PERSIAN GULF YEAR VI SUMMER 2008 Lebanon: the Doha Agreement Ends the First Restructuring
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Q UARTERLY MIDDLE EAST – PERSIAN GULF YEAR VI SUMMER 2008 Lebanon: The Doha Agreement ends the first restructuring phase in the post-Syrian Lebanon Diego Baliani 5 SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE The Balkans after Kosovo. Regional consequences of Kosovo Centro Militare di Studi Strategici declaration of independence and new political developments Paolo Quercia 15 CeMiSS Quarterly is a review supervised by CeMiSS director, Rear COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES – EASTERN EUROPE Admiral Luciano Callini. The spill-over of Bucharest summit Andrea Grazioso 21 It provides a forum to promote the knowledge and understanding of international security affairs, military TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS strategy and other topics of The United States approach towards Iran. Once again. significant interest. Lucio Martino 31 The opinions and conclusions expressed in the articles are those of AFGHAN THEATRE the contributors and do not High tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan necessarily reflect the position of the Fausto Biloslavo 35 Italian Ministry of Defence. AFRICA Africa: between successful approaches for the future and the Military Center for Strategic Studies Department of International Relations farce of reality Palazzo Salviati Maria Egizia Gattamorta 41 Piazza della Rovere, 83 00165 – ROME - ITALY CINA E INDIA tel. 00 39 06 4691 3204 The Sino– Japanese axis fax 00 39 06 6879779 Nunziante Mastrolia 47 e-mail [email protected] LATIN AMERICA Social cleavages in Bolivia, Argentina and Paraguay Riccardo Gefter Wondrich 51 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The United Nations-African Union cooperation in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding: challenges and opportunities Valerio Bosco 57 Quarterly Year VI N° 2 - Summer 2008 Middle East - Persian Gulf LEBANON : THE DOHA AGREEMENT ENDS THE FIRST RESTRUCTURING PHASE IN THE POST -SYRIAN LEBANON Diego Baliani The Lebanese Government attacks Hizbullah’s militia After 18 months of politico-institutional paralysis and street politics, and 6 months of vacancy in the Lebanese Presidency, the Lebanese political crisis escalated quickly into armed confrontation between pro-government and pro-opposition Lebanese militias during May 2008. The clashes killed at least 81 people and wounded at least 250, and officially ended with the signing of the Doha accord, on May 21 st ,1 and the election of the new Lebanese President, on May 25 th .2 The clashes began when opposition militias, composed mainly the Shia fighters belonging to Hizbullah and Amal, reacted violently against two decisions adopted on May 6 th by the Lebanese government, which is controlled by the Sunni-led “March 14” alliance. 3 The first controversial decision had been the reassignment of the Beirut airport’s security chief, Gen. Wafiq Shuqayr, accused of sharing sensitive information on Lebanese officials and politicians of the ruling majority with Hizbullah and Amal. The information allegedly collected through a system of hidden cameras and listening devices installed on a runway at Beirut airport. 4 The second controversial decision the declaration of the “illegality and unconstitutionality” of Hizbullah’s independent telephone network. 5 According to media reports and statements provided by its leaders, Hizbullah has an independent, underground fibre-optic telephone network, through which its military leadership exerts the militia’s command, control and communication functions. The network reportedly provided secure communications among the militia’s commanders, located in South Beirut, and field units, located in South Lebanon, during the 2006 summer war 6. Some media reports also alleged that the network possibly extends to the Mount Lebanon Governatorate and to the new Hizbullah’s stronghold in the Bekaa Valley, north of the Litani River. 7 The first relevant consideration is that, for the first time since the April 2005 Syrian withdrawal and the subsequent “March 14” electoral victory, the -led government adopted two decisions targeting Hizbullah’s military infrastructure. On May 3 rd , just before the adoption of the two government decisions, Walid Jumblatt – leader of the “Progressive Socialist Party” and among the most vocal opponents of Hizbullah – vehemently attacked Hizbullah’s telephone network and accused the latter of manning a hidden anti-government surveillance system inside the Beirut airport. 8 The significance of Hizbullah’s telephone network can be inferred from the statements released by Hizbullah’s leaders before the May 6 th government decisions. On May 5th , Hizbullah’s deputy secretary, Shaikh Naim Qassim, warned that “Hizbullah will deal with those who interfere with the network as if they were Israeli spies” and vowed to fight the government over the telephone network. 9 On May 8 th , during a press conference aired by al- Manar TV , the Secretary General of Hizbullah, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, stated that “In the July war, our most important point of strength was the command and control, thanks to the fact that communication between the leadership and the various commanders and field fighters was secured”, i.e. Hizbullah’s military communication network was not penetrated by the Israeli intelligence services. 10 Mr. Nasrallah also emphasized that “the most important recommendation in the [Winograd] report was the need to eliminate Hezbollah’s command and control system in 5 Quarterly Year VI N° 2 - Summer 2008 Middle East - Persian Gulf which telecommunications play a decisive role” 11 . Being aware of the seriousness of the upcoming crisis, Mr Michel Aoun, the leader of the “Change and Reform Bloc” and currently allied with Hizbullah and Amal, compared the government decisions to a “declaration of war”, on May 6 th12. If the above account and considerations are correct, the second relevant consideration is that the extremely violent reaction of Hizbullah and its allied militias could mean that the safeguard of both the militia and the weapons is Hizbullah’s top priority and, as such, a non-negotiable issue. Indeed, for the first time Hizbullah turned the “weapons of the resistance” against its Lebanese rivals, thus breaching its promise to use them only against Israel and never against the Lebanese people. It is remarkable that, during the last 18 months of uninterrupted political crisis, no other government decision had been able to provoke Hizbullah’s armed retaliation. Hizbullah’s military reaction The opposition’s militias reacted to the government’s challenge with a well coordinated, quick and effective military action which led to clashes that killed at least 81 people and wounded at least 250. 13 Hizbullah’s offensive can be divided into two phases. The first phase took place in Beirut from the 7 th to 10 th of May, during which the clashes killed at least 37 people and wounded at least 100. 14 The opposition fighters led by Hizbullah quickly defeated the militias loyal to the Sunni Saad al-Hariri’s “Future Movement”, then turned control over the city to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 15 . The disorder began on May 7 th , when the opposition-backed General Federation of Labour Unions called a street demonstrationand strikes to protest against the salary increase decided by the government, which they deemed insufficient. 16 The demonstration was boycotted by the unions loyal to the majority and quickly turned into an Hizbullah raid that ended with the takeover of the mainly Sunni Western Beirut, an area that hosts the government buildings and the residence of many politicians of the Sunn- led “March 14” alliance. In about 12 hours, between May 7 th and May 8 th , the Hizbullah-led militias armed mainly with assault rifles and RPGs defeated in a series of clashes the opposing pro-government, mainly Sunni militias, and seized the buildings hosting the political parties and the media loyal to the “March 14” 17 . According to the accounts, it seems that the opposition’s forces included fighters of Hizbullah, Amal and the Syrian National Socialist Party (SNSP), and were coordinated by the better-trained Hizbullah’s military commanders 18 . Even if Amal’s militiamen seemed to be less disciplined Hizbullah’s (according to some accounts they possibly profaned some Sunni religious symbols), the military operation was successful and – probably – planned in advance. The first phase ended on May 10th , after the government delegated to the LAF the responsibility to “decide” the fate of the anti-Hizbullah measures adopted on May 6 th (i.e. to withdraw them.) As a consequence, Shia militias finished handing over to the LAF the positions seized during the clashes and withdrew form the streets of Beirut 19 . After the withdrawal, Hizbullah maintained the “civil disobedience” campaign to pressure the government to officially withdraw the measures against its militia. On May 11 th , the LAF took control of North-West Beirut 20 . The second phase took place in Tripoli, in the North Lebanon Governatorate, as well as in the Druze strongholds of Aley and Chouf, in the Mount Lebanon Governatorate, from the 10 th to 14 th of May. The clashes killed at least 44 people and wounded at least 150 21 . The most serious clashes happened on May 10 th -11 th at Aley, Mount Baruk and Chouf, and pitted the Shia-led 6 Quarterly Year VI N° 2 - Summer 2008 Middle East - Persian Gulf opposition militia (apparently including some pro-opposition Druze fighters) against the pro- government Druze militia loyal to Walid Jumblatt. The fighters allegedly used machine-gun, RPGs and, for the first time, heavy artillery. Even in this case, the pro-government forces suffered a crushing and quick defeat 22 . Faced with the military victory of the opposition militias, the Lebanese government officially withdrew the decisions contested by Hizbullah, on May 14 th . In turn, the opposition promised to end the “civil disobedience” campaign once the ruling “March 14” agrees to talks 23 . If the accounts are correct, we can try to some assessments. An assessment of the consequences of the clashes The first assessment about Hizbullah. From a military point of view Hizbullah proved to be the strongest Lebanese militia by quickly defeating the militia loyal to the ruling coalition.