Latin America's Authoritarian Drift
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
July 2013, Volume 24, Number 3 $12.00 Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift Kurt Weyland Carlos de la Torre Miriam Kornblith Putin versus Civil Society Leon Aron Miriam Lanskoy & Elspeth Suthers Kenya’s 2013 Elections Joel D. Barkan James D. Long, Karuti Kanyinga, Karen E. Ferree, and Clark Gibson The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way Kishore Mahbubani’s World Donald K. Emmerson The Legacy of Arab Autocracy Daniel Brumberg Frédéric Volpi Frederic Wehrey Sean L. Yom Putin versus Civil Society The Long STruggLe for freedom Leon Aron Leon Aron is resident scholar and director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Insitute, a Washington, D.C.–based think tank. His most recent book is Roads to the Temple: Memory, Truth, Ideals and Ideas in the Making of the Russian Revolution, 1987–1991 (2012). Civil unrest, no matter where it takes place, is always difficult to as- sess. For experts and policy makers, the dilemma is depicted by meta- phors as well-worn as they are accurate: Flash in the pan or tip of the iceberg? Do demonstrations and rallies manifest intense but fleeting anger and frustration? Or do they represent enduring sentiments that eventually may force major reforms or even a change in regime? Evaluating the prospects for Russia’s “new” protesters, who began to mobilize en masse after fraudulent State Duma elections in Decem- ber 2011, and the civil society from which they sprang is no exception. Perhaps history can help us to understand contemporary developments. Of course, no historical parallel is perfect, but though history is hardly an infallible guide, it is the only one we have and may have something to teach us here. Today’s Russian protests have increasingly come to re- semble past civil-rights and civil-resistance efforts in other parts of the world, including the Indian independence movement led by Mahatma Gandhi (1917–47), the U.S. civil-rights movement (1945–70), Solidar- ity in Poland (1979–81), “People Power” in the Philippines (1983–86), the anti-Pinochet movement in Chile (1983–88), the mass demonstra- tions of the glasnost revolution in the Soviet Union (1987–91), the struggle against Slobodan Miloševiæ in Serbia (1991–2000), Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution a year later. Despite myriad differences, the people who participated in those movements—whether in support of racial equality, democratization, or decolonization, or in opposition to corruption, police brutality, or dis- crimination—would instantly recognize the two essential and overlap- ping demands of the Russian protesters: 1) an end to de facto disenfran- Journal of Democracy Volume 24, Number 3 July 2013 © 2013 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press Leon Aron 63 chisement, wherein votes cast for the “wrong” party or candidate are “undercounted” or do not count at all; and 2) equality before the law, which is daily subverted and distorted by authorities at all levels—as low as the traffic police and as high as the chairman of the Central Elec- toral Commission. The movement’s first demand was the nullification of the 2011 elec- tions and the scheduling of a new fair and transparent vote. “We are not allowed to vote in our own country!” “Give me back my voice!” “Don’t kill freedom, don’t steal votes! Putin has stolen our voices!” (In Rus- sian, the word for “voice” and “vote” are the same—golos.) Demonstra- tors, some wearing tape over their mouths, carried signs bearing these and thousands of other slogans in late 2011. 1 One protester at a rally in Novosibirsk (1,750 miles from Moscow) told a reporter that the law “must be the same for all.” 2 The falsification of the election results was a “violation of our rights as citizens,” declared another demonstrator, a middle-aged woman, adding that “the right to choose must be restored!” One key similarity between the protests in Russia today and past civil-resistance movements is nonviolence. Despite constant provoca- tions, harassment, and occasional beatings, the protesters have remained peaceful. The commitment to nonviolence had been apparent even be- fore the mass demonstrations broke out. In a 2011 interview, Evgenia Chirikova, head of the Moscow environmental group EMCO and one of the most popular leaders of the movement, told me: I think we look more like the Gandhi movement in India. We lead many ordinary people who understand that, to continue the parallel, we are not worse than the British, we are not worse than our authorities, that we are not slaves and that, although the empire humiliates us we continue to resist and do not respond with violence. We consciously avoid violence, never resort [to] violent means in our struggle [because] when you don’t respond to violence with violence you avoid multiplying evil. 3 Another critical similarity between today’s Russian protesters and earlier civil-rights movements is their strong moral foundation, root- ed in the quest for dignity in democratic citizenship. Gandhi called his movement satyagraha—“truth force” or “soul force.” When I asked Lev Gudkov, president of the Levada Center and Russia’s leading indepen- dent pollster, what struck him most about the protest movement, he cited the movement’s “moral character,” which he found “starkly undeniable and remarkable” after so many years of political apathy. “I have not seen anything like it in the past twenty years,” he added. Like most other civil-rights movements, this one rejects the “system” less because of specific political or economic grievances than because its members find that system offensive and beneath them as people and as citizens. One Russian expert summarized this sensibility as the rejec- tion of “total corruption, lies, and violence” because they were “incom- 64 Journal of Democracy patible with decent life.”4 According to another Russian observer, the people were demonstrating for “human dignity, the right to choose their own fate and to live in a lawful state.” 5 The protesters constantly used words like honor, decency, dignity, and conscience. “We don’t want revolutions,” said one prodemocracy activist at a 4 February 2012 rally in the Siberian city of Omsk. “Respect us! [We] are free people in an unfree country,” read a poster in Moscow. As one demonstrator put it, “We simply want to be able to live and work honestly, but this [system] does not give us that right.” Similarly, a middle-aged female demonstrator in Novosibirsk told a reporter that she was there “because in my country, my government ignores my interests and humiliates me.”6 The protest slogans reflected this moral sensibility: “Don’t lie to us!”7 “Don’t steal from us!” 8 “Listen to us!”9 “We are not cattle!” “We are not a faceless crowd!” “We are the people!” I am here because of “self-respect,” said a participant in a protest rally after Putin’s reelection in March 2012. “Instead of ideological dogmas, follow moral norms, believe in common sense and in the individual,” said Alexei Navalny, the popular anticorruption blogger who was one of the Moscow protest leaders. The rally, he contended, was not “so much about ‘politics’” as it was about the “very simple idea of the struggle for one’s rights, for one’s voice, for one’s choice.” According to one Russian commenta- tor, the crucial part of the movement’s credo was not “economic [or] social, and even less so political,” but rather the “ethical imperative of ‘living in truth.’”10 This echoes earlier nonviolent movements in the region. Indeed, the title of Russian dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s 1974 samizdat essay “Not to Live a Lie” later served as the motto of the Polish and Czech anticommunist reform movements. Toward a Freer Tomorrow Similarly, today’s Russian protesters are seeking to effect vast po- litical and social change through a personal and deeply moral effort. Nowhere is this intense moral commitment more evident than in the quest for a better future for their children, which became a leitmotif of the movement. Worried that his baby daughter would grow up to ask what he was doing “when they decided we would live in a state like Syria instead of Europe,” a 27-year-old lawyer who joined the Decem- ber 2011 Moscow protests said, “I don’t want to tell her I was too busy to do anything about it.” 11 According to Chirikova, although people of all ages turned out for the demonstrations, “parents with small children were there in greatest numbers. That is indicative of something. We are anxious about the future, not even for ourselves, but for . our children. They deserve to live in a better Russia.” A 34-year-old advertising agent from Moscow traveled to Yaroslavl to volunteer for an independent can- Leon Aron 65 didate’s campaign so that she would be able to tell his children that he “took action” during the Putin regime and “achieved results.” 12 Given the similarities between ear- lier civil-rights movements elsewhere Again and again, after in the world and the current Russian periods of strong eco- civil-resistance movement, what does nomic growth, newly history tell us about its prospects? expanded middle classes Precedent is no guarantee, but the Kremlin should be worried. The record begin to desire more than is fairly unambiguous: When led by mere personal freedom the middle class (or its children, the and prosperity, and thus students) such movements have had a start to demand political high rate of success. liberty and a say in how It was the middle class that founded their country is governed. the Indian National Congress, the main vehicle of the independence movement led by lawyer Mahatma Gandhi.