Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Overview and Findings 1

he Manhattan Project-the secret effort to invent and build the first atomic bomb-was accomplished in less than 4 years at a cost of approximately $2 billion.l The project was backed by the resources of America’s largestT and most advanced corporations and engineering fins, and employed the talents of thousands of the world’s best scientists, technicians, and workers. A half century later, the institutional descendant of the Man- hattan Project, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), cofronts a new mission: cleaning up the environmental pollution left by cold war nuclear weapons production. This new mission presents DOE with daunting technical and organizational challenges as it strives to revise policies that led to widespread pollution throughout the Nuclear Weapons Complex and to restore contaminated environments to safe conditions, It is estimated that cleanup of environmental contamination from nearly 50 years of nuclear weapons manufacture will cost more than $100 billion and require more than 30 years to com- plete. The cost and length of the cleanup are uncertain because DOE is the true extent of pollution and the means to remedy it areas yet only dimly understood, Some areas of the Weapons Complex responsible for may never be restored to pristine conditions.2 The tasks involved in the cleanup of environmental contami- protecting those nation are unfamiliar to DOE. Indeed, the entire field of hazard- who will do ous waste management and environmental remediation is in its infancy. Methods of characterizing contaminated sites are highly the work of uncertain, 3 and approaches to cleaning up are largely unproved at both waste sites owned by private industry and government- cleaning up owned facilities such as DOE reservations.4 5 It is clear, however, that cleaning up the 14 facilities in 13 States that make up the Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) will

1 2 Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

demand the application of great talent and re- As DOE turns its attention toward its new mis- sources. The tens of thousands of people who sion of environmental restoration and waste will be engaged in cleanup of the Weapons Com- management, the Department assumes responsi- plex will join a large and growing industry devot- bility for providing safe and healthful working ed to the characterization and restoration of con- conditions for those who will do the work of taminated environments. It is estimated that over cleaning up. The vigor and success with which the next 5 years, DOE’s Office of Environmental DOE implements health and safety programs for Restoration and Waste Management could re- cleanup workers will be a signal of its willing- quire the services of as many as 25,000 scien- ness and ability to embrace the “new culture” tists, engineers, and technicians.6 spoken of by the Secretary of Energy—a culture Some workers will be involved in collecting that honors protection of the environment, environmental samples, studying groundwater health, and safety as a fundamental priority.8 If movement, and designing remediation projects. effectively conducted, the DOE cleanup could Others will be operating earth moving equip- serve as a model of how workers engaged in haz- ment; handling, inspecting, and repacking waste ardous waste and emergency response operations drums; or building dams, digging trenches, and should be protected from work-related illness constructing complex waste treatment facilities. and injury. Still others will be plant operators, maintenance Environmental restoration and waste manage- personnel, and technical experts at vitrification ment activities at DOE provide an opportunity to plants, wastewater treatment facilities, and incin- advance the state of the art of occupational health erators. Municipal firefighters, police, medical and safety programs for cleanup workers. DOE’s experts, and other emergency response personnel stated commitment to attain a new culture that may be called on in the event of fire, explosion, respects the environment, health, and safety; its or accidental release of toxic materials. search for new ways of incorporating effective The NWC cleanup will be one of the largest worker protection programs into contract agree- environmental remediation efforts ever, and very ments; and its intent to pursue cleanup in a re- likely the largest undertaken by the Federal Gov- sponsible and cost-effective manner-all place ernment at taxpayers’ expense. If conducted ef- DOE in a position to become a major force in ad- fectively, the DOE cleanup could serve as a vancing the programs and technologies needed to model of how workers engaged in hazardous adequately protect workers from safety hazards waste and emergency response operations should and from the adverse effects of exposure to toxic be protected from work-related illness and in- materials. jury. DOE’s past refusal to acknowledge its Achieving such a leadership position in occu- obligation to comply with environmental laws pational health and safety will require DOE to and regulations means that the Department is adopt policies and undertake actions now only in starting environmental characterization and re- their incipient stages. To apply management mediation activities more than a decade after the lessons gleaned from experience at non-Federal private sector began cleaning up Superfund and cleanup operations, DOE must first recognize the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act need for strong management commitment to the (RCRA) sites. During those years, much has occupational safety and health (OSH) of its been learned about how to protect the health and cleanup workers. Comprehensive, DOE-wide safety of cleanup workers; DOE could apply OSH policies, objectives, programs, and means these lessons to great advantage. of assessing progress must be developed. The co- operative efforts of line managers and health and Chapter l–Overview and Findings 3

safety professionals will be required along with input from experienced workers. Consultation and interaction with other government agencies and organizations with expertise in worker protection issues will also be needed if DOE is to formulate a timely and effective approach to cleanup worker protection. The policies adopted then will have to be implemented and enforced. Finally, truly independent oversight of OSH policies will be necessary at DOE facilities, with mechanisms developed to reward or penalize ad- herence to or violation of these policies.

CLEANUP WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS In addition to many of the safety hazards associated with conventional construction operations, such as manual lifting, operation of heavy ma- chinery, electrical hazards, exposure to extreme heat and cold, and confined space operations, workers involved in characterizing or remediat- ing toxic waste sites may encounter fire and explosion hazards, as well as the health threats associated with exposure to toxic chemicals and radiation. 9 10 Stress-related illness can also af- flict cleanup workers because of the unusual de- Cleanup workers face safety hazards associated with mands and uncertainties associated with this traditional construction tasks as well as health risks work.11 Finally cleanup workers at DOE facili- from exposure to toxic chemicals and radionuclides. ties will confront-in addition to all of the usual radiation are in dispute. 14-17 The long-term con- risks encountered in hazardous waste work— sequences of exposure to chronic, low dosages of other hazards, such as high-level radioactive toxic materials, radiation, or mixtures of these— waste and mixed waste, that are unique to the the types of exposures most likely to be encoun- Weapons Complex. tered by cleanup workers—remain largely unin- It is not known what specific health risks 12 No prospective studies vestigated. cleanup workers face. The construction trades, which include many have been done of health effects among workers workers engaged in environmental cleanup, are employed in the new industry of environmental among the most hazardous occupations in the remediation. It is highly uncertain what, if any, United States and have long been associated with specific biologic effects result from exposure to a high rate of worker injuries.18 19 An estimated toxic substances encountered during work with $8.9 billion is spent annually on costs related to 20 hazardous waste. The health outcomes associat- construction accidents. Indirect costs, included with exposure to most of the chemicals in ing reduced productivity, schedule delays, and 13 commercial use are poorly understood, and the damage to equipment or facilities, account for health consequences of exposure to low doses of most of this amount. 4 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

A number of useful objective measures of past ing environmental cleanup work. Instead, clean- safety performance have been developed, and re- up workers must depend on less certain strategies search has demonstrated several ways of reduc- for identifying site-specific hazards, such as envi- ing workplace injury rates, including effective ronmental monitoring and medical surveillance, worker health and safety training, and the plan- and must rely in large measure on respirators, im- ning and enforcement of safe work practices. An permeable clothing, and other personal protective analysis by the Business Roundtable concluded equipment to prevent exposure to toxic materi- that site owners can effectively influence job als.24 safety and that strong construction safety pro- The demographics of much of the private sec- grams are cost effective.21 tor hazardous waste work force—youth, frequent Workers employed in the construction indus- turnover, high proportion of minorities25-serve try also suffer higher rates of some cancers and to lessen the power of individual employees. The increased overall mortality compared to the U.S. realities of workers’ compensation laws in most population as a whole.22 The causes of these in- States restrict a worker’s means of legal recourse creased rates of nontraumatic deaths among con- in the event of injury or adverse health effects. struction workers are not understood; possible re- The burden of proof in cases of alleged work-relationships between work-related risks and health lated health problems is on the worker; pervasive outcomes among construction workers have not scientitic uncertainties about the health impacts been well studied. of environmental toxicants often make it difficult The large number and variety of toxic chemi- to prove that a given ailment is work related. cals present at many hazardous waste sites, the Many health professionals believe that in most potential interaction of contaminants, and the cases, cleanup workers can be protected from “disorderly physical environment” of cleanup the harmful effects of exposure to toxic sub- work make it difficult, and sometimes impossi- stances.26-28 However, achieving such protection ble, to accurately assess all potential chemical or requires that managers pay vigilant attention to radiologic hazards. In many cases, site contami- identifying and anticipating potential site hazards nants are unidentified and loose in the environ- and devote adequate resources to design and im- ment or “uncontrolled.” These factors result in plementation of the occupational health and safe- work situations that: ty programs needed to mitigate such hazards. In addition, workers must be trained to recognize • “may include numerous and varied hazards unexpected dangers when they are encountered that may pose an immediate danger to life or and must be knowledgeable in the use of person- health; al protective equipment. Ž may not be immediately obvious or identifi- The Office of Technology Assessment found able; that there is sufficient evidence to question the ● may vary according to the location on site adequacy of existing provisions for protecting and the task being performed; 23 cleanup workers from occupational illness and ● may change as site activities progress.” injury. Concerns about cleanup worker health Because of these features, the application of and safety have arisen during operations at non- traditional approaches to worker protection— Federal cleanup sites. These concerns are also namely, a reliance on industrial hygiene data to salient to environmental restoration of the Nu- identify potentially dangerous worker exposures clear Weapons Complex. Some features of the and the use of engineering controls to reduce or DOE cleanup may intensify worker protection eliminate such exposure-is often precluded dur- problems encountered at non-Federal facilities. Chapter l-Overview and Findings 15

CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO tigations demonstrate that DOE or its prime PROTECT WEAPONS COMPLEX contractors failed to exercise prudent judgment in CLEANUP WORKERS occupational health and safety matters during The failure to adequately protect cleanup cleanup. Inadequate attention to OSH issues dur- workers now can have effects that range from ing cleanup of federal facilities may leave the near-term public dissatisfaction to future claims government vulnerable to lawsuits and claims akin to those now being made by veterans of of liability against the Federal Government. The 33 by citizens living downwind linkage between worker health and safety and atomic bomb tests, 34 off-site health impacts is well recognized by of nuclear tests, and by DOE workers and oth- communities surrounding hazardous waste sites, ers alleging radiation-related illness and dam- as experience with Superfund has shown.29 30 If ages .35-39 worker health and safety is perceived by the public to be neglected or poorly protected, public confidence in the overall cleanup effort could be APPROACH USED IN THIS STUDY undermined. Public doubts about the adequacy of This OTA background paper was written after worker protection, the accuracy of site character- review of available government documents and ization, the hazards of proposed remediation published articles that chronicle cleanup worker plans, and the reliability of emergency response health and safety issues.40 OTA also consulted capabilities could lead to strong pressures to re- numerous government officials involved in over- peat characterization studies, revise planned sight or regulation of cleanup worker safety and cleanup strategies, strengthen emergency re- health, as well as DOE contractor employees, sponse plans, or take other measures that would DOE and private sector workers involved in haz- delay cleanup schedules and increase costs. ardous waste operations, labor representatives, Given the extent and complexity of contami- academic experts, and health and safety man- nation at the NWC, the projected size of the agers from environmental and engineering firms. cleanup work force, and the expected decades- Two workshops were held to discuss issues long duration of cleanup activities, work-related raised in this background paper. The first, re- accidents and illnesses are bound to occur. 31 Oc- ferred to as the “OTA Workshop on DOE Clean- cupational illnesses are also likely in view of the up Workers,”’41 included employees of DOE, the volume and nature of hazardous materials known Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the to exist on weapons plant reservations .32 Occupational Safety and Health Administration In addition, uncertainties about the health haz- (OSHA); workers at DOE weapons facilities; ards associated with characterization and restora- representatives of labor unions engaged in clean- tion of contaminated environments are pervasive; up work; and health and safety professionals existing regulatory mandates governing cleanup from academia and the private sector. The second worker health and safety are ambiguous; and sig- workshop, the “OTA-HWAC Workshop,”42 in- nificant weaknesses characterize DOE’s and its cluded OTA staff and members of Hazardous contractors’ occupational health and safety pro- Waste Action Contractors (HWAC), a national grams for cleanup workers. These features sug- association of engineering and science firms gest that the Federal Government could face sig- practicing in hazardous waste management. nificant liability claims in the future if large In the course of this project, OTA staff visited numbers of the cleanup workers develop work- all of the facilities in the DOE Nuclear Weapons related diseases or suffer injuries that might rea- Complex. The EPA-Labor Health and Safety sonably have been prevented, or if future inves- Task Force, a group that includes representatives 6 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

from several government agencies and labor or- pertinent to occupational safety and health poli- ganizations convened to address controversial is- cies and practices, including internal memoranda sues surrounding cleanup worker health and safe- and drafts of proposed OSH orders and pro- ty, allowed OTA staff to attend several of its grams. The DOE Office of Environmental meetings and to review the minutes of other Restoration and Waste Management (EM) and meetings. OTA staff benefited greatly from the the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health opportunity to accompany representatives from (EH) reviewed and commented on a draft of this OSHA, EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers OTA background paper. (ACE), and the EPA-Labor Health and Safety Because of the limited data documenting Task Force on a tour of a (non-DOE) Superfund health and safety risks or health outcomes among site. This tour was part of an interagency effort to cleanup workers, the lack of reliable surveys of establish an OSHA inspection protocol for Su- work conditions at hazardous waste sites, and the perfund incineration sites.43 44 absence of any comprehensive or prospective There is no comprehensive documentation of studies of the occupational illnesses or injuries the successes or problems associated with worker encountered during environmental cleanup work health and safety programs at hazardous waste at private sector sites or at government facilities, sites either in the private sector or at DOE facili- some of the information presented in this OTA ties. The government does not categorize workers background paper is necessarily anecdotal. engaged in environmental remediation or hazard- Nonetheless, several themes and issues were ous materials emergency response actions in raised consistently and repeatedly in the course ways that allow accurate analyses of occupation- of OTA’s investigation; these are discussed here. al health and safety statistics in this industry.45 There is also considerable consensus among the Further, much of the activity at hazardous waste diverse participants in the EPA-Labor Health and sites thus far has involved characterization stud- Safety Task Force on the major health and safety ies aimed at mapping pollution pathways and problems at private sector waste sites—although short-lived emergency removal projects.46 47 individuals have differing ideas about the sources Only recently have actual remediation and clean- and solutions to these problems. up activities become a prominent aspect of work at Superfund and RCRA sites. This is also the SUPERFUND AND RCRA EXPERIENCE: case at DOE facilities, where site characteriza- WORKER PROTECTION LESSONS tion efforts are ongoing and environmental clean- The experience accumulated in the course of 48 up work is just getting underway. nearly two decades of Superfund and RCRA ac- OTA’s analysis of DOE’s capacity to protect tivities provides valuable lessons on how to es- cleanup worker health and safety draws on a tablish effective occupational health and safety number of documents reviewing DOE’s manage- programs during hazardous waste operations and ment of environment, safety, and health issues. environmental remediation. As the environmen- (See, for example, work cited in footnotes 49- tal restoration industry continues to grow and 64.) Some of these reports were compiled by ex- hazardous waste operations shift from characteri- pert independent panels, many convened at the zation studies to actual cleanup, new problems request of the Secretary of Energy. These re- are identified and the regulatory response to these views, although focusing primarily on the DOE emerging issues continues to evolve. weapons production work force and not on clean- Some of the problems that plague efforts to es- up workers, provide useful information about the tablish sound OSH programs during environmen- Department’s general approach to worker health tal cleanup operations are technical in nature and and safety. OTA also examined DOE documents .—

Chapter l–Overview and Findings 7

result from the difficulties associated with efforts were not familiar enough with site operations to to identify site contaminants and worker expo- recognize potential hazards.93 94 sures, and from the pervasive uncertainties re- Site owners and prime contractors often “push garding the human health consequences of expo- down” responsibility and accountability for sure to environmental pollutants. However, the worker health and safety to subcontractors95— overriding problems that hinder worker protec- even though subcontractors frequently have less tion efforts during hazardous waste cleanup re - experience, can devote fewer resources to hazard sult from a lack of emphasis on OSH issues in Su - identification and worker protection, and com- perfund and RCRA procedures, and inadequate mand less access to trained occupational safety management commitment to or accountability for and health professionals than the prime contrac- cleanup worker health and safety. tor.96 Fear of legal liability has made some man- The next section of this chapter introduces agers reluctant to intercede in worksite health and some of the reasons why cleanup workers in the safety problems that do not directly involve their private sector are not better protected against oc- own employees-even when they are aware of cupational injury or illness. Chapter 2 of this obvious exposure hazards or unsafe work prac- OTA background paper addresses these matters tices.97 Furthermore, the lack of rigorous en- in more detail. Chapter 3 discusses cleanup forcement of OSHA standards during hazardous worker health issues within the context of clean- waste operations and emergency response leaves up of the Nuclear Weapons Complex. employers unaccountable for the adequacy of worker protection measures. Management Commitment and Accountability Inadequate Characterization Data Management commitment to worker health The Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study and safety is increasingly recognized as a critical (RIFS) process in Superfund cleanups and element of all good occupational health and safe- RCRA Facility Investigation (RFI) efforts are 91 92 ty programs. The environmental laws and supposed to provide information about the pres- regulations that drive most cleanup operations do ence, location, and concentration of hazardous not however, assign OSH matters a high priority. contaminants at a site. These data are then ana- Cleanup managers who are compelled to devote lyzed to produce assessments of baseline health great attention to complying with environmental risks posed by site contaminants and devise ap- laws and other competing priorities, sometimes propriate engineering responses to the pollu- neglect the need for aggressive and sustained tion. 98 Unfortunately, the data gathered by the management involvement in developing and imp- engineers and environmental scientists who de- lementing effective worker protection strate- sign and conduct characterization studies typical- gies. ly fail to provide the type of information needed Moreover, cleanup operations are character- to evaluate potential worker health and safety ized by a diffuse managerial structure that makes threats.99-103 In some cases, characterization it difficult to maintain clear chains of command studies are incomplete when requests for cleanup or to determine who is accountable for occupa- proposals are sent out for bid or when remedia- tional health and safety. Cleanup workers have tion work begins. In other instances, site assess- been endangered because health and safety ex- ment activities may have been carried out years perts were unavailable on-site; lacked the senior- before actual remediation gets under way; thus ity, training, or authority to interrupt production assessment reports do not represent the site con- schedules when worker safety was threatened; or ditions existing when cleanup work begins. 8 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Site characterization activities are generally unexpected” and to train workers to identify un- not designed to produce the information needed foreseen contamination problems. to “engineer” a cleanup. Most professionals with experience in environmental cleanup anticipate Poor Contracting Practices that remediation activities will uncover “surpris- The lack of flexibility in many cleanup con- es” not revealed during the site characterization tracts contributes to the difficulties of creating ef- phase. These surprises are usually unpleasant and fective occupational health and safety programs may include, for example, more extensive zones for cleanup workers. Contractors bidding on of subsurface contamination, or additional “hot cleanup jobs are placed in a difficult position as a spots” with high contamination levels. result of the large uncertainties inherent in all en- These realities have led many environmental vironmental restoration work, the errors and remediation specialists to endorse the so-called omissions that distinguish most characterization observational approach to cleanup. The observa- data, and the failure to include provisions in tional approach is a method for staging data col- cleanup contracts that allow changes in original lection and remedial action so as to account for HASPS or renegotiation of worker protection the uncertainties inherent in assessing environ- costs. Managers are often forced to choose be- mental contamination. The approach involves tween either assuming “worst-case” scenarios initiating response action early to prevent migra- and planning for elaborate worker health and tion of contaminants and then collecting the addi- safety provisions in their bids; or hoping that no tional information necessary to design the final new hazards come to light in the course of clean- remedy. Contingency plans are developed to de- up (a hope that experience has shown is usually fine actions that will be taken if additional areas unrealized) and budgeting less money for worker of contamination are found or if remedial actions protection. are not as effective as planned. Employers engaged in cleanup work com- The quality and focus of site characterization mand widely differing levels of expertise in occu- data are important because these data are the pational health and safety matters. Even large l04 basis of site health and safety plans (HASPS). firms that possess significant technical abilities HASPS are legally mandated by HAZWOPER, vary widely in the amount of attention paid to imp- the OSHA standard governing worker protection lementing and enforcing principles of worker during hazardous waste site operations and emer- safety and health protection.105 In an effort to gency response. HASPS must present a written better assess work-related hazards, some large blueprint of health and safety hazards associated environmental firms have tried to include costs of with proposed work plans at contaminated sites additional characterization studies in the cleanup and must establish the personal protective gear, bids submitted, but they have not always suc- work practices, medical surveillance, and health ceeded, especially when negotiators lack health and safety training required to conduct the clean- and safety backgrounds or are unfamiliar with the up and respond appropriately to any emergencies hazards of environmental cleanup work. The that might arise. practice of awarding contracts for environmental When characterization data are inaccurate or cleanup solely on the basis of a low bid may mili- incomplete, there is no sound basis from which to tate against firms that incorporate strong worker craft effective site-specific health and safety protection programs into contract proposals. plans or to determine the level of worker protection required in performing specific work tasks. To address this deficiency, the basic premise of health and safety practice must be to “expect the Chapter l–Overview and Findings 19

Difficulties in Interpreting OSHA’S ● methods for monitoring worker exposure to Hazardous Waste Operations and potentially hazardous substances; Emergency Response Standard ● methods for determiningg acceptable worker The regulation that protects hazardous waste exposure levels during cleanup operations; workers is vague and difficult to enforce. In ● the criteria that determine an individual 1990, the Occupational Safety and Health Ad- worker’s eligibility for inclusion in legally ministration promulgated a regulation to protect mandated medical surveillance programs workers engaged in hazardous waste operations and prescribe minimum hours of health and and emergency response, the so-called HAZ- safety training; WOPER standard.l06 Other OSHA regulations, ● the content of medical surveillance pro- such as standards governing construction worker grams and the qualifications of physicians protection, use of respirators, and exposure to who design and manage the activities; and certain regulated materials, also apply to environ- ● the adequacy of emergency response prepa- mental cleanup work, but HAZWOPER is the rations and capabilities during hazardous most comprehensive and important regulation waste operations. applicable to cleanup worker health and safety. OSHA has also proposed a regulation that HAZWOPER is a “performance-based” regu- would establish certification criteria for cleanup lation. The standard sets forth a number of goals worker health and safety training programs man- and approaches that employers must adopt, but dated by HAZWOPER.109 Some aspects of the does not prescribe how cleanup worker protec- proposed rule (29 CFR 1910.121) have been crit- tion programs should be designed or implement- icized; in particular, the absence of any required ed. Some aspects of HAZWOPER are ambigu- certification for trainers or for the programs that OUS. OSHA has not issued guidance documents train emergency response personnel have been that would aid employers in interpreting and ap- cited.110-112 plying the standard. Also, different OSHA regional offices have offered contradictory inter- 107 Weak Oversight of Occupational Health pretations of some HAZWOPER provisions. and Safety Rules by Regulators Consequently, there is significant controversy The Occupational Safety and Health Act holds about how elements of the standard should be im- employers responsible for providing workers plemented, and wide variations exist in the rigor- with “safe and healthful working conditions.’66 ousness of cleanup worker protection programs HAZWOPER, the OSHA regulation enacted to at hazardous waste sites. To respond to such con- protect cleanup worker health and safety, man- troversy in a more timely manner than its bureau- dates a structured, but nonspecific, approach to cratic procedures usually allow, the OSHA Di- worker protection during hazardous waste opera- rectorate of Compliance Programs recently tions and emergency response.67 Under this stan- published a compilation of letters and memos dard, critical decisions about how to identify and from OSHA headquarters that respond to specific 108 mitigate cleanup worker health risks are left to queries on HAZWOPER interpretation. the judgment of individual employers. Especially controversial aspects of HAZWOP- The quality of worker health and safety pro- ER implementation include the following: grams implemented under HAZWOPER at Su- ● provisions for dividing waste sites into work perfund and RCRA sites are reported to vary zones categorized by the potential for work- widely. 68 69 These inconsistencies are apparently er exposure to hazardous materials within a consequence of information gaps and uncer- these zones; tainties about necessary levels of worker protec- 10 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

tion; differences in the rigorousness with which Health (NIOSH), ACE, and representatives of different employers pursue worker safety and labor unions whose members frequently conduct health; OSHA’s failure to issue detailed guidance cleanup work. This Task Force has been con- to help employers interpret and apply the broadly structive in identifying some of the more pressing worded HAZWOPER regulation; and weak and pervasive worker protection problems at OSHA enforcement efforts. RCRA and Superfund sites. OSHA and EPA have agreed to cooperate in EPA’s principal goals, however, which are developing an OSHA inspection protocol for in- largely a response to public and congressional cinerators at Superfund sites.70 In general, how- pressures, are to reduce the time needed to com- ever, OSHA enforcement of HAZWOPER has plete the RCRA and Superfund processes, and to 71 72 not been vigorous. OSHA has about 1,000 accomplish cleanup more economically. EPA’s inspectors (including supervisors and trainers) to “new Superfund paradigm,” is designed to speed enforce health and safety standards for nearly 3.6 up site assessment and initiate activity early in million employers and 55 million workers .73 cleanup so as to reduce “immediate risks.”80 81 Aside from a few planned Superfund incinerator Some contend that these priorities may beat odds inspections, neither the more than 4,000 RCRA with worker protection needs, which might dic- sites that require or have undergone remediation, tate a “go-slow” approach in unusually hazardous nor the 1,354 sites on Superfund’s National Pri- situations or in implementing innovative reme- 74 75 orities List have been targeted as high priori- dies.82 ties for OSHA inspections. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease EPA is the Federal agency with the most ex- Registry (ATSDR) is responsible for determining pertise in hazardous waste operations, but EPA the potential human health impacts of toxic mate- staff are not well prepared to assess or oversee rials released into the environment, and has broad worker health and safety during cleanup. Few of statutory authority to intervene when environ- EPA’s regional staff or project managers have oc- mental contaminants imperil human health,83 cupational health and safety backgrounds. Cur- ATSDR officials are rarely present during clean- rently, none of the staff members of EPA’s Office up operations, however, and focus mostly on pos- of Solid Waste and Emergency Response sible off-site health effects of Superfund and (OSWER) Hazardous Site Control Division are RCRA pollution. 84 In some circumstances, ef- occupational health or safety professionals, EPA forts to mitigate risks to off-site populations may maintains furthermore that it lacks the authority actually increase the health and safety hazards to enforce OSHA’s HAZWOPER standards.76 faced by cleanup workers.85 86 EPA has, at times, neglected to consider work- Neither the assessment of cleanup worker er risks when selecting cleanup options .77 EPA health and safety risks nor the evaluation of officials have acknowledged the need to weigh worker protection programs has high priority for worker health risks against the benefits of partic- the regulatory agencies most involved in imple- ular remediation measures but have developed a menting Superfund and RCRA, The OSHA regu- formal means of doing so only in the past few latory officials who are most knowledgeable months,78 79 and the effectiveness of these pro- about worker protection issues generally are not posed changes has yet to be tested. familiar with environmental cleanup work and To its credit, EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and are rarely present during cleanup operations, Emergency Response (OSWER) has established whereas the EPA regulators who are most famil- the EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force, iar with hazardous waste work know little about consisting of employees from EPA, OSHA, the occupational health and safety matters and refuse National Institute of Occupational Safety and to enforce OSHA standards. The net result is that Chapter l–Overview and Findings I 11

the interpretation and implementation of cleanup told to devote more resources to health and safety worker OSH standards are highly variable and matters. are left, essentially, to the voluntary efforts of The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 87-90 employers. Consequently, the forces that 1970 exempted Federal agencies from the author- drive cleanup operations—particularly the need ity of OSHA to the extent that those agencies to comply with environmental regulations and exercised independent authority over worker the need to address concerns about off-site health safety and health,121 DOE, granted such authori- impacts of pollution-may, in practice, overshad- ty under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Act, ow questions and actions aimed at possible risks is the only Federal agency that claims such an ex- to cleanup workers, emption. DOE Order No. 5483 requires DOE contractors to obey and implement all OSHA CLEANUP WORKER PROTECTION standards. 122 However, OSHA does not have IN THE DOE NUCLEAR WEAPONS right-of-entry or inspection at DOE weapons fa- COMPLEX CLEANUP PROGRAM cilities, nor can it issue citations at DOE facilities The task of cleaning up environmental con- or impose financial or criminal penalties if DOE 123 tamination throughout the Nuclear Weapons contractors fail to comply with these standards. Complex presents greater technical and political The DOE Office of Environmental Restoration challenges than cleanup at private hazardous and Waste Management, which has line manage- waste sites, DOE must grapple with the chal- ment responsibilities for cleanup of the NWC, is lenges of cleanup, even as it confronts other diffi- struggling to establish OSH policies applicable to cult and unfamiliar missions such as nuclear DOE contractor employees engaged in environ- weapons dismantlement. Accomplishing these mental remediation and waste management. EH, missions is likely to require significant changes the DOE office charged with providing indepen- in DOE’s priorities, organizational structure, and dent oversight of occupational health and safety approach to problem solving. programs within DOE and among its contractors, The Secretary of Energy has acknowledged has reorganized, added new safety and health that DOE and its predecessor agencies have his- staff, and is in the process of revising and updat- torically embodied an institutional culture that ing DOE orders, some of which are relevant to valued weapons production over the protection of cleanup worker protection. human health and the environment. 113 Multiple These and other proposed and accomplished expert and government reports have documented actions indicate that DOE has taken a number of DOE’s past inattention to occupational health positive steps to improve worker health and safe- and safety and to environmental protection, ty at its facilities. However, DOE and its contrac- DOE’s past failures in these realms have been tors continue to operate under an organizational pervasive and serious.114 structure that presents serious obstacles to In efforts to alter this record, DOE initiated a progress in safeguarding worker health and safe- number of reforms and issued directives in 1991 ty. OTA notes three major organizational issues and 1992 aimed at improving health and safety that must be confronted if DOE is to institution- programs at its facilities, 115-119 Management re- alize a “new culture of accountability in environ- sponsibility for worker protection has been reem- ment, safety, and health.” phasized within the DOE organization; its Office First, managers and workers throughout DOE of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) has been and its contractor corps must be convinced that restructured; 120 and DOE’s contractors have been occupational health and safety is truly a top priority of the Department. OTA analysis indicates that this is not now the case. 124-131 In 1990, 12! Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

OSHA found that “pressures to get the job done ability of EH to properly monitor DOE and con- often overrule safety and health concerns.” Some tractor performance in OSH matters is inade- top managers openly derided the significance of quate and is likely to remain so despite progress the “new culture,” and workers also indicated in formalizing contractor assessment protocols, skepticism of health and safety as a serious prior- because of the small numbers of qualified field ity. Today, assertions that DOE management is staff. Actual enforcement of OSH orders is hap- aggressively pursuing staunch worker protection hazard, and the only penalty levied DOE or con- policies are undermined by delays in addressing tractor managers for failure to comply is embar- inadequate OSH practices documented by Tiger rassment. EH, which is charged with providing Teams,132 133 as well as delays in official adop- independent oversight of OSH activities, is not tion of proposed OSH orders; by the failure of truly independent. Its policy recommendations DOE managers to impose penalties on contrac- must, in practice, receive the concurrence of tors who do not enforce sound worker protection other DOE program managers. The EH role is policies; and by reports that DOE facility opera- advisory only; this Office has no authority to en- tions have continued or been resumed before ap- force its own stated policies. propriate safety training and procedures were These three structural flaws in DOE’s ap- completed.134 135 proach to worker protection—lack of strong Second, DOE line organizations require sig- management commitment to OSH priorities; lack nificantly more staff and more resources devoted of sufficient OSH staff and resources in DOE to OSH matters. The DOE approach to worker program offices to carry out stated OSH respon- health and safety protection calls for its line orga- sibilities; and lack of independent oversight or nizations, such as EM, to develop OSH policies enforcement of OSH policies and orders at DOE within the purview of their program missions and facilities-are likely to impede efforts to ensure ensure that contractors implement these policies protection of workers engaged in cleanup of the adequately. In practice, there are far too few OSH Nuclear Weapons Complex. professionals in DOE to accomplish this. DOE In addition, DOE’s decentralized internal or- staff trained or experienced in OSH matters are ganization and the diffuse, multilayered structure scattered throughout the line organizations and of DOE-contractor relationships are likely to in- are frequently found in “advisory” positions with tensify the difficulties with accountability, effi- no real influence. cient communication, and chain of command that As in the private sector, actual cleanup at DOE have hampered the protection of cleanup workers facilities is just beginning. EM, the line organiza- during other hazardous waste operations. tion directly responsible for cleanup, has laid an Finally, because of the scope and complexity important foundation for the DOE cleanup effort of environmental contamination throughout the and may, in time, develop effective and innova- NWC, worker protection issues encountered at tive occupational safety and health programs. non-Federal cleanup sites, including inadequate However, OSH issues have been neglected by characterization of site OSH hazards, poor con- EM thus far, and the Office does not have the tracting procedures, and controversial and vari- staff needed to create or monitor a robust worker able implementation of HAZWOPER, are likely health and safety program for the cleanup. EM to be not only revisited but magnified during the managers, preoccupied with other priorities, ad- DOE cleanup. The DOE institutional structure dress OSH issues only reactively. that will frame OSH policy and practice for the Third, DOE has no reliable or credible proc- cleanup is poorly suited to address many of these ess for rewarding or punishing managers’ per- matters. formance in matters of safety and health. The Chapter l–Overview and Findings 13

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS and interactions with other government agencies and with labor representatives. Opportunities for DOE The challenge of environmental restoration Focus Now and waste management at the DOE Weapons The need to focus high-level management at- Complex provides an opportunity both: to ad- tention and increased resources on protecting vance the state-of-the-art of occupational health those who will do the work of cleaning up is ur- and safety programs for the cleanup workers who gent. Some needed provisions, such as worker will carry out DOE’s new mission of environ- training programs, medical surveillance strate- mental restoration; and to create a model for gies, and emergency response plans, will take keeping the thousands of workers engaged time to develop and implement and must be in worldwide in this task safe and healthy. place when cleanup commences.

Current DOE Approach Inadequate Areas Needing Attention DOE’s current approach to worker health and Key areas where concerted management ef- safety is marked by three major weaknesses: forts could bring needed results are:

● the Department has not established an insti- ● improving characterization data for contam- tutional culture that honors protection of en- inated sites in order to prepare good health vironment, safety and health as fundamental and safety plans; priorities; ● improving contracting practices to ensure ● the DOE Office of Environmental Restora- proper incentives for protecting workers at tion and Waste Management (EM) has not all contracting levels; developed effective OSH policies and pro- ● interpreting and implementing OSHA work- grams for the cleanup or ensured that con- er protection standards and supplementing tractors are implementing appropriate work- these with rigorous management attention to er protection programs; safety and health, including outside over- ● the DOE Office of Environment, Safety and sight; Health (EH) does not have the field staff ● providing for informed and active worker necessary to oversee cleanup worker health participation in protection programs. and safety and does not have sufficient authority to enforce OSH policies and orders Consequences of Failure among DOE line managers and contractors. Failure to prudently and adequately protect cleanup workers at Nuclear Weapons Complex Draw From Experience could have serious consequences. Individual Experience in protecting cleanup workers dur- workers might experience illnesses or injuries ing RCRA corrective actions and Superfund op- that could have been avoided had effective OSH erations has revealed a variety of problems that programs been in place. In addition, concerns have ranged from inadequate health and safety about worker protection might result in schedule delays, increased costs, and erosion in the pub- planning, to poor training to lax enforcement of cleanup worker protection standards. DOE could lie’s faith in proposed cleanup plans. learn from this experience by participating in the EPA/Labor Superfund Health and Safety Task Force, and by initiating additional consultations 14 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES

1 R. Rhodes, The Mak”ng of the Atomic Bomb (New York NY: 20 me Business Ro~d@ble, Improving C0nw74cti0n Safev Sirnon and Schuster, 1986). Pe~ormance, Report A-3 (New Yorlq NY; January 1982, reprinted z U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Complex July 1990). Cleanup-the Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Produc- 21 Ibid. tion, OTA-O-484 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Of- 22 c Rob&04 F< St-, H. Venable, et. al., The Assessment of fice, February, 1991). Hazards in the Construction Industry (National Institute for Occu- 3 Ibid. pational Safety and Health, May 1990). 4 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Corrdng 23 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Clean-Superfund Problems Can Be Solved, OTA-lTE-433 (lVash- (NIOSH), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October, 1989). U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 5 D.M. Mackay, J.A. Cherry, “Groundwater Contamination: (EPA), Occupah”ond Safety and Health Guidance Manual for Haz- Pump-and-Treat Remediatio&” Environmental Science and Tech- ardous Waste Site Activities (Washington DC: U.S. Government nology, vol. 23, No. 6, 1989, pp. 630-636. Printing Office, October 1985), p. 2-1, G C.W. Holmes, R. Lewis, ct. al., “Environmental Restoration u M Gochfe]d, “me Medi~ Surveillance Of -dous Wrote and Waste Management Manpower Needs Assessment: U.S. De- Workers,” Occupational Medicine State of the Art Reviews, vol. 5, partment of Energy Complex,” Contract DE-AC06-76RL0 1830, No. 1, Januaxy-March 1990, p. 3. June 1992. 25 M. Gochfeld, V, Cmpbell, and P. Landsbergis, “Demo~a- 7 Office of Technology Assessment, Complex Cleanup, 1991, phy of the Hazardous Waste Industry,” Occupational Medicine op. at. Stare of the Art Reviews, vol. 5, No. 1, Janq-March 1990, pp. 9- 8 James D. Watkins, Secretary of Department of Energy, “Ten 23. Points Initiative,” reprinted in Occupational Safety and Health Ad- 26 Offlce of Technology Assessment Workshop on cle~uP ministration, Evaluan”on of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Occu- Worker Health and Safety at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, pational Safety and Health Programs for Its Government-Owned Washington DC, May 15, 1991. Contractor -Operated Facilities, December 1990, p. B13. 27 Office of TwhnoIon Assessment-Hazardous waste Action 9 J. Demerit, “Training Under Superfund, ” Toxicology and ln- Contractors (I-WAC) Workshop, Washingto% DC, Sept. 17, 1991. dustria/Health, vol. 5, No. 4, 1989, pp. 103-110. 28 M, Gochfeld, Dirmtor, Occupational Health Divisio% Uni- 10 M GocMeld and J, B~ger, Ynvestigaticms and Activities at versity of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Robert Wood Supcrfund Sites,” Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Re)’iews, Johnson Medical School, persoml communication with T. O’Toole, vol. 5, No. 1, January-March 1990, pp. 127-142. Office of Technology Assessment, April 22, 1991 - 11 N Fiedler, “un~ers~~g stress h H=dous Waste Work 29 office of TechnoloW Assessment, Complex Cleanup, 1991* ers,” Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews, vol. 5, No. 1, op. cit. January-March 1990, pp. 101-108. ~ Office of Technolo~ Assessmen4 Coming Clean, 1%9, oP. IZ J Mefius, ~~Medical s~eiuance for H=dous Waste ‘Ork- cit. crs, ” Journal of Occupational Medicine, vol. 28, No. 8, August 31 DOE po~ts out that its rate of lost workdays due to COns~C- 1986, pp. 679-683. tion-related illnesses or injuries is about half that of the private sec- Is Natio~ Academy of Sciences, Risk Assessment in the Fed- tor. These claims must be tempered by documentation by the Occu- eral Government. Managing the Process (Washington, DC: Na- pational Safety and Health Administration of serious, wide-spread tional Academy Press, 1983), p. 12. errors in DOE’s methods of recording work-related illness or injuxy. 0 14 National Academy of Sciences, Health Effects of Exposure ‘ Also, recent audits of DOE line management oversight of contractor Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, BEIR V (Washington DC: Na- construction practices suggest that DOE’s performance in this area tional Academy Press, 1990). is weak. is A. Stewti, “Healthy worker and Healthy !kvivOr Eff~ts in 32 office of Technolo~ Assessment Workshop on c*e~uP Relation to the Cancer Risks of Radiation Workers,” American Worker Health and Safety at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, Journal of /ndusm”al Medicine, vol. 17, No. 2, 1990, pp. 151-154. op. cit. 16 E. Gil&fi, “studies of Workem Exposed to bW Doses of Ex- 33 P.L. 10@321 . ternal Radiatiou” Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews, M U,st Congress, General Accounting Office, Marshall ~s- vol. 6, No.4, October-December 1991, pp. 665-680. landtitate of the Nuclear Claims Trust Fund, GAOiNSlAD-92- 17 J Go f- Radia~”on-Induced Cancerfiom hw Dose EXPO- 229, (September 1992). sure: An Independent Analy$is (San Francisco, CA: CNR Book Di- 35 K.R, Feinberg, “In the Shadow of Fernald: Who Should Pay vision, 1990). the Victims?” The Brookings Review, summer 1990, pp. 41-46. 18 B+ ~v ad J). we-, Occupational Health-Recognizing 36 Weapons Complex Monitor, “DOE to pay Fernald Citizens and Preventing Work-Related Disease (Bostoq MA Little Brow $73 million in Three Installments,” Feb. 14, 1990, p. 3. 1988), p. 4. 37 R. Bo~o, ~~second Downwin&r Lawsuit Filed,” The SPoke- 19 J .B .Fu- Construction Safety, Security, and ~ss Pre- man Review, Aug. 10, 1990, p. B2. vention (New Yorlq NY: Wiley-Interscience, 1984). Chapter l–Overview and Findings 115

38 Associated Press, “Judge Combines Radiation Lawsuits, ” 55 U.S. Dep~cnt of Energy, Environment, Safety and H~~ Tri-City Herald, Mar. 3, 1991. Office of Environmental Audit, Environmental Survey Preliminary 39 E. Schumacher, “Hanford Spends $39 Million in ~~wycrs,” Report, Los Aiamos National Laboraton, Los Aiamos, New Mexico The Spokesrnarr Reivew, Mar. 8, 1992, p. B6, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 40 Throughout this paper, tie te~ “cleanup worker” includes 1988). all individuals who engage in hazardous waste operations or emer- % u .s .Dep~ment of Energy, Environment, s~ew ad ‘~]~ gency response, Thus, project managers, engineers, supervisors, en- Office of Environmental Audit, Tiger Team Assessment of the Oak wronmental scmntists, technicians, laborers, firefighters, and others Ridge Y-12 Piant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (Washington, DC: U.S. arc all cleanup workers, Government Printing Office, February 1990). ~1 Offlcc of T~hnology Assessment Workshop on DOE Clean- ST u .s .Dep~ent of Energy, Envlronmcnt, Safety and H~lth up Workers, op. cit. Compliance Assessment [)f the Ne)’ada Test Si~e, (Washing[on, DC: ~z oTA_wAc workshop, oP cit. U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990). 43 Env~onmcn(al protection Agency-IArcrr Health and s~cty 5L7 Natio~ Academy of Sciences, Committee to Provide Inter- Task Force, minutes of meeting, June 27, 1992, im Oversight of the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, Commission 44 Offlcc of Hca]th Compliance Assistance, Directorate of C~m- on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources, The Nucicar plmnce Programs, U.S. Dcp,artmcnt of IAor, Occupational Safety Weapons Complex: Management for Health, Safety, ami the Envi- and Health Administmtion, “Draft Protocol for OSHA Compli,ancc ronmertt (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989). Inspections of Supcrfund Inciner:ition Sites,” May 13, 1992. 59 Advisory committee on Nuclear Facility Safety to tic us. ‘s J.T. Hughes, “An Assessment of Training Needs for Worker Department of Energy, “Final Report on DOE Nuclear Facilities,” Safety and Health Programs: Hazardous Waste Operations and November 1991. Emergency Response,” Applied Occupational En~[rorrmentul Hy- 60 u .s .Congress, General Accounting Office, Increased Rating giene, February 1991, p. 116. Resuits in An’ard Fee to Rock} Fiats Contractor, GAO/RCED-92- 46 wm K. Reilly,, A(fminis~~itor, [1 S. Environmental ~otcc- 162 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March tmn Agency, “S(atemcnt Before the Subcommittee on Investiga- 1992), tions and Oversight, Committee on Public Works arid Transportat- 61 Defense Nuc]e~ Fac~]itles Safety Board, “Recommendation ion,” U.S. House of Representatives, Oct. 3, 1991. to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section 2286a(5) 47 U.S. Envlronm~nta] Protection Agency, “Update on SuPcr- A[ornic Energy’ Act of 1954, as amended,” Dec. 19, 1991. fund, ” submitted to Subcomrnittcc on Investigations and Oversight, 62 U.S. General Accounting Off’ice, More Attention to Health Comrnlttcc on Public Works and TrimspottatloI~, U.S. House of and Safety Needc(i at Pantex, GAOmCED-91- 103 (Washington, Representatives, Oct. 3, 1991, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oficc, April 1991). 18 Office of Technology Assessment, ~’orrlln{q Clf’an, 19~9. 63 Richlmd Field Office, U.S. Department of Energy, “DOE In- Op. clt, vcstlgation Board Report Fall-Related Fatality of a Construction 49 u s, DepLirtlnent of ~bor, Occupational Safct}’ and H~lth Worker at Hanford Silc 105-F Building on Apr. 7, 1992,” May Admimstration, Ejuluurlon qf the US. Department of Encr-qy’s Oc- 1992. cupl (Washington, DC: l_I.S, Gov- 67 ;9 CFR 1910.120, ernment I%ntmg Office, August 1987). fi OTA_HWAC Workshop, op. cit. 5L U.S. Department of Energy, Envimnmcnt, S:licty and Iicalth 69 J coca115, rndu~~i,il Eiygicmlst, Office Of Enlergcncy R~- Olflcc of Er~\’ironmcntal Audit, Er~\~rott/)~c~tt{~/ .~ur~ej Prc[iminary sponsc and Rcmcdiation, US. Environmental Protection Agcrrcy, Report, Rock>s Flats Plant, Gol~icn, Cc)lorudo (Washington, DC: Co-chair, EPA-L,abor Health and Safety Task Force, Of flcc of Li. S Govcrnrnent Prmtlng Office, June 1987) Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. Environmcnt:il Protcc- s 7 [r .s .F .ncrgl, Rc$ ~arctl and Dc; c1 opmcnt Ad rmn I Smt ion, tlon Agency; personal communication to T. O’TOOIC, Offlcc of hlound Labor.itory, .Wounii klhorat{)~l E~l\/rl)/l))lt’tl/ul Piutoniurn Tcchnolo~ Assessment. .$/udj, 1974 ~ Sprlngflc]d, VA: National Technical Inforrniition Scr- m Occupatlorlal Safety and Hca]th Administration, Office of Vlcc!, 1975) Hc:tlth Compliiil]ce Assistiu]ce, Directorate of Compliance Pro- -W cl ,S, Dcp:lrtr~lcrlt ~>f Encr~y, Env ironmcnt, Siifety and H~alfll gri!nls, LJ.S Department of Labor, “Protocol for OSHA Compliance Office of Envlronmcntal Audit, F)~\lr~)r/?)tt’~]f, B1/trc, “’] EPA-l~ibor Ficiiltll iirld Safety Task Force, rnlnutcs of rncet- Montunu, ( Wiishlrlgtorl, DC: L’. S (;o~ crnmcnl I’rln(l ng Of( ICC, inp, Sept. 22, 1992, Septcmhcr 1988), 720 r.4-IIW’AC W’orkfhop, op. cll. 16 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

73 Uos, Cowas, (j~~~ AccO@hg Offl% o@O~fOr im- ~ U.S. Dep~ent of Labor, Occupational Safety ~d H~th proving Safety and Health in the Workplace, GAO/HRD-90-66BR. Administration “OSHA Inspection of Bros Hazardous Waste In- (Washington, DC: U.S. Governm ent Printing Offke, August 1990). cinerator Facility,” 1992. 7A U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Superfund 95 OTA.mAC Workshop, oP. cit. prO~tXS,” 9200.1-12, May 1992. 96 OTA wo~op on DOE cleanup workers, Op. cit. 75 Uos, ~v~~en~ protection Agency, “Supplemen@ w oTA-mAc Workshop, oP. cit. terial, National Priorities List Proposed Rule,” EPA 9320-7~51, 9S U.S. ~vhomen~ protection Agency, OffIce of Emergency February 1992, p. 3. and Remedial Response, Risk Assessment Guidance for Super- 76 J. Belagq Regio~ Administrator, U.S. Environmental ~0- fund: vol. 1: Human Health Evaluation Manual, 9285.701A, July tection Agency letter to H. Lenow, Counsel to Hausom Massachu- 1989. Cit setts Permanent Firefighters Association, Apr. 29, 1992. 99 OTA Wo&shop on DOE cl~up Worbrsj ‘pm ” ~ R. H- ~d R. ~uscins~, “fi&ge ROD Ove_d,” Im M. ~Meld and E. Fava@ “Medical !huveitie of ~- Environ Report, Winter 19891Sp~ 1990, p. 1. ardous Waste Workers: Conclusions and Consensus,” Occupan”orud 78 -WA issues ~h for Early Risk Assessment to SCIWII Medicine: State of the Art Reviews, vol. 5, No. 1, January-March Alternatives,” Super@dReport, Jan. 15, 1992. 1990, pp. 151-159. 79 ~ce of fiagemy and Remedial Response, U.S. EnvhOn- 101 0’fA-~Ac wO&ShOp, op. ciL mental Protection Agency, Risk Assessment Guidance for Super- loz ~A-~bor HcxIJth and safety Task Force, minutes Of m@- fimd: Vol.1-Human Health Evaluation Manual, Part B, Develop- ing, Mar. 5, 1991, May 3, 1992. - ment of Risk-Based Preliminary Remediation Goals, (Washington 103 J. Mow D~~tor of Occupiitiond Sddy ~d ‘da ‘ DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, December 1991). borers Health and Safety Fund of North America, “Testimony on so u s. Enviro~en~l. Protection Agency, Office of Solid Proposed Rulemaking on Accreditation of Training Programs for Waste and Emergency Response, “Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Hazardous Waste Operations,” Docket No. S-760-5, U.S. Depart- Model-SACM,” March 1992. ment of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Ad.ministratio@ 81 EpA-~bor H~th and Safety Task Force, mhlutes Of w. 5, Jan. 22, 1991. 1992 meeting. 104 OSHA and NIOSH refer to Site Safety and Hdth pl~ 82 L. MWhy, D~ector, ~dous ~te~S Tr*g, ‘tm- (SSHPS) whereas EPA uses the term Health and Safety Plans. tional Association of Firefighters, personal communication to T, Throughout this documen~ health and safety plan (HASP) is used to O’Toole, July 17, 1992. include all these terms. 83 EpA.~bor H~ti and Safety Task Force, minutes Of ~. 5, 105 OTA-WAC Workshop, op. it. 1992 meeting. 106 OSM promulgated an interim final rule on H~wdous ~ U.S. O&Ice of TecMology Assessmen4 Compkx Cleanup, Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) as 29 1991, op. cit. CAR 1910.120, December 1986; the fti rule was issued on Mar. 85 J, CoCalls, Natioml Institute of OtXupatioml Stiety ~d 6, 1989, with an effective date of Mar. 6, 1990. Health, Environmental Investigation Branch (formerly Co-chair, 107 OTA-WAC Workshop, op. cit. EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force), personal cmmmmica- log U.S. Dep~ent of Labor, Occupational Safety ad He~th tion to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment, August AdrninistratiorL “HAZWOPER Interpretive Quips (IQs),” October 1992. 1992. 86 utter from K.F. Gravit4 Area Director, Occupational s~ety 10955 Federal Register (WAingtoq DC: U.S. Gove~ent and Health AdministratiorL U.S. Department of Labor to J. Merloni, Printing Office, Jan. 26, 1990): “Accreditation of Training Pro- Jr., president Massachusetts Laborer District Council, Oct. 13, grams for Hazardous Waste Operations; Notice of Proposed Rule- 1989. rnaking,” U.S. Department of Labor, pp. 277&2793. ST OTA Wo~op on DOE Cleanup Workers, OP. cit. 110 J. Mo- op. cit. 88 OTA.~AC Workshop, op. cit. 1 I 1 Natioml ~ti~te of Environmental Health Sciences, Ac- 89 U.S. Env~o~en~l Protection Agency-Labor H@lth ad crealtation of Training Programs for Hazardous Waste Operations Safety Task Force, minutes of meeting, Sept. 22, 1992. (March 1990). m U.S. Envirorunen~l protection Agency-Labor H~lth ~d 112 ~temtio~ Association of Firefighters, “Accreditation of Safety Task Force, notes from Mar. 11, 1991 meeting. Training programs for Hamrdous Waste Operations,” Docket No. w U.S. mp~ent of hbor, Occupational Safety ~d H~th S-760-B. U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Administration% “Safety and Health Program Management Guide Health Administratio~ Jan. 22, 1991. lines; Issuance of Voluntary Guidelines” Federal Register, vol. 54, 113 J-es wa~s, secre~, U.S. Department Of Energy, No. 16, pp. 3904-3916, Jan. 26, 1989. “Ten-Point Initiativc+Remarks by James D. Watkins, June 27, ~ U.S. ~p~ent of Labor, Occupational Safety ~ H~th 1989,” reprinted in Evaluation of the U.S. Departme nt of Energy’s Administratio~ “Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Occupational Safety and Health Program for Its Government- Chemicals; Explosives, and Blasting Agents; Final Rule,” Federal Owned Contractor-Operated Facilities, Occupational Safety and Register, vol. 57, No. 36, pp. 6356-6417, Feb. 24, 1991. Health Admi.nistrationj December 1990, op. cit., p. B-1-13. w OTA Wo~op on DOE Cleanup Workers. 114 ~lce of TduwIogy Assessment Complex Cleanup, 1991, op. cit. Chapter l–Overview and Findings ! 17

115 James wa~s, secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, 125 us. Conwess, General Accounting Office, Increased Rar- “Strengthening Line Management and Accountability in DOE Con- ing Results in Award Fee to Rocky Flats Contractor, GAO/RCED- tractor Worker Safety and Health Programs,” memorandm Mar. 92-162 (wWdliIlgtOIlj DC: U.S. GOV emment Printing Office, March 20, 1991. 1992). 116 ~ld, 126 Defense NucleaI Facilities Safety Bored, op. cit. - 117 Jwes wa~, swe~, U.S. Department of Enmgy, “De 127 u-s. Congress, General Accounting Office, op. cit., veloping Strategy For Assigning Rewards and Penalties for Com- GAO/RCED-91-103, (Washington DC: U.S. Government printing pliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration OffIce, April 1991). (OSHA) Regulations and DOE Orders,” memorandum, Mar. 20, 126 U.S. D~~ent of Labor, Occupational Health md Safety 1991. Administiatioq Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Oc- 118 James wa~s, secretary, U.S. Department Of Energy, cupational Safety and Health Program for Its Government-Owned, “Reevaluation of the DOE’s Pending Whistleblower Rule,” Mar. Contrucfor-Operated Facilities (Washington, DC: U.S. Gover- 20, 1991. nment Printing OffIce, December 1990). 119 U,s. Dep~cnt of Energy, OffIce of the press Sarew, 129 Ricwd Field Office, op. Cit. “Secretary of Energy Appoints Environment, Safety and Health 130 Ricwd Field Office, op. cit. Committee,” Mar. 30, 1992. 131 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Worken. no petm Bms~ Acfig Assi.mm Secretary Envkomen4 Safe- 132 weapons Complex Monitor “Hanford Shows Lack of ty and Health+ U.S. Department of Energy to the Secretary, “hnple- Progress on ES&H Issues, DOE Report Says, Aug. 10, 1992, pp. mentation Plan for the Office of Heal@” memorandu% May 18, 19-20. 1990. 133 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, offke Of Safety, Offla of ~- 12139 u.S.C 651-678 (West 1985 and SUpp. 1992), 4@)(l). vironment Safety and Health, “Report on the DOE Occupational 122 us, Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment, Safev Safety and Health Program Review of the Portsmouth Gaseous Dif- and Health, “Contractor Occupational Medical Program, DOE fusion Plant”, October 1992. Order 5480.8A,” June 26, 1992. 1~ Weapons Compffl Monitor “OFNSB Critical of Westing- 123 Executive ~der 12191 gives OSHA authority to tispect house, DOE at Savannah River Plutonium Plant”, Mar. 30, 1992, DOE facilities for the limited purpose of inspecting working condi- pp. 7-8. tions for Federal employees. 135 Adviso~ Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety,op. cit. 124 Advisow Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, oP. cit.