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Home , Hizbul Mujahideen, Islamic terrorism, Political violence, September 11 attacks, The Islamist, War

24 RETHINKING THE “ ON ” NEW APPROACHES TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE POST-9/11

Paul B. Stares and Mona Yacoubian

HE NEW STRATEGIC CHALLENGE FAC- lenges that transcend national and are ing the in the wake of driven by nonstate actors and processes. This T9/11 is often compared with the great does not mean that the traditional toolbox of “generational” struggles of the twentieth cen- responses is now irrelevant or tury against and communism. While renders obsolete the standard menu of conflict the contest likely will be as prolonged and re- prevention and management techniques—on quire a comparable of national the contrary. But these techniques must be and international resources if the United States adapted and complemented with new ap- is to prevail, the comparison should not be proaches that acknowledge unconventional pushed too far.The struggle we now find our- attributes of these new security challenges. In selves in is like neither II nor the the case of Islamist militancy, the nature of the , with their clearly defined - evolving challenge is still poorly understood. , “front lines,” and rules of engagement. Thus, before describing an alternative, and The perpetrators of the attacks what we believe to be a more effective represent a transnational, highly dynamic, in- for responding to Islamist militancy than the creasingly decentralized, religiously inspired approach currently favored in the “global war movement propelled for the most part by a di- on terror,” this chapter will first lay out a dif- verse collection of nonstate actors.They operate ferent way of thinking about the new strategic in some instances openly but more often clan- challenge confronting the United States. destinely, using unorthodox tactics and weap- ons.The challenge posed by what we define as “Islamist militancy” is fundamentally differ- THE NEW STRATEGIC CHALLENGE ent, therefore, from traditional “-centric” Despite a plethora of studies and policy pre- threats to international and security. scriptions since the , we As such, Islamist militancy has more in com- are still trying to grasp the nature of the new mon with other so-called new security chal- strategic challenge we face and how best to

425 426 PAUL B. STARES AND MONA YACOUBIAN

Figure 1. Islamist Militancy, c. 2006

Transnational Islamist- Groups with a Global Agenda

Abu Sayyaf Group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, al Qaeda, al Qaeda in , Salafiyyah Jihadiyyah, Ansar al-, Jemaah Islamiya International Islamic Battalion, Islamic Movement of Saudi charities, al Qaeda Web sites Independents (e.g., 3/11, 7/7)

Hamas, , al Mukmin Hizbul-, Moro Islamic Liberation Front Jamaat-e-Ulema Islami, Hezbollah/ party organizations Nationalist/Insurgent Support/Mobilization Islamist-Militant Groups Networks with a Local Agenda

counter it.There is no better indication of this to “.” Using the term “” to than the complete lack of consensus or com- refer to those who either employ or espouse mon lexicon about what to call the threat. Is violent means in pursuit of political ends not it “global terrorism,” “,” “al only avoids the notoriously slippery defini- Qaeda and its affiliates,” “Sunni jihadists,” “Is- tional problems associated with terrorism but lamist radicals,” or “terrorist extremism”? This also serves to underscore that the challenge is is not just a semantics issue; words and both multidimensional and broad based, in- have vital operational import. Without clarity volving more actors than just those who actu- on who, precisely, is our adversary, we are un- ally carry out terrorist attacks.2 Indeed, Islamist likely to ever develop a clear and comprehen- militancy has three main constituent groups sive understanding of its objectives, strategy, whose memberships are constantly evolving and operational character. And without such a and overlap in significant ways. common understanding, it will be difficult, if There are, first, the transnational jihadist not impossible, to conceive of an effective and groups that have a global agenda (principally sustainable response. Yet it is our assessment al Qaeda and its affiliates); second, the - that there is neither a broadly accepted under- alist insurgent groups that have essentially standing of the challenge we face nor a com- a local agenda (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah, and prehensive long-term strategy to counter it. some of the Kashmiri groups); and, third, the Our preference is to classify this broader miscellaneous organizations and networks that challenge as “Islamist militancy.” Like the 9/11 directly and indirectly support these militant Commission, we feel it important to use the groups. Distinctions among these groups are modifier “Islamist”—a -religious move- difficult to discern. Indeed, more and more new ment within the —rather than organizations and groups are emerging that “Islamic”—the culture and of Islam.1 share common traits with overlapping agen- Unlike the 9/11 Commission, however, we das. Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the prefer the simpler, less loaded term “militancy” principal actors in 2006. The diagram is not RETHINKING THE “” 427 meant to be exhaustive and is merely illustra- approach has its shortcomings and tive of the phenomenon and its key consti- even liabilities. Describing the phenomenon tuent elements. as a global insurgency dangerously exaggerates Islamist militancy does not represent a the threat by assuming a degree of organiza- conventional national security threat—that tion and unity among its various actors that much is clear and generally understood. Nei- currently does not exist. The COIN approach ther does it represent a conventional terrorist also risks conflating many kinds of Islamist threat, which typically has a distinctive—often struggles and perversely even serving to legit- singular—identity with reasonably clear polit- imize them. Unless suitably adapted, the stan- ical goals, organizational structure, and area dard COIN framework with its simplistic of operations. Conventional counterterrorist distinctions between “,” “,” and responses, with their emphasis on apprehend- “uncommitted” could make matters worse, es- ing an organization’s leaders and rolling up pecially if or “kinetic” responses come networks or cells of activists and supporters to dominate. through improved intelligence gathering and With these concerns in mind, we propose sharing, are usually effective therefore. Although an alternative strategy to countering Islamist such methods remain just as necessary to any militancy that views the challenge as one would campaign against Islamist militancy, it is also a global threat or epidemic. The becoming clear that they will not be sufficient. conceptual leap required by this approach is The growing trend, exhibited in attacks such not as far as it first appears. Social scientists as those in Madrid (March 2004), increasingly have looked to epidemiology to (July 2005), and elsewhere, toward the emer- understand a variety of social contagions, and gence of localized, self-organizing militant here Islamist militancy is no different. Specif- groups acting largely independently of higher ically, our approach draws on the scientific operational direction underscores the limits of principles and practices of epidemiology as conventional counterterrorism responses. well as the insights from a growing body of re- Not surprisingly, an increasing number of search on “social contagion phenomena” such experts now advocate drawing on the strate- as fashions, fads, rumors, civil , and gies and tactics of unconventional, or “irregu- revolutionary ideas.4 Moreover, many com- lar,” warfare to meet the challenge.3 The threat mentators and even U.S. have em- is portrayed as a global insurgency that re- ployed disease metaphors to describe the chal- quires a commensurate global counterinsur- lenge of Islamist militancy.5 Thus references gency (COIN) campaign. There is some logic to terrorism being a “virus” or to al Qaeda “mu- to this as elements of the challenge reflect tating” or “metastasizing” are common. Simi- characteristics of a classic insurgency. Certainly, larly, the image of madrassas and al Qaeda’s stated goals of expelling “ and being “incubators” of a “virulent ” is crusaders” from the Muslim world and cleans- frequently invoked. Such metaphors have a ing it of apostate regimes—all with the objec- visceral appeal in that they help to convey a tive of reestablishing a purified —can dangerous and, moreover, darkly insidious be viewed as an insurgency of sorts. The threat. For some, the disease metaphor also recognition that success ultimately hinges on sets—implicitly, at least—a more realistic goal winning “hearts and minds” in the Muslim for what can be practically achieved to elimi- world is also a critically important attribute of nate this scourge. Just as very few diseases a response. have been completely eradicated, so the like- Yet just as classic counterterrorism meas- lihood that terrorism or will ures have their limits, so a strictly counter- be rendered extinct is remote. The best that 428 PAUL B. STARES AND MONA YACOUBIAN can be hoped for is for it to become a manage- Figure 2. The Epidemic Model able, low-probability, albeit sometimes deadly, nuisance much like many other social ills. Host Beyond its metaphorical appeal there are more practical attractions to an epidemiological/ public health approach. Three stand out:

◆ First, epidemiologists observe rigorous stan- Vector(s) dards of inquiry and analysis to understand the derivation, dynamics, and propagation Agent Environment of a specific disease. In particular, they seek clarity on the origins and geographical and social contours of an outbreak: where the disease is concentrated, how it is transmit- nize that success in controlling and rolling ted, who is most at risk or “susceptible” to back an epidemic typically results from a infection, and why some portions of carefully orchestrated, systematic, priori- may be less susceptible or, for all intents tized, multipronged effort to address each and purposes, immune. Applying the same of its constituent elements. At the same time, methodological approach to mapping and however, it is also recognized that signifi- understanding Islamist militancy can yield cant progress or major advances can some- immediately useful guidance on where and times be precipitated by relatively minor how to counter it. —or “tipping points.”6 Again, ◆ Second, epidemiologists recognize that dis- there are lessons and insights to be learned eases neither arise nor spread in a vacuum. here for orchestrating a global counter- They emerge and evolve as a result of a terrorism campaign. complex dynamic interactive process be- tween people, pathogens, and the environ- Before turning to what such a campaign to ment in which they live. Indeed, the epi- defeat Islamist militancy might look like were demiologic concept of “cause” is rarely if it to follow a public health or counterepidemic ever singular or linear but is more akin to a approach, it is necessary to understand how epi- “web” of direct and indirect factors that demiologists typically try to understand dis- play a lesser or greater role in differing cir- ease and how this can help us understand the cumstances. To make sense of this com- challenge we face. plexity, epidemiologists typically employ a standard analytical device that “deconstructs” the key constituent elements of a disease. THE EPIDEMIC MODEL This model helps not only to understand As indicated, epidemiologists employ a stan- the phenomenon in its entirety but also to dard approach, or model, to study epidemics anticipate how it might evolve in the fu- that deconstructs an outbreak into four key ture. As will be discussed, the same systemic components, recognizing that in reality they conception of disease can be adapted to un- are all dynamically interconnected, as shown derstand the constituent elements of Is- in figure 2.7 lamist militancy and their evolution. In simple terms, the agent refers to the ◆ Third, just as epidemiologists view disease pathogen (e.g., a virus or bacterium) that causes as a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, so disease. The host is the person infected by the public health officials have come to recog- disease (the “infective”), while the environment RETHINKING THE “WAR ON TERROR” 429

Figure 3. The Epidemic Model Applied to Is- lesser or greater extent an adherent of militant lamist Militancy Islamist ideology. As defined, Islamist mili-

Individuals/Cells, tants are those who employ or espouse the use Organizations of violence in pursuit of political goals. The environment refers to key factors spe- cific to the Muslim world that promote expo- sure to Islamist militancy—conflict, political Mosques, Madrassas, repression, economic stagnation, and social Internet, Prisons, Media, Social Networks alienation being the leading influences. Vectors in this case refer to a variety of known conduits that are used to propagate the ideology and Militant Islamist Conflict; Political, Ideology Economic, Social associated action agendas, such as mosques, Conditions prisons, madrassas, the Internet, satellite tele- vision, and diasporic networks. It is important to understand that the epi- demic model of Islamist militancy acknowl- refers to a variety of external factors that affect edges that the vast majority of find both agent and host. At the center of the triad the core elements of Islamist militant ideology are the vectors, the key pathways, or conduits, to be both aberrant and abhorrent. In this re- that help propagate the disease. spect they are effectively “immunized” to its Islamist militancy is clearly not a disease in appeal. However, some unknown, yet critical, a comparably clinical fashion. Whereas those proportion of the is clearly “sus- who fall victim to disease are typically passive ceptible” to becoming not only an adherent of and unwitting receptors of the pathogen, Is- the ideology but actively motivated by it. lamist militants to a lesser or greater extent Several policy-relevant benefits accrue from willingly decide to play an active role of some conceiving of Islamist militancy in this fash- kind. Yet their actions are clearly driven by a ion. First, it captures the key elements of the core set of ideas and beliefs—an ideology— challenge in a systemic manner rather than in that has an “infectious” appeal. In this and other the disaggregated, unconnected way that so respects Islamist militancy can be seen as hav- often bedevils analysis and understanding. ing epidemic-like qualities. It, too, therefore, Second, it is a dynamic model that acknowl- can be deconstructed using the classic epi- edges that the phenomenon is not static but demic model, as shown in figure 3. constantly evolving with the emergence of new Thus, so applied, the agent is Islamist mili- strains, new hosts, new vectors, and changing tant ideology. Specifically, two primary “strains” environmental conditions. Third, it provides can be identified: (1) a transnational Salafist/ insights into how Islamist militancy may evolve jihadist ideology as espoused by al Qaeda8 and in the future. (2) a nationalist/insurgent Islamist militant However, unlike with an outbreak of dis- ideology as espoused by groups such as Hez- ease, in which those infected typically (though bollah, Hamas, and some of the militant Kash- not always) are motivated to report their con- miri groups. Each of these ideological strains dition to seek treatment, the size and spread is characterized by a specific set of underlying of Islamist militancy are clearly more difficult assumptions, motivations, and goals. to assess. A combination of indicators (e.g., The host is the group or person “infected” the number of attacks conducted or thwarted by the agent. More specifically, the host refers and militants killed or incarcerated, the influ- to a group or individual who becomes to a ence of jihadist Web sites, the dissemination 430 PAUL B. STARES AND MONA YACOUBIAN

Figure 4. Growth of the “Epidemic” individuals, eliminating or decontaminating identifiable vectors of transmission, and, if an antidote exists, treating and rehabilitating in- dividuals who have succumbed to the disease. Containing and contracting the number of in- fectives can effectively eradicate the pathogen, though such a success is rare, as indicated earlier. T-IM Second, protect those who are most vulner- able or susceptible to the disease (the high-risk groups) as well as those who are most critical N/I-IM S/M to a functioning society (high-value groups). The most effective countermeasure is selective “SUSCEPTIBLES” or targeted immunization programs. Interest- ingly, not everyone needs to be inoculated to achieve what is known as “herd immunity”— essentially, the level at which the probability MUSLIM WORLD of an infected person being in contact with a Key nonimmunized person is very low, if not zero. T-IM = transnational Islamist militants If an effective vaccine is not available, other N/I-IM = nationalist/insurgent Islamist militants protective are employed, including S/M = support/mobilization networks encouraging “safe practices” through public education to reduce the probability of expo- sure and the rate of new infection. Third, remedy the environmental conditions of training materials, etc.) suggests that the that fostered the emergence of the disease in phenomenon is expanding as well as mutating specific areas and its subsequent spread. Many in the ways indicated earlier. Surveys within types of interventions are conceivable, from the Muslim world of people’s attitudes toward the local to the global, depending on the na- the United States and the West more gen- ture of the threat. erally would also suggest that the pool of Adapting the same basic strategic imper- “susceptibles”—those at risk for becoming Is- atives of a counterepidemic campaign to the lamist militants—is large and expanding in threat posed by Islamist militancy would im- certain countries. Figure 4 depicts the overall mediately translate into the following opera- growth of Islamist militancy. tional priorities:

◆ Containing and contracting the activities THE COUNTEREPIDEMIC APPROACH of the most “virulent” Islamist militant Faced with the outbreak of an infectious dis- organizations—the transnational jihadist ease, public health officials typically employ a groups with global reach and apocalyptic three-pronged strategy to counter the threat. agendas—as well as those who could gain a First, contain the most threatening outbreaks meaningful operational presence in areas of to prevent them from gaining enough mass significant strategic interest. These areas and momentum to overwhelm public health would include most notably Iraq, , responders and threaten public order. Stan- , , , Pales- dard measures include quarantining specific tine, the , and the Muslim areas to contain the movement of infectious communities of Western , as well as RETHINKING THE “WAR ON TERROR” 431

areas in the vicinity of key global financial/ counterterrorism measures and discrete spe- economic infrastructure assets. cial intelligence/military operations, contain- ◆ Protecting the high-risk/high-value com- ment initiatives would extend to placing greater munities of the Muslim world. According emphasis on disrupting and restricting the un- to open-source—unclassified—accounts, a trammeled use of key vectors—the Internet, disproportionate number of the officers and satellite TV, prisons, schools, mosques, and foot soldiers in the transnational jihadist so on—by Islamist militant organizations. cause come from a few countries—Saudi Some vectors can be physically shut down, Arabia, Egypt, , Algeria, , others “decontaminated” of unwanted infec- Pakistan—and from the European diaspora tious agents.9 measures appear communities.The high-value communities to be a largely haphazard, after-the-fact effort consist of the educational, religious, politi- at the present, rather than a systematically cal, and security sectors of countries where planned, internationally executed campaign. Islamist militant organizations could make Because of the practical limits to such efforts the greatest inroads and the growing num- in an open society, greater attention should ber of transnational cultural, business, and also be given to nurturing and propagating media networks that affect the lives of many what can be termed an “ideological antidote” millions of Muslims throughout the larger to the key tenets of Islamist militant ideology. (Islamic community). This can involve a broad-gauged campaign to ◆ Remedying the key environmental factors denounce and delegitimize jihadist propa- that foster Islamist militancy.The most im- ganda and practices such as beheadings and portant would appear to be the ongoing the killing of innocent , including fel- conflicts or involving Muslims low Muslims, as well as more discrete efforts and non-Muslims that help validate the cen- aimed toward a specific group or community. jihadist argument that Islam is under The former includes mobilizing moderate re- attack and that also serve as recruiting mag- ligious figures to issue fatwas condemning the nets and training grounds—notably, Iraq, ideology and tactics used as a perversion of , , Afghanistan, Chech- Islam and encouraging key opinion makers, nya, and several smaller conflicts in Central cultural leaders, and figures to do and Southeast . within the same.10 Such efforts have been made, but the European diaspora communities and apparently not in an extensive or concerted public corruption, , and way.11 More targeted activities include exploit- economic stagnation in key areas of the ing the ideological contradictions or schisms Muslim world are widely viewed as addi- within the transnational jihadist movement to tional factors. foment internal dissension and possible defec- tion. There are reports, for example, of suc- These strategic imperatives can be further cessful counterideological efforts in Yemen translated into specific containment, protec- that in turn yielded operational success in tive, and remedial programs or initiatives that, rolling up a local al Qaeda network.12 again, draw on the principles and practices of Although many Islamist militants are a counterepidemic campaign. beyond such intellectual suasion—essentially the health care equivalent of treatment and Containment Measures rehabilitation—this may not be the case with In addition to limiting the operational reach some groups and organizations. Local national- and capabilities of the most threatening Is- insurgent movements, in particular, may be lamist militant organizations by using standard susceptible to a “rehabilitative” process in much 432 PAUL B. STARES AND MONA YACOUBIAN the way that other terrorist organizations have ogy could be designed and implemented in abandoned armed struggle. The evolving role many different arenas, from schools to mosques of groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, for to mass media outlets. Unless they are under- example, suggests the possibility of their inte- taken in the Muslim communities of Western gration into their respective political systems. Europe, however, these are clearly not initia- The provision of amnesties to insurgents will- tives that the United States (and the West ing to lay down arms, as in Afghanistan, con- more generally) should lead or be openly asso- stitutes another element of rehabilitation. And ciated with. Western states can, however, prod in Iraq, reports suggest a growing rift between allies and partners in the Muslim world and the nationalist Iraqi elements of the insurgency provide discreet assistance. and foreign jihadists, in part as a result of the Such “ideological immunization” efforts latter’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians.13 aimed at high-risk communities should not just provide a negative image of militant Is- Protective Measures lamism, however. Ideally, they should also Whereas the containment measures are di- offer a positive and compelling alternative vi- rected primarily at those already infected, pro- sion for the future. Indeed, efforts to under- tective measures are aimed at those who are mine militant and provide a positive most at risk and those who play important counterideology can be mutually reinforcing. societal functions. It is conceivable that with Again, the same arenas and conduits—schools, better understanding of why certain groups mosques, mass media outlets—have a critical and individuals become first sympathetic to, role to play, and thus efforts designed to mo- then supportive of, and, finally, actively engaged bilize and strengthen moderate voices in these in Islamist militant causes, targeted programs sectors should be an indispensable component to effectively immunize at-risk groups could be of the overall effort.15 designed.There are many cases where key pop- ulations have been targeted in ways designed Remedial Measures to turn off their receptiveness to specific ideas, Many of the previous initiatives will be harder messages, and unhealthy or antisocial prac- to accomplish or will likely fail if parallel ef- tices, including by appealing to people’s com- forts are not also taken to remedy some of the mon sense, their personal safety, their peer key environmental conditions that promote group standing, religious edicts, and societal Islamist militancy in the Muslim world. For norms, among other approaches. In some cases reasons discussed earlier, an intensified effort the tactics used are not unlike real vaccination should be made to resolve or at least tamp programs that work on the principle of expos- down the violent conflicts that have a partic- ing uninfected to a weakened or ularly strong resonance within the Muslim attenuated version of the virus so that the body world. Indeed, successful conflict management learns to identify and reject the real thing. Po- and prevention strategies will play a key role litical campaigns, for example, often expose in impeding the spread of Islamist militancy. key undecided voters to the arguments of op- Besides reducing the direct role of the pres- posing candidates, in some cases to ridicule ence of violent conflict in jihadist recruitment the candidates, but more often to “arm” the and training, efforts will voters with convincing reasons to be skeptical help invalidate jihadist and but- when they hear the same arguments from those tress moderate support. candidates.14 The implementation of political reforms Similar public programs aimed at under- focused on good governance, particularly mining the appeal of militant Islamist ideol- greater transparency, accountability, and the RETHINKING THE “WAR ON TERROR” 433

Figure 5. Countering the “Epidemic” ately young population. In addition, economic reforms that create an environment that is more appealing to foreign investors will help the Muslim world to integrate more effectively into the broader global economic system and help bridge the gap in relative performance between the Muslim world, particularly the , and the global economy. T-IM ◆◆◆

N/I-IM S/M The combined effect of these containment, protective, and remedial measures will be to “SUSCEPTIBLES” reverse over time the negative trends discussed earlier. As figure 5 depicts, the effect will be to divide, isolate, and weaken mili- MUSLIM WORLD tant organizations and marginalize their oper- ational impact. The pool of susceptibles will also shrink in relation to the rest of the Mus- Key T-IM = transnational Islamist militants lim world, which through the various reme- N/I-IM = nationalist/insurgent Islamist militants dial efforts will become a more “healthy” and S/M = support/mobilization networks integrated part of the larger, globalizing world. As with a campaign, success in countering the challenge of Islamist mili- tancy will depend on a sustained commitment over many years, if not decades, by a broad , will also play a key role in neutral- coalition of like-minded states acting in part- izing Islamist militant ideology that calls for the nership with a multitude of nongovernmental overthrow of corrupt regimes. Likewise, greater actors. Simply stated, there is no single or , including broader freedoms of easy cure. assembly and expression as well as the free- dom to form political parties and other associ- ations, will help to level the political playing CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS field and allow “healthy” outlets for dissent. The counterepidemic approach to meeting the Particular emphasis should be placed on insti- challenge of Islamist militancy follows in fun- tution building so as to prevent democratic damental respects the basic tenets of effective gains from being undermined by autocratic conflict prevention and management. These regimes or exploited by nondemocratic oppo- tenets can be summarized as follows using sition forces. Facilitating the political partici- common admonitions from the world of pub- pation of peaceful, moderate Islamists can also lic health care: help to develop an effective counterweight to Islamist militants and their violent tactics. ◆ Prevention is better than cure. Reducing the The implementation of economic reforms momentum of a conflict, especially after pas- designed to spur growth and bolster job creation sions have become inflamed and blood spilt, will likewise help to ease popular disaffection, is clearly more difficult than taking early particularly among the region’s disproportion- preventive measures to forestall violence; 434 PAUL B. STARES AND MONA YACOUBIAN

positions harden, options narrow, and the international peace and stability that may have costs rise. Early warning and early response previously been considered distant and incon- can therefore make all the difference. sequential can now resonate more widely, more ◆ Diagnose before treating. Knowing thy ail- quickly, and with greater impact. For similar ment is just as important as knowing thy reasons, nonstate actors can now wield unpre- . While it doesn’t guarantee success, cedented power for good and bad while also understanding clearly the source(s) and dy- having much greater latitude to operate across namics of a conflict before taking action borders—again with positive and negative con- obviously improves the chances of applying sequences, as al Qaeda and numerous war- the right tools in the right place with the lords around the world have demonstrated. right outcomes. At the same time, states seeking to prevent ◆ Do no harm. The Hippocratic Oath is no and manage conflict, whether it be within their less relevant to conflict management. As borders or in areas both adjacent and far away countless examples attest, poorly timed or from them, find themselves in a changed op- calibrated interventions can make a prob- erating environment. Besides the interdepen- lem worse, not better. Knowing what to do dencies of a globalizing world, emerging legal and when to do it in conflict management rules and norms affect their much is as much an art as a science, but again, more than was ever previously the case. Their experience provides a rich set of guidelines, actions, furthermore, are subject to greater particularly when it comes to balancing in- scrutiny and accountability by virtue of not only centives and disincentives, force with diplo- the constant 24/7 gaze of the global media but macy, and so on. also an expanding network of intergovern- ◆ Address the source, not the symptoms. Resolving mental and nongovernmental organizations. the root cause of a conflict typically raises As a consequence of these new realities, the bar in terms of what is required to se- states can rarely, if ever, address threats to peace cure peace, but as many long-festering dis- and stability as singular actors. The task is putes attest, the “Band-” approach to likely to be too big to solve alone, while impor- conflict management at best delays and tant advantages—not least in terms of gener- in many instances complicates the task of ating international legitimacy—can be derived finding a sustainable solution. from acting collectively. This imperative to co- ◆ Palliate what you cannot cure. Sometimes, operate may seem too high a price to pay to however, a solution is beyond practical those concerned about national , reach. Just as some diseases are—for the but such concerns are arguably becoming re- time being, at least—incurable, so some dundant in an increasingly interdependent conflicts become, for all intents and pur- world if they haven’t already become so. In- poses, intractable. Under such circumstances deed, giving up some de jure sovereignty may the best that can be achieved is to limit the be the only way for states to regain some de consequences and not make a bad situa- facto sovereignty, especially when it comes to tion worse. nonstate-based threats such as transnational terrorism. As indicated at the outset, however, the task The growing imperative to cooperate in- of conflict prevention and management must ternationally is matched by the comparable adapt to the emerging realities of the twenty- need for states to partner with nongovernmen- first century. As a consequence of the forces of tal actors and civil society in general.The ben- , the world has clearly become a efits are mutual. States need the cooperation smaller, more interconnected place.Threats to of NGOs to manage those who would exploit RETHINKING THE “WAR ON TERROR” 435 the business and commerce sectors, among ence (: First Back Bay, 2002); M. Epstein, others, for nefarious ends. NGOs likewise need “Modeling Civil Violence: An Agent-Based Compu- the support of to operate effec- tational Approach,” Proceedings of the National Academy tively and relatively freely. Again, such part- of Sciences, vol. 99, suppl. 3 (May 14, 2003): 7243– nerships can confer legitimacy on both sides. 7250; Luis M. A. Bettancourt, Ariel Cintron-Arias, David I. Kaiser, and Carlos Castillo-Chavez, “The Finally, states must adapt their internal po- Power of a Good Idea: Quantitative Modeling of the litical and bureaucratic structures and processes Spread of Ideas from Epidemiological Models,” Santa to these new imperatives. What were largely Fe Institute Working Paper (Santa Fe, N.M.: Santa vestiges of the Cold War and earlier eras have Fe Institute, February 6, 2005). to be reformed or replaced with new mecha- 5. For example, Richard N. Haass, former direc- nisms for governmental decision making, co- tor of policy planning, U.S. State Department, went ordination, and implementation. Without such further in drawing the analogy in a major speech: changes, effective conflict prevention and man- “The challenge of terrorism is . . . akin to fighting a agement will only become more difficult to virus in that we can accomplish a great deal but not achieve. eradicate the problem. We can take steps to prevent it, protect ourselves from it, and when an attack oc- curs, quarantine it, minimize the damage it inflicts, NOTES and attack it with all our power.” Richard N. Haass, An earlier version of this chapter was presented to the speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, , Aspen Strategy Group Workshop “Mapping the Ji- October 15, 2001. Likewise, ’s top counterter- hadist Threat: The War on Terror since 9/11,” Aspen, rorism , Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, has often Colorado, August 5–10, 2005. It also draws on a compared the terrorist threat posed by groups such as larger body of USIP-sponsored research reported in al Qaeda to a mutating virus. See, for example, “Front- “Rethinking the War on Terror: A Counter-Epidemic line: Al Qaeda’s New Front,” October 12, 2004, Strategy,” Peace Watch (Washington, D.C.: United http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ States Institute of Peace, April-May 2006), http:// front/map/bruguiere.html. www.usip. org/peacewatch/2006/april_may/war_on_ 6. Numerous examples of “tipping points” exist terror.html. in nearly every realm of life, from fashion to . The reversal of New York ’s burgeoning crime 1. SeeNational Commission on Terrorist At- wave in the stands as a classic example of iden- tacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the tifying and successfully exploiting a tipping point. In National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the that case, the New York police embarked on a strategy United States (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), of cracking down on relatively minor “quality-of-life” 362n3. crimes. They went after panhandlers on the street 2. We recognize, therefore, that there are also and subway fare-beaters, as well as employing a con- peaceful Islamist organizations, including legal Is- certed effort to clean the graffiti from subway cars and lamist political parties such as the Party for Justice ensure that they stay clean. These relatively minor and Development in Morocco and charitable organ- measures constituted a key tipping point that appar- izations such as the Red Crescent. ently contributed to a significant downturn in seri- 3. See, for example, David J. Kilcullen,“Counter- ous crime. ing Global Insurgency,” in Journal of 7. Two key references were consulted for this 28, no. 4 (August 2005): 597–617; and Bruce Hof- section: B. Burt Gerstman, Epidemiology Kept Simple: fman, testimony to the House Armed Services Com- An Introduction to Traditional and Modern Epidemiol- mittee: Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional ogy (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley Liss, 2003); and Leon Threats and Capabilities, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., Gordis, Epidemiology, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: Elsevier February 16, 2006. Saunders, 2004). 4. See, for example, Malcolm Gladwell, The Tip- 8. The modern traces its roots ping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Differ- to the nineteenth-century Egyptian religious figure 436 PAUL B. STARES AND MONA YACOUBIAN

Muhammad Abduh and his disciple , “Britain’s Mainstream Muslims Find Voice,” New who denounced the innovations and schisms (notably York Times, March 6, 2005. Similarly, measures must the Sunni-Shiite divide) within the Muslim commu- be taken within prison systems to curtail and ulti- nity as perversions of Islam. Salafists demand a return mately cease recruitment. See Ian Cuthbertson, “Pris- to the pure form of Islam as practiced by the prophet ons and the Education of Terrorists,” World Policy and his immediate successors. Over the Journal 21, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 20, for specific recom- past two centuries, the Salafi movement has evolved, mendations. split, and adapted to differing circumstances through- 10. Alvarez, “Britain’s Mainstream Muslims Find out the Muslim world. Salafists do not necessarily call Voice.” Mainstream Muslims in Britain have also taken for the use of violence; some focus almost exclusively steps to isolate Islamist militants and strengthen ties on social behavior, calling for an ultraconservative moral between moderates and the British establishment. code to direct dress and other social practices. How- 11. See David E. Kaplan, “Hearts, Minds, and ever, a violent/extremist branch of the movement com- Dollars,” U.S. and World Report, April 25, 2005. bines the missionary zeal associated with the call to 12. See James Brandon, “Koranic Duel Eases purge Islam of its impure elements with the violent Terror,” Christian Science Monitor, February 4, 2005. anti-Western extremism incubated among jihadists in Afghanistan in the 1980s and . Sources on 13. Sabrina Tavernise, “Marines See Signs Iraq the Salafist/jihadist ideology include Quintan Wik- Rebels Are Battling Foreign Fighters,” New York torowicz, “The New Global Threat: Transnational Times, June 21, 2005. Salafis and ,” Policy 8, no. 4 (Decem- 14. See Matt Bai, “The Framing ,” New York ber 2001): 18–38; Christopher M. Blanchard, Al Times Magazine, July 12, 2005. See also Bettancourt Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, CRS Report et al., “The Power of a Good Idea,” 10. for Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 15. In , for example, a broad curriculum re- State, February 4, 2005); Anonymous, Through Our view is taking place that emphasizes more moderate Enemies’ Eyes: , Radical Islam, and and progressive interpretations of Islam. See Hassan M. the Future of America (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, Fattah, “Jordan Is Preparing to Tone Down the Islamic 2002); and , The War for Muslim Minds Bombast in Textbooks,” New York Times, June 12, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press, 2004). 2005. A number of European governments are also 9. For example, in February 2005, London’s exploring options for having greater influence over Finsbury Park , once a bastion of radicalism, the training of imams who preach in European was reclaimed. A new board of directors ousted the mosques. See Elaine Sciolino, “Europe Struggling to mosque’s radical cleric, Abu Hamza al-Masri, and Train New Breed of Muslim Clerics,” New York literally changed the locks. See Lizette Alvarez, Times, October 18, 2004.