeks to address an important point of contact between early Christian ascetic practice and the heritage of ­Platonism through the end of the fourth century AD. In short, I find marked similarities between Pierre Hadot’s reading of Plato’s Phaedo, for example, and that of St Augustine’s personal prayer book, the Confes- sions. After outlining essential characteristics of Hadot’s take on spiritual exercises and Augustinian anthropology, I subject the text of the Confes- sions to critical examination in order to determine whether an emphasis on ‘spiritual exercises’ is indeed present. I argue that similar spiritual practices may be clearly discerned. First, I discuss the distinct ‘Christian’ and Augustinian character of ‘spiritual exercises’ which incorporate bibli- cal typology of Adam and Christ as paradigmatic for the spiritual life. Next, in terms of concrete practices, I then discern from the first four books of the Confessions a series of exercises through which such a path of spiritual progress (i.e. from ‘Adam’ to ‘Christ’) may occur. Of note, I consider the dialectic praxis of 1) contemplative reading, 2) prayer- writing and 3) prayer itself, or ‘pure’ prayer – distinct from Augustine’s written reflections; 4) the role of lectio divina or meditation on Scrip- ture; and, finally, 5) meditation on death. In addition to developing these individual practices, it is the traditional Augustinian anthropology (rooted as it is in a theology of divine grace) that reveals the essential ‘Christian’ contribution of Augustine’s.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction to Philosophy of Pierre Hadot Or on to Spiritual Exercises
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Siberian Federal University Digital Repository Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences 12 (2013 6) 1739-1746 ~ ~ ~ УДК 1(091) Introduction to Philosophy of Pierre Hadot Or On to Spiritual Exercises Jānis Šķesteris* University of Latvia 28/30 Mārstaļu Str., Riga, LV-1050 Received 28.08.2013, received in revised form 26.09.2013, accepted 28.11.2013 By focusing on the key concepts of the French philosopher Pierre Hadot – conversion and spiritual exercises – this article provides introduction of the views of this philosopher. Hadot’s main research interest was ancient philosophy, and thus he has developed an innovative method for understanding the philosophy of this period. Hadot points out that from his point of view ancient philosophy was primarily a way of life and therefore must be understood as “spiritual exercises”. This concept is understood as an effort in changing and transforming the self, which is called conversion in the philosophy of Hadot. Keywords: Pierre Hadot, spiritual exercises, conversion, ancient philosophy. Introduction Pierre Hadot was a philosopher and From the very beginnings of Western historian whose general research focus was philosophy1 thinkers have given countless ancient philosophy. By describing his scientific definitions of philosophy from the position of efforts, the Latvian philosopher Igors Suvajevs their doctrines. Despite the fact that there have points out that the works of Hadot can be divided always existed many different interpretations in two distinct parts. (Љuvajevs, 2008, 116) The of this discipline, an established stereotype of first part is translations, reconstructed texts the philosopher as a theoretician has persisted and commentary.
    [Show full text]
  • THE TEETH of TIME: PIERRE HADOT on MEANING and MISUNDERSTANDING in the HISTORY of IDEAS Pierre Force Columbia University [Forthc
    THE TEETH OF TIME: PIERRE HADOT ON MEANING AND MISUNDERSTANDING IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS1 Pierre Force Columbia University [Forthcoming in the February 2011 issue of History and Theory–Do not quote without the author’s permission] The French philosopher and intellectual historian Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) became known in the United States thanks to Arnold Davidson who introduced him to the English-speaking public in a 1990 Critical Inquiry article and called him the single most important influence behind the later Foucault and his concept of the care of the self.2 His fame in his own country came a few years later, with the publication of a book entitled Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?3 In it Hadot developed an opinion he had held for a long time, namely that ancient philosophy was primarily a set of concrete practices aimed at shaping the soul, and that ancient philosophers were much more interested in pursuing this goal than they were in achieving doctrinal coherence. Very few studies of Hadot’s work have been published so far, aside from Davidson’s articles and prefaces.4 1 Thanks to Sandra Laugier, Samuel Moyn, Melvin Richter and Dorothea von Mücke for comments and suggestions. 2 Arnold Davidson, “Spiritual Exercises and Ancient Philosophy: an Introduction to Pierre Hadot,” Critical Inquiry 16 (1990) 475-82. See Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, translated by Robert Hurtley, New York: Vintage Books, 1988-1990, vol. 3. 3 Pierre Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? Paris: Gallimard, Folio Essais, 1995. 4 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, edited with an introduction by Arnold I.
    [Show full text]
  • Trung Ngo-Cooper Vs. Hadot: on the Nature of Hellenistic Therapeutic
    Noesis¯ Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy Vol. 19, no. 1, 2018, pp. 24-32. NOESIS¯ XIX COOPER VS HADOT: ON THE NATURE OF HELLENISTIC THERAPEUTIC PHILOSOPHY TRUNG NGO Even though it is widely accepted that ancient philosophy is prac- ticed as a way of life with the aim of achieving human flourishing, there is controversy about the nature of its practice. This paper pits two opposing views about the conduct of ancient philosophy. Siding with Hadot and against Cooper, I will argue in this essay that there is insufficient ground to constrain ancient philosophy to philosophical discourse. Key Words: Stoicism, Therapeutic Philosophy, Philosophy as a Way of Life 1 INTRODUCTION Pierre Hadot argues that there is a profound misunderstanding about the essence of ancient Greek philosophy with its representation as dedicated to theoretical and philosophical discourse since the Greeks’ quest for wis- dom involves a process of transformation of one’s way of being and living (Hadot,1995, 2002). Based on his review of ancient texts, he offers his thesis about the distinctiveness in the life of Hellenistic philosophers and their prac- tices of philosophy which cannot be conducted outside of schools organized to educate those who have chosen a way of life unique to the doctrines be- ing taught by the masters (Hadot, 2002, p.4,99). According to Hadot, these teachings demand the students to adopt a different life style geared toward a transformation of their worldview, the acquisition of new knowledge and the elimination of false beliefs. To that extent, the Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic’s philosophical schools all have the aim of achieving a good life for their follow- ers through specific therapeutic spiritual exercises which are characterized by practices in discursive dialogue, meditation, contemplation as well as physical and dietary regimes (Hadot, 2002, p.6).
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy As a Way of Life
    Philosophy as a Way of Life Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault Pierre Hadot Edited with an introduction by Arnold I. Davidson Translated by Michael Chase BLACKWELL Oi/orJ UK. S- CambriJtc USA Philosophy as a Way of Life 265 ". people everywhere felt the same way as this small number, and became 11 as nature meant for them to be: blameless, irreproachable, and lovers of wisdom, rejoicing in the beautiful just because it is beautiful, and considering that there is no other good besides it... then our cities Philosophy as a Way of Life would be brimful of happiness. They would know nothing of the things that cause grief and fear, but would be so filled with the causes of joy and well-being that there would be no single moment in which they would not lead a life full of joyful laughter; indeed, the whole cycle of the year would be a festival for them.1 In this passage from Philo of Alexandria, inspired by Stoicism, one of the fundamental aspects of philosophy in the Hellenistic and Roman eras comes : clearly to the forefront. During this period, philosophy was a way of life. This Every person - whether Greek or Barbarian - who is in training for is not only to say that it was a specific type of moral conduct; we can easily wisdom, leading a blameless, irreproachable life, chooses neither to see the role played in the passage from Philo by the contemplation of nature. commit injustice nor return it unto others, but to avoid the company of Rather, it means that philosophy was a mode of existing-in-the-world, which busybodies, and hold in contempt, the places where they spend their , had to be practiced at each instant, and the goal of which was to transform time — courts, councils, marketplaces, assemblies — in short, every kind the whole of the individual's life.
    [Show full text]
  • Pierre Hadot's What Is Ancient Philosophy?
    A Philosophical Mode of Life: Pierre Hadot’s What is Ancient Philosophy? Max H. Sotak, Ph.D. Max Sotak received his Ph.D. in Dogmatics from North-West University of South Africa, M.A. degrees in Philosophy and Christian Thought and Psychology and Adult Education from Regis University, and the M.A. in Humanities from California State University. Professor Sotak is the Associate Dean of Academic Operations in Regis University’s College for Professional Studies, a large adult program in Denver, Colorado. Professor Sotak has taught graduate and undergraduate courses in philosophy, humanities, religious studies, Christian thought, computer information systems, and computer programming. Abstract: This article presents Pierre Hadot’s treatment of a philosophical mode of life as it originated in ancient philosophy and fared down through the centuries. Hadot contends that philosophical discourse begins with a choice of life—an existential option from which philosophical discourse arises. The concept of philosophy as a purely theoretical attitude developed after the ancient period and reflects the domestication of philosophy within the context of the medieval and modern universities. The ancient schools of philosophy were concerned with a way of life that demanded the conversion of one’s being, a change of lifestyle, and a specific view of the world. Philosophical discourse, on this view, was designed to reveal, justify, and represent the existential option to the world. Pierre Hadot has contributed two exceptional works on philosophical practice,
    [Show full text]
  • ON AFFECTS in ANCIENT THOUGHT, in MEMORIUM PIERRE HADOT Matthew Sharpe
    PARRHESIA NUMBER 13 • 2011 • 144-56 “ON THE PRESENT IS OUR HAPPINESS”: ON AFFECTS IN ANCIENT THOUGHT, IN MEMORIUM PIERRE HADOT Matthew Sharpe The birds they sing At the break of day ‘Start again,’ I heard them say ‘Don’t dwell on what has passed away And what is yet to be ...’ Leonard Cohen, Anthem Hour by hour, life is kindly offered us We have learned but little from yesterday Of tomorrow, all knowledge is forbidden, And if I ever feared the coming evening, - The setting sun still saw what brought me joy. Do like me, then: with joyful wisdom Look the instant in the eye! Do not delay! Hurry! Run to greet it, lively and benevolent, Be it for action, for joy or for love! Wherever you may be, be like a child, wholly and always; Then you will be the All; and invincible. Goethe, Marienbad Elegy, cited in Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 231.1 French philosopher Pierre Hadot passed away on the night of April 24-25, 2011. The following is offered as a critical tribute to, and reflection upon his work. THESES The theses of Pierre Hadot’s life work, so important in shaping the later Foucault, are now widely known. They are these: i. Classical philosophy was first of all an existential choice or way of life. This way of life involved developing and learning rational, theoretical discourses, which were often highly sophisticated. But it was not reducible to the production, learning, or conveying of theoretical systems. As Hadot liked to say, it aimed as much to form the student, as to inform them.
    [Show full text]
  • Pierre Hadot: Stoicism As a Way of Life
    Pierre Hadot: Stoicism as a Way of Life Citation: Sharpe, Matthew 2020, Pierre Hadot: Stoicism as a Way of Life. In Lampe, Kurt and Sholtz, Janae (ed), French and Italian Stoicisms: From Sartre to Agamben, Bloomsbury Academic, London, Eng., pp.260-280. Published in its final form at https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/french-and-italian-stoicisms- 9781350082038/ This is the accepted manuscript. ©2020, Bloomsbury Publishing Reprinted with permission. Downloaded from DRO: http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30136430 DRO Deakin Research Online, Deakin University’s Research Repository Deakin University CRICOS Provider Code: 00113B French and Italian Stoicisms Pierre Hadot Chapter 13 Pierre Hadot Stoicism as a Way of Life Matthew Sharpe In a series of articles and books beginning in 1972, the philologist and philosopher Pierre Hadot developed a reading of Stoicism as a philosophical way of life that has had widespread influence. Hadot’s conception of Stoicism is given its most extended expression in his magisterial 1992 study of Marcus Aurelius, La Citadelle intérieure: Introduction aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle, together with a later work, co-authored with Ilsetraut Hadot (2004), on Epictetus’ Handbook and the Neoplatonist Simplicius’ commentary on this text. Since the translation of La Citadelle intérieure (1998, henceforth cited parenthetically as IC), alongside Hadot’s cognate studies on ancient philosophy more widely in Philosophy as a Way of Life (1996c) and What is Ancient Philosophy? (2000), Hadot’s conception of Stoicism has been taken up by a range of global, internet-based “Stoic” communities, committed to proselytizing and practicing Stoicism as a manner of life.
    [Show full text]
  • The University of Chicago a Philosophy to Live By
    THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO A PHILOSOPHY TO LIVE BY: GOETHE‘S ART OF LIVING IN THE SPIRIT OF THE ANCIENTS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF GERMANIC STUDIES BY GEORGINNA ANNE HINNEBUSCH CHICAGO, ILLINOIS DECEMBER 2018 Table of Contents List of Abbreviations....................................................................................................................... v Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... vii Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Goethe and Ancient philosophy .................................................................................................. 6 Philosophy as an Art of Living: Making the most of life ........................................................ 10 Art & Science as a Goethean Art of Living .............................................................................. 18 Introduction of Chapters ........................................................................................................... 19 Chapter 1 Ancient Philosophy as an Art of living........................................................................ 26 Central Claim & Methodology ................................................................................................. 29 Outline of this chapter ..............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Adam Robbert Pierre Hadot on Philosophy As a Way of Life Paper Presented at the California Institute of Integral Studies San Fr
    Adam Robbert Pierre Hadot on Philosophy as a Way of Life Paper Presented at the California Institute of Integral Studies San Francisco, CA Thursday, April 19, 2018 Clear a space around the self and do not let yourself be carried away and distracted by all the sounds, faces, and people around you. Clear a space around the self, to think of the aim, or rather of the relation between yourself and the aim.1 – Michel Foucault Pierre Hadot on Philosophy as a Way of Life Pierre Hadot (1922–2010) was a French philosopher and historian of ancient philosophy, especially of Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, Cynicism, Epicureanism, and Neoplatonism. He was a professor at the Collège de France in Paris where he also wrote and taught on a number of philosophers, including Marcus Aurelius, Plotinus, Descartes, Kant, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and Merleau-Ponty, to name a few. In this essay, I draw from several of his translated works, including What is Ancient Philosophy? the collection of essays found in Philosophy as a Way of Life, his work Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision, and his text on Marcus Aurelius, The Inner Citadel. The essay serves as an overview and introduction to the thought of Pierre Hadot. However, what follows is not a reconstruction of any particular school of philosophy. Nor does the essay offer a linear reconstruction of the history of these philosophies. Instead, in this essay I recreate the sense of what Hadot found so crucial to philosophy. Namely, the idea that philosophy is a way of life, a set of practices spiritual in nature.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy As Way of Life for Christians ? Iamblichan and Porphyrian Reflections on Religion, Virtue, and Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas Wayne J
    Document généré le 25 sept. 2021 08:41 Laval théologique et philosophique Philosophy as Way of Life for Christians ? Iamblichan and Porphyrian Reflections on Religion, Virtue, and Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas Wayne J. Hankey Le néoplatonisme Résumé de l'article Volume 59, numéro 2, 2003 Le but de Pierre Hadot en développant la notion de philosophie ancienne comme « exercice spirituel » était de fournir une solution de rechange à la URI : https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/007419ar religion. Dans cette perspective, Hadot rend le triomphe de la chrétienté et de DOI : https://doi.org/10.7202/007419ar la scolastique médiévale, exemplifié par Thomas d’Aquin, responsable de la « perte de la philosophie comme manière de vivre ». Le jugement qu’il porte Aller au sommaire du numéro sur Thomas d’Aquin s’applique également au néoplatonisme ancien. Or, de fait, pour les deux il n’y a rien d’abstrait dans la théorie de la philosophie comme ascension vers Dieu : la philosophie est une manière de vivre qui nous transforme et nous tourne vers le divin. Comme son prédécesseur Éditeur(s) néoplatonicien, l’Université médiévale considérait la philosophie comme un Faculté de philosophie, Université Laval « exercice spirituel » dans le cadre d’une spiritualité chrétienne qui préparait Faculté de théologie et de sciences religieuses, Université Laval aussi les intellectuels à une félicité surnaturelle. ISSN 0023-9054 (imprimé) 1703-8804 (numérique) Découvrir la revue Citer cet article Hankey, W. J. (2003). Philosophy as Way of Life for Christians ? Iamblichan and Porphyrian Reflections on Religion, Virtue, and Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas. Laval théologique et philosophique, 59(2), 193–224.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is Philosophy As a Way of Life?
    What is Philosophy as a Way of Life? [forthcoming in Parrhesia] JOHN SELLARS ABSTRACT: What is philosophy as a way of life? Is it a distinctive approach to philosophy? Is it closely aligned with continental philosophy? Does it offer a third way, distinct from both analytic and continental philosophy? Is all philosophy potentially life-changing? Do we lose something important if we conceive philosophy as a practical therapeutic exercise? I shall attempt to address all these questions, drawing on Lucretius for my final response. I. Introducing Philosophy as a Way of Life In recent years there has been a gradual development of interest in the idea that philosophy might be conceived as a guide to life. The phrase ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life’ is closely associated with the French philosopher and scholar of ancient philosophy Pierre Hadot, whose work gained prominence in the English-speaking world in 1995 with the publication of a book called Philosophy as a Way of Life.1 In the chapter from which the volume gets its title Hadot claims that in antiquity “philosophy was a way of life,” a “mode of existing-in- the-world, which had to be practiced at each instant, and the goal of which was to transform the whole of the individual’s life.”2 Philosophy was conceived as a 1 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), based upon, although not straightforwardly translating, Hadot’s Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1981; 2nd edn 1987; new edn Albin Michel, 2002).
    [Show full text]