24 RETHINKING THE “WAR ON TERROR” NEW APPROACHES TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD Paul B. Stares and Mona Yacoubian HE NEW STRATEGIC CHALLENGE FAC- lenges that transcend national borders and are ing the United States in the wake of driven by nonstate actors and processes. This T9/11 is often compared with the great does not mean that the traditional toolbox of “generational” struggles of the twentieth cen- national security responses is now irrelevant or tury against fascism and communism. While renders obsolete the standard menu of conflict the contest likely will be as prolonged and re- prevention and management techniques—on quire a comparable mobilization of national the contrary. But these techniques must be and international resources if the United States adapted and complemented with new ap- is to prevail, the comparison should not be proaches that acknowledge unconventional pushed too far.The struggle we now find our- attributes of these new security challenges. In selves in is like neither World War II nor the the case of Islamist militancy, the nature of the Cold War, with their clearly defined combat- evolving challenge is still poorly understood. ants, “front lines,” and rules of engagement. Thus, before describing an alternative, and The perpetrators of the September 11 attacks what we believe to be a more effective strategy represent a transnational, highly dynamic, in- for responding to Islamist militancy than the creasingly decentralized, religiously inspired approach currently favored in the “global war movement propelled for the most part by a di- on terror,” this chapter will first lay out a dif- verse collection of nonstate actors.They operate ferent way of thinking about the new strategic in some instances openly but more often clan- challenge confronting the United States. destinely, using unorthodox tactics and weap- ons.The challenge posed by what we define as “Islamist militancy” is fundamentally differ- THE NEW STRATEGIC CHALLENGE ent, therefore, from traditional “state-centric” Despite a plethora of studies and policy pre- threats to international peace and security. scriptions since the September 11 attacks, we As such, Islamist militancy has more in com- are still trying to grasp the nature of the new mon with other so-called new security chal- strategic challenge we face and how best to 425 426 PAUL B. STARES AND MONA YACOUBIAN Figure 1. Islamist Militancy, c. 2006 Transnational Islamist-Militant Groups with a Global Agenda Abu Sayyaf Group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, al Qaeda, al Qaeda in Iraq, Salafiyyah Jihadiyyah, Ansar al-Islam, Jemaah Islamiya International Islamic Battalion, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Saudi charities, al Qaeda Web sites Independents (e.g., 3/11, 7/7) Hamas, Hezbollah, al Mukmin Hizbul-Mujahideen, Moro Islamic Liberation Front Jamaat-e-Ulema Islami, Hezbollah/Hamas party organizations Nationalist/Insurgent Support/Mobilization Islamist-Militant Groups Networks with a Local Agenda counter it.There is no better indication of this to “terrorism.” Using the term “militants” to than the complete lack of consensus or com- refer to those who either employ or espouse mon lexicon about what to call the threat. Is violent means in pursuit of political ends not it “global terrorism,” “Islamic terrorism,” “al only avoids the notoriously slippery defini- Qaeda and its affiliates,” “Sunni jihadists,” “Is- tional problems associated with terrorism but lamist radicals,” or “terrorist extremism”? This also serves to underscore that the challenge is is not just a semantics issue; words and names both multidimensional and broad based, in- have vital operational import. Without clarity volving more actors than just those who actu- on who, precisely, is our adversary, we are un- ally carry out terrorist attacks.2 Indeed, Islamist likely to ever develop a clear and comprehen- militancy has three main constituent groups sive understanding of its objectives, strategy, whose memberships are constantly evolving and operational character. And without such a and overlap in significant ways. common understanding, it will be difficult, if There are, first, the transnational jihadist not impossible, to conceive of an effective and groups that have a global agenda (principally sustainable response. Yet it is our assessment al Qaeda and its affiliates); second, the nation- that there is neither a broadly accepted under- alist insurgent groups that have essentially standing of the challenge we face nor a com- a local agenda (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah, and prehensive long-term strategy to counter it. some of the Kashmiri groups); and, third, the Our preference is to classify this broader miscellaneous organizations and networks that challenge as “Islamist militancy.” Like the 9/11 directly and indirectly support these militant Commission, we feel it important to use the groups. Distinctions among these groups are modifier “Islamist”—a politico-religious move- difficult to discern. Indeed, more and more new ment within the Muslim world—rather than organizations and groups are emerging that “Islamic”—the culture and religion of Islam.1 share common traits with overlapping agen- Unlike the 9/11 Commission, however, we das. Figure 1 provides a general snapshot of the prefer the simpler, less loaded term “militancy” principal actors in 2006. The diagram is not RETHINKING THE “WAR ON TERROR” 427 meant to be exhaustive and is merely illustra- insurgency approach has its shortcomings and tive of the phenomenon and its key consti- even liabilities. Describing the phenomenon tuent elements. as a global insurgency dangerously exaggerates Islamist militancy does not represent a the threat by assuming a degree of organiza- conventional national security threat—that tion and unity among its various actors that much is clear and generally understood. Nei- currently does not exist. The COIN approach ther does it represent a conventional terrorist also risks conflating many kinds of Islamist threat, which typically has a distinctive—often struggles and perversely even serving to legit- singular—identity with reasonably clear polit- imize them. Unless suitably adapted, the stan- ical goals, organizational structure, and area dard COIN framework with its simplistic of operations. Conventional counterterrorist distinctions between “enemies,” “friends,” and responses, with their emphasis on apprehend- “uncommitted” could make matters worse, es- ing an organization’s leaders and rolling up pecially if military or “kinetic” responses come networks or cells of activists and supporters to dominate. through improved intelligence gathering and With these concerns in mind, we propose sharing, are usually effective therefore. Although an alternative strategy to countering Islamist such methods remain just as necessary to any militancy that views the challenge as one would campaign against Islamist militancy, it is also a global public health threat or epidemic. The becoming clear that they will not be sufficient. conceptual leap required by this approach is The growing trend, exhibited in attacks such not as far as it first appears. Social scientists as those in Madrid (March 2004), London increasingly have looked to epidemiology to (July 2005), and elsewhere, toward the emer- understand a variety of social contagions, and gence of localized, self-organizing militant here Islamist militancy is no different. Specif- groups acting largely independently of higher ically, our approach draws on the scientific operational direction underscores the limits of principles and practices of epidemiology as conventional counterterrorism responses. well as the insights from a growing body of re- Not surprisingly, an increasing number of search on “social contagion phenomena” such experts now advocate drawing on the strate- as fashions, fads, rumors, civil violence, and gies and tactics of unconventional, or “irregu- revolutionary ideas.4 Moreover, many com- lar,” warfare to meet the challenge.3 The threat mentators and even U.S. officials have em- is portrayed as a global insurgency that re- ployed disease metaphors to describe the chal- quires a commensurate global counterinsur- lenge of Islamist militancy.5 Thus references gency (COIN) campaign. There is some logic to terrorism being a “virus” or to al Qaeda “mu- to this as elements of the challenge reflect tating” or “metastasizing” are common. Simi- characteristics of a classic insurgency. Certainly, larly, the image of madrassas and mosques al Qaeda’s stated goals of expelling “Jews and being “incubators” of a “virulent ideology” is crusaders” from the Muslim world and cleans- frequently invoked. Such metaphors have a ing it of apostate regimes—all with the objec- visceral appeal in that they help to convey a tive of reestablishing a purified caliphate—can dangerous and, moreover, darkly insidious be viewed as an insurgency of sorts. The threat. For some, the disease metaphor also recognition that success ultimately hinges on sets—implicitly, at least—a more realistic goal winning “hearts and minds” in the Muslim for what can be practically achieved to elimi- world is also a critically important attribute of nate this scourge. Just as very few diseases a counterinsurgency response. have been completely eradicated, so the like- Yet just as classic counterterrorism meas- lihood that terrorism or political violence will ures have their limits, so a strictly counter- be rendered extinct is remote. The best that 428 PAUL B. STARES AND MONA YACOUBIAN can be hoped for is for