Centralization in Nonviolent Civil Resistance Movements

CEU eTD Collection Centralization inNonviolent Civil Resistance In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts of thedegree ofMaster requirementsfor ofthe fulfillment In partial United WeStand,DividedFall: Department of International Relations and European Studies RelationsandEuropean Department ofInternational Supervisor: Professor ErinK.Jenne Supervisor: Professor Central European University Movements. WordCount: 14,555 Budapest, Hungary Evgeniia Iakhnis Submitted to 2012 By CEU eTD Collection discipline, and create a viable alternative on the political arena. movement undermines its ability effective conduct negotiations,to maintain nonviolent a of character spontaneous the In contrast, falls. regime previous the once alternative political effective negotiations,nonviolentdiscipline, prevents disruption of a viable and presents of headcoalitiona strong atthe campaigna nonviolent of enablesconduct movementto the existence the that reveals It campaigns. nonviolent of outcome the to centralization of levels from 1987-1989 and Bulgaria in1989,explorescasual the link mechanisms that different political transformation.achieve movementshavelower while chances spontaneous organizational to structures, A detailed analysis other with movements succeed than likely moreto are organization of anumbrella or a coalition two cases by ofled campaigns nonviolent that show analysis statistical the of findings The campaigns. resistance civil resistance, Romania This thesis examines how the level of centralization affects the outcome of nonviolent of outcome the affects centralization of level the how examines thesis This Abstract i CEU eTD Collection who have been supporting me every moment of my instudies Budapest. my parents to thanks special finally, And, different. been have would CEU the at experience my him, Without my drafts. whilethesis reading andpatience criticism constructive invaluable advice. I also want to say a special thank you to Matthew Stenberg for his I wouldlike toexpress tomy my gratitude andsupervisor Erin for her Jenne support Acknowledgements ii CEU eTD Collection Chapter 2. Quantitative Analysis Quantitative 2. Chapter Action Literature Chapter 1.Applying Social MovementApproaches to Address the Theoretical Gapin Nonviolent Introduction Bibliography Appendix Conclusion Chapter3. Case Studies: Romania 1987-1989 and 1989 Bulgaria 1.3 1.2 1.1 2.4 Statistical model and results and model Statistical 2.4 2.3 Control variables 2.2 The independentvariables 2.1 The dataset and the dependent variable 3.3. Comparative analysis 3.2 Bulgaria Romania 3.1. Methodology Level of Centralization in Nonviolent Civil Resistance Campaigns NonviolentAction Literature versus Social Movement Literature ...... 54 ...... 52 ...... 1 ...... 58 ...... 43 ...... 35 ...... 5 ...... 21 ...... 26 ...... 50 ...... 25 ...... 24 ...... 27 Table of Contents of Table ...... 24 iii ...... 34 ...... 5 ...... 15 CEU eTD Collection (New York: Columbia University Press,2011). 1 and careful strategy a grand of cleararticulation the that Schock argue Kurt and DuVall Ackerman, Jack Peter Gene Sharp, factor. strategic the on focusing campaign resistance to others? compared successful campaign unarmed makes one What civil resistance? nonviolent of outcomes the divergent we explain can how arises: question the Therefore, oppression. challenging of way effective and simple most the as be romanticized not should action nonviolent that show elsewhere and Belarus, Burma, China, Mexico, Niger, Palestine, in Tibet, campaigns Unarmed insurrections. failed polities. repressive brutally nonviolentthat methods of struggle maybe effective in places,includingunexpected in prove in Arab in East mostthe Orangethe Middle recent Spring Revolution Ukraine, and in Lebanon, CedarRevolution the in Brazil,“Diretas Ja” campaign in Philippines, Power” the counterparts. full arenearly campaigns as partial aslikelytoachieve twice violentor success their resistance nonviolent that shows field in the research recent regimes, oppressive against experienced a wave of in insurrections lastunarmed decade. the of violence levels of high historically with However, even parts world the lessdeveloped the managed limited with achieve that casualties. unarmed resistance political to transformations casesof the of acts violence overshadow andother terrorism conflicts, civil decolonization, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Maria and Chenoweth Erica Most studies of nonviolent action try to explain the effectiveness with numerous arecontrasted resistance ofnonviolent cases suchsuccessful However, of an unarmed Despite the common misperception that military power is strategy effective military power themost that misperception thecommon Despite The 20 1 The movementin resistance Solidarity Poland, Otpor “People inSerbia, the th century was the bloodiest century in the history of mankind. Two world wars, WhyCivil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logicof NonviolentConflict Introduction 1 , CEU eTD Collection Agriculture, 1959-1966,” 3 Nondemocracies (New York: Pagrave Publishers LTD, 2000); Kurt Schock, Sargent, 2005); Peter Ackermann, Jack DuVall, 2 structure may account for different strategic capacity of social movements. and organizational in leadership differences meaning that develop strategy,” effective will they likelihood the in differ “organizations that out points Ganz Marshall movements. social of on outcome the structure of organizational impact the branches, emphasizes process regime in 1963. KonstantinosPrimein Karamanlis’ Greek the 2005-2006or campaign againstMinister such formal hierarchical structure, as theThai regime Shinawatra’s campaign against Thaksin with organization led party or by one resistance campaigns nonviolent are most centralized the Finally, higher levelsof centralization. by characterized inthePhilippines,are campaign organization or a coalition of several organizations or parties, such as the People Power were more organized led lackedleadership. butstill central byan Campaigns any umbrella in Brazil, rule military against campaign Ja” “Diretas the or Lebanon in Revolution Cedar in 1974,havelevel thelowest of ledcentralization. Campaigns byseveral such groups, as the military againstmovement such rule nonviolent as theGreek structure, formal organizational no with insurgencies Spontaneous centralization. of levels different had have campaigns different that shows record historical The campaigns. civilresistance nonviolent of outcome movements. nonviolent civil of structure of on examines organizational resistance theeffect success the goals.achieve its failed to selection of nonviolenttechniques distinguishes asuccessful campaign from a campaign that Marshall Ganz, “Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Unionization the in Capacity Strategic Resourcefulness: and “Resources Ganz, Marshall Gene Sharp, Gene The literature on social movements, namely the resource mobilization and political The main aim of this thesis is to investigate how the level of centralization affects the Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential , (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2005). American Journal of Sociology 2 However, no study has been undertaken that systematically that undertaken been has study no However, A Force More Powerful: ACentury of Nonviolent Conflict 2 105:4(January 2000), 1011. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in , (Boston: Porter 3 Similarly, , CEU eTD Collection 5 University Press, 1998), 124. 4 the effect of the level of centralization on the outcome of nonviolent civil civil resistance nonviolent of outcome the on level of centralization the of effect the about conclusions derives findings and thecase study compares contrasts and chapter fourth RomaniaMill’s ofDifference. 1989analyzed andBulgaria through The Method 1987-1989 byformal organizations.” coordinated autonomous and local contextually rooted units linkedby andconnective structures on partly based are formsof organization effective most“the that He argues than others. the be successful likely to moremodels are certain organizational Sidney accordingTarrow, to Chenoweth and Stephan. Maria Chenoweth by Erica compiled based database on the movements resistance civil nonviolent success of of analysis regression large-N statistical undertakes chapter second The centralization. level of may eliminate gapin the approach process helpto action scholarshipthe nonviolent regarding 1900andbetween 2006anddetailed casestudies. isargument my consistent with findings from statistical nonviolentanalysis of campaigns This structure. a formalized hierarchical ledbyan with orcampaigns campaigns organization succeed thanspontaneous chances to better have coalition or organization an umbrella led by movements civil nonviolent resistance I will arguethat Therefore, a common strategy. providing withconstruct connective participants a common structures to identity maintain and while flexibility leadership and by diverse arecharacterized types Both organizational these acommon goal. under united organizations acoalition several of or leadership horizontal with andform sustained relationships with opponents andsupporters. attract repression, of face in resilient be discipline, nonviolent maintain capacity, strategic maximal obtain yetflexibleto enough be shouldcampaigns centralized arguethat Iwill approach, Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011. Sidney Tarrow, Sidney The structure of the thesis is as follows. The first chapter explains how the political the how explains chapter first The isfollows. thesis of as the The structure organization areanumbrella model fit this perfectly that structures The organizational Power inMovement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 5 The third chapter consists The of third chapter detailed of casestudies 4 Following the scholars of the political process 3 (New York: Cambridge CEU eTD Collection may inconsider towageefficient order unarmed struggle against oppressive regimes. activists movements’ resistance that lessons offer but also resistance nonviolent of trajectories campaigns. The findings from this not study only intoprovide insight variation in the 4 CEU eTD Collection 8 7 Sargent, 2005). 6 disciplined, and continuous manner disciplined, and continuous basedon specificthe context. inan should methods beimplemented organized, nonviolentsuccess action.The of nonviolentintervention. According to Sharp, strategic planning is the paramount factor for the of of methods methods and persuasion, and noncooperation, of methods protest categories: roots of state power through certain methods. He divides these methods into three broad succeed. Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall provide a detailed account of successful nonviolent successful of account provide adetailed Ackerman Jack DuVall and succeed. Peter or fail movements resistance conditions which under explain to in order campaigns resistance they receive from their subjects. violentmethodsthan of struggle. change social and political in achieving effective more prove may resistance civil Nonviolent efficiency. of of considerations out but of principle as amatter not violence to methods nonviolent shouldwhich prefer activists to nonviolence, according to pragmatic approach work in his three-volume capacity. Sharp, have toexplain tried successandthe failure of nonviolentcampaigns throughstrategic 1970s,scholars backin action nonviolent for the foundation thetheoretical who established as ofmovements determiningfactor the characteristics of Starting with theirSharp, success. 1.1 Ibid, 50. Ibid, 33. Gene Sharp, Gene Nonviolent Action Nonviolent Action Literature versus Social Movement Literature Chapter 1. Applying Social Movement Approaches to Address the Sharp claims that the power of rulers is based on the obedience and cooperation that cooperation obedience and the is based on of rulers power the that Sharp claims Other scholars build on Sharp’s ideas and provide descriptive accounts of buildnonviolent descriptive ideasOther scholars and of accounts provide Sharp’s on accountfor organizational failsaction literature onnonviolent to Existing Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential Theoretical ActionGap in Nonviolent Literature 6 7 The aim of undermineisnonviolent thesocial action to Theaimof 5 The Politics ofNonviolentAction, 8 , (Boston: Porter takes a CEU eTD Collection 14 13 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 12 2009), 17-29. Democratization,and Governance in theMiddle East 11 University of MinnesotaPress, 2005). 10 Pagrave Publishers LTD, 2000). 9 resistance campaign from a campaign that fails. that a campaign from campaign resistance methods of nonviolentaction, and resiliencedistinguish a nonviolentsuccessful civil such thatfactors Schocknotes campaigns. as tactical innovation,between shifting different strategic and primacy explain maintainsstrategic that factors outcomesnonviolent different of successful leadcampaigns. to nonviolent of outcome that factors concerningthe hypotheses theoretical Sharp’s testing movements thus resistance nonviolent civil resistance campaign has been argued by Hardy nonviolentcivil campaign hasbeenarguedby Merriman, Hardy resistance success of nonviolentlevels of such a crucial capacity. campaigns.consider However, contribute todifferentnot they whichendogenous factors do campaigns. nonviolent of outcome the on capacity of strategic effect the emphasizes and Sharp Positive effect of loyalty shifts on the outcome of levels of participation provide nonviolent movements with several mechanisms crucial for crucial mechanisms several with movements nonviolent provide participation of levels determinantof success nonviolentcampaignany of is thenumber of participants. Higher major the that conclude and campaigns resistance nonviolent and violent of analysis large-N a McCarthy Mayerand N.Zald, determinant of of determinant success byitself as itfrom derives capacity strategic of the movement. the support of movement.a nonviolent loyalty shifts weakens the pillars of support of the opponent while expanding the pillars of Peter Ackermann, Jack DuVall, Jack Ackermann, Peter Merriman, 21. Sharp. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, in Action,” of Nonviolent Dynamics and “Theory Merriman, Hardy Kurt Schock, Kurt Advocates of nonviolent action also emphasize the importance of loyalty shifts for Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan in book the Stephan Maria and Erica Chenoweth Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies A Force MorePowerful: A Century ofNonviolent Conflict 12 Sharp, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory 14 However, the presence of loyalty cannotbea presenceofloyalty However, the shifts 13 and other nonviolent action scholars. Emergence of Emergence scholars. action nonviolent other and , Maria J. Stephan ,ed., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 6 10 Therefore, like Schock DuVall, Ackerman, 9 Kurt Schock follows the argument of Why Civil Resistance Works Why Civil Resistance Civilian Jihad. Nonviolent Struggle, , (Minneapolis: , (New York: 11 John D. conduct , CEU eTD Collection 18 17 16 15 no offer and centralization movements’ of question the address not do they Specifically, place. in thefirst parameters two these may affect that characteristics endogenous for the account fail they level to participation of and capacity strategic focusingon the by However, undermineto and their opponents achieve stated goals their through nonviolent methods. likely to achieve its ultimate outcome.”achieve its ultimate likely to more makes increase“single of participants 10% a campaign active unitover confirms that campaign is by demonstrated Chenoweth and large-N Stephan through analysis. data The problems. fewerand commitment encounter not rely campaigns muchon clandestine do as violent activities underground as campaigns) nonviolent (as barriers informational lower have also actions Nonviolent movements. violent commitviolentacts against opponents may inhibitsignificantly public’sthe in participation nonviolent campaignshave moral lower barriers violent than The actions. unwillingness to barriers,elderly Besidesphysical with disabilities. people populations, children,and women, by joined be to likely more are movements nonviolent Therefore, diverse. more much nonviolence is in casesof and measures range of asthe intactics actions, violent participation participation are lower.” because thebarrierscampaigns to “nonviolentcampaigns likelyare more attractto higherlevels of participation violentthan beresistancemore prove successfulnonviolentto campaigns campaigns violent because than the abilitythe produceloyalty andto shifts, civic disruption. innovations, and diversity, tactical resilience, level suchashigher opposition of their success, Ibid, 39-40 Ibid, 32-39 Ibid. Chenoweth and Stephan, 10. Scholars of nonviolent action show how successful resistance movements use power The argument that number of participants determines the outcome of nonviolent of outcome the determines participants number of that The argument Participation in nonviolent action does not require the same physical skills as 18 17 7 15 16 Chenoweth and Stephan argue that argue Stephan and Chenoweth CEU eTD Collection 22 21 Sociology 20 19 similar beliefs into gathergroups, produceand goals certain strategies and tactics, andcreatea countermovement and attempts to implements these goals.” these implements to and attempts countermovement identifiesorganization that its with goals preferencesthe movementof a social or a formal, or “a complex, as organization movement a social define Zald and McCarthy aggregation. aimed are atresource that seen movements are as carriersof social (SMO) movementorganizations Social others. among supporters, andexternal attention media skills, may critical successof the amovement, money, include time,organizational Resources, to in McCarthy and Zald,engagement social requiresof aggregation conflict resources. movements. in social factors and strategic of actors, rationality the relations, newdeprivation and collectiveThe behavior. perspective oninstitutionalized focused power gained prominence inthe 1970s asa critique of then-traditional the theories of relative It movements. in social centralization of level the and leadership to attention considerable civil resistance. nonviolent trajectories the affectof characteristics movements’ howendogenous illustrate helpmay to regimes). oroppressive occupants government onpopularforeign concentrated authority against to challenges (campaigns primarily is scholarship resistance civil nonviolent scholars, movement social to Compared specific forms of social movements based on the primacy of nonviolentvery resistance as seen be methods. could resistance civil Nonviolent movements. social on literature general campaign. systematic analysis of how differentlevels of centralization may affect the outcome of a Ibid, 20. McCarthy and Zald, 18. J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," Schock, xvi. Resource mobilization tosocial mobilization that pays is movements theory Resource an approach This gap in scholarshipthe nonviolent of canbe action addressed byinsightsfrom the 9 (1983): 528. 19 However, some broad approaches to social movements 8 22 Through SMOs people with Annual Review of 20 According to 21 CEU eTD Collection 25 in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam 24 23 of of Thereisnoa movement. view single the effect of inabout crackdowns regime nonviolent repression. have fewer constraints and are more likely to respond to opposition with severe forms of regimes authoritarian In contrast, forms of contestation. different to more open thus, are, and barriers, institutional and normative, electoral, by more constrained are regimes democratic movements; social of success of determinant be a to claimed frequently is type Regime of Features politicalthe system with movements provide and opportunities constraints. action. model the collective of employing bystrategically politics engage incontentious Changes in opportunities providepolitical and constraints openings thatallow people to claims. certain advance and form alliances, others, over andstrategies tactics certain prefer mobilize, may waypeople the affect factors exogenous argue that approach of supporters this focus. of theoretical and Emphasizing importance the political opportunities constraints, suggestmovements, I turning tothepolitical approach.process balancedumbrella organizations with horizontal analysisleadership or coalitions. Therefore, to obtain a more centralized formal social movement organizations and disregard other models, such as of the role be for asocial to successful. necessary movement resource of the organizationalbasis for collective action.structure The efficiency in the of ansuccess organization of socialis considered to be a key authoritarian regimes, and this did not affect theirchances of success. in but in democracies, not emerged campaigns resistance civil nonviolent of majority Chenoweth and Stephan, 66. Gil Merom, David S. Meyer,«Protest and Political Opportunities», Not only regime type but also the repressiveness of the regime may affect the outcome its mobilization buildstheory onresource and expands The political approach process to excessiveattention however, pay approach, mobilization of resource the Supporters 24 How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel However, the findings of Chenoweth and Stephan show that the overwhelming the that show Stephan and Chenoweth of findings the However, . (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15. 9 Annual Review Sociologyof 25 30 (2004): 126. 23 CEU eTD Collection 32 31 30 ʋ 29 28 Social Movements. 27 26 a campaign, of solidarity andincrease theinternal opponent movements. Brian Martin may repression supportforargues that decreaseexternal the outcome of nonviolent campaigns. structural occurringchanges have did times specific not during on the asystematic effect democratic during movements period. this However, their own statistical reveal findings that pro- successful of overrepresentation to the due success higher incidenceof with a associated be Warcould Cold of intheend the thatoccurred campaigns suggestthat and Stephan of the opponent state. tosucceed regardless of capabilities nonviolent havehigh the campaigns chances prove that opponents. overpowerful victory achieve often weak parties movements. with access to a civil nonviolentof successthe Some regimes campaigns. scholars of arguethat resistance large number of resources are bynearly of 35%. campaign success less likelylikelihood the reduces repression regime violent study, Chenoweth’s to according However, to be defeated public mobilization. on havemay a effect positive backfiring regime’s suggestthat byNepstad oppositional on the outcome of nonviolent civil resistance campaign. On one hand, financial or strategic or financial hand, one On campaign. resistance civil nonviolent of outcome the on effects positive and negative both have may help state External support. external or sanctions Ibid, 75. Chenoweth and Stephan, 68. Ibid. Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," Chenoweth and Stephan, 68. Clifford Bob and Sharon Nepstad, “Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement?” Leadership and Assassination in Assassination and Leadership a Movement?” Murder Leader, a “Kill Nepstad, Sharon Bob and Clifford Brian Martin, 1 (Summer2001), 96. Certain periodstime may also provide people with structural Chenoweth openings. Finally, structural opportunities may include external factors such asinternational factors includemay external opportunities Finally,structural maybe is on apredictor capabilities awhether Additionally, acountry’s debate there 29 Justice ignited: TheDynamics of backfire Scholars of the asymmetrical warfare, however, empirically demonstrate that demonstrate empirically however, warfare, asymmetrical the Scholars of American Behavioral Scientist 31 32 28 50:10(June 2007),1370-94. 10 , (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007). 26 30 while Clifford Bob and Sharon Chenoweth and Stephan also Stephan and Chenoweth International Security 26, 27 CEU eTD Collection 37 Science 36 International Society,” (May/June 2005), 438-441; David Cortright, “Powers of Persuasion: Sanctions and Incentives inthe Shaping of 35 34 2005). frame enough is to model robust that of liesan in creation organizational organizers the movement for central dilemma thatthe argues Tarrow action. collective the channeling including theform mobilizing Mobilizingof play structures. structures important rolean in opponents.” bring people together in organizations, and mobilize them against more powerful identities, collective create exploit political “organizersopportunities, to contention that use but emphasizes that they alone factors, structural of theimportance recognizes approach, process of political advocates the cannot explain the success of socialmovements, thus,is more than ambiguous. Sidney one Tarrow, of mostthe prominent movements. He claims 33 contrast, argue that international sanctions are often effective. areoften sanctions thatinternational argue contrast, domestic population more than the targeted regimes. more than targeted domesticthe population to David andinternational Cortright Donald Seekings, pressuremayharm diplomatic the international sanctions on the outcome of campaigns is also highly controversial. According potential recruiters who are reluctant to act on behalf of a foreign state. foreign a of behalf act on to are reluctant who recruiters potential rider problem,a free- to lead may support state external that out delegitimize point Stephan and Chenoweth Similarly, a campaign challengers. of maneuverability strategic the complicate may movement the to in support the eyes of domestic governmentspopulation and and drive theinmovement receivedSerbia, funding substantial from linkedEuropean agencies to awayUnited States. On resistance the example, Otpor, achieve For goals. its to a movement may help assistance the other hand, Daniel Byman claims that foreign Tarrow, 3. Nikolay Marinov, “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” Country Destabilize Sanctions “Do Economic Marinov, Nikolay Donald M. Seekings, “Burma and US Sanctions: Confronting an Authoritarian Regime,” Authoritarian an Confronting US Sanctions: and “Burma M.Seekings, Donald Chenoweth and Stephan, 55. Daniel Byman, 49:3 (July 2005),564-576; Martin,2007. The effect of structural opportunities and constraints on the outcome ofresistance outcome the on constraints and opportunities of structural The effect 37 The way people utilize the political openings dependsonvarious factors, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism International Studies 38:2 (April 2001), 115-120. 11 35 , (New York: Cambridge University Press, Martin and Nikolay Marinov, in Marinov, Nikolay and Martin 36 American Journal of Political Asian Survey 34 The effect of 45:3 33 CEU eTD Collection strategic capacity of social movement. the of capacity strategic defines the structure type of thatthe organizational suggests models. He organizational exist. ceases to organization differences in their strategic capacity. Strategic capacity measures the availability of theavailability measures capacity Strategic capacity. strategic in their differences the through be explained could turn in their which strategies, and tactics in their differences by be explained campaigns could two these of outcomes different the that he argues incrowd.” the feel and not lost interests its particular “stress and its activities maintain over control to group allow each structures Such backgrounds. organizational preferences, and interests, different help a create with that common structures provide to connective identity among participants allies, and supporters. necessary interaction sustain acontinuous with lackto may authorities, the infrastructure it is that organization problem with the a decentralized however, itsof base; internalization permanent through disruption for capacity its lose may it that is organization centralized 43 42 41 40 39 38 flexibility. organizational and by structures, coordinated formal organizations.” are based and on partly localautonomous contextually rooted linkedunits by connective of mostorganization forms effective succeed: “the to isfor amovement autonomy required political action. coordinate andaggregate to andnetworks participants link that ties informal allow to flexible sufficiently yet and authorities with relations sustained Ganz, 1003-1062. Ibid. Ibid, 135. Ibid, 124. Ibid, 137. Ibid, 124. Marshall Ganz builds on the importance of flexibility of social movements’ Joint campaigning by coalitions of organizations often meets these criteria for thesecriteria meets often of organizations by coalitions campaigning Joint 42 Once the goal of the campaign is achieved, the coalition or umbrella 39 Therefore, a delicate balance between centralized organization and organization centralized between balance a delicate Therefore, 41 Coalitions umbrella or organizations horizontal with leadership 43 Comparing two agricultural unions in California, 12 40 38 The problem with a with problem The CEU eTD Collection the opponent. the mustitFirst, survive be mustable to undermine itsecond, repression; be able to the powerof characteristics. important must have two movement civil resistance nonviolent successful increase the participation and commitment of members and the accountability leaders, are membersof of accountability and the participation the and commitmentincrease likely to more expanding are at horizontal more of channels communication, adept are moreflexible, are “network-organized challenges structures, highly hierarchical centralized to in Schockargues that comparison templates. repression hierarchical than state organizational domain of nonviolent in action hisbook regimes. oppressive struggle against successful to the may contribute centralization levels of different that observe who scholars action fewnonviolent aretwoof the Burrowes Schock and Robert Kurtmovements’ outcome. on a nonviolent such factors effect of however,movement. Advocatesactionsuccess approach,the nonviolentthe of overlook of a the for centralization, of level the namely factors, endogenous of importance the emphasize leadership andmutual accountability. have with capacity leadership selection bureaucratic lowerthan organizations strategic diverse and hierarchical accountability a strategic with solution problem. Organizations to produce anovellikely more for anddeliberation are and effective diverseto democratic ideas 45 44 of their organizations.” structures flows, accountability and resource processes, deliberative collectiveand the action depends andrepertoiresnetworks, of social on movement “leaders'lifeexperience, the the of capacity strategic of level The motivation. participants’ of level the and information, informationimportant situation, the deviseabout ability novelsolutions the to using this Schock, 49. Ibid, 1005. Kurt Schock attempts to apply the assumptions of political process theory approach process political and the mobilization resource the scholars of Therefore, to the 45 Network-oriented organizational structures are more efficient for withstanding for efficient more are structures organizational Network-oriented 44 More democratic More thatprovide structures organizational conditions Unarmed Insurrections 13 . AccordingSchock, a . to CEU eTD Collection 50 49 New York Press, 1996), 190. performed through a federation, a network, or a is a federation,or performeddemarchy.A federation anetwork, a through of coalition relational, psychological, and economic needs of all participants of a resistance movement. satisfy is to in required order structures leadership decentralized Third,of creation killed. the or leadersbeen arrested, ineffective, survive ismore campaign likely have after to rendered while by adecentralized opponent orbeenremoved the its leadershiphascompromised once distinctstrategicleadership A may has advantages. movement becentralized fatally weakened lives. decentralized havein their Second, on thatan effect when decisions partake people First, decentralized personal resistance movements. leadershipencourages responsibility decentralized havemay for leadership nonviolent is civil certain preferable advantages, levels. tolower model further it leadership acentralized While disseminate authoritatively design forfunctions.are responsiblea campaign all leadershipThey and a unified strategy of with a hierarchical structure. establishing formal the allocating to of without bodies resources a centralized organization levels many on activities coordinate level national the on operating organizations umbrella ismore,What succeed. to campaigns resistance for nonviolent is necessary that participation andsustained broad andfor provide groups diverse coordinate andorganizations umbrella 48 47 46 of coordination. degree require acertain decentralized groups that leadershipopen structure. Defense innovatelikely repression.” weather morelikely more are to tactically, and to Ibid, 195. Ibid, 192. Robert Burrowes, Ibid, 51. Ibid, 50. A similar argument is offered by Burrowes in his book Though he emphasizes the advantages of decentralization, Burrowes acknowledges Burrowes of decentralization, advantages the Though he emphasizes . He suggests that a nonviolent resistance movement requires a decentralized and a decentralized requires movement resistance nonviolent thata . Hesuggests The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense. A Gandhian approach 48 In hierarchical organizational structures, one or a few individuals a few or one structures, organizational hierarchical In 47 14 The Strategy of Nonviolent The Strategyof , (Albany: State University of 50 Coordination may be may Coordination 46 Federations 49 CEU eTD Collection Therefore, I will argue that nonviolent civil resistance movements led by an umbrella an by led movements resistance civil nonviolent that argue will I Therefore, goals. its achieve to flexibility the by is characterized yet centralization of level sufficient horizontal an leadership provides a or with umbrella groups/organizations/parties organization discipline, and form sustained relations with opponents. A coalition of several maintainsupporters, nonviolent attract capacity, maximal strategic obtain facerepression, of have a certain level of centralization but, at the same time, be flexible enough to be resilientin 1.2 resistance. of nonviolent campaign, and if so, which organizational model contributesnonviolent a most of to the successful efficiency the affects outcomes centralization of level the whether into insight provide is there for room theoretical both and study empirical question.this Thisof research will therefore, outcomes; in campaigns divergence affect may centralization of levels different how of analysis systematic a offering without movements resistance civil nonviolent of randomly from group selected volunteers. several representative requiresof aformation isanewconceptthat empirically, demarchy 51 gathering.” resource positions of its but own is facilitatingresponsible for communication, coordination, and which has“a tosucceedit is afacilitator, requires nopolicy that group for such a network smalland thatoperate independently.numerous of According Burrowes, consists groups to is Anetwork lesscentralized organization. from each participant of consisting representatives own makingactions.in Decision federations is a federated through council usually performed several organizations united undera butcommon with maintaininggoal each control its over Ibid. Level of Centralization Campaignsin Nonviolent CivilResistance The central argument of this thesis is that nonviolent civil resistance campaigns should Schock and Burrowes merely touch on the importance of centralization for the success the for centralization of importance the on touch merely Burrowes and Schock 51 Compared to these two concepts that have proven to be efficient 15 CEU eTD Collection 53 Theory and Research," and Theory 52 Hypotheses ledcampaigns bya party an or organization with a formalized hierarchy. or succeed campaigns chances to acoalition spontaneous than have greater or organization goals externalstructure, consisting ofmutually membership,issueperceived focused oriented, on a goal or formal to internal own its lacking the structure, formal the of independent constructed, coalition,deliberately Accordingand Stevenson,to Pearce and Porter, a coalition is “an interacting group of individuals,requiring movement. the of capacity andstrategic theresilience increases leadership that diverse concerted member action.” committee with a monthly rotating presidency. rotating monthly a with committee by headedan executive was factions, oppositional and some Socialist Democrats, Christian inPinochet governmentThis coalition, 1983-1989. Republicans, Radical,Social and uniting against movement led pro-democracy Chilean the that wasacoalition Alianza Democratica For example,the leadership. orrotating executive committee an membersof group through formal theauthority; thus, decision making in process isa coalition performedusually bya hierarchy of avoid a organizations anddecentralized coalitions centralized organizations, order to achieve the from In regimes. repression withstand likely to moregoal are suchcampaigns First, organization. of political change, campaignsled hierarchical by those a formal, compared to advantages discernible the movements must to be able to withstand of Democracy the Pakistaniduring movementagainstpro-democracy Zia ul-Huqin 1983. Nigerian against militaryrevolt from rule 1993-1999 and the Movementfor Restoration the nonviolentcivil movementsincluderesistance theNational Democratic Coalition the during Heraldo Munoz, Heraldo William B. Stevenson, Jone L. Pearce, and Lyman W. Porter, "The Concept of 'Coalition' in Organization in of 'Coalition' Concept "The W. Porter, Lyman and L.Pearce, Jone Stevenson, B. William Coalitions and decentralized organizational structures are usually characterized by areusually characterized structures organizational anddecentralized Coalitions Nonviolentcampaigns ledan byacoalition or have organization umbrella two The Dictator's Shadow: LifeUnder Augusto Pinochet The Academyof Management Review 16 10:2 (April1985): 261. 53 Other examples of coalitions leading coalitions of examples Other , (Basic Books, 2008),145. 52 Compared to CEU eTD Collection Ogoni Minority,” 59 58 57 56 55 54 hundreds more, other women continued to effectively organize their various activity.” effectively their organize women to continued more,hundreds other of arrest and harassment violent the and movement- the started who woman the Vicenti, De its “Despite initial thekidnap of andmurder a dozen organizers. Azucenaincludingwomen- Argentina continued effectively to undermine state’sthe power even after the violent arrest of in campaign Plaza” the of “TheMothers For example, historically. repeatedly demonstrated by which to wage the struggle with maximum effectiveness, their chances of succeedingare of chances their effectiveness, maximum wage with struggle the to by which of nonviolent civil resistance movements. According to Sharp, “if the resisters success the to iscritical capacity lack Strategic capacity. strategic better a possess strategyleadership diverse its leader, KenSaro-Wiwa. chief theexecution of after fell apart - People Ogoni the for the Survival of Movement The organization- a centralized led exploitation by and corporate against government theNigerian movement Ogoni contrast, disintegrate. might even be campaign or seriously weakened nonviolent the rendered ineffective, or hasarrested been leadership Once centralized occurs. whenrepression disadvantages repression and refuse to submit or retreat. often lack both the flexibility and strategic capacities to resist repression. to capacities strategic and flexibility the both lack often weather repression.” weather likely to more are and tactically, innovate likely moreto are leaders, of and accountability the members of and commitment participation increase the more to likely are communication, at expanding challengers are“morenetwork-organized horizontal channels of adept Clifford Bob, “Political Process Theory and Transnational Movements: Dialectics of Protest among Nigeria’s Ibid, 194. Burrowes, 193. Ibid. Schock, 50. Sharp 2005, 381. Second,campaigns nonviolent ledby an a coalition or umbrella organization with strategic distinct have campaigns centralized that notes similarly Burrowes 57 Burrowes argues that the advantages of horizontal Burrowesarguesthattheadvantages leadership have horizontal of been Social Problems 56 49:3 (August 2002),395-415. 54 Schock points out that hierarchical outthat points Schock organizations 17 59 55 He argues that 58 In CEU eTD Collection 65 64 Social Movements 63 62 61 60 success. encourages innovations and creativity and enhances therefore themovements’ possibility of capacity for disruption…” their lose they base, their internalize permanently they when is that, organizations movement hierarchical of dilemma “the that argues he models, organizational formal centralized highly organizational models. than other opportunities emerging political of aremoretaking advantage efficientat structures process scholars, and opponents’ vulnerabilities. Sidneythe at strike and strengths movements’ the utilize Tarrow to inorder strategy grand the of framework in particular, greatly diminished.” emphasize that certain organizational greater capacity to develop effective strategy than those that do not.” those that than develop strategy effective capacity to greater have action of yetsalientrepertoires constituencies,collective diverse and and to ties weak andoutsiders, strong insiders combine “leadership that outthat teams leadership. Hepoints withleadership viewpoints.” teams skills backgrounds, anddiverse if succeed attract they likely more to are him, “movements According to of a movement. existence of connective structures in social movements is highly important as it allows the allows it as important highly is movements in social structures connective of existence backgrounds. with between The different participants necessary structures provide connective parties advantage over campaigns organizations, ledbyor asthey important several groups, Ganz, 1015. Ibid, 37. Aldon Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg, “Leadership in Social Movements,” in Movements,” inSocial “Leadership Staggenborg, Suzanne and Morris Aldon Ibid, 137. Tarrow, 127. Sharp, 43. Strategic capacity may depend on a movement’s level of centralization. Political centralization. of level movement’s a on depend may capacity Strategic Aldon Morris proposes a connection between diverse leadership and strategic capacity leadership strategic and between a diverse connection proposes Aldon Morris Additionally, campaigns led by a coalition or an umbrella organization have an an organization ledby or umbrella Additionally,a coalition campaigns 64 Ganz also argues in support of forms of Ganzalsoarguesinsupport decentralized organizational diverse with , Snow David A., Soule Sarah A., Kriesi Hanspeter, ed. (Blackwell, 2004), 36. 60 The tactics and methods resisters choose should be implemented in the implemented be should choose resisters methods and tactics The 61 Criticizing the resource mobilization approach with its emphasis on emphasis its with approach mobilization resource the Criticizing 62 18 65 The Blackwell Companion to 63 Diverse leadership Diverse CEU eTD Collection 70 69 68 514. leadership theory and practic 67 66 action.” coalition andpotential issue(s) coalition about with another one communicate members. the among action collaborative and goals, interests, values, understandings, shared create commitments, movements successful that Ganz suggests interests. identity production among differentpreferences and with a common of people is more, they must take joint or orchestrated actions in order to be considered a coalition. provided by Stevenson divergence of andlackgoals a grandstrategy. of learning, facilitate motivation mutual whileresistance groups and lead may weakties trust, to necessary connective structures between participants, Hypothesis 1follows: between participants, necessary structures connective provide and withstand repressions, likely to more are capacity, strategic greater possess groups led to the failure of the Chinese pro-democracy movement in movement 1989. pro-democracy ofthe led Chinese the failure to groups different leaders of between coordination ties and such lackof the claims that Burrowes is complicated.Supporting umbrellathis coalition argument, muchmore or organization united not groups ina betweenseparate such ties action. nonviolentof Creation successful for necessary thecreation of andsharedidentities facilitate withinties groups coalition the between leaders of organizations. student leaders of small between in conflicts of andcoordination general an absence the organization resulted umbrella Burrowes 198. 261. Porter, and Pearce Stevenson, Ibid. in Movements,” Social and Organization, Leadership, Change: “Leading Ganz, Michelle Tarrow, 124. Therefore, communication and joint actions performed by members of andjoint performed bymembersof actions communication different Therefore, Assuming that coalitions and decentralized organizations with diverse leadership with diverse coalitions organizations anddecentralized Assuming that e, Nitin Nohria and RakseshKhurana, ed. (Harvard Business School Press, 2010), et al , “Coalitions are considered to consist of members who members of consist to considered are “Coalitions , 19 68 According to the definition of coalition 67 Strong ties between different between ties Strong Handbook of 70 The absence of 69 What 66 CEU eTD Collection 74 73 1987), 46. 72 71 suppressed. military regained killing Military several Intelligence Serviceagentsand engaginginAs the arson. result, the swords, and stones with back fighting violence, with control actions military the to responded citizens over the due andlackleadership weakorganizational structure However, to the centralized of country,movementprotest against junta military in 1988 was very close totoppling the government. and the oppositional movement was brutallystruggle.”strugglenonviolent weakensthe nonviolent a alongside guns that“theuseof claiming importance its emphasizes succeed. Sharp both general andcan produce communication and specificinstruction behavior.” on command of lines “clear as discipline nonviolent maintaining and achieving to significantly contributes group theresistance within effectiveorganization outthat Sharp points defined with organizationalstructure leaders maintainsnonviolentrecognizable discipline. level awell-movements compare with higher the disadvantages First, to organization. of Movements structure have any with spontaneous majorstructure. organizational two centralization. with horizontalleadership aremore likely to succeedthanmovements with other levels of may be emerging within the opponent group. opponent the within be emerging may repression from and opponents the undermine to any sympathetic feelingsfor resisters the that lead to a collapse of a movement, because it tends to provoke disproportionately harsh Schock, 96-97. Sharp, 2005, 390. Gene Sharp and Afif Safieh, “Gene Sharp: Nonviolent Struggle,” Nonviolent Sharp: “Gene Safieh, Afif and Sharp Gene 393. Sharp, Maintaining isin nonviolent discipline turn crucially importantfor acampaign to lack leveland havecentralization of lowest the resistance movements Spontaneous H1: Nonviolentcivila coalitionorparty/organization resistance movements led by 74 20 73 For example, the Burmese pro-democracy example, Burmese the For 72 Journal of Palestine Studies The introduction of violence may violence of introduction The 17:1 (Autumn 17:1 71 CEU eTD Collection between violent rates exploreaim insuccess differences not to does thesis as this only,campaigns violent and non-violent1900 and 2006,106of which are codedasnon-violent. The analysis willbe non- run on Stephan. Maria and Chenoweth campaigns.by Erica compiled based database on the movements resistance civil nonviolent success of In doing the of analysis of will regression Thelarge-N statistical part in first parts. a consist two research analysis,success I of seeka nonviolent civilto establishresistance campaign. In order a to achieve this goal, I divide my 1.3 follows: 2 Hypothesis allies, and authorities the with interactions and discipline nonviolent of maintenance the complicates 77 76 75 supporters. upholdlacksinfrastructure to a sustained interaction alliesandexternal with authorities, Such usually “anarchical countermodel” withstructure. an nomovements organizational stronger the better.” “thebe need potential well resisters to and moreorganized relatively organizedstrong-the and authority, the with negotiations in be successful to inorder that, suggests Sharp concessions. winning of raisingthe possibility negotiating partners, being credible chance of considered have ahigher andcoalitions resistance,spontaneous organizations compared to Second, with more developed organizationalstructure. strugglethanmovements succeed innonviolent lesslikelyto movements H2: Spontaneous are Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011. Tarrow, 137. 371. Sharp, Methodology The goal of this study is revealto whether the level of centralization plays a role in the Therefore, assuming that spontaneity and the lack of organizational structure lack of organizational andthe thatspontaneity assuming Therefore, 76 75 Tarrow also emphasizes the shortcomings of completely decentralized completely of shortcomings the emphasizes also Tarrow 77 The database consists of 323 campaigns emerging between emerging of323campaigns consists Thedatabase 21 CEU eTD Collection University, updated July 11, 2011), 38-141. 79 Nonviolent Action, bloodshed.change without political level byahigherisand achieved regimecentralization characterized of in1989, communist the against campaign Bulgarian the case, second The transformation. nonviolent communist regime from 1987 to1989,is characterized asspontaneous andfailedprovide to a independentvariables. dependent and Thefirst case,the Romanian campaign against the the of variation is the selection case basisthe of The analysis. large-N for the cases used of list from the chosen were studies case These analysis. in data the assuggested movements organizational models with variable of nonviolent dependentthe civilsuccess of resistance identifystudieslink inorder to causal processes that variables the independentof these in-depth includecase will achieve thesis partof second this the theirless likelyto goals, are movements spontaneous chances tosucceedwhile acoalitionbetter have or organization support,andinternational capacity, external state sanctions. regime type, asimultaneous violent campaign, violence on the part of the regime, government outcome, Icontrol for intervening variables canbethat influence expected to it. These include movements’ nonviolent the on structure organizational of effect independent the isolate 78 Database, Randle, and Michael Clark, Howard Carter, April by compiled action nonviolent on bibliography the from sources multiple variable).and (dependent their outcome variables) (independent campaigns nonviolent of centralization of levels between correlation 80 Global Nonviolent ActionDatabase {Available at April Carter, Howard Clark and Michael Randle, Michael and Clark Howard Carter, April Erica Chenoweth, Erica Having established in large-N movementsanalysis that nonviolent led byan umbrella Independent variables of the level of centralization were coded manually basedon were coded centralization of of level the Independent variables 79 and conflict narratives accompanying narratives and conflict ( London: York Publishing, 2006). Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying Why CivilResistanceWorks 78 case studies from the Global Nonviolent Action Nonviolent Global the from studies case People Power andProtest since 1945: A Bibliography on http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/ 22 Why Civil Resistance Works. Resistance Why Civil } 80 , (Wesleyan Inorder to CEU eTD Collection failed while the Bulgarian campaign failed whiletheBulgarian succeeded. during Inspite Bulgarianpro-democracy movement. of Romanian the all movementthat, during and nosuch security was registered forcesdefection conflict defected the target’s because the of likelihood success hadgreater a campaign also Romanian the that predict scholars action nonviolent other and Chenoweth Schock, Sharp, Bulgaria. in participants succeed as its peak membership is significantly higher: 100,000participants versus 70,000 chancesto greater have would campaign Romanian the that predict would Stephan Maria and Chenoweth Erica campaign. the fight to help military overt received and authoritarian were regimes both repression; brutal and,weremetwith regime Europe Eastern the of same region in the happened target; a as regime communist the with change regime of objective same Theyhadintransitions Europe. the Eastern democratic of in waveof peaceful the 1980-1989 happen Theyboth of with Difference timecharacteristics. during the several common period I have chosen to compare these cases because they meet the criteria for Mill’sMethod meet criteria the they because compare cases these I havechosen to 23 CEU eTD Collection 82 81 (antioccupation, goals claimed of the achievement the complete conditions: following the had satisfy campaign to A successful limited andsuccess(“2”). (“1”), failure (“0”), success criteria of a non-violent campaign with the antiregime, antioccupation, and secession goals. met the that 96 campaigns included analysis statistical the Therefore, level of centralization. 2000, Slovakia Ghana lack 1989-1992, 2000,and Tanzania 1992-1995 availabledataon their by in inCroatia governmentCampaigns in andwas 1999-2000,Senegal also excluded.the model. The from excluded statistical the ashaving outcampaigns of 106nonviolentcoded campaigns goals”the “other were andwere andmovements, they feminist with associated violenceare typically both sides. Four on antiglobalization, rights, human to compared because, scholarship nonviolent for case hard a movements and provide secession Antiregime,antioccupation andsecession. antioccupation most extreme forms of nonviolent resistance with three specific goals: antiregime, 2.1 violent tactics. violent toarmedmethods or as opposed onnonviolent rely primarily that arecampaigns campaigns objective.” political defined as “a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a and of consists 323 campaigns between 1900 and2006.Theunit of is analysis a campaign, campaigns, which is reflected through the respective dichotomous variable therespective through whichis campaigns, dichotomous reflected (“VIOLSIM”). Ibid, 5. Online Methodological Appendix, 3. The dataset dependent and the variable The dataset used for the empirical analysis was compiled by Chenoweth and byChenoweth used for empirical Stephan the wascompiled The dataset analysis The dependent variable is the campaigns’ outcome coded through scaleof an through ordinal coded outcome is campaigns’ variable the The dependent those on focus will my research Stephan, and Chenoweth of argument the Following 82 Some of the nonviolent campaigns existed simultaneously with violent with campaigns existedsimultaneously Some nonviolent of the 81 106 out of 323 campaigns are coded asnon-violent. Nonviolent are coded of 106out 323 campaigns Chapter 2. Quantitative Analysis Quantitative 2. Chapter ɋ hinese “Hundred Flowers Movement” wasinitiated hinese “HundredFlowers Movement” 24 CEU eTD Collection 84 83 Action Database, from Global the studies Nonviolent case including encyclopedias, and success the of campaigns. nonviolent structure organizational of type between distinct each establish acorrelation to in order variables asdummy was coded (“4”).Each of levels these by group one ascampaigns organized coded were accountability) hierarchical process, decision-making centralized leader, self-proclaimed or elected orparty organization, group, (e.g. bureaucratic formalwith leadership, hierarchical structure partiesor were codedas ledcampaigns byacoalition (“3”); campaigns led byone acoalitiongroups, by were led or organizations, thatof campaigns an umbrella organization (“2”); by several groups as organized centralizedcampaigns were coded leadership without parties or groups severalorganizations, initiated by were that (“1”); campaigns spontaneous as werecoded any organizational structure inmanner emerged an without unplanned independentfour dummyvariables of centralization were introduced. Nonviolent actions that therefore, research; of in process empirical identified the were levels Four centralization of 2.2 Theindependent variables was used for regression models to obtain meaningful coefficients. however, following the argument of Chenoweth, a dichotomous indicator of success or failure correlations; of for analysis used was andsuccess success limited failure, of scale Ordinal on the outcome (outcome as a discernible resultof activities of a nonviolent campaign). effect an apparent year and of activities peakof the secession) within one regime change,or Global Nonviolent ActionDatabase {Available at Chenoweth and Stephan, 14. Data on the level of campaign centralization are drawn from multiple sources, multiple from aredrawn centralization of level campaign the on Data forof thepurposes thiscoded study. variables of were The independent centralization http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/ 25 } 84 conflict 83 CEU eTD Collection 88 87 86 85 2.3 Controlvariables Clark, Randle. and by compiled action Carter, nonviolent by Chenoweth, compiled narratives disruption, tactical capabilities, and tactical disruption, from loyalty shifts capabilities, regimethe supporters. mechanismsseveral requiredfor success,suchasenhanced resilience,expanded civic activates numbers likelysucceed. High participation more are to level higher participation of with campaigns nonviolent Stephan, and Chenoweth to According campaign. the of point support. state external and sanctions, international occurrence, campaign of period campaign, violent simultaneous capacity, government violence,type, regime defection, regime security membership, forces include peak These civil literature on nonviolentresistance. structure on movements’the success. Iidentified important control variables in the existing of impact organizational independent establish the to is impossible it variables, for these have an effect on the outcome of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. Without controlling violence to crack down on a campaign. Government capacity variable is taken from the from is variabletaken capacity Government a campaign. on crack down to violence used regime the whether identifying variable is adichotomous violence Regime regime. in orautocratic democratic emerged movement measures whetherthe variable)dummy by structure. political the created resistance for opportunities the duringdefected conflict. the forces security whether target’s the captures variable that is adichotomous forces defection Ibid, 64. Chenoweth and Stephan, 10. Randle. and Clark Carter, Online Methodological Appendix, 38-141. The LMEMBERS variable captures the logged number of highestthe members thelogged at numberof captures variable The LMEMBERS Apartfrom independentthe variables of centralization, there are other factors that may Control variables of regime type, government capacity, and regime violence capture regime and capacity, government type, variablesof regime Control 85 and sources from and bibliography a comprehensive sources on 26 86 88 Regime type (democracy Regime type 87 Security CEU eTD Collection 90 1973. 32:1(October1984), 31-43 ; Gene Sharp, 89 of Centralization Table 1.Cross-tabulation ofFailure, Partial Success, andSuccess withRegard toLevel model2.4 Statistical andresults consequences, as it may justify repression and decrease support for the challenge. support repression justify may itand decrease consequences, as is have presenceof in wing a radical a movement likely armed the negative scholars, to methods violentthe were used nonviolent. Accordingmostalong with action nonviolent to separate violent campaign was active simultaneous after1991) or theCold 1991). War (after to the campaign in questionWarindicatingis variablenonviolent duringcampaign adummy whetherthe occurred (1949- or whether regime. tothe Cold available material setand capabilities the ofWar captures data Correlates altogether. movement of collapse leadthe the to and shifts, loyalty prevent severe repression, suggests violence use the that byasegmentof of challengers may disproportionately unleash against the resistance campaign. resistance the against its behaviorfor regime imposed on the are sanctions international pressureor diplomatic whether indicating variable a dichotomous is sanctions International Stephan. and Chenoweth overt military or economic aid from another state to fight against the opponent as coded by Sharp, 390. Sharp, Herbert Haines, “Black Radicalization andthe Funding of Rights:Civil 1957-1970,” Simultaneous violentcampaign is a variabledichotomous identifying whethera External state supportExternal state is variablea dichotomous indicating whethercampaign received 90 The Politics of Nonviolent Action. 27 Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, Social Problems 89 Sharp CEU eTD Collection success; 2 = success 0=failure; 1 = partial successes. That falls in line with Chenoweth’s argument that nonviolent resistance campaigns nonviolent that argument Chenoweth’s inline falls with successes. That Total Out of 96 total nonviolent as campaigns, of are coded Out of civil 96 total cases 53.1% resistance 0 2 1 Centralization within % Count Centralization within % Count Centralization within % Count Centralization within % Count Spontaneous 100,0% 27,8% 33,3% 38,9% 18 5 6 7 28 Several groups Several 100,0% 59,3% 14,8% 25,9% 27 16 4 7 Centralization Coalition 100,0% 64,7% 23,5% 11,8% 34 22 8 4 Hierarchical 100,0% 47,1% 35,3% 17,6% 17 8 6 3 100,0% 53,1% 25,0% 21,9% Total 96 51 24 21 CEU eTD Collection Therefore, these two organizational types were excluded from from wereexcluded model. twoorganizational regression these the Therefore, types (several andreveal organization) not groups significant do a statistically correlation. study while othertwo variables is significant, the statistically andspontaneous) (coalitions independent coded variables nonviolent successcivil two of campaigns and resistance variables variable between andassociation success. suggestthat the dependent results of The and regime type. All these indicators were included in the regression models models in as control included regression were the All indicators and these type. regime members, number of movement, violent simultaneous repression, regime forces defection, succeeded in and47.1% failed in of 17.6% cases. failedandinmovements 25.9%cases,led while by formal,hierarchicala organization terms ledfailure movements success and byseveralgroups succeeded in59.3% of their rates: centralization. of level higher with when atcampaigns27.8% lowest to compared campaignshavethe successrate spontaneous centralization. 7out of campaigns18 spontaneous goals. failedtoachieve stated Additionally, comparedlevels all at38.9% havethehighestcampaigns failure to of rate other with failedcampaigns suchalevelgoals. achieve Spontaneous stated to centralization of failure of Only4outof haveand34 highest thelowest success rateof 11.8%. 64.7% rate the a coalition or organization umbrella an by led Campaigns organization. hierarchical formal a campaigns led byan umbrella organization acoalition,or and 17.7%werecampaignsled by spontaneous campaigns, 35.4%were 28.1%werecampaignsledbyseveral groups, successful. werepartially 25%campaigns goals, while their stated moresucceedmuch often believed. 21.9% than commonly failedof achieve campaigns to The results show that the success of nonviolent campaigns is correlated with with security iscorrelated campaigns nonviolent successof the that The results show independent study between reveal correlations to wasused correlation A Spearman Campaigns led by several and groups hierarchical fall in organizations in between Turning to levelthe centralizationof inresistance nonviolentmovements, 18.8%were 29 CEU eTD Collection regression modelsAppendix (see The first formodel includes detailed output). variables at0.1%. 1%; ***significant at **significant at5%; *Significant standardized. are variables All Table 2:Regressions onSuccess of Nonviolent CivilResistance Campaigns international sanctions did not reveal statistically significant association with either the either with variabledependent study or andwere variables excludedfrom regressionthe models. association significant statistically reveal not did sanctions international model includedand capacity Government inas control were variables. regression the overt state support is correlated to coalitions; therefore, both Cold War and overt state support the while movements spontaneous and coalitions both with is correlated War Cold the of variables checkto their influence on the success jointly with the study variables. The variable Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients along with the robust standard errors for five (Nagelkerke) Pseudo R² Constant Cold War state support External violence Regime dummy Democracy violence Simultaneous (logged) members Number of defection Army Spontaneous Coalitions 0.466 (2.020) -2.652 (1.142) -1.154 (.664) 1.076 (.767) -1.020 (.185)* 0.279 (.902)*** 3.055 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model Model Model Model Model 5 Model 4 3 1 2 0.616 (2.388) -2.395 (1.326) -1.635 (.849) -0.414 (1.005)** -2.112 (.220) 0.296 (1,339)*** 4.320 (1.356)* -2.322 (1.019)* 1.822 30 0.647 (2.599) -3.533 (.995) 1.502 (1.553) -2.382 (.922) -0.785 (1.135)** -2.766 (.238) 0.369 (1.637)*** 5.212 (1.402)** -2.865 (1.223)** 2.561 0.686 (2.878) -0.585 (1.370) -1.233 (.909) -0.544 (1.182)** -2.971 (.265) 0.124 (1.479)* -2.868 (1.198)** 2.696 (2.215)** -4.401 (1.391)*** 4.839 0.708 (2.907) -1.281 (1,144) 1.542 (1.512) -1.868 (1.026) -1.046 (1.344)*** -3.661 (.270) 0.151 (1.742)*** 5.782 (1.574)** -3.469 (1.412)** 3.458 (2.458)* -4.706 CEU eTD Collection inclusion inclusion indicatingof campaign variable the during that the Cold the Waroccurred (Model is specified muchbetter thanthemodel with only.control variables from 0.616, suggesting0.466 to model that the variableswith for organizational the structure variable R-squared increases dependent firststudy variables.than the model Pseudo without movements. of that spontaneous isbiggerthan movements coalition averageof size the that cases show andother from These against1987-1989. occupation Tibetan Chinese spontaneous revolt only Greece in in1974 attracted 2,500 people andonly participated people the 10,000 in military rule against protests spontaneous Incontrast, participants. overamillion attracted againstrevolt led by Military Democratic Coalition 1993-1999was National rule and Nigerian the Similarly, people. million 2 over attracted and Organization Action Democratic structure. The Filipino campaign Power People from 1983-1986 wasled bythe United organizational andits movement size a of average the between is a connection often there become more important determinants of success than number of participants. Empirically participants to lose its statistical significance. It suggests that coalitions and spontaneous inclusion2). The variablesstudy of two of organizational causestypes thenumber of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, while campaigns, resistance civil nonviolent the regime type, regime and not violence do prove be statisticallyto (Model significant 1). campaigns, violent simultaneously level.occurring of existence lower 0.1 at the The but be to alsoseems significant of impact on numberparticipants success;the positivelarge,the has a Army defection campaigns. civil resistance nonviolent successof tothe related strongly coalitions The next two models show that both It is mentioningworth that secondthe model explains muchmorevariance in the The includes model second variables control from Model the 1 and variablesstudy of and spontaneous . Coalitions is positively associated with the success of success with the associated positively is 31 spontaneous coalitions and has a negative coefficient (Model coefficient hasanegative spontaneous are robust are to the to CEU eTD Collection 91 modes means their or in model at variables holdingthe other all that Table3shows, The campaign. civil resistance of probabilities predicted the calculate predictivehighest of power 70% (Model 5). support. The fifth model includes all mentioned abovethe control variables and has the type during isimportant War Cold aswellafter and ornotthereis whether external state organizational the that means intervention and War Cold for controlling when even significant 3) andsupport overt the dummy The fact(Model both 4). that study variables remained higher chanceof 76.5%. 8.3% of butsucceeding,if had movementthe coalitional itwouldstructure, have amuch such hypothetical case.Being thehave Tibetan spontaneous, campaign would achanceof meets the conditions for againstChinese occupation example, Tibetan (1987-1989) revolt the organization is 76.5%. The chanceis 46.8%. foracampaign succeed when itto is led by an or a coalition umbrella itisled either aformal, byseveral or groups/organizations/parties hierarchical organization) nor ledby succeed spontaneous neither (when a coalition when itischance ofacampaignto Ordinal variables were held at their means, dichotomous variables were held at their modes. attheir held were variables dichotomous means, attheir held were variables Ordinal I used from outputthe Model predictive5, whichhas thehighest in power, order to Of course, such numbers can only have meaning if cases have the assigned values. For values. assigned the have cases if meaning have only can numbers such course, Of 91 , the chance of a spontaneous campaign to succeed is The campaign 8.3%. ato , thechance of spontaneous coalitions 32 and spontaneous for an average nonviolent CEU eTD Collection succeed in nonviolentstruggle thanmovements with more developed organizational structure. to likely less are movements spontaneous that hypothesis second my and centralization levels of with other movements than succeed likely to more are leadership horizontal ledbyacoalition with aparty/organization civil movements or nonviolent resistance Table 3.Probabilities ofSuccessBasedon the Centralization Factor Therefore, the results of the statistical analysis confirm both my first hypothesis that hypothesis first my both confirm analysis statistical the of results the Therefore, 33 CEU eTD Collection 8. 94 93 1997), 54. of oppositional civil groups. The Romanian and Bulgarian cases also have different outcomes: by a coalition led was campaign Bulgarian while the as spontaneous ischaracterized regime communist the against campaign Romanian the centralization: of levels different had Bulgaria democracy campaign; both campaignsmet were with brutal regime repressions. and emergedin authoritarian thatreceivedregimes overtmilitary helpsuppress to pro- the Cold War, had the same goal of regime change against the same communist regime target, Romania Bulgaria werehighly and both occurred in atsimilar: they end the Eastern Europe of similaritnot." inwhich respects does other which of consists "comparing instances in phenomenonwhich withdoes occur, instances in 92 study variable. the on values different and characteristics general similar cases with chooses investigator perform in comparison through Mill’sMethod the of controlled Difference, which the Van wecan AccordingEvera, in to 1989. and Bulgaria from cases: Romaniatwo 1987-1989 at closely look will I outcome, the to centralization of levels different link that mechanisms connecting thewith independent dependentthe variable. methodsis in Case-study thanlarge-N much morethe causal effective testing processes of likelihood statistical the success.happening. analysis whythisis However, cannottell us the on effect negative strong a reveal movements spontaneous while effect, positive associated with different outcomes of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. Coalitions have a John Stuart Mill, Ibid, 57. Stephen Van Evera, Stephen Although they are otherwise similar, nonviolent the in campaigns Romania and The discussion in the previous chapter suggests that different organizational organizational different are types suggeststhat in chapter previous the The discussion 1989 Bulgaria and Studies: 1987-1989 Romania 3. Case Chapter 93 A System of Logic The Method of Difference is one of the most common comparative methods, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science , (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1972), Book III, chapter 34 94 Nonviolent civil resistance campaigns in campaigns resistance civil Nonviolent 92 Therefore, to explore the causal the to explore Therefore, , (New York: Cornell University Press, CEU eTD Collection South America and Post-Communist Europe, 96 95 democracy. stable by followed successfully not was regime authoritarian of where fall the the Europe Eastern making Nicolae seizedpower, only in the newauthoritarians country Romania Ceausescu bloody Revolution deposition highly asafter dictatorial was andof unsuccessful, 1989 of Romanian The Romania. of exception notable the with below from movements or above from All the former communist countries of the region wereRomania 3.1. transformed either through reforms campaign. Bulgarian the during occurred defection while nosuch movement protest the to forces defected security counterpart in Bulgaria. First, it was characterized by higher level of participation, second, the indicators important Romanianthe nonviolent hadmore succeed chances campaign its to than movementachieved political without bloodshed.change Romanianthe providecampaign failed nonviolent a to transformation, theBulgarian while study I will emphasize how the repressive character of Ceausescu’s regime shapedthe regime of Ceausescu’s character therepressive how emphasize study I will revolution.” “captured the of phenomenon the and of Ceausescu’s regime could explain the impossibility of peaceful transformation in Romania Sovietthe Union. Juan Linz andAlfred Stepan claim sultanisticandtotalitarianthe character extreme personalism and despotism regime Ceausescu the of andits special relationship with Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan, Alfred and J Linz Juan 438. Sharp, The cases of Romania and Bulgaria are especially interesting because based on two Most authorsMost argue thethat exceptionalism ofRomania beby explained can the The wave of democratization swept over Eastern European countries in 1980s. thelate European countries Eastern sweptover of The democratization wave 95 Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.Southern Europe, (London: The Johns Hopkins Press Ltd., 1996), 355-359. 35 96 Accepting this point of Acceptingview,inof this point this case CEU eTD Collection 102 101 Oxford,and Oxford University Press, 1993), 163. 100 99 98 when protests broke out on the streets of Bucharest, the army defected and serious fighting andserious army the defected of Bucharest, thestreets outon broke when protests Cluj, Targu Mures, and Constanta demanding an end to the blood-letting. the demandingCluj, end Mures,andConstanta to an Targu 97 massacre with thousands of people killedhappened during night the of December 17. until Ceausescu ordered5,000 people headquarters. The theparty surrounded army touch not did demonstrators the to deal with them reforms. governmental his of the of criticism because villagemovea remote to to “a la Tiananmen Square.”Timisoara in order to protect LászlóAs T a result, a bloody of streets the on followed. people gathered December 1989, In Bucharest Iasi,Timisoara, and further in demonstrations suppressed by army its however, leadersarrested; the with disappeared. suspiciously main andthe activists werecancelled, concessions initiallyconcessions, later but breadledthese that to reduced against rations inTransylvania appear in 1980s. regimethe began to movements. in nonviolent resistance lowspontaneous of efficiency of the statistical results illustrates case from Romanian the character of Romanianthe lacked opposition, which anyform of data organization. Empirical headquarters, protesting andheadquarters, wage cuts against demanding living normal conditions. in of city the besieged alocal center the marchedprotested party and through Brasov. They happened whenserious popular uprising onNovember 15,1987, tens of workers thousands of Rady, 73. Ackerman and DuVall, 436. Martyn Rady, Martyn Rady, 99. Ibid. Gale Gale Stokes, Appalled by newscomingthe from RomaniansTimisoara, tookto in streets the Arad, Lacking a clear strategy and defined goals, the protest in Brasov was brutally in Brasovwas the goals, protest and defined Lacking aclearstrategy Martyn Rady points out that the first signs of incipient resistance to the Ceausescu The Walls Came Tumbling Down: TheCollapse ofCommunism in Eastern Europe Romania in Turmoil , London: IB Tauris&Co LTD., 1992, 73. 97 Ę Serious popular Serious began in1986 protests with astrike kés, the Hungarian reform minister who was ordered 36 102 ByDecember 21, 98 , (New York The next The 99 101 100 Over CEU eTD Collection what was happening; “some thought the prisoner had escaped, others that foreign had that forces had escaped,others prisoner the thought “some whatwas happening; hadone idea sheerof an No curiosity. either or by accident street drawn peoplethe on were the participants. faltering,come struggled andthe opposition upwith to listof the satisfactory demands for all was obviously regime when the movement the phase of last the formulatedon only were a unitary clear notstand.” andcertainly platform on which Thedemandsto of opposition the a have not did and reactionary largely were “demonstrations that notes She Pusca. Mihaela is and, chances sharedbyAnca had limited for success, therefore, organizational structure society. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 101. emerged.” hadnosamizdatsociety yet and, unionCzechoslovakia, unlike trade independentapparatus fragmentedhighly anddisorganized.“unlike He comments that Poland, Romania lackedan was countries, European Eastern to other Romania, compared in opposition the that fact purpose.” clear and organization yet“lacked both people consisting Salvation Front” of guard”. “old communistthe aspower was followed seized by democratic “National of the defeatCeausescu, no transition successful the of In spite ousted. was and Ceausescu Committee, Central of the headquarters 107 106 105 104 103 dictator. to the began between the army,now loyal to the nation, and the Securitate forces that were still loyal Anca Mihaela Pusca, Mihaela Anca Ibid. Ibid, 73. Rady, 75. Stokes, 165. Rady’s argument, thatnonviolentactions inRomanialacked 1987-1989 any Rady emerging protests claims significant thatthe in attracted numbers1987-1989 of 106 Intellectual Intellectual of likefragmented, remained groups opposition Romanian other 107 103 Quoting the participants and witnesses of Timisoara, she concludes that On Decemberprotestors supported by 22, army the thestormed Revolution, Democratic Transition and Disillusionment. The Case of Romania 37 105 104 He puts special emphasis on the , CEU eTD Collection 111 110 111. for was certainlynot open a demand that Ceausescu, of resignation immediate was the on agreed demanda messinto concrete demonstrators fear. The only by that and ruled confusion insignificant personal items flats such andas passports, food. The whole negotiation turned nogrand strategy clearHaving askingfor started or revolutionaries plan the demands, of revolt!” spontaneous was anentirely “It despair- of and out desperation streets the driven onto demonstrations inRomania weredisorganized fragmented. Heargues and people that were and incountries, all pro-democracy the Eastern European campaigns other protests in inRomania opposition the late 1980s.Frauendorfer thatcompared confirms activists to the European Home, 109 108 demands: listof awell-articulated or committee havean organized not did they but Timisoara, in 20 December negotiationson table of the wereinvited at protestors that Pusca states wereunprepared tonegotiate. in however, Romaniademonstrators transition; smoother a allowed for peaceful negotiations Europe Intherestof Eastern of countries its opponent. organization undermined the ability movementof the conducteffective to negotiations with lateinof onits outcome. 1980shad the all, First effect of anegative absence of any kind the agreeonits1987-1989 unique character. spontaneous invaded Romania.” Ibid. Pusca, 103. Michael Randle, Michael Ibid, 97. with prime-minister Dascalescu’s aggressive demands. aggressive Dascalescu’s prime-minister with faced when listof demands aconcrete of haveor action plan a not and did other, each know not did members delegation of the most thus and of representatives committee formedin byan with ad hoc was negotiate the sentparty elites The to delegation Similarly,of agreethatthespontaneous character opposition historians the in Romania 109 Therefore, most Therefore, historians providingthe descriptiveof account events in Romania People Power: TheBuilding of a New European Home offers an extensive interview with Helmuth Frauendorfer, who was one of one was who Frauendorfer, Helmuth with interview extensive an offers 108 Michael Randle, in his book 38 People a Power. TheBuldingof New 111 , (Stroud: HawthornPress, 1991), 110 CEU eTD Collection 116 115 114 62-80. 113 112 wouldif have beeneasier was more movement the andorganized centralized. discipline in Maintaining turn that of protests. character maintainedopposition peaceful nonviolentother scholars,have action the been regime’srepressions not would if asbrutal the arguments fornonviolent primacy the discipline offeredof Ackerman, and bySharp, DuVall foughtdisciplineback.keep nonviolent not defectedarmy the butthat did December.” 22 prior to Securitate firethe and returned on peoplethe partof the took Timisoara in soldiers “some mentions that The author protestors. the sideof the fightingon started Randle also concludes that the revolutionarson. and fighting, hand-to-hand lost stone-throwing, with accompanied were riots the of its nonviolent violent methodsfrequently to and,shooting.the provoked resorted thus, momentum Romanian of protestors Siani-Davies,revolution, Peter the account adetailed to whoprovides when the according However, theauthorities. army of side the entirely on occurred violence the that explain refercampaign. Although most the authors revolution in they to asviolent, Romania always prevented themaintenance ofnonviolentdiscipline thatis in paramount nonviolentany completely. negotiation at that point. Ibid, 115. Randle, 42. Ibid, 80. Peter Siani-Davies, Peter Ibid, 103-104. fell stones were thrown, more cars were set on fire, and the shooting began again, dead.leaving anumber of protesters began shooting the and fire, on set were cars more thrown, were stones fell […]As by night the accompanied of breaking windows the violenceserious erupted, wereinitially In protests it nightfall Tagru Muresthe peaceful,and was only after that leaders with recognizable structure organizational a well-defined lackof the Second, 115 Romanian activist Helmuth Frauendorfer interviewed by Randle also confirms also Randle by interviewed Frauendorfer Helmuth activist Romanian Romanian Revolution of December 1989 112 As the result, the negotiations with the party elite failed 114 39 , (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), 113 He says that most 116 Following the CEU eTD Collection 120 119 118 117 within the party. It is they who turned out to be the principal beneficiaries of the revolution. that was sufficiently organized tocome topower was the group of the communist“old guard” of Romanianin group burstout only on protests spontaneously cities late1989,the streets the massive once outthat bitterly points factions. Nagy communist by revolution reactionary oppositional thatwould groups stratabroad unite of ledsociety “capture” the of to the afterThe lack becameCeausescu’s evident Romanian Revolution of defeat. any organized spontaneous, and politically manipulated to produce agoverningproduce alternative.” to manipulated andspontaneous, politically short, sufficient too organizationalnational “The visibility.and uprisingwas resources with organizations produce leaders or democratic not Revolution the did concludethat is by LinzandStepan. sharedThey veterans, party disaffected the to viable alternative effective negotiations with the Ceausescu’s regime, prevented the maintenance of nonviolent of maintenance the prevented regime, with Ceausescu’s the negotiations effective conduct to movement the of ability the undermined it outcome: its on effects negative by regime. shortly followed democratic the Romania where thein wasnot only of defeat Europe dictator the was the Eastern country By 1990s the rhetoric. democratic in of bespite allegedly socialist, to continued government governmental alternative to the National Salvation Front. strong enough partiespresenta andfragmented while not to were groups also reconstituted any well-organized thebring forefront to becausepredetermined, didnot therevolution basically was elections presidential and outcome of parliamentary the the that similarly argues Ackerman and DuVall, 438. Randle, 71. Linz and Stepan, 359. Rady, 75. The third and probably most important negativeimportant of most The third effect character of andprobably disorganized the This view, that the lack of centralization in the uprising prevented the creation of a lackcreation the inThis view,that the prevented of uprising of centralization the The low level of organization of the Romanian revolution had three discernible 120 40 119 As a result, the orientation of the 118 Randle 117 CEU eTD Collection 124 123 1989,” ofDecember Transition Romanian the from Evidence 122 121 asin culture oppositional a second of for the development no space allowed regime regime. the of qualities totalitarian and sultanistic strong whatsoever. exist such outlawed,manipulated, andit to butnot could harassed, extentthat not continuously an opportunitiesinfor offered opposition Ofcourse, dissent. greater these countries alsowas there regimes of communist nature the less repressive because the possible was democracy towards transition peaceful the inand Poland Hungary that argues society.” He of fringes individualsat the and wouldgroups be it thebe catalyst spontaneous, out, largely would break to protest were anti-regime that, ensured but all regime Ceausescu of the characteristics “the therefore, opposition; their structure regimes that claims Hall Richard regime. of Ceausescu’s nature the is inRomania repressive nationally exceptionally known the groups explanations are the most prominent in the scholars’ debate. in case. this nonexistent were countries European Eastern inother change historianshave over why large debated movements and opposition led the reformist that to its andrevolution of negative consequences,leaderlessand Romanian amorphous character Recognizing byhard-line of capture the facilitated the communists. power discipline, and unlikely generateto demonstrations of solidarity or new expressions of dissent.” that any oppositionideologically Comprehensivestunted. control society over and within party was the so total seemed quixoticleaderless, and if bedisorganized,clandestine, atall, itopposition, would existed and suicidal, “dissent was seen as a solitary gesture, Linz and Stepan, 352. Ibid, 1072. Richard Andrew Hall, “Theories of Collective Actionand Revolution: Nestor Ratesh, Nestor Linz and Stepan similarly explain the exceptionalism of the Romanian case through The first certainly and most common the nonexistenceof explanation of and organized Romania: The Entangled Revolution 122 The sultanistic nature of the Ceausescu’s regime ensured that societal that ensured regime of Ceausescu’s nature the Thesultanistic , (New, York: Praeger Publishers, 1991),14. 41 Europe-Asia Studies 124 According to them, Ceausescu’s 52 (September2000), 1071. 123 121 Three CEU eTD Collection 126 125 small, the arrangement, small is personal matters the that thing “The only transformation: Romanians donothave enoughof fora political an culture democraticorganized illustrates that most Romanians do not have an idea of civil society. He argues that the opposition in civil society brings down the regime without being met by violence.” combination virtually inprecludes a transition which a democratic well-organized and “sultanisticand totalitarian the that conclude Linz andStepan in Therefore, Hungary. in 60inPoland, Czechoslovakia 21 organizations leaders to and compared 27 unknown with independent two Romania hadonly show that that Free Europe, EuropebyRadio Eastern in conducted movements independent of survey the of results the cite They crime. be a to foreigner wasconsidered a with andevery beconversation registered hadto every typewriter intense asinRomania: as services his security and of the penetration fearthe dictator of the was state noother Bulgaria. In a lesser extent, Germany and,to East Poland, Czechoslovakia, existence of such organizations as Civic Forum or Solidarnost in Romania. non- the explain may class working the of marginality and weakness the that suggests Ratesh Therefore, former with contempt. the frequently treated who intellectuals, and between workers communication lackin of a that argues was Romania there author the more, frighten manipulate couldof authorities population and thisthe segment with Whatis ease. therefore, values; urban obtain and environment urban the into assimilate to time enough countries.other InRomania it partially of consisted displaced peasants whodidhave not in class working the than younger much was class working Romanian the fact the to attention European countries. Ratesh draws Eastern toother working inRomania class the compared Ratesh, 15. Ibid, 357. The third explanation deals with the weak civil society in Romania. Mircea Mihaies The second explanation is offered by Nestor Ratesh and deals with the different role of 42 126 125 CEU eTD Collection 127 communists of ingovernment out 1991. in pushedthe the negotiated multi-party resignation Zhivkov,June 1990,and elections of in the Union of DemocraticBulgaria, opposition began to organize in late 1980s. the Several united oppositional groups Forces, causing censorship. a political crisis in an police secret and harsh characterized suppression dissent, bythe of ubiquitous ruthless the country that led toBulgariabecame one of mostthethe repressive authoritarian regimes in Europe. This regime was 3.2 Bulgaria itson in hadeffect outcome. anegative country the campaign democratic pro- of character thespontaneous that agree allhistorians However, and centralization. organization of level lowest the had movement Romanian the why of explanations different proved to be more difficult than in other countries of the region. chauvinism andnationalism. He the developmentconcludes, in of democracy Romania with combined identity a weaksense of thelack of led to foreign domination existence under long of periods Frauendorfer, to According and ruleUSSR of Bulgaria. the came the under Romania After Greater Secondthe the War, inWorldof only 1918. parts Romanian territory countries, under asthree beforedomination existed separate were united which then 1878and exceptionalism inopposition of Romania. HeremindslivedunderOttoman usthat Romania the to explanation same the offers Randle, to interview in his Frauendorfer, Helmuth barely spot.Passivity living warm have anyandevil vitality.” with kindof defeated Challenges 129 128 1989 Mircea Mihaies, “The Neighbors of Kafka: Intellectual’s Note from the Underground” in Underground” the Notefrom Intellectual’s ofKafka: Neighbors “The Mihaies, Mircea Minton F. Goldman, Randle, 117. , Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., ( New York: Routledge, 1999), 254. During rule the of communistthe leader Zhivkov, Todor whocamepower to in 1954, , (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 83. 129 However, despite the highly totalitarian character of the communist regime in regime communist the of character highly the totalitarian despite However, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe. Political, Economic andSocial 43 128 Therefore, there can be can there Therefore, The Revolutions of Revolutions The 127 CEU eTD Collection 1980s. At first, the new Bulgarian intelligentsia did not have much reason to oppose the oppose to reason much have not did intelligentsia Bulgarian new the first, At 1980s. push for more vocal opposition from other segments of society. voluntarily afterwards. (around 5,000people) from weredeported country.the Some left 300,000Turks country the Turks and other of protests, organizers leaders, community Turkish demonstrations, the Asaresultof wereinjured arrested. and andmanyparticipants werekilled of Dozens people and using tanks. bombs, dogs, andtroops and by assaulted smoke militia guns, the were Communist place inMay regime.over 15,000people Demonstrations thattook 1989 attracted demonstrations, againsthunger stoppages,and persistentpressure work strikes the the of wasformedRights, of inMay Activists Democraticthe organized League 1989. a of series The mostgroups. prominent of them, Democraticfor the theDefense League of Human and Turks form concerned human-rights abuses to with others minority started Turkish the of andpractices names. upTurkish give policies living againstforcing Turks inBulgaria, many abandon them to and cultural religious and his communist party. Since 1985, Zhivkov had been implementing harsh discriminatory movement. environmental the and intelligentsia, the major community, ethnic Turkish the three sources: came from change. dissent began situation toBulgarian The mainstream of 1988the after 132 131 130 leaving individualand spacewere arrested of prosecuted, only for acts resistance. leaders theirmeeting, from and wereharassedandprevented 1988. Groups effectively up to Ibid. Randle, 35. Linz and Stepan, 335. The intelligentsia constituted the second source of dissent in Bulgaria in the late in the in Bulgaria dissent of source second the constituted intelligentsia The Ethnic played importantrole Turks an inundermining Zhivkov the position Todor of Linz and Stepan showthat totalitarianLinz andin Stepan with regime Bulgaria dealt opposition 132 These protests and the brutal reaction of the government, acted as a 131 In response to this forced assimilation, the Bulgarian 44 130 However, CEU eTD Collection stay instay by leader.John unpopularpower According againstthe uniting Feffer, to “with an centre of centre of Sofia apetition and presented of 11,500 signaturesto nationalthe assembly. marchedthe organized through peopleof amassdemonstration Ecoglasnost who 5,000 over of the regimehad the reverse effect and on November 3, thefinal day of the conference, 137 136 135 134 133 beatup and arrested. demonstrators with by inaweek, police the suppressed day, holding upplacards condemning regime’s the Protests wereenvironmental record.” each Sofia in central spot same in the themselves planted “Demonstrators demonstrations: and of protests a series organized in Ecoglasnost Sofia, conference environmental CSCEthe 1989at InOctober environmental policies. issues with governmental Ecoglasnostwas April environmental 1989, the organization established, connecting In in proving area. decline the ecological data with anexhibition staged Ruse, whereactivists demonstrations contamination against of airthe chlorine with gasbeganin December 1987in government. of the the actions criticized membersTurkish protests, started sending group of this national the appeals to assembly that of suppression After thebrutal University. wasformed atSofia Glasnost Perestroika and opposition. democratic abelated create reforms of adopt the failure to with regime’s the frustrated became in theUSSR Bulgarianswas were awareof what on going However, by1988, educated who munificencethem.” regime’s the toward flatteringobliquely remindingof them them, and regime. Zhivkov “artfully theirloyalty cultivated by theiracknowledging achievements, Randle, 36. Ackerman and DuVall, 431. Stokes, 146. Randle, 146. Goldman, 89. Under from growing pressure opposition,the someof Zhivkov’s colleagues tried to The third source of dissent in Bulgaria came from environmental activists. The first The activists. environmental from came in Bulgaria dissent of source third The 135 134 In the fall of 1988, the Club for the Support of for Support the Club 1988, the fall of Inthe 45 perestroika 136 and began to began and Thebrutality 137 133 CEU eTD Collection 140 139 138 willing tointroduce limited a reformsperestroika-style topursue of political development. maintainits leadership.took Mladenov, who placethe of Zhivkov after his was resignation, pushed Zhivkov resign,mightto his hoping that departure enable theCommunist Party to Zhivkov.” forestallParty had decided scenarioGerman to an East actionwith prompt against theBulgarian Communist streets, withinexplode the the reformers onto opposition aboutto Research Center inSofia,2010), 175. various origins and aims: (UDF). TheUDF was founded onDecember 7and consisted of with opposition groups beginning the a recognizable forceinto at dissent spontaneous from Bulgariaweak transformed of Decemberface.” 1989human a with it endow to as communism withdismantle to much so not aimed They perestroika. the organizationcolleagues “came to power with little more than the ambition of emulating Gorbachev’s of in account of Dimitrov, 1980.According events late the and Mladenov his Bulgaria to in the Union of Democratic Forces 141 ranks of ranks of Communistthe in Party 1960s,becamethe the Union’sfirst Chairman. According to Zheliugroup. dissidentintellectuals Zhelev,ofthe one most prominent expelledfrom the membersincludedeach from three council bya The that headed UDF was coordinating Vasselin Dimitrov, Vasselin Goldman, 90. Feffer, John NassyaKralevska-Owens, 140 Union. Workers’ SocialBulgarian the Movement, Initiative Civil the Society, Students’ Independent Democratic Repressions Spiritual Clubthe to Individuals Values, of Subjected after 1945,the Committee for the Protection of PartyReligious Rights, Freedomthe Federation,Labor the for Independent Podkrepa the of Rights, Human of Protection ConscienceSociety and Independent the Society, Independent ….. Ecoglasnost the Democracy, and theThe Founding Declaration of UDFwassignedby the for Club Glasnostthe and Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Vesselin Dimitrov, in his book in his Dimitrov, Vesselin However, such limited reforms were not enough and came too late. Opposition in late. Opposition too came enough and werenot suchlimited reforms However, 138 Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov and Politburo member Andrei Lukanov Andrei member Politburo and Mladenov Petar Minister Foreign Shock Waves. Eastern Europe after the Revolutions 141 Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition Communism versus Democracy: Bulgaria 1944 to 1997 Bulgaria: theUneven Transition 46 , (London: Routledge, 2001), 37. , (Boston: South EndPress,1992), 232. , (Sofia: American , provides a detailed 139 CEU eTD Collection 144 143 142 public life.” of andplacewoninthecountry’s activity, andsubject profile autonomy,specific prestige constituting “preserved Foundingtheirthe the Union groups of all Declaration UDF, the the army and the militia. army the and parliamentary elections, rehabilitating repressed unlawfully individuals and depoliticizing the demand for a new democratic Constitution, new labor and social legislation, democratic same Atthe UDF program processes.” including the a time, clear-cutcompiled of a demands, further development the of flexible “in to democratic leadershipthe order and a structure abolish Article 1 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the leading role of the Communist the of role leading the guaranteed which Constitution, the of 1 Article abolish The UDF toform called people a humanchain around the National Assembly, demanding to reached 50,000. protestors number of thatthe mentions Kralevska-Owens revolution. Nassya massive demonstration in Sofia that showed communistleaders the power of a popular leaders.” newopposition welcome the square…to streamed tothe “excited people rally 70,000 bytheUDFgathered over organized had oppositional for people.As attracting multiplegroups channels first mass influential a result,the most the of comprised coalition The system. democratic competitive fully of satellites to a reformedUDF was more capable Communist of mobilizing people. TheParty, UDF leaders,Bulgarian revolution in fournotmajor ways.satisfiedwere First, the opposition united under the umbrellato of determinedplaythe the role to push for the creation of a identity among – participants identitythe of anti-communistthe struggle. groups, UDF the provided helped connectivethe them with structures createthat acommon to Kralevska-Owens, 185. Ibid. New Political and Public Forces The existence of a centralizing organizational structure influenced The existence of of structure organizational outcome the the a centralizing 142 Therefore, the UDF was formed as an umbrella organization with diverse organization an formedumbrella as UDFwas the Therefore, 143 Despite the different backgrounds and aims of the oppositional , BTA Parelleli, (Sofia: Courier Press Service, 1990), 4. 144 OnDecember first UDFled truly 14,1989,the the 47 CEU eTD Collection (December14, 1989), accessed through LexisNexis Academic on May 27, 2011. itparticipate in Thus, the UDF showed political its invitedParliament, responsibility. was to And second, bymaintainingand discipline preventing among protestors attack the on the mobilizeits itby ability popularDecember on to showed discontent protest the organizing 14. First, negotiation partner. seeing leaders UDFasadesirable the started CommunistDimitrov, leaders. to According from concessions Communist andthe partner achieved important campaign. in the violence of outburst the preventing building, the storm to not remainand peaceful to demonstrators the urging speeches UDFgave the The leadersof 148 147 146 145 weeks: past consistingdemonstrators, mostly youth, couldof easily fargo too and thegains reverse of the provocativeto respondmaintain to actionsnonviolentdiscipline. andto not protestors urgedthe leaders UDF The parliament. on an attack and prevent demonstrators goal. common the under united of people for mobilization important was of creation a coalition democracy inevitable. longermaintain was to noand atransition to regime the enough Party. Guillermo Angelov, "Parliament Postpones Crucial Vote, 20,000 protest," Ibid. 38. Dimitrov, Ibid, 192. 145 Third, after the demonstrations the Union managed to emerge as a crediblenegotiation ''Democracy ''Democracy be should achievedin way.'' a democratic way,'' said Zhelev,Zheliu whoheads Union the forForces of Democracy in Bulgaria. described themostly as youthful ''behavingprotesters like a mob.'' ''This isnot the One witness wayinto Parliament. its andforce andtry would violent become crowd nightfall. Leadersof Bulgaria's main pleaded opposition group for fearing restraint, the Parliamentthe buildingfor severalhours beforebeingdisperse persuaded to after shouting surrounded The ''resign, with and''down party,'' the demonstrators, resign'' in theUDFmanaged Second, torestrain of course the demonstrations Mladenov and his colleagues finally realized that the courseoflimited the that was realized reforms Mladenov and hisfinally colleagues 48 148 United Press International 147 The crowd of , 146 The CEU eTD Collection 151 150 149 streets despite the radical moods helpedmaintain mobilize disciplinenonviolentgroups alargenumber of onthe to to people, in the crowd, to enable the fourmovement discernible positive effectsto conducton its outcome. The existence effective of the coalition of oppositional was agreementthe hold to the firstdemocratic multi-party elections inJune 1990. achievement of negotiations round-table the important police. secretThedisbanded the most and parties, political of existence the legalized individual, the of rights civil and freedoms leaders.fundamental agreementfrom safeguardedCommunist TheBCP that signed an list had concessions UDF leaders of andmanagedachieveimportant a clear-cut demands to instarted early January aturningproved in point democracy transition the to in Bulgaria. The round-table negotiations itas happened inHungary and Poland. resign as well.A truly democratic constitution was adopted in the country in July 1991. demonstrationsin Bulgarian Sofia made cities other eventually and Lukanov Prime Minister inover40years. head ofBulgaria noncommunist first the became Zhelev, Zheliu UDF, the of head The 1990. July in resignation Mladenov’s President forced that demonstrations street and strikes of aseries UDF organized and emerged asa strong political Notsatisfiedopponent. with resultsthe of elections,the the in votes themajority UDF 36%of over Party) gained parliament, the of received the seats the the BCP organized Dimitrov notes, (transformed political Communist force.though,as Even UDFmanagedthe to itselftransform from a coalition of oppositional intocivic groups an elections, parliamentary of threshold On the Party. Communist transformed the to alternative Ibid, 42. Ibid. Dimitrov., 40-41 The high level of organization and centralization of the Bulgarian revolution thus had thus revolution Bulgarian the of centralization and organization of level high The Finally, oppositional enough the presentcoalition was strong a viableto governmental 49 Further protests andFurther protests large anti-BSP 149 These negotiations that Thesenegotiations 150 151 CEU eTD Collection would provide a viable alternative to the existing party. In contrast, the Union of the Union of Democratic party.contrast, existing In the to viable alternative a would provide that groups well-organized or any bring leaders forefrontthe democratic not to did revolution was sufficiently that only the group Ceausescu’s defeat, After communists. hard-line the to viable alternative organized to come tononviolentdiscipline andignore governmental provocations. power was maintain to demonstrators called the The UDFleaders onParliament. an attack the prevent group of thecommunist first place. In the case violencefrequently violence, theshooting with to andsometimes even in responded provoked leaders. of Bulgaria, the UDF Themanaged maintenancethe of nonviolent Lacking discipline.in effective leadership, protestors Romania to restrain the demonstrators and elections. multi-party firstof the date with the opponent. As the result of these negotiations,many issues were settled,including the effective discussions round-table conduct to able its leaderswere list demands, andcut of hadForces aclear- Union the of Democratic Inthe caseof Bulgaria, impossible. discussion didlist of havewhichmadetheconstructive not demands, acoherent Protestors concessions. significant obtain and regime Ceausescu’s with negotiations start effective to movement the of character countries. in opposition the spontaneous The the ability Romaniaof undermined in these resistance civil nonviolent of outcomes in different role important an played Bulgaria Comparative3.3. analysis alternative. political aviable presenting by regime Communist the overthrow finally andto leaders, communist the with negotiations Third, the lack of centralization in the Romanian uprising prevented the creation of a the creation in uprisingof prevented Romanian Third, lackof the centralization the prevented revolution inRomanian caseof lowSecond,organization the levelthe of and in Romania movements pro-democracy the of centralization of levels Different 50 CEU eTD Collection the political in political Bulgaria. the course managedForces to itselftransform intoa well-organized political force andpush changeto 51 CEU eTD Collection leaders. extremely bloody and highly Ceausescuunsuccessful, as by was communistreplaced other 1989 was theRomanian campaignof As aresult, hard-linealternative the communists. to viable a create and discipline, nonviolent maintain regime, Ceausescu’s with negotiations effectiveconduct its ability to in undermined Romania of character opposition the spontaneous The civil nonviolentresistance. of roleoutcomes indifferent an important played centralization levels of thatdifferent cases showed two these of Comparison analysis. of statistical from results the the Difference of Method Mill’s basedon selected cases were casesof resistance: ofnonviolent two Romania and from in 1987-1989 Bulgaria 1989. These analysis acomprehensive conducted I campaigns, nonviolent resistance civil of outcome the variablesholding all means attheirother andmodes. achievetransformation apolitical to chance a8.3% campaigns haveonly spontaneous that movements The with organizational structures. probabilitiesother of shows analysis predicted movements,transformation. having achieve a political havea76.5%chanceto by coalitions Additionally, headed shows that campaigns the thelowest probabilities of predicted The analysis structures. organizational with other movements than findings of thelevel regressionsucceed likely to more leadership are diverse with an or umbrella organization by a coalition analysisof centralization,large-N statistical analysis of 96 cases. Thefindings of analysisthis campaigns show that led show that spontaneous through wasdemonstrated campaigns nonviolent outcome of successful to the contribute levels certain of centralization that argument The campaigns. civil resistance nonviolent are less likely to succeed than In order to explore the casual mechanisms that link different levels of centralization to centralization levels of link different that mechanisms casual the toexplore In order The present thesis has examined how the level of centralization affects the outcome the of affects centralization level how the of examined has thesis The present Conclusion 52 CEU eTD Collection through nonviolentthrough methods. transformation achieve political to try asthey activists movements’ for resistance guidance as serve may findings Its implications. practical has also study The action. nonviolent by civil so farbeenoverlooked something of that theoreticians campaigns,the has resistance nonviolent of success the of predictor important an be may type organizational movement’s a that show they Theoretically, value. practical and theoretical both with action nonviolent of cases of the nonviolent resistance, such as Arab Spring, in the dataset and compare the results. allows one conductto such an analysis. Second, it would be interestinginclude to more recent andcompiled byChenoweth Stephan Thedataset campaigns. resistance civil andviolent nonviolent in centralization of level the of importance the compare to interesting be would movementachieved political without bloodshed.change anti-communist Bulgarian the result, a As Party. Communist the to alternative viable a leaders,Communist toprevent disruption of nonviolentdiscipline, provide and to theUDFas conducteffective with movementto democracy negotiations campaign enabled the The findings of the present research have important implications for our understanding The findings of open thesis this up interestingfurther avenues forit research. First, In contrast, the existence of a strong coalition at the head of the Bulgarian pro- 53 CEU eTD Collection Model 2 Model 1 1 Step Model Summary parameter estimates changed by less than ,001. than less by changed estimates parameter Estimationa. terminated atiteration number 6because 1 Step Model Summary Variable(s)a. entered onstep 1: defect, regviol, violsim, lmembers, demdum. Step 1 Variables inthe Equation a. Estima a parameter estimates changed by less than ,001. than less by changed estimates parameter 60,095 Log-2 likelihood 45,109 Log-2 likelihood Constant demdum lmembers violsim regviol defect tion terminated atiteration number 5because a a -3,024 1,076 ,279 - - 3,055 B 1,020 1,154 Square Cox & Snell R ,350 Square Cox & Snell R ,462 2,020 ,664 ,185 ,767 1,142 ,902 S.E. ,616 Square R Nagelkerke ,466 Square R Nagelkerke Appendix 1,021 11,479 Wald 2,239 2,626 2,290 1,767 54 1 1 df 1 1 1 1 ,312 ,001 Sig. ,135 ,105 , ,184 098 ,315 21,231 Exp(B) ,049 2,933 1,322 ,361 CEU eTD Collection Model 3 Step 1 inEquationVariables the a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: defect, regviol, violsim, lmembers, demdum, spont, coal, cw. Step 1 inEquationVariables the ,001. than less by changed estimates parameter Estimationa. terminated atiteration number 7because 1 Step Model Summary Variable(s)a. entered onstep 1:defect, regviol, violsim, lmembers, demdum, spont, coal. a a 42,538 Log-2 likelihood Constant coal spont demdum lmembers violsim regviol defect Constant cw coal spont demdum lmembers violsim regviol defect a 4,320 B - - 5,212 B -2,395 1,822 - - ,296 - - -3,533 1,502 2,561 - - ,369 2,766 2,382 2,322 ,414 2,112 1,635 2,865 ,785 ,485 Square Cox & Snell R 1,135 1,553 1,637 S.E. 2,388 1,019 1,356 ,849 ,220 1,005 1,326 1,339 S.E. 2,559 ,995 1,223 1,402 ,922 ,238 ,647 Square R Nagelkerke 1,006 3,194 2,932 ,238 1,800 4,415 1,521 10,408 Wald 1,906 2,279 4,382 4,173 ,725 2,405 5,935 2,351 10,131 Wald 55 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 df ,316 ,074 ,087 ,626 ,180 ,036 ,218 ,001 Sig. ,167 ,131 ,036 ,041 ,395 ,121 ,015 ,125 ,001 Sig. ,091 6,182 ,098 ,661 1,344 ,121 ,195 75,197 Exp(B) ,029 4,492 12,943 ,057 ,456 1,446 ,063 ,092 183,416 Exp(B) CEU eTD Collection Model 5 Model 4 parameter estimates changed by less than ,001. than less by changed estimates parameter iterat at terminated Estimation a. 1 Step Model Summary parameter estimates changed by less than ,001. than less by changed estimates parameter Estimationa. terminated atiteration number 7because 1 Step Model Summary a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: defect, regviol, violsim, lmembers, demdum, spont, coal, statesup. Step 1 inEquationVariables the a 39,085 Log-2 likelihood 37,021 Log-2 likelihood Constant statesup coal spont demdum lmembers violsim regviol defect a a -,585 - 2,696 - - ,124 - - 4,839 B 4,401 2,868 ,544 2,971 1,233 Cox & Snell R ,514 Square Cox & Snell R ,531 Square ion number 6because 2,878 2,215 1,198 1,497 ,909 ,265 1,182 1,370 1,391 S.E. ,708 Square R Nagelkerke ,686 Square R Nagelkerke ,220 6,317 ,810 12,106 Wald ,041 3,949 5,068 3,672 ,359 56 1 1 1 1 df 1 1 1 1 1 ,639 ,012 ,368 ,001 Sig. ,839 ,047 ,024 ,055 ,549 1,132 ,051 ,291 126,390 Exp(B) ,557 ,012 14,822 ,057 ,580 CEU eTD Collection Step 1 inEquationVariables the cw. a. V ariable(s) entered onstepdefect,regviol, 1: lmembers, violsim, demdum, spont, coal, statesup, a statesup coal spont demdum lmembers violsim regviol defect Constant cw 5,782 B -1,281 1,542 - 3,458 - - ,151 - - 4,706 3,469 1,046 3,661 1,868 2,907 1,144 2,458 1,412 1,574 1,026 ,270 1,344 1,512 1,742 S.E. ,194 1,816 3,665 5,999 4,856 1,039 ,311 7,425 1,527 11,022 Wald 57 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 df ,660 ,178 ,056 ,014 ,028 ,308 ,577 ,006 ,217 ,001 Sig. ,278 4,673 ,009 31,749 ,031 ,352 1,163 ,026 ,154 324,398 Exp(B) CEU eTD Collection Byman, Daniel. Byman, University Press,of New York 1996. Global Nonviolent Action Database. Compiled at the Swarthmore College. {Available online at {Available College. Swarthmore the at Compiled Database. Action Nonviolent Global Harvard BusinessSchool Press, 2010,509-550. Leadership TheoryandPractice, Handbook of In Organization, and “LeadingMovements.” Social change:Ganz, Leadership, Marshall. 1003- 62. 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