Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

February 1993

OTA-BP-O-85 NTIS order #PB93-163368 GPO stock #052-003-01316-9 Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex, OTA-BP-O-85 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993).

For sale by the U.S. Goverment Printing Office Superintendent of Documents.Mail Stop.Stop SSOP Washington, DC 20402-9328 ISBN 0-16 -041667-1 Foreword

old War nuclear weapons production has left a legacy of environmental contamination that is unprecented in scope and complexity. The Department of Energy has begun cleaning up pollution at the Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC)-an expensive, decades-long task that will requirec a workforce numbering tens of thousands of scientists, technicians, and laborers. Protecting their health and safety must be a major goal of this cleanup effort. Achieving this goal will require DOE to successfully confront significant technical and managerial challenges, but it also poses a unique opportunity to advance state-of-the-art occupational health and safety technologies and practices. The Senate Committee on Armed Services asked OTA to undertake this project as part of OTA’s evaluation of environmental restoration and waste management at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex. The Committee directed OTA to examine risks workers might face in cleaning up contamination at the Complex and to evaluate the effectiveness of DOE’s occupational safety and health programs for cleanup workers. This background paper concludes that, thus far, DOE and its contractors have devoted little attention to cleanup worker health and safety. They have not convinced workers and managers that a “new culture” of accountability in environment, safety, and health is truly ascendent. DOE’s plans call for ambitious increased capability in occupational safety and health matters, but DOE has devoted few resources to these efforts. Policies and programs needed to protect cleanup workers are not yet in place. Yet DOE could apply to great advantage both its own technical strengths and the lessons learned by the Nation’s experience with protecting cleanup workers at non-Federal waste sites. If the Department aggressively addresses its organizational problems, it could become a major force in establishing the principles, practices, and technologies needed to restore contaminated environments to safe conditions-in a manner that ensures that the “cure” for contaminated environments does not do more harm than the pollution itself. In the course of preparing this background paper, OTA received important assistance from many individuals and organizations. Workshop participants, employees of OSHA, EPA, and DOE, and numerous contributors and reviewers from academia, industry, and organized labor gave generously of their advice and time. In the absence of such expert advice and guidance, OTA would have been unable to accomplish this study. The analysis and conclusions of this background paper are, of course, OTA’s, and OTA assumes full responsibility for the paper and the accuracy of its contents.

. . . Roger Herdman, Acting Director Ill workshop Participants

DOE CLEANUP WORKER Robert Goldsmith Michael Silverstein HEALTH AND SAFETY Office of Health Surveillance and Occupational Safety and Health Epidemiology Washington State Department of Ed Bergin U.S. Department of Energy Labor and Industry Occupational Safety and Health Administration Lanny Graves Sandra Tillet U.S. Department of Labor Atomic Trades and Labor Council Occupational Health Foundation Y-12 Plant Joseph Cocalis Office of Solid Waste and William H. Greendyke HAZARDOUS WASTE ACTION Emergency Response Los Alamos National Laboratory CONTRACTORS (HWAC) U.S. Environmental Protection WORKSHOP Agency Ellen J. Mangione Disease Control and Environmental Richard C. Gerlach Steven Cordova Epidemiology Health Sciences Division Joint Company Union Safety Colorado Department of Health Halliburton NUS Environmental committee Corp. Rocky Flats Plant James Melius Thomas Bailey U.S. Department of Energy Division of Occupational Health and Environmental Kleinfelder, Inc. Denny Dobbins Epidemiology Worker Education and Training New York State Deparatment of Martin S. Mathamel Branch Health Health and Safety Division Occupational Health and Technical CH2M-Hill Services John Moran Safety and Health Laborers’ Carolyn M. Kiely National Institute of Environmental Hazardous Waste Action Health Sciences National Health and Safety Fund Contractors John Serocki Brad Whitehurst Diane Morrel Office of Environmental State & Technical Affairs Health & Safety Restoration and Waste Hazardous Waste Action Ebasco Environmental Management Contractors U.S. Department of Energy Glenn Paulsen Illinois Institute of Technology

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the workshop participants. The participants do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this background paper. OTA assumes full responsibility for the background paper and the accuracy of its contents.

iv Preject Staff

John Andelin PRINCIPAL STAFF ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF Assistant Director OTA Science, Information, and Tara O’Toole Kathleen Beil Natural Resources Division Project Director Office Administrator

Robert W. Niblock Joan Ham Kim Holmlund Oceans and Environment Program Principal Analyst Administrative Secretary Manager Sharon Knarvik CONTRIBUTING ANALYSTS Secretary

Emilia Govan Senior Analyst CONTRIBUTOR

Peter Johnson Florence Poilon Senior Associate Editor

German Reyes Analyst

v List of Abbreviations

ACE-United States Army Corps of Engineers NIOSH—National Institute of Occupational Safety and DOE-United States Department of Energy Health EH—-DOE Office of Environment, Safety and Health NWC-nuclear weapons complex EM—DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and OSH-occupational safety and health Waste Management OSHA-Occupational Safety and Health ERMC-Environmental Restoration Management Administration Contractor PEL—permissible exposure limit GAO-United States General Accounting Office PPE-personal protective equipment HASP-Health and Safety Plan RCRA—Resources Conservation and Recovery Act HAZWOPER-Hazardous Waste Operations and RFI-Remedial Facility Investigation Emergency Response Standard RIFS-Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study HWAC-Hazardous Waste Action Contractors USCG—United States Coast Guard LANL--Los Alamos National Laboratory WAS—Westinghouse Hanford Corporation M+O-Management and Operation Contractor

vi contents

1 Overview and Findings, 1 Cleanup Worker Health and Safety Risks, 3 Consequences of Failure To Protect Weapons Complex Cleanup Workers, 5 Approach Used in This Study, 5 Superfund and RCRA Experience: Worker Protection Lessons, 6 Cleanup Worker Protection in the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex Cleanup Program, 11 Summary of Findings, 13 Chapter 1 Endnotes, 14

2 Lessons From Superfund and RCRA, 19 Worker Protection Issues Within the Regulatory Process, 19 Problems With Contracting Practices, 24 Effectiveness of Cleanup Worker Health and Safety Regulations, 27 Chapter 2 Endnotes, 43

3 Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, 49 Management Commitment to Occupational Safety and Health Priorities, 50 Line Management Responsibility for Occupational Safety and Health, 52 Oversight of Occupational Safety and Health Practices, 56 Worker Protection Competes With Other Cleanup Priorities, 59 DOE Site Characterization Data, 60 Impacts of DOE Contracting Practices, 62 Application of HAZWOPER to DOE Cleanup, 64 Chapter 3 Endnotes, 73

Conclusion–Opportunities and Dangers, 79

vii Overview and Findings 1

he Manhattan Project-the secret effort to invent and build the first atomic bomb-was accomplished in less than 4 years at a cost of approximately $2 billion.l The project was backed by the resources of America’s largestT and most advanced corporations and engineering fins, and employed the talents of thousands of the world’s best scientists, technicians, and workers. A half century later, the institutional descendant of the Man- hattan Project, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), cofronts a new mission: cleaning up the environmental pollution left by cold war nuclear weapons production. This new mission presents DOE with daunting technical and organizational challenges as it strives to revise policies that led to widespread pollution throughout the Nuclear Weapons Complex and to restore contaminated environments to safe conditions, It is estimated that cleanup of environmental contamination from nearly 50 years of nuclear weapons manufacture will cost more than $100 billion and require more than 30 years to complete. The cost and length of the cleanup are uncertain because DOE is the true extent of pollution and the means to remedy it areas yet only dimly understood, Some areas of the Weapons Complex responsible for may never be restored to pristine conditions.2 The tasks involved in the cleanup of environmental contami- protecting those nation are unfamiliar to DOE. Indeed, the entire field of hazard- who will do ous waste management and environmental remediation is in its infancy. Methods of characterizing contaminated sites are highly the work of uncertain, 3 and approaches to cleaning up are largely unproved at both waste sites owned by private industry and government- cleaning up owned facilities such as DOE reservations.4 5 It is clear, however, that cleaning up the 14 facilities in 13 States that make up the Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) will

1 2 Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

demand the application of great talent and re- As DOE turns its attention toward its new mis- sources. The tens of thousands of people who sion of environmental restoration and waste will be engaged in cleanup of the Weapons Com- management, the Department assumes responsi- plex will join a large and growing industry devot- bility for providing safe and healthful working ed to the characterization and restoration of con- conditions for those who will do the work of taminated environments. It is estimated that over cleaning up. The vigor and success with which the next 5 years, DOE’s Office of Environmental DOE implements health and safety programs for Restoration and Waste Management could re- cleanup workers will be a signal of its willing- quire the services of as many as 25,000 scien- ness and ability to embrace the “new culture” tists, engineers, and technicians.6 spoken of by the Secretary of Energy—a culture Some workers will be involved in collecting that honors protection of the environment, environmental samples, studying groundwater health, and safety as a fundamental priority.8 If movement, and designing remediation projects. effectively conducted, the DOE cleanup could Others will be operating earth moving equip- serve as a model of how workers engaged in haz- ment; handling, inspecting, and repacking waste ardous waste and emergency response operations drums; or building dams, digging trenches, and should be protected from work-related illness constructing complex waste treatment facilities. and injury. Still others will be plant operators, maintenance Environmental restoration and waste manage- personnel, and technical experts at vitrification ment activities at DOE provide an opportunity to plants, wastewater treatment facilities, and incin- advance the state of the art of occupational health erators. Municipal firefighters, police, medical and safety programs for cleanup workers. DOE’s experts, and other emergency response personnel stated commitment to attain a new culture that may be called on in the event of fire, explosion, respects the environment, health, and safety; its or accidental release of toxic materials. search for new ways of incorporating effective The NWC cleanup will be one of the largest worker protection programs into contract agree- environmental remediation efforts ever, and very ments; and its intent to pursue cleanup in a re- likely the largest undertaken by the Federal Gov- sponsible and cost-effective manner-all place ernment at taxpayers’ expense. If conducted ef- DOE in a position to become a major force in ad- fectively, the DOE cleanup could serve as a vancing the programs and technologies needed to model of how workers engaged in hazardous adequately protect workers from safety hazards waste and emergency response operations should and from the adverse effects of exposure to toxic be protected from work-related illness and in- materials. jury. DOE’s past refusal to acknowledge its Achieving such a leadership position in occu- obligation to comply with environmental laws pational health and safety will require DOE to and regulations means that the Department is adopt policies and undertake actions now only in starting environmental characterization and re- their incipient stages. To apply management mediation activities more than a decade after the lessons gleaned from experience at non-Federal private sector began cleaning up Superfund and cleanup operations, DOE must first recognize the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act need for strong management commitment to the (RCRA) sites. During those years, much has occupational safety and health (OSH) of its been learned about how to protect the health and cleanup workers. Comprehensive, DOE-wide safety of cleanup workers; DOE could apply OSH policies, objectives, programs, and means these lessons to great advantage. of assessing progress must be developed. The cooperative efforts of line managers and health and Chapter l–Overview and Findings 3

safety professionals will be required along with input from experienced workers. Consultation and interaction with other government agencies and organizations with expertise in worker protection issues will also be needed if DOE is to formulate a timely and effective approach to cleanup worker protection. The policies adopted then will have to be implemented and enforced. Finally, truly independent oversight of OSH policies will be necessary at DOE facilities, with mechanisms developed to reward or penalize ad- herence to or violation of these policies.

CLEANUP WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS In addition to many of the safety hazards associated with conventional construction operations, such as manual lifting, operation of heavy ma- chinery, electrical hazards, exposure to extreme heat and cold, and confined space operations, workers involved in characterizing or remediat- ing toxic waste sites may encounter fire and explosion hazards, as well as the health threats associated with exposure to toxic chemicals and radiation. 9 10 Stress-related illness can also af- flict cleanup workers because of the unusual de- Cleanup workers face safety hazards associated with mands and uncertainties associated with this traditional construction tasks as well as health risks work.11 Finally cleanup workers at DOE facili- from exposure to toxic chemicals and radionuclides. ties will confront-in addition to all of the usual radiation are in dispute. 14-17 The long-term con- risks encountered in hazardous waste work— sequences of exposure to chronic, low dosages of other hazards, such as high-level radioactive toxic materials, radiation, or mixtures of these— waste and mixed waste, that are unique to the the types of exposures most likely to be encoun- Weapons Complex. tered by cleanup workers—remain largely unin- It is not known what specific health risks 12 No prospective studies vestigated. cleanup workers face. The construction trades, which include many have been done of health effects among workers workers engaged in environmental cleanup, are employed in the new industry of environmental among the most hazardous occupations in the remediation. It is highly uncertain what, if any, United States and have long been associated with specific biologic effects result from exposure to a high rate of worker injuries.18 19 An estimated toxic substances encountered during work with $8.9 billion is spent annually on costs related to 20 hazardous waste. The health outcomes associat- construction accidents. Indirect costs, included with exposure to most of the chemicals in ing reduced productivity, schedule delays, and 13 commercial use are poorly understood, and the damage to equipment or facilities, account for health consequences of exposure to low doses of most of this amount. 4 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

A number of useful objective measures of past ing environmental cleanup work. Instead, clean- safety performance have been developed, and re- up workers must depend on less certain strategies search has demonstrated several ways of reduc- for identifying site-specific hazards, such as envi- ing workplace injury rates, including effective ronmental monitoring and medical surveillance, worker health and safety training, and the plan- and must rely in large measure on respirators, im- ning and enforcement of safe work practices. An permeable clothing, and other personal protective analysis by the Business Roundtable concluded equipment to prevent exposure to toxic materi- that site owners can effectively influence job als.24 safety and that strong construction safety pro- The demographics of much of the private sec- grams are cost effective.21 tor hazardous waste work force—youth, frequent Workers employed in the construction indus- turnover, high proportion of minorities25-serve try also suffer higher rates of some cancers and to lessen the power of individual employees. The increased overall mortality compared to the U.S. realities of workers’ compensation laws in most population as a whole.22 The causes of these in- States restrict a worker’s means of legal recourse creased rates of nontraumatic deaths among con- in the event of injury or adverse health effects. struction workers are not understood; possible re- The burden of proof in cases of alleged work-relationships between work-related risks and health lated health problems is on the worker; pervasive outcomes among construction workers have not scientitic uncertainties about the health impacts been well studied. of environmental toxicants often make it difficult The large number and variety of toxic chemi- to prove that a given ailment is work related. cals present at many hazardous waste sites, the Many health professionals believe that in most potential interaction of contaminants, and the cases, cleanup workers can be protected from “disorderly physical environment” of cleanup the harmful effects of exposure to toxic sub- work make it difficult, and sometimes impossi- stances.26-28 However, achieving such protection ble, to accurately assess all potential chemical or requires that managers pay vigilant attention to radiologic hazards. In many cases, site contami- identifying and anticipating potential site hazards nants are unidentified and loose in the environ- and devote adequate resources to design and im- ment or “uncontrolled.” These factors result in plementation of the occupational health and safe- work situations that: ty programs needed to mitigate such hazards. In addition, workers must be trained to recognize • “may include numerous and varied hazards unexpected dangers when they are encountered that may pose an immediate danger to life or and must be knowledgeable in the use of person- health; al protective equipment. Ž may not be immediately obvious or identifi- The Office of Technology Assessment found able; that there is sufficient evidence to question the ● may vary according to the location on site adequacy of existing provisions for protecting and the task being performed; 23 cleanup workers from occupational illness and ● may change as site activities progress.” injury. Concerns about cleanup worker health Because of these features, the application of and safety have arisen during operations at non- traditional approaches to worker protection— Federal cleanup sites. These concerns are also namely, a reliance on industrial hygiene data to salient to environmental restoration of the Nu- identify potentially dangerous worker exposures clear Weapons Complex. Some features of the and the use of engineering controls to reduce or DOE cleanup may intensify worker protection eliminate such exposure-is often precluded dur- problems encountered at non-Federal facilities. Chapter l-Overview and Findings 15

CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO tigations demonstrate that DOE or its prime PROTECT WEAPONS COMPLEX contractors failed to exercise prudent judgment in CLEANUP WORKERS occupational health and safety matters during The failure to adequately protect cleanup cleanup. Inadequate attention to OSH issues dur- workers now can have effects that range from ing cleanup of federal facilities may leave the near-term public dissatisfaction to future claims government vulnerable to lawsuits and claims akin to those now being made by veterans of of liability against the Federal Government. The 33 by citizens living downwind linkage between worker health and safety and atomic bomb tests, 34 off-site health impacts is well recognized by of nuclear tests, and by DOE workers and oth- communities surrounding hazardous waste sites, ers alleging radiation-related illness and dam- as experience with Superfund has shown.29 30 If ages .35-39 worker health and safety is perceived by the public to be neglected or poorly protected, public confidence in the overall cleanup effort could be APPROACH USED IN THIS STUDY undermined. Public doubts about the adequacy of This OTA background paper was written after worker protection, the accuracy of site character- review of available government documents and ization, the hazards of proposed remediation published articles that chronicle cleanup worker plans, and the reliability of emergency response health and safety issues.40 OTA also consulted capabilities could lead to strong pressures to re- numerous government officials involved in over- peat characterization studies, revise planned sight or regulation of cleanup worker safety and cleanup strategies, strengthen emergency re- health, as well as DOE contractor employees, sponse plans, or take other measures that would DOE and private sector workers involved in haz- delay cleanup schedules and increase costs. ardous waste operations, labor representatives, Given the extent and complexity of contami- academic experts, and health and safety man- nation at the NWC, the projected size of the agers from environmental and engineering firms. cleanup work force, and the expected decades- Two workshops were held to discuss issues long duration of cleanup activities, work-related raised in this background paper. The first, re- accidents and illnesses are bound to occur. 31 Oc- ferred to as the “OTA Workshop on DOE Clean- cupational illnesses are also likely in view of the up Workers,”’41 included employees of DOE, the volume and nature of hazardous materials known Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the to exist on weapons plant reservations .32 Occupational Safety and Health Administration In addition, uncertainties about the health haz- (OSHA); workers at DOE weapons facilities; ards associated with characterization and restora- representatives of labor unions engaged in clean- tion of contaminated environments are pervasive; up work; and health and safety professionals existing regulatory mandates governing cleanup from academia and the private sector. The second worker health and safety are ambiguous; and sig- workshop, the “OTA-HWAC Workshop,”42 in- nificant weaknesses characterize DOE’s and its cluded OTA staff and members of Hazardous contractors’ occupational health and safety pro- Waste Action Contractors (HWAC), a national grams for cleanup workers. These features sug- association of engineering and science firms gest that the Federal Government could face sig- practicing in hazardous waste management. nificant liability claims in the future if large In the course of this project, OTA staff visited numbers of the cleanup workers develop work- all of the facilities in the DOE Nuclear Weapons related diseases or suffer injuries that might rea- Complex. The EPA-Labor Health and Safety sonably have been prevented, or if future inves- Task Force, a group that includes representatives 6 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

from several government agencies and labor or- pertinent to occupational safety and health poli- ganizations convened to address controversial is- cies and practices, including internal memoranda sues surrounding cleanup worker health and safe- and drafts of proposed OSH orders and pro- ty, allowed OTA staff to attend several of its grams. The DOE Office of Environmental meetings and to review the minutes of other Restoration and Waste Management (EM) and meetings. OTA staff benefited greatly from the the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health opportunity to accompany representatives from (EH) reviewed and commented on a draft of this OSHA, EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers OTA background paper. (ACE), and the EPA-Labor Health and Safety Because of the limited data documenting Task Force on a tour of a (non-DOE) Superfund health and safety risks or health outcomes among site. This tour was part of an interagency effort to cleanup workers, the lack of reliable surveys of establish an OSHA inspection protocol for Su- work conditions at hazardous waste sites, and the perfund incineration sites.43 44 absence of any comprehensive or prospective There is no comprehensive documentation of studies of the occupational illnesses or injuries the successes or problems associated with worker encountered during environmental cleanup work health and safety programs at hazardous waste at private sector sites or at government facilities, sites either in the private sector or at DOE facili- some of the information presented in this OTA ties. The government does not categorize workers background paper is necessarily anecdotal. engaged in environmental remediation or hazard- Nonetheless, several themes and issues were ous materials emergency response actions in raised consistently and repeatedly in the course ways that allow accurate analyses of occupation- of OTA’s investigation; these are discussed here. al health and safety statistics in this industry.45 There is also considerable consensus among the Further, much of the activity at hazardous waste diverse participants in the EPA-Labor Health and sites thus far has involved characterization stud- Safety Task Force on the major health and safety ies aimed at mapping pollution pathways and problems at private sector waste sites—although short-lived emergency removal projects.46 47 individuals have differing ideas about the sources Only recently have actual remediation and clean- and solutions to these problems. up activities become a prominent aspect of work at Superfund and RCRA sites. This is also the SUPERFUND AND RCRA EXPERIENCE: case at DOE facilities, where site characteriza- WORKER PROTECTION LESSONS tion efforts are ongoing and environmental clean- The experience accumulated in the course of 48 up work is just getting underway. nearly two decades of Superfund and RCRA ac- OTA’s analysis of DOE’s capacity to protect tivities provides valuable lessons on how to es- cleanup worker health and safety draws on a tablish effective occupational health and safety number of documents reviewing DOE’s manage- programs during hazardous waste operations and ment of environment, safety, and health issues. environmental remediation. As the environmen- (See, for example, work cited in footnotes 49- tal restoration industry continues to grow and 64.) Some of these reports were compiled by ex- hazardous waste operations shift from characteri- pert independent panels, many convened at the zation studies to actual cleanup, new problems request of the Secretary of Energy. These re- are identified and the regulatory response to these views, although focusing primarily on the DOE emerging issues continues to evolve. weapons production work force and not on clean- Some of the problems that plague efforts to es- up workers, provide useful information about the tablish sound OSH programs during environmen- Department’s general approach to worker health tal cleanup operations are technical in nature and and safety. OTA also examined DOE documents .—

Chapter l–Overview and Findings 7

result from the difficulties associated with efforts were not familiar enough with site operations to to identify site contaminants and worker expo- recognize potential hazards.93 94 sures, and from the pervasive uncertainties re- Site owners and prime contractors often “push garding the human health consequences of expo- down” responsibility and accountability for sure to environmental pollutants. However, the worker health and safety to subcontractors95— overriding problems that hinder worker protec- even though subcontractors frequently have less tion efforts during hazardous waste cleanup re - experience, can devote fewer resources to hazard sult from a lack of emphasis on OSH issues in Su - identification and worker protection, and com- perfund and RCRA procedures, and inadequate mand less access to trained occupational safety management commitment to or accountability for and health professionals than the prime contrac- cleanup worker health and safety. tor.96 Fear of legal liability has made some man- The next section of this chapter introduces agers reluctant to intercede in worksite health and some of the reasons why cleanup workers in the safety problems that do not directly involve their private sector are not better protected against oc- own employees-even when they are aware of cupational injury or illness. Chapter 2 of this obvious exposure hazards or unsafe work prac- OTA background paper addresses these matters tices.97 Furthermore, the lack of rigorous en- in more detail. Chapter 3 discusses cleanup forcement of OSHA standards during hazardous worker health issues within the context of clean- waste operations and emergency response leaves up of the Nuclear Weapons Complex. employers unaccountable for the adequacy of worker protection measures. Management Commitment and Accountability Inadequate Characterization Data Management commitment to worker health The Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study and safety is increasingly recognized as a critical (RIFS) process in Superfund cleanups and element of all good occupational health and safe- RCRA Facility Investigation (RFI) efforts are 91 92 ty programs. The environmental laws and supposed to provide information about the pres- regulations that drive most cleanup operations do ence, location, and concentration of hazardous not however, assign OSH matters a high priority. contaminants at a site. These data are then ana- Cleanup managers who are compelled to devote lyzed to produce assessments of baseline health great attention to complying with environmental risks posed by site contaminants and devise ap- laws and other competing priorities, sometimes propriate engineering responses to the pollu- neglect the need for aggressive and sustained tion. 98 Unfortunately, the data gathered by the management involvement in developing and imp- engineers and environmental scientists who de- lementing effective worker protection strate- sign and conduct characterization studies typical- gies. ly fail to provide the type of information needed Moreover, cleanup operations are character- to evaluate potential worker health and safety ized by a diffuse managerial structure that makes threats.99-103 In some cases, characterization it difficult to maintain clear chains of command studies are incomplete when requests for cleanup or to determine who is accountable for occupa- proposals are sent out for bid or when remedia- tional health and safety. Cleanup workers have tion work begins. In other instances, site assess- been endangered because health and safety ex- ment activities may have been carried out years perts were unavailable on-site; lacked the senior- before actual remediation gets under way; thus ity, training, or authority to interrupt production assessment reports do not represent the site con- schedules when worker safety was threatened; or ditions existing when cleanup work begins. 8 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Site characterization activities are generally unexpected” and to train workers to identify un- not designed to produce the information needed foreseen contamination problems. to “engineer” a cleanup. Most professionals with experience in environmental cleanup anticipate Poor Contracting Practices that remediation activities will uncover “surpris- The lack of flexibility in many cleanup con- es” not revealed during the site characterization tracts contributes to the difficulties of creating ef- phase. These surprises are usually unpleasant and fective occupational health and safety programs may include, for example, more extensive zones for cleanup workers. Contractors bidding on of subsurface contamination, or additional “hot cleanup jobs are placed in a difficult position as a spots” with high contamination levels. result of the large uncertainties inherent in all en- These realities have led many environmental vironmental restoration work, the errors and remediation specialists to endorse the so-called omissions that distinguish most characterization observational approach to cleanup. The observa- data, and the failure to include provisions in tional approach is a method for staging data col- cleanup contracts that allow changes in original lection and remedial action so as to account for HASPS or renegotiation of worker protection the uncertainties inherent in assessing environ- costs. Managers are often forced to choose be- mental contamination. The approach involves tween either assuming “worst-case” scenarios initiating response action early to prevent migra- and planning for elaborate worker health and tion of contaminants and then collecting the addi- safety provisions in their bids; or hoping that no tional information necessary to design the final new hazards come to light in the course of clean- remedy. Contingency plans are developed to de- up (a hope that experience has shown is usually fine actions that will be taken if additional areas unrealized) and budgeting less money for worker of contamination are found or if remedial actions protection. are not as effective as planned. Employers engaged in cleanup work com- The quality and focus of site characterization mand widely differing levels of expertise in occu- data are important because these data are the pational health and safety matters. Even large l04 basis of site health and safety plans (HASPS). firms that possess significant technical abilities HASPS are legally mandated by HAZWOPER, vary widely in the amount of attention paid to imp- the OSHA standard governing worker protection lementing and enforcing principles of worker during hazardous waste site operations and emer- safety and health protection.105 In an effort to gency response. HASPS must present a written better assess work-related hazards, some large blueprint of health and safety hazards associated environmental firms have tried to include costs of with proposed work plans at contaminated sites additional characterization studies in the cleanup and must establish the personal protective gear, bids submitted, but they have not always suc- work practices, medical surveillance, and health ceeded, especially when negotiators lack health and safety training required to conduct the clean- and safety backgrounds or are unfamiliar with the up and respond appropriately to any emergencies hazards of environmental cleanup work. The that might arise. practice of awarding contracts for environmental When characterization data are inaccurate or cleanup solely on the basis of a low bid may mili- incomplete, there is no sound basis from which to tate against firms that incorporate strong worker craft effective site-specific health and safety protection programs into contract proposals. plans or to determine the level of worker protection required in performing specific work tasks. To address this deficiency, the basic premise of health and safety practice must be to “expect the Chapter l–Overview and Findings 19

Difficulties in Interpreting OSHA’S ● methods for monitoring worker exposure to Hazardous Waste Operations and potentially hazardous substances; Emergency Response Standard ● methods for determiningg acceptable worker The regulation that protects hazardous waste exposure levels during cleanup operations; workers is vague and difficult to enforce. In ● the criteria that determine an individual 1990, the Occupational Safety and Health Ad- worker’s eligibility for inclusion in legally ministration promulgated a regulation to protect mandated medical surveillance programs workers engaged in hazardous waste operations and prescribe minimum hours of health and and emergency response, the so-called HAZ- safety training; WOPER standard.l06 Other OSHA regulations, ● the content of medical surveillance pro- such as standards governing construction worker grams and the qualifications of physicians protection, use of respirators, and exposure to who design and manage the activities; and certain regulated materials, also apply to environ- ● the adequacy of emergency response prepa- mental cleanup work, but HAZWOPER is the rations and capabilities during hazardous most comprehensive and important regulation waste operations. applicable to cleanup worker health and safety. OSHA has also proposed a regulation that HAZWOPER is a “performance-based” regu- would establish certification criteria for cleanup lation. The standard sets forth a number of goals worker health and safety training programs man- and approaches that employers must adopt, but dated by HAZWOPER.109 Some aspects of the does not prescribe how cleanup worker protec- proposed rule (29 CFR 1910.121) have been crit- tion programs should be designed or implement- icized; in particular, the absence of any required ed. Some aspects of HAZWOPER are ambigu- certification for trainers or for the programs that OUS. OSHA has not issued guidance documents train emergency response personnel have been that would aid employers in interpreting and ap- cited.110-112 plying the standard. Also, different OSHA regional offices have offered contradictory inter- 107 Weak Oversight of Occupational Health pretations of some HAZWOPER provisions. and Safety Rules by Regulators Consequently, there is significant controversy The Occupational Safety and Health Act holds about how elements of the standard should be im- employers responsible for providing workers plemented, and wide variations exist in the rigor- with “safe and healthful working conditions.’66 ousness of cleanup worker protection programs HAZWOPER, the OSHA regulation enacted to at hazardous waste sites. To respond to such con- protect cleanup worker health and safety, man- troversy in a more timely manner than its bureau- dates a structured, but nonspecific, approach to cratic procedures usually allow, the OSHA Di- worker protection during hazardous waste opera- rectorate of Compliance Programs recently tions and emergency response.67 Under this stan- published a compilation of letters and memos dard, critical decisions about how to identify and from OSHA headquarters that respond to specific 108 mitigate cleanup worker health risks are left to queries on HAZWOPER interpretation. the judgment of individual employers. Especially controversial aspects of HAZWOP- The quality of worker health and safety pro- ER implementation include the following: grams implemented under HAZWOPER at Su- ● provisions for dividing waste sites into work perfund and RCRA sites are reported to vary zones categorized by the potential for work- widely. 68 69 These inconsistencies are apparently er exposure to hazardous materials within a consequence of information gaps and uncer- these zones; tainties about necessary levels of worker protec- 10 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

tion; differences in the rigorousness with which Health (NIOSH), ACE, and representatives of different employers pursue worker safety and labor unions whose members frequently conduct health; OSHA’s failure to issue detailed guidance cleanup work. This Task Force has been con- to help employers interpret and apply the broadly structive in identifying some of the more pressing worded HAZWOPER regulation; and weak and pervasive worker protection problems at OSHA enforcement efforts. RCRA and Superfund sites. OSHA and EPA have agreed to cooperate in EPA’s principal goals, however, which are developing an OSHA inspection protocol for in- largely a response to public and congressional cinerators at Superfund sites.70 In general, how- pressures, are to reduce the time needed to com- ever, OSHA enforcement of HAZWOPER has plete the RCRA and Superfund processes, and to 71 72 not been vigorous. OSHA has about 1,000 accomplish cleanup more economically. EPA’s inspectors (including supervisors and trainers) to “new Superfund paradigm,” is designed to speed enforce health and safety standards for nearly 3.6 up site assessment and initiate activity early in million employers and 55 million workers .73 cleanup so as to reduce “immediate risks.”80 81 Aside from a few planned Superfund incinerator Some contend that these priorities may beat odds inspections, neither the more than 4,000 RCRA with worker protection needs, which might dic- sites that require or have undergone remediation, tate a “go-slow” approach in unusually hazardous nor the 1,354 sites on Superfund’s National Pri- situations or in implementing innovative reme- 74 75 orities List have been targeted as high priori- dies.82 ties for OSHA inspections. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease EPA is the Federal agency with the most ex- Registry (ATSDR) is responsible for determining pertise in hazardous waste operations, but EPA the potential human health impacts of toxic mate- staff are not well prepared to assess or oversee rials released into the environment, and has broad worker health and safety during cleanup. Few of statutory authority to intervene when environ- EPA’s regional staff or project managers have oc- mental contaminants imperil human health,83 cupational health and safety backgrounds. Cur- ATSDR officials are rarely present during clean- rently, none of the staff members of EPA’s Office up operations, however, and focus mostly on pos- of Solid Waste and Emergency Response sible off-site health effects of Superfund and (OSWER) Hazardous Site Control Division are RCRA pollution. 84 In some circumstances, ef- occupational health or safety professionals, EPA forts to mitigate risks to off-site populations may maintains furthermore that it lacks the authority actually increase the health and safety hazards to enforce OSHA’s HAZWOPER standards.76 faced by cleanup workers.85 86 EPA has, at times, neglected to consider work- Neither the assessment of cleanup worker er risks when selecting cleanup options .77 EPA health and safety risks nor the evaluation of officials have acknowledged the need to weigh worker protection programs has high priority for worker health risks against the benefits of partic- the regulatory agencies most involved in imple- ular remediation measures but have developed a menting Superfund and RCRA, The OSHA regu- formal means of doing so only in the past few latory officials who are most knowledgeable months,78 79 and the effectiveness of these pro- about worker protection issues generally are not posed changes has yet to be tested. familiar with environmental cleanup work and To its credit, EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and are rarely present during cleanup operations, Emergency Response (OSWER) has established whereas the EPA regulators who are most famil- the EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force, iar with hazardous waste work know little about consisting of employees from EPA, OSHA, the occupational health and safety matters and refuse National Institute of Occupational Safety and to enforce OSHA standards. The net result is that Chapter l–Overview and Findings I 11

the interpretation and implementation of cleanup told to devote more resources to health and safety worker OSH standards are highly variable and matters. are left, essentially, to the voluntary efforts of The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 87-90 employers. Consequently, the forces that 1970 exempted Federal agencies from the author- drive cleanup operations—particularly the need ity of OSHA to the extent that those agencies to comply with environmental regulations and exercised independent authority over worker the need to address concerns about off-site health safety and health,121 DOE, granted such authori- impacts of pollution-may, in practice, overshad- ty under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Act, ow questions and actions aimed at possible risks is the only Federal agency that claims such an ex- to cleanup workers, emption. DOE Order No. 5483 requires DOE contractors to obey and implement all OSHA CLEANUP WORKER PROTECTION standards. 122 However, OSHA does not have IN THE DOE NUCLEAR WEAPONS right-of-entry or inspection at DOE weapons fa- COMPLEX CLEANUP PROGRAM cilities, nor can it issue citations at DOE facilities The task of cleaning up environmental con- or impose financial or criminal penalties if DOE 123 tamination throughout the Nuclear Weapons contractors fail to comply with these standards. Complex presents greater technical and political The DOE Office of Environmental Restoration challenges than cleanup at private hazardous and Waste Management, which has line manage- waste sites, DOE must grapple with the chal- ment responsibilities for cleanup of the NWC, is lenges of cleanup, even as it confronts other diffi- struggling to establish OSH policies applicable to cult and unfamiliar missions such as nuclear DOE contractor employees engaged in environ- weapons dismantlement. Accomplishing these mental remediation and waste management. EH, missions is likely to require significant changes the DOE office charged with providing indepen- in DOE’s priorities, organizational structure, and dent oversight of occupational health and safety approach to problem solving. programs within DOE and among its contractors, The Secretary of Energy has acknowledged has reorganized, added new safety and health that DOE and its predecessor agencies have his- staff, and is in the process of revising and updat- torically embodied an institutional culture that ing DOE orders, some of which are relevant to valued weapons production over the protection of cleanup worker protection. human health and the environment. 113 Multiple These and other proposed and accomplished expert and government reports have documented actions indicate that DOE has taken a number of DOE’s past inattention to occupational health positive steps to improve worker health and safe- and safety and to environmental protection, ty at its facilities. However, DOE and its contrac- DOE’s past failures in these realms have been tors continue to operate under an organizational pervasive and serious.114 structure that presents serious obstacles to In efforts to alter this record, DOE initiated a progress in safeguarding worker health and safe- number of reforms and issued directives in 1991 ty. OTA notes three major organizational issues and 1992 aimed at improving health and safety that must be confronted if DOE is to institution- programs at its facilities, 115-119 Management realize a “new culture of accountability in environ- sponsibility for worker protection has been reem- ment, safety, and health.” phasized within the DOE organization; its Office First, managers and workers throughout DOE of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) has been and its contractor corps must be convinced that restructured; 120 and DOE’s contractors have been occupational health and safety is truly a top priority of the Department. OTA analysis indicates that this is not now the case. 124-131 In 1990, 12! Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

OSHA found that “pressures to get the job done ability of EH to properly monitor DOE and con- often overrule safety and health concerns.” Some tractor performance in OSH matters is inade- top managers openly derided the significance of quate and is likely to remain so despite progress the “new culture,” and workers also indicated in formalizing contractor assessment protocols, skepticism of health and safety as a serious prior- because of the small numbers of qualified field ity. Today, assertions that DOE management is staff. Actual enforcement of OSH orders is hap- aggressively pursuing staunch worker protection hazard, and the only penalty levied DOE or con- policies are undermined by delays in addressing tractor managers for failure to comply is embar- inadequate OSH practices documented by Tiger rassment. EH, which is charged with providing Teams,132 133 as well as delays in official adop- independent oversight of OSH activities, is not tion of proposed OSH orders; by the failure of truly independent. Its policy recommendations DOE managers to impose penalties on contrac- must, in practice, receive the concurrence of tors who do not enforce sound worker protection other DOE program managers. The EH role is policies; and by reports that DOE facility opera- advisory only; this Office has no authority to en- tions have continued or been resumed before ap- force its own stated policies. propriate safety training and procedures were These three structural flaws in DOE’s ap- completed.134 135 proach to worker protection—lack of strong Second, DOE line organizations require sig- management commitment to OSH priorities; lack nificantly more staff and more resources devoted of sufficient OSH staff and resources in DOE to OSH matters. The DOE approach to worker program offices to carry out stated OSH respon- health and safety protection calls for its line orga- sibilities; and lack of independent oversight or nizations, such as EM, to develop OSH policies enforcement of OSH policies and orders at DOE within the purview of their program missions and facilities-are likely to impede efforts to ensure ensure that contractors implement these policies protection of workers engaged in cleanup of the adequately. In practice, there are far too few OSH Nuclear Weapons Complex. professionals in DOE to accomplish this. DOE In addition, DOE’s decentralized internal or- staff trained or experienced in OSH matters are ganization and the diffuse, multilayered structure scattered throughout the line organizations and of DOE-contractor relationships are likely to in- are frequently found in “advisory” positions with tensify the difficulties with accountability, effi- no real influence. cient communication, and chain of command that As in the private sector, actual cleanup at DOE have hampered the protection of cleanup workers facilities is just beginning. EM, the line organiza- during other hazardous waste operations. tion directly responsible for cleanup, has laid an Finally, because of the scope and complexity important foundation for the DOE cleanup effort of environmental contamination throughout the and may, in time, develop effective and innova- NWC, worker protection issues encountered at tive occupational safety and health programs. non-Federal cleanup sites, including inadequate However, OSH issues have been neglected by characterization of site OSH hazards, poor con- EM thus far, and the Office does not have the tracting procedures, and controversial and vari- staff needed to create or monitor a robust worker able implementation of HAZWOPER, are likely health and safety program for the cleanup. EM to be not only revisited but magnified during the managers, preoccupied with other priorities, ad- DOE cleanup. The DOE institutional structure dress OSH issues only reactively. that will frame OSH policy and practice for the Third, DOE has no reliable or credible proc- cleanup is poorly suited to address many of these ess for rewarding or punishing managers’ per- matters. formance in matters of safety and health. The Chapter l–Overview and Findings 13

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS and interactions with other government agencies and with labor representatives. Opportunities for DOE The challenge of environmental restoration Focus Now and waste management at the DOE Weapons The need to focus high-level management at- Complex provides an opportunity both: to ad- tention and increased resources on protecting vance the state-of-the-art of occupational health those who will do the work of cleaning up is ur- and safety programs for the cleanup workers who gent. Some needed provisions, such as worker will carry out DOE’s new mission of environ- training programs, medical surveillance strate- mental restoration; and to create a model for gies, and emergency response plans, will take keeping the thousands of workers engaged time to develop and implement and must be in worldwide in this task safe and healthy. place when cleanup commences.

Current DOE Approach Inadequate Areas Needing Attention DOE’s current approach to worker health and Key areas where concerted management ef- safety is marked by three major weaknesses: forts could bring needed results are:

● the Department has not established an insti- ● improving characterization data for contam- tutional culture that honors protection of en- inated sites in order to prepare good health vironment, safety and health as fundamental and safety plans; priorities; ● improving contracting practices to ensure ● the DOE Office of Environmental Restora- proper incentives for protecting workers at tion and Waste Management (EM) has not all contracting levels; developed effective OSH policies and pro- ● interpreting and implementing OSHA work- grams for the cleanup or ensured that con- er protection standards and supplementing tractors are implementing appropriate work- these with rigorous management attention to er protection programs; safety and health, including outside over- ● the DOE Office of Environment, Safety and sight; Health (EH) does not have the field staff ● providing for informed and active worker necessary to oversee cleanup worker health participation in protection programs. and safety and does not have sufficient authority to enforce OSH policies and orders Consequences of Failure among DOE line managers and contractors. Failure to prudently and adequately protect cleanup workers at Nuclear Weapons Complex Draw From Experience could have serious consequences. Individual Experience in protecting cleanup workers dur- workers might experience illnesses or injuries ing RCRA corrective actions and Superfund op- that could have been avoided had effective OSH erations has revealed a variety of problems that programs been in place. In addition, concerns have ranged from inadequate health and safety about worker protection might result in schedule delays, increased costs, and erosion in the pub- planning, to poor training to lax enforcement of cleanup worker protection standards. DOE could lie’s faith in proposed cleanup plans. learn from this experience by participating in the EPA/Labor Superfund Health and Safety Task Force, and by initiating additional consultations 14 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES

1 R. Rhodes, The Mak”ng of the Atomic Bomb (New York NY: 20 me Business Ro~d@ble, Improving C0nw74cti0n Safev Sirnon and Schuster, 1986). Pe~ormance, Report A-3 (New Yorlq NY; January 1982, reprinted z U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Complex July 1990). Cleanup-the Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Produc- 21 Ibid. tion, OTA-O-484 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Of- 22 c Rob&04 F< St-, H. Venable, et. al., The Assessment of fice, February, 1991). Hazards in the Construction Industry (National Institute for Occu- 3 Ibid. pational Safety and Health, May 1990). 4 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Corrdng 23 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Clean-Superfund Problems Can Be Solved, OTA-lTE-433 (lVash- (NIOSH), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October, 1989). U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 5 D.M. Mackay, J.A. Cherry, “Groundwater Contamination: (EPA), Occupah”ond Safety and Health Guidance Manual for Haz- Pump-and-Treat Remediatio&” Environmental Science and Tech- ardous Waste Site Activities (Washington DC: U.S. Government nology, vol. 23, No. 6, 1989, pp. 630-636. Printing Office, October 1985), p. 2-1, G C.W. Holmes, R. Lewis, ct. al., “Environmental Restoration u M Gochfe]d, “me Medi~ Surveillance Of -dous Wrote and Waste Management Manpower Needs Assessment: U.S. De- Workers,” Occupational Medicine State of the Art Reviews, vol. 5, partment of Energy Complex,” Contract DE-AC06-76RL0 1830, No. 1, Januaxy-March 1990, p. 3. June 1992. 25 M. Gochfeld, V, Cmpbell, and P. Landsbergis, “Demo~a- 7 Office of Technology Assessment, Complex Cleanup, 1991, phy of the Hazardous Waste Industry,” Occupational Medicine op. at. Stare of the Art Reviews, vol. 5, No. 1, Janq-March 1990, pp. 9- 8 James D. Watkins, Secretary of Department of Energy, “Ten 23. Points Initiative,” reprinted in Occupational Safety and Health Ad- 26 Offlce of Technology Assessment Workshop on cle~uP ministration, Evaluan”on of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Occu- Worker Health and Safety at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, pational Safety and Health Programs for Its Government-Owned Washington DC, May 15, 1991. Contractor -Operated Facilities, December 1990, p. B13. 27 Office of TwhnoIon Assessment-Hazardous waste Action 9 J. Demerit, “Training Under Superfund, ” Toxicology and ln- Contractors (I-WAC) Workshop, Washingto% DC, Sept. 17, 1991. dustria/Health, vol. 5, No. 4, 1989, pp. 103-110. 28 M, Gochfeld, Dirmtor, Occupational Health Divisio% Uni- 10 M GocMeld and J, B~ger, Ynvestigaticms and Activities at versity of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Robert Wood Supcrfund Sites,” Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Re)’iews, Johnson Medical School, persoml communication with T. O’Toole, vol. 5, No. 1, January-March 1990, pp. 127-142. Office of Technology Assessment, April 22, 1991 - 11 N Fiedler, “un~ers~~g stress h H=dous Waste Work 29 office of TechnoloW Assessment, Complex Cleanup, 1991* ers,” Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews, vol. 5, No. 1, op. cit. January-March 1990, pp. 101-108. ~ Office of Technolo~ Assessmen4 Coming Clean, 1%9, oP. IZ J Mefius, ~~Medical s~eiuance for H=dous Waste ‘Ork- cit. crs, ” Journal of Occupational Medicine, vol. 28, No. 8, August 31 DOE po~ts out that its rate of lost workdays due to COns~C- 1986, pp. 679-683. tion-related illnesses or injuries is about half that of the private sec- Is Natio~ Academy of Sciences, Risk Assessment in the Fed- tor. These claims must be tempered by documentation by the Occu- eral Government. Managing the Process (Washington, DC: Na- pational Safety and Health Administration of serious, wide-spread tional Academy Press, 1983), p. 12. errors in DOE’s methods of recording work-related illness or injuxy. 0 14 National Academy of Sciences, Health Effects of Exposure ‘ Also, recent audits of DOE line management oversight of contractor Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, BEIR V (Washington DC: Na- construction practices suggest that DOE’s performance in this area tional Academy Press, 1990). is weak. is A. Stewti, “Healthy worker and Healthy !kvivOr Eff~ts in 32 office of Technolo~ Assessment Workshop on c*e~uP Relation to the Cancer Risks of Radiation Workers,” American Worker Health and Safety at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, Journal of /ndusm”al Medicine, vol. 17, No. 2, 1990, pp. 151-154. op. cit. 16 E. Gil&fi, “studies of Workem Exposed to bW Doses of Ex- 33 P.L. 10@321 . ternal Radiatiou” Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews, M U,st Congress, General Accounting Office, Marshall ~s- vol. 6, No.4, October-December 1991, pp. 665-680. landtitate of the Nuclear Claims Trust Fund, GAOiNSlAD-92- 17 J Go f- Radia~”on-Induced Cancerfiom hw Dose EXPO- 229, (September 1992). sure: An Independent Analy$is (San Francisco, CA: CNR Book Di- 35 K.R, Feinberg, “In the Shadow of Fernald: Who Should Pay vision, 1990). the Victims?” The Brookings Review, summer 1990, pp. 41-46. 18 B+ ~v ad J). we-, Occupational Health-Recognizing 36 Weapons Complex Monitor, “DOE to pay Fernald Citizens and Preventing Work-Related Disease (Bostoq MA Little Brow $73 million in Three Installments,” Feb. 14, 1990, p. 3. 1988), p. 4. 37 R. Bo~o, ~~second Downwin&r Lawsuit Filed,” The SPoke- 19 J .B .Fu- Construction Safety, Security, and ~ss Pre- man Review, Aug. 10, 1990, p. B2. vention (New Yorlq NY: Wiley-Interscience, 1984). Chapter l–Overview and Findings 115

38 Associated Press, “Judge Combines Radiation Lawsuits, ” 55 U.S. Dep~cnt of Energy, Environment, Safety and H~~ Tri-City Herald, Mar. 3, 1991. Office of Environmental Audit, Environmental Survey Preliminary 39 E. Schumacher, “Hanford Spends $39 Million in ~~wycrs,” Report, Los Aiamos National Laboraton, Los Aiamos, New Mexico The Spokesrnarr Reivew, Mar. 8, 1992, p. B6, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 40 Throughout this paper, tie te~ “cleanup worker” includes 1988). all individuals who engage in hazardous waste operations or emer- % u .s .Dep~ment of Energy, Environment, s~ew ad ‘~]~ gency response, Thus, project managers, engineers, supervisors, en- Office of Environmental Audit, Tiger Team Assessment of the Oak wronmental scmntists, technicians, laborers, firefighters, and others Ridge Y-12 Piant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (Washington, DC: U.S. arc all cleanup workers, Government Printing Office, February 1990). ~1 Offlcc of T~hnology Assessment Workshop on DOE Clean- ST u .s .Dep~ent of Energy, Envlronmcnt, Safety and H~lth up Workers, op. cit. Compliance Assessment [)f the Ne)’ada Test Si~e, (Washing[on, DC: ~z oTA_wAc workshop, oP cit. U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990). 43 Env~onmcn(al protection Agency-IArcrr Health and s~cty 5L7 Natio~ Academy of Sciences, Committee to Provide Inter- Task Force, minutes of meeting, June 27, 1992, im Oversight of the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, Commission 44 Offlcc of Hca]th Compliance Assistance, Directorate of C~m- on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources, The Nucicar plmnce Programs, U.S. Dcp,artmcnt of IAor, Occupational Safety Weapons Complex: Management for Health, Safety, ami the Envi- and Health Administmtion, “Draft Protocol for OSHA Compli,ancc ronmertt (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989). Inspections of Supcrfund Inciner:ition Sites,” May 13, 1992. 59 Advisory committee on Nuclear Facility Safety to tic us. ‘s J.T. Hughes, “An Assessment of Training Needs for Worker Department of Energy, “Final Report on DOE Nuclear Facilities,” Safety and Health Programs: Hazardous Waste Operations and November 1991. Emergency Response,” Applied Occupational En~[rorrmentul Hy- 60 u .s .Congress, General Accounting Office, Increased Rating giene, February 1991, p. 116. Resuits in An’ard Fee to Rock} Fiats Contractor, GAO/RCED-92- 46 wm K. Reilly,, A(fminis~~itor, [1 S. Environmental ~otcc- 162 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March tmn Agency, “S(atemcnt Before the Subcommittee on Investiga- 1992), tions and Oversight, Committee on Public Works arid Transportat- 61 Defense Nuc]e~ Fac~]itles Safety Board, “Recommendation ion,” U.S. House of Representatives, Oct. 3, 1991. to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section 2286a(5) 47 U.S. Envlronm~nta] Protection Agency, “Update on SuPcr- A[ornic Energy’ Act of 1954, as amended,” Dec. 19, 1991. fund, ” submitted to Subcomrnittcc on Investigations and Oversight, 62 U.S. General Accounting Off’ice, More Attention to Health Comrnlttcc on Public Works and TrimspottatloI~, U.S. House of and Safety Needc(i at Pantex, GAOmCED-91- 103 (Washington, Representatives, Oct. 3, 1991, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oficc, April 1991). 18 Office of Technology Assessment, ~’orrlln{q Clf’an, 19~9. 63 Richlmd Field Office, U.S. Department of Energy, “DOE In- Op. clt, vcstlgation Board Report Fall-Related Fatality of a Construction 49 u s, DepLirtlnent of ~bor, Occupational Safct}’ and H~lth Worker at Hanford Silc 105-F Building on Apr. 7, 1992,” May Admimstration, Ejuluurlon qf the US. Department of Encr-qy’s Oc- 1992. cupl (Washington, DC: l_I.S, Gov- 67 ;9 CFR 1910.120, ernment I%ntmg Office, August 1987). fi OTA_HWAC Workshop, op. cit. 5L U.S. Department of Energy, Envimnmcnt, S:licty and Iicalth 69 J coca115, rndu~~i,il Eiygicmlst, Office Of Enlergcncy R~- Olflcc of Er~\’ironmcntal Audit, Er~\~rott/)~c~tt{~/ .~ur~ej Prc[iminary sponsc and Rcmcdiation, US. Environmental Protection Agcrrcy, Report, Rock>s Flats Plant, Gol~icn, Cc)lorudo (Washington, DC: Co-chair, EPA-L,abor Health and Safety Task Force, Of flcc of Li. S Govcrnrnent Prmtlng Office, June 1987) Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. Environmcnt:il Protcc- s 7 [r .s .F .ncrgl, Rc$ ~arctl and Dc; c1 opmcnt Ad rmn I Smt ion, tlon Agency; personal communication to T. O’TOOIC, Offlcc of hlound Labor.itory, .Wounii klhorat{)~l E~l\/rl)/l))lt’tl/ul Piutoniurn Tcchnolo~ Assessment. .$/udj, 1974 ~ Sprlngflc]d, VA: National Technical Inforrniition Scr- m Occupatlorlal Safety and Hca]th Administration, Office of Vlcc!, 1975) Hc:tlth Compliiil]ce Assistiu]ce, Directorate of Compliance Pro- -W cl ,S, Dcp:lrtr~lcrlt ~>f Encr~y, Env ironmcnt, Siifety and H~alfll gri!nls, LJ.S Department of Labor, “Protocol for OSHA Compliance Office of Envlronmcntal Audit, F)~\lr~)r/?)tt’~]f, B1/trc, “’] EPA-l~ibor Ficiiltll iirld Safety Task Force, rnlnutcs of rncet- Montunu, ( Wiishlrlgtorl, DC: L’. S (;o~ crnmcnl I’rln(l ng Of( ICC, inp, Sept. 22, 1992, Septcmhcr 1988), 720 r.4-IIW’AC W’orkfhop, op. cll. 16 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

73 Uos, Cowas, (j~~~ AccO@hg Offl% o@O~fOr im- ~ U.S. Dep~ent of Labor, Occupational Safety ~d H~th proving Safety and Health in the Workplace, GAO/HRD-90-66BR. Administration “OSHA Inspection of Bros Hazardous Waste In- (Washington, DC: U.S. Governm ent Printing Offke, August 1990). cinerator Facility,” 1992. 7A U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Superfund 95 OTA.mAC Workshop, oP. cit. prO~tXS,” 9200.1-12, May 1992. 96 OTA wo~op on DOE cleanup workers, Op. cit. 75 Uos, ~v~~en~ protection Agency, “Supplemen@ w oTA-mAc Workshop, oP. cit. terial, National Priorities List Proposed Rule,” EPA 9320-7~51, 9S U.S. ~vhomen~ protection Agency, OffIce of Emergency February 1992, p. 3. and Remedial Response, Risk Assessment Guidance for Super- 76 J. Belagq Regio~ Administrator, U.S. Environmental ~0- fund: vol. 1: Human Health Evaluation Manual, 9285.701A, July tection Agency letter to H. Lenow, Counsel to Hausom Massachu- 1989. Cit setts Permanent Firefighters Association, Apr. 29, 1992. 99 OTA Wo&shop on DOE cl~up Worbrsj ‘pm ” ~ R. H- ~d R. ~uscins~, “fi&ge ROD Ove_d,” Im M. ~Meld and E. Fava@ “Medical !huveitie of ~- Environ Report, Winter 19891Sp~ 1990, p. 1. ardous Waste Workers: Conclusions and Consensus,” Occupan”orud 78 -WA issues ~h for Early Risk Assessment to SCIWII Medicine: State of the Art Reviews, vol. 5, No. 1, January-March Alternatives,” Super@dReport, Jan. 15, 1992. 1990, pp. 151-159. 79 ~ce of fiagemy and Remedial Response, U.S. EnvhOn- 101 0’fA-~Ac wO&ShOp, op. ciL mental Protection Agency, Risk Assessment Guidance for Super- loz ~A-~bor HcxIJth and safety Task Force, minutes Of m@- fimd: Vol.1-Human Health Evaluation Manual, Part B, Develop- ing, Mar. 5, 1991, May 3, 1992. - ment of Risk-Based Preliminary Remediation Goals, (Washington 103 J. Mow D~~tor of Occupiitiond Sddy ~d ‘da ‘ DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, December 1991). borers Health and Safety Fund of North America, “Testimony on so u s. Enviro~en~l. Protection Agency, Office of Solid Proposed Rulemaking on Accreditation of Training Programs for Waste and Emergency Response, “Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Hazardous Waste Operations,” Docket No. S-760-5, U.S. Depart- Model-SACM,” March 1992. ment of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Ad.ministratio@ 81 EpA-~bor H~th and Safety Task Force, mhlutes Of w. 5, Jan. 22, 1991. 1992 meeting. 104 OSHA and NIOSH refer to Site Safety and Hdth pl~ 82 L. MWhy, D~ector, ~dous ~te~S Tr*g, ‘tm- (SSHPS) whereas EPA uses the term Health and Safety Plans. tional Association of Firefighters, personal communication to T, Throughout this documen~ health and safety plan (HASP) is used to O’Toole, July 17, 1992. include all these terms. 83 EpA.~bor H~ti and Safety Task Force, minutes Of ~. 5, 105 OTA-WAC Workshop, op. it. 1992 meeting. 106 OSM promulgated an interim final rule on H~wdous ~ U.S. O&Ice of TecMology Assessmen4 Compkx Cleanup, Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) as 29 1991, op. cit. CAR 1910.120, December 1986; the fti rule was issued on Mar. 85 J, CoCalls, Natioml Institute of OtXupatioml Stiety ~d 6, 1989, with an effective date of Mar. 6, 1990. Health, Environmental Investigation Branch (formerly Co-chair, 107 OTA-WAC Workshop, op. cit. EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force), personal cmmmmica- log U.S. Dep~ent of Labor, Occupational Safety ad He~th tion to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment, August AdrninistratiorL “HAZWOPER Interpretive Quips (IQs),” October 1992. 1992. 86 utter from K.F. Gravit4 Area Director, Occupational s~ety 10955 Federal Register (WAingtoq DC: U.S. Gove~ent and Health AdministratiorL U.S. Department of Labor to J. Merloni, Printing Office, Jan. 26, 1990): “Accreditation of Training Pro- Jr., president Massachusetts Laborer District Council, Oct. 13, grams for Hazardous Waste Operations; Notice of Proposed Rule- 1989. rnaking,” U.S. Department of Labor, pp. 277&2793. ST OTA Wo~op on DOE Cleanup Workers, OP. cit. 110 J. Mo- op. cit. 88 OTA.~AC Workshop, op. cit. 1 I 1 Natioml ~ti~te of Environmental Health Sciences, Ac- 89 U.S. Env~o~en~l Protection Agency-Labor H@lth ad crealtation of Training Programs for Hazardous Waste Operations Safety Task Force, minutes of meeting, Sept. 22, 1992. (March 1990). m U.S. Envirorunen~l protection Agency-Labor H~lth ~d 112 ~temtio~ Association of Firefighters, “Accreditation of Safety Task Force, notes from Mar. 11, 1991 meeting. Training programs for Hamrdous Waste Operations,” Docket No. w U.S. mp~ent of hbor, Occupational Safety ~d H~th S-760-B. U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Administration% “Safety and Health Program Management Guide Health Administratio~ Jan. 22, 1991. lines; Issuance of Voluntary Guidelines” Federal Register, vol. 54, 113 J-es wa~s, secre~, U.S. Department Of Energy, No. 16, pp. 3904-3916, Jan. 26, 1989. “Ten-Point Initiativc+Remarks by James D. Watkins, June 27, ~ U.S. ~p~ent of Labor, Occupational Safety ~ H~th 1989,” reprinted in Evaluation of the U.S. Departme nt of Energy’s Administratio~ “Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Occupational Safety and Health Program for Its Government- Chemicals; Explosives, and Blasting Agents; Final Rule,” Federal Owned Contractor-Operated Facilities, Occupational Safety and Register, vol. 57, No. 36, pp. 6356-6417, Feb. 24, 1991. Health Admi.nistrationj December 1990, op. cit., p. B-1-13. w OTA Wo~op on DOE Cleanup Workers. 114 ~lce of TduwIogy Assessment Complex Cleanup, 1991, op. cit. Chapter l–Overview and Findings ! 17

115 James wa~s, secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, 125 us. Conwess, General Accounting Office, Increased Rar- “Strengthening Line Management and Accountability in DOE Con- ing Results in Award Fee to Rocky Flats Contractor, GAO/RCED- tractor Worker Safety and Health Programs,” memorandm Mar. 92-162 (wWdliIlgtOIlj DC: U.S. GOV emment Printing Office, March 20, 1991. 1992). 116 ~ld, 126 Defense NucleaI Facilities Safety Bored, op. cit. - 117 Jwes wa~, swe~, U.S. Department of Enmgy, “De 127 u-s. Congress, General Accounting Office, op. cit., veloping Strategy For Assigning Rewards and Penalties for Com- GAO/RCED-91-103, (Washington DC: U.S. Government printing pliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration OffIce, April 1991). (OSHA) Regulations and DOE Orders,” memorandum, Mar. 20, 126 U.S. D~~ent of Labor, Occupational Health md Safety 1991. Administiatioq Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Oc- 118 James wa~s, secretary, U.S. Department Of Energy, cupational Safety and Health Program for Its Government-Owned, “Reevaluation of the DOE’s Pending Whistleblower Rule,” Mar. Contrucfor-Operated Facilities (Washington, DC: U.S. Gover- 20, 1991. nment Printing OffIce, December 1990). 119 U,s. Dep~cnt of Energy, OffIce of the press Sarew, 129 Ricwd Field Office, op. Cit. “Secretary of Energy Appoints Environment, Safety and Health 130 Ricwd Field Office, op. cit. Committee,” Mar. 30, 1992. 131 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Worken. no petm Bms~ Acfig Assi.mm Secretary Envkomen4 Safe- 132 weapons Complex Monitor “Hanford Shows Lack of ty and Health+ U.S. Department of Energy to the Secretary, “hnple- Progress on ES&H Issues, DOE Report Says, Aug. 10, 1992, pp. mentation Plan for the Office of Heal@” memorandu% May 18, 19-20. 1990. 133 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, offke Of Safety, Offla of ~- 12139 u.S.C 651-678 (West 1985 and SUpp. 1992), 4@)(l). vironment Safety and Health, “Report on the DOE Occupational 122 us, Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment, Safev Safety and Health Program Review of the Portsmouth Gaseous Dif- and Health, “Contractor Occupational Medical Program, DOE fusion Plant”, October 1992. Order 5480.8A,” June 26, 1992. 1~ Weapons Compffl Monitor “OFNSB Critical of Westing- 123 Executive ~der 12191 gives OSHA authority to tispect house, DOE at Savannah River Plutonium Plant”, Mar. 30, 1992, DOE facilities for the limited purpose of inspecting working condi- pp. 7-8. tions for Federal employees. 135 Adviso~ Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety,op. cit. 124 Advisow Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, oP. cit. Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 2

he United States has had nearly 20 years’ experience with hazardous waste operations at Resource Con- servation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Superfund sites, Much of this work has involved site characteriza- tionT efforts: attempts to identify the nature of site pollutants and to map their locations, concentrations, and environmental transport routes. In addition, emergency removals of contaminants have been carried out at about one-third of all (non-Federal) sites 12 on the National Priorities List (NPL). permanent cleanup activities and construction projects that usually involve more complex and lengthy remediation actions are just getting underway at most sites. Nonetheless, the RCRA-Superfund experience offers important lessons about protecting the health and safety of workers engaged in environmental remediation—lessons that are directly applicable to cleanup of the Nuclear Weapons Complex. The RCRA - WORKER PROTECTION ISSUES WITHIN THE Superfund REGULATORY PROCESS experience offers Competition Between Worker Protection and Other Cleanup Priorities important lessons The environmental laws and regulations that drive the goals about protecting and schedules of most environmental cleanup operations do not assign worker health and safety a high priority. Superfund and worker health RCRA regulations and procedures are complicated, and are intended to guide employers through the multitude of technical & safety uncertainties and necessary assumptions that are inevitably part of environmental remediation.3-5 Amid the complexities and controversies surrounding site characterization, remedial design,

19 20 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

and cleanup, the information and programs need- investigations of worker protection issues associ- ed to ensure the safety and health of cleanup ated with “enclosures” at hazardous waste sites a workers and emergency responders can be over- high priority.9 shadowed or neglected. In setting cleanup priorities, site owners, man- Weak Oversight of Occupational Health agers, and regulators must contend with a range and Safety Rules by Regulators of issues and goals, such as the concerns and pri- The Occupational Safety and Health Act holds orities of local communities, technical obstacles all employers responsible for providing workers to meeting target levels of residual contamina- with “safe and healthful working conditions.”10 tion, legally binding agreements on cleanup The Occupational Safety and Health Admin- schedules or project “milestones,” and cleanup istration (OSHA) standard for Hazardous Waste costs. The importance of worker health and Operations and Emergency Response (HAZ- safety protection may become lost in this welter WOPER), enacted to protect cleanup worker of competing issues, especially when the work- health and safety, mandates a structured, but non- force is unorganized, transient, and inexperi- specific, performance-based approach to worker enced—as is the case for a large proportion of protection during hazardous waste operations 6 cleanup workers —and when work-related ill- and emergency response.ll Under this standard, nesses are not clearly linked to specific work crucial and complex decisions about how to hazards or appear only years after initial expo- identify and mitigate cleanup worker health risks sure. are left to the judgment of individual employers. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease The quality and the comprehensiveness of Registry (ATSDR) is responsible for determining health and safety programs implemented under the potential human health impacts of toxic ma- HAZWOPER at Superfund and RCRA sites are terials released into the environment. ATSDR has reported to vary widely.12 13 These inconsisten- broad statutory authority to evaluate the human cies stem from several sources, including of in- health implications of environmental toxicants, formation gaps and uncertainties about necessary and has occasionally intervened to protect the levels of worker protection; differences in the 7 health of cleanup workers. ATSDR officials are rigorousness with which different employers rarely present during cleanup operations howev- pursue worker safety and health protection; er, and the Agency’s work focuses mostly on OSHA’s failure to issue detailed guidance docu- possible off-site health effects of Superfund and ments that would help employers to interpret and RCRA pollution. apply the broadly worded HAZWOPER regula- In some circumstances, efforts to mitigate tion; and a weak OSHA enforcement effort. risks to off-site populations may increase the OSHA and EPA cooperatively developed an health and safety hazards faced by cleanup work- OSHA inspection protocol for incinerators at 14 ers. For example, at one Superfund site, contrac- Superfund sites. In general, however, OSHA tors proposed construction of a structure to pre- enforcement of HAZWOPER has been weak.15 vent air releases of volatile organic compounds OSHA has about 1,000 inspectors (including su- (VOCs) that were being pumped from contami- pervisors and trainers) to enforce health and safe- nated groundwater. However, workers operating ty standards for almost 3.6 million employers 16 within this structure would have been exposed to and 55 million workers. Aside from the hand- VOC levels that were up to half the concentration ful of planned Superfund incinerator inspections, believed immediately dangerous to life and OSHA has not targeted the more than 4,000 8 health, OSHA and EPA recently agreed to make RCRA sites that may require or have undergone Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 21

remediation, or the 1,354 sites on Superfund’s with environmental cleanup work and are rarely NPL17 18 as high priorities for OSHA inspec- present during cleanup operations. The EPA reg- tions. ulators who are most familiar with hazardous EPA is the Federal agency with the most ex- waste work know little about OSH matters and pertise in hazardous waste operations. However, refuse to enforce OSHA standards. The net result EPA staff are not well prepared to assess or over- is that interpretation and implementation of see worker health and safety during cleanup. Few cleanup worker OSH standards are highly vari- of EPA’s regional staff or project managers have able and are left, essentially, to the voluntary ef- occupational health and safety backgrounds. forts of employers.25-27 Currently, EPA maintains that it does not have the authority to enforce OSHA’s HAZWOPER EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force requirements .19 The EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emer- EPA has, at times, neglected to consider work- gency Response (OSWER) has established the 20 21 er risks when selecting cleanup options. EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force, con- Although EPA officials have acknowledged the sisting of employees from EPA, OS HA, the need to weigh worker health risks against the National Institute of Occupational Safety and benefits of particular remediation measures, they Health (NIOSH), the Army Corps of Engineers have developed a formal means of doing so only (ACE), and representatives of labor unions in the past few months, and the effectiveness of whose members frequently conduct cleanup the proposed changes in EPA’s risk assessment work. Regular meetings of the Task Force have 22 approach has yet to be tested. provided a collegial, nonbureaucratic setting in EPA’s principal goals, which are largely a re- which participants can discuss problems associ- sponse to public and congressional pressures, are ated with the interpretation and enforcement of to reduce the time needed to complete the RCRA HAZWOPER from a technical and professional and Superfund processes, and to accomplish perspective, 28 outside the policymaking process. cleanup more cheaply. A recent proposal for a The Task Force is situated in the EPA office “new Superfund paradigm” is designed to speed that has line control over remedial action pro- up site assessments and initiate activities early on grams. Task Force members believe this organi- in the cleanup process to reduce “immediate zational position gives it greater authority and 23 risks.” It is not clear how this new paradigm persuasive powers with contractors and construc- will affect cleanup worker health and safety. tion managers than if it were located in a health Some contend that these “faster, cheaper” priori- and safety oversight unit. ties are at odds with worker protection needs, The Task Force has facilitated the clarification which might in certain cases dictate a “go-slow” and integration of EPA, OSHA, and ACE poli- approach to unusually hazardous situations or cies, and has been constructive in identifying 24 when implementing innovative remedies. some of the more pressing and pervasive worker Neither the assessment of cleanup worker protection problems at RCRA and Superfund health and safety risks nor the evaluation of pro- sites. One major accomplishment of the group is posed and implemented worker protection pro- the preparation of “fact sheets,” or simplified grams has high priority for the regulatory agen- guidance documents, on topics that have been cies most involved with the implementation of problematic at Superfund sites.29-34 Other ac- Superfund and RCRA. The OSHA regulatory of- complishments that have been stimulated by ficials who are most knowledgeable about work- needs identified by the Task Force include a er protection issues generally are not familiar Memoranda of Understanding between OSHA 22 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

and EPA that provide EPA funding to train plished by ensuring that worker risks area specif- OSHA personnel and develop a protocol for OSH ic focus of initial characterization efforts, requir- inspections of hazardous waste incinerator opera- ing management to take proper heed of site haz- tions.35 36 ards, and instituting appropriate emergency The Task Force represents a multidisciplinary, response plans. Such actions could improve com- interagency, cooperative effort that has proved munity acceptance of cleanup plans and thereby extremely useful in developing viable approaches expedite the remediation process. to worker health and safety protection in the environmental cleanup industry. EPA’s OSWER de- Worker Protection Needs and Site serves credit for initiating and supporting the Characterization Task Force. Yet despite such progress, the Task Site characterization activities are especially Force appears to enjoy only limited support important to efforts to protect cleanup workers. among EPA and OSHA policymakers. EPA has Characterization data obtained during the not hired any health or safety professionals to re- Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) place the two industrial hygienists who formerly process in Superfund cleanups and during RCRA staffed OSWER's Design and Construction Facility Investigation (RFI) efforts are supposed Management Branch. OSHA, too, was initially to provide information about the presence, loca- reluctant to participate in the incinerator inspection, and concentration of hazardous contami- tion project. nants so that appropriate engineering responses Some evidence suggests that EPA staff per- to the pollution can be devised.46 ceive Task Force suggestions and findings as po- EPA requires that potential remediation alter- 47 tential impediments to the achievement of other natives at Superfund sites be assessed against agency goals, such as the speedy completion of nine criteria that include overall protection of 37-39 There is some justificatiion for such cleanup. human health and the short-term effectiveness of concern. One issue that the Task Force has raised different cleanup technologies-thus implying repeatedly is the inadequacy of site characteri- the obligation to consider risks to cleanup work- 48 zation data with respect to the identification of ers. Practitioners and health professionals con- potential safety hazards and worker health sulted by the Office of Technology Assessment risks. 40-42 provisions that would allow revision of (OTA) maintain, however, that in practice, other or additions to the regional site characterization criteria—particularly “implementability” and so as to better support HASPS might delay clean- cost—weigh more heavily than protection of up schedules. cleanup worker health and safety. In practice, The Task Force has also focused attention on possible threats to cleanup workers are seldom the inadequacy of emergency response plans at considered at the outset of site characterization some Superfund sites. Lack of appropriate train- efforts, and such issues are rarely factored into ing and equipment on the part of municipal fire- decisions about environmental sampling strate- 49-51 fighters who might be called on to respond to gies. Consequently, RI/FS and RFI data fre- emergencies during the cleanup operation is of 43-45 quently fail to provide the information needed to Remedying these prob- particular concern. determine the nature or seriousness of the health lems may be time consuming and costly. and safety hazards that cleanup workers might Since EPA is under considerable pressure to encounter and do not always translate into useful demonstrate rapid progress in moving waste sites information about potential worker exposures, through to closure, delays are of concern to health risks, or necessary protection levels.52 OSWER staff. However, avoiding delays in future cleanup schedules might best be accom- Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 23

RI/FS and RFI data are the foundation on methods to ensure accurate determinations of 56 which site-specific worker health and safety worker exposure. Most standards do not in- plans are formulated. Health and safety plans clude monitoring requirements, however, and in (HASPS) are legally mandated documents in- any case, many of the substances found at waste tended to identify specific hazards workers might sites are not addressed by OSHA regulations.57 face and provide a blueprint of worker protection Careful consideration of sampling strategies, programs and safe work practices to be followed measurement methods, and quality assurance (QA) programs is essential if environmental monitoring data are to be successfully applied to worker protection programs, The National Academy of Sciences, in its recently published report on monitoring exposure to airborne pollutants, has estimated that 15 to 25 percent of the total monitoring budget should be expended on QA.58 Attempts to organize environmental monitoring programs for cleanup workers are constrained by the technical limitations of available monitoring equipment; real-time instruments suitable for field use are especially needed. (See box 2-B.) The logistic complexities of assaying worker exposures under the changeable conditions of many PPE is needed to prevent worker exposure to hazardous waste operations and most emergency contamination when the nature and extent of toxic response scenarios are also problematic. Finally, pollutants is uncertain, These workers wear protective clothing and respirators while drilling the costs associated with robust worker monitor- sampling wells. ing programs can be considerable, and such in- vestments are not always recognized as high pri- during cleanup activities. HASPS are a key ele- orities in contract negotiations.59 60 ment of OSHA’s HAZWOPER standard, the EPA recognizes that environmental sampling major Federal regulation governing the occupa- strategies used in Superfund and RCRA cleanup tional health and safety of cleanup workers. If are often poorly conceptualized, and has empha- site hazards are not recognized in characteriza- sized the need to link environmental monitoring tion studies, HASPS are likely to be flawed. data to specific information needs and to involve The failure of RI/FS and RFI data to provide risk assessors and other health professionals sufficient information to support sound and effi- early on in data collection strategies.61 EPA has cient worker protection programs reflects a per- recently issued interim guidelines for risk assess- vasive lack of focus in site characterization stud- ment at Superfund sites that aim to streamline en- 53 54 ies. Decisions about what substances to look vironmental sampling and to address directly the for at contaminated sites, what instruments to potential worker risks associated with imple- use, how long or often to carry out monitoring, menting selected cleanup remedies.62 63 This etc., are very site specific, require considerable new approach may prove useful if it truly does di- professional judgment, and are not readily pre- rect more attention toward characterizing risks to scribed by regulations (see box 2-A).55 cleanup workers. There is some danger, however, OSHA standards for some toxic substances that EPA’s eagerness to make site evaluations (e.g., lead, benzene) mandate specific monitoring shorter and less expensive could counteract the 24 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Box 2-A—Environmental Monitoring and Worker Protection at Hazardous Waste Sites: How Much Is Enough? The purpose of environmental monitoring at hazadous waste sites is to identify the type and quantity of site contaminants, and to map envviromnmental transport pathways, current boundaries, and probable future migration patterns of the contamination. The appropriateness and efficiency of the traditional approach to environmental monitoring at hazardous waste sites have been controversial Some experts are frustrated with the delays and costs associated with laborious efforts to “study a site to death,” whereas others complain that hasty and possibly ineffective cleanup remedies are being imposed before the nature of the contamination● is understood. At many Superfund sites, enormous amounts of data are collected to no purpose because monitoring programs not integrated with the information requirements of proposed remediation tasks, risk assessment activities, or worker protection programs. For example, at a Superfund site in EPA Region II, large numbers of environmental samples were collected and analyzed during incineration of lagoon sludge containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and other toxic materi als. The results of these analyses were not routinely reviewed by health and safety professionals, nor were they used to confirm or improve the effectiveness of ongoing occupational safety and health (OSH) procedures.l 2 Decisions about what substances to look for contaminated sites, what instruments to use, how long or often to carry out monitoring, etc., are very site specific, require considerable professional judgment, and cannot be readily prescribed by regulations. Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard on Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) requires environmental monitoring at toxic waste sites, it does not specify that the highest exposures to most hazardous materials be monitored. OSHA standards for some toxic substances (e.g., lead, benzene) mandate specific monitoring methods to ensure accurate determinations of worker exposure.3 Most standards do not include monitoring requirements, however, and in any case, many of the substances found at waste sites are not addressed by OSHA regulations. 1 Joee#l coceli& CO-CIUU“ , Us. w “ 1 ~ A&v-= Heahh md Safety Task rbrce, pemenal co rmnmicatiim to T. O’Toole, Aug. 19,1992 2 R. Curtis, Dixector, Ocmpetieml S@y md Heal& Admidmmd “in’s HeeIth Respanse T- U.S. Depamwm of Labor, letter to J. Rocbe, Residcat hgineer, U.S. Almy ~ of e, Aug. 17,1992. 3 U.S. Caqpw, Ommd A~ CMce, Occupational Safety and Health: Options for Improving Health and S~ety in the Wor&place, GAO/HRD-90-66BR (Augwt 1990). benefits of an increased focus on cleanup worker quired. A typical cleanup operation will include health and safety. officials of State and Federal regulatory agencies; managers of contracting firms and subcontrac- PROBLEMS WITH CONTRACTING tors; and an array of organized and unorganized PRACTICES laborers, skilled workers, technicians, scientists, 66 The sprawling, complicated A multilayered managerial structure encom- and engineers. passing a large number and variety of employers structure of such a work force generates signifi- is an important feature of most cleanup opera- cant management challenges to protecting clean- tions. 64 65 Waste sites undergoing cleanup resem- up worker safety and health. ble more routine construction sites, with many Contractual agreements among site owners, tasks proceeding simultaneously and with work- prime contractors, and subcontractors are the ers employed by multiple contractors or subcon- principal mechanisms for establishing the occu- tractors coming and going as their skills are re- pational health and safety programs that will be —

Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 25

Box 2-A—Continued Unusual or episodic exposures like those that occur during accidents may represent some of the most serious health threats at waste sites, but such exposures would not be noted during routine monitoring. Thus, inhalational exposures that occur during unusual wind conditions, or dermal exposures that occur when a drum is pierced accidentally or when personal protective equipment fails, are not easily anticipated or documented by routine environmental monitoring. Also, monitoring data may reflect only average exposures when biological effects are determined by peak concentrations. Monitoring that measures ambient conditions may fail to reflect the actual exposure of particular individuals. Disputes over the accuracy and adequacy of characterization data, and how these data inform interpretations of worker health risks, have caused delays in cleanup schedules at Superfund sites and Resource Conservation and Recover Act (RCRA) facilities. At a Superfund site in Massachusetts, for example, the prime contractor was unable to produce characterization data justifying the designated boundaries of supposedly uncontaminated areas. Work was halted for several months while the prime contractor, labor representatives, and regional Environmental Protection Agency and OSHA officials attempted to resolve the controversy. Additional environmental sampling was eventually necessary.4 5 Phase I contract costs increased by $1.3 million as a result of response actions associated with safety and health issues. 6 The regarding the adequacy of site characterization data spilled over into local communities, led citizens to question the wisdom of the entire cleanup plan, and contributed to additional delays in cleanup schedules.7 At the Nyanza Superfund site in New England, characterization data failed to identify important site contaminants, and the HASP resulting from this inaccurate picture of site hazards proved inadequate to protect workers.8Employees working without protective gear, in a supposedly “clean” area of the site, un- covered drums containing unidentified materials. Six workers became ill; one was hospitalized. At this same site, it was discovered-after cleanup work had begun-that no methods existed for detecting potentially dangerous levels of methylmercury found on-site.9 Cleanup had to be halted for several months while monitoring procedures and safe work practices were devised. 4 L Mqhy, ‘*Cn~i~ in ~ F~ ~~i~,” fhlfeR0C12 pIIXX%dhI&S of ~ ‘kt Protection Agency Design and Construction Issues at Hazardous Waste Sites Conference, Dallas, TX, May 1-3,1991, EPA 540/8-91fl12, p. 828. 5P. Gratin, Area Director, U.S. Depmnent of Labor, Occupational Safety and Healt& letter to J. Merloni, Jr., President, Massachusetts Laborers’ Dishict blXIC& Oct. 13, 1989. 6 J. Cocalis, Co-Chair, EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Pmce, personal cornmuni cation to T. O’Toole, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Aug. 19, 1992. 7 J. MorQ Co-Chair, EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force, personal communi cstion to T. O’Toole, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, June 23, 1992. s Ibid. 9 James Merloni, Jr., Administrator, New 13@and Laborers’ Training and Trust FUOL letter to Congressman Joseph D. Early, U.S. House of Repnxentatives, July 13, 1989. followed during cleanup operations. From the matched to appropriate worker protection strate- perspective of occupational safety and health, gies. cleanup contracts must ensure that site HASPS Unless occupational health and safety pro- adequately address site hazards and worker risks, grams included in contract bids are critically re- and that employers are held accountable for viewed and the health and safety records of com- implementing such plans. Contracts must also peting bidders are taken into account, companies be sufficiently flexible to allow individual con- offering cheaper, less stringent worker protection tractors or subcontractors to negotiate changes in programs may have an unwarranted advantage the original HASPS as work progresses so that over firms whose bids include more rigorous the evolving understanding of site hazards is OSH plans. Contract proposals that incorporate

331-056 0 - 93 - 3 QL 3 26 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Box 2-B-Environmental Monitoring: Technical Limitations

Environmental monitoring methods can be divided into measurements obtained via direct-reading instruments and those obtained by sample collection with laboratory analysis of results. Direct-reading field instruments provide instantaneous readings, albeit of a somewhat general nature, for some groups of contaminants. Laboratory analysis of environmental samples can provide more specific information about the types and concentrations of contaminants, and is usually required for purposes of legal documentation, but time (hours, days, weeks, or months) is needed to obtain the results. Direct-reading monitoring instruments are becoming increasingly available and have several advantages.l Immediate availability of contaminant measures is obviously useful, eliminating both the time and the costs required for laboratory analyses. Direct-reading instruments are invaluable for certain aspects of cleanup, such as the early stages of site investigation, or during confined entry procedures when means of detecting very high levels of contaminants that might pose immediate danger to life or health are required. Direct-reading equipment is available to detect flammable or explosive atmospheres, oxygen deficiency, the presence or absence of organic vapors, some contaminants in soil or groundwater, and surface contamination by radionuclides.2 Direct-reading instruments are also useful for identifying changing conditions at a site to alert personnel that additional caution may be warranted. For example, direct-reading instrumentation can be used to monitor drilling or drum-packing operations. If an area of highly concentrated chemicals is penetrated or a drum leak occurs, abruptly high direct readings of contaminant concentration could prompt an immediate reevaluation of the health and safety procedures in effect and possibly prevent worker exposure. Significant limitations attend the use of most direct reading field instruments, however.3 Low concentrations of contaminants are not easily detected by direct-reading equipment, and often only classes of contaminants, not specific chemicals, can be identified Some contaminants cannot be detected by such equipment, and most direct-reading instruments are not sensitive enough to detect low levels of contamination that may be of concern. Most instruments cannot detect airborne concentrations of less than 1 part per million. In some cases, subsequent laboratory analysis of samples is necessary to verify results of such direct- reading instruments, particularly when monitoring results are being used for litigation or regulatory purposes. Direct-reading instruments require careful calibration and must be operated by skilled personnel who understand their limitations and idiosyncrasies. The interpretation of values given by direct-reading equipment is not necessarily straightforward4 There is potential interference by other contaminants, and appropriate sampling protocols for use of this equipment have not been well established. Direct-reading equipment is essential for many worker protection monitoring programs, but as the National Academy of Sciences noted, there are major research and development needs in this areas

W. Chudyk, “Field Screening of Hazardous Wsste Sitis;’Emirome~l Sciewe &Technology, WA 23, No. 5, 1989, 21 pp. 504-507. Us. ~ Pm@iou Agency, CM&e of Euxwgency and Remedial Respmse, “Estabiisbing Work Zones at Uncontro I.led Hazardous Waste Sites,” Publication 9285.2-06FS, April 1991. 3 ~& 4 Office of Technology Assessnxmt Workshop cm DOE Cleanup Workem, op. cit. 5 N~~ Ac~my of ~=$, H~n @osureAssessment for Airborne Po1l- ~~ D(!: National kXUk321y PRX?S), 1991. vague or boilerplate HASPS may militate against costs of additional investigations into potential firms that insist on more rigorous or comprehen- site hazards.67 sive occupational health and safety programs or It is important that contract bids and awards be that wish to include in their contract bids the reviewed by persons who are informed about ac- —.————— — ..——.

Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 127

tual site conditions, who recognize the limita- and health programs or procedures applicable to tions of available characterization data, and who environmental cleanup activities. have sufficient technical background to evaluate HAZWOPER is a complex regulation of many occupational health and safety needs.68 Other- parts (see figure 2-1).75 The standard requires wise, the programs required to protect cleanup employers to consider systematically the poten- workers may be negotiated out of contract agree- tial hazards to cleanup workers at specific waste ments. sites, and to develop procedures to explicitly Negotiators who lack professional training in gauge and avoid, or mitigate such hazards. HAZ- occupational health and safety, or are unfamiliar WOPER acknowledges the uncertainty inherent with the great uncertainties about site hazards in hazardous waste operations and mandates sev- and worker risk that pervade hazardous waste eral strategies for dealing with this uncertainty, operations, may fail to recognize the need for Figure 2-l—Elements of Site-Specific Health and prudent, proactive approaches to worker protec- Safety Plans Required by HAZWOPER 69 tion. Some OSH professionals have com- (29 CFR 1910.120(a)-(o)) plained to OTA that the lack of occupational health and safety expertise among Federal contract negotiators has made it difficult to ensure a. Scope, application, and definitions adequate levels of worker protection during b. Safety and health program cleanup operations.70 c. Site characterization and analysis

EFFECTIVENESS OF CLEANUP WORKER d. Site control HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATIONS e. Training

Overview of OSHA’s Hazardous Waste f. Medical surveillance Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) Standard g. Engineering controls, work practices, and personal protective equipment for Congress has recognized that workers engaged employee protection in hazardous waste and emergency response operations face special health risks .71 The h. Monitoring

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act i. Informational programs of 198672 required OSHA and EPA to establish regulations to protect such workers. Accordingly, j. Handling drums and containers

EPA and OSHA promulgated identical regula- k. Decontamination tions,73 the so-called HAZWOPER standard, to protect workers engaged in hazardous waste op- l. Emergency response by employees at erations and emergency response.74 uncontrolled hazardous waste sites Many different laws and regulations, promul- m. Illumination gated by both Federal and State authorities, can affect cleanup worker health and safety. How- n. Sanitation at temporary workplaces ever, HAZWOPER targets workers engaged in o. New technology programs hazardous waste operations and emergency re- — sponse, and is the most comprehensive and spe- SOURCE: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid cific regulation governing occupational safety Waste and Emergency Response, “Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response,” April 1991. 28 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

including requirements for task-specific hazard ence firms engaged in hazardous waste manage- or risk analyses to assess the possible dangers of ment, notes that the technological uncertainties particular jobs; ongoing environmental monitor- of hazardous waste work incur “enormous busi- ing to evaluate worker exposure during cleanup; ness risks” and “create many opportunities for medical surveillance programs for certain cate- large legal liability exposures.”83 HWAC notes gories of workers; worker health and safety train- that regulatory guidance documents provide imp- ing to equip individual workers to respond appro- ortant clues to interpreting hazardous waste priately to health threats they might face in the statutes and regulations-and hence are a crucial course of their jobs; and written, “regularly re- hedge against future liability. hearsed,” emergency response plans to handle Two years have passed since the final HAZ- “anticipated emergencies.” WOPER rule was published, but OSHA has not yet issued guidance on how critical parts of the HAZWOPER LACKS DETAILED GUIDANCE regulation should be interpreted or put into prac- HAZWOPER is a performance-based stan- tice. The lack of specificity of many HAZWOP- dard. It describes broad goals that the law aims to ER provisions, combined with the absence achieve, but does not include detailed instruc- of comprehensive compliance guidance from tions on how employers should reach these OSHA, has made it difficult for employers and 76 goals. The diversity of hazards, setttings, and regulators to apply the standard in particular situ- work tasks encompassed by environmental clean- ations. Consequently, HAZWOPER has been up operations, and the “uncontrolled” nature of variously interpreted by employers and Federal the pollutants at issue, generally preclude the use officials in different OSHA and EPA regions.8485 of explicitly prescribed engineering and mechan- For example, for some toxic substances, ical controls to eliminate site safety and health OSHA standards specify workplace air concen- hazards or to prevent exposure to such hazards.77- trations that constitute “action levels.”86 When 79 The lack of scientific understanding of the monitoring indicates that action levels have been health impacts of environmental toxicants further attained, OSHA mandates that particular re- complicates attempts to dictate specific worker sponses be triggered, such as the initiation of protective measures. medical surveillance and the use of personal pro- The rigor with which elements of HAZWOP- tective equipment. 87 88 Many of the contaminants ER are implemented varies greatly, in part be- found at hazardous waste sites are not addressed cause key components of the regulation are by OSHA regulations, however. Employers are worded vaguely and subject to different interpre- thus left to determine what concentrations of 80-82 tations. Most Federal regulations are accom- contaminants in different media should be con- panied by preambles, guidance documents, and sidered action levels and what actions should be other materials that describe the history, intent, triggered. Different employers at the same clean- and appropriate application of the regulation. up site may use different action levels.89 EPA, for example, has issued many guidance Some of the variability in implementing HAZ- documents pertinent to aspects of Superfund WOPER is due to “information vacuums”-a cleanups. OSHA also typically publishes guid- virtual absence of toxicological data, exposure ance documents to inform employers and its own monitoring technology, or both. For example, inspectors about how specific regulations should there is no toxicological information regarding be applied and to ensure that regulations are en- the cancer-causing potential of 75 to 85 percent forced in a consistent manner. of all chemicals in commercial use.90 The data Hazardous Waste Action Contractors (HWAC), base on noncancer health effects due to exposure a major trade association of engineering and sci- to environmental toxicants (e.g., neurological, Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 29

immunological, or reproductive effects) is se- verely limited in nearly all cases.91-93 The lack of clear regulatory guidance has caused the HAZWOPER standard to be implemented in ways that are inconsistent, inefficient, and in some cases ineffective. 94 There is a need to establish uniform, validated methods for calc- ulating probable worker exposure from given levels of pollutants in certain media. There is also a need for regulatory guidance on how to assign action levels for some common site contaminants and what worker protection measures should be Workers moving drums of hazardous waste. triggered when action levels are reached.

● employers determine what doctors are com- EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY UNDER HAZWOPER petent to design and manage medical sur- Although all employers are responsible for veillance programs; and providing “safe and healthful working condi- ● employers are the final arbiters of whether 95 tions,” employer responsibility for the health and how to alter worker protection strategies and safety of cleanup workers is especially bur- based on the results of medical surveillance densome because of the unpredictable and vari- or environmental monitoring. able nature of cleanup work, the performance- based structure of HAZWOPER, and the lack of EPA has made it clear that prime contractors interpretive guidance from OSHA, Under HAZ- will be held responsible for inadequate health 96 WOPER, employers must determine whether a and safety plans submitted by subcontractors. particular job is hazardous, assess the degree of The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir- risk involved, and design the appropriate protec- cuit ruled recently that the U.S. Army Corps of tion strategies to be followed. These decisions are Engineers is responsible for failing to enforce its usually made under conditions of great uncer- own health and safety plan, and is liable for a tainty and with little-or contradictory-scientif- subcontractor’s failure to follow ACE safety pro- 97 ic evidence in support of a given course of action. cedures. Under HAZWOPER: OSHA has indicated that employers are responsible for conducting site characterization ● employers assess the adequacy of environ- studies that accurately portray potential worker mental characterization data for identifying hazards. In a number of instances, OSHA has is- site hazards; sued citations to both prime contractors and sub- ● employers interpret these data and deter- 98- contractors for failure to identify site hazards, n mine whether and which potential risks are 100 Employers have challenged such citations ‘ important; the grounds that the lack of comprehensive com- ● employers decide how risks to worker will pliance guidance for HAZWOPER makes it im- be mitigated, what level of protective gear is possible to know whether characterization data needed, and what levels of worker exposure accurately portray site hazards, what level of de- to potentially hazardous-and sometimes tail must be included in site health and safety unregulated-materials are acceptable; plans, or what specific occupational safety and health strategies should be implemented to protect workers against uncertain risks.101 102 30 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

These objections are undercut by HAZWOP- HEALTH AND SAFETY PLANS ER’s clear directive that in the event worker risks HAZWOPER requires that a detailed health or exposures are unknown or unquantified, work- and safety plan be in place before any characteri- 103 It is not practice- ers should be fully protected. zation or cleanup work begins. The site-specific ble, however, to outfit workers in full protective HASP is intended to establish comprehensive gear whenever indeterminate exposures to uncer- health and safety principles and practices to be tain risks are encountered or anticipated: such followed by all employees working on-site dur- uncertainties are simply too pervasive in cleanup ing normal operations or during emergencies. work. Regulatory guidance providing rational, The HASP is the essential starting point of an ad- consistent approaches to some of the major, com- equate occupational health and safety program at mon questions regarding interpretation and im- cleanup sites. plementation of HAZWOPER could aid employ- According to HAZWOPER, the HASP must ers and simplify OSHA’s enforcement efforts. identify all the safety and health hazards that a site is believed to harbor. An understanding of Problems With Specific site hazards must then be linked to planned work HAZWOPER Elements tasks. Potential worker health and safety threats Most OSHA health standards mandate the use associated with particular jobs must be anticipat- of specific engineering and mechanical controls ed via hazard analyses, risk assessments, or other designed to limit worker exposure to potentially disciplined methods of scrutiny. Strategies for 104 dangerous materials. The diversity of hazards, worker protection must be devised, such as the settings, and work tasks encompassed by envi- use of environmental and worker monitoring, ronmental cleanup operations—and the “uncon- medical surveillance, emergency response plans, trolled” nature of the environmental contami- worker health and safety training and the use of nants at issue—render this approach impractical personal protective gear. The organizational for many hazardous waste operations, however. structure of the cleanup operation must be de- Instead, HAZWOPER provides a framework for scribed and provisions made for the protection of anticipating and responding to potential health off-site populations during cleanup activities. A and safety risks encountered during environmen- written HASP must be in place before any tal restoration activities, and specifies a number characterization or mediation work begins, and it of elements that must be included in cleanup must be updated annually or whenever additional worker protection strategies. information about the site is acquired and work Some of the most critical elements of the plans change. HAZWOPER approach are subject to disparate Experience at Superfund sites and RCRA fa- 105 interpretations. The performance-based lan- cilities has revealed a number of problems as- guage of the standard has allowed employers to sociated with HAZWOPER-mandated HASPS. implement aspects of HAZWOPER in widely HASPS formulated on the basis of erroneous or differing ways, and the validity and appropriate- incomplete information about site conditions or ness of these various approaches have been hotly cleanup plans may promote inappropriate health 106 disputed. The design and enforcement of site- and safety practices. As noted earlier, characteri- specific health and safety plans, the designation zation data available when HASPS are written of work zones, and the development of medical may fail to identify significant site hazards. surveillance programs have proved especially Important potential worker risks may therefore contentious and are discussed below. be missed or inaccurately assessed. Alternatively, if insufficient information is available about a po- Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 31

tential exposure hazard, the HASP may recom- employee received first- and second-degree burns mend an unnecessarily stringent approach to over 40 percent of his body. The ACE investiga- worker protection. Fully encapsulated clothing tion team that reviewed the incident noted that fa- and respirators decrease a worker’s ability to talities would have been a near certainty if other 114 communicate and impose risks of heat stress, re- workers had been in the area, This accident duced peripheral vision, and physical clumsiness occurred after more than 12,000 tons of contamin- on workers. These may be important factors in ated soil had been incinerated successfully. hot climates or in situations where agility or the Changes in the composition of the soil being ability to make a rapid exit is necessary. treated significantly affected the behavior of the Experience at cleanup sites indicates that in incinerator and eventually led to the massive some cases the written provisions of the HASP, overpressure that resulted in explosion. Smaller although adequate, are not enforced by either the explosions had occurred prior to the accident, prime contractor or regulators, and do not reflect causing temporary and automatic shutdown of actual site conditions or work practices.107 108 the plant, but they were not fully investigated or This was reportedly the case at two Superfund allowed to interrupt production.115 sites in New Bedford, Massachusetts, where Another incinerator accident resulted in the mandated emergency response plans exist only hospitalization of three workers. Once again, fail- on paper. At the New Bedford Harbor site, where ure to persistently scrutinize potential worker plans call for polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) risks resulted in injuries. In this case, slag and contaminated sediment to be dredged from the soil deposits were known to collect in the inciner- harbor and incinerated, the water supply avail- ator quench tank during burns of contaminated able in the event of a fire is only 25 percent of soil, and workers had to remove this material that called for in the written HASP.109 110 The manually between burns. On at least two occa- New Bedford Fire Chief has publicly stated that sions, workers refused to enter the tank for fear of his department lacks the training and equipment being hit by falling pieces of hot slag, but man- needed to respond to emergencies at either of the agers failed to inspect the burner chamber for two local Superfund sites, and has prohibited slag buildup to determin e the danger to workers members of his department from entering either operating in the tank below. On the day of the ac- of these sites.111 112 cident, two workers were inside the quench tank, Another problem with many HASPS is the ten- shoveling slag onto the tank portal, when approx- dency to concentrate on potential worker health imately 3 cubic yards of slag/soil fell from the threats (e.g., long-term cancer risks) while pay- burner. These workers received second- and ing little attention to more immediate site safety third-degree burns over 30 percent and 75 percent 113 risks. problems encountered at hazardous of their bodies. Five other workers who had waste incinerators illustrate the seriousness of joined in the rescue effort were taken to the hos- safety risks and the need for detailed analyses of pital for evaluation of lung irritation from breath- potential hazards and ongoing vigilance in evalu- ing the fine dust particles released when the slag ating risks and altering worker protection strate- fell. One of these workers was hospitalized with gies as cleanup proceeds and site operations pulmonary edema.116 change. At one site, while soils contaminated with ex- WORK ZONES plosives were being incinerated, an explosion re- OSHA has determined that wastes sites may sulted in more than $200,000 in property damage be divided into zones, according to the “poten- and more than $1 million in costs for research, tial” for worker exposure to hazardous materials incinerator redesign, and lost production. One 32 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Figure 2-2—illustration of Typical Work Zones at Hazardous Waste Sites

\ \\ . . “ “. “ l--i+ 0 Command post

\ Prevailing wind direction *,\

—.— —====siL- , d

—

SOURCE: U S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, “Establishing Work Zones at Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites,” April 1991. (see figure 2-2). Exclusion or “hot” zones should yond instruction in the proper evacuation proce- include all areas where workers are “potentially” dures in case of emergency.l19 exposed to contaminants in excess of OSHA’s Limiting the hot zone confers logistic and eco- published Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs). nomic advantages because outside this zone, ap- Access to such areas should be restricted to those plicable HAZWOPER training provisions are who have received certain levels of health and less rigorous, decontaminatiion procedures need safety training and who are equipped with appro- not be followed, workers do not have to use spe- priate personal protective gear. Decontamina- cial protective gear, and work can generally pro- tion procedures must be followed when people ceed in a less rigid and more rapid fashion. Yet or items of equipment leave such exclusion OSHA offers little guidance on how employers 117 118 zones.. should determine if workers are “potentially ex- On the periphery of hot zones are contaminat- posed” to hazardous materials, other than to note ion reduction zones (CRZS), where decontami- that such exposures120 121 include “accidental or possi- nation procedures take place. Beyond the CRZs ble exposure.” OSHA provides no sugges- are support zones, which should be free from tions about what to do if a site contains contamin- contamination or exposure hazards. According to ants that are not regulated or have no “published HAZWOPER, workers in the support zone need levels,’’ 122 nor does it suggest how employers no special protective equipment or training be- Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 33

exposures and risks, different employers make use of different assumptions, which result in differing estimates of allowable exposure levels.123

MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE Medical surveillance in the workplace refers to the periodic and systematic collection and analysis of data about workers’ health and workplace conditions, with the aim of detecting “illnesses or health trends that indicate a possible adverse effect of workplace exposures” before serious disease has become evident or the worker would normally seek medical advice,124 In addition to indicating the effectiveness of worker protection from hazards and providing early recognition of work-related health effects, medical surveillance programs may also:

● contribute valuable information to studies of long-term health impacts of occupational exposures among groups of workers, and ● allow evaluation of an individual worker’s . $- - 4. “fitness” to carry out particular job tasks or to cope with physical stresses such as wear- ing respirators or encapsulated clothing. 125

Decontamination procedures must be carried out The information collected in medical surveil- when workers leave “hot zones” for uncontaminated lance programs may take the form of question- or “clean” areas of the site. naires, physical exams, medical tests such as x rays or blood analyses, or environmental moni- should gauge risks to workers exposed to mixt- toring and industrial hygiene data. To be useful, ures of hazardous materials (see box 2-C). such information must be gathered and analyzed OSHA’s published PELS refer to allowable air in a systematic way: there must be some coherent levels, but many environmental contaminants en- rationale directing the types of data that are col- countered at waste sites are found in soil, sedi- lected and the questions that are analyzed. The ment, vegetation, and water, There is no scientific most important purpose of medical surveillance consensus about, or validation of, what methods activities is the translation of analytic results into should be used to convert the amount of a toxic actions that forestall or reduce further exposure substance that is legally permissible in ambient to materials shown to be hazardous. air into the allowable concentration of that sub- When surveillance data are analyzed over pop- stance in soil or other media. Determining the de- ulations or whole groups of workers, it is possi- gree of hazard or risk associated with a particular ble to practice “primary prevention.” In such worker exposure, and the level of worker protec- cases, medical surveillance reveals that some ex- tion required, depends on a number of assumpt- posure or situation is causing adverse health ef- ions and estimates. In the absence of validated or fects or abnormalities that might lead to future government-sanctioned methods for estimating 34 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Box 2-C-Cleanup Workers and Allowable Limits of Exposure to Environmental Toxicants Among the most difficult issues surrounding protection of cleanup worker safety and health is the question of what “levels of exposure” to particular toxic substances are reasonable and legal. Many toxic substances encountered at hazardous waste sites are not covered by existing regulations. The 620 substances for which the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has published Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs) were chosen for their relevance to general industry and exclude many of the substances found at Superfund and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) sites. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) publishes allowable exposure limits for some materials, but many of EPA’s regulations are media specific. It is not clear that standards designed to regulate allowable concentrations of toxic substances in groundwater can or should be translated into occupational limits for a particular toxic contaminant in soils, for example. Mixtures of hazardous contaminants have not been satisfactorily addressed by any regulatory agency. The scientific basis for setting particular exposure limits is often scanty. Approximately 60,000 chemicals are used commercially; human data are available on the cancer-causing potential of about 60 substances. Animal and in vitro studies of carcinogenicity have been conducted on a somewhat larger number of substances, but no information whatsoever is available on the cancer-causing potential of 75 to 85 percent of all chemicals in commercial use today.l Even less is known about the nonacute, noncarcinogenic effects of chemical exposure. Scientists have become increasingly attentive to noncancer biological end points, such as the impact of environmental toxicants on the neurological, immunological, and reproductive systems. Most worker exposure standards focus on ambient air contaminants, and almost all regulatory standards and recommended exposure levels (PELs, Threshold Limit Values, etc.) are based on air monitoring measurements. This historical focus on airborne contaminants in occupational settings does not accurately capture many potentially toxic exposures encountered during hazardous waste operations, such as the ingestion of contaminated soil or skin absorption of toxins. It is often unclear how to translate measurements of contaminants in ambient air into dosages received by individual workers via ingestion or absorption through the skin. Furthermore, many OSHA standards are outdated, and the scientific basis for many PELs has been challenged.2 34 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently vacated more than 400 OSHA PELs established in 1989, thereby in effect making the worker exposure limits established in 1971 the law of the land.5 The difficulty of accurately measuring cleanup worker exposure to toxic materials is increased by the variety of particular cleanup tasks and associated worker exposures, which may differ from one day to the next. Episodic worker exposures to hazardous materials, such as releases that occur during accidents, are especially difficult to monitor. The transiency of much of the hazardous waste work force makes it difficult — 1 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessmmt, Complex Cleanup-the Environmental Legacy of Nucltzr Weapons Production (Washington DC: U.S. Govermrmt Printhg Office, February 1991). 2 S. Roach and S. Rsppaport, “But ‘Iky Are Not Tbrmholds: A Critical Analysis of the Docunmmtation of Threshold Limit Values,” American Journal of Industrial Medicine, vol. 17, pp. 727-753, 1990. 3 B. Castlernan and G. Ziem “Corporate Influences on Threshold Limit Values,” American Journal of industrial Medicine, vol. 13, pp. 531-554, 1988. 4 Me pit~er, ‘+s~&d SW@; A pO~tiC~ Mss,’’American Jownal afIndustrkd Medicine, VOI. 17, No. 2, pp. 255-Z9, IW. 5 Occupational Safety and Health Reporter, “Labor Department Asks Eleventh Circuit To Reconsider Core on OSHA Exposure Limits” (Washington, DC: ‘he Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.) %pt, 9,1992, pp. 515-516. Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 35

Box 2-C-Continued to determine workers’ past exposures or to ascertain an individual’s cumulative exposure burdens. There are no regulations requiring that a worker’s cumulative exposure be tracked over time. In some situations, peak levels of exposure bear most heavily on health outcomes; interpretation of monitoring data that record only average exposures may therefore be problematic. In the absence of occupational standards, the allowable exposure levels for hazardous waste workers are unclear. Some argue that EPA standards, developed to protect community health and based on lifetime risks (24-hour exposures for 70 years) and a consideration of sensitive individuals such as the elderly and young children, should be applied. Others believe this approach is overly conservative. Many legal exposure standards in fact represent compromises between health considerations and other concerns such as cost, feasibility, and the potential benefits of a chemical.6 7 In many cases, there is no pragmatic alternative to such compromises. Different stakeholders have competing interests in the establishment of exposure standards, and regulators must act on the basis of the limited toxicologic information available. It is important to keep in mind, however, that legal standards and recommended exposure guidelines are not always well validated by scientific evidence. Appropriately designed medical surveillance programs might, over time, eliminate much of the uncertainty about what level of worker protection is needed in different exposure situations, but medical surveillance of cleanup workers is itself hampered by limited science, vague regulations, potentially high costs, and poor oversight by managers. What is certain is that controversies over the adequacy of worker monitoring, and wide variations in the costs and efficacy of such programs, will continue to occur.

6 IWChael Pi[cher, “Stan&rd Setting: A Political Process, ’’American Journal of Industrial Medicine, vol. 17, No. 2, 1990, p. 255. 7 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in rhe Federal Government: Managing the Process (Washington, DC: National Academy Press 1983) pp. 44-47. health problems in some portion of the work Medical surveillance is especially important in force. This recognition provides the impetus to hazardous waste work. 129 Traditional industries alter work conditions so that additional exposures rely on industrial hygiene monitoring to detect are reduced or eliminated. The ability to use worker exposure to dangerous substances. This medical surveillance data in support of primary information guides the use of appropriate engi- preventive strategies depends on how the data are neering controls, personal protective equipment, organized and assessed, the way results are com- safe work practices, etc. At hazardous waste municated to workers and decision makers, and sites, however, the usefulness of environmental the manner in which managers— respond to the re- monitoring to detect worker exposures is limited Suits. 126-128 (see box 2-B). The failure to identify or accurate- The identification of health problems in partic- ly map site contaminants; the episodic nature of ular individuals-with prompt intervention in the many worker exposures, especially during acci- form of removal from harmful work situations dental releases of toxic materials and other emer- and medical treatment if necessary-is called gencies; and the lack of reliable, real-time field “secondary prevention.” With secondary preven- instruments to detectcontaminants in all media tion, the individual has experienced a harmful ex- mean that, in many situations, medical surveil- posure and some adverse biological effect has al- lance is the only way to recognize worker expo- ready occurred. sure to toxic substances.l 30 36 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

In addition, many of the engineering controls ronmental firms told OTA that they believe fail- and work practices used in traditional industrial ure to include all employees working on a haz- settings to prevent worker exposure to hazardous ardous waste site in surveillance programs substances are impractical at hazardous waste amounts to negligence and is an invitation to sites, Instead, less reliable methods of worker litigation in the event of worker injury or ill- 135136 protection must be used, such as personal protec- ness.. tive equipment (PPE) or work practice tech- In any case, there is no scientific basis for niques (e. g., exclusion of untrained workers HAZWOPER’S 30-day demarcation for medical without appropriate PPE from contaminated 137 Guidelines for medical 131 surveillance coverage. areas of the site). Finally, given the many sci- surveillance programs covering EPA employees entific uncertainties about the biological conse- acknowledge that brief, high-dose exposure to quences of exposure to environmental toxicants, toxic materials may carry as much, and some- prudence demands that the health status of clean- times greater, risk than longer but lower dose ex- up workers be reviewed periodically to ensure posures. Likewise, some exposures, work tasks, that adverse exposures and health effects are not and work conditions may be more hazardous occurring. than others.138 HAZWOPER does not link man- The medical surveillance provisions of HAZ- dated medical surveillance to such considera- WOPER are a tacit admission of the difficulty of tions, however. reliably protecting cleanup workers from poten- The OSHA standard includes requirements tially hazardous exposure. The HAZWOPER pertaining to what written information about standard does not mandate medical surveillance medical surveillance results must be given to in- for all workers at hazardous waste sites, however. dividual workers and to employers, as well as Only those employees “who are or may be ex- employer record-keeping requirements. The posed” at or above OSHA’s PELs for 30 or more medical surveillance provisions do not stipulate days a year, who wear a respirator for 30 or more that physicians in charge of medical surveillance days a year, who become sick due to over- programs be trained or have experience in occu- exposure during a release incident, and who are pational or environmental medicine; doctors need members of emergency response teams must be only be “licensed physicians” according to HAZ- 132 offered medical surveillance. Under HAZ- WOPER, The standard also fails to specify the WOPER, workers who do not meet OSHA’s “30- content of medical exams or testing programs day trigger” are not eligible for periodic medical (see box 2-D). HAZWOPER does not require surveillance evaluations and are not required to that information gathered for medical surveil- undergo medical assessment at the termination of lance purposes be analyzed by qualified health employment. professionals or that the results be reported to Determining which workers “may be” ex- health authorities, even if adverse health impacts posed to high levels of toxic materials is as prob- are detected or conventional protection programs lematic in designating eligibility for medical sur- are discovered to be inadequate. veillance coverage as it is in delineating the The absence of any requirement to report the boundaries of work zones. Some consider the 30- results of medical surveillance of cleanup work- day trigger an invitation to hire short-term workers to health authorities is a serious shortcoming ers to perform the dirtiest and most dangerous of HAZWOPER. Indeed, there is no requirement jobs, without burdening employers with the costs to analyze collected data: employers may comply of providing medical supervision or adequate with the law even if surveillance results are never training for these workers.133 134 On the other reviewed. The absence of a reporting requirement hand, representatives from some national envi- increases the difficulty of developing truly worth- Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 37

Box 2-D—Design of Medical Surveillance Programs for Cleanup Workers The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health defines medical or health surveillance as “the periodic medicophysiological examinations of exposed workers with the objective of protecting health and preventing disease.”l Surveillance tests may detect evidence of exposure to a potentially harmful substance-so that appropriate action can be taken to prevent additional exposure; or a test may signal a biological efffect of toxic exposure-hopefully an effect that occurs early in the course of illness, when removal from additional toxic insults or the initiation of appropriate medical treatment can forestall the development of serious disease. Even in traditional industries there is little agreement about what constitutes appropriate medical surveillance for a broad range of exposures and work processes. Anecdotal reports suggest that surveillance involving general industrial workers may at times be excessively elaborate and expensive, that large amounts of data may be gathered to little purpose, or that collected data may be inappropriately reviewed and analyzed. On the other hand, the hazardous waste industry is relatively new; no prospective studies of hazardous waste workers have been done; and the long-term health risks to these workers remain largely uninvestigated. There is no consensus on what particular medical exams or diagnostic tests should be included in a medical surveillance program for hazardous waste workers. One study of more than 400 such workers found that laboratory tests typically used in medical settings were incapable of distinguishing “exposed” (i.e., employees whose job titles and descriptions placed them at potential risk of coming in contact with hazardous chemicals) from “unexposed” employees.2 The number and usefulness of tests that aim to detect the effects of toxic exposure are seriously limited by a lack of information about the biological consequences of exposure to particular chemicals. Many diagnostic medical tests, designed to evaluate people who are already ill, are too insensitive to serve as indicators of the early abnormalities one would like to detect in surveillance programs. Other tests are nonspecific and prone to register an “abnormal” reading even when actual diseases or the effects one is attempting to measure do not exist. When administered to large populations of healthy individuals, a test inability to distinguish the truly abnormal from apparently abnormal (i.e., its tendency to produce “false- positive” readings) can result in a large number of abnormal readings. Such results may then be repeated to check their accuracy or may lead to more elaborate medical testing, which can cause significant anxiety and expense.

‘ S. Hemberg, ‘The Validation of Biological Monitoring: An Introduction,” Occupational and Em,ironmental Chemical Hazarok, V. Foa et al., eds. (New York NY: JOlIII Wiley& Sons, 1987). 2 E. Favata and M. Goehfeld, “Medical Surveillance of Hazardous Waste Workers: Ability of Laboratory Tests to Disc riminate Exposure,” American Journal of Industrial Medicine, vol. 15, 1989, pp. 255-265. (contmutd on nexl page) while programs because data from different sur- Finally, because the precise hazards and nature veillance programs may be variously analyzed or of possible worker health impacts associated interpreted, cannot easily be pooled, and are un- with hazardous waste operations are poorly available to researchers seeking to identify trends understood, it is important to use medical sur- or reliable indicators of exposure or health ef- veillance results to take advantage of every op- fects. Small companies may be unable to design portunity to practice primary prevention. Unless medical surveillance programs with enough sta- medical surveillance data are translated into im- tistical power to detect important adverse worker proved work site health and safety practices, health impacts. “screening and monitoring . . . become sound and 38 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Box 2-D-Continued Thousands of possible medical tests could be included in a medical surveillance program for hazardous waste workers; it is important that such tests be chosen judiciously. If the medical surveillance program is not designed to include appropriate tests of exposure to or effects of the toxic materials present at a work site, then reliance on seemingly “normal” medical surveillance results could induce a false sense of security. On the other hand, pursuit of a large “grab bag” of test components is also unwise. Meaningful analyses of large amounts of data may be impractical, and a larger number of tests increases the likelihood of false- positive results. Medical surveillance programs should not be limited to periodic monitoring of the health of individual workers without reference to previous findings. They should include analyses of changes in individual workers over time, as well as cross-sectional “snapshot” analyses of group data. Although a slight decre- ment in lung function in a single individual might not be cause for concern, progressive loss of function in a single person or a similar loss of lung function among a group of workers who share job tasks or exposures should, at the least, prompt a work site evaluation and a search for the cause of such findings. Determining the components of a medical surveillance program is a matter of clinical judgment. It is not possible to compile a cookbook of recipes to dictate the ingredients of medical surveillance programs that are appropriate for all cleanup sites. As much as possible, medical surveillance programs should be designed on a site-specific basis. Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response standard requires only that medical surveillance for hazardous waste workers be conducted by “licensed physicians,” effective and efficient programs must be designed by health professionals who have knowledge of the toxic substances a site is suspected or known to harbor, who understand what medical tests can effectively detect such exposures or their effects, and who recognize the capabilities and limitations of the tests selected. fury, preventing nothing.’’ 139 HAZWOPER, how- materials may be the frost warning that contami- ever, contains no requirement that managers take nation exists in a particular area or that a release medical surveillance results into account when of toxic materials has occurred. reviewing the adequacy of existing health and The Superfund Amendments and Reauthor- safety practices or planning new approaches. ization Act (SARA) specifically requires that hazardous waste workers, managers, supervisors, Problems With Health and Safety and emergency response personnel receive health Training Under HAZWOPER and safety training, and directs OSHA to issue regulations specifying training standards and cer- Cleanup workers’ health and safety depends to tification requirements.141 The HAZWOPER a great degree on the use of personal protective standard sets forth the general “elements” that equipment and on workers’ abilities to recognize and respond appropriately to unanticipated haz- should be covered in training courses for cleanup workers and specifies the number of training ards. The safety of local communities also de- hours required for different categories of work- pends on cleanup workers’ performance and ers. judgment, because improper management of OSHA has also proposed the Hazardous Waste contaminants could lead to off-site dispersion of 142 140 hazardous materials. The uncertainties of site Operations Training Accreditation Standard, which stipulates course content, training hours, characterization and the continuously changing accreditation review processes, and other issues nature of sites undergoing cleanup mean that in greater detail. The proposed regulation is cur- worker recognition of the presence of hazardous Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 39

rently under review; it is expected to be finalized posure limits where respirators are not nec- in early 1993. essary, and the characterization indicates HAZWOPER stipulates that hazardous waste that there are no health hazards or the possi- workers must receive health and safety training bility of an emergency developing” must that meets certain minimum requirements before also receive 24 hours of off-site instruction engaging in operations that could expose them to and one day of field experience.144 toxic materials or to safety or health hazards. Because OSHA fails to specify any criteria for Initial or “generic” training must include certain distinguishing between general site workers and topics, such as the basic principles of hazard identification, the use of PPE, and review of the those occasional workers who are “unlikely” to be exposed to hazardous materials above pub- site HASP and of medical surveillance programs. lished PELs, the responsibility for determining Additional training is to be furnished to workers 143 which workers receive the more extensive train- exposed to “unique or special hazards .“ ing is placed on employers. In practice, some Programs must include both classroom instruc- complain that there is a trend to “train to the low- tion and supervised, site-specific field training. 145-147 HAZWOPER also specifies the minimum est minimum level, which is 24 hours .’’ number of training hours that workers must log. The OSHA training categories have been criti- The amount of training required is supposedly cized for the same reasons that the designation of keyed to a worker’s potential for being exposed work zone boundaries and worker eligibility for medical surveillance has provoked criticism: to hazardous materials above permissible expo- there is no scientific basis for determining an in- sure limits: dividual worker’s “potential for exposure” to • “General site workers (such as equipment hazardous materials during cleanup work. A operators, general laborers and supervisory 1990 workshop held by the National Institute of personnel)” must receive a minimum of 40 Environmental Health Sciences was unable to de- hours of off-site instruction and at least 3 termine what criteria could be used to distinguish days of supervised field experience. between general site workers and “occasional”

● On-site managers and supervisors “directly workers or to determine the applicability of the 148 responsible for or who supervise” cleanup 24-hour training for “occasional workers.’’ workers must receive an additional 8 hours Another contentious aspect of HAZWOPER’s of specialized training. proposed training rule is the grandfather clause • In addition, general site workers and super- that allows some workers to be exempted from visors must receive at least 8 hours of “re- the initial, generic training requirements.149 fresher training” annually. Employers who can “document or certify” that a • “Occasional” workers who are on-site for worker’s experience or past training has resulted only “a specific, limited task . . . and who are in training “equivalent to” that required by HAZ- unlikely to be exposed over permissible ex- WOPER are not required to provide initial train- posure limits and published exposure limits” ing. OSHA does not specify what type or amount must undergo a minimum of 24 hours of off- of past experience qualifies a worker for “equiva- site instruction and at least 1 day of super- lent training.” Thus, the employer determines vised field training. which workers are in need of instruction in an ac- • Another category of workers, who are regu- credited program. Critics contend that this provi- larly on-site but work in areas that have been sion violates SARA’s intent that cleanup workers monitored and “fully characterized indicat- receive appropriate training in accredited pro- ing that exposures are under permissible ex- grams.150 151 40 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Some union representatives with extensive ex- OSHA’s proposed accreditation standard perience in hazardous waste operations and envi- would not impose specific, detailed requirements ronmental remediation claim that even 40 hours on the content of health and safety training cours- of instruction—the maximum required under es. The proposed rule includes no minimum stan- OSHA’s proposed accreditation standard-is in- dards or training requirements for instructors, sufficient to teach individuals the rudiments nec- does not incorporate peer review or on-site in- essary to perform cleanup work safely. Several spection of proposed programs, and does not re- unions have created cleanup worker training pro- quire that annual refresher courses be reviewed grams that are more rigorous than HAZWOPER and accredited.161 requires, and some have developed 80-hour A grants program for the training and ed- 152 153 “generic” courses. The International ucation of workers engaged in hazardous Association of Firefighters (IAFF) argues that waste operations and emergency response was firefighters and emergency responders need far established by the 1986 Superfund amend- 162 163 more extensive and rigorous training than either ments. Nonprofit organizations with HAZWOPER or the proposed accreditation stan- demonstrated access to appropriate populations dard mandates.154 of cleanup workers are eligible to apply for aid in In the absence of a current regulatory standard developing, implementing, and operating worker governing the content and quality of the training health 164and safety training and education pro- curricula for hazardous waste workers, many dif- grams. The overall program is administered by ferent programs have emerged to meet the HAZ- the National Institute of Environmental Health WOPER requirements that cleanup workers ob- Sciences (NIEHS) and currently supports 16 tain certain minimum hours of health and safety training grants involving a total of 60 individual training. Both the content and the quality of ex- institutions. 165 166 isting courses appear to vary widely.155 Some NIEHS adopted a National Institutes of courses are reportedly entirely didactic and in- Health-type peer-review process to review initial volve no hands-on training in the use of PPE, grant applications and to oversee grant manage- 156 etc. Because HAZWOPER includes no specif- ment activities and program administration. ic requirements for course content or format, em- Stringent review criteria require applicants to ployers accept as “trained” any worker who can demonstrate access to the target population; to provide certification that he or she has received provide an experienced, qualified program direc- the requisite number of hours of instruction.157 tor; and to offer hands-on training with appropri- The target audience should be a factor in di- ate facilities and equipment. Protocols for on-site recting the focus and the content of training pro- peer review of field programs are being devel- grams. Some labor unions have developed train- oped. 167 ing courses that assume students will be skilled Initial efforts of NIEHS grantees were directed crafts people who have a basic knowledge of toward developing suitable curricula for hazard- trade-specific safe work practices. EPA offers ous waste work training and establishing appro- courses geared primarily to Federal Superfund priate field training facilities. The widely varying site managers and to State and local government audiences that the grantees targeted necessitated officials. 158 Some vendors of health and safety a range of teaching materials and classroom exer- 168 programs, however, do not differentiate among cises. NIEHS subsequently established a na- the needs of different groups, and train laborers, tional clearinghouse for training materials and skilled crafts people, and scientists with ad- course curricula developed by its grantees that vanced degrees in the same classes, using the makes such technical information and curricula same materials.159 160 available to the general public.169 Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 41

Emergency Response cluding organizations such as fire and police de- Emergencies arising at hazardous waste opera- partments; local environmental, hospital, and tions differ from other health and safety issues transportation personnel; community groups; and 173 associated with environmental cleanup work. site owners. Site accidents, equipment failures, weather dam- Together, SARA Title I and Title III are de- age, or other emergency situations are likely to signed to provide communities with a compre- require the assistance of individuals beyond those hensive, integrated capacity to respond to emer- who work on-site or are directly involved in gencies arising from environmental release of cleanup. Emergency responders might include hazardous chemicals. The intent was to create a police officers, firefighters, medical personnel, basic emergency response infrastructure (via and possibly local civil defense, transportation, Title 111) and to deal with emergencies that might and government officials. Releases of site con- result from operations at uncontrolled waste sites taminants may also pose a public health threat to by requiring site-specific emergency response off-site populations. plans and hazardous materials training for desig- Two sections of SARA are relevant to emer- nated emergency responders (via Title I/HAZ- gency response at Superfund sites. SARA Title I WOPER). directs EPA and OSHA to establish specific regu- A number of recent incidents have revealed lations to protect the health and safety of workers significant flaws in the implementation of Title engaged in hazardous waste operations and 111 provisions as well as serious problems with the emergency response plans and capabilities at emergency response. These are the HAZWOP- 174-182 ER regulations that OSHA issued in 29 CFR Superfund sites. Emergency response 1910.120. EPA promulgated identical regulations plans at some Superfund sites appear to be “paper in 40 CFR 311. HAZWOPER requires that emer- programs” that exist in written form but remain 183 184 Also, local com- gency response plans be included in all site largely unimplemented. HASPS and details the necessary components of munities may be unable or unwilling to invest the 170 these plans. HAZWOPER al SO requires that resources necessary to train and equip fire depart- the emergency response plan be “rehearsed regu- ments or others to comply with legal mandates larly” as part of the overall site training program pursuant to SARA Title III. and reviewed periodically and amended, as need- In the course of reviewing the HASP at the ed.171 Baird-McGuire Superfund site, it was discovered SARA Title III, “The Emergency Planning that the local fire department lacked the resources and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,” re- to provide either the equipment or the mandated quires municipalities to take steps to ensure the training needed to prepare firefighters to respond safety of communities from environmental re- to an emergency at Baird-McGuire. Although 172 leases of toxic substances. The statute man- EPA believed that the local fire department had dates the preparation and testing of a comprehen- agreed to provide support to the site, none of the sive emergency response plan that would go into local firefighters or emergency medical techni- effect in the event of significant environmental cians had received even the minimal 8-hour release of hazardous substances. Title III thus “awareness” training required of first respon- 185 pertains to most hazardous waste operations and ders. This situation violated the EPA’s audit most industrial facilities that use or store hazard- guidelines for the evaluation of local community response capabilities as well as HAZWOPER ous materials, not just to Superfund or RCRA 186 The situatiion was corrected after sites. The plan is required to include the involve- regulations. ment of a variety of State and local officials, in- EPA provided training of local firefighters through an Interagency Agreement with IAFF. 187 42 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

In December 1991, the Fall River, Massa- gating programmatic remedies for these is- chusetts fire department responded to a hazard- sues.194 ous materials incident at a local manufacturing The emergency responder provisions of HAZ- facility, where a worker had fallen into a contain- WOPER and the proposed training accreditation er of chemicals. A firefighter-who had not re- standard have generated intense criticism from ceived legally mandated hazardous materials many quarters including EPA,195 the Interna- training —entered the container, fell, and was tional Association of Firefighters,196 and other himself submerged in chemicals. Two ambu- labor organizations. 197 OSHA’s failure to require lances and their crews were subsequently conta- certification of training for emergency response minated in the rescue effort. The response of the workers has been especially controversial. local hospital was also less than optimal.188 The OSHA contends that it lacks both the personnel shower designated for decontamination was not and the resources needed to review and accredit usable, and a long delay occurred before either training programs for the many emergency re- man was washed clean of the chemical (dimethyl sponders (including professional and volunteer diisocyanate). One of these contamination vic- firefighters) who might be called on to assist in tims subsequently developed liver failure.189 an emergency during hazardous waste operations A review of this incident conducted by EPA’s or during an accidental release of toxic materi- 198 Emergency Response Team in conjunction with als. the EPA-Labor Task Force determined that in a HAZWOPER does not stipulate any minimal fire department with more than 200 profession- training requirements for emergency responders. als, serving a population of 100,000, only 6 fire- The standard notes only that “employees who are fighters had received hazardous materials re- engaged in responding to hazardous situations at sponse training equivalent to OSHA’s operations . . . cleanup sites that may expose them to hazard- level; 2 firefighters had been trained to specialist ous substances shall be trained in how to respond level. No one in the department had been trained to such expected emergencies.’’ 199 The standard as an incident commander.190 designates five tiers of emergency response In New Bedford, Massachusetts, the fire de- workers and links training requirements to the re- partment has publicly stated that it is not pre- sponsibilities an individual is likely to exercise pared for and will not respond to an emergency at during an emergency. OSHA offers no justifica- the New Bedford Harbor and Sullivan’s Ledge tion for why emergency responders in succes- Superfund sites, *9* where plans call for contamin- sively lower ranked tiers should be afforded less ated sediments to be dredged from the harbor protection in the form of less extensive hours of and incinerated within city limits. Although a health and safety training. No minimum number written emergency response plan has been devel- of hours of training is required of the first, lowest oped for the lower risk preliminary phases of this tier of emergency responders, “who are likely to site, the present plan, if applied to the planned in- witness or discover a hazardous substance re- cineration phase of the cleanup, will be unaccept- lease.’’ 200 Only 24 hours of safety and health able with regard to personnel roles, lines of au- training is required of even the highest category thority, communication, safe distance zones and of emergency responders, which includes “on places of refuge, civilian evacuation plans, emer- scene incident commanders.” In addition, train- gency care for responders, and use of personnel ing courses for emergency responders are explic- 192193 equipment. If prompt action is not taken to itly exempted from accreditation requirements address emergency response activities and relat- under OSHA’s proposed rule.201 ed training issues, lead time may not be sufficient The IAFF found in 1991 that 79 percent of the to prevent costly project delays. EPA is investi- nation’s firefighters considered themselves inad- Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 43

equately trained to deal with hazardous materials ous materials. However, traditional firefighting emergencies, and 82 percent felt they were not tasks do not require a knowledge of basic chem- adequately equipped.202 The IAFF is concerned istry, the reactive properties of chemicals, the that fire departments responding to emergencies characteristics of hazardous materials, or radia- at cleanup sites might be unprepared to provide tion protection—all of which are skills needed to the assistance required by the situation in a man- conduct effective emergency response operations 204 ner that affords adequate protection to firefight- at hazardous waste sites. OSHA and EPA also ers and others. There is particular concern about apparently assume that fire departments will have the absence or inadequacy of preincident plan- the benefit of the health and safety training re- ning. IAFF argues that provisions must be made quired under Title III provisions of SARA. in advance for communication and coordination Recent experience at Superfund sites suggests of activities, as well as for transfer of command that such an assumption may be unwarranted. to the fire department “in pre-identified areas .”203 Many towns and cities have apparently not yet In crafting HAZWOPER requirements for complied with the emergency response prepared- emergency response training, OSHA may have ness provisions of Superfund and lack the re- presumed that firefighters’ proficiency in fire sources to do so in the near future.205 206 suppression affords expertise in handling hazard-

CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES 1 William Reilly, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection 1039 USC. 651-678 (West 1985 ~d SUPP1. 1992). Agency, “Statement Before the Subcommittee on Investigations 1129 CFR 1910.120. and Oversight Committee on Public Works and Transportation, IZ Office of Technology Assessment-Hazardous Waste U.S. House of Representatives,” Oct. 3, 1992, Advisory Council (HWAC) Workshop, Washington, DC, Sept. 17, z Under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 1992. (SARA), the Environmental protection Agency has the authority to 13 J coc~s, pemo~ communication to T. O’Toole, Aug. 19, order emergency removal of environmental contamimtion at un- 1991, op. controlled hazardous waste sites when the contamination is be- cit. lieved to represent an acute or immediate threat to human health. 14 occupatlon~ s~e~ and Health Administration, Office of An example of a such action was the removal of thousands of high- Health Compliance Assistance, Directorate of Compliance ly radioactive metal “needles,” 200 lab reagent chemicals, deterio- Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, “Protocol for OSHA rating shock-sensitive ether cans from a Superfund site in Ncw Compliance Inspections of Superfund Incineration Sites-Draft York. Final,” NOV. 16, 1992. 3 42 U.S.C. 9601 et. scg. 15 u . s. Environmental protection Agency-Labor Health and 4 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Safety Task Force, minutes of meeting, Sept. 22, 1992. Contingency Plan, 40 CFR 300 et. seq. lb u s. Genera] Accounting office, OptiOnS for ~mp~o~’~ng 5 C. Zarnuda, “Superfund Risk Assessments: The Process and Safety and Health para3:in the Workplace , GAO/HRD-9@66BR Past Experience at Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites” The Risk (August 1990). Assessment of Environmental and Human Health Hazards: A 17 u s. .Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Textbook of Case Studies , D.J. Paustenbach (cd.) (New York, NY: Waste and Emergency Response, “Superfimd Progress,” 9200.1-12, J. Wiley& Sons) 1989. May 1992. 6 M. Gochfeld, V. Campbell, P. Landsbergis, “Demography of 18 us. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid the Hazardous Waste Industry,” Occuputlonal Medicine: State of Waste and Emergency Response, “Supplementary Material, the Art Reviews, vol. 5, No. 1, January-March 1990, pp. 9-23. National Priorities List Proposed Rule,” EPA 9320-7/05 1, February 7 Mark Bashor, Asst. Administrator for Federal Facilities, 1992, p. 3. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, personal com- ]~ Letter from J. Bclaga, Regional Administrator, us. munication to T. O’Toole, Nov. 24, 1992. Environment Protection Agency to H. Lenow, counsel to Hanson 8 J. Cocalis, National Institute of Occupational Safety and Permanent Fire Fighters Association% Apr. 29, 1992. Heal@ Environmental Investigation BranclL personal communica- Zo R, H~is, R, Kapuscirlslci, “Hardage ROD Overturned, ” tion to T. O’Toole, Aug. 19, 1992. Environ Report , Winter 1989/Spring 1990, p. 1. 9 M. Garrahan+ Senior Industrial Hy@enist, Occupational Safety 11 Superfund Report “EPA Issues Guidance for Early Risk and Health Administration, persoml communication, T. O’Toole, Assessment to Screen Alternatives,” Jan. 15, 1992. Dec. 1, 1992. 44 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

n U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Emergency 39 L Murphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training, and Remedial Response, Risk Assessment Guidance for Supe@ui: International Association of Firefighters, personal communication Vol. l—Human Health Evaluation para3:Manual, (Part B, to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment, July 17, 1992. Development of Risk-Based Preliminary Remediation Goals , u U.S. Enviro~ental protection Agency-Labor Heal~ ‘d (December 1991). Safety Task Force, minutes of Oct. 17, 1991 meeting. 23 u. s. Envirorunental Protection Agency, Office of Solid 41 U.S. Enviro~ental Protection Agency-Labor Healti ~d Waste and Emergency Response “Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Safety Task Force, notes from Mar. 5, 1991 meeting. Model—SAC~” March 1992. 42 J. Mow Co-cti, u.S. Environmental Protective Agency 24 L. Murphy, Director, HtizardOu S Materials Training, Labor Health and Safety Task Force, Director of Occupational International Association of Firefighters, personal communication Safety and Health, Laborers’ Health and Safety Fund of North tO T. O’TOOIC, OTA, Ju1y 17, 1992. America, personal communication to T. O’Toole, Jan. 22, 1991. 25 Office of Tec~ology Assessment Workshop on Clemup 43 us, Envirorlmental protection Agency Labor-Healti ad Worker Health and Safety at the Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Task Force, minutes of July 10, 1992 meeting. Weapons Complex, Washingto~ DC, May 15, 1991. 44 us. Enviro~ental Protection Agency-Labor Heal~ ‘d 26 Office of Technology Assessment-HWAC Workshop, op. cit. Safety Task Force, minutes of June 17, 1992 meeting. 45 Memo ‘7 EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force, notes from Mar, 5, from L. MuWh y, Director Hazardous Materials 1991 meeting Training International Association of Firefighters to Environmental 28 K, Ayers, Chief, Design and Construction Management Protection Agency-Labor Task Force, July 20, 1992, Branch, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. 46 I_J.S. Enviro~ental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Environmental protective Agency, personal communication to T. Waste and Emergency Response Risk Assessment Guidance for O’TOok, Aug. 20, 1991. Superfund, Human Health Evaluation Manual, Part A (9285.701A) ‘9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Washington DC, Sept. 29, 1989. Waste and Emergency Response, “Hazardous Waste Operations 47 MOS. cle~up work m date has taken place at Supefid ‘ites. and Emergency Response: General Information and Comparison” Relatively few RCRA facilities have begun extensive remediation (9285 .2-09FS). April 1991. action. Although most of the obsemations in this report are drawn so u s. .Environmental protection Agency, Office of Solid from experience at Superfund sites, regulators, environmental pro- Waste and Emergency Response, “Hazardous Waste Operations fessionals, and lalxx representatives believe that this experience is and Emergency Response: Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites also applicable to environmental cleanup at RCRA facilities, and RCRA Corrective Actions” (9285 .2-08FS) April 1991. 48 s, Goll~, E. Dodge, B. Bixler, “Conducting Remedial 31 U,S. Enviro~ental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Investigations and Feasibility Studies Under CERCLA,” Superjhnd Waste and Emergency Responses, “Hazardous Waste Operations ‘88-Proceedings of 9th National para3:Conference , Washington and Emergency Response: RCRA TSD and Emergency Response DC, NOV. 28-30, 1988. Without Regard to Location” (9285 .2-07FS) April 1991. @ OTA-WAC Workshop, op. cit. 32 U.S. Enviro nmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid 50 J. Moran, Director of Occupational Stiety ad ‘ealth~ Waste and Emergency Responses, “Hazardous Waste Operations Laborers Health and Safety Fund of North America, personal com- and Emergency Response: Establishing Work Zones at munication to T. O’Toole, Jan. 22, 1991. Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites” (9285 .2-06FS) April 1991. 51 K. Ayers, Chief, Design and Construction M~agement ~J US. Enviro~en[al Protection Agency, Office of Solid Branch U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, personal commu- Waste and Emergency Responses, “Hazardous Waste Operations nication to J. H- T. O’Toole, Feb. 12, 1991. and Emergency Response: Health and Safety Responsibilities at 52 OTA Workshop on DOE CleanUp Workers, op. cit. Remedial Sites” (9285.1-02) April 1991. 53 U,s$ CongeSS) office of Technology Assessment-j coming M u s. EnviroDental. protection Agency, Office of SOlid Clean-Superfund Problems Can Be So(ved , OTA-ITE-433 Waste and Emergency Responses, “Hazardous Waste Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October and Emergency Response: Hazardous Waste Operations and 1989). Emergency Response: Available Guidance (9285 .2-1OFS) April M U,s$ Congess, Ofiqm of TtXhIIOIOgy Assessment oTA-o- 1991. 484, Complex Cleanup —The Environmental Legacy of Nuclear 35 Occupatlond safety and Health Administration, OffiCe of Weapons Production (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Health Compliance Assistance, “Protocol for OSHA Compliance Office, February 1991). Inspections of Superfund Incineration Sites,” op. cit. 55 c Nob]e, 1~Keep~g OSHA’S Feet to the Fire,” Technology 36 EpA-Labor He~th and Safety Task Force, July 18, 1991 Review , February/Mmch 1992, pp. 43-51. meeting. 56 Gener~ AccOUfig office, Options for IrnProv@ Health w Env~o~en~ protection Agency-Labor Healti ~d Safety and Safety in para3:the Workplace , op. cit. Task Force, minutes of Oct. 17, 1991, meeting. ST OTA wor~hop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. 38 utter from Don Clay, Asst. A(hinis~tor, OffIce of Solid 58 NatiO~ A~demy of sciences, Hutnan Exposure Assessment Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection for Airborne para3:Pollutants (Washington, DC: National Agency, to Les Murphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training, Academy Press, 1991). International Association of Firefighters, June 23, 1992. 59 OTA-WAC Workshop, oP. cit. @ OTA wO&hOp Orl DOE Cleanup Workers Op. cit. —.._—

Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 45

61 u s Envjronrncntal Protection Agency, Office of Solid 79 N. Nelson et rd., “Cleanup of Contaminated Sites,” Toxic Waste and Emergency Response, “Guidance for Data Usability in Chemicalx, Health and the Envirorlment , L. Lane and A. Uptom Risk Assessmcn~” 9285 .7-05FS, September 1990. cds. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). cz u .s .Envlromental Protection Agency Office of Emergency so U.S. Environmental Protection Agency-Labor Health and and Remedial Response, Risk Assessment Guidunce for Superfund- Safety Task Force, notes from Mar. 5, 1991 meeting. Purt B , op. c~t. 81 OTA wO&ShOp on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. 63 Ibid., Part C. 82 OTA-NAC workshop, oP. cit. ~ ~, Morm, and D. Elisburg, “Hazardous Waste Sites: Worker 83 H=dous waste Action Contractors, The Hazardous Wasre Protection Perspectives”, Conference Proceedings: First EPA Practice--para3 :Technical and LegaI Environment 1992 (HWAC, Design and Construction Issues para3:at Hazardous Waste Site Washington DC: 1991), p. vi. Conference , EPA 540/8-91/012, May 1991 ~A u .s . Environmental Protection Agency-Labor Health and 65 Nationa] Institute of Occupational Safety and Health Safety Task Force, (NIOSH), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), notes from Mar. 5, 1991 meeting. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Environmcntat Protection Agency as J Mor~ and D. Elisburg, Op. cit. (EPA), Occupational Safety and Health para3:Guidance Manual 86 2“9 CFR 1910.1000. for Hazardous Wuste Sire Activities (Washington, DC: U.S. ~~ Federal Re,gisrer 37591 (Sept. 27, 1988). Government Printing Office), October 1985. w Federal Register 2332 (1989) 66 Morm ~d Elisbcrg, op. cit. 89 OTA-HWAC Workshop, op. cit. 67 Off’lce of Technology Assessment-HWAC Workshop, oP. cit. 90 National Academy of Sciences, Risk Assessment in the 68 u . s. Environmental Protection Agency-Labor Health and Federal Government: para3:Managing the Process (Washington Safety Task Force, notes from Mar. 5, 1991 meeting. DC: National Academy Press, 1983). 69 office of TCChnOIO~ Assessment-HWAC Workshop, op. cit. 91 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 70 Ibid. Neurotoxicity: ldentifiing and Controlling Poisons of the Nert’ous 71 u s. congress,. House of Representatives Committee on System (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April Govcmmcnt Operations, “OSHA’S Failure to Protect the Health and 1992). n Safety of Workers at Hazardous Waste Sites,” House Report 99- 92 National Academy of Sciences, Biologic Markers ‘ 140, May 21, 1985. Immunotoxicology (Washington, DC: Nationat Academy Press, ~z 42 usc 9601 Ct ‘~” 1992). 73 ~c contents of the HAZWOPER standard promulgated by 93 National Academy of Sciences, Biologic Markers in each agency are identical. The jurisdictions of OSHA and EPA dif- Reproductive para3:Toxicology (Washington, DC: National fer. EPA covers public employees of States without OSHA-ap- Academy Press, 1983). provcd State plans. Federal employees are covered under Executive w oTA_wAc Workshop, op. cit. Order No. 12196. OSHA and EPA have agreed that OSHA will be 9539 U.S.C. 651-678 (West 1985 and SUppl. 1992). the agency respon.wble for interpreting the regulations. The OSHA 96 us. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid HAZWOPER regulations are codified at 20 CFR 1910,120 (54 Waste and Emergency Response, “Hazardous Waste Operations Federal Register 9294, Mar. 6, 1989). The EPA regulations Me cod- and Emergency Response: Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites ified at40CFR311 @cdcral Register 26654, June 23, 1989) and in- and RCRA Corrective Actions,” op. cit. corporate the OSHA standards by refercncc. 97 us. Co~ of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, S. Phillips a Td me stadad is applicable at any cleanup carri~ out bY and P.D, para3:Phillips v. United States of America , No. 91-8040, govcmmcnt body that revolves hazardous substances, including Mar. 30, 1992. sites on or recommended for the National Priorities List; sites where 98 us Dep~ent of Labor, Occupational Safety and H~tb preliminary characterization efforts are conducted bdore the pres- Administration, data from Federal and State (18B) State Inspection ence of hazardous materials has been ascertained or ruled out; of Hazardous Waste Activity, Mar. 1, 1990 through Dec. 6, 1991. RCRA sites undergoing corrective actions; operations at RCRA 99 EpA-~bor Health and Safety Task Force, fiUteS from Oct. treatment, storage, and disposal facilities; emergency respome op- 17, 1991 meeting, erations for releases of, or substantial threats of releases of, hazard- Im Occupation s~e~ and Healti Administration, Directorate ous substances; and voluntary cleanup operations. of Compliance Programs, “HAZWOPER-Interpretative Quips 7529 CFR 1910.120. (IQs),” October 1992. 76 R, Yodaiken, “Surveillance, Monitoring, and Regulatory lol OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. Concerns” J. of para3:Occupational Medicine , vol. 28, No. 8, 102 OTA-WAC Workshop, oP. cit. August 1986, pp. 569-571. 10329 cm 1910.120. 77 J. Melius, “Medicai Surveillance for Hazardous Waste 104 M Gochfeld, “Medical Surveillance of Hazardous Waste Workers,” J. of Occupational Medicine , vol. 28, No. 8, August Workers: Principles and Problems,” Occupational Medicine: Stare 1986, pp. 679-683. of the Art Reviews , vol. 5, No. 1, January-March 1990, p 107. 78 E. Fanvata, and M. Gochfeld, “Medical Surveillance of Ios OTA-WAC workshop, op. cit. Hazardous Waste Workers: Ability of Laboratory Tests to t06 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. Discriminate Exposure, ” American Journal para3:uf Industrial 10T OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, 0p. cit. Medicine , vol. 15, 1989, pp. 255-265. 46 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

108 Enviromen~ ~otection Agency-Labor Healti ~d S~etY 132 zo cm 1910.120$ Task Force, notes from Mar. 5, 1991 meeting. 133 The so-by ~=er *O applies to eligibility for HAZWOP- 109 L Murphy, Director, International Association of ER-mandated health and safety training. Firefighters, memorandum to Environmental Protection Agency- 13A OTA wor~hop of DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. Labor Health and Safety Task Force, “New Bedford,” July 20, 135 Ibid. 1992. 136 OTA-WAC workshop, op. Cit. ‘10 Wehran Envirotech, “Site Health and Safety Plan-New 137 J. Melius, op. cit. Bedford Superfund Site,” November 1991. 138 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “U.S. ] ] I H opem~w, chief, Civ of New Bedford, Massachusetts Environmental Protection Agency Environmental Response Term’s Fire Department, “Special Communication%” Oct. 7, 1992. Occupational Medical Monitoring Program Guidelines for SARA 112 M. Boyle, N. white, “PCB Site Cleanup Hits Snag,” Cape Hazardous Waste Field Activity Personnel, ” 9285.3-04, January Cod Standard para3:Times , Oct. 27, 1992. 1990. 113 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. 139 M. Silverstein, “Medical Screening, Surveillance and the I 14 u s. Army COT5 of Engineers, Accident Investigation Prevention of Occupational Disease,” Journa/ of Occupational Report, “Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant Incinerator Accident, Medicine, vol. 32, No. 10, October 1990, pp. 1032-1036. Second of Two Accidents,” Mar. 10, 1989. l@ Office of Technology Assessment complex Cieanup, l$@l, 1‘5 Ibid. op. cit. I IC u s. hy. COWS of Engineers, Accident Investigation 141 fib L, 99-499, 42 U.S.C. 126(d). ,42 ~ (-7R 1910.121 “ Report, “Cornhusker Army Ammunition Plant, Incinerator Accident, First of Two Accidents,” Sept. 17, 1987. 143129 u.s.c. 8655; Pub. L. W-499, Oct. 17, 1986. 117 u s. .Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid IW 40 cm 1910.120. Waste and Emergency Response, “Establishing Work Zones . . .“, 145 j, Mor~ “Tes~ony of Laborers’ hternationat UniOn of op. cit. North Arneric& AFL-CIO, Laborers-AGC Education and Training 118 Occupatlond Sdety ad He~th Administration, Director of Fund, and Laborers’ HeaJth and Safety Fund of North America on Compliance Proposed Rulernaking on Accreditation of Training Programs for Programs, “HAZWOPER-Interpretive Quips”, op. cit. Hazardous Waste Operations, ” Docket No. S-760-B, U.S. 119 U.S. Enviro~ental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Waste and Emergency Response, “Establishing Work Zone . . .“, Adrninistratiow Jan. 22, 1991, p. 14. op. cit. 146 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. IZO ~aticia clw~ Director 13txignak, Director of ComPli~cet 147 L. Murphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training, Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health International Association of Firefighters, personat communication Administration, letter to J. Moran, Laborers’ National Health and to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment, July 17, 1992. Safety Fund, Oct. 3, 1990. 148 National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences, 121 Occupational Stie[y Wd He~th Administration, Director of Minimum Criteria for Worker Health and Safety Training of Compliance Programs, “HAZWOPER-Interpretative Quips”, op. Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response , April cit. 1990. 12229 CFR 1910.120, July 1, 1991, p. 367. 14940 CFR 1910.121 123 OTA-HWAC Workshop, op. cit. ISO OTA wO&hOp m DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. ‘U David Rempel, “Medical Surveillance in the Workplace: 151 J. Wmen, Executive Director, Laborers-AGC MuCation Overview,” Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews , vol. and Training Fund, “Testimony on Proposed Rulemaking on 5, No. 3, July-September 1990. Accreditation and Training Program for Hazardous Waste 125 ~osH/os~scG@pA, 1985, oP. cit. Operations,” Docket No. S-760-B, U.S. Department of Labor, 126 w. H~perin and T. Frazier, “Surveillance for the Effects of Occupational Safety Health Administration Jan. 22, 1991. Workplace Exposure”, Annual Review of Public Health , vol. 6, 152 Nolan Hancock, Director, Citizenship-Legislative Department, Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers International 1985, pp. 419-32. n 127 w. H-dper~ J. RatcMfe et al!, “Medical Screening ‘ ‘e Union, personal communication to T. O’Toole, Office of Workplace: Proposed Principles”, Journal of Occupational Technology Assessment. Medicine , vol. 28, No. 8, August 1986, pp. 547-552. 153 J. Mor~, Director of Occupatioml safety and Heal@ IM OTA Workshop on DOE Clemup ‘orkem. f Laborers’ Health and Safety Fund of North America, personal com- 129 E Favata ~d M. Gochfeld, “Medical s~veillwce ‘ munication to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment. Hazardous Waste Workers: Ability of Laboratory Tests to 154 R, Dtify, Dfiector Of Health and Safety, International Discriminate Exposure,”American Journal para3:of Industrial Association of Firefighters, “Testimony on Proposed Rulemaking Medicine, vol. 15, 1989, pp. 255-265. on Accreditation of Training Programs for Hazardous Waste 130 J. Melius, “OSHA Standard for Medical Surveillance of Operations,” Docket No. S-760-B, U.S. Department of Labor, Hazardous Waste Workers,” Occupational Medicine: State of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Jan. 22, 1991. Art Reviews , vol. 5, No. 1, January-March 1990, pp. 143-150. 155 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. 131 M Gochfeld, “Medic~ Surveillance of H=dous Wrote 156 mid. Workers,” op. cit. 157 Ibid. Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 47

15~ u s. Enviro~en[al Protection Agency, Office of Solid 178 L MuWhy, “Crisis in the Fire Service,” Proceedings of First Waste and Emergency Response, Office of Emergency and EPA Design and Construction Issues at Hazardous Waste Sites Remedial Response, “Hazardous Materials Incident Response Conference , Dallas, TX, May 1-3, 1991, p. 827. Training Program,” Jan. 1, 1991. 179 Les MuWhy, Dlrcc(or, Hazardous Materials Training, 159 B, Sattlcr, Director, National Center on Hazard International Association of Firefighters, letter to R. Guimond, Communications, University of Maryland, personal communication Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and to OTA staff, Apr. 9, 1991. Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 160 u s. .Dcpafiment of Health and Human SemiCeS, public Mar. 4, 1992. Health Service and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease ISO R. Guimond, Deputy Assistant Administrator, OffiCe of Registry, Esaluatirtg Hazardous K’aste Educution and Training , Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental (November 1990). Protection Agency, letter to Les Murphy, Dlrcctor, Hazardous 16 I National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, Materials Training, Intcrnatronal Association of Firefighters, Apr. Department of Health and Human Services, “Testimony of the 6, 1992, National Instltutc of Environmental Health Scrviccs on the 18 I R, Camara, Firefighters Association of Fall River, Occupat]ontil Safety and Health Administration’s Proposed Massachusetts letter 10 Don Clay, Assistant Administrator, Office Standard for Accreditation of Hazardous Waste Operations and of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, LT. S. Environmental Emergency RcsporLsc Training: 29 CFR 1910. 121”, Jan. 29, 1991. Protection Agency, Feb. 12, 1992. 1~~ Supcflun(l Amendments ~d R@?uthorization Act of 1986S 182 D clay, ASSISt~t A(fminlSt~tor, office Of Solid waste and Section 126(g). Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, let- 163 J. Hughes, “An Assessment of Training Needs for Worker ter to L. Murphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training Program, Safety and Health Programs: Hazardous Waste Operations and International Association of Firefighters, June 23, 1992. Emergency Rcspon~c, ” Applled Occupational En\ironnzcnta[ IB~ J Mor~, co-c~llr, EPA-hbor Task Force, memorandum H-ygienc , vol. 6, No 2, February 1991, pp. 114-118, to Vicki Santoro, Environmental Protection Agency Emergency Iti 5 I Ft,dfrai Rp,clstcr , 4556 DCC. 19, 19~6 Response Team, “Fall River, MA Title III Audit, June 26, 1992, ” 165 ‘Niitlonal Institute of Environmental Health SCi CnCCS, July 9, 1992. “Summ:i~ of NIEHS Funded Supcrfund Worker Training Grants”, 1s4 p Li~cr, Dis~ic[ Chief, Ncw Bedford, MA Fire Depmment, 1991 “mcmomndum to H. Opcnshaw, Chief of Department, re: Grass

I ~~ National Ins[i tu t c of Environmental Health SClcll Ks, Fire PCB Site Foot of Sawyer Street,” Mar. 14, 1992. “Request for Grant Applicatio~Hazardous Materials and Waste 1X5 H, ~now, Esq., On behalf of Hanson PCMKIII cnt Firefighters Worker Health und Safety Trainirlg—Background Infornlatlon,” Association, IAFF Local 2914, Icttcr to J. Bclaga, Regional Miu. 16, 1990, Administrator, Region 1, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1~7 National Institute of Environmental Health S~icnCc S, Apr. 9, 1992. “Summary Report of 1990 Site Visit Reviews of NIEHS Worker 186 L, Mqhy, Op. cit. Tralnlng Cirantcrs-Driift Version 2-2591,” February 1991. 1~7 J. coc~ls, Co-chair, Environmental f%otcction Agency, 16s D Dobbln, program Administrator, Worker Health and Health and Safety Task Force, personal communication to T. Safety Training Grant program, National Institute of Environmental O’TOOIC, my 18, 1992. Health Sciences, personal communication to T. O’TOOIC, Office of 1~$ R. Cmma, letter to Don Clay, Feb. 12, 1992, op. cit. Tcchnolo~g Assessment, Feb. 20, 1991, 189 L, Murphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training, 169 National Instltutc of Environmental Health Sciences, International Association of Firefighters, personal communication “Testimony of the NIEHS on the OSHA’S Pmposcd Standard for to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment, July 17, 1992. Accrcditatlon of Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency lm J Mor~, “Fall River Audit,” Op. Cit. Response Trammg: 20 CFR 1910.121 ,“ U.S. Department of Labor, 191 Lcs Murphy, Director, Intcrnationa] Association of Washington DC, Jan, 29, 1991, Firefighters, Hazardous Materials Training, memorandum to ITo 29 CFR 1910.120. Environmental Protection Agency-Labor Health and Safety Task 17] Ibid. Force, “NCW Bedford,” July 20, 1992. 17Z SARA Title III, Sec. 301-305, En}’ironnrenfal Srarures 192 J Cocdls, Co.chAr, EPA-Labor Health and safety Task (Rockville, MD: Government Institutes, Inc., 1991), p. 1048. Force, personal communication to T. O’TOOIC, Office of 173 Ibid. Technology Assessment, Aug. 19, 1992. 174 u s Environmental protection Agency-Labor Health ad ’93 Ibid. Safety Task Force, Minutes of Meeting, June 25, 1992. 194 Ibid. ITS u s Environmental Protection Agency-Labor Hc~lth ad 195 stephen L~tig, Director, Emergency Response Division+ Safety Task Force, Minutes of Meeting, Aug. 17, 1992. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Comments of OSHA’S 176 U.S. Env~onrncnt~ Protection Agency-Labor Hcalti ~d Proposed Rule: Accreditation of Training programs for Hazardous Safety Task Force, Minutes of Meeting, May 14, 1992. Waste Operations,” OSHA Docket, No. S-760-B, U.S. Department 177 u s. Env~onmental I%otcction Agency-Labor Health ad of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Safety Task Force, Minutes of Meeting, April, 13, 1992. ’96 R. Duffy, op. cit. 48 ! Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

~3 ~, Mwhy, ‘iCrisis ~ me Fire Service,” op. cit. 197 Don Cky, Assist~t Administrator, Office Of Solid Waste Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, let- 204 L. Murphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training, ter to K. Ringeu Executive Director, Laborers’ Health and Safety International Association of Firefighters, personal communication Fund, June 23, 1992. to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment, Jan. 20, 1991. 19855 Federal Register , 2778, J~. 26, 1990. ms J. Mor~ memor~d~ to Vicki Santoro, JUne 16, 1991, oP. 19929 Cm 1910.120. cit. m Ibid. 206 L Muqhy, memor~dum to Environmental protection ml 55 FR , 2778, Jan. 26, 1990. Agency-Labor Task Force-New Bedford, June 20, 1992. op. cit. ~z R. D~fy, 1991, Op. Cit. Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 3

ore than 3 years have passed since the Department of Energy began a concerted, publicly declared cam- paign to chart a “new course” toward full accountability in the areas of environment, safety, and health.M1 Yet evidence of DOE leadership and substantive accom- plishments in furthering worker health and safety remain sparse. The “new culture” pursued by the Secretary of Energy, a culture that honors protection of the environment, health, and safety as fundamental organizational values, has not been translated into official policies and programs-or even been wholly accepted— by DOE and its contractors. The new culture has not taken hold largely because of three flaws in DOE’s approach to worker protection: 1. Not all DOE employees, contractor managers, and workers are convinced that worker health and safety truly takes precedence over other goals. 2. Within DOE, organizational responsibility for occupational health and safety is dispersed among different program The “new culture” offices. This has caused staff with occupational safety and health (OSH) experience to be thinly spread throughout at DOE has DOE line organizations. Within the DOE Office of Envi- ronmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM), not yet been there are insufficient numbers of OSH professionals to develop program-specific policies or ensure implementation translated into and enforcement of such policies by EM contractors. 3. Internal oversight of DOE and contractors’ implementa- official policies tion and enforcement of OSH programs is weak. The DOE Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) does not and programs have enough qualified field staff to monitor contractor operations. Furthermore, EH has no direct authority to en-

49 50 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

force OSH orders or regulations. EH in- activities. 10 DOE also ordered its program of- fluence on DOE line organizations rests fices to include specific crosscuts in the fiscal chiefly on the capacity to embarrass line year 1993 budget to identify and summarize all managers into complying with OSH orders occupational health and safety activities in a sin- and regulations. There are no meaningful gle document “to make visible and facilitate ac- rewards or penalties for occupational tion on OSH activities.” Future budget submis- health and safety performance levied on sions will be subjected to comprehensive OSH DOE or its contractors. reporting and will be used to support an OSH l 1 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of Five-Year Plan that is under development. 1970 established that those Federal agencies that In August 1992, DOE and OSHA signed a exercise statutory authority to prescribe or en- Memorandum of Understanding that provides force occupational safety and health standards, DOE with access to OSHA’s technical expertise or regulations affecting those conditions, were and formalizes arrangements for joint training not subject to the authority of the Occupational programs. The agreement acknowledges that Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) under DOE retains authority to develop, implement, Section 4(b) 1 of the Act.2 DOE is the only Feder- and enforce OSH policies for its contractor em- al agency that claims such an exemption. DOE ployees, whereas OSHA has the right to conduct unannounced inspections at DOE facilities to and its contractors derive authority to determine 12-14 their own occupational safety and health stan- protect Federal (i.e., DOE) employees. dards from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.3 These are positive steps, but it is unclear if There is thus no external oversight or regulation such efforts can overcome fundamental organiza- of DOE’s or its contractors’ performance in OSH tional obstacles that underlie DOE’s approach to matters. worker protection. DOE’s problematic organiza- When OSHA released its comprehensive De- tional OSH framework, coupled with the enor- cember 1990 report on occupational safety and mous scope and complex nature of the pollution health programs at DOE facilities, it recom- at Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) will likely mended that DOE institute a number of major or- reflect and magnify worker protection problems ganizational changes to ensure adequate worker already encountered at non-Federal Superfund safety and health protection.4 DOE reacted sites. Success in addressing cleanup worker promptly to the OSHA review by reasserting line health and safety at the NWC will depend to a management responsibility for contractor safety large extent on achieving substantial changes in and health programs5 and by directing the rele- the organizational format of DOE’s approach to vant DOE program offices to present the Secre- worker protection. The next section discusses or- tary with ways of responding to the OSHA find- ganizational problems pertinent to OSH matters ings.6-8 at DOE. Subsequent sections of the chapter ad- Several important reforms resulted from these dress particular OSH issues encountered at non- Federal hazardous waste sites that are likely to be efforts, including the establishment of an Office of Occupational Safety within EH9 and the addi- troublesome during cleanup of the NWC. tion of many health and safety professionals, among them former OSHA employees, to DOE MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT TO headquarters staff. In addition, both EH and EM OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND have established advisory boards consisting of HEALTH PRIORITIES outside experts to augment in-house expertise Skepticism about the vigor and persistence of and provide an independent perspective on DOE DOE’s commitment to occupational safety and Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 51

health continues to haunt the Department. In the [an] . . . insistence on rapid response without ad- course of OSHA’s 1990 audit of DOE worker equate understanding [that] has produced pre- health and safety programs—carried out at mature action plans and decisions, with resul- DOE’s request—OSHA inspectors noted that tant frequent schedule revisions, organizational “pressures to get the job done often overrule changes, and unclear explanations of the need 15 and bases for the actions and decisions. Work- safety and health concerns.” OSHA found that ers may be left with no alternative but to consid- resource allocation decisions and planning by er production in fact as the continuing, domi- DOE managers and contractors did not indicate nant priority, and safety as simply a passing worker health or safety to be of paramount con- fancy of the current Secretary .29 cern. OSHA reported that some top managers in DOE’s contractor organizations failed to demon- OSHA noted that union representatives were strate a strong commitment to worker health and not routinely included in health and safety com- safety: mittees, and that employees were not routinely asked to participate in safety and health inspec- One top manager stated that occupational 30 tion activities at weapons sites. Although at safety and health was not a fundamental organizational value . , . [and] saw the emphasis on most weapons sites, joint labor-management safety and health as a hindrance to the facility’s committees have been formed to facilitate commission. 16 munication about health and safety issues and other matters,31 32 workers have not been active- Assertions that DOE management is aggres- ly enlisted in efforts to enhance occupational sively pursuing staunch worker protection poli- safety and health at DOE facilities. 33 cies are weakened by failure to correct inade- OSHA also noted that investigations of work- quate OSH practices documented by Tiger ers’ complaints of health and safety problems Teams; 17 18 by long delays in official adoption of 19-21 had in some instances resulted in DOE field of- proposed OSH orders; by the failure of DOE fices referring the problem back to the employer managers to impose penalties on contractors who against whom the complaint was raised. In some do not enforce sound worker protection cases, OSHA found that allegations of reprisals 22 23 policies; and by reports that DOE facility op- against employees who had initiated health and erations were resumed or allowed to continue be- safety complaints had not been investigated fore appropriate safety training and procedures properly by DOE.34 24-27 had been completed. Reports of workers being harassed for raising Workers, too, appear skeptical of the depth health and safety concerns continue to surface. and staying power of DOE’s commitment to the For example, the DOE Inspector General report- new culture. In November 1991 the Secretary’s ed in September 1991 that a DOE contractor and Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety a former contractor at Hanford had acquired found that the new philosophy of valuing health wiretapping and eavesdropping equipment de- and safety over weapons production is “not un- signed for covert surveillance, in violation of derstood, accepted or believed” by workers at DOE orders and Federal acquisition require- Rocky Flats,28 where public controversy over ments. Security forces at the Idaho National En- safety has been intense. The committee (referred gineering Laboratory and at Savannah River to as the Ahearne committee after its Chair, John were discovered to have similar equipment. 35 Ahearne) reported that DOE’s response to high- The Inspector General reviewed 14 instances of profile safety issues has been characterized by covert video surveillance conducted by security forces at Hanford, but found no evidence to sub- 52 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

stantiate allegations by Hanford workers that qualified staff to develop occupational health and they had been subjected to illegal surveillance safety programs suited to EM line operations and after complaining about health and safety prob- has little capacity to assess contractors’ perfor- lems. 36 mance in health and safety matters. As of late In February 1992 the Department of Labor 1992, the DOE Office of Environment, Safety, found that a worker at the Oak Ridge National and Health, had not initiated serious consulta- Laboratory had been isolated, assigned to menial tions with EM or other line organizations to de- jobs, and forced to work in hazardous areas after termine the top priorities of the line programs or raising concerns about safety issues.37 38 The to assist managers in formulating effective OSH DOE contractor involved is appealing this ruling. policies. In April 1992, DOE published its proposed EM headquarters staff handling worker safety Whistleblower Rule in the Federal Register.39 and health matters are overwhelmed with the The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy has taken the constant need to react to the latest crisis, and are lead in developing complaint procedures for unable to devote the time and resources needed to DOE contractor employees, but these procedures develop coherent cleanup worker protection poli- have not been finalized.40 EH reviews of employ- cies.44 EM's office of Oversight and Self-As- ee concerns programs indicate that some DOE sessment is responsible for producing health and field offices have neglected to establish adequate safety policy, implementation guidance, and employee concerns programs in spite of long- technical advice on EM related OSH matters, and standing directives to do so.41 for assessing the adequacy of EM and its contractors’ occupational safety and health perform- 45 LINE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY ance. EM has a single staff person with training FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY in occupational health and safety, and two em- AND HEALTH ployees with nuclear safety expertise.46 47 The Occupational health and safety programs EM program office responsible for environment- within DOE and its contractor corps are based on al remediation has no staff trained in occupation- two organizational “pillars”: line responsibility al safety or health, and is planning to rely entirely on contractors to meet its OSH needs. One for safety42 and health, and independent oversight. (See figure 3-1,) A directive from the consequence of such staffing patterns is that by Secretary of Energy explicitly charged DOE line August 1992, EM headquarters staff had not reviewed a single cleanup site health and safety organizations with responsibility for occupation- 48 al health and safety matters within their plan (HASP). purview. 43 Each program office (e.g., Environ- When the DOE Office of Environmental Res- mental Restoration and Waste Management, De- toration and Waste Management was established fense Programs, Nuclear Energy) is expected to in 1989, its leaders confronted pressing responsi- develop health and safety policy relevant to its bilities. Undertaking cleanup of the Weapons mission, to issue guidance in worker safety and Complex required EM to create and staff a new health matters, and to assess contractors’ OSH program office; to initiate more productive rela- performance. tionships between DOE and its contractors and Responsibility for worker safety and health between DOE and a skeptical, alarmed public; to may be an appropriately decentralized function demonstrate progress and justify proposed clean- in a large organization. However, EM, the DOE up budgets to Congress; to comply with environ- program office examined by the Office of Tech- mental regulations, and to meet schedule dead- nology Assessment, lacks adequate numbers of lines in Interagency Agreements. Amidst these diverse and urgent efforts, EM neglected the de- Figure 3-l-The Department of Energy ------...... r=== Deputy Secretary Under Secretary 1 , E J Office of Security Affairs I Office of Scientific OffIce of Scheduling . Office of the Secretary of Office of Special Projects and Engineering Recruitment, and Logistics Energy Advisory Board Training and Development r 4

I OffIce of Minority Office of Intelligence Office of Public Affairs — F -1 Economic Impact - I 1 1 I 1 Office of Policy, Board of Office of Nuclear Safety Planning and Analysis Contract Appeals I A d

IOffice of Procurement I I -.. II Office of I Assistant Secretary, Officc ! of Financial Inspector Assistance, and Administration and Congressional and General Counsel Management General Program Human Resource Intergovernmental and Controller I Mana~ement II Management

I 1 I

Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Conservation and Nuclear Energy Fossil Energy Renewable Energy

I ~— — -——-—_-L– Assistant Secretary, Office of Civilian office of Economic Regulatory Ertvironmental office of Radioactive Waste New Production Restoration and Waste Energy Research Management Reactors Management —— Adminis::n.JE -. 1 SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, 1992. 54 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

velopment of rigorous or high-profile policies re- (DNFSB)54—that DOE develop clear health and lated to cleanup worker safety and health. safety policies at the national level and establish It maybe that EM will evolve a more purpose- explicit, measurable goals that its operations of- ful and aggressive approach to occupational safe- fices and contractors should achieve to imple- ~ and health as the organization becomes estab- ment these policies. lished, as cleanup gets underway, and as the In the absence of a comprehensive OSH order cleanup workforce increases in size. Currently, or policy directed at cleanup work, DOE contrac- however, there is little evidence of leadership in tors must rely on existing DOE orders. Numerous OSH matters at EM headquarters, and few indi- expert reviewers55-57 have Cemented that many cations that decision makers have recognized the DOE OSH orders lack specificity and adequate need to urgently address cleanup worker protec- implementation guidance. This lack of precision tion issues. allows DOE contractors great leeway in deter- The head of DOE’s Environmental Restora- mining what constitutes satisfactory compliance tion and Waste Management program explicitly with Occupational Health and Safety orders. reaffirmed the Secretary of Energy’s commitm- Also, DOE’s existing OSH orders and policies do ent to protecting worker health and safety as not address some worker protection issues specif- the “highest programmatic priority” in a July ic to the DOE cleanup, such as the content of 1991 memo to all EM and contractor per- health and safety training programs or medical sonnel. 49 The memo goes on to list actions and surveillance for hazardous waste workers. programs needed to accomplish EM’s OSH Recent DOE policy changes designed to re- goals: duce risks to off-site populations, but developed in the absence of comprehensive occupational ● establishment of firm OSH priorities and re- health and safety policies or a clear focus on sponsibilities, worker protection needs, may have heightened ● development and implementation of quan- cleanup worker health and safety threats. For ex- titlable OSH performance standards to en- ample, the Final Safety Analysis for Rocky Flats sure programmatic accountability, concentrated principally on off-site radiological ● planning and budgeting for necessary OSH risks from plant operations. The Secretary’s Ad- resources to ensure availability, and visory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety ex- ● formulation and application of improved 50 pressed concern that changes in plant operations channels of communication. made on the basis of this safety analysis might Little progress has been made in implement- actually increase risks to workers.58 In addition, ing these programs. Some of EM’s OSH goals the committee worried that concerns about envi- could be accomplished by adopting the proposed ronmental threats might prompt managers to re- DOE Order 5483, XX, “Occupational Safety and place carbon tetrachloride, a liver toxin used in Health Program for DOE Employees;’ which large quantities at Rocky Flats, with less toxic— was designed by EH and has been under review but more flammable-solvents. Because fire haz- by DOE program offices for months. Adoption of ards are among the most serious threats at the this order would be a constructive response to the plant, a narrow analysis that focuses on health recommendation repeated over the years by mul- hazards but ignores potential worker safety risks tiple expert advisory bodies—including the Na- could be disastrous.59 tional Academy of Sciences,51 OSHA,52 the Ad- The Ahearne committee also expressed con- visory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety,53 cern that ongoing activity may jeopardize work- and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board ers at the Hanford tank farms, where potentially Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 55

flammable high-level radioactive waste is stored. equate worker health and safety practices is ex- The committee noted that DOE and its contractor tremely limited.62-65 DOE regards Hanford’s sin- managers “have shown little appreciation of the gle-shell tanks as its top safety concern because safety of workers working on top of Tank 101- of the potential for tank contents to undergo a SY,’ which is suspected to have an appreciable chemical explosion and spew radionuclides chance of exploding. The committee went on: across the surrounding countryside. Yet at least At Hanford, as elsewhere in the DOE, there 16 different “events” resulting in worker expo- is a tendency to concentrate on risk to the gener- sure to tank vapors occurred between 1987 and al public and give much less attention to work- 1992, before a DOE investigation revealed the se- ers. At such an isolated site as Hanford, this can riousness of the problem and the lack of adequate make conditions seem much better than they management response,66 really are.60 Several of these exposures caused workers to be hospitalized; at least one worker suffered per- There is a pressing need to establish the prima- manent loss of lung function. In January 1992 an cy of orders, standards, and regulations applica- investigation by the DOE Richland Field Office ble to cleanup worker protection at DOE facili- concluded that the causes of the recurring expo- ties. Throughout DOE and its contractor corps, sures were inadequate “implementation of man- compliance with environmental laws is seen as agement systems,” lack of a properly developed having a higher priority than compliance with oc- industrial hygiene program, and “failure to prop- cupational health and safety regulations. The for- erly characterize the work environment and de- mer are statutory requirements, and violation is velop appropriate engineering controls.”67 It is understood by DOE and its contractors to carry a notable that the Richland Field Office Safety Pro- threat of great embarrassment and possible fries gram had no staff whatsoever from August 1991 against DOE. Some fear that criminal sanctions until April 1992.68 From 1980 through August might be levied against the employees responsi- 1991 the Richland Field Office had only one-half ble. of one full-time-equivalent (FTE) staff person for Occupational health and safety regulations, on industrial hygiene functions .69 the other hand, have the status “merely” of DOE A former Assistant Secretary of Labor for Oc- orders, which many mangers consider “policy” cupational Safety and Health, who reviewed rather than explicit, legally enforceable com- DOE’s internal report investigating the tank farm mands. Although the Secretary of Energy specif- exposures70 at OTA’s request, commented: ically instructed managers to comply with all applicable OSHA standards and regulations,61 The failure of those in responsible manage- DOE and its contractors appear to regard this di- ment charge to assign resources to this problem rective as 1ess compelling or of lower priority in the presence of repeated violations would, without any doubt, have been viewed by OSHA than compliance with environmental statutes. as willful violations of the [Occupational Safety This attitude is understandable, if regrettable, and Health] Act and subject to possible criminal given the absence of effective mechanisms for penalties. This conclusion would probably have enforcing OSH orders at DOE facilities and the been reached by the end of 1987 when three lack of significant or visible penalties imposed [worker exposure] episodes had occurred, but for failure to implement sound worker protection certainly by 1989 when the episodes reoccurred. policies. The absence of high priority for solving this A litany of problems at the Hanford tank farms problem in 1990, with attendant lack of profes- suggests that DOE’s ability to monitor contractor sional staff and resources could well put some- OSH practices or induce contractors to follow ad- one on trial for criminal behavior [had the oc- 56 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

currences been subject to OSHA enforcement to OSHA’s complaint that DOE field offices were and penalties]. Also, in 1989 with the reoccur- embroiled in a “major conflict of interest” be- rence of the episode, [an OSHA finding of] “im- cause they were responsible both for ensuring minent danger” and a series of restrictive proce- contractor compliance with DOE health and safe- dures akin to closure of a manufacturing facility ty policies and for reporting back to program probably would have been invoked.’l offices at DOE headquarters on their own effec- A DOE internal memo on the subject of the tiveness as overseers and enforcers of such com- 80 tank farm vapor exposures noted that if Hanford pliance. were subject to OSHA citations and penalties, The EH site representative reports indicate fines up to $70,000 per day might be expected.72 that significant progress must be made if DOE Nonetheless, despite these and other failures in line managers are to exercise meaningful over- occupational health and safety performance, the sight of contractor OSH activities. For example, DOE contractor at Hanford was granted an award EH site residents found that the Oak Ridge Field fee of almost $5 million in 1991.73 Office had not assessed the adequacy of the site construction contractor’s work control program OVERSIGHT OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY and could not guarantee that “adequate work con- AND HEALTH PRACTICES trols will be established and implemented to ensure worker safety during construction activi- DOE’s Office of Environment, Safety, and ties.” 81 This report also documented that the Health makes up the second pillar of the Depart- construction management contractor had not en- ment’s approach to worker health and safety pro- sured that the personnel who assessed the site for tection: independent oversight. EH is responsible the presence of possible worker safety hazards for providing DOE line management programs were properly trained to perform this task.82 In with internal review of DOE and contractor OSH addition to these findings of inadequate DOE programs. EH also provides line organizations oversight of OSH matters, the EH representative with technical advice, develops and maintains found that “work controls specifying safety re- DOE orders, and conducts Technical Safety Ap- praisals and Tiger Team Assessments.74 quirements are not effectively and consistently implemented and followed by construction per- EH has 11 site representatives or “residents” sonnel and their management at work sites.”83 stationed at 5 weapons facilities. These 11 individuals are responsible for monitoring contractor OSH performance throughout the NWC,75 cover- DOE Chain of Command and 76 Accountability for Occupational ing a total work force of more than 100,000. Safety and Health EH site representatives have been directed to shift their evaluation of DOE facilities from com- Other monthly reports of EH site representa- pliance-oriented inspections to “programmatic tives provide additional evidence that DOE line assessment” of DOE line management OSH per- management is not effectively overseeing con- formance and to identify root causes of deficien- tractor occupational health and safety per- cies.77 The results of these assessments are sent formance. One impediment to effective DOE directly to DOE Program Secretarial Officials oversight of contractors is the complex and over- (PSOs) such as the Assistant Secretary for EM.78 lapping jurisdictions of its different line organi- Formerly, EM field resident reports were re- zations at weapons facilities. viewed at the DOE field office level. The change According to an EH report on Idaho National in reporting structure was made to increase the Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for example, visibility of OSH performance79 and to respond DOE managers failed to independently assess or _—

Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 57

verify contractors’ freeze protection initiatives. that all contractor and subcontractor employees (Such winterization precautions are essential to have undergone legally mandated health and ensure functioning fire protection systems at safety training, are enrolled in required medical INEL.) 84 This failure was largely due to confu- surveillance programs, and so forth, will be diffi- sion about the jurisdictional overlaps between cult under these circumstances. Currently, most different line management organizations at DOE. weapons facilities lack administrative mecha- A memo from the DOE Office of Defense Pro- nisms to ensure that workers transferring to new grams (DP) detailing department policy on freeze jobs at a facility undergo initial fitness exams protection was interpreted by the prime contrac- prior to beginning new duties or are subsequently tor as being applicable to DP facilities only. Con- enrolled in appropriate medical surveillance pro- sequently, the contractors did not address INEL grams. Overseeing the quality and comprehen- operations controlled by EM in its response to siveness of cleanup worker health and safety pro- the Idaho Field Office questionnaire. DOE field grams administered by hundreds of DOE office staff failed to realize that the contractor subcontractors engaged in the cleanup will be a had not considered all aspects of INEL opera- monumental task. tions. 85 DOE Tiger Teams and OSHA noted that Another instance of inadequate DOE oversight health and safety personnel at DOE facilities had of contractor activities was documented by EH a poor grasp of OSHA inspection and hazard as- representatives at Hanford, who found that con- sessment methods.89 Recent guidance from EH struction contractor safety programs were quite headquarters to its site representatives on how good, but that the Richland Field Office exercised DOE and contractor OSH performance should be only “weak” oversight over contractor construc- assessed is an important step forward, but with- tion safety programs and had failed to assign any- out a significant infusion of staff and resources, one the responsibility of identifying emerging such guidance cannot overcome current staffing regulations, requirements, or safety training limitations within DOE. needs in construction. The representatives deter- OSHA and DOE have negotiated a Memo- mined that “contractor [IOSH] performance is due randum of Understanding (MOU) that establish- to the contractor’s efforts rather than direction es a formalized working relationship and allows from the line organization.”86 The report noted “where practical” for “mutually beneficial” OSH that DOE field office staff “did not programmati- training, technical assistance and information ex- 90 cally review any of the contractor’s safety pro- change, and program evaluations. Although the grams and that the contractor could revise exist- MOU does not specifically mention cleanup ing safety programs without [the field office’s] worker issues, DOE EH has already arranged acknowledge. Therefore there is no assurance that cess to computerized files of OSHA’s “HAZ- the apparently acceptable performance of a con- WOPER Interpretative Quips” and has plans to tractor will remain acceptable.”87 access much of OSHA’s technical information as The lack of strong, centralized control over well.91 DOE contractor organizations will hinder efforts The interactions made possible by the MOU to ensure consistent and comprehensive imple- might be very helpful to DOE staff, who are try- mentation of OSHA’s Hazardous Waste Oper- ing in effect to reproduce OSHA policies and ation and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) programs. The content of the MOU is vague, standard and other health and safety standards however; it contains no promises of specific in- during the NWC cleanup. DOE headquarters is teractions and proposes collaboration only “to currently unable to determine the roster of work- the extent priorities and resources permit.” 88 ers at a given weapons facility. Ascertaining Specific arrangements for reimbursing OSHA 58 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

will be worked out in future interagency agree- health program (DOE Order 5480.9) adopted in ments.92 1980. The new order would establish program re- EH has initiated major revisions of two DOE quirements for DOE line management and con- orders that are fundamental to worker protection tractors involved in all construction activities, in- at the Weapons Complex. The Occupational cluding environmental restoration, and might Safety and Health Program for DOE Contractor provide some of the ingredients needed to create Employees (DOE Order 5483. XX)93 is a com- sound health and safety plans for cleanup work. prehensive reformulation of DOE OSH orders EH has tried to instill sound occupational that would codify the hierarchy of DOE-devel- health and safety principles into line manage- oped OSH standards, DOE-adopted OSHA stan- ment programs through the provision of technical dards, DOE-adopted consensus standards, etc., support. EH has begun an effort to assist contrac- that managers should follow in implementing tors with the development of model worker pro- worker protection programs at DOE facilities. In tection projects. Managers will have the option of addition, the proposed Order 5483.XX establish- using EH seed funds to pilot worker health and es DOE OSH program requirements; sets forth safety initiatives that will be published and re- rules for procedures, schedules, and employee viewed in a DOE on-line clearinghouse.99 This participation in DOE and contractor OSH self- project was a response to OSHA’s complaint that assessments; prescribes reporting procedures for the historically insular nature of DOE operations work-related illnesses and injuries; and describes had led it to repeatedly reinvent the wheel and a risk assessment methodology for determining had hindered consistency in OSH practices.lOO the priority of abatement procedures .94 EH has also undertaken a significant upgrading This proposed DOE order would also establish of DOE’s documentation of work-related injuries a formal process for hazard abatement and would and illnesses in an effort to remedy serious inac- require approval of any significant delays in cor- curacies noted by OSHA in current record-keep- recting identified hazards.95 OSHA found that at ing procedures. 101 one facility, more than 5,000 hazards had gone The impact of recommendations and policy uncorrected for over a year because managers did proposals from EH is tempered by the relatively not recognize these items as a priority. At another weak authority it exerts over DOE line manage- facility, OSHA identified inadequate ventilation ment. EH acts in an “advisory capacity” to DOE and electrical conditions that had been uncorrect- program offices; its policy products are subject to 96 ed for 6 years. A 1992 EH review of occupa- comment and review by these program offices. tional safety and health programs at the Ports- (The proposed “Occupational Health and Safety mouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant revealed more Order, 5480.XX’ garnered 1,300 comments from than 500 violations of DOE OSH orders, most of within DOE.102) EH maintains that after such which were classified as “serious.” Many of these intra-agency review, it makes independent deter- violations had been previously identified, but had minations on final policies to be submitted to the not been corrected.97 Situations such as the fail- Secretary for approval. The Assistant Secretary ure to abate—or even fully investigate—the for EH has the option of bringing EH proposals vapor exposure hazards at the Hanford tank to the Secretary for approval that do not have the farms would hopefully become less likely with concurrence of other DOE program offices.103 the adoption and implementation of the proposed 104 order. In practice, the process of gaining official ap- Another OSH order under development by EH proval of EH recommendations is one of compro- 105 is the Construction Safety Program,98 which mise and accommodation. EH has tried, with would replace the current construction safety and some success, to “leverage” its sparse resources Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 59

and authority by conducting “special assess- tween EH and EM will be required to develop ments” of high-profile problem areas or opera- and implement OSH programs most urgently tions. These reviews are used essentially to em- needed for cleanup. EH initiatives and policies— barrass managers into more vigorous OSH no matter how valid---are meaningless unless efforts. line management and field staff have the will and DOE’s limited capacity to enforce worker resources to implement them. health and safety policies and orders among con- Finally, oversight and enforcement of contrac- tractors has been documented by OSHA and by tor occupational health and safety activities by EH site residents reports,106-109 This failure was both line management and EH must be augment- grimly illustrated by the death of a Hanford con- ed. DOE must demonstrate its commitment to tractor employee, who was killed in April 1992 worker health and safety by making the formula- after falling through the roof of an abandoned re- tion and implementation of clear and coordinated actor building known to be in danger of collapse. OSH policies an urgent priority. Otherwise, as The fatality demonstrated that written safety pro- will be discussed in the next section of this back- cedures are not always followed, even when ground paper, management attention will contin- workers and supervisors are aware of their exis- ue to focus on other goals, such as schedules for tence.110 achieving environmental compliance and con- DOE and contractor management participa- tract costs, at the expense of worker protection is- tion in many EH initiatives is voluntary; the prin- sues. The risks of such a course include the po- cipal EH approach to oversight of line manage- tential endangerment of thousands of employees ment OSH activities remains reactive responses and further erosion of DOE’s credibility as a re- to problems that might have been avoided had sponsible and competent protector of environ- strong programs been implemented. Critical ment, safety and health. OSH orders proposed by EH have yet to be approved. WORKER PROTECTION COMPETES Nonetheless, progress in occupational health WITH OTHER CLEANUP PRIORITIES and safety at DOE should be measured against DOE and contractor managers involved in the pervasive and serious deficiencies in worker cleanup of the NWC must contend with all of the protection that characterized operations before issues that clamor for attention and resources at 1989, with consideration for the difficulties of se- non-Federal hazardous waste sites. If anything, curing management and worker commitment to the competing pressures and priorities are more new DOE missions and priorities. In this light, diverse and intense at DOE weapons facilities. EH efforts over the past year represent positive Communities neighboring weapons sites are steps toward a programmatic approach to a “new greatly concerned about possible health and envi- culture” honoring environment, safety, and health ronmental impacts of the pollution—and have at DOE. expressed this concern via Congressional hear- The organizationally segmented structure of ings, the national media and in successful and occupational safety and health activities at DOE pending lawsuits against DOE.lll -113 The pres- demands extensive staff and resources that are sure on EM and on DOE contractors to demon- not now in place. Further progress in institution- strate progress while holding down costs is unre- alizing rigorous worker protection throughout the lenting, and occurs in a context of technical Weapons Complex requires a significant increase complexities unmatched at most non-Federal in trained occupational health and safety profes- waste sites. sionals in DOE line organizations and in EH. In addition, serious and sustained consultation be- 60 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

In addition to the need to comply with applic- Many contentious questions are involved in in- able environmental regulations, particularly Su- terpreting and implementing HAZWOPER, co- perfund and the Resource Conservation and Re- ordinating policies among Federal agencies, and covery Act (RCRA), the DOE cleanup is being communicating effectively with those who actu- driven by priorities and schedule “milestones” ally do the work of cleaning up. DOE might more established in Interagency Agreements (IAGs) efficiently resolve some of these issues by con- negotiated among DOE, EPA, and individual vening a multidisciplinary, interagency task States. The milestones and deadlines set forth in force—perhaps even broader in membership than IAGs were typically agreed to before reliable EPA’s—including for example, staff from the Na- characterization data was available and in the ab- tional Institute of Environmental Health Sciences sence of health-based cleanup priorities or analy- (NIEHS) and the Agency for Toxic Substances ses of potential occupational hazards associated and Disease Registry (ATSDR), as well as health with proposed cleanup work.114 The need to re- and safety experts from relevant unions. Health spond to regulatory demands and IAG schedules and safety staff from DOE’s EM and EH might has preoccupied much of the management talent also benefit from sitting in on sessions of the in EM. Available evidence, including staffing EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force. patterns and resource allocation, indicates that DOE line management has paid relatively little DOE SITE CHARACTERIZATION DATA attention to OSH issues associated with the Both the scale and the complexity of contami- cleanup. nation at the Nuclear Weapons Complex distin- DOE has convened the Tripartite Commission guish the DOE cleanup from most other hazard- 118 to discuss occupational health and safety matters ous waste operations. These factors increase related to its operations. This high-level working the uncertainties involved in mapping environ- group consists of DOE senior managers, contrac- mental pathways or determining pollution tor managers, and representatives of national boundaries, and in turn heighten the difficulties labor organizations with members employed at associated with identifying site hazards, recog- facilities in the NWC. The group has discussed nizing potential worker health and safety risks, DOE initiatives in medical surveillance, health and designing and implementing work practices and safety training, and other matters pertinent to that effectively limit such risks. DOE workers generally; it is not designed to Characterizing the nature, extent, and future focus solely on cleanup issues. Much of the course of environmental contamination is a group’s discussion has reportedly been directed time-consuming and technically difficult job in at the fate of DOE production workers whose any case, but it will be especially challenging original job titles will be eliminated as weapons throughout the NWC. Records documenting past production activities end and some facilities are releases of contaminants from DOE weapons fa- 115 The Tripartite converted into cleanup sites. cilities are scant. The exact content and location Commission does not address the level of techni- of past releases are frequently unknown, and the cal detail that is the major focus of the EPA- environmental pathways followed by contamin- 116 Labor Health and Safety Task Force, 117 nor ants released years or decades earlier are often does it include representatives from EPA, the Na- difficult to track. **9 tional Institute of Occupational Safety and In many cases, the volume of contaminants re- Health (NIOSH), OSHA, or other Federal agen- leased to the environment at DOE facilities cies whose missions and expertise are pertinent dwarfs the amount of hazardous material found at to the NWC cleanup. more typical waste sites. Groundwater contami- Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 161

nation has been confirmed at all NWC facilities. DOE has not directed contractors to factor po- All nonarid sites are believed to have surface tential cleanup worker health threats into charac- 120 water contamination. The volume of soil and terization strategies or remediation plans. The sediment contaminated with radionuclides, haz- Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) re- ardous chemicals, or both is estimated to total cently proposed to assist the EH Office of Health 121 billions of cubic meters. Thousands of solid Physics and Industrial Hygiene by developing waste management units have been identified technical documents in support of draft program throughout the Weapons Complex, many of requirements for a “Health and Safety Standard which require remedial action. Hundreds of for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency buildings and other structures will eventually re- Response” and an “Industrial Hygiene Technical quire decontamination and decommissioning. Manual for Health and Safety During Hazardous The sheer magnitude of characterization ef- Waste Operations and Emergency Response.’’ 124 forts at the NWC will pose great challenges to at- The former document is to follow OSHA’s HAZ- tempts to link environmental data with potential WOPER standard, whereas the latter “will be worker health and safety threats. Currently, DOE similar in depth and scope” to existing NIOSH 125 environmental cleanup requires the analysis of and OSHA manuals. It is unclear to what ex- two to three million samples per year. DOE has tent this proposed project might develop new ma- estimated that by 1995, at least 10 million analy- terial specific to the nuclear weapons sites clean- ses of environmental samples conducted in off- up. DOE has noted that this proposal “will be site laboratories will be required annually.122 The revised to include EM,’’ 126 but the draft docu- possible presence of radionuclides in DOE sam- ments appear to be aimed at worker protection ef- ples will magnify the costs and logistical prob- forts that commence only after site characteriza- lems typically associated with characterizing tion is well under way or completed. complex pollution scenarios-including long de- DOE lacks the field staff needed to determine lays in obtaining sample results—because few if contractors have done a good job analyzing the laboratories are equipped to handle such analy- type and extent of pollution, or to assess whether ses. available characterization data adequately delin- Very few DOE or DOE contractor employees eate the health and safety hazards that cleanup involved in characterization of the nuclear weap- workers might encounter. Thus, DOE managers ons sites are trained in any health discipline. will have little substantive basis for evaluating Trained industrial hygienists qualified to assess contractors’ proposed site-specific HASPS. the adequacy of available characterization data Prime contractors at some weapons facilities and review the quality of contractors’ HASPS are are attempting to reduce the time and costs re- in short supply at DOE. The few industrial hy- quired to complete characterization efforts by gienists who are available still appear to be con- integrating Remedial Investigations with Feas- centrating on reviewing exposure hazards and ibility Studies. Westinghouse Hanford is plan- establishing industrial hygiene protocols for ning to use the “observational approach” in as- weapons production activities.123 OTA was un- sessing pollution in Hanford old plutonium 127 able to identify anyone at DOE headquarters, in reactor areas for example. This approach has either EM or EH, who is attempting to establish been used with success at some non-Federal guidance or policies that DOE contractors or waste sites and incorporates the idea that charac- field staff could use to assess the adequacy of terization studies should be conducted for a spe- characterization data used in formulating HASPS cific purpose, not merely to satisfy regulatory for cleanup worker protection. checklists (see ch, 1). 62 Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

A focal point of environmental studies used to sis or in the procedures required for subcontrac- support the observational approach to site charac- tors to obtain these data. terization should be the identification of possible Such inconsistencies in the structure of DOE risks to cleanup workers. It is not evident, howev- contractor organizations add another layer of er, that either DOE or EPA has instructed con- complexity to efforts to link characterization data tractors to make potential threats to cleanup to potential cleanup worker health threats. The worker health an important “purpose” of site lack of standard procedures for collecting, ana- characterization. In the absence of such policy, lyzing, and recording site characterization data eagerness to reduce characterization costs may and ongoing environmental monitoring data will also reduce the availability of environmental data also impede efforts to fashion efficient, effective, vital to site hazard identification and worker pro- and consistent medical surveillance programs or tection. health and safety training programs for the clean- DOE has not issued any orders or guidance to up. ensure that contractors use approved or consistent methods in collecting and analyzing environ- IMPACTS OF DOE mental samples throughout the Weapons Comp- CONTRACTING PRACTICES lex so that pollution scenarios at different sites DOE and its predecessor agencies were not can be compared. Indeed, DOE has no compre- conceived as organizations subject to strong cen- hensive plan for consistently gathering and ana- tralized direction and control. The Manhattan lyzing environmental monitoring data within or Project was a loose consortium of private corpo- across weapons sites, and no strategy and little rations who agreed to participate in building the technical capacity for relating such data to poten- atomic bomb for reasons of national security. tial adverse health effects among workers or off- The companies that contributed their skills and site populations who may be exposed to pollu- expertise to managing and operating govern- tants.128 Consequently, DOE has no means of ment-owned nuclear weapons facilities during determining which of the many thousands of pol- the Cold War (the M&Os) did so in an era when luted areas within the NWC require more urgent the risks of nuclear technology and other poten- or more rigorous characterization and cleanup tially hazardous processes used in weapons pro- because of their potential health risks. Nor will duction were not fully known. These considera- DOE be able to weigh potential risks to cleanup tions, and the pressure to augment the nuclear workers against possible benefits of proposed en- arsenal, induced the government to indemnify vironmental remedies. M&Os against nuclear and other losses, includ- Another problem confronting identification of ing workers’ compensation costs. 131 potential cleanup worker health and safety threats Over the years, a special “partnership” devel- is the lack of coordination or consistent manage- oped between DOE and its M&O’s that has ment of characterization data across DOE facili- greatly complicated DOE’s oversight of its con- ties. Subcontractors engaged in cleanup efforts at tractors.132 About 90 percent of DOE’S total bud- DOE facilities have complained to OTA that it is get is spent on contractors, primarily those who sometimes difficult to get access to characteriza- 129 manage the NWC. This amounted to $17.6 bil- tion data pertinent to worker health and safety. lion in fiscal year 1990.133 130 The varying organizational structures associ- Beginning in the 1980’s, revelations about the ated with different DOE contractors are such that seriousness of environmental contamination there is no consistency among sites in the titles of throughout the NWC, and a succession of weap- individuals assigned to data collection and analy - ons facility shutdowns prompted by safety con- Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 63

cerns raised questions about DOE’s ability to ef- large number of subcontractors and the multiple fectively monitor contractor operations. Such layers of managerial responsibility characteristic events also prompted questions about the appro- of ERMC cleanup operations will dilute and con- priate limits of contractor indemnification in the fuse responsibility and authority for worker face of regulatory noncompliance.134 health and safety issues. DOE has tried to build provisions into ERMC Environmental Restoration Management agreements that enhance its authority over con- Contractors (ERMCS) tractors. For example, ERMCs will not be “bank- Environmental cleanup will be a significant rolled” in advance by the government for cleanup activity at all sites run by M&O contractors, in- costs. Instead, they will have to invest their own cluding those facilities that continue to have re- capital, and DOE will reimburse costs after bud- 139 This approach may force sponsibilities for weapons production, testing, getary review. and dismantlement. DOE has determined that at ERMCs to pursue more responsible and prudent facilities where environmental restoration is the cost-accounting practices than have always been only or major mission, Environmental Restora- followed by M&Os, but it might also encourage tion Management Contractors (ERMCs) will re- contractors to scrimp on outlays for occupational place or augment M&Os. safety and health, unless DOE imposes and en- ERMCs will be responsible for conducting forces explicit OSH performance criteria. Superfund Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Two ERMCs are currently planned. The Fluor- Studies, RCRA Remedial Field Investigations, Daniel Co. has been selected as the ERMC at and associated “base program” activities. Sub- Fernald, DOE estimates that up to $5 billion contractors supervised by the ERMC will actual- could be spent on the Fernald cleanup over the ly carry out the characterization studies and will next 5 years; the ERMC could earn as much as 140 design and implement remedial actions. The $125 million annually during this period. Bid- ERMC Will be responsible for procuring and ding for the Hanford ERMC is under way. The 135 managing construction subcontractors. The Hanford ERMC will manage all environmental DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and restoration and defense decontamination and de- Waste Management is the program office in commissioning projects. Waste management ac- charge of all environmental restoration and waste tivities at Hanford, including characterization management act iv i ties, whether they occur at and retrieval of materials stored in high-level ERMC sites or at facilities run by M&O contrac- waste tanks, will remain the responsibility of the tors.136 current M&O contractor, Westinghouse Hanford 141 The ERMC concept was designed to help re- Corporation. (WHC). store public confidence in the DOE cleanup effort by making a clear distinction between clean- Cost-Plus Award Fee Process up contractors and those who had generated the Contractors at all DOE weapons facilities contamination, ERMCs also reflect DOE’s desire (M&Os and ERMCs) are now subject to a new to expand its contractor corps to include firms contracting process, the cost-plus award fee with environmental expertise and to inject more (CPAF) policy. DOE established the CPAF to en- competition into bids for its cleanup contracts. courage attention142 to environment, health, and DOE claims that contractor accountability is safety issues, Under the new policy, contrac- 137 increased under the ERMC rules. Some critics tors are paid a “base fee” for reimbursement of have. however, dubbed the ERMC approach “an costs, plus a variable “award fee,’” 51 percent of accountability disaster.”138 It is possible that the which is determined by DOE on the basis of con- 64 Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

tractor performance in environment, safety, and the concurrence of the DOE field office manag- 157 health. 143 If the contractor fails any one of these er.. DOE's EM and EH offices reviewed the categories, the entire award fee would be at award fee in an advisory role: EM supported the risk.144 award; EH did not. EH opposition was based The record suggests that the award fee largely on 29 significant deficiencies in environ- contracting provisions are not functioning as ment, safety, and health cited by the board. In re- planned. Reports by the General Accounting Of- viewing this decision, GAO was unable to deter- fice (GAO) *45 and the DOE Inspector Genera1146 mine the weight accorded environment, safety, have called into question DOE’s willingness or and health in the final award decision. GAO also ability to use the CPAF to hold contractors ac- recalled earlier undeserved awards to previous countable for performance. OSHA noted that Rocky Flats contractors who tolerated serious en- M&Os have avoided penalties for deficiencies in vironment, safety, and health problems, and health and safety by negotiating larger base noted that “some of the same problems we identi- fees.147 For example, the M&O contractor at Oak fied [in 1989] still exist.’’ 158 Ridge increased its “award fee” in 1992 com- In practice, DOE contractor compliance with pared to 1991, even though its performance in en- environmental regulations appears to receive vironment, health, and safety-areas that suppos- more emphasis than occupational health and edly determine 51 percent of the award-had safety issues when award fees are assigned. The declined. The contractor accomplished this by CPAF process does not establish what, if any, negotiating a higher base fee in 1992,148 portion of the award is based on occupational GAO reported that under the new cost-plus safety and health performance. As discussed ear- award fee system, DOE failed to reduce contrac- lier in this background paper, the priorities and tor awards even when serious deficiencies had processes that guide Superfund and RCRA been found in contractor performance.149 150 At cleanups accentuate the importance of environ- Hanford, for example, multiple management mental cleanup schedules, costs, and possible errors in safety performance,151 152 and short- off-site impacts of pollution, downplaying poten- comings in hazard analysis and worker protection tial health and safety threats to on-site workers. at the high-level radioactive waste tank farms, *53 154 DOE appears to be reasserting these priorities in did not prevent WHC from receiving an apprecia- its contractor awards. Contractor performance in ble award fee in fiscal year 1991.155 environmental areas— measured by meeting At the Nevada Test Site, the contractor’s per- schedule deadlines and milestones set forth in formance in environment, safety, and health in IAGs-appears to weigh more heavily than per- 1990 was rated “average.” According to DOE formance in occupational health and safety. policy, this should result in lower award fees. The DOE Inspector General found, however, that APPLICATION OF HAZWOPER DOE field personnel adjusted the maximum TO DOE CLEANUP award fees to allow their contractor to earn fees equal to earlier amounts-without increasing its Policy Guidance on Implementation performance score.156 The M&O contractor at Rocky Flats was The DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management has line responsibilities granted an award fee of $1.7 million for 1991, for the cleanup of weapons facilities. EM has even though the performance review board found made it clear that all environmental restoration that the contractor did not deserve the award. De- fense Programs, the DOE office responsible for and waste management activities are subject to existing DOE orders and must comply with Rocky Flats, decided to overrule the board with Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 65

HAZWOPER, OSHA’s construction standard (29 It is also probable that cooperative cross-orga- CFR 1926), and other relevant OSHA regula- nization efforts among health and safety staff at tions. 159 EM and in different divisions of EH will be nec- In December 1991, responding to earlier fin- essary to create workable and rigorous OSH poli- dings by the DOE Inspector General that failure to cies for the cleanup. The EPA-Labor Task Force comply with HAZWOPER training provisions on Health and Safety has demonstrated that regu- was widespread at NWC facilities,160 the Office lar discussion among experienced health and of the Environment within EH issued guidance safety practitioners from multiple disciplines and on “OSHA Training Requirements for Hazardous agencies can produce valuable insights and help Waste Operations.’’161 EH recently completed a resolve some of the more ambiguous and prob- draft of a document outlining HAZWOPER,162 lematic questions surrounding HAZWOPER im- which essentially reiterates the requirements of plementation. DOE’s efforts to interpret and im- OSHA’s standard,163 albeit in a more readable plement HAZWOPER effectively might also format. It also provides some important ancillary benefit from consultation with health and safety references that might be helpful in implementing experts from academia and the private sector, as the regulation and includes a sample outline of a well as different branches of the government site-specific HASP. such as NIOSH, NIEHS, ATSDR, and the Army The effort proposed by LANL in October Corps of Engineers (ACE), who are familiar with 1992 to develop a draft “Health and Safety Stan- some of the issues involved. DOE has not yet ini- dard for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emer- tiated any such outreach. gency Response” on behalf of the EH Office of DOE and its contractors are not moving ag- Health Physics and Industrial Hygiene164 will gressively to ensure that the minimal require- presumably focus more specifically on the pro- ments of HAZWOPER are met at DOE facilities. grammatic requirements of identifying and con- EM has not issued policies or guidance explain- trolling cleanup worker exposures to health and ing how DOE field offices and contractors should safety hazards, although available documents do interpret and implement HAZWOPER. The EH not make clear how the EH HAZWOPER draft HAZWOPER draft, even if promptly finalized, differs from the proposed LANL project. It is will not address interpretive issues associated also unclear that either effort will significantly with HAZWOPER that were discussed in earlier alter or augment the existing OSHA standard. sections of this background paper. Full implementation of the OSHA HAZWOP- In the absence of clear DOE policies and ER standard at DOE facilities will require con- guidance, implementation of HAZWOPER by siderable effort and cooperation on the part of different contractors at different facilities is cer- DOE line managers and contractors. A robust im- tain to be of variable quality. Furthermore, com- plementation of the standard-for example, a pliance with some aspects of the HAZWOPER program that takes into account private sector standard developing emergency response plans criticisms of deficiencies in OSHA’s proposed and meeting worker training requirements, for health and safety training program accreditation example-requires contractors to make prepara- process, includes reporting requirements and tions well in advance of initiating site cleanup ac- qualification criteria for physicians designing tivities. However, DOE has not yet carried out as- medical surveillance programs, and imposes sessments of the resources and programs that more rigorous standards for emergency respon- must be established to ensure compliance with der training—cannot occur unless DOE line HAZWOPER. The next section of this back- managers and EH staff make such goals a priori- ground paper addresses the implication for DOE’s complex cleanup of specific elements of 66 Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

HAZWOPER that have proved contentious at and Safety Supervisor who has “overall responsi- non-Federal cleanup sites. bility for development and implementation of the HASP.’’ 171 The proposed guidance also requires Health and Safety Plans that a health and safety officer be on-site during The site Health and Safety Plan is a corne- all level A,B, or high-hazard level C field opera- rstone of HAZWOPER’s approach to cleanup tions, and during all invasive/evacuation work worker protection. Experience with Superfund such as well drilling. Site OSH officers would and RCRA cleanups has shown that the design have stop-work authorization. These provisions, and implementation of HASPS encompass many if implemented, might mitigate some of the prob- of the most frequently encountered disputes asso- lems with accountability and chain of command ciated with HAZWOPER.165 166 EPA explicitly that have been troublesome at non-Federal clean- states that “there can be only one HASP per up sites. site .’’167 Many of the DOE sites, however, are Organizing and updating the paperwork need- huge. The Idaho National Engineering Labora- ed to document site characterization studies, tory is larger than the State of Rhode Island. Han- work plans, and environmental monitoring re- ford is nearly as big. Even relatively small sites, sults, and the challenges of linking appropriate such as Fernald and Rocky Flats, harbor multiple worker protection strategies to particular cleanup and complicated pollution sources. 168 At a given jobs throughout the NWC, will be formidable. time, dozens of subcontractors may be operating Paper reviews of written HASPs-let alone field on-site and potentially be exposed to different assessments of the adequacy of implemented 169 170 Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUS) health and safety programs-will be daunting encompassing many different contaminants en- tasks. Thus far, the press of competing demands vironmental transport pathways, and waste and limited staffing have prevented the EM head- streams. quarters Office of Oversight from reviewing a 172 The scope and complexity of contamination single HASP from any weapons facility. No throughout the NWC will probably accentuate Federal or State agency currently reviews HASPS the problems experienced at other waste sites in for the DOE cleanup. *73 linking characterization data to potential cleanup OTA has reviewed site-wide HASPS written to worker health and safety risks. Characterization support cleanup activities at some DOE facilities, of the NWC will continue for years, and in some but has not reviewed a sufficient number to draw cases, will overlap with remediation activities generalizable conclusions. The few documents and efforts to prevent contamination from reviewed by OTA focused on weapons produc- spreading. It will be necessary to have systems in tion activities—not cleanup operations-and em- place that allow existing HASPs to efficiently in- phasized hazards from radionuclide contaminat- tegrate new site information, including environ- ion. Health threats associated with potential mental monitoring data, plans for altered or addi- worker exposure to hazardous chemicals did not tional work tasks, and associated worker receive much consideration, even though charac- protection strategies. terization data demonstrated the presence of Crafting HASPS that accurately delineate these materials on-site. Potential safety threats weapons site hazards will require a major effort were also given minimal attention. on the part of DOE and its contractors. The EH The tendency of DOE and its prime contrac- Draft Hazardous Waste Operations and Emer- tors to focus on radionuclides and neglect nonra- gency Response document stipulates that DOE dioactive chemical hazards has been noted by the 174 contractors must designate a Company Health National Academy of Sciences and by DOE Tiger Teams auditing environment, safety, and Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 67

health programs at NWC facilities. This empha- levels and action levels is too pressing to wait the sis also reflects DOE staffing patterns and the im- 3 years or longer that are usually required for portance accorded radioactive materials in DOE OSHA to complete new rule making under the orders. Administrative Procedures Act, EPA is working The focus on radioactive hazards that has tra- on the development of allowable soil standards 182 ditionally characterized DOE contractor OSH for radionuclides, but denies having juris- practices need not be a Liability as DOE attempts dictional authority over workers. A consensus to forge HASPS suitable for cleanup of environ- approach that draws on expertise from EPA, ments contaminated with a wide variety of toxic NIOSH, OSHA, and other knowledgeable agen- materials, Although the Advisory Committee on cies and individuals might usefully address issues Nuclear Facilities Safety 175 and the Defense Fa- such as appropriate environmental monitoring 176 cilities Nuclear Safety Board have strongly strategies and methods, and the development of criticized the poor quality and dispersed organi- action levels and other worker exposure stan- zation of DOE radiation protection programs, dards. DOE clearly has significant, if insufficient, expertise in this area. Radiation protection, which Medical Surveillance will be a critical component of worker health and In 1990 the Secretarial Panel for Evaluation of safety programs during many cleanup operations Epidemiologic Research Activities at DOE at the NWC, is not an area in which many health (SPEERA) strongly criticized DOE’s past efforts and safety professionals outside DOE have ex- to conduct medical surveillance among weapons tensive experience. If DOE “borrowed” expertise production workers. In particular, SPEERA in nonradiologic hazard assessment and control noted that epidemiologic studies and health sur- from other agencies or sources of expertise, it veillance programs were uncoordinated and could focus greater efforts on upgrading and ap- lacked the capacity to monitor workplace expo- plying its own capabilities in radiation protec- sure, to evaluate such exposure in terms of work- tion. ers health, or to prescribe the corrective actions The Nuclear Weapons Complex contains some required. *83 environmental contaminants and mixtures of pol- DOE and its contractors still have very limited lutants that may never be encountered at more ability to monitor worker exposure to toxic mate- typical hazardous waste operations, High-level rials. This is true even for weapons production radioactive waste and mixed waste (containing workers, whose exposures are technically and ad- both radionuclides and hazardous chemicals) are ministratively much less difficult to track than in this category. For some contaminants and con- those of cleanup workers. Medical staff at many tamination scenarios, there are no published stan- DOE facilities do not have access to information dards or guidelines setting forth appropriate ac- documenting potential production worker expo- tion levels and permissible exposure limits. For sures and are not informed of job transfers that example, no Federal agency has established al- might result in worker exposure to hazardous ma- lowable worker exposure levels for soil contami- terials. 184-190 Thus, some NWC facility medical 177 nated with radionuclides. departments are unable to verify that workers Attempts by DOE to independently establish who are potentially exposed to hazardous materi- allowable worker exposure levels are likely to en- als are receiving appropriate medical surveil- counter strong opposition because its credibility lance.191 in the field of occupational health and safety has Efforts to establish a viable system of medical been called into question as a result of past prac- surveillance for workers engaged in the DOE tices. 178-181 The need for such worker exposure 68 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

cleanup facilities must overcome several obsta- agers, or improved the visibility and status of oc- cles. The initial problem is that worker job titles cupational health and safety professionals at and tasks, management procedures, and the or- DOE. ganizational structure of occupational medicine The separate Offices of Environment, Safety, departments are different at each weapons facil- and Health within EH and the different divisions 192 ity. This makes it difficult to craft and imple- in the Office of Health appear to remain indepen- ment DOE-wide procedures that would identify dent domains with their own agendas. OTA found individual workers who potentially face hazard- little evidence of coordination or communication ous exposures, are at greatest risk of acquiring among the Offices of Health Physics and Indus- work-related illnesses, and are required by DOE trial Hygiene, Occupational Medicine, and Epi- orders or OSHA standards to be offered inclusion demiology and Health Surveillance, and no indi- in medical surveillance programs. cations of regular contact between EH staff and The task of identifying individual cleanup health and safety professionals working in DOE workers at high risk for exposure to potentially line organizations. toxic contaminants and in need of medical sur- The DOE Office of Occupational Medicine veillance is further complicated by the panoply of continues to exert little influence within DOE or employers engaged at a given site, and by the among its contractors. Neither the newly created lack of any coherent analysis of characterization Office of Occupational Medicine, nor the Office data from the perspective of potential worker ex- of Epidemiology and Health Surveillance, had posures. Medical directors at DOE facilities are acquired its full complement of staff when a hir- not informed when subcontractors are working ing freeze was imposed across all EH divisions. on-site, do not assess the potential hazards that Consequently, as of late 1992, both of these of- subcontractor employees might encounter, and fices remain well below projected size.197 198 do not review subcontractors’ medical surveil- In June 1992, DOE Order 5480.8A, which lance programs. prescribes minimal occupational medicine Another problem impeding efforts to develop program requirements for DOE contractors,199 DOE medical surveillance programs that comply was updated for the first time in more than a with HAZWOPER is the lack of influence and decade. 200 The new order has the potential to authority of the EH Office of Occupational Med- place occupational medicine in a more proactive icine. 193 195 - which would presumably be the role at DOE facilities. For example, under the source of policies related to cleanup worker med- new order, managers must ensure that site occu- ical surveillance. pational medicine physicians are informed of 201 When DOE established the Office of Health worker exposures. On paper, the new Contrac- within EH in May 1990, separate offices were as- tor Occupational Medicine Order is a significant signed responsibility for industrial hygiene and improvement; the speed and thoroughness with health physics, epidemiology and health surveil- which the order is actually implemented will be lance, and occupational medicine196 (see figure important indicators of managers’ readiness to 3-2). This reorganization of health activities was embrace a strong health and safety presence at a direct response to SPEERA recommendations the operations level. and accomplished the important goal of collect- EH had to make important concessions to ing previously disparate health-related programs DOE program offices to win approval of the Oc- under a single Deputy Assistant Secretary. It is cupational Medicine Order, however. To achieve not clear, however, that this reorganization has the “consensus” among DOE Program Secretari- effectively signaled the importance of occupa- al Officers that is a prerequisite for adoption of tional medicine to DOE and its contractor man- most EH policy recommendations, EH dropped 0) Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex (0 Medicine Medicine Programs Occupational Occupational Assessments Medicine 1 I -4

Occupational I 1 1 1- & Secretary Com logic Health Studies Health Epidemio for Health & Coordination munication Assistant Surveillance Epidemiology

r--l Deputy Physics Health Evaluations Hygiene Physics Industrial Programs Programs Industrial Health Hydiene Assessment Performance & f- ...... I- Health and Security j & & & Risk Administration I of Safety H Safety Trans- Safety, Packing Program and Analysis portation Analysis Technology Performance for Analysis Technology Office f- ...... I- Budget Resident : Assurance Secretary of Deputy Quality Secretary Safety Review & Technical Environment, Verification Quality Performance Office l Assessment PHrformance f- "- Assistant for H n -----' and Principal I —— Assistant & Safety Deputy of Evaluatio 'prOjects Safety Support Analysis Policy Personnel Protection Tedmical Standards Informatior Safety Secretary Office I Ocrupational Special Program Waste Project Activities Activities NEPA Oversight 3-2-Assistant - ...... e gu F 1992. Audit Secretary mental Environ- Energy, ~ of Environment Assistant for Water RCRAI Radiation Department Deputy CERCLA Air, mental & En:~ Guidance U.S. J 1 Jy —— SOURCE: Military Nuclear Materials mental Environ- Compliance Compliance Applications Compliance f- muu"- 70 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

language requiring that contractor medical direc- The development, implementation, and analy- tors report directly to the site manager and in- sis of useful medical surveillance data necessari- stead allowed the option of medical directors rely represent a multidisciplinary task requiring the porting to “another management level with cooperation of health experts from many disci- sufficient authority to ensure program effective- plines including medicine, industrial hygiene, 202 203 ness.” The importance of t.his concession is health physics, biostatistics, and epidemiology. reflected in comments by the National Academy OTA found little indication that the institutional 204 205 206 of Sciences, SPEERA, and OSHA, capacity for such cooperative efforts exists at These expert reviewers observed that occupation- DOE. al medical input to decisions at DOE facilities In its approach to medical surveillance for the was “negligible” and “inadequate”; that medical NWC cleanup, DOE is repeating some of the departments were relegated to a reactive role at mistakes critics have accused it of making in DOE facilities; and that these roles were mirrored studying the health outcomes of radiation-ex- 214215 at DOE headquarters. posed workers. DOE is not reaching be- In 1991 and 1992, EH conducted audits of oc- yond its own organization to gather expertise cupational medicine programs throughout the from other government agencies or the private Weapons Complex. These studies documented sector. The failure to institute an effective quality that as of 1992, occupational physicians at many assurance program for medical surveillance data weapons facilities remain uninformed of work- collection and analysis will compromise any ers’ potential exposure to hazardous materials, findings the data might suggest. The absence of that physicians continue to experience problems any system for following individual workers’ cu- in getting the attention of decision makers, and mulative exposures to hazardous materials will that every occupational medicine program in the also limit what lessons can be learned from med- Weapons Complex has fewer staff than called for ical surveillance efforts. The data documenting by DOE orders .207-213 surveillance activities will differ not only from The weakness of contractor occupational med- site to site but also among subcontractors. There icine programs has important implications for the will be little chance of pooling data from differ- cleanup. As matters now stand, there is no entity ent vendors in ways that support sound science, in DOE or its contractor corps capable of design- and the opportunity to learn what kinds of sur- ing, conducting, or overseeing the medical surveillance are useful, which are a waste of time veillance of cleanup workers required under and money, and what types of cleanup task or ex- HAZWOPER. In the absence of guidance from posures are problematic, will be lost. DOE, contractors and subcontractors are free to Finally, it is very important that DOE make a pursue any notion of adequate medical surveil- strong effort to guarantee workers that the con- lance that a licensed physician is willing to en- tents of individual medical records will be treated dorse. Under these conditions, the quality and confidentially, that pooled information used for comprehensiveness of cleanup worker medical research purposes or made available to the public surveillance are destined to be uneven. The costs will not permit identification of individuals, and of this service are also likely to vary considerably that the contracts and affiliations of persons con- because DOE has no means of competently as- ducting medical surveillance will be disclosed if sessing the scope or effectiveness of proposed requested. These steps are necessary both to en- surveillance activities. courage extensive worker participation in surveillance projects and to comply with standard ethi- cal medical practices. . - -. —

Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 171

Health and Safety Training pelled to reimburse Westinghouse for these 221 A December 1990 DOE Inspector General’s fines. report documented that contractors at seven The National Defense Authorization Act for M&O facilities and three field offices were not fiscal years 1992 and 1993 authorized DOE to complying with AZWOPER health and safety award training grants to workers engaged in haz- training requirements. The report noted that the ardous substance response or emergency re- 222 root causes of noncompliance were “acceptance sponse at nuclear weapons facilities. DOE and of non-compliance conditions and a lack of cor- NIEHS have begun collaborative efforts in this area. 223 224 porate and DOE ownership of problems;’ as well . as failure of DOE field offices to issue site-spe- A provision in an earlier Defense Authoriza- cific guidance to M&O contractors or to monitor tion Act had required DOE to evaluate the suit- contractor training efforts.216 ability of NIEHS Training Grants for workers In response to these findings, EH staff pre- involved in hazardous waste operations and 225 pared guidance on “OSHA Training Require- emergency response at DOE facilities. In the ments for Hazardous Waste Operations.’’ 217 Al- course of its assessment of NIEHS training pro- though this guidance does spell out procedures grams, DOE found that about half of the DOE for documenting training at DOE sites, it is little contractors had trained all or most employees tar- more than a near-verbatim reiteration of the sec- geted for 24- and 40-hour health and safety tions of the OSHA regulation that deal with courses. DOE also discovered that its contractors worker training, stapled to a copy of EPA’s “Fact were “taking various approaches” to defining Sheet on Establishing Work Zones at Uncon- populations of employees who require training trolled Hazardous Waste Sites.”218 The guidance under HAZWOPER. At some DOE facilities, de- document does not indicate what the content of cisions about worker training were left to subcon- 226 training curricula for DOE cleanup projects tractors who conducted cleanup operations. should be (beyond reproducing OSHA’s suggest- The survey revealed that the confusion evident at ed HAZWOPER course content checklist), nor non-Federal waste sites about which workers does it incorporate the training course accredita- should receive 24 hours of training and which tion criteria proposed in OSHA’s 1910.121 regu- should undergo 40-hour training sessions was 227 lation 219 or indicate that DOE will evaluate the also bothering DOE contractors. DOE facili- adequacy of cleanup worker health and safety ties were relying on an assortment of vendors to training programs. deliver training, at costs of $1,000 to $1,200 per 228 A year after EH released the guidance on trainee for a 40-hour course. HAZWOPER training, the Colorado Health De- The report also noted a number of barriers to partment found violations of RCRA training re- utilization of NIEHS training programs. It was quirements among DOE contractor personnel at suggested that NIEHS grant programs might be 220 the Rocky Flats Plant. In May 1992, the DOE more attractive to DOE contractors if DOE head- Hanford contractor denied State inspectors from quarters guidance and standards “were to specify the Washington State Department of Ecology ac- as a minimum criterion for all training that it cess to personnel training records. The State cited meet the requirements of the [proposed 29 CFR the contractor for “failure to properly identify 1910.121] OSHA rule on training program ac- 229 personnel in the training plan,” a violation that creditation . . .“. DOE has not promulgated could include penalties up to $6,000 per day. such guidance, however. Although EH plans to DOE has admitted that under the terms of the develop curricula for all worker health and train- DOE-Westinghouse contract, it would be coming courses to be implemented by DOE line organizations, there is no program to develop mini- 72 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

mum criteria or course content for the cleanup on Emergency Response an urgent basis. DOE contractors continue to DOE weapons facilities have written emergen- comply with HAZWOPER’s worker training re- cy response or disaster plans addressing emer- quirements without any guidance from DOE gencies that might arise from regular (weapons headquarters on course content, type or extent of production) operations at each facility.235 All hands-on training, or site-specific training needs. DOE facilities have on-site fire brigades and are The International Association of Firefighters required to establish liaisons with236 local fire de- (IAFF) has expressed concern that NIEHS grant partments and medical facilities. DOE Tiger monies set aside for DOE workers will not be di- Team audits of environment, safety, and health rected toward the special training needs of fire- performance at weapons facilities have docu- fighters. The IAFF contends that firefighters who mented deficiencies in emergency preparedness might be called on during emergencies related to at DOE facilities, although these assessments DOE cleanup activities—including personnel presumed continued weapons production opera- employed at on-site fire brigades and members of tions and did not usually address risks from envi- municipal fire departments located near weapons ronmental cleanup activities. sites—are in urgent need of extensive training in The Ahearne committee report noted that Han- hazardous materials incidents.230 The IAFF ford does not have plans to handle an emergency maintains that most NIEHS programs do not pro- at high-level waste tanks.237 The committee also vide adequate training for emergency response concluded that at Rocky Flats, the potential re- 231 (ER) professionals, and argues that firefighters lease of toxic chemicals, “which could be cata- require more substantive training courses than strophic to the on-site population,” had been in- those that merely satisfy the minimal number of adequately assessed,238 and that Rocky Flats “has 232 hours stipulated by HAZWOPER. IAFF be- not had much success in demonstrating its emer- lieves that providing adequate training for ER gency preparedness and response capabilities, professionals should be a top priority in worker even in exercises” carried out as late as May health and safety efforts at all hazardous waste 1991.239 The Ahearne committee found fire de- 233 operations, including DOE weapons facilities. tection and suppression systems at Rocky Flats to The IAFF conducted an informal survey of be “antiquated” This finding is of particular con- hazardous materials training among emergency cern because, historically, fires have been the responders employed in fire brigades at DOE fa- greatest safety hazard at that location. Recent de- cilities and at fire departments located in commu- cisions to cease production operations may re- 234 nities near nuclear weapons facilities. All reduce the possibility of accidents and emergency sponders reported having had some emergency situations at this facility. response training, but most had received only Many emergency scenarios that could plausi- “awareness/operational level” instruction. Train- bly arise during the DOE cleanup would require ing was provided by a variety of vendors includ- the involvement of off-site fire departments and ing in-house instructors (Hanford); State-certi- emergency medical teams. At Pantex, where as- fied instructors (Savannah River, Oak Ridge sembly, dismantlement, and testing of conven- National Laboratory, and Hanford); community tional explosive components of nuclear warheads college- or university-based training programs take place, the Tiger Team found off-site medical (Pantex, Rocky Flats); and instructors from a na- facilities to be inadequate and noted no evidence tional chemical manufacturing concern (Han- that DOE had ever audited the real status of med- ford). There is presently no way of evaluating the ical response there or compared actual capabili- content or quality of these courses. ties to the commitment made by the local hospi- —

Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 73

240 tal in written contracts. DOE has taken steps to ated with weapons production activities. Some remedy these deficiencies. exceptional situations covered by the environ- It is difficult to assess the ER capabilities mental restoration and waste management pro- available at DOE facilities with respect to clean- gram-such as the potential for fire or explosion up tasks, in part because neither DOE nor its con- at the Hanford tank farm where residues of high- tractors have surveyed the possible emergency level radioactive waste are stored, fire in a radia- response needs specifically associated with envi- tion-contaminated building at Rocky Flats, or an ronmental restoration and waste management op- emergency involving vitrification of high-level erations. Most emergencies that might plausibly radioactive waste-could potentially jeopardize arise from environmental restoration or waste large numbers of workers or pose significant management functions are likely to be less risks to off-site populations. calamitous than the worst-case scenarios associ-

CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES

] U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice, “Set- 13 U.S. Dep~ent of Labor and U.S. Department of Energy, ting the New DOE Course,” SEN-1 1-89, Sept. 5, 1989, Memorandum of Understanding, July 1992. 2 39 U,S.C. 651-678 west 1985 and Supp. 1992). 14 Executive Order No. 12196, Feb. 26! 1980. 342 U.S.C. Section 2201(f). 15 occupatio~ safe~ ~d He~~ Administration, Evaluation 4 Occupational Safety and Health Adrninistratio~ U.S. Depart- of U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit. ment of Labor, Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Oc- ‘6 Ibid. cupational Safety and Health Program for Its Government-Owned 17 weapon5 Complex Monitor, “Hanford Shows Lack of Contractor-Operated Facilities, December 1990. Progress on ES&H Issues, DOE Report Says” (Washingto~ DC: - 5 Jmes Wati, Secretw, U.S. Department of Energy, memo Exchange Pubs.), Aug. 10, 1992, pp. 19-20. randum, “Strengthening Line Management and Accountability in 18 us. Dep@ment of Energy, Office of Environment Safety DOE Contractor Worker Safety and Health Programs,” Mar. 20, and Healti Environment, Safety and Health Compliance Assess- 1991. ment of the Portsmouth Gaseous Difision Plant (Springfield, VA: 6 Jmes Wati, Secre-, U.S. Department of Energy, ‘mem- National Technical Information Service, April 1990). orandum, “Strengthening Office of Environment, Safety and Health 19 Roy Gibbs, Ac~g D~~tor, OffIce of Occupational Safety, Independent Oversight of DOE Line Management of Worker Safe- Office of Environment Safety, and Healti U.S. Department of En- ty and Health Programs,” Mar. 20, 1991. ergy, presentation to OTA staff, Oct. 8, 1992. 7 James Watkins, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, memo- m w Gr=ndyke, M~~ Director (re~ed), Los ~amos ‘a- randum, “Developing A Strategy for Assigning Rewards and Peml- tional Laboratory, personal communication to T. O’Toole, Office of ties for Compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Adminis- Technology Assessment, Mar, 4, 1991, tration (OSHA) Regulations and DOE Orders,” Mar. 20, 1991. 21 U,S. ConHess, offke of Technology Assessment Worhhop 8 James Watkins, Secretaxy, U.S. Department of Energy, memo- on Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the DOE Nuclear Weap- randum, “Reevaluation of the DOE’s Pending Whistleblower ons Complex, Washington DC, May 15, 1991. Rule,” Mar. 20, 1991. 22 U.S. Conwss, General Accounting Ofilce, Increased Rafing 9 petm Bms~ Ac~g Assistant Secretary, Environment, SafetY Results in Award Fee to Rocky Flats Contractor, GAO/RCED-92- and Healti U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to the Secre- 162 (March 1992). tary of Energy, “Implementation Plan for the Office of Health,” 23 Weawm Complex Monitor, “Despite Lower Performance May 18, 1990. Rating, Martin Marietta Award Fees Higher” (WashingtorL DC: 10 U .S . Dep~ent Of Ener~, OffiCe Of he Ress Secre@? Exchange Pubs.), June 22, 1992, pp. 11-12. “Secretary of Energy Appoints Environment, Safety and Health 24 Stif ad Wfie RW~s, “Audit of Unused Buildings at Han- Committee,” Mar. 30, 1992. ford Finds Hazards,” The Spokesma?+Review, Nov. 13, 1992. 11 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, memorandum to all Depart- u Rictimd Field Office, U.S. Department of Energy, “T~ B mental Elements, “Supplementary Request for Occupational Safety Investigation of Hanford Tank Farm’s Vapor Exposures,” April and Health Data Required for the FY 1993 Internal Review Budget 1992. Process,” May 14, 1991. 26 Job TX%, ~~a, ~gh-~vel Tanks Task Force, Office of 12 Occupatioti Heal~ and Safety Reporter, “OSHA Jfisdic- Environmental Restomtion and Waste Management, U.S. Depart- tion Over DOE-Owned Plants Outlined in Memorandum of Under- ment of Energy, memorandum to Ronald Gerton, DOE Richland standing, ” (Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.) vol. Field Office, “Investigation of Persomel Exposure to Noxious Va- 13, Aug. 26, 1992, p. 422. pors of Tank 103-C,” WHC Internal Memo #76314-91 -KEM-040, Jan. 14, 1992. 74 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

27 U.S. Dep@ent of Energy, OffIce of Envir0nmen4 Safe& 51 NatiO~ A~demy of Sciences, The Nuclear WCMpOnS Com- and Herdth, “Site Representative ProgranL Rocky Flats Regional pltz-Managementfor Health, Safety, and the Environment (Wash- OffIce Monthly Report for March 1992,” RF-92-03, June 5, 1992. ington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989). ~ Advisov Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety to the Secre+ 52 ~upatio~ Safev and Health Administration, Evaluation tary of Energy, “Finat Report on DOE Nuclear Facilities,” Novem- of U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit. ber 1991, p. 20. 53 Advisov Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, Op. tit. m Ibid. 54 J Conway, ~, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Bo~7 w Occupation s~e~ ~d Health Administration, Evaluation “Recommendation to the Secretary of Energy, pursuant to 42 of the Department of Energy ..., op. cit. U.S.C. 2286a(5) Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,” Dec. - 31 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, “Report-Evaluation of tie Suit 19, 1991. ability of the Training Program Developed by the National Institute 55 Natio~ A&emy of Sciencw, The Nuclear weUpOnS Com- of Environmental Health Sciences for Trainin g Workers Involved plex. . . . op. cit. in Environmental and Waste Management Activities of the U.S. M Mitre Corp., “COrnp@Ve Review of Safety Standards for Department of Energy,” May 1991, p. 3-16. DOE Defense Nuclear Facilities,” (no date), Executive Summary, 32 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. vol. 1. Contract Report for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 33 Ibid. Board. 34 Occupatioti Safety ~d Health Administration, Evaluation 57 ~upatio~ s~e~ and Health Administration, Evaluation of U.S. Department of Energy . . ., op. cit. of U.S. Department of Energy . . ., op. cit. 35 U,S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Inspector General, 58 Advisov committee on Nuclear Facility safety, op. cit. “Report on Inspection of Surveillance Equipment and Activities at 59 Ibid. DOE Field Office, Richland,” DOIYIG-0299, September 1991. m Ibid. 36 K. Scheider, “Inquiry Finds Illegal Surveillance Of Workers 61 U.S. Depar~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice, in Nuclear Plants,” New York Times, Aug. 1, 1991, p. A18. SEN-6-89, “Departmental Organimtion and Management Ammge- 37 Weapons Complex Monitor, “Labor Sides with whistle- ments,” May 19, 1989, Sept. 5, 1989. blower,” (Washington DC: Exchange Pubs.), Feb. 10, 1992, p. 20. 62 us, Dep~ent of Energy, EnvkOnmenC Safety ‘d ‘d@ 38 M. wald, “wh.istlebloWer at National Laboratory Was Disci- Technical Safety Appraisals of the Hanford Tank Farm Facility plined, Labor Department Rutes,’’New York Times, Feb. 5, 1992, p. (Springfield, VA: National Technical Infomnation Service, May A16. 1989). 3910 CFR 708. 63 Advisow Committm on Nuclear Facility Safety, oP. Cito 40 Roy Gibbs, oP. cit. a Rictid Field Mice, oP. cit, - 41 J. FiQger~d, Jr., U.S. Department of Energ, Depum Assis 65 WeaPm Complex Monitor, “State Issues Violations at Han- tant Secretary, Safety and Quality Assurance, memorandum to P. ford as Tank Monitors Found Inoperable” (Washington DC: Ex- Ziemer, Assistant Secretary of Environment, Safety and Health, change Pubs.), May 25, 1992, p. 1. “EH-30 Site Representative, September Monthly Reports,” Oct. 29, 66 Ricwd Field Office, op. Cit. 1991. 67 Ibid. 42 ~cupatio~ Stiety and Health Administration, Evaluation a Ibid. of U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit. @ Offlce of Ihvironment, Safety and Heal@ U.S. Depment 43 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice 6, of Energy, Report on the EH Special review of Occupational Safety SEN-6-89, “Departmental Organization and Management Arrange- and Health Programs for the Hanford High-Level Waste Tanks, Oc- ments,” May 19, 1989. tober 1992. 44 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. m Mcwd Field Office, oP. cit- 45 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notiw, “De- 71 Moflon Com ~of~sor ~d Director, Division of Environ- partmental Organ&a tion and Management Arrangements,”SEN- mental Health Engineering, The Johns Hopkins University, School 6E-92, Feb. 21, 1992. of Hygiene and Public Health, letter to T. O’Toole, OTA, July 27, 46 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, oP. cit. 1992. 47 J Serocki, Office of oversight and Health Assessment ‘a- n Jo~ TseW, Ma, H@-hvel Tanks Task Force, Office of partment of Energy, Office of Environmental Restoration and Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, U.S. Depart- Waste Management, personal communication to T. O’Toole, OTA, ment of Energy, memorandum to Ronald Gerton, DOE Richland July 11, 1992. Field Office, “Investigation of Persomel Exposure to Noxious Va- 4S ScrW~, J., Offlce of oversight and Health Assessment, ME pors of Tank 103-C,” WC Internal Memo #76314-91 -KEM-040, Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management per- Jan. 14, 1992. sonal communication to T. O’Toole, OTA, July 11, 1992. 73 J Wagoner, -ger, Richland Field OffIce, U.S. Dep~- 49 Leo D~fy, Director, Office of Environmental Restoration ment of Energy, letter to T. Anderson, President, Westinghouse and Waste Management U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum Hanford Corp., July 2, 1992. to EM DOE and Contractor Persomel, “EM Policy and Commitm- 74 Occupation s~e~ and Health Administration, Evaluation ent Regarding Occupational Health and Safety,” July 11, 1991. of US. Department of Energy ...,op. cit. w Ibid. 75 Roy Gibbs, op. cit. —

Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 75

76 u .s .Conwess, offim of Technology ~~ssmenti C~mP1ex 102 Roy Gibbs, op. Cit. cleanup, 1991, op. cit. loq p. Ziemer, Assistant Secretary for Environment+ Safety ~d 77 p. Zlemer, Assistant Secretary, Environment, Stiety ad Heal@ U.S. Department of Energy, letter to T. O’Toole, OTA, Oct. Healti U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to R. ClaytoL 14, 1992. Assistant Secretary, Defense Programs, William Young, Assistant 104 Offlce if tie SwretW, U.S. Department of Energ’y, Smre- Saretary, Nuclw Safety, L. Duffy, Assistant Secretary, Environ- tary of Energy Notice, “Departmental Organizational and Manage- mental Restoration and Waste Management, “EH Site Representa- ment Arrangements,” SEN-6E-92, Feb. 21, 1992. tive Assessment of Occupational Safety and Health Issue Manage- 105 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. men~” Sept. 6, 1991. 106 Occupation s~e~ and Health Adrninistratio~ Evaluation 78 Roy Gibbs, op. cit. of U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit. 79 us. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment+ Stiety tOT J. Fitzger~d, maorandum to L. Duffy, J~. 14, 1992, oP. and Heal@ “Briefing on Draft Revision to DOE Order 5480.9 cit. Construction Project Safety and Health Management” no date. 1o13 p. Ziemer, Assistant Secretary, Environment, Safety and w Occupation s~e~ and Healti Administration, ~VUh@fiO~ Healm U.S. Department of Energy memorandum to R. ClaytoL of U.S. Department of Energy . . .% op. cit. Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, “EH Site Representative s 1 p. Zlemer, Assistant Secretary Environment, Safety ad and March Monthly Report,” June 5, 1992. Healti U.S. Department of Energy, memo to William Young, Of- l@ p. Ziemer, Assistant Secretary, Environment, Stiety ad fice of Nuclear Energy, “EH Site Representative Monthly Reports,” Healti U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to R. Clayton, Dec. 26, 1991. Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, “EH Site Representative 82 Ibid. Monthly Report,” July 2, 1992. ‘3 Ibid. 110 Ricmd Field office, U.S. Department of Energy,Rictiand u Ibid. Field Office, “DOE Investigation Board Report on Fall-Related Fa- 85 Ibid. tality of a Construction Worker at Hanford Site 105-F Building on 86 J. Fitzger~d, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Stiety ASSW- April 7, 1992” May 1992. ance and Quality, U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to Leo I I 1 Office of TKhnology Assessment, Complex cleanup, 1991, Duffy, EM-1, “EH Site Representative Monthty Report,” Jan. 14, op. cit. 1992, 11’2 W~Pm Complex Monitor, “DOE to Pay Fernald Citizens 87 Ibid. $73 Miltion in Three Installments,” (Washington, DC: Exchange 88 R, Goldsmi~ Director, Office of Epidemiology ad H~~ Pubs.) Feb. 19, 1990, p. 3. Surveillance, U.S. Department of Energy, personal communication 113 W=wm Comp]ex Monitor, “At Oak Ridge OPS . . . Citizen to T.O’Toole, OTA, July 21, 1992. Files Wrongfut Death Suit Against DOE,” (Washington, DC: Ex- 69 Occupation s~e~ ~d He~~ Administration, Evaluation change Pubs.) June 27, 1990, p. 12. of the Department of Energy ..., op. cit. 114 Office of TwhnoIo= Assessment, Complex Cleanup, 1991, ~ U.S. Dep~ent of Labor and U.S. Department of Energy, op. cit. MOU, op. cit. I IS D E1isburg, formerIy Director, Occupational Healti Foun- 91 Roy Gibbs, op. clt” f dation personal communication to OffIce of Technology Assess- 92 u s. Depment of ~~r and U.S. Dep~ent o ‘nergy’ ment staff, Mar. 19, 1991. MOU, op. cit. 116 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, oP. cit. 93 Office of Environment, Safety and Heal@ Office of s~etY, I 17 D Elisburg, perso~ communicatio~ Mar. 19, 1991, op. cit. U.S. Department of Energy, “Briefing on DOE 5483.XX Occupa- 116 &ce of TwhnoIogy Assessmen~ Complex Cleanup, 1991, tional Health and Safety Program for DOE Contractor Employ- op. cit. ees—Draft,” Apr. 14, 1992. 119 ~ld. % Ibid. *M Ibid. 95 Roy Gibbs, Op. cit. 121 fiid. 122 Rewfl o Defense plant wastes) % occupatio~ s~e~ md He~th Administration, Evaluation n “DOE Sampling, Analysis of U.S. Department of Energ y. ., op. cit. Requirements to Increase in Coming Decade” (Silver Spring, MD: 97 u s. Dep@ent. of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Envtion- Business Publishing), May 22, 1992. ment, Safety and Health, Report on the Department of Energy Oc- 123 DOE Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, OP. cit. cupational Safety and Health Program Review of the Portsmouth lx U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Los Ahmos Natiod ~bOrato- Gaseous Difision Plant, October 1992. ry, “Draft Health and Safety Standard for Hazardous Waste Opera- 98 u.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment Stiety tions and Emergency Response—Statement of Work, October and Health, “Briefing on Draft Revision to DOE Order 5480.9- 1992.” Construction Project Safety and Health Managemen~” no date. 125 Ibid. 99 Roy Gibbs, op. cit. 126 R .c . Fleting, Regulatory compliance Divisiom Office of 100 Occupatioti Sdety and He~th Administration+ Evaluation Program Support, Environmental Restoration, U.S. Department of of US. Department of Energy ., op. cit. Energy, informal note to T, O’Toole, OTA, Oct. 9, 1992. ’01 Ibid. 76 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

127 Rqofi on Defense pklt wwest “New Cleanup Strategy MO Us. cow,, Gmd Accouq Office, Vuznerabilify of Could Save Millions on Cleanup of DOE’s Hanford Site,” (Silver DOE’s Contracting to Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Mismanagement Spring, MD: Business Publishing) July 3, 1992, p. 111. GAO/RCED-92-101 (my 1992). 128 ~lce of TwhnoIogy Assessmen~ Complex Cleanup, 1991, 151 Weapom Complex Monitor, “DOE gives Westinghouse op. cit. Hartford ‘Satisfactory’ Rating” (Washington, DC: Exchange 129 OTA Worwop on Cleanup Worker Health and Safety, op. Pubs.), Jan. 13, 1992. cit. 152 U.S. Dep~ent Of Energy, 0ffk42 of Environment, s~ety 130 Office of Technology Assessment, Hazardous waste Action and Heal@ “EH-30 Site Representative Office Monthly Report for Contractors (HWAC) Workshop, Washington DC, Sept. 17, 1991. August-September 1991,” Jan. 14, 1992. 131 Occupatioti s~e~ and Health Adrninistratiow Eva~uafi~n 1S3 M-d Field office, Op. Cit. of the Department of Energy. . . . op. cit. 1~ U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, office of Environment, s~ety 132 mid. and Healm “Technical Safety Appraisal of the Hanford Tank Farm 133 Wapons Complex Monitor, “In the GAO” (Washington, Facility,” DOE/EH-0088, my 1989. DC: Exchange Pubs.) June 18, 1992, pp. 24-25. 155 J~. w%oner, _gm, WCW Field OffIce, U.S. Depart- 134 offIce of TechnoIo~ Assessment, Complex cleanup, op. ment of Energy, letter to T.M. Andersoq President, Westinghouse cit. Hanford Co., July 2, 1992. 135 Weapom complex Monitor, “DOE Issues Long-AWtited 156 W=pm Complex Mo~tor, “IG Report Criticizes Field Of- Request for Proposals for Fernald ERMC” (Washington, DC: Ex- fice hfanagemen~” (Washington DC: Exchange Pubs.), June 22, change Pubs.), Jan. 13, 1992, p. 2. 1992. 136 U.S. ~pm~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice, 157 WeaPm Complex Monitor, “GAO Says Awmd Fee for “Departmental Organizational and Management Arrangements,” EG&G at Rocky Flats Unjusti.tied,” (Washington DC: Exchange SEN 6E-92, Feb. 21, 1992. Pubs.), Apr. 13, 1992. 1sI’ weapons Complex Monitor (Washington, DC: Exc@We 158 US, ~ner~ ACCO- OffIce, Vulnerability of DOE Con- Pubs.), Jan. 13, 1992 op. cit. tracting ..., op. cit. 138 mid. 159 M ~, Dir~tor, C)ffke of Environmental Restoration 139 mid. and Waste Management, memorandum, “Safety and Health Review la weapom Complex Monitor, “Fernald ERMC Mkion post- for Startup/Restart of All Operations,” Feb. 6, 1991. poned, On-Site Target Now End of Year” (Washington DC: Ex- km U.S. ~pmat of EtItigy, OffIce of ~ ~P@or G-* change Pubs.), Mar. 30, 1992, p. 1. “Environmental Training at the Department of Energy,” DOE/IG- 141 WWPIIS Complex Monitor, “DOE Requests proPosals for 0294, Dec. 21, 1990. Hanford Cleanup Contractor”, (Washington DC: Exchange Pubs.) 161 U.S. Dq~ent of Energy, OffIce of Environment Stiety Apr. 20, 1992, pp. 1-4. and Heal~ “OSHA Training Requirements for Hazardous Waste f 142 H-s Befo~ tie subcommittee On H~& ~ Stiety ‘ Operations,” DOE/EH-0227P, December 1991. the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 162 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment s~ety “Oversight Hearings on Health and Safety of Workers at Depart- and Healt.tL “Draft-Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency ment of Energy Owned Nuclear Facilities Operated by Private Con- Response (HAZWOPER),” no date. tractors,” Serial No. 101-32, May 10& 17, 1984. 16329 ~ 191o.12o. 143 u.s, Dep~ent of Energy, Secre@ry of Energy Notice, 164 Los -OS NatioA Laboratory, “Draft-Health ~d S~e- “Setting the New DOE Course,” SEN-11-89, Sept. 5, 1989, ty Standard for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Re- 144 U.S. ~p~ent of ~r=, Environmental Restoration ~d sponse: Statement of WO*” October 1992. Waste Management, Five-Year Plan Fiscal Years 1992-1996, 165 Dam from ~patio~ Safety ~d HAth A(hhktdoQ DOE/S-0078P (Spriq@eld, VA: National Technical Information U.S. Department of Labor, “Federal and 18(B) Source Inspections Services), June 1990). of Hazardous Waste Activity,” Mar. 1, 1990 through Dec. 6, 1991. 145 U.S. COngreSS, General Accounting ~lce, Vuherability of 166 ~vkowenti Mtition Agency-Labor H~~ ~ ‘tie~ DOE’s Contracting to Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Mismanagement Task Force, notes of meeting, Mar. 5, 1991. (May 1991). 167 U.S. Environmen~ protection Agency, Office Of Solid 146 W=pons CoWlex Monitor, 1’IG Report Criticizes Field Of- Waste and Emergency Response, Hazardous Waste Operations and fice Management” (Washington, DC: Exchange Pubs.) June 22, Emergency Response: Uncontrolled Waste Sites andRCRA Correc- 1992. tive Actions, 9285 .2-08FS. (April 1991). 147 Occupation s~e~ and Health Adrninistratio~ Evaluation 168 Offiw of Twhnology Assessmen~ Complex Cleanup, 1991 of the Department of Energy ..., op. cit. op. cit. 148 Weapons complex Monitor, (w=h@tOn, DC: ‘ic%e 169 EPA defies ms- as “any unit at a facility from which Pubs.), op. cit. hazardous constituents might migrate, irrespective of whether the 149 Rewfl on Defense p~t Wastes, “GAO F~ds Con@cting units were intended for the management of solid and/or hazardous Practices Prone to Abuse” (Silver Spring, MD: Business Publishers, wastes.” Thus an SWMU could be a unit such as a landfdl, waste hlC.), my 22, 1992. pile, surface impoundment container, @or incinerator. Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 77

ITO U.S. Offlm of Technology Assessment complex cleanup, ‘w Ibid. 193 w. G d k , M. SW@ 1991, op. cit. reen y e D, Minner, D. Comad, L. Cle- 171 us. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment, Stiety venger, J. Hightower, L. Kreisler, J. Spickhard, P. Mossman, Med- and Health, “Draft-Hazardous Waste Operation and Emergency ical Directors DOE Facilities, letter to J. Watkins, Secretary of En- Response- HAZWOPER,” op. cit. ergy, Aug. 7, 1989. 172 J. Semcki, July 11, 1992, op. cit. 194 Willim Greendyke, Chair, DOE Medical professional 173 J. CW~iS, Cocm, EPA-Labor Health and Safety Tmk Committee, letter to J. Watkins, Secretasy of Energy, Mar. 5, 1990. Force, personal communication to T.O’Toole, OffIce of Technolo- 195 Natio~ Ac~emy of Sciences, The Nuclear weapons COm- gy Assessmen6 Aug. 19, 1992. ple-x. . . . op. cit. 174 Natio~ Actierny of Sciences, The Nuclear weapons Com- 196 H.J. pe~gill, Dep~ent of Energy, Acting Deputy Assis- plex Management for Health, Safety, and Environment (Washing- tant Secretary for Healthj memorandum to the Secretary of Energy, ton DC: National Academy Press, 1989). “Implementation Plan for Office of Heal@” May 18, 1992. ITS Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, op. cit. 197 R. Gol~@ Dkector, OffIce of Epidemiology and He~th 176 Defeme Facfities Board, “Recommendations tO tie Secre- Surveillance, U.S. Department of Energy, personal communication tary of Energy Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286a(5). Atomic Energy to T.O’Toole, July 21, 1992. Act of 1954, as amended,” Dec. 19, 1991. 198 G. Gebus, Di~tor, Office of Occupational Medicbe, U.S. 177 U.S. Conwess, Office of Technology Assessment, Compl~ Department of Energy, personal communication to T.O’Toole, July Cleanup, op. cit. 21, 1992. 178 Natio~ Academy of sciences, Improving Risk COmni- 199 u s. Dep~tment. of Energy, Environment, Stlfety and cation (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1989) p. 120. Healti “Contractor Occupational Medical Prograrq” DOE Order 179 B. Mere, “Nuclem weapo~ Facilities Face Attacks from 5480.8, June 26, 1992. Environmentalists, Government Agencies,” Journal of the Amer- ~ WT. Greendyke, formerly Chair, DOE Medicrd professio~ ican Medical Association, Aug. 4, 1989, p. 604. Committee, Medical Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory (re 180 Physlcims for smi~ Responsibility, Dead Reckoning: A tired), personal communication to T. O’Toole, Aug. 24, 1992. Critical Review of the Department of Energy’s Epidemiologic Re- 201 us. ,Dep~ent Of fiergy, Assistant Secretary for Environ- search (Washington, DC: Physicians for Social Responsibility, men~ Safety and Heal@ “Contractor Occupational Medical Pro- 1992). graQ” Order 5480.8A 181 Seaew Pmel for the Evaluation of Epidemiologic Re- ‘2 Ibid. search Activities for the U.S. Department of Energy, (SPEERA) 203 w. Grmdyke, Op. cit. “Report to the Secretary,” March 1990. 204 pJatio~ Academy of Sciences, The Nuclear weaPon cOm- 182 Weapm Complex Monitor, “EPA Better ‘Get Off It’s Duff’ plex. . . . op. cit. on Rad Standards, Glem Warns” (Washington, DC: Exchange 20S S=eti pael for Evaluation of Epidemiologic RtiWch Pubs.), Apr. 13, 1992. Activities at the U.S. DOE, op. cit. 183 Seaeti pmel for the Evaluation of Epidemiologic Re- 206 ~cupatio~ s~e~ ~d H4t.h Administration Evaluation search ..., op. cit. of the Department of Energy ...,op. cit. 184 U.S. Dep~@ of Energy, Office of Occupational Medi- 207 US, Dep~ent of Energy, Oflice of OCcupatioMl M*5 cine, “Occupational Medical Program Appraisal Nevada Test Site,” icine, “Occupational Medical Appraisal Nevada Test Site,” Mar, 2-6, 1992. Mar. 2-6, 1992. ls~ U,S. Dep~ent of Energy, OffIce of Occupational Medi- 2f18 u-s- Dep~@ of fiergy, ~lce of Occupatioti ‘d- cine, “Occupational Medical Program Appraisal at Fernald Envi- icine, “Occupational Medical Program Appraisal at Fernald Envi- ronmental Management ProJecL” June 1992. ronmental Management Projecg” June 1992. 186 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Ofllce of Occupatioti Mfi- 209 us. Dep~ent Of EIIergy, OffIce Of occupatio~ Med- cine, “Appraisal of the Occupational Medical Program at the icine, “Appraisal of the Occupational Medical Program at the Oakridge K-25 Site,” Nov. 12-22 and Dec. 2-10, 1991. Oakridge K-25 Site,” Nov. 12-22 and Dec. 2-10, 1991. 187 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of OCcupathid Medi- 210 U. .S Departm~t of fiergy, offlCe Of occupation Med- cine, “Occupational Medical Program at Mason & Hanger (Pantex icine, “Occupational Medical Program at Mason & Hanger (Pantex Plant),” Sept. 30, 1991. Plant), Sept. 30, 1991. 188 us. Dep~ent of ~ergy, Office Of Occupational ‘eti- 21 I U.S. ~p~ent of Energy, Office of OccupatiOMl Med- cine, “Occupational Medical Program Hanford Environmental icine, “Occupational Medical program Hanford Environmental Health Foundation Richkmd, WA,” June 24-26, 1991. Health Foundation Richland, WA” June 24-26, 1991. 189 u-s, Dep~@ of Energy, Ofllce of Occupational Medi- 212 U*S. ~p~=t of EQmW, Offlce of Occupational Med- cine, “Occupational Medical Appraisal LawrenceLivermore Na- icine, “OWupational Medical Appraisal Lawrence Livermore Na- tional Laboratory,” Apr. 27-May 1, 1992. tional Laboratory, Apr. 27-May 1, 1992. 190 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of occupatio~ M~- 213 I-J.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Occupational Medic- cine, “Occupational Medical program Review,” Los Alamos, NM, ine, “Occupational Medical Program Review, Los Alamos, m Sept. 22-Oct. 25, 1991. Sept. 22-Oct. 25, 1991.” 191 OTA wor~hop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit. 214 ~ysicia for Socti R~ponsibility, oP. cit. 78 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

215 Seaeti pael for Evaluation of Epidemiologic Research ‘7 Ibid. Activities at the U.S. DOE, op. cit. ‘a Ibid. 216 U.S. ~p~at of mm=, OffIce of the Inspector G~erd 29 Ibid. Environmental Training at the Department of Energy, DOE/IG- 230 L. Mwhy, ~$~sis in the F~e SeNice,” Proceedings of First 0294, Dec. 21, 1990. EPA Design and Construction Issues at Hazardous Waste Sites 217 u-s. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment, Safety Conferences, Dallas, TX, EPA 540/8-91/012, May 1-3, 1991. and Health, Environmental Guidance-OSHA Training Require- 231 L. Mqhy, Dhector, H~dous ~teridS Trtig, ‘d ‘“ ments for Hazardous Waste Operations, DOE/EH-0227, December Corbett, Assistant Project Director, International Association of 1991. Firefighters, personal communication to OTA, Nov. 20, 1991. 218 us. Env~onmen@l Protection Agency, Office of Solid 232 L, MWhy, ~~Tes~ony on Accreditation of Tr*g Pro- Waste and Emergency Response, “Establishing Work Zones at Un- grams for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Re- controlled Hazardous Waste Sites,” 9285.2-06F6, April 1991. spons+omments of the International Association of Firefight- 21955, Federal Register (Jan. 26, 1990) 2776. ers, ” Docket No. S-760-B, U.S. Department of Labor, 220 Weqom Complex Monitor, “Rocky Flats Cited for 56 Vio- Occupational Safety and Health Administration, May 26, 1992. lations,” (WashingtorL DC: Exchange Pubs.) June 19, 1992, p. 2. 233 L. Mqhy, ~~o~ COIItXItUtticiltio~ Nov. 20, 1991, ‘p- Cit” 221 Weapom Complex Monitor, “State Denied AC~SS to Tr*- ~ ~te~o~ Association of Firefighters, “Phone fhuvey of ing Records,” (Washington, DC: Exchange Pubs.) May 25, 1992, Hazardous Materials Training Among Municipal Firefighters b pp. 2-3. cated Near DOE Weapons Plants,” 1992. 222 Natio~ Defense Authorization Act for FY 1992 ~d 1993, 235 U.S, Dep~ent of Energy Order 5481 .B. Pub.L. 102-190, Dec. 5, 1991. 2315 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy Order 5480.7. 223 p. Whi&leId, Deputy Assistant SaretiUy for Envkonmenti 237 Adviso~ Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, op. cit. Restoration U.S. Department of Energy, letter to K. Oldew Direc- ‘8 Ibid. tor, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, June 12, ‘9 Ibid. 1992. zlo us. Dep~ent of Energy, “Tiger Team Assessment of tie 224 K. Olden, D~ector, Natlonat Institute of Environmental Pantex Plant Arnardl“ o Texas,” DOE/EH-0130, February 1990. Health Sciences, letter from to P. WhM3eld, Deputy Assistant Sec- Ml U.S. Congess, General Accounting Office, Marshall ~$- retary of Environmental Restoratio~ U.S. Department of Energy, IandHtatus of the Nuclear Claims Trust Fund, GAO/NSIAD-92- June 29, 1992. 229 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 225 Natio~ Defense Authori~tion Act for Fiscal Yem 1991? 1992). Pub.L. No, 101-510. 226 us. Dep~ent of Energy, Evaluation of the Suitabilio of the Training Program Developed by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences for Training Workers Involved in Environmental and Waste Management Activities of the Depar- tment of Energy, May 1991. Conclusion— Opportunities and Dangers

leanup of the DOE Nuclear Weapons tect cleanup workers, and ensuring that such pro- Complex offers the opportunity to define grams are properly implemented and enforced. and advance the standard of health and OSHA has not issued regulatory guidance for this safety protection provided to workers en- complex regulation, which has left some techni- gagedc in the growing, world-wide industry of en- cal provisions of the standard subject to contro- vironmental remediation. To meet this challenge, versial and diverse interpretations. In addition, DOE and other federal agencies must recognize OSHA’s limited capacity to inspect work prac- that protection of those who do the work of tices or enforce OSH standards at cleanup sites cleaning up is urgent and has been too long ne- has meant that enforcement of HAZWOPER is glected. left largely to voluntary efforts by employers. Characterization and remediation of polluted The quality and effectiveness of cleanup worker environments pose numerous work-related health protection is reported to vary greatly. and safety hazards. During environmental clean- Worker protection problems at DOE are even up operations at non-federal sites, worker protec- more critical than in the private sector due to the tion issues have been given insufficient attention. scope and complexity of environmental contamin- Experience at these sites indicates that many is- ation at the NWC and organizational features of sues compete for management attention. The reg- DOE’s approach to occupational safety and ulations and procedures of Superfund and RCRA health. DOE has not yet institutionalized its do not emphasize worker protection issues. stated commitment to a culture of excellence and Environmental compliance, schedule deadlines, accountability in environment, health, and safety cleanup costs, and community concerns about matters. The meager staff and resources allocated possible off-site health risks are usually given to OSH matters within the Office of Environ- higher priority than occupational health and safe- mental Restoration and Waste Management indi- ty. Worker protection is often neglected by man- cates a neglect of this crucial area. To date, DOE agers, or addressed only in written health and has failed to develop cleanup-specific OSH poli- safety plans that do not accurately portray site cies, or to effectively monitor or enforce contrac- hazards or work practices. tors’ OSH programs. Unless this is changed, ef- Under OSHA’s Hazardous Waste Operations fective cleanup worker protection throughout the and Emergency Response Standard (HAZWOP- NWC will not be achieved. ER), employers are responsible for identifying The reorganized DOE Office of Environment, site hazards, designing effective programs to pro- Safety and Health has issued some proposals to

79 80 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

revise existing DOE OSH orders that would, if oped that takes worker health and safety hazards adopted, provide a more coherent and workable into account, and that allows risks to cleanup approach to worker protection programs general- workers to be weighed against the benefits of ly. EH has little capacity to oversee DOE line proposed remediation plans. Means of monitor- managers’ or contractors’ OSH practices in the ing contractor OSH performance must be devel- field, however, and no authority to actually en- oped and an incentive system that levies appro- force OSH orders. In the absence of independent priate rewards and penalties for OSH practices enforcement authority or close collaboration must be put in place. Achieving these goals will with, and commitments from, the DOE line orga- most likely require the cooperation of gover- nizations, EH efforts—no matter how valid — nment agencies and experts outside of DOE. will remain largely reactive. As the cleanup workforce expands, so do the As the owner-manger of the largest environ- chances of accidents, toxic exposures, and fur- mental cleanup effort in history, DOE is posi- ther loss of trust in DOE’s willingness or ability tioned to develop the organizational approaches, to demonstrate responsible oversight of contrac- information, and technologies that would ad- tor practices and to make good its promise to vance the state of the art of occupational health “honor environment, safety and health as funda- and safety practices for the growing, world-wide mental organizational priorities.” DOE has an cleanup industry. To accomplish this, DOE must, opportunity to create policies, programs and at minimum, acknowledge the urgency of the technologies for cleanup worker health and safe- worker protection issues that confront the depart- ty that could set the standard for the entire envi- ment and significantly augment OSH expertise at ronmental remediation industry. But it must EM headquarters and in the field. An approach to move swiftly. site characterization and cleanup must be devel- —————.——.—————————— ———————————————————— Supcrintcndcnt of Documents Publications Order Form }Jl Order Prwessmg Code Tt’lcphonc order~ (202) 783-3238 “7053 To fax your ordcv-s (202) S 12-2250 mm ❑ YES, PICW scnLi mc the (()]]owing: Charge your order. /t’s Easy! copies of’ Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Ilealth and Safety at lhe A’uclear W’capons Complex–Background Paper (W pages), S/N 052-()()3-()13 I (5-9 ut $5.00 cxh.

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