Q UARTERLY
MIDDLE EAST – PERSIAN GULF YEAR VI SUMMER 2008 Lebanon: The Doha Agreement ends the first restructuring
phase in the post-Syrian Lebanon Diego Baliani 5
SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE The Balkans after Kosovo. Regional consequences of Kosovo Centro Militare di Studi Strategici declaration of independence and new political developments Paolo Quercia 15
CeMiSS Quarterly is a review supervised by CeMiSS director, Rear COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES – EASTERN EUROPE Admiral Luciano Callini. The spill-over of Bucharest summit Andrea Grazioso 21 It provides a forum to promote the knowledge and understanding of international security affairs, military TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS strategy and other topics of The United States approach towards Iran. Once again. significant interest. Lucio Martino 31 The opinions and conclusions expressed in the articles are those of AFGHAN THEATRE the contributors and do not High tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan necessarily reflect the position of the Fausto Biloslavo 35 Italian Ministry of Defence. AFRICA Africa: between successful approaches for the future and the Military Center for Strategic Studies Department of International Relations farce of reality Palazzo Salviati Maria Egizia Gattamorta 41 Piazza della Rovere, 83 00165 – ROME - ITALY CINA E INDIA tel. 00 39 06 4691 3204 The Sino– Japanese axis fax 00 39 06 6879779 Nunziante Mastrolia 47 e-mail [email protected]
LATIN AMERICA Social cleavages in Bolivia, Argentina and Paraguay Riccardo Gefter Wondrich 51
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The United Nations-African Union cooperation in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding: challenges and opportunities Valerio Bosco 57
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LEBANON : THE DOHA AGREEMENT ENDS THE FIRST RESTRUCTURING PHASE IN THE POST -SYRIAN LEBANON Diego Baliani The Lebanese Government attacks Hizbullah’s militia After 18 months of politico-institutional paralysis and street politics, and 6 months of vacancy in the Lebanese Presidency, the Lebanese political crisis escalated quickly into armed confrontation between pro-government and pro-opposition Lebanese militias during May 2008. The clashes killed at least 81 people and wounded at least 250, and officially ended with the signing of the Doha accord, on May 21 st ,1 and the election of the new Lebanese President, on May 25 th .2 The clashes began when opposition militias, composed mainly the Shia fighters belonging to Hizbullah and Amal, reacted violently against two decisions adopted on May 6 th by the Lebanese government, which is controlled by the Sunni-led “March 14” alliance. 3 The first controversial decision had been the reassignment of the Beirut airport’s security chief, Gen. Wafiq Shuqayr, accused of sharing sensitive information on Lebanese officials and politicians of the ruling majority with Hizbullah and Amal. The information allegedly collected through a system of hidden cameras and listening devices installed on a runway at Beirut airport. 4 The second controversial decision the declaration of the “illegality and unconstitutionality” of Hizbullah’s independent telephone network. 5 According to media reports and statements provided by its leaders, Hizbullah has an independent, underground fibre-optic telephone network, through which its military leadership exerts the militia’s command, control and communication functions. The network reportedly provided secure communications among the militia’s commanders, located in South Beirut, and field units, located in South Lebanon, during the 2006 summer war 6. Some media reports also alleged that the network possibly extends to the Mount Lebanon Governatorate and to the new Hizbullah’s stronghold in the Bekaa Valley, north of the Litani River. 7 The first relevant consideration is that, for the first time since the April 2005 Syrian withdrawal and the subsequent “March 14” electoral victory, the -led government adopted two decisions targeting Hizbullah’s military infrastructure. On May 3 rd , just before the adoption of the two government decisions, Walid Jumblatt – leader of the “Progressive Socialist Party” and among the most vocal opponents of Hizbullah – vehemently attacked Hizbullah’s telephone network and accused the latter of manning a hidden anti-government surveillance system inside the Beirut airport. 8 The significance of Hizbullah’s telephone network can be inferred from the statements released by Hizbullah’s leaders before the May 6 th government decisions. On May 5th , Hizbullah’s deputy secretary, Shaikh Naim Qassim, warned that “Hizbullah will deal with those who interfere with the network as if they were Israeli spies” and vowed to fight the government over the telephone network. 9 On May 8 th , during a press conference aired by al- Manar TV , the Secretary General of Hizbullah, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, stated that “In the July war, our most important point of strength was the command and control, thanks to the fact that communication between the leadership and the various commanders and field fighters was secured”, i.e. Hizbullah’s military communication network was not penetrated by the Israeli intelligence services. 10 Mr. Nasrallah also emphasized that “the most important recommendation in the [Winograd] report was the need to eliminate Hezbollah’s command and control system in
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which telecommunications play a decisive role” 11 . Being aware of the seriousness of the upcoming crisis, Mr Michel Aoun, the leader of the “Change and Reform Bloc” and currently allied with Hizbullah and Amal, compared the government decisions to a “declaration of war”, on May 6 th12. If the above account and considerations are correct, the second relevant consideration is that the extremely violent reaction of Hizbullah and its allied militias could mean that the safeguard of both the militia and the weapons is Hizbullah’s top priority and, as such, a non-negotiable issue. Indeed, for the first time Hizbullah turned the “weapons of the resistance” against its Lebanese rivals, thus breaching its promise to use them only against Israel and never against the Lebanese people. It is remarkable that, during the last 18 months of uninterrupted political crisis, no other government decision had been able to provoke Hizbullah’s armed retaliation.
Hizbullah’s military reaction The opposition’s militias reacted to the government’s challenge with a well coordinated, quick and effective military action which led to clashes that killed at least 81 people and wounded at least 250. 13 Hizbullah’s offensive can be divided into two phases. The first phase took place in Beirut from the 7 th to 10 th of May, during which the clashes killed at least 37 people and wounded at least 100. 14 The opposition fighters led by Hizbullah quickly defeated the militias loyal to the Sunni Saad al-Hariri’s “Future Movement”, then turned control over the city to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 15 . The disorder began on May 7 th , when the opposition-backed General Federation of Labour Unions called a street demonstrationand strikes to protest against the salary increase decided by the government, which they deemed insufficient. 16 The demonstration was boycotted by the unions loyal to the majority and quickly turned into an Hizbullah raid that ended with the takeover of the mainly Sunni Western Beirut, an area that hosts the government buildings and the residence of many politicians of the Sunn- led “March 14” alliance. In about 12 hours, between May 7 th and May 8 th , the Hizbullah-led militias armed mainly with assault rifles and RPGs defeated in a series of clashes the opposing pro-government, mainly Sunni militias, and seized the buildings hosting the political parties and the media loyal to the “March 14” 17 . According to the accounts, it seems that the opposition’s forces included fighters of Hizbullah, Amal and the Syrian National Socialist Party (SNSP), and were coordinated by the better-trained Hizbullah’s military commanders 18 . Even if Amal’s militiamen seemed to be less disciplined Hizbullah’s (according to some accounts they possibly profaned some Sunni religious symbols), the military operation was successful and – probably – planned in advance. The first phase ended on May 10th , after the government delegated to the LAF the responsibility to “decide” the fate of the anti-Hizbullah measures adopted on May 6 th (i.e. to withdraw them.) As a consequence, Shia militias finished handing over to the LAF the positions seized during the clashes and withdrew form the streets of Beirut 19 . After the withdrawal, Hizbullah maintained the “civil disobedience” campaign to pressure the government to officially withdraw the measures against its militia. On May 11 th , the LAF took control of North-West Beirut 20 . The second phase took place in Tripoli, in the North Lebanon Governatorate, as well as in the Druze strongholds of Aley and Chouf, in the Mount Lebanon Governatorate, from the 10 th to 14 th of May. The clashes killed at least 44 people and wounded at least 150 21 . The most serious clashes happened on May 10 th -11 th at Aley, Mount Baruk and Chouf, and pitted the Shia-led
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opposition militia (apparently including some pro-opposition Druze fighters) against the pro- government Druze militia loyal to Walid Jumblatt. The fighters allegedly used machine-gun, RPGs and, for the first time, heavy artillery. Even in this case, the pro-government forces suffered a crushing and quick defeat 22 . Faced with the military victory of the opposition militias, the Lebanese government officially withdrew the decisions contested by Hizbullah, on May 14 th . In turn, the opposition promised to end the “civil disobedience” campaign once the ruling “March 14” agrees to talks 23 . If the accounts are correct, we can try to some assessments.
An assessment of the consequences of the clashes The first assessment about Hizbullah. From a military point of view Hizbullah proved to be the strongest Lebanese militia by quickly defeating the militia loyal to the ruling coalition. Hizbullah also proved to be able to protect its weapons regardless the US and French pressure to disband its militia. However, from a political point of view Hizbullah breached its promise to use its weapons only against Israel, and to never turn them against the Lebanese people. In the short term, this will cause embarrassment to Hizbullah’s ally, the Maronite Michel Aoun, who had justified its seemingly odd alliance with the Shia pro-Syrian opposition forces arguing that Hizbullah is a nonsectarian national resistance force. Indeed, Mr. Aoun fought Syria between 1989 and 1990 and, after being defeated by the Syrian forces, went into exile until the 2005 withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon. In this respect, it seems that Aoun is one of the few Lebanese politicians that never cooperate with the Syrian regime during Syria’s occupation of Lebanon. It si possible that Aoun will exact a heavy political price from Hizbullah his sacrifice. In the long term, the apparently sectarian nature of the clashes will probably undermine the argument adduced by Hizbullah to justify the existence of its private militia, i.e. that it is the only national non-sectarian resistance force able to protect the country from Israel, as it demonstrated during the 2006 war. This will increase pressure on Hizbullah to disband its militia, together with UN Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006), the presence of circa 13.000 UNIFIL forces in South Lebanon (which is successfully avoiding the renewal of hostilities among Israel and Hizbullah), US and French pressure to disarm Hizbullah, the possible upgrading of the ongoing peace negotiation between Israel and Syria officially launched on May 21 st24, and the eventual establishment of formal relations between Lebanon and Syria. The second assessment is about the ruling “March 14” alliance, with particular focus on the “Future Movement” led by Saad al-Hariri and the “Progressive Socialist Party” led by Walid Jumblatt. From a military point of view, the defeat was crushing. The “March 14” forces proved not to be able to protect their respective constituencies in case of sectarian armed confrontation with Hizbullah. The defeat could possibly feed the rearmament of the Sunni militias, in particular the Lebanese Jamaa Islamiya . Moreover, the US, French and Saudi political support proved to be an insufficient guarantee in the event of an armed clash with Hizbullah. From a political standpoint, the defeat will possibly undermine the political authority of the “March 14” leadership in front of its own constituencies. Even if, after the takeover of Beirut, the “March 14” can denounce the sectarian nature of the Hizbullah’s militia and label the latter as an “occupying force”, the former had to recognize the military strength of Hizbullah and its allies
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in Lebanon, and finally agreed to compromise on Hizbullah’s political claims in the Doha accord of May 21 st . The third assessment is about the LAF, which at the time of the clashes was headed by Gen. Michel Suleiman, the current Lebanese President. During the fighting occurring from 7 th to 11 th of May, the LAF remained neutral and did not intervene to stop the clashes, limiting themselves to protect the Lebanese government institutions and to assume custody of the Sunni positions seized by Hizbullah during the clashes. 25 There probably were at least three reasons under LAF’s decision to stay neutral. The first reason probably was the safeguard of the LAF’s internal unity. In a contest characterized by persistent conflicts among powerful private militias, the LAF are the only non-sectarian national armed force that could eventually protect the national security of all Lebanon. After 18 months of sectarian political confrontation and 3 days of armed clashes, the risk of a fragmentation of the LAF along sectarian lines became evident when the Lebanese Army Command warned in a communiqué that the enduring violence “poses a threat to the unity of the military establishment” 26 . The second reason probably was the safeguard of the impartiality of the LAF, which could have been undermined by an eventual LAF’s intervention against one of the conflicting militias. Indeed, during the 18 months-long political crisis and the subsequent clashes the LAF were the only Lebanese institution able to preserve an image of national unity in a contest of deep sectarian polarization, that was pitting against each other the Sunni-led ruling coalition against the Shia led-opposition, with the Druze and, most of all, the Christian communities divided among the contenders. The risk of damaging the LAF’s impartial image became present on January 27 th , when the LAF intervened to evacuate the street occupied by the opposition’s supporters engaged in street protests. After the intervention, the LAF and Mr. Suleiman found themselves involved in the killing of 9 opposition’s supporters, affiliated to Hizbullah and Amal, under circumstances that are not clear yet 27 . The third reason probably was the safeguard of LAF’s military prestige, recently boosted by both the 2006successful deployment of 15.000 Lebanese troops in South Lebanon for the first time in 40 years – alongside the over 12.000-strong UNIFIL forces – and the successful 2007 military campaign against the Islamist group Fatah al-Islam, inside the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp. Hizbullah is stronger than Fatah al-Islam and in case of direct military confrontation could also prevail against the Lebanese Army, thus seriously undermining the military prestige and credibility of the latter. The decision to not intervene in the clashes safeguarded the internal unity and the prestige of the LAF, but could have undermined their image of impartiality. Some officers denounced LAF’s inaction during Hizbullah’s aggression 28 . Moreover, some among the “March 14” ranks questioned that LAF’s decision to take in custody the positions seized by Hizbullah while the clashes were still ongoing, actually freeing Hizbullah’s forces from the task to guard the positions seized and allowing the latter to focus on the conquest of new positions 29 .
The international dimension of the crisis: the Doha agreement It seems that the foreign powers involved in the Lebanese crisis, i.e. the United States, France and Saudi Arabia (supporting “March 14”) as well as Syria and Iran (supporting Hizbullah) abstained from intervening during the sectarian clashes among Lebanese factions, thus limiting themselves to approve the Doha agreement, that reflect the power balance among the factions established by the conflict.
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The agreement was reached on May 21 st , after 6 days of negotiations 30 , with the mediation of the Arab delegation headed by the Qatar’s prime minister, His Excellence Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr al-Thani, and Arab League’s secretary general, Amr Moussa. The factions reached an agreement on five main issues 31 . First, they agreed to convene within 24 hours a parliamentary session to elect Michel Suleiman as President (indeed, Mr. Suleiman was elected President on May 25 th with a majority of 118 votes out to 127 living members 32 – thus reaching the two third majority required by the opposition – and took office on May 26 th ). 33 Second, they agreed to appoint a new national unity government composed of 30 ministries, including 16 ministries to be appointed by the March 14 alliance, 11 ministries to be appointed by the opposition and the remaining 3 ministries to be appointed by the President. Third, they agreed to refer to the Parliament the discussion of the Boutros draft law on the reform of the electoral system, which will be based on the division of Beirut in three districts and the adoption of the qada as an electoral constituency, in conformity with the 1960 electoral law (thus determining a “shrinkage” of the constituency, which will increase from the current 14 to 26). Fourth, they committed themselves to abstain from the use of weapons and violence to obtain political gains, and to resume a dialogue on promoting the State’s authority throughout Lebanon under the aegis of the new President and with the participation of the Arab League. Fifth, the faction’s political leaders committed themselves to abstain from the rhetoric of treason or sectarian instigation. As for the election of Michel Suleiman as President, the conflicting parties had long agreed on its candidacy, even if he was not the first choice neither for the Sunni-led majority nor for the Shia-led opposition. From the pro-Western “March 14” standpoint, President Suleiman proved to be a leader able to promote and safeguard the Lebanese national unity while he was commanding the LAF. He effectively promoted the State authority and protected the Lebanese national security by deploying the Lebanese Army in South Lebanon, in coordination with UNIFIL, and by crushing the Islamist group Fatah al-Islam in the north of the country. On the other hand, many among the March 14 ranks complained that Mr. Suleiman indirectly helped Hizbullah’s takeover of Beirut, in the light of the fact that the LAF did not intervene militarily to stop Hizbullah’s armed aggression and accepted to take in custody the positions seized by Hizbullah while the fighting was still ongoing. From the opposition standpoint, Mr. Suleiman looks like a President able to cooperate with Syria, considering that he was elected commander of the LAF in 1998, while Lebanon was still under Syria’s occupation. At the time, it was not possible to assume such an office without Syria’s consent. On May 25 th , during his first public address after the parliamentary vote, President Suleiman provided three important indications about his future conduct 34 . First, he said that for the future Hizbullah’s weapons should only be directed against Israel, thus implicitly confirming that Hizbullah’s militia will not be disarmed in the short term. The message is that an eventual disarmament of Hizbullah’s militia will be reached through political dialogue between the Lebanese factions rather than coercion against Hizbullah. Second, the Lebanese institutions and factions should launch a national dialogue to agree on a national defence strategy, which will determine the role of the LAF and, as a consequence, the role (and the fate) of Hizbullah’s militia. Third, he called for the establishment of excellent and equal relations between Lebanon and Syria, which means that in the future Lebanon will cooperate with Syria, on one hand, and that Syria must formally recognize
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Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence by establishing full diplomatic relations with Lebanon, on the other. As for the compromise on the composition of the new government, it is a clear victory for Hizbullah and the opposition as a whole. With 11 ministries out of 30, the opposition obtained the so-called “blocking minority”, or in other words a veto power on every future government decision on fundamental matters (such as those that require a majority of two thirds in the Lebanese decision-making institutions). The veto power will allow Hizbullah to block every government decision on two fundamental issues, regardless of the distribution of the 11 ministries among the opposition parties: first, the decisions on Hizbullah’s militia and weapons; second, the decisions on the establishment of an international tribunal to try those responsible of the murder of Rafiq al-Hariri (killed on 14 February 2005), which could possibly convict high ranking Syrian officials and finally destabilize the Syrian regime. The military operation carried out in May demonstrated Hizbullah’s willingness to protect its militia by force, even if this could trigger a new Lebanese civil war. That because the militia is the main Hizbullah’s asset, which can influence the political destiny of Lebanon even against of the states sponsoring the ruling March 14, i.e. the United States, France and Saudi Arabia. As for the Hariri’s tribunal, Hizbullah asserted that it is not against the tribunal in principle, but that it absolutely against using the tribunal as a tool to destabilize the Syrian establishment. Finally, many analyst agree that the proposed electoral reform draft law – which should be promoted by the new Lebanese government and enacted before the 2009 parliamentary elections – will assure better political representation, thus confirming the predominance of both Sunni and Shia parties, but also guaranteeing that the Christian support will be indispensable to any future Lebanese government (thanks to the foreseen shrinkage of the electoral constituencies to the size of a qada ). On July 11 th , the Lebanese premier Fouad Siniora announced the formation of the new Cabinet, after almost five weeks of negotiations between Lebanese factions 35 . The opposition obtained the key ministries of foreign affairs – which will manage the relations with Syria – and telecommunications – which will deal with Hizbullah’s telephone network. The deal reached among the factions assigned 5 portfolios to Aoun’s “Change and Reform Bloc” (4 ministers, including the telecommunications minister, Gebran Bassil, plus the vice premier), 3 ministers to Amal (including the foreign minister, Fawzi Salloukh), 1 minister to Hizbullah, 1 minister to the SSNP and 1 to the Democratic Party. President Suleiman appointed inter alia the Defence minister, Elias al-Murr, and the Interior minister, Ziad Baroud. It is possible that the opposing factions – assuming the impartiality of the President – left to the latter the appointment of the ministries responsible for national defence and security and, above all, for the establishment of the State’s authority all over Lebanon on a non-sectarian basis 36 .
The conclusion of the first restructuring phase in post-Syrian Lebanon The Doha agreement ended an 18 months-long political and institutional crisis that pitted against each other the Lebanese State institutions (the premier v. the speaker of the parliament) and political factions (the Sunni-led March 14 alliance v. the Shia-Maronite opposition alliance), during which the opposing forces engaged in an a long and exhausting tug-of-war finally ended by the small-scale civil-war erupted in May. The opposing Lebanese factions fought relying on different assets. Inside Lebanon, the “March 14” alliance relied on both the
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domestic support of the majority of the Lebanese population and the strong anti-Syrian sentiment provoked (rightly or wrongly) by the long series of murders that killed at least 9 prominent anti-Syrian Lebanese politicians, lawmakers, officials and journalists between 2004 and 2007 37 . Outside the country, the “March 14” enjoyed the support of the United States, France, Saudi Arabia and the United Nations. Between 2005 and 2007, those domestic and foreign assets allowed the “March 14” to dominate both the Parliament and the government, and to pursue an anti-Syrian and anti-Hizbullah policy that scored the following successes: the March-April 2005 withdrawal of the 14.000 Syrian troops from Lebanon – which ended 15 years of Syrian occupation and dominance – caused by both the strong international pressure exercised by the United States and France and the wave of anti-Syrian protests triggered by the killing of the former Lebanese premier, Rafiq al-Hariri 38 ; the victory in the parliamentary elections celebrated between the 29 th of May and the 20 th of June of 2005 39 ; the 2006 approval of UN Security Council resolution 1701, which calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias and for the deployment of up to 15.000 Lebanese troops as well as 13.000 UNIFIL military personnel in South Lebanon, a former Hizbullah’s stronghold 40 ; the 2007 agreement between the Lebanese government and the United Nations that defined the statute of the international tribunal which could eventually pursue those behind the assassination of Rafiq al- Hariri and of several other political murders occurred in Lebanon in the last two years (the statute entered into force on 10 June 2007). The “March 14” alliance anti-Syrian policy, which joined the broader international anti-Syrian policy promoted by the United States and France since 2005, finally clashed with Hizbullah’s powerful reaction. Unlike the “March 14” alliance, Hizbullah has the most powerful Lebanese militia, which was able to fight the strongest Middle Eastern armed force, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), for 34 days without being destroyed, during the summer of 2006. Moreover, the 2 days-Beirut takeover of last May proved that Hizbullah is able to defend its weapons and its militia, if provoked. In the aftermath of the 2006 summer war, Hizbullah enjoyed broad support both domestically and regionally because of its military performance against the IDF. Domestically, the Lebanese shared perception of a clear and present Israeli threat motivated for a while the broad Lebanese support in favour of Hizbullah. Regionally, Hizbullah’s stiff and successful resistance against the IDF 2006 offensive galvanized the Arab Middle Eastern populations, given that for the first time since 1948 – and after five crushing defeats suffered by the Arab armies against Israel in the last 60 years – an Arab militia was able to confront the strongest Middle Eastern Army. Once the psychological effect of the war had vanished, the overall support to Hizbullah was suddenly reduced to its core constituencies and sponsor, i.e. the Lebanese Shia community domestically and Syria, Iran and Hamas regionally. Notwithstanding its relative isolation, Hizbullah showed that it can effectively protect its interest in Lebanon without foreign help. A possible assessment is that Hizbullah’s victory of last May – a victory gained military on the field and officially recognized in the clauses of the Doha agreement – determined a new and officially recognized power balance in Lebanon based on the real strength of the competing Lebanese factions. The ruling “March 14” alliance with continue to lead the country, thanks to the support of the majority of the Lebanese people and of the International Community. But in deciding the future of the country it will have to take into account the needs of Hizbullah and its militia, in Lebanon, and of Syria, in the Middle East – in the light of the historical,
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geographical, economical and cultural ties that links the two neighbouring countries. The coveted veto power in the Cabinet finally obtained by Hizbullah (and by the opposition broadly speaking) does not indicate what Hizbullah’s future policy will look like, but rather what the “March 14” alliance can not do in the future, i.e. forcefully disbanding Hizbullah’s militia and (probably) to use the Hariri’s tribunal to destabilize the Syrian establishment. It is probable that the political initiative will rest on the “March 14” alliance and its parliamentary majority, given that Hibullah’s political platform is not clear at all – aside from protecting its militia and its Syrian ally. Hizbullah’s political platform – as can be inferred from Hizbullah’s statute, the 1985 open letter, as well as the behaviour and the statements of its leaders – does not indicate well-defined policies, but rather a vague ideological commitment to the principle of the Iranian wilayat al-faqih , the promotion of the anti-Israeli “resistance community” ( mujtama muqawin ) and the promotion – together with Syria, Iran and Hamas – of the “axis of denial” ( jabhat al- mumana’a ) against the US plan for the Great Middle East 41 . It is not clear at all if Hizbullah really pursue the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon, even of this aim is still included in the 1985 open letter. It seems that, at the moment, Hizbullah’s political priority is to safeguard its militia. As already noticed above, no other issue triggered such a violent reaction from the “Party of God” during the 18 months-long political crisis. The series of successes scored by the ruling “March 14” alliance between 2005 and 2007 was finally balanced by Hizbullah’s show of strength. It is possible that Hizbullah’s takeover of Beirut was also favoured by the disclosure of an ongoing Israeli-Syrian pace dialogue, officially recognized by the parties involved on May 21 st42. Indeed, an eventual peace agreement between Syria and Israel would undermine the significance of Hizbullah’s resistance both politically and militarily, in the long term. As a consequence, Hizbullah could have decided to cash its “political check” now that it is in a relative strong position compared to the rival Lebanese factions – thanks to its military might. As the time goes on, the political importance of Hizbullah’s militia could progressively diminish as a consequence of an eventual easing in the relations among Israel and Syria, France and Syria and Syria and Lebanon, respectively. In the short term, regardless of the eventual persistence of minor clashes in Lebanon, it is possible – and even probable – the beginning of an official political dialogue between Syria and Lebanon. The election of Mr. Suleiman as President and the appointment of a foreign minister belonging to Amal are strong indicators in this sense – and the results were evident during the Paris summit of July 13 th over the French “Union for the Mediterranean” initiative, during which a Lebanese President, Michel Suleiman, and a Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, met for the first time in history. 43 It is noteworthy that during the sectarian clashes of last May there was not foreign intervention, at least apparently. It seems that the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran did not intervene, essentially leaving the Lebanese factions free to wrestle among themselves to establish the new domestic power balance. Regardless the fact that, on May 9 th , the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, had accused Syria and Iran to be the instigators of Hizbullah’s military takeover, eventually all the foreign powers involved in the Lebanese crisis accepted and welcomed the Doha agreement – as well as Hizbullah’s new power status, as a consequence 44 . Even the UN Security Council, on May 22 nd , adopted a non-binding resolution that backed the Doha agreement and called for the respect and implementation of all relevant
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UN resolution on Lebanon, including those over the disarmament of all Lebanese militia. It is noteworthy that the UN Security Council declaration did not mention Hizbullah 45 . The final assessment is that the Doha agreement – by giving to Hizbullah a veto power in the government and safeguarding its militia – officially recognized a new political and institutional power balance in Lebanon closer to the real strength of the competing Lebanese factions, and structurally enshrined this new power balance in the Lebanese institutional system. Considering that the Doha agreement structurally changed the political and institutional Lebanese decision- making processes, from May 21 st onward, it is possible to assess that the agreement ended the first restructuring phase of the post-Syrian Lebanon. During this phase, lasted from April 2005 to May 2008, the “March 14” alliance skilfully used its domestic and international support to score a series of political victories that were not proportionate to its relative strength in Lebanon, if one consider Hizbullah’s military might and Syria’s power of influence. Hizbullah’s reaction brought the Lebanese institutional framework back to the reality of the domestic balance of power in Lebanon. The new Lebanese institutional system, by reflecting more carefully the real power balance among Lebanese faction, may foster political stability and security in Lebanon, and may create the condition for the adoption of truly national policies, i.e. policies agreed by both the majority and the opposition. It is not possible to foreseen if the agreement between the Lebanese factions will last and for how long, but it is certain that it is practically impossible to rule Lebanon without taking into consideration the needs and the role of both Hizbullah and Syria.
Diego Baliani
1 See “Lebanese factions reach a deal to end crisis”, CNN , 21 May 2008. 2 See “Suleiman Elected President”, Naharnet , 25 May 2008. 3 See “Beirut cabinet challenges Hezbollah, tensions rises”, Reuters , 6 May 2008. 4 Ibidem . 5 See “Tension Running High as Government, Opposition Appear to be on Collision Course”, Naharnet , 6 May 2008. 6 See “A Cell Phone Civil War in Lebanon”, Time , 7 May 2008; see also “Hezbollah Phone Network Spat Sparks Beirut Street War”, The Christian Science Monitor , 9 May 2008. 7 See “A Cell Phone Civil War in Lebanon”, Time , cit. 8 See “Lebanon – Jumblatt accuses Hizbullah of bid to take over Beirut airport”, The Daily Star , 4 May 2008. 9 See “Hizbullah Vows to Fight Government over Telephone Network”, Naharnet , 6 May 2008. 10 See Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N° 23, Lebanon: Hizbollah’s Weapons Turn Inward , 15 May 2008. 11 Ibidem . 12 See “Aoun’s FPM: The Government Declared War”, Naharnet , 6 May 2008. 13 See “Lebanese army says will intervene from Tuesday”, Reuters , 12 May 2008. 14 See “Lebanon political conflict turns violent”, Reuters , 7 May 2008. See also “Hezbollah gunmen start withdrawal from Beirut”, Reuters , 10 May 2008. 15 See “Army Takes Control of North Lebanon, Opposition Ends Beirut Takeover”, Naharnet , 11 May 2008. 16 See “Opposition Workers Call for Beirut Demonstration, Majority Unions Boycott, Tensions Escalates”, Naharnet , 6 May 2008.
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17 See “Hizbullah controls Beirut, March 14 Says ‘Violence Will Not Terrorize Us”, Naharnet , 9 May 2008. 18 See Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N° 23, Lebanon: Hizbollah’s Weapons Turn Inward , op. cit. 19 See “Hezbollah gunmen start withdrawal from Beirut”, Reuters , 10 May 2008. 20 See “Army Takes Control of North Lebanon, Opposition Ends Beirut Takeover”, Naharnet , cit. 21 See “Lebanese army says will intervene from Tuesday”, Reuters , cit. 22 See “Hezbollah wages war on Druze in Mount Lebanon”, YaLibnan , 11 May 2008. See also “Hezbollah fighters pile pressure on Lebanon rivals”, Reuters , 11 May 2008. 23 See “Lebanon cancels anti-Hezbollah measures”, Reuters , 14 May 2008. 24 See “Israel, Syria holding direct talks in Turkey”, YnetNews , 21 May 2008. 25 See “Lebanese Army says will intervene from Tuesday”, Reuters , 11 May 2008. 26 See “Army Warns: Persisting Tension Threatens Unity of the Troops”, Naharnet , 8 May 2008. 27 See “Riots damage Suleiman’s chances at top post, pose conundrum for army”, The Daily Star , 29 January 2008. 28 See “Stand-off ends with Lebanon revocation”, Financial Times , 14 May 2008. 29 See Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N° 23, Lebanon: Hizbollah’s Weapons Turn Inward , op.cit. 30 See “Lebanon leaders tackle core issues at Qatar talks”, Reuters , 17 May 2008. 31 For an English translation of the agreement’s text, see “The Doha Agreement”, NOW Lebanon , available in
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THE BALKANS AFTER KOSOVO
REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF KOSOVO DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND NEW POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Paolo Quercia
A quiet independence in a troubled neighbourhood The leading event of the first quarter of the year was undoubtedly the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, followed by the adoption of a new constitution for the newborn Balkan state. The second quarter of the year was an highly expected period for a number of reasons: firstly, it was the initial testing time for the independence and the occasion to asses the first steps of the new government and the reaction of both Serbs minority in Kosovo and of Belgrade. Secondly, Serbia political scene has been stalled by deep political crises subsequent to the collapse of Kostunica’s government and the risk of the rise of a radical nationalist government has been faced; thirdly, the old unresolved question of Macedonian identity and nationhood remerged in a second acute Balkan political crises that brought a new government in power in Skopje after an ethnically violent electoral campaign. Fourthly, Kosovo independence brought a new political confrontation among different fragments of the international community, the EU lead vs the UN lead.
The region after Kosovo. It is clear that Kosovo declaration of independence was an episode mostly connected with the rituality of the secession than with its substance. It was mostly a formal fact – although overloaded with rhetoric and symbolism – since an independent Kosovo was de facto working since 1999 1 first under the control and, after 2004, with the mentoring of the UN mission in Kosovo. For this reason the declaration of independence didn’t produce major domino effects, since the neighbouring states – except Serbia – and the European ones have already accommodated in the last years a geopolitical room for the de facto state. First months of independence didn’t produce significant improvements in the number of states that did recognise Kosovo compared with the very first weeks after independence. The overall number of countries that established diplomatic relations with Kosovo remains limited, especially to the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. With this limited recognition the world community is not standing against the statehood of Kosovo but it refuses to legitimise ex post the principle of humanitarian war of intervention and the practice of secession in a manner not consistent with the uti possidetis principle and the respect of state integrity. Until middle 2008, we can find four different polarisations in state attitude towards Kosovo: a. states who support Kosovo independence because they have been part of the military coalition that made war to Yugoslavia in 1999 or because they belong to the European Union family and they share a common neighbourhood policy for the Balkans; b. countries who don’t have any specific sensitiveness with Kosovo issue but are influenced by United States foreign policy; c.
1 From a certain point of view and limited only to some factors of statehood it is possible to say that Kosovo had a parallel independent or autonomous structures since 1992.
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countries who are basically hostile to the recognition of Kosovo independence not for geopolitical reasons but because they are keen to safeguarding the international political existing borders and the principle of non interference in internal affairs; d. regional countries who are sensitive to the Albanian issue in the Balkans (Macedonia and Montenegro) or are receptive to Serbian political inputs (Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina). A special case is of course Serbia. On this issue the politics of Belgrade towards Kosovo independence is more bipartisan of what it could appear since – leaving ideology and rhetoric apart – almost all the political spectrum is nowadays in favour of keeping a similar line over Kosovo: no possibility of recognition. From this point of view, the new Tadic government will keep on the same state policy on Kosovo that characterised the previous government lead by Kostunica. Towards this path are directed the comments of Tadic on the legitimacy of the northern Serbs parallel Parliament that has been established in Mitrovica and that will remain a source of concern for the new Kosovo institutions. What can be expected from Tadic executive, is a different line on the political and diplomatic measures taken in the past months by Serbian government in “retaliation” for the recognition of Kosovo. Soon or later, it is expected that the new Serbian government will return the ambassadors to some of the countries that recognised Kosovo independence. Tadic government will be characterized also by a softer approach to NATO, developing possible forms of cooperation not based on a membership plan. It is in fact clear the Serbia will not do anything to reduce the Atlantic gap and that only the EU membership should be considered an integration political goal for Belgrade. In this environment, Kosovo government is making the preparations to open nine new embassies abroad in some of the countries that did recognise Kosovo’s independence. For the moment new embassies will be opened in USA, Albania, Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. This geographic distribution of the new embassies indicates already what could be the future geopolitical posture of Kosovo state. Apart the natural, granted and in a way ambiguous relations that will take place between Pristina and Tirana, the real compass of Kosovo international relations will be held in Washington. Kosovo will be guidelined from Tirana and Washington/London more than from Bruxelles, Berlin, Rome or Paris. The European dimension of Kosovo international relations will remain very feeble and it will be mostly limited to the emigration factor, especially as far as Switzerland, Germany and Austria are concerned. More than one third of the Kosovo pre war population is considered to live abroad. These figures could also increase consistently since independence won’t bring economic sustainability. According to some forecast Kosovo is entering into a long phase of recession that will increase the number of emigrants towards Europe. It is likely that, if this emigrational trends will be confirmed, soon EU member states will adopt a more rigid visa policy towards Kosovo nationals. A specific issue is related to the formation and selection of the new diplomatic personnel. A framework agreement is already in place between Britain’s Foreign Office and Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a second one could be reached with Tirana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is likely that relations with Italy will remain substantially undetermined for a long time since Italy didn’t develop a clear and coherent policy towards Kosovo, despite the high expectations that are present both in Tirana and Pristina.
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The revenge of Milosevic. Serbian elections where held on the 11 th of may and they represented a very important turning point in the post Milosevic politics. Serbian first party remained the radicals, leaded by Mr. Nikolic, who collected more than 30% of votes. But the results of the radical outsiders - and somehow outcast – is not a real victory. Nikolic party demonstrated already in the last presidential elections that it could significantly pass the threshold of a million votes. But in this election the real challenge for him was – after having established an alliance with the conservatives of Kostunica – to attempt to bridge the radicals and nationalists into the government, in a similar way as HDZ did in Croatia. This operation failed and this failure could be explained with two different factors. First of all it is a much difficult task to soften moderate and nationalist and radical stances in a political climate of defeat and territorial mutilation (as it was not the case in Croatia). In fact, it would have been a very awkward situation if the independence of Kosovo would have given, at the same time and in the same society, a more nationalist and irredentist spin to Kostunica’s DSS (as it happened) and a more moderate and democratic approach to Nikolic’s radical party (an outcome that happened only partially). In other words, the political effect of Kosovo independence worked in the direction to bring a more nationalist approach in the political electorate, making impossible for the ultra-nationalist radical party the possibility of moving from radical nationalism to democratic patriotism. The second factor that worked to keep the SRS in a marginalised corner outside the government was the interests of external states. Not only the European Union, but also US and Russia felt quite uncomfortable to the possibility that the radical party could enter a government coalition. If this was obvious for US and EU, it slowly became also Russian position. In fact, the anti western and pro Russian rhetoric of SRS left Moscow virtually unbiased, while the risk of a destabilising political force coming to power in Belgrade could have been armful to the policy of energetic influence of Moscow in the Balkans. In fact the energetic strategy based on trans- national acquisition and cross border pipelines brings the necessity of political homogeneity of the region and the creation of the conditions for long-term stability based on the absence of territorial disputes. In this context the political homogeneity created in the Balkans by the United States political and military strategy and by the EU enlargement policy becomes a fertile ground for Russian economic and energetic interests in the region. For this reason Moscow kept good relations with several Serbian political parties, from Tadic DS to the Socialist Party up to the Radicals . The creation of a new government in Belgrade based on the strange alliance between Tadic 5 parties coalition called “pro a European Serbia” (DS, G17+, SPO, LSV, SDP, that reached 38% of votes with 102 seats ), the libertarians of Jovanovic who are in favour of Kosovo secession from Serbia (LDP, 5,2% and 16 seats), the representatives of the minorities (the Hungarians of Vojvodina with 4 seats, the Bosniaks of Sandjac with 2 seats and the Albanians of Presevo Valley with 1 seat) and the Socialist party of the deceased leader Slobodan Milosevic (who reached 8% and 20 seats, becoming the necessary ally for both Tadic and Kostunica bloc) is still under way, but the alliances are already forged. The decision of the Socialists to enter the government with most of the parties deriving from the former DOS – a political bloc that was created in resistance to the power of Milosevic and that masterminded the coup d'état that removed Serbian leader from his post and sending him to the Hague – is the most relevant political element of this election.
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The paradox of the return of the socialist party to the government in Belgrade brings an end to the political era of the anti-Milosevicism in the name of a more realistic approach. It will not be a surprise if the political successors of Milosevic in the new Serbian government will be more pragmatic and less nationalists of democratic and anti Milosevic parties like Kostunica’s DSS. In fact according to some interpretations of the war in Yugoslavia the role of Milosevic and of the Serbian socialist party in the secession of Yugoslavia was not the role of an ultra nationalist movement that decided to wage war all across the federation against all the other nationalities. Milosevic was, on the contrary, a modest burocrat of the communist party, originally far from nationalists views who managed to build his political power in a cynic power game becoming the mediator between the radical-nationalist and the more moderate components of the Serbian communist party and society. In this specific political moment of Serbia, where it is necessary to conciliate europeism and liberalism together with mild nationalism and nostalgic irredentism activated by Kosovo independence, the socialist party is again a natural and useful option for Tadic. Its relatively small size and the necessity for the socialists to be progressively re-included into Serbian political life and into international relations could transform it in a loyal government party. If this will happen it will be an historical revenge post mortem for Slobodan Milosevic. The testing ground of this alliance will be represented by the two parliament votes that are awaited in the next that should ratify two important decisions taken by the previous government: the ratification of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between Serbia and the European Union (it must be noted that in the past parliament the socialist party approved a document against the signing of the agreement together with the radical party and the DSS. This action from the DSS formally broke the alliance between Kostunica and Tadic bringing to early political elections); the second vote will deal with the energy. Last January Russia’s Gazprom Neft signed a deal to buy 51% stake of the Serbia oil monopoly NIS, while in February Medvedev and Kostunica reached an agreement for including Serbia into the South-stream project, a pipeline for the transit of natural gas through Serbia to Europe, crossing also other Balkan countries. The ratification of the Serbian Russian – energetic deals was postponed after the political vote, and it will be now one of the first significant political actions that the new parliament should implement.
Macedonia. Going back to Ohrid ? An important political change occurred in Macedonia with the new anticipated political elections that produced a new parliament where the VMRO-DPMNE his holding alone the absolute majority. It is a great success for the Prime Minister Nicola Gruevski, who called for earlier elections after Kosovo independence brought important political consequences into the governing coalition with the request of the ethnic Albanian minority party of recognition of Kosovo. The crises that Macedonia went through in the first semester of the year had two sides. One was related to the ethnic Albanian – Slavs relations and the second was related to a violent inter ethnic fight between the two Albanian speaking parties. In this context, the pressure coming from Greece for the need to change the name of the country from Macedonia to options, added fuel to the internal political situation and the majority party had an easy game to play the role of the defenders of the national identity. In a context with internal economic problems, troubled borders with the unrecognised northern neighbour of Kosovo, internal inter-ethnic conflicts among the two Albanian political parties, and pressure from Greece to change the
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name, Gruesvski managed to give satisfaction the frustrated Macedonian national sentiment. Episodes of the frustration of the national sentiment include what happened last June when the president of the Republic had to cancel a state trip to Greece because the Greek airport authorities denied the permission to enter the national airspace because the airplane had a Macedonian flag painted on. The issue of the name appear to be a more serious field of confrontation between the two countries (and a powerful internal source of legitimacy) than what it was estimated (by the international community and by the United Nations). The issue of the name between Macedonia and Greece has been recently exacerbated by the fact that, soon after the successful political elections, the re-elected Prime Minister Gruevski decided to raise formally (with a letter addressed to the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis) the issue of the existence of an alleged “Macedonian” minority in Greece, referring to some Slavs community that left the country during the civil war in 1949. This new issue raised in the bilateral relations could definitively trouble the Greek – Macedonian relations (also considering the fact that the minority issue could be easily be transferred from the Slav-Macedonian minority to the ethnic Albanian minority leaving in Greece). In this context NATO (and potentially the EU) will became a more distant goal for Macedonia, as it happened when Macedonian has been left aside and Albania and Croatia alone received invitation to join the Alliance.
International community divided Kosovo issue is a strongly divisive matter. The independence of the former Yugoslavian province was able to break the coherence of the European Union and also NATO on the issue of recognition. It is highly disruptive of the regional political environment, as well as of the UN Security Council. But the management of the international presence in post independence Kosovo has been, in the first semester of 2008, an issue capable of bringing great differences in the international community. The start of the EU planned mission EUlex was delayed because of these discordances among the international community. It should now be ready to start after a compromise has been reached with what will remain of UNMIK, the United Nations mission in Kosovo. The EU mission should become operative and functioning by the autumn and it will progressively and gradually replace UNMIK, with a little coexistence period to avoid a time vacuum. But it is likely that this take over will not happen as smoothly as it appears, since in some part of the country inhabited by Serbs, UNMIK will not leave. De facto we will assist to a division of the international presence in territory of Kosovo since EUlex mission – a mission inconsistent with UN Resolution 1244 – can take place only in the areas controlled by Pristina’s government. An eventual extension of EUlex control in areas inhabited by Serbs will undoubtedly lead to incidents and conflicts, as it happened in Mitrovica some months ago when the inhabitants of city occupied the tribunal in a violent uprising fearing that it was going to be handed over from UN to EU administration. In fact the Serbs identify the EU mission not as an international protectorate over a disputed territory (as was the case of UNMIK2) but as an
2 It must be said that even the UN where not able/willing to exercise a real protectorate over Kosovo during the decade of its ruling and a mandate for the transfer of power to was included in the Resolution 1244.
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assistance mission of the international community to the independent Kosovo. In fact the legitimacy of EUlex can be found not in a UN Resolution but only in the Kosovo constitution, since the Ahtissari Plan, the only international legal document that speaks about the UN/EU turn over has been rejected by the Security Council; for these reasons Russia claims that EUlex is illegal. A paradox, since the mandate of the 3000 strong EUlex mission, endorsed by EU countries, is to help Kosovo in creating a lawful state by tutoring local institutions in the areas of police, customs and judiciary. Meanwhile UNMIK as got a new chief, the Italian diplomat Zannier, and one of its first tasks should be to find a modus vivendi and operandi with the Kosovo Serbs in the new framework of an independent Kosovo. To be “accepted” by Serbs as a neutral institution, UNMIK has to differentiate substantially from EUlex and should not act as an extension of Pristina’s government. This conditions are to be met in Mitrovica and in the enclaves if UNMIK wants to have an effective capacity with the Serbian population, who decided to boycott all the new independent structures and created their own parallel “parliament” in Mitrovica. But if UNMIK will try to work with the Serbs parallel institutions – that are considered illegal by Pristina – it will than become very difficult for the UN mission to establish a relation with the central government. The Kosovar institutions, and especially its president Fatmir Sediu, have clearly rejected the possibility of two separate missions for Serbs and Albanians and that they would not accept any sort of agreement between UNMIK and Serbian authorities from Pristina or Belgrade.
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THE SPILL -OVER OF BUCHAREST SUMMIT Andrea Grazioso
The NATO summit in Bucharest will probably be remembered as the occasion when NATO member states reached an agreement for the realization of a European segment of the missile shield, strongly backed by the United States. Apart from technical aspects, this was a very significant decision as many doubts about Russia’s harsh opposition were overcome – doubts that had certainly influenced some European members’ attitude. As significant as this was the decision to postpone the Membership Action Plan for both Georgia and Ukraine. In this case, Russia’s veto was crucial in preventing a wide consensus among NATO members. During the Bucharest summit, the United States seem then to have gained a partial success, for their stance of the priority of an anti-ballistic defense system met with approval from other participants, while there was a slowdown in the process of NATO enlargement to members of the “New Europe” that seem much closer to Washington than to Brussels. As for Russia, the first impression is that it suffered a “honorable defeat”, as it failed to block US plans for the missile shield. But in the following weeks, Moscow promptly adopted a series of political and diplomatic measures suggesting that a different analysis of the after-Bucharest could be made.
An unlikely Russian troops withdrawal from Moldova First of all, it should be highlighted that, unlike the previous meetings, the Bucharest summit did not end with an overt call for Russia to comply with its duties and withdraw the remaining military contingent from Transnistria and Abkhazia. As well known, it is precisely because of this non-fulfilment that the CFE Treaty signed by the NATO countries has never been ratified, which in turn made Russia suspend its obligations under the Treaty. NATO countries are unanimous in recognizing that the costs of a renewed mutual suspicion, if not military tensions, at their borders, would be too high. Not surprisingly, the Alliance has slightly softened its official position, presumably trying to bring back Russia on the rails of established confidence-building measures, with the CFE Treaty among them. And it is not surprising that a week after the Bucharest Summit, on April 11 Moldovan president Voronin met the leader of the separatist region of Transnistria, Igor Smirnov, seven years after their last meeting. In last months Voronin, whose presidential term will soon expire, seemed anxious to put an end to Moldova’s separation into two entities, which are mutually hostile and unwilling to cooperate. Over recent months it has become increasingly clear that European and NATO countries are unwilling to adopt decisive measures neither against Russian military presence in Transnistria nor against Tiraspol’s ruling leadership. As a result, Voronin seemed to aim at reaching some kind of arrangement with Smirnov, even at the cost of compromising any future integration of Moldova into both the NATO and the European Union. To the meeting of April 11, however, Smirnov was said to have come with a list of requests – including the recognizing of Transnistria as an autonomous political entity and the right to host
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Russian military contingents – which were probably planned with the specific purpose of thwarting reunification talks. This hardening can be interpreted as a sign that Moscow – which probably is behind the scenes of Smirnov’s behavior – is determined to keep Transnistria’s wound open and hinder any stabilization in the region.
Serious threats to Ukraine’s stability While Moscow probably welcomed NATO decision to delay Atlantic Alliance’s enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, the formula used by NATO suggests that their memberships remain a possibility, which could be realized in the short run. Therefore, what Moscow perceives as a very serious threat to its security – an approach of NATO borders, with their military bases at the heart of Russian territory – still causes strong frictions with the Alliance. That is why Moscow gave clear signals to Kiev and Tbilisi, in order to ward off this kind of scenarios. In the case of Ukraine, the specter was raised of rejecting the Treaty signed in 1997, with which Russia and Ukraine had established their borders by mutual consent. More precisely, both Putin – during the Bucharest Summit and then at the bilateral meeting with Bush at Sochi – and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stressed that strong differences currently exist in Ukraine between its West area and its East and South zones, and an eventual joining to NATO would not help to keep the country united. Putin made only a veiled threat, but Russian military chief of staff Baluyevsky went far and spoke of military and “other” measures to be adopted in case of Ukraine’s joining to NATO. Within Moscow political circles there are increasingly frequent discussions about a review of Khruschev’s decisions, particularly the possibility that Russia may again take over Crimean peninsula.
The fate of Sevastopol Russian base Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the political separation of Ukraine from Russia, the issue of finding a solution for the large Russian naval base at the outskirts of Sevastopol, Crimea, has attracted more and more attention. Sevastopol always had a very important role in supporting Soviet naval strategy in the Black Sea, and – above all – in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Middle East. In other words, Sevastopol has always been the epitome of the “push toward warm seas” that has been one of the main elements first of the ambitious Russian imperial strategy, then of Soviet plans. In December 1991, when the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, there were other problems looming at the window, and Russia was not, nor it felt to be, the direct heir of ancient Russian Empire. In the latest years, as is well known, things have substantially changed, and Russia now has a new status of great power, at least on paper.
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As for the wider, more complex issue of the ties between Russia and the rest of the Western community, the definition of their respective areas of influence and responsibility has come back to the fore. In this context, military power now plays a new central role. It is therefore unsurprising that also the issue of the Sevastopol base – and in general of the whole Crimean peninsula – is once again of topical interest. In 1997, along with the Treaty on friendship and co-operation between Russia and Ukraine, with which the two countries recognized “administrative” borders of the Soviet Union as international borders, was signed an agreement for a twenty-year lease of the base with its related infrastructures to Russia, which expires in 2017. The agreement stated that at the end of that period each party could terminate it by notifying its decision no later than twelve months before its due expire date. Otherwise, it could be extended for a five-year period, which would be renewable. In principle, the first withdrawal of the Russian fleet from Sevastopol is therefore not to be expected before than nine years. Russia’s open opposition to Kiev’s joining to NATO, however, caused Ukraine authorities to promptly make their moves, which may upset Moscow but are completely legitimate under current agreements. On the basis of a president Yushchenko’s directive, Ukraine council of ministers set to draw a bill that is expected to be ready in the second half of July; if approved by Ukraine Parliament, it will probably prescribe 2007 as the last year of Russian presence in Sevastopol and the other detachments in the Crimea region. Officially, this ‘early’ decision would aim at assuring the longest possible notice, giving Russians the opportunity to make a well-organized withdrawal and move their men and equipment to another base outside Ukraine. Ukraine is trying, in fact, to prevent Moscow from interpreting the 2017 date just as the beginning of the withdrawal process, and not as its deadline. At the same time, Ukraine presidency and government decided to comply to the letter with current agreements with Moscow and follow procedures that could not be legally questioned by Russia. As said above, notifying the 2017 expiry of the agreement may seem premature. But in practice, it could be not easy for Russia to find a valid alternative place where to base its Black Sea Fleet. The first Russian port on the Black Sea, the Novorossiysk port, for example, is an oil terminal whose importance is destined to further increase in the coming years. A movement of Russian fleet to Novorossiysk would directly collide – in terms of both space at disposal and available resources – with Russian strategic priority of strengthening crude oil export capacity. The Olympic Games scheduled for 2014 at Sochi will probably drain further resources and building capacities, so that they too would be in competition with the creation of a new naval base. Some analysts, who are skeptical about Russian true military capability, believe that the Black Sea Fleet is already reduced to a very low level, and the loss of Ukraine shipyards’ building capacity will not only render impossible its upgrading, but also the expansion project supported by Russian Navy Commander, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky.
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In sum, by the end of the next decade Russia could not need a large base, because it would not have a very significant Black Sea Fleet any more. But as Russia’s special representative to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, recently recalled: “Russia created Sevastopol for the fleet, not the fleet for Sevastopol”. That is to say, the usage of that large base on the Black Sea – the sole true access to the “warm seas” – it is the result of a precise centuries-old strategy, which cannot be undermined by such “mishaps” as an Ukraine leadership not aligned with Moscow’s interests. Beyond technical aspects, the Sevastopol base has clearly a high symbolic value, so that Russian top leaders inevitably are every day more hostile toward Ukraine and its overtures to NATO on the one hand, and its closed attitude toward Russia on the other one. As a result, last May Moscow’s mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, openly asked for a “return” of Crimea to Russia, while Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, stressed that 92 percent of the population of Sevastopol are ethnically Russians. Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, has not gone so far yet, though on June 14, addressing the residents of Sevastopol during the commemorations for the 225 th anniversary of the founding of the city, he recalled the historical events – and the heroism – of both the city and the Black Sea Fleet. In other words, there is wide consensus in Russia about taking resolute actions to preserve its own strategic position on the Black Sea. Indeed, on June 4 the Duma approved by a large majority a resolution that called on Russian government to evaluate the possibility of denouncing its Treaty with Ukraine – along with the recognition of current borders – if Kiev persists with its bid for NATO membership and its decision to expel Russian Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol. In the face of Ukraine’s and Russia’s opposite stances – and of their respective political leaderships – the Atlantic Alliance has begun to play a more active role. On June 16-17, NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, headed a delegation of the North Atlantic Council, comprising the 26 NATO countries’ ambassadors, on a visit to Kiev, to revitalize the Intensified Dialogue that was formally launched in 2005. During the meeting, Ukraine authorities confirmed their determination to pursue full NATO membership, as well as their commitment to a serious cooperation with the Alliance during the transition period. Ukraine decided to participate in the NATO Response Force as the first partner country to do so and to facilitate land and air transit for the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan. Moreover, it said it would consider the possibility of deploying additional personnel in that country. For its part, the allied delegation stressed the importance of adequately financing Ukraine “State Program to Inform Ukrainian Society” as the main instrument to alleviate the hostility of large sectors of Ukrainian public opinion toward the Atlantic Alliance.
Abkhazia and S. Ossetia: two steps short of recognition On the eve of the Bucharest Summit, Russia had played – as in the previous weeks – the card of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence, more precisely of a recognition by Moscow of some sort of autonomous status for the two regions, as reprisal in case of Georgia’s integration
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into NATO. Given the results of the NATO Summit on this topic, Moscow’s move on April 16 was astonishing: President Putin issued an “executive order”, namely a presidential decree authorizing the establishment of official relations between Russian ministries and government agencies and their counterparts in the two separatist regions of Georgia. In particular, with the decree the legitimacy of both the legal entities registered by the laws of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the official documents issued by the authorities of those regions is recognized; it also contains several measures for social and economic cooperation. All those measures would be aimed at the protection of Russian citizens’ rights and interests in the two separatist regions. It should not be forgotten, however, that Russian authorities has already begun to issue passports to many citizens who have always lived in those regions, thus creating the conditions for the “protection of Russian citizens”, which the April 16 decree was aimed at. Virtually all the international players, who for one reason or another had or still have a say in the matter of “frozen conflicts” in Georgia more or less openly protested against Moscow’s decision. Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States expressed “deep concerns” for what happened, and hoped that Russia would soon return to the principle of respect for Georgia’s sovereignty. Similar statements were made by the European Union, the NATO Secretary General, the US State Department, and by various EU members’ governments and presidencies, including the Baltic States, which have always sided with Tbilisi in its dispute with Moscow. Russia’s response, through its UN envoy, Vitaly Churkin, was contemptuous; commenting Western countries’ declarations and demands Churkin said that those countries are fully aware that Russia would not comply with their requests. Putin’s maneuvers do not mean, strictly speaking, that he recognized the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. From this perspective, the link between Georgia’s integration into NATO and the recognition of the separatists has been preserved. But, by giving Russian passports to the citizens of those regions and adopting administrative measures to protect their rights and interests Russia determined a situation that is very close to annexation, thus making an even more politically and strategically significant move. The confirmation that Moscow wanted to flex its muscle only arrived four days after. On April 20, a Georgia’s armed forces unmanned reconnaissance drone was shot down while it flied over Abkhazia near the cease-fire zone, which represents the de facto border between Georgia and the breakaway region since 1992. Abkhazian authorities reported that in previous months another unmanned aerial vehicle had been shot down, but Tbilisi denied it owned these reconnaissance systems. In this case, however, the unmanned drone transmitted images of the fight aircraft that downed it after few seconds. Making public those images, Georgians had to admit they owned some reconnaissance drones – probably Israeli-made Hermes 450 aircrafts – but they could bring evidence of a direct Russian involvement in the incident. In fact, the shape of a MiG-29 – a kind of aircraft owned by Russians, not by Abkhazians – could be distinguished in the images. Moreover, radar tracking – this too made public – revealed
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that the interceptor probably took off from a base at Gadauta, Abkhazia, which Russians claimed of having left in accordance with OSCE commitments.
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Russian troops entering Abkhazia The UAV shooting down obviously stirred up tensions between Tbilisi, Moscow and Abkhazia’s separatist authorities. At first, the incident had been interpreted as a warning by Moscow to Tbilisi, both to emphasize the difference between their respective military capabilities and to influence the outcome of political elections scheduled in Georgia for the next month. Having instead a military value in the first place, the episode must be understood as a measure to prevent Georgia from making surveillance over sensitive areas. Starting from April 29, a new Russian military contingent has entered Abkhazia and positioned in the area between the Inguri river – which marks the border between Abkhazia and Georgia – and the Kodori river, a few kilometers West. Moscow claimed that the sudden deployment of new forces was needed to block any future “invasion” of Abkhazia by Georgia. But, in any case, the whole Russian contingent would not outnumber the limits – about 3.000 troops – previously imposed to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia. The mission had been decided during the first half of 1990s to stabilize the region after a brief but bloody civil war, which had ended with the deportation of most part of Georgian population out of Abkhazia. Over the years, it has helped to stabilize the region but not to solve the conflict, one of the “frozen conflicts” of the post-Soviet era. Despite it is still used by Moscow, the name itself – “Mission of the Commonwealth of Independent States” – represents a heritage of the past. Only Russian troops are stationed in Abkhazia, and the reinforcements sent at the end of April had not been previously discussed or approved by CIS representatives. As for the United Nations, Security Council set up an Observer Mission (UNOMIG) that was sent to Georgia to monitor the ceasefire and the separation of forces on the line that runs mostly along the Inguri river. Made up of 113 unarmed blue helmets, UNOMIG has never had any active role, except referring what happened in the area under surveillance. The blue helmets did not confirm the alarm raised by Moscow of an “imminent Georgian invasion of Abkhazia”, thus indirectly confirming Tbilisi’s claims that denied it. Nonetheless, there are the conditions for a military confrontation between Russians and Georgians, even in the short run. In 1994, at the end of the civil war, part of Abkhazian territory was not occupied by the separatists, but remained under the control of Georgian rebel bands because of the orographic complexity of the region, along with the scarcity of communications. That is the upper Kodori valley, a portion of land that, since then, has been a sort of autonomous province within the separatist region of Abkhazia. After more than ten years, Georgian authorities carried out a military raid and entered the zone, reaffirming their control over it. Also known as Upper Abkhazia, it was here that the “Abkhazia’s government in exile” – representing the hundred thousands Georgian people who had been expelled from Abkhazia in the early 1990s – was moved from Tbilisi.
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Of course, this entity is a thorn in Abkhazian separatists’ side both from a political perspective and because this territory out of their control extends within Abkhazian territory for many kilometers, with mountain ranges that form a rugged natural barrier. Abkhazian leader, Sergei Bagapsh, has many times publicly called for the “reconquest” of this territory and the expulsion of Georgian forces. Tbilisi has deployed in this enclave an indefinite number of troops, probably some hundreds units, who formally belong to Georgian Interior Ministry. For its part, Russian Defense Ministry stated that the troop level in Abkhazia had been increased from 1.997 up to 2.542 units. According to Russian press agencies, Russian reinforcements, which include some hundreds of paratroopers, would be quartered in the villages of Akamara and Arasadzikh, in the nearby of the Kodory valley.
Risks of spillover effects and extension of the crisis First of all, it should be stressed that Putin’s decree of April 16 did not apply only to Abkhazia, but to South Ossetia as well. The situation in S. Ossetia is similar to that of Abkhazia, including the presence of a “loyalist” Authority, which claims the control of the territory for Tbilisi. And in South Ossetia, too, Russian and Georgian troops have been confronting each other; while they are officially there in the context of a peacekeeping mission, each front has actually defended a frozen status quo since the early 1990s. Indeed, it is evident that Moscow is making moves to annex South Ossetia in the form of a reunification with North Ossetia, which is part of Russian Federation. During a recent conference at Moscow, both the leaders of North and South Ossetia made clear their respective views on the issue. While the two Georgian separatist regions are not adjacent, they seem to share the same fate. In terms of military confrontation, the presence of two distinct “fronts” has made the situation very hard to handle by the undermanned and under-funded Georgian forces. Should the confrontation in Abkhazia turn into a real conflict, some fights would likely break out in South Ossetia as well. It is interesting to notice that the financing of Georgian armed forces have hugely increased over the last years, so they have been turned from a conscript into a volunteer, professional force. Moreover, in the last few years a substantial Georgian contingent have rotated in Iraq as part of US Operation Iraqi Freedom. While they have been charged primarily with the task of protecting Iraqi infrastructures, Georgian units have so far increased their field expertise, and their military skills are far better than four years ago. They are not a match for Russian forces yet, but qualitative and quantitative gap between the two forces is narrowing. In other words, if in the short period a twin crisis – in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – would be for Tbilisi an overwhelming problem to tackle with, in the medium run it could be worthwhile for Georgians to engage Russians outside their territory on many fronts at the same time, in regions that are characterized by complex orography.
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If South Ossetia represents the second front of a possible escalation in the military confrontation between Russia and Georgia, the whole Caucasus could actually become the theatre of a much wider conflict. On April 29, the same day Russians began to send their reinforcements in Abkhazia, one of the leaders of Chechen guerrilla, Movladi Udugov, claimed that his movement was ready to back Georgians in case of conflict with Russia. According to Udugov, in February the guerrilla leader Dokka Umarov had ordered the creation of a special cell to monitor Russia-Georgia relations and take advantage of an eventual conflict for the Chechen cause and, in general, for anti-Russia independence movements. Indeed, strong anti-Russia sentiments are widespread among other Caucasus peoples than Chechnya, and in the recent past Moscow control over the entire region seemed to be less firm. Georgia and Chechnya share a 80-kilometer border, and during the most harsh period of confrontation between Russia and the separatists Moscow repeatedly accused Tbilisi of allowing guerrillas to cross the border and find refuge and supplies in Georgia. Being adjacent to the area of potential conflict, Kabardino-Balkaria would also be affected by Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence struggle, which could ignite a larger confrontation. Tbilisi thus retains the capacity to make difficult for Moscow to handle and control its territory, and a recognition by separatist authorities of several republics of Northern Caucasus – symmetric to Moscow recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – could be the first step toward the extension of the conflict.
The internationalization of the crisis Tbilisi seems to be reaching its goal of extending economic and diplomatic support from outside. Indeed, most new NATO and EU members have openly sided with Georgia. More important, Azerbaijan and, more recently, Kazakhstan have begun to invest large resources in the Caucasus country. On May 16, Azerbaijan oil company unveiled a new oil terminal near the city of Poti, on Georgia’s Black Sea coast. Starting from 2010, the terminal will be able to export up to 10 million tons of oil per year. Moreover, last February Kazakhstan oil company had taken over a new terminal near Batumi – the largest Georgian city on the Black Sea – with a crude oil export capacity of 15 million tons per year. Along with these facilities there is the well-known Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyan oil pipeline, with the parallel gas pipeline, which can carry energy products directly from the Caspian Sea to Turkey and then to Europe. Georgia is therefore an important hub in the marketing system of the energy resources extracted in the Caspian Sea region. With the foreign direct investments by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan governments – not to mention the growing Arabian and US interests in the area – the number of players who want a stabilization of Georgia is only increasing. It is significant that energy transport infrastructures on Georgian territory directly compete with those of Russia. A conflict between Moscow and Tbilisi would therefore affect the strategic interests of a growing number of countries.
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On June 19, Georgian President, Mikhail Saakashvili, announced during a televised interview that Georgia adopted the necessary legal measures to ask for the withdrawal of Russian military from Abkhazia, since they do not operate as an interposition force between two conflicting parties any more, but they themselves take part to it. Though the news was made known only in the middle of June, at the beginning of May Georgian authorities informed of their intentions the secretariat of the Commonwealth of the Independent States, under whose aegis Russian military operate. Tbilisi also seems to have duly informed the United States and the European Union. Then, on June 17 Russian Federation Foreign Ministry released a statement condemning the last moves of Tbilisi and warning about the risk of a revival of a “frozen conflict”, should its peacekeepers be withdrawn. Meanwhile, Georgian government suggested to the Parliament an increase of about 200 million dollars in 2008 Defense budget to 980 millions. This measure would be aimed at increasing the interoperability between Georgian and NATO armed forces, with a view to the integration into the Atlantic Alliance. But there is no doubt that the upgrading will have direct impact on Georgian capacity to face an eventual military crisis in Abkhazia. The most important novelty, however, was the resolution passed by European Parliament on June 5, by a majority vote of 581 against 50, and 17 abstentions. The resolution asked Russian Federation for an immediate withdrawal of additional troops sent to Abkhazia, and stated that the current format of Russian peacekeeping operation – as well as the mandate by the CIS – did not adapt to that situation any more, since Russian forces are no longer impartial. Moreover, European Parliament strongly disapproved Russian intention to establish direct relations with Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities, and asked for the European Commission to give the proper importance to this issue during the EU-Russia summit scheduled for the end of the month.
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THE UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS IRAN . ONCE AGAIN . Lucio Martino
The watershed of the Khomeini Revolution is now thirty years old, and all five of the Administrations which have since had their turn in the White House have seen Iran as a rising power within the whole region, a power particularly active in all three sectors of the United States strategic architecture, those of nuclear proliferation, transnational terrorism, and energy security.
It is also true that at least since the Monroe Doctrine of 1821, the United States has not produced a strategic vision which was not global, even at the cost of sacrificing a regional equilibrium. A relatively recent example of this is offered by the attitude decided at the time of the Khomeini Revolution, which was generally seen as instrumentally more effective than the reign of Reza Pahlevi in the context of that which was then the grand strategy of the United States, that of the containment of the Soviet Union. At the same time, through a complex fabric of multi-sector relationships, Iran occupies a high position in the international priorities of many European States, including Italy, and Iran is sometimes able to exercise a direct or indirect influence in their contacts. It follows then that the case of Iran seems to progressively repeat the same corrosive capacity on Trans-Atlantic cohesion as the ancient Palestinian question, the other huge and unresolved regional inheritance from the Cold War. However, at the centre of a systemic interaction which is still typically bilateral, the margins for Iranian maneuver are extraordinarily tight when compared to the corresponding capacities of the United States. The United States is the only actors capable of revolutionizing an international interaction process which is by its own nature generally very slow to evolve. To assess international questions today without recognizing the qualitative and quantitative uniqueness of the United States is an exercise that recalls the elaboration of traditional philosophic ‘propositions,’ the result of which is always logical, but at the same time, lacking any true significance. Given that the Western cognitive stratification denies the existence of a single ‘reality’, and affirms the coexistence of several versions of such, all this as a result of a more or less commonly accepted dialectic argument, in order to trace the foreseeable speed and direction of the United States approach to Iran, more important than the reality of Iran itself is the manner in which Iran is perceived in the United States, and the manner in which this perception fits within the wider United States strategic picture. After leaving the containment of the Soviet Union behind and launching the visionary and short lived “New World Order”, according to which the two old rivals would “collaborate with” instead of “confront” each other to contribute to international stability, the United States has gradually and against its will come to realize the historic uniqueness of its condition as the last power to survive the long process of natural selection typical of an international system produced by the Peace of Westphalia. With the beginning of the “Engagement and Enlargement” of February 1995, and then continuing through the years and the Administrations, with the following National Security Strategy documents in October 1998, September 2002, and March 2006, the vision of the United States has been prompted by a paradox which is perfectly congruous with their political-
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cultural identity: the defense of what fifteen years ago Krauthammer baptized as “The Unipolar Moment” and the simultaneous universal affirmation of the principals of fundamental liberty.
Both the “Global War on Terror” and the consequent and lately almost forgotten “Greater Middle East Initiative”, as distinctive as they are, are only two of the many political instruments designed to achieve this end. At the moment, no one in the United States believes that Iran will ever be capable of catalyzing any sort of process of American decline, nor those they will ever be the centre of the United States grand strategy. It must be recognized that Iran is different from other States in the region, because Iran is the only one to combine in itself three forces, and these are often in conflict with each other. They are traceable to a deeply rooted nationalism, to a widespread pan-Islamism, and to a fierce Shiite revolutionary will. Despite the many attempts to move beyond the limits typical of the modern national state, no one inside of the United States strategic community has ever really doubted the firmness of Iranian nationalism, rooted as it is not only in a language, an ethnic identity and a common culture, but also in an historic experience with a wealth of invasions by strangers who have inexorably fed a strong feeling of diffidence towards each of the populations which surround Iran. The case of pan-Islamism is different, seen as being a product of the Khomeini Revolution, and therefore less deeply rooted in Iranian society. In any case, as confirmed in the Iranian Constitution, the Iranian post-revolutionary governments have all embraced a universal ideology, one sustained over time with greater or lesser intensity, but one at least in the opinion of most United States observers as having always led to an Iranian support of all Islamic revolutionary movements, including obviously that of Palestinian origin. Iran now seems destined to remain a purely Shiite state, such that, with the exception of a few radical Palestinian groups such as the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, principal Sunnite actors continue to regard Iran with great suspicion. This dynamic is based largely on the Iranian natural tendency to side with the Shiite part of other populations (as was particularly evident in the case of the ethnic factions which have disrupted Iraq for years), and on the absolute incapacity of the Sunnite to share both the revolutionary iconography and the conceptual base of the Islamic republic of Iran which grew out of the Revolution. At the moment, in consequence of the interaction of these three forces, Iran is not perceived as able to develop a hegemonic capacity that could change the regional balance, let alone the global equilibrium. On the other hand, the violent interaction of these three forces seems to have led to a notable dose of pragmatism in the formulation of a foreign policy which is often judged capable of sudden, dramatic accelerations, alternated with sudden slow-downs, leading to accusations of considerable irrationality. During the last three decades, the United States approach to Iran has always been influenced by the diffidence which is characteristic of someone who is forced to interact with an actor who is possibly caught up in the continual irrational re-propositioning similar to “The Prisoner’s Dilemma”, during which the two protagonists, instead of assuming in the other a common and shared rationality, continue to react based on the assumption of an absolutely irrational opponent. Although frequent direct and indirect confrontations between the two States have occurred, they have sometimes been forced by circumstance to cooperate, even in the absence of any formal
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relationship. Both commonalities and differences have been very evident in the progress of the three main contemporary dynamics, dynamics which have been further complicated by the
involvement of the principal European States: Iraq and Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear program, and the Palestinian question. The Iranian and United States strategic priorities regarding Iraq and Afghanistan seem to complement each other. Both Washington and Teheran wish to defend the regional stability from “El Qaeda” or “Taliban” Sunnite extremism. Although the strong United States military presences near the Iranian borders cannot but augment the old fears. Many in the United States feel that it is this convergence of interests that is at the base of the support that Iran seems to be giving the Iraqi and Afghani guerrilla fighters. At the cost of increasing regional instability, Iran could hereby guarantee a release of pressure in its contacts with the United States, averting thereby an attack. Or else, the dimensions of the support given by Iran to the Afghani-Iraqi guerrillas would be in proportion to the perception that Teheran has of the military threat, real or assumed, which Washington presents to the survival of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian nuclear program seems to be another problem which is just as difficult to solve. Even if the American Intelligence community has concluded that Iran must have suspended its attempts to develop its nuclear capacity back in 2003, the room for negotiation between the parties is very much reduced. The reasons for the determined obstinacy with which Teheran pursues its nuclear ambitions range from the incapacity to free themselves of the uncomfortable inheritance of the now distant reign of Reza Pahlevi, to the more rational double need to protect themselves from an attack from the United States, and to achieve a symmetrical balance of the nuclear capacity of India, Pakistan and Israel. In any case, there is a strong conviction in the United States that the Iranian nuclear program is an objective which is so important and one which is also shared by all the principals in Iran so that not even a radical change in the power structure could bring about its abandonment. The other great problem is the Iranian opposition to the Middle East peace process. No one seems able to evaluate how much of the anti-Israel rhetoric is the product of a calculated strategy, or simply the result of comments from a weak political system torn apart by its own contradictions. Although consensus is strong about the fact that for the Iranian leadership a sincere hostility towards Israel is morally and ideologically legitimate, the recent war-like rhetoric appears inspired by attempts to curb the internal pan-Islamic push and to capture consensus within the many Sunnite communities in the Persian Gulf. Despite this strategic divergence, the United States and Iran have sometimes implicitly arrived at a form of collaboration. An example of this is to be seen in the tolerance the United States displayed regarding the help sent by Iran to the Muslims in Bosnia during the long Yugoslavian war of secession. Another is seen in the long common opposition to the Iraq and Afghani regimes. In line with this, a new area of tactical cooperation could be envisioned in a common opposition to drug trafficking, given that Iran, the United States and the European states share the same wish to block the flow of narcotics originating from Afghanistan. On the other hand, as much as it now seems improbable, the possibility of the Iranian situation degenerating into a new phase of open conflict should not be excluded. In this case, other than
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an intensification of the conflict in the two principal regional theatres of action, the United States expects an Iranian reaction aimed at the destabilization of the main Middle Eastern governments. Assuming that such a circumstance does not place the regime itself in danger of collapse, no one really believes that Teheran would be as irresponsible as to create an armed
conflict with the United States, given its absolute military inferiority, or even to proclaim an embargo on the exportation of its own oil. It is even less likely that Teheran would commit economic suicide by interfering with the traffic in the Straits of Hormuz. The Iranian question moves ahead through phases of immense fluidity, rich in highs and lows in the negotiations, in a system in which the negotiation process is more important than any point of arrival, to the point where a continual procrastination over time seems, for the United States and for the main European states, in reality in the interests of relationships with Teheran, which are finally at a stage where they are more “manageable” than they have ever been since the Seventies.
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HIGH TENSION BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN Fausto Biloslavo
Elections in sight in Kabul, political crisis in Islamabad Tensions have risen between Kabul and Islamabad since Afghan President Hamid Karzai threatened to attack the Taleban bases in Pakistan on the grouns of “legitimate defence”. For the first time, the Afghan president threatened to send soldiers over the border to attack the insurgents. Karzai’s main targets are two emerging Pakistani Taleban leaders: maulana Fazlullah and Baitullah Mehsud. “The fact that they (the Talebans) cross the border”, Karzai declared, “in order to kill Afghan targets and coalition soldiers gives us the right to go there and do the same."
“Baitullah Mehsud should that know we will go after him and attack him on his own ground,” Karzai said. “Along with Fazlullah he will understand that we will defeat them and we will avenge all that they have done in Afghanistan in these past years.”. It remains to be seen if Karzai’s threat, which is reminiscent of the Turkish incursions against the militant PKK Kurds in the North of Iraq, will be carried out. Humayun Hamidzada, Karzai’s spokesman, underlined that the president is also contesting the Pakistani government’s plan to begin peace negotiations with the Talebans in the tribal areas just over the Afghan border. Karzai’s words caused an immediate reaction in Islamabad where the Foreign Minister summoned the Afghan ambassador to issue a formal objection to Karzai’s speech. Premier Yousuf Raza Gilani stressed that he will not allow foreign troops to follow the militia onto Pakistani territory. Tensions with Washington have also been rising ever since the Americans carried out an air attack in Northwestern Pakistan which killed 11 Pakistani soldiers. A unit of American troops, part of the ISAF mission, was attacked on 10 June in the province of Kuman on the Pakistan border. The attackers used light arms and RPG missiles from Afghanistan, just two hundred metres from the Pakistan border. The unit called for air support and a coalition bomber dropped four bombs which hit the hostile forces that had fled into Pakistan. The victims were eleven Pakistani paramilitaries from the border corps whose task it is the keep peace on the fragile border. In reality, the border corps is made up of members of the local Pasthun tribes who often cannot be distinguished, even in their dress, from the Talebans. The border guards, in any case, are said to have helped the Talebans to infiltrate into Afghanistan. This accusation is contained in secret American documents which reveals that a large number of Afghani have infiltrated into the Pakistani border corps.The Pakistani paramilitaries are even accused of having taken part in the Taleban attacks against the coalition forces, according to several reports written after the border clashes. The 10 June incident took place 35 kilometres Northwest of Ghalanai, in Eastern Afghanistan, close to the Mohmand district in the Pakistani tribal zone. The Americans released a film on internet of the clash and the air attack which was taken by a pilotless plane. (http://www.dvidshub.net/media/video/0806/DOD_100020431.wmv). This document shows clearly that what took place was, as the US troops had already claimed, a “legitimate” bombing. In addition no border corps post was hit.
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Despite this evidence, Islamabad condemned this action as an “unacceptable” and “vile” attack which was a “gross violation of the Pakistan-Afghan border”. According to the foreign minister it was a “clear denial of the big sacrifices that Pakistan made in order to combat terrrorism”. The Mohmand tribal elders issued a statement condemning the America attack and they threatened to summon a “laskhar”, that is , a tribal army to fight against the Americans “for our country, as we already did in 1948 in Kashmir”. The Pasthun from the tribal zones sent volunteers to fight in the first India-Pakistan conflict which led to the division of Kashmir. Things worsened on 22 June when NATO soldiers were attacked by mortars launched from inside Afghanistan and responded with an artillery attack. The three artillery attacks were launched for “self-defence” in the border area of Paktika. The number of incidents in Eastern Afghanistan has increased by 40% since the start of the year, with a jump of 53% in April. There was no shortage of even more hostile motives between Kabul and Islamabad. Sayed Ansari, spokesman for NDS, the Afghan intelligence agency, accused Pakistan of ordering the 27 April bomb attack against Karzai. The head of State barely avoided a well-planned kamikaze attack carried out during a military parade. According to various documents, confessions, and the terrorists’ mobile telephone logs, ISI, the powerful Pakistan military secret service, was behind the attack. The Pakistani defence minister dismissed these accusations as lies but the revelations were embarrassing. “The terrorists used code-names in phone calls to Pakistan and they received text messages from abroad about the attack”, according to an Afghan spokesman. The key player in this was an Afghan known only as Homayoun. The head of a cell that already tried to assassinate Karzai, he was killed during an attack on the terrorists’ hideout in Kabul. The numbers contained in his phone provide evidence of the involvement of several persons linked to ISI, such as Jalaluddin Haqqani, a noted Mujaheddin commander, now allied with the talebans and Al Qaida, and one who has always, since the holy war against the Red Army, kept close ties with ISI. The porous nature of the border with Pakistan is one of the main elements of destabilization in Afghanistan just as it was at the time of the Soviet invasion when the Mujaheddin used the tribal border zones as safe havens. The Pakistani prime minister Yousaf Razi Gilani renewed his offer to build a barrier along the border to stop militia crossing over. The building of a “wall” was already begun by the previous pro-Musharraf government but was subsequently judged useless and construction was abandoned. The border is 2,400 kilometres long and initial work was only on a 35-kilometers section. The land is so dangerous and so difficult to keep under surveillance that the Talebans would have no trouble, in any case, in finding ways across into Afghanistan. Pakistan has also installed a satellite surveillance system for the porous border, especially for those areas that have never been precisely defined on maps. This was announced by Rehman Malik, the Pakistan Internal minister. He explained that the system will not only keep an eye on illegal movements towards the border but will also monitor the movements of the NATO forces. This is a sign that we are only at the beginning of the Afghan-Pakistan border crisis.
Afghanistan: elections on the way The Afghan presidential elections, due to be held in 2009, still seem a long way off, but the political manoeuvring has already begun. The terrorists already tried to upset things in their
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assassination attempt against President Karzai during a military parade in Kabul. What is at stake is not only the future of the head of State but also the gradual shifting of power to the dominant ethnic group, the Pasthun, which has markedly conservative and Jihadist tendencies. Parliamentary elections will be held in 2010 if the UN fails to convince the riotous Afghan politicians to hold the two elections jointly in order to save money and guarantee better safety. Karzai was the first to announce that he will be running and, at the moment, he remains the favourite to succeed himself even if he is accused of not having kept promises made with regard to security, jobs, and the battle against corruption. On 12 April, speaking at a conferring ceremony at the University of Kabul, Karzai announced that he would run and that “professor Rabani had telephoned to ask me to do so”. Burhanudin Rabani is one of the old guard of Mujaheddin leaders who fought against the Soviet invaders. He has been a supporter of Karzai, on and off, for many years so there was nothing casual in Karzai’s choosing to mention him because other leaders of the past, such as the ultra- conservative Abdul-ul-Rab Rasoul Sayaf and Haji Muhammad Muhaqiq, are both anxious to get into the fray. If Karzai decides on an alliance with the conservatives he will probably be forced to give two vice-presidential positions to the two former Mujaheddin. Karzai seems determined to seek support from the extremists and has not ruled out involving some Taleban fringes with whom he has been negotiating secretly. Several other minor figures have announced that they will run for president including Ramazan Bashardost, a Hazara parliamentarian and supporter of the war against corruption, and the Tajik Massouda Jalal, the only woman candidate, who already ran in 2004. The big players who will challenge Karzai are waiting none-too-quietly in the wings to forge alliances for both the presidential and parliamentary elections. Zalmay Khalilzad’s decision to enter the field has created quite a stir. It seems he is preparing to resign as American representative to the United Nations. Of Afghan origin, he was the first US ambassador to Kabul after the fall of the Talebans. He later served as ambassador in Baghdad and is one of Karzai’s mentors. Asked about his future, he did not rule out the possibility of running: “I am not a candidate for any position in Afghanistan but I am at the service of the Afghan people”. Sources close to him, say that the former Columbia University professor is seriously considering either running for President or lending his support to his old friend Karzai. The real challengers will be the former interior minister, Ali Ahmad Jalali, and Hedayat Amin Arsala, one of the most prominent members of Karzai’s cabinet. Jalali is also an Afghan- American and former professor at the national Defence University in Washington. He served as interior minister from 2003-2005 in Kabul. A genuine Pashtun, he worked with the Voice of America for twenty years and, as minister, immediately clashed with the Tajik officials in the ministry. In the end, he was forced to resign but he has continued to build a network in the light of a possible run in the elections. The governor of the province of Nangarhar, Gul Agha Shirzai and Ehsanullah Bayat, director general of one of the biggest Afghan companies, are two of his most prominent supporters. The former is attempting to speed up the reconstruction process while the latter is loved by the people for his initiatives in favour of the poorer sections of the community. Another formidable opponent is Arsala, the most moderate member of Karzai’s cabinet. He is a Pasthun from the Jabar Kehl tribe which is linked to former Afghan king, Zahir Shah. He holds
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a doctorate from the George Washington University and worked at the World Bank before returning to Afghanistan to join the anti-Soviet resistence movement. Mustafa Zaher, the king’s grandson, may also decide to run after joining Rabani’s National Front. The unknown quantity will be Yunes Qanooni, the last surviving heir to the Tajik commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was killed in an Al Qaida attack two days before 11 September. President of the lower house of Parliament, he is the real eminence grise of the Panjsher group, so called after the valley where Massoud held out against ten fierce Soviet offensives. He ran against Karzai in 2004 and came second.
Redistribution of the Italian troops and the Farah offensive. In August, the Italians will cede the command of the ISAF Mission in Kabul to their French allies. Thus the partial “repositioning” of our troops in Afghanistan, as announced by Defense Minister Ignazio La Russa, will begin. In the short-term, that is, in August, the number of troops will be reduced from the current 2,600 to 2,000-2,100. In the same time troops will be moved to the Western region under Italian command. At the end there will be some 2,400 Italian troops in Afghanistan. A reduced number will remain in Kabul, while the bulk of the troops will be concentrated in the Western sector, where there will be 500 more troops than there are today. Italy will also send out about forty carabinieri who will be involved in the training of the local police. Minister La Russa has not ruled out sending four Tornado strike fighters to take part in air cover missions. The newly flexible approach to the caveats – the so-called national limits to how each contingent is employed – is already in place. The period of 72 hours initially required for an intervention outside a contingent’s zone has been reduced to just 6. American Defense secretary Robert Gates has applauded this decision but the Italians will also have to do more in the Western sector. The ISAF command plans require reinforcements for an offensive in the Farah province, the “hottest” one under Italian control.
Musharraf risks impeachment Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf risks impeachment. These accusations could not come from the parliament but from the four provincial assemblies. Musharraf’s opponents (the PPP or Popular party, and the PML-N, the Muslim League) have the two-thirds majority necessary in these assemblies to call for his impeachment. The leaders of the two parties, which are struggling to govern the country, are said to have already discussed taking this course. But they are hoping that Musharraf will resign without things having to come to this pass. Political tension over the destiny of the head of state is mounting. Former premier, Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Muslim League, has gone so far as to demand that Musharraf be tried for treason, a crime which is punishable by hanging. “We asked you to leave with honour”, Sharif told a public meeting in Islamabad, “now the people have issued a new verdict, they want you to be tried”. At that point 20,000 protestors shouted “Hang Musharraf”. “Is hanging only for politicians?” asked Sharif, referring to former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, father of Benazir Bhutto, hanged by a military dictator in 1979. Asif Ali Zardari, widower of Benazir Bhutto, is hoping for a softer, less traumatic solution for the country and the armed forces. He too, however, has declared that “the day is not far off when we will call on an exponent of the Popular Party to assume the role of president”.
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Following a flurry of unconfirmed rumors which suggested that the head of State was preparing for exile in Turkey or in Great Britain, Musharraf himself had to issue a denial. He does not want to leave Pakistan, but it is likely that he will have to leave office in order to obtain immunity if his rivals decide to proceed with his impeachment. The governmental crisis, brought on by the resignations of the ministers from the Muslim League (9 of 24 ministers, including the Finance minister), reflects the indecision of the executive, and undermines the country’s stability. Sharif has guaranteed external support but has not been able to come to a deal with Zardari over the fundamental cause of the crisis: the re- installment of the sixty judges sacked by Musharraf. It is not an insignificant question because if the magistrates, including the president of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Chaudhry, are re- installed, Musharraf’s position could become even less secure. The judges could contest crucial decisions, such as last year’s declaration of a state of emergency, with the aim of bringing about Musharraf’s impeachment. Zardari is afraid that a judicial revenge would cancel the amnesty which allowed him to return home and which cancelled various charges for which he would otherwise have had to answer, including corruption. The PPP has presented a proposal for the revision of the constitution which would see the powers of the head of state being reduced. The proposal, which contains 62 constitutional emendments, cancels the President’s right to remove the government from office. The power to nominate the head of the armed forces and of the provincial governments would pass to the prime minister. And not only: the president would only be allowed to stay in power for two mandates. Which Musharraf has already done.
Uncertain agreements with the Talebans and Washington’s fears Pakistan’s defense minister, Chaudhry Ahmad Mukhtar, is convinced that dialogue with the Talebans is in his country’s interests. “Meetings with the Taleban leaders were held before and are being held now”, he was reported as saying, by the local Geo television. In May the Islamabad government ordered the “gradual” withdrawal of troops from the Swat valley in the northwestern Pakistani tribal zone. For months the Islamic militias fought in tough battles against the army. The leader of the armed fundamentalists is Mullah Fazlullah. A young people’s leader, he has forged an alliance with Beitullah Mehsud, head of the Pakistani Talebans who fights further South in his stronghold in Southern Waziristan. The truce in the Swat valley provides for the total application of the tough Koran Sharia law. In exchange for the gradual withdrawal of the army, the militias have agreed to stop their attacks, to allow young girls attend school, and to avoid public displays of weapons. The Pakistani troops have partly withdrawn or, as they put it, have been repositioned, also in that slice of Waziristan devastated by the guerilla war and terrorism carried out by Mehsud’s men. Mehsud is the most dangerous element in the tribal area and has been accused of having ordered the assassination of former premier Benazir Bhutto. Formally, this “changing of positions”, was decided in order to allow 200,000 homeless from the area to return to their half- destroyed fields and the decimated livestock. Mehsud has made it clear that while he accepts the truce with Islamabad he will not give up his war against the NATO troops who support the Kabul government. “Islam does not recognize the frontiers or borders”, he declared, “the Jihad will continue in Afghanistan”.
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In reality that truce and the negotiations are very fragile and reflect the internal weakness of the Islamabad executive. The best term to explain the current situation and the government’s strategy for the area is “confusion”. The most worrying aspect is that the Tehrik-e-Taleban, Meshud’s new Taleban movement, is expanding beyond the remote tribal areas. Even Peshawar, the Northwestern Casablanca where spying, Al Qaida hunts, and fundamentalism meet, is under threat. In June the Pakistani launched an offensive with tanks, helicopters and fighter planes in order to break the “siege”. The aim is to guarantee security for NATO’s vital supply route in Afghanistan, which follows the Kyber pass. The Afghani foreign minister, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, expressed his deep concern: “The meetings with extremist groups will not help the peace process in Pakistan or in Afghanistan” while John Negroponte, the US Assistant Secretary of State, told congress: “I hope that these negotiations proceed with caution, and that they don’t conclude with a result which provides the extremist elements with the right or the capacity to have free run of the tribal areas, areas from which to launch attacks against Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States or the rest of the world”. In addition to this, the body which controls American government spending (GAO), made a nasty discovery. Since 2001, Pakistan has received 5.5 billion dollars from the US for the war against terrorism. Some 2 billion dollars of this sum is now being investigated by the GAO. By way of example, at least 35 million dollars should have been used to build military roads and bunkers but no trace of these can be seen. To underline its concern, the Pentagon suspended 81 million dollars worth of military supplies to Pakistan. A small portion of the total defense sum but still an important signal against the negotiations between Islamabad and the Talebans.
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Africa
AFRICA : BETWEEN SUCCESSFUL APPROACHES FOR THE FUTURE AND THE FARCE OF REALITY Maria Egizia Gattamorta
The African continent is increasingly disputed by prestigious international players, as evidenced by the interests of India and Japan, who are increasingly structuring and differentiating their cooperation. Therefore, not only, the preferential relationship with China from the East, but agreements designed to promote a real long-term development. Several factors seem to converge for a real development in the region, nevertheless Africa – in order to project itself into the future- first has to trace a balance of the democratic path done so far, examine how or whether it is interested in the tutelage of the indispensable basic principles, screen the results achieved in terms of governance, verify whether economic plans led to economic growth or have been blocked by local corruption and dysfunction. The tragedies of Darfur and Somalia remain pending as the uncertainties of the food crisis and economic stagnation; the horizon carries new “challenges” related to “domesticated” electoral competitions. The Zimbabwe case has been occupying the African political scene since March. In the short term, despite – or perhaps because of - weak South African and regional mediation there do not seem to be conclusive or satisfactory solutions. The XIth Summit of the African Union has shown inconsistencies, fundamental hesitations, bad assimilations and the application of internationally recognised principles. The support given to Robert Mugabe, the united front of Africans against possible Western sanctions do not show strength or maturity but only their inability to free themselves from old patterns of power.
Africa-India: looking for a successful partnership A new quite but efficient partner emerges on the African scene: India. Several are the guidelines on which the relations were structured: the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) development initiative, the India-Africa Forum. What is the origin of this “apparently” new relationship? How is it developing? Could this be the real combination that might trigger mechanisms of a virtuous growth for the African continent? Can this be true and sustainable over time? The initial signals can certainly be recognized in the bonds created during the Bandung Conference, then were enriched by the support provided by New Delhi to the liberation movements and the fight against the apartheid of the white regime of Cape Town and Pretoria. However, it is throughout the nineties - with the affirmation of a strong domestic national industry in need of energy, oil and gas -that interdependencies were strengthened. To this, two things have to be added: the role of a common colonial power that has a similar background and the Asian Diaspora, a large community in the islands and African countries that face the Indian Ocean. Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa and Madagascar represent in fact a land in which Indo – African cultures and traditions are blended. The first India-Africa Forum, held in New Delhi on April 8 th -9th was promoted on the basis of contacts launched in recent years within the contexts of IOR-ARC and IBSA. The forum was
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attended by 14 African heads of State including those of Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda as well as vice presidents and high rank government officials. Two documents were adopted during the Summit: the Delhi Declaration and the Framework for Cooperation . The first is a political act of great lucidity that contains common positions for United Nations reform ( a key and always present element), for environmental protection, for an approach to common choices promoted by the WTO and for a joint commitment against international terrorism; the framework, instead, outlines new areas for joint work between equals with a great vision and perspective. A synergistic action is launched based of seven chapters: economic cooperation, political cooperation, Science and Technology, cooperation in social development, Tourism, Infrastructure, Media and Communication. Driven by pragmatism and realism, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced his adoption of a system of tariff preferences ( Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme ) for exports of 50 under-developed countries (34 of which are African) and the doubling of credit volume from the current 2.15 billion dollars to 5.4 billion dollars over the next five years. The intent is to double within few years the volume of commercial exchanges which currently stands at about 30 billion dollars. Why should this collaboration take place? Indian technology and low priced of medicines to be used as a currency in exchange of African oil. Certainly, the acquisition of oil resources itself is already an achievement, however, the approach and involvement of the black continent appear to be an anti-China move (despite official statements of the Indian Prime Minister). At the time, the presence of these two Asian contenders in the African Continent is not yet comparable in terms of Foreign Direct Investment and trade exchange. It is the quality of the offers that might make the difference in the near future. De facto, India is a democracy and this offers a guarantee for partnerships among players of equal value. It does not boast its non-interference in others internal political situations even in some situations where flagrant violations of human rights were committed…although, a careful analysis could transpire that the Government of New Delhi silently refrained from the UN sanctions against Khartoum. India’s collaboration seems more constructive and based on respect for democratic rules, which have been consolidated and strengthened over time Could this be the suitable alliance, useful to activate the essential virtuous process that is long needed for the African continent? All signals are leading towards this direction, with the hope that this approach is not only “different” but also “winner”, enable to inject a new “action dynamism” in to the African continent.
Africa-Japan: can the TICAD Conference be the right path for the continental development? The acceleration of economic growth and the promotion of Continental development: these are the guidelines that have inspired the fourth edition of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD ), focused on the theme Toward a vibrant Africa: a continent of hope and opportunity (Yokoama, May 28 th – 30 th ) Japan has been working silently and constantly. It supports a long-term vision for the African situation and has been promoting since 1993 a mechanism designed to ensure dialogue with 53 African partners, by involving agencies and international financial institutions.
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Over the years, the dialogue was transformed into a “global framework”, in order to facilitate initiatives for concrete development, nurtured by the logics of ownership and partnership . In this period several organisms, parallel to TICAD, were promoted in order to support the work and keep the debate animated: the Asia-Africa Trade and Investment Conference (AATIC), Asia-Africa Investment & Technology Promotion Centre (AAITPC), the Africa-Asia Business Forum (AABF), the AFRASIA Business Council (AABC), the Africa-Asia SME Network (TECHNONET Africa), the TICAD Exchange Network, the TICAD-AFRICA IT Initiative. The purpose of these structures was to promote trade and investment among African partners and the island of the Rising Sun , to facilitate the identification of new partners for the creation of joint ventures, to encourage favourable conditions for the promotion of Small and Medium joint ventures, and ultimately a real community, or rather a network for the free flow of information and correct trade data. In addition to the industry sector, great attention was also given to the agriculture sector, considered to be vital in securing survival and reducing poverty in Africa (for example the advertising campaign for the NeRicA-New Rice for Africa). NeRicA ( a particular type of rice, that suits the characteristics of African territory and is more resistant to parasite attacks), was promoted in the markets, with the aim of tackling the many food crises and combating malnutrition present in many African countries. TICAD was then directed to ensure human security through the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Within this contest a strong commitment was adopted towards education and health for the consolidation of peace and the democratization process. Additionally, another innovative chapter of the Japanese policy was that of environmental protection. This long path is what constitutes the backbone of TICAD, that does not appear to be a “smoky” project but an actual forum aimed to concretize projects, carefully selected from diverse sectors of economic development, human security and environmental protection. Japan, like India with its spectrum of proposals, presents itself in Africa following a specific logic to promote a self-sustained development in the future. The Yokohama Meeting adopted three documents: an Action Plan , a Declaration and Follow-up Mechanism . In order to accelerate the development process, participants stressed among other issues the need to improve the regional infrastructure system (still considered to be insufficient), the possibility of promoting tourism in general (particularly eco tourism) and the importance of private sector (both nationally and internationally). As for what regards human security social and economic fields, in order to promote the achievement of the millennium, the necessity for improving the quality of the education system was highlighted together to the need for an efficient public health system, like the importance of major involvement of women in the public life and in the economy. As for what concerns the political nature of human security, attention was called on the necessity of a particular assistance to all countries committed to reconstruction processes and a “continuous and inclusive” dialogue as well as strengthened governance were encouraged. In the environmental sector, many initiatives promoted by the African themselves were recognized, including those promoted through the Conference of International Solidarity for the Protection of African and Mediterranean Regions and the program Cool Earth (supported by Japan). A Follow-up Mechanism (composed from a secretariat, a joint committee and supported by regular ministerial meetings) was promoted in order to monitor individual processes, as well as
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to stimulate the continuation pf the TICAD initiatives. Among the major commitments made in the Action Plan is worth noting that taken to duplicate public aid from the current 900 million dollars up to 1.8 billion dollars by 2012, to move GDP share from the current 0.17 % for public aid to 0.7% within the upcoming years as expected by the Millennium Development Goals (without instead setting a time limit previously set for 2015), a 10 billion dollars worth plan to promote Continental Economic growth combined with environmental protection. More significantly, the visibility promised by the Japanese premier, who will host the G-8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit to be held on July 7 th -9th . This is therefore an articulated plan that foresees the participation of international organisms and joint committees that are directly affected. A plan that certainly seeks in return the enormous mineral wealth and energy of the African continent, but within the context of a long- term period could facilitate a substantial, endogenous and sustainable development. The interlocutors on the African continent are numerous but the variable geometrical triangulation with India, Japan and Brazil seems to be the right remedy in order to follow a path oriented towards self-reliance, aimed to reach real growth and backed mutual cooperation. . XIth Summit of the African Union: the case of Zimbabwe The thorniest issues for the continental balance were dealt with during the XIth Summit of the African Union in Sharm el Sheikh (June 30th-July 1 st ), which focused on the theme “ Meeting the Millennium Development Goals on Water and Sanitation ”. Several were the issues on the Summit’s agenda (the effects of food crisis and increase of foodstuffs on weak economies in Africa, and the resolution of conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Chad, Comoros; the protection of human rights, the impact of increased oil prices), but greater attention was given to the continuing tragedy in Darfur, to the recently ignited crisis between Eritrea and Djibouti, and in particular, to the outcome of the second round of the elections in Zimbabwe. Foreign Minister burkinabé, Djibrill Bassolé, was appointed mediator of the African Union and the United Nations for the Darfur issues. This choice was to reward the political path covered in recent years under the guidance of Blais Compaoré and nevertheless for the results obtained in the Ivorian mediation with the Ouagadougou Agreement of March 2007. As for what regards the newly open front in the Horn of Africa, the choice of government of Asmara to move troops into the border region with Djibouti was not shared with the Union which demanded an unconditional immediate withdrawal of its men. So far, this might seem relatively normal, a classic routine of a mid-term meeting by the continental organization, in order to indicate slight adjustments. The most apparent inconsistency emerged on the Zimbabwean issue. Dealing with this subject proved the structural weakness of the AU, the lack of respect to the principles of freedom and democracy. At this point the Union disowned its plans and was seen as a farce. Recent events regarding Robert Mugabe’s “feud” are largely known. He was confirmed as a President in the second round of presidential elections on June 27 th with 90.2% of preferences. What was the reaction of the African Union? While it is right to emphasize Botswana’s request to exclude the country from the African Union meetings and from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the criticism of Nigeria addressed to the conduct of outgoing and re-elected President, the complaint of Senegalese President Wade from the strategy tinged by policy of the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-
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PF), everything else - sadly - is total emptiness. The African leaders welcomed Mugabe with open arms, that man who ruled his country with violence over the past 28 years, who brought hunger to a country once considered the granary of the continent , who filled the prisons with all dissenting voices, who followed insane economic policies and brought inflation to unthinkable levels. All appeals made by opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai who had requested international peacekeepers received deaf ears, as well as warnings made by Moeletsi Mbeki (vice president of the South African Institute for International Affairs) of a serious danger looming over the continent in front of a government that was illegally constituted. What happened to the statements made by the observation missions of SADC according to which the result “does not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe” or those of the AU Parliament mission which denounced that the elections were “not free and fair”? The only step taken was a resolution (unbinding) which, recognising the complexity of the situation in Zimbabwe, has encouraged members of the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change ( MDC) to promote a dialogue aimed at reconciliation, has supported the creation of a government of national unity, recommended the continuation of SADC mediation, appealed to the parties to refrain from actions that could have a negative impact on the climate of dialogue. The extreme caution on this matter adopted by the Pan African Parliament nearly grazed hypocrisy. How does the African continent emerge from this affair? Definitely the weakness ( and the opportunism) of Thabo Mbeki, the inadequacy of the regional community of reference (SADC) but above all, the democratic and political immaturity of all AU representatives. There is always a price for growth…and in front of this matter in particular ( as in other ongoing crisis like Darfur) a serious involution was witnessed. The African Union does not seem to be able to seize the questions from the population. The Summit was a missed opportunity for the continent, to demonstrate the ongoing of a real change.
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India and China
THE SINO – JAPANESE AXIS Nunziante Mastrolia
The breakup (as the visit by Shinzo Abe to China last year was defined) is over and for Hu Jintao the “hot spring” started with his visit to Japan from May 6-10, the second in the history of the People’s Republic of China since the visit of Jiang Zemin in 1998. There is an air of relaxation in Asia and it would be reductive to descend the attitude of Chinese major condescension towards the aspirations of other regional actors, from the need to lower the tones and calm the waters before the Olympics scheduled for next August. Probably something more profound might be going on: Asia started to move away from its past. To date, in other words, in the Far East no process has been launched to overcome previous horrors and reconciliation. What emerged frequently (due to the escalation of the crisis on the Korean peninsula or for the publication of Japanese history texts that went silent on the violence inflicted by the Japanese occupying forces in China) is the fact that deep within the conscience of the region’s population the memory of the sorrows sustained still lived on nor Japan was yet forgiven for its violent past. Therefore behind the surface of cordiality in relations, as between South Korea and Japan or the tensions between Japan and China, the development of the friendship / enemy continued to submerge its roots in the pains of World War II. One thing that emerges so obvious if you take into consideration the results of the visit made by Jiang Zemin in Japan in 1998, a trip strongly influenced by the ghosts of the past. On that occasion, Jiang repeatedly reminded the Japanese of their imperialist past, even in the presence of the emperor. He also refused to sign a joint communiqué with the premier Keizo Obuchi since the text did not include an apology for the war atrocities Japan committed and he requested from his former enemy an official apology (this time in writing and not just in words as repeated several times by the Tokyo Government) for the military occupation of China in the Thirties. It is important to underline that Jiang grew under Japanese occupation and his uncle Jiang Shangqing died while fighting against the occupiers. The role played by the United States as a mediator prevented the Asian situation from degenerating dues to old frictions. Today the overall situation is completely changed to the extent that a process of reconciliation has started. On one hand a chairman of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party of China based in Taiwan) travelled on an official visit to China after the Chang-Kai-shek troops fled the island. On the other hand many observers have stressed the beginning of a new era in the relations between Japan and South Korea after the visit of neo-premier Lee Myung-bak which followed the trip to Tokyo on April 20 th -21 st . Meanwhile Hu Jintao and Japan’s prime minster, Yasuo Fukuda, were seen playing ping pong. A choice of an image that is particularly evocative of the climate of détente that Tokyo and Beijing want to establish, as happened in the early Seventies between China and the United States of America. But the message behind this could be much more subtle. The image of the two leaders at the ping pong table could allude to a common desire of establishing an axis of strategic cooperation between Tokyo and Beijing as Mao did three decades ago with Nixon. This might lead to the reduction in the US-China relations.
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Such a strategy could also be nurtured, as seen in the past months, by fears winding across America of future economic afflictions and for the consequent twenty protectionists that could begin to expire rapidly, given that “ it will become increasingly difficult to mobilize consensus in favour of economic internationalism” 1. In other words, Asian reconciliation could be the fruit of the fear that the US might slow down the race and the strategy of appeasement as a remedy, also economical , in order to overcome the decline of American consumption. The political reconciliation in post – war Europe was the necessary precondition in order to create a network of profound economic integration among the countries of the old continent. On the contrary, in Asia, the growing economic integration between Japan and Taiwan with mainland China has been a counterweight to a very clear persistent political friction against the separatist leader of Taipei Chen Shui-bian and is ever- present against Shinzo Abe’s Japan and his visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Now the attempt to balance the actual state of things and create the conditions for a more profound political harmony seems fairly obvious, also a further catalyst to the growing economic integration. With this in mind, it appears symbolic that the first aid to arrive to the earthquake zones have been a plane load of comfort goods from Taiwan and a team of experts sent directly from Japan. As this was not enough in June a major taboo was broken. On May 29 th , Beijing which has always instigated its nationalism against Chinese imperialism during World War II, and has always attacked headlong all major political-military leadership, specifically requested from Tokyo support from Japanese national defence forces to rescue the populations affected by the May 12 th earthquake. Both parties agreed on not using the Japanese C-130 but opted for civil flights on June 24 th and also for the first time a Japanese destroyer, the Sazanami, made its entrance into the Chinese port of Zhanjiang in the Guangdong province. The visit is part of a cooperation programme between the two countries together with the docking of the destroyer “Shenzhen” in Japan. The Sazanami, which carries a crew of 240 members transported bed sheets, medicines and other basic necessities for the survivors of the March 12 th earthquake in Sichuan. The fact that humanitarian aid arrived on a warship of a former aggressor could express the strong will both parties have in wanting to send messages of detente throughout the region and thus express the desire to consolidate a strengthened strategic cooperation by burying the ghosts of the past. In other words, China and Japan seem to be in a hurry to dissolve the knots that have created tensions in their bilateral relations in the past. This is confirmed by an announcement made on June 18 th in which both parties declare having reached an agreement for settlement of the hoary thorny issue of the exploitation of some off-shore gas deposits in the East China Sea. Peace seems to have also reached the Taiwan Strait and news of relaxation prevails after the victory of the Kuomintang. Even India is trying to become a bearer of a new regional architecture able to lay the foundations for the resolution of fractures which could undermine political cooperation between regional players.
1 Lawrence Summers, “I confess, I regret globalization”, Il Sole 24 Ore, May 11th 2008.
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India and China
India and China should be promoters of a new regional order that is open and inclusive in a way that it is sufficiently flexible to be compatible with the major diversity that exist in Asia. This was confirmed by Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee during his recent visit to China (June 4 th -7th ) 2. Nevertheless, despite the recent honeymoon between the two Asian giants, some concerns and reasons for friction persist, such as border disputes that remain unresolved even though the two parties have met eleven times to unravel the issue. Moreover, it is clear that part of the Indian establishment still does not trust have enough trust of the Chinese new “smiley” politics. As early as in May the Chief of Staff of the Indian Navy, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, publicly expressed concern about the exponential growth of Chinese submarine forces "Nuclear submarines have long legs", and the island of Hainan where Beijing is building a new naval base for the new Jin class submarines increases its range of projection. In June, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Deepak Kapoor, has instead pointed his finger at the development of a Chinese space program for military purposes “Chinese space programme is expanding at an exponentially rapid pace in both offensive and defensive content "3. Only a few days before, the Indian Defence Minister A. K. Antony announced the constitution of an Integrated Space Cell to put the country in a position to tackle the growing threat against Indian orbiting assets due to the fact that “ offensive counter space systems like anti-satellite weaponry, new classes of heavy-lift boosters and small and an improved array of Military Space Systems have emerged in our neighbourhood ”. The reference here can only be related to the Chinese development of anti-satellite technologies, as revealed in January 2007. Concerns about the vulnerability of Indian orbiting assets is strong, mostly because it is on those that India’s competitiveness depends in the relocation of the services in off-shoring outsourcing, on which depends over 50% of India’s GDP. These elements, together with the May 7 th missile Agni-III 4 test, give a clear impression that India continues to nurture some fear from Beijing.5 In the past there was evidence that a system of strengthened alliances between India, Japan, Australia and the United States was slowly surfacing with some elements that hinted to containment intentions towards Beijing. On one hand, fears of a wave of protectionism in America, on the other hand the conciliation policy of Beijing are slowly scaled this approach. Within this context the Chinese decision to share India’s aspirations (as it seems even the Japanese) within the Security Council and the new role Australia seems to play are slowly unhinging the start of an Asia NATO. On the contrary what emerges slowly is a new system of cooperation focused on Beijing, which in years to come could benefit from the propulsion of a Sino- Japanese axis, in many ways similar to the Franco-German axis in Europe.
2 “India will not tolerate any anti-China activity: Pranab”, The Hindu, June 6 th 2008. 3 “Look what China’s up to, we need own space command: Army chief”, The Indian Express, June 17 th 2008. 4 Bharath Gopalaswamy and Harsh V. Pant, “Beyond Agni-III: A long way to global power”, The Asian Age, June 26 th 2008. 5 Pranab Dhal Samanta, “Revealed: how Pak and China didn’t want India at UN high table”. The Indian Express, June 15 th 2008.
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Today, the role this axis can play appears to be fairly indecipherable. It could be a driving force for stability and prosperity in the region and globally, as well as turning into the centre of “co- prosperity” area, which could realize the Japanese slogan of the Thirties of an Asia for Asians- In other words, the return of Haushofer pan-regions.
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Latin America
SOCIAL CLEAVAGES IN BOLIVIA , ARGENTINA AND PARAGUAY Riccardo Gefter Wondrich
Political stalemate in Bolivia Last May and June four departments in the South-East of Bolivia -Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija- carried out a referendum for autonomy, not recognized by the Electoral National Court. President Evo Morales had tried to prevent the referendums by all means -also appealing to the Organization of American States and to the Catholic Church- considering them “illegal and separatist”. The popular consultations were approved by large majority thus strengthening the political power of the opposition forces. Then, on June 29, one more political defeat for Morales came from the elections for the governor of Chuquisaca department. The elections were held in advance after Governor David Sánchez’s resignation last November, following the violent riots -with casualties amounting to three dead and 300 wounded persons- against the Constituent Assembly in the town of Sucre. The victory of opposition candidate Savina Cuellar confirms the advance of the opposition to Evo Morales government. The consultations on administrative autonomy deepen the gap between the Eastern part of the country, rich in agriculture and oil and gas, and the poorer Western departments in the Andean region. The small department of Tarija at the boarder with Argentina has 85% of the country’s natural gas. Two totally different and hardly compatible schemes are at stake. On one side the government’s plan for a political change toward socialism including the state-centred idea in favour of the inclusion of native groups. This plan is strongly supported economically and politically by the Venezuelan government. On the other side there is the federalist plan, giving greater importance to the private sector in the economy, brought forward by the opposition in Santa Cruz and the others Eastern departments. This division reflects the deep changes that have occurred in Bolivian economy during the last 30 years, shifting the focus from the extractive industry of the Andean region to the agriculture and gas industry of the Eastern provinces, where the presence of Brazilian landlords and firms (Petrobras) is gaining importance. As a matter of fact, the political situation has come to a stalemate, with a further important revoking referendum due on August 10 next, in which the President, the Vice President and the nine Governors will submit their appointment to the electors, to be reconfirmed in office. The choice of the revoking referendum, anomalous in the Bolivian tradition, was taken last December by Evo Morales to face the opposition’s continuous blocking up every legislative project, starting from the approval of the new Constitution, on the part of the government. The referendum rules clearly favour the President more than the governors. To be removed from office, the negative votes must be more than the election votes. While Evo Morales in 2005 got 53.7% of the votes, some governors were elected with less than 40%, thus making their defeat more likely. This is one of the reasons why on June 23 last the opposition governors declared their unwillingness to accept the referendum and their preference towards general elections.
Fernando Lugo’s victory: Paraguay at a turning-point? On April 20 last, Paraguay saw the victory of the former Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo at the head of a wide and various coalition of 10 parties and 20 organizations representing trade
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unions, farmers and social groups, under the name of Patriotic Alliance for Change (APC). Lugo triumphed with a ratio of more than 10 points over Blanca Olevar from the ruling Partido
Colorado , riding the Paraguayan electorate’s will of change. The election represents a historical landmark, marking, after 61 years, the defeat of the party that shaped the South American country’s political identity according to its interests. The new government will take office next August 15. Lugo will have to be pragmatic in searching dialogue and conciliation with the various political actors and the Armed Forces. He will face a state bureaucracy endowed with important resources and with a high corruption level. In foreign policy, the new minister Milda Rivarola has announced the intention to reconsider the status of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, unchanged since 1957. This is the first approaching step towards recognition of the Chinese Popular Republic. In fact Paraguay is now the only country in Latin America that still recognizes the independence of Taiwan. There are two priority issues for the new government. The recovery of the so called “energetic sovereignty” to be obtained through re-negotiation of the price of energy sold to neighbouring countries, and the fight against poverty and in favour of the native population. On the first issue, Lugo intends to revise the Itaipú and Yacyretá treaties controlling the prices of energy sold by Paraguay to Brazil and Argentina respectively. These treaties were signed at the time of the construction of the two homonymous power plants. Itaipú -on the Paraguay river- covers 19% of the total Brazilian energy consumption and 95% of the Paraguayan one. Yacyretá -on the Paraná river- covers 16% of Argentine consumption. The two dams were built with Brazilian and Argentine money and Paraguay agreed to pay its debt by selling the surplus of its energy needs. At present, with Bolivia unable to increase its production of natural gas, Paraguayan energy is fundamental to the two big neighbouring countries. It was therefore the right moment to make the energy “fair price” -increased by 3 or 4 times- one of the basic issues in the electoral campaign, declaring the invalidity of contracts signed by dictatorial governments. In addition to the energy issue, there are other problems, related to the Brazil- Paraguay border, worrying both diplomacy and security forces: from immigration to arms and household appliances smuggling, from drug traffic to the protection of Brazilian investments in the agricultural field. It remains to be seen if Brazil will be willing to sacrifice short term economic profit in favour of medium and long term regional stability. Fight against poverty is the main economic and social priority. In Paraguay there are supposedly as many as 300.000 poor families with no access to land. Upon these premises, Lugo declared his intent to make a land register of all rural estate in the last 25 years, the first step towards a possible agrarian reform. During Alfredo Stroessner dictatorship (1954-1989) the government had allotted huge plots of land to Armed Forces chiefs to secure their support. Moreover, in recent years, the soy-bean development has favoured the inflow of huge foreign investments, mainly from Brazil. Modifying the present situation will not be easy. As for the international identity of the next government and its financial policy, an important signal will be whether the payment of part of the debt with the International Monetary Fund, due next August, will take place. The alternative could be running into debt with the Venezuelan government, following the Argentine example.
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Mr. Lugo has declared for a strengthening of enlarged Mercosur (that is with Venezuela as a full member) without openly accepting Venezuelan flatteries. So far. It will be in the interest of
Brazil and Argentina -as well as the United States- to convince the new government not to take radical positions.
Oil factor in Cuba’s future Last June a reportage published by the Miami Herald brought up the matter of drilling and oil extraction off the Cuban Northern coastline. This is to be one of the main issues in the geopolitical scenery of the Gulf of Mexico in the next years. In fact 2009 will mark the beginning of offshore drilling in the first oil fields situated in Cuba’s Exclusive Economic Zone, just a few tens of miles from Florida. The debate on the relations with Cuba and the convenience of maintaining the embargo is therefore interlacing with discussions on U.S. energy supplying. A 2004 research of the United States Geological Service estimates Cuba’s Northern basin capable of producing 4.6 billion oil barrels and 9.8 billion natural gas cubic feet, volume that would place Cuba at the level of Ecuador as for hydrocarbon reserves. In approximately ten years the Caribbean island could produce more than 500,000 oil barrels a day. Today Cuba uses 145,000 barrels, of which 92,000 are imported from Venezuela. In the off-shore drilling activities various oil companies are involved, in partnership with Cuban CUPET: Spanish Repsol-YPF in association with Norks-Hydro (Norway) and ONGC (India), Sherritt (Canada), Petronas (Malaysia), PDVSA (Venezuela) and Petro Vietnam (Vietnam). But only ONGC, Norks-Hydro and Petronas master the technology required to operate in deep waters. For this reason many analysts foresee in the near future the appearance in the area of Brazilian Petrobras, either operating on its own in new fields still to be allotted, or in association with other companies. Petrobras is leader in the activity of drilling and extraction in deep waters. In the United States the discussion on drilling activity off the U.S. coasts is at the centre of the political debate and of the presidential campaign. With the gasoline price over $4 a gallon, President Bush has asked Congress to revise the 1982 ban to perform new oil drilling within 200 miles from the coast. This moratorium is due to expire in 2012, but its early cancellation has turned into an electoral subject. The Republican candidate John McCain has supported the President’s proposal, together with the Governor of Florida Charlie Crist, who previously had always spoken in favour of the moratorium, like his predecessor Jeb Bush. Oil activities are foreseen within Cuban maritime boundaries (the border line with the United States being drawn during Jimmy Carter presidency in 1977 with a treaty that has never been ratified by the two countries and is renewed every two years). Should these activities have an imminent start, there could be consequences on the environment, on tourism and on the economy (oil from the U.S. and the Mexican area could be sucked up as well). Members of the Cuban-American community and of the Democratic Party would also like to re-negotiate the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Gulf of Mexico, already subdivided into 59 exploration blocks.
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In conclusion, slowing down oil activities under way could prove very difficult, while its increase through the action of foreign companies would weaken the position of the supporters of American embargo upon Cuba.
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Four months of tensions between Argentinean Government and farmers A deep confrontation between farmers and the government of Cristina Kirchner has been on the scene in Argentina for more than four months. It is the first time since 2002 that an economic sector succeeds in contrasting the government so effectively. The conflict brought to a general slowing down of the economy, and threatens to have consequences upon national political balance. President Cristina Kirchner has wasted much of the political consent gained with the electoral victory last October. A gap has opened within the majority Peronist block between the close supporters of the government and the representatives of the internal provinces. Vice- President Julio Cobos himself has chosen to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the protest, thus keeping distance from the government’s intransigent position and being publicly humiliated by the Chief of Cabinet Alberto Fernández for his insubordination. The conflict was triggered by a set of rules raising taxes on soy-bean exports issued by the government on March 11 last, replacing the previous fixed 35% rate with a variable progressive tax linked to the product’s international price. The imposition of a maximum price for soy-bean caused the reaction of the four national unions representing agricultural producers. Road blocks were organized, harvesting as well as the distribution of provisions suffered interruptions with the request to the government to take a step backward and change the export tax scheme. The protest fuelled a rise in global soy prices, being Argentina one of the world's top suppliers of soy, corn, wheat and beef. In fact, taxes upon agricultural exports represent a fundamental voice in the national balance. These assets are used at government’s discretion to adopt policies of income re-distribution, to keep low the prices of some goods and services (gasoline, transportation, energy), to finance infra-structure projects and even to pay public debt. In the aftermath of 2001-2002 financial collapse, Argentinean authorities chose to keep a weak currency -compared to the dollar- in order to boost competitiveness in the export sector. Both industrial and farming activities welcomed this measure and invested in technology and capital means. But the actual internal inflation, estimated between 25% and 35% a year, the increase in oil and chemicals products, the logistics and energy bottlenecks have put this economic model in a critical position. Hence the first big protest against the government took place, questioning the whole system of fiscal relationships between the central state and the internal provinces. The farmers gained the sustain of huge social sectors, both urban and rural, and reached the historic goal of obtaining the support of almost half of the lawmakers in the lower house of Congress. Mayors and governors in the agricultural provinces have felt obliged to support their electors’ requests, in spite of being elected in the ranks of Kirchnerism . Congress has regained its role of legislative chamber, which had been seriously altered by the government in the past years. Historically Argentina has suffered from excessive concentration of power in the President’s hands, added to institutional weakness and scarce independence of the three powers. All these factors have been growing worse in the past years. Moreover, the country is experiencing the anomalous situation of a double presidency, with former President Néstor Kirchner managing internal political power and struggling to keep the union of the Peronist Party. Apart from the
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outcome of the conflict with the rural sector, the government appears to be weaker and forced to modify, from now on, the style of its political behaviour. The conflict with agricultural sectors
has slowed down the national economy and reduced the country’s income. Two further sources of problems are inflationary tendencies and requests to get a rise in salary on one side and the energy shortage on the other. The Argentineans are much more worried about the growth of the economy than they were just a few months ago.
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THE UNITED NATIONS -AFRICAN UNION COOPERATION IN CONFLICT PREVENTION , PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING : CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES Valerio Bosco
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sudan-Darfur, Chad. As new and old African crisis faced escalation, setbacks or progress in the first half of 2008, the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) experienced new occasions of cooperation in crisis management. While the UN Secretary General (SG) Ban Ki-Moon is trying to work on the strengthening of the UN conflict prevention and resolution tools through the reorganization of the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the African Union is still developing, between rivalries and resistances, its peace and security architecture. Lessons learned suggested from different case-studies raise both hopes and concerns on the future of the UN-AU cooperation in crisis management. However, backed by the UN Security Council (SC), Ban Ki-Moon proposed to further develop the UN-AU partnership by increasing the United Nations support to the capacity building process of the AU.
The new UN conflict prevention tools and the cooperation with the African Union in maintaining international peace and security. After the 2007 Ban Ki-Moon’s restructuring proposal on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), at the beginning of 2008, the UN SG and Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe undertook a similar initiative aimed at strengthening structures and functions of the DPA. The establishment of an high level experts mediation team deployable within 24 hours in crisis situations, the creation of a new Policy, Partnerships and Mediation Support Division, the idea of a new regional networks of DPA field offices: according to Ban Ki-Moon, these measures could provide the DPA with “ sufficient capacity for improved monitoring and analysis, effective policy formulation and rapid dispatch to support early resolution of conflicts and good offices efforts ”1. In particular, the mediation team would utilize important experts on “ how to rewrite constitutions to promote peace, find formulas for the sharing of wealth and power, promote justice and reconciliation in the wake of atrocities and transition former soldiers into civilian life ”2. The operational and financial overstretch of UN peacekeeping operations followed to the new surge in blue helmet deployment between 2006 and 2007 - UNIFL in Lebanon, UNAMIS and UNAMID in Sudan and Darfur, UNMIT in Timor East brought the peacekeeping budget up to 7 billion dollars - gave a new momentum to the debate on the need to increase UN capabilities in anticipating political tensions or conflicts
1 United Nations General Assembly, Department of Public Information: 5th Committee takes up Department of Political Affairs’ Reform, 5 March 2008. 2 United Nations, Department of Public Information, Political Affairs: United Nations Announces New ‘On-Call’ Mediation Team, To Advise Peace Envoys In Field, 5 March 2008. Joyce Neuhas (USA), adviser on conflict prevention of former US President Jimmy Carter, has been appointed as head of the experts mediation team and is assisted by Jeffrey Mapendere, executive director of the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotation (CIIAN), Patrick Gavigan former Senior Official of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, John McGarry (Canada) expert on Power-Sharing Institutions and peace-broker of Belfast agreement on Northern Ireland.
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before they escalate in violence or civil wars . This issue can be considered the new priority set by UN SG for 2008 3. The SG emphasis on conflict prevention is also linked to the increasing UN engagement in mediation efforts in Africa. In particular, during these last years, the UN Security Council and the SG - through his Special Envoys or Special Representative - are playing a greater role in addressing potential or evident threats to international peace and security. The increasing use of targeted individual sanctions (against Sudanese, DRC and Cote d’Ivoire authorities), the SC decision to deploy MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad) whose mandate is to protect civilians and prevent the spill over of the Darfur crisis into a regional dimension (UNSC resolution 1778) 4, SC mediation efforts aimed at ending years of deadlock between the Government of Morocco and the Frente Polisario in Western Sahara provide important examples of the most recent Security Council preventive initiatives in Africa. SG mediation and good offices in DRC, Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan through his Special Envoy Joachim Alvaro Chissano have tried to reduce the deeply unstable situation caused by the continued activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army and are trying to facilitate the peace process. Furthermore, the SC mission in Africa in June 2007 and the most recent one, from May 28 to June 10 2008, its meetings with African leaders and regional and subregional actors underlined Security Council’s efforts to play a more proactive role in addressing conflicts and threats to regional and international peace and security. Electoral assistance and UN Peacebuilding efforts can also be considered very useful conflict prevention tools. As shown by the increasing demand for United Nations preventive activities of field-oriented nature, special political missions can offer effective conflict prevention tools that directly engage parties in “trust-rebuilding process”. The UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea Bissau and Central African Republic, the UN integrated office in Sierra Leone and Burundi are playing a vital role in preventing these post-conflict countries from relapsing into war by assisting the full re-establishment of State authority through their own territories. This deep UN engagement in crisis management in Africa makes the African Union its natural partner in addressing threats to regional and international peace and security . Since 2002, the African Union undertook an ambitious attempt to build up the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA is composed by the Peace and Security Council – the standing decision- making organ on conflict prevention and crisis management which mirrors functions and working procedures of the UN SC – a Panel of the Wise, a continental early warning system, the African stand by force – regional brigades undertaking missions under six scenarios ranging from observation to intervention - and a military staff committee. The AUPSA showed AU Member States political will to create a collective security and early warning apparatus to prevent conflict and facilitate timely and efficient response to crisis situations in Africa . Since 2003, the AU has led several operations and mediation initiatives: the peacekeeping mission in Burundi in 2003, the joint AU-ECOWAS action in Togo (2005) in facilitating a reversal of the
3 United Nations, Report of the Secretary General: Revised estimates to the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, Overall policymaking, direction and coordination, Political Affairs, Office of Central Support Services, Staff assessment, related to the strengthening of the Department of Political Affairs, A/62/521. 4 MINURCAT is a multidimensional mission consisting of three pillars: a United Nations presence with civilian, human rights and military liaison components, a UN/Chadian police force in Eastern Chad and 4000 European Union military Force (EUFOR) to support the mission.
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palace coup d’état after the death of the President Faure Gnassingbe 5, the support to post- conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone confirmed AU intention to increase its role in crisis management. Furthermore, between 2004 and 2007, the deployment of the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), the UN-AU hybrid operation in Darfur, the operation in Somalia (AMISOM), and the electoral and security mission to the Comoros Island in May 2007 showed AU political will to became a more substantive actor and UN partner in promoting peace and security in Africa. During the first half of 2008, several African crisis situations erupted or escalated and set new challenges for the UN-AU cooperation in maintaining international peace and security.
Conflict prevention: Kenya and Zimbabwe. Success and failure? While the solution to the Kenyan crisis in early 2008 can be considered as the main success of coordinated efforts in the UN-AU cooperation in conflict prevention, the crisis in Zimbabwe raised new doubts on AU capability to promptly and effectively act against human rights violations such as the acts of violence perpetrated by President Robert Mugabe against his political opponents led by Morgan Tsvangirai. Presidential, Parliament and local elections were held in Kenya in December 2007 under allegations of corruption. As a political, security and humanitarian crisis ensued, an estimated 600,000 people were displaced in and numerous reports of abuses against civilians emerged, including arbitrary killings. A mediation initiative by the then AU Chairman, Ghanaian President John Kufuor, was launched with support from the AU, the UN, the EU, and the USA. An AU-backed panel of African eminent persons led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan undertook mediation efforts between supporters of the ruling party headed by Kibaki and the opposition party, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). While the UN Secretariat fully supported the mediation team efforts in facilitating the political dialogue, Under Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe briefed the SC on the political, security and humanitarian situation within the country and emphasized the need to investigate into human rights abuses in Kenya. When the UN SC requested Kenya’s leaders “ to do all that is in their power to bring the violence to an end and to restore calm ”6, the AU Assembly adopted a decision calling for an investigation into human rights violations and urged the parties “to commit to a peaceful solution in conformity with rule of law”. These coordinated UN-AU efforts played an important role in promoting a power-sharing agreement between the Party of National Unity (PNU) of President Kibaki and the ODM: the two parties accepted a package deal including a constitutional review process, a commission of inquiry on post-election violence, an independent review committee to look into the conduct and management of the
elections, and a truth, justice and reconciliation commission . The power-sharing agreement between President Kibaki and Raila Odinga, the ODM leader, who was appointed Prime Minister on April 17 2008, has been suggested as the most useful crisis prevention model – the
5 On February 5, 2005 Eyadema Gnassingbe, Africa’s longest serving ruler, died after 38 years in power. When Eyadema’s son, Faure Gnassingbe, was appointed Togo’s new leader by the army, the African Union denounced the move as “unconstitutional”. While ECOWAS adopted economic sanctions against Togo, AU suspended Togo’s membership. 6 United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement, UNSC,PRST/2008/4.
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“Kenyan solution” – to manage the crisis erupted in Zimbabwe and to stop Mugabe’s violence against the political opposition led by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). However, the last meeting of the African Union in Sharm El Sheikh simply expressed its deep concern about the violence in Zimbabwe by calling for a government of national unity without referring to whether such a government should be led by President Mugabe, or by Tsvangirai, the leader of the MDC, who won the first round of presidential voting in March 2008. Deep divisions emerged within the African Union: while Botswana and Kenya took hard positions against Harare – they invoked the exclusion of Zimbabwe from the AU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) meetings until a political solution is found and the deployment of an AU peacekeeping operation – several AU Member States did not show the political will to engage the AU in a mediation initiative aimed at preparing a transitional government and new, fair and free second round of elections, based on the results of the first one 7. The crisis in Zimbabwe shows that the normative shift which took place in Africa since the birth of the African Union in 2002 is far from being completed: while the AU Peace and Security Architecture seemed to affirm that the traditional principle of non interference – the basic rule of African international relations during the post-decolonization era – cannot be translated in indifference to human rights violations, the African Peace and Security Council right to intervene in crisis situations and adopt coercive measures still needs to be fully implemented on the ground . Discussions and debates within the AU on the need to fully materialize this principle can be encouraged by the UN action and initiatives in the framework of the 10 years capacity building program. Furthermore, the UN can play a vital role in stimulating the AU “collective reflection” on challenges linked to the tension and disputes that often characterise electoral processes in Africa: in fact, the President of the AU Commission, Jean Ping (former president of the UN General Assembly) announced in Sharm El Sheikh that the AU Panel of Wise will soon elaborate proposals and recommendations to address this issue. Again, the current assistance the UN is giving to the creation of the Secretariat of the Panel of Wise could be crucial in helping the AU to elaborate code of conducts for electoral process based on experiences and lessons learned gathered by the Electoral Division of the UN DPA . However, the fact that the UN SC did not find an agreement on imposing sanctions against Mugabe’s regime and its leaders - Russian and Chinese vetoes against the draft resolution sponsored by USA and UK were backed by Viet Nam, Lybia and South Africa - shows the existence of a deep rift within the International Community and risks undermining both UN and AU diplomatic efforts . While a resolution threatening sanctions would not have probably broken the consensus within the Security Council, different views on the nature of the Zimbabwe crisis and of the UN SC prerogatives in maintaining international peace and security dramatically persist. Nevertheless, the strong position taken from Burkina Faso delegation in support of the UK-USA draft resolution – “Africa’s history had shown instances of a small
7 Christophe Boisbouvier: Zimbabwe, Mugabe ou comment s’en débarasser , in Jeune Afrique, 29 Juin- 5 Juillet, n. 2477, pag. 14-16. Also: Africa’s Shame , The Economist, July 4, 2008.
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spark causing great conflagrations and the situation in Zimbabwe should be regarded as a potential danger and a threat to peace in Southern Africa” 8– confirmed that many African Member States are not attached to the traditional significance of non-interference and are ready to fully engage the UN SC in addressing internal crisis which undermine regional peace and security.
Peacekeeping: Somalia and Darfur. Risk of failure? Both in Somalia and Darfur the UN and the AU diplomatic and military efforts risk facing further setbacks . As mentioned above, the African Union Mission in Somalia and the UN- AU hybrid force still have to deal with several constraints: the lack of financial and human resources represent the main problem. While AMISOM does not find additional countries willing to offer their own troops – Burundi and Uganda are the sole contributors – UNAMID force and asset generation difficulties persist: the hybrid force continues to lack critical assets such as helicopters and surveillance aircraft. In the meanwhile, humanitarian and security situations in both countries are deeply deteriorating. According to the last data provided by the UN Secretariat, Somalia has now to deal with one million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 450.000 refugees; on the Sudanese situation, the World Food Program recently informed the SC that it may have to cut food rations to civilians in Darfur because of insecurity. While the UN Secretariat is working on the relocation of the UN political office from Nairobi to Mogadiscio, the SC will probably reiterate its appeal to the SG to promote a greater UN assistance to AMISOM. As the agreement reached in Mogadiscio between the Transitional Federal Government and Arms for re-liberation of Somalia is based on the idea of an international stabilisation force taking over from the Ethiopian Forces, the SC will probably have to discuss in the coming weeks the concrete feasibility of this option . Despite AU repeated appeals to the International Community to provide support for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation “that would take over AMISOM and assist the long term stabilization and reconstruction of the country”,9 the idea of a United Nations blue helmet operations does not seem to be popular among UN SC members. The UN peacekeeping overstretch and the legacy of unsuccessful attempts by both the UN and US in the 1990s to restore peace in Somalia prevent AU request from being fulfilled. On the Sudanese crisis, both the SC and the AU PSC expressed their concerns for renewed clashes between government and Southern forces in the contested region of Abey. The risk of a new civil war between Northern and Southern forces, the increasingly deteriorating security conditions both in Sudan and in Darfur region poses a great challenge to the mandate of UNMIS and to the full deployment of the hybrid force which is still dealing with lack of cooperation from Karthoum. However, the recent appointment of Djibril Yipènè Bassolé of Burkina Faso as Joint African Union-United
8 United Nations, Department of Public Information: Security Council fails to adopt sanctions against Zimbabwe Leadership , 11 July 2008. 9 African Union: Communique of 139 th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 29 June 2008, Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt.
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Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur showed UN-AU will to keep a coordinated diplomatic pressure on Sudanese authorities. Finally, the request of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo to formally charge Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir with genocide and crimes against humanity in the orchestration of violence against civilians in Darfur is matter of great concerns both within the UN SC and the AU . Sudan’s U.N. ambassador, Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem Mohamad, warned that the announcement of charges against Bashir or other senior officials would “destroy” international efforts to reach a peace settlement in Darfur. At this stage, an arrest warrant for al-Bashir risks undermining UN-AU diplomatic efforts to reach a peace settlement in Darfur: moreover, it could further deteriorate security situation in Sudan and Darfur and push the hybrid force towards a dramatic failure .
New challenges: Chad-Sudan crisis and Horn of Africa between conflict prevention- resolution and peacekeeping. Both the Sudanese and Somali crisis have developed into a regional dimension. The spill over of Darfur conflict to Chad and Central African Republic and the increasing political and military tension in the Horn of Africa clearly set additional challenges for the UN-AU cooperation in crisis management. The UN SC and the AU PSC has so far adopted a low key approach to Chad . They both have been reluctant to ask the Chadian Government to address the delicate political situation and the proxy war which is taking place between N’Djamena and Karthoum : while Chad is accused of supporting Darfur rebels, Chad’s insurgency is backed by the Sudanese authorities. In this dangerous situation, the EU is playing a very important role since the deployment of its first major overseas military force: in fact, EUFOR is helping and supporting the deployment of MINURCAT and is trying to secure the humanitarian assistance within the country 10 . While a joint UN-EU technical assessment mission has been dispatched to Chad and CAR to prepare a study on post EUFOR arrangements based on a re-deployment of a blue helmets contingent, a deeper cooperation between EU-AU-UN is needed 11 . Nevertheless, while Lybian and French delegations at the United Nations expressed their strong reservations in increasing diplomatic pressures on N’Djamena to promote a national reconciliation, several UN SC Members suggested the need to focus on further prevention initiatives to neutralize risks of a regionalised war. UN-AU engagement in more regular interactions with the Contact Group which facilitated the Dakar
10 EUFOR came under fire following to recent clashes between Chadian government forces and rebels: according to the President Iddris Déby “ by declining to engage with rebels, European force is clearly cooperating with invaders ”. David Axe: Chad, European Force sticks to mandate, Inter Press Service, UN-Terraviva Journal. 15 June 2008. 11 In the area of peace and security the EU has became a key partner of the African Union: while €350 million have been committed through the EU Peace Facility for Africa, the Joint Strategy and the Plan of Action adopted at the EU-AU Summit in Lisbon in December 2007 promoted a stronger partnership in order to establish a functioning African peace and security architecture and provided predictable and sustainable financing for Africa-led peace support operations.
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Agreement between Chad and Sudan could prove to be very useful 12 . In East Africa, tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia on the border issue and Eritrean military actions against Djibouti are creating an unpredictable regional situation which is likely to explode. Since Eritrea- Ethiopia Boundary Commission dissolved itself without being able to demarcate the frontier because of the Ethiopian refusal to accept the binding ruling on the disputed town of Badme, Asmara started blaming the UN for not enforcing that decision. After having entered in the buffer zone, Asmara also placed several restrictions on the movement of the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). While the AU adopted a cautious approach on the issue, the UN SG and the UN SC condemned Eritrea’s military action and urged both parties to resolve the dispute peacefully. SC members are currently discussing the option of ending the UNMEE mandate which is expiring on July 31 st : while a complete withdraw of the mission may risk a resumption of open hostilities, the establishment of a UN Observer Mission could promote confidence building measures and help mediate incidents along the border. Furthermore, an additional conflict prevention effort could involve a SG plan for a future UN presence in the area. While on the border crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea the AU-UN cooperation has been generally weak, the two organizations adopted a stronger and more coordinated approach in dealing with the crisis between Eritrea and Djibouti. On this issue, the AU and the UN joint mediation efforts seem to be able to avoid a further escalation of the crisis . After the June 12 th Presidential Statement adopted by the UN SC which essentially condemned Eritrean military actions along the border, Ban Ki Moon used his good offices to facilitate discussions between the two countries. Close AU-UN monitoring of the situation confirmed that both sides were regrouping on either side of the border: while the UN SC recently issued a press statement requesting a fact finding mission to be sent to the region 13 , the AU PSC, on June 29 th , strongly condemned Eritrea’s military actions by also calling upon Asmara “to immediately and unconditionally withdraw from the Djiboutian Territories it occupies ”. Furthermore, the AU PSC denounced the lack of cooperation showed by the Eritrean authorities – Asmara refused to receive a good offices mission of the AU Commission – and called on the UN SC to continue supporting the efforts of the African Union 14 . The UN Peacebuilding activities and the role of the African Union . Since 2007 the UN Peacebuilding Commission has focused its works on post-conflict reconstruction in Burundi and Sierra Leone. In the first half of 2008, two new African countries, the Central African Republic and Guinea Bissau, have been referred from the UN Security Council to the attention of the PBC. The AU played a very important role in lobbying the UN SC to put those two countries situations on the PBC agenda: in particular, as the Guinea Bissau was facing increasing difficulties in fighting drug trafficking and organised crime, the African Union called the International Community to act through the PBC in order to streamline and
12 The Dakar Agreement was signed on March 13 2008: Chad and Sudan agreed to end cross-border attacks and to normalise their diplomatic relations. The agreement was signed thank to the good offices and mediation of Lybia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Gabon, the AU Commission. Cfr. By Lamine Ghanmi and Alistair Thomson; Chad, Sudan agree pact to end cross-border attacks , Reuters, 13 March 2008. 13 United Nations Security Council, Press Statement, SC/9376. 14 African Union: Communique of 140 th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 29 June 2008, Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt.
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consolidate regional peacebuilding efforts and further support the preparations for the legislative elections scheduled for November 16 th . Nevertheless, the AU is expected to play a key role in the drafting process of a strategic framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea Bissau. A coordinated UN-AU approach to CAR situation seems also to be very important in view of setting, in consultation with the national government, specific peacebuilding priorities. Next steps of the UN-UA cooperation in crisis management . Crisis prevention . The ways in which UN and AU dealt with African crisis in the first half of 2008 showed both progress and setbacks. While the Kenyan solution seems to be far from being applied to the Zimbabwe crisis, the lack of political will within the AU Members to strongly address Mugabe’s atrocities hinders an immediate solution based on democracy and respect of rule of law. However, the development of AU conflict prevention tools will continue and the UN can play a greater role in this process. Apart from supporting the strengthening of the AU Panel of the Wise, the UN will probably increase its training offer to African Union staff in order to improve their capacity to undertake analyses as a part of the continental early warning system. Nevertheless, following the recent reform of the UN mediation tools, the United Nations Secretariat will assist the AU in establishing a small standing team quickly deployable in crisis situations. Peacekeeping. As Darfur and Somalia demonstrate, the AU commendable political will to deal with conflicts is currently being hampered by the lack of critical logistics, human and financial resources. The UN DPKO is currently helping the AU – through its African Union peacekeeping Support Team – in developing its capacities to deploy and manage peace operations. However, the crucial issue seems to be related to the funding of regional peacekeeping activities . In view of enhancing the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organizations when they undertake peacekeeping under UN mandate, the SG recently proposed to set up an “ AU-UN panel consisting of distinguished persons to make concrete recommendations on how to support, both financially and operationally, those operations, in particular as related to start-up funding, equipment and logistics ”15 . As the AU is often unable to pay for its mission, AU Missions – launched in many cases with the expectation that the UN will eventually take over the leadership – are heavily dependant on international financing. In the case of AMISOM, even if it is largely reliant on contributions from the EU, Italy, USA, Canada, United Kingdom and Japan, African Union has been unable to reimburse its troops contributors. As requested by several African delegations at the UN, the SG could re- open the debate within the General Assembly on the possibility of funding AU operations through UN Member States assessed contributions to United Nations regular budget. Peacebuilding . During the biennium 2008-2009, the ten years capacity building program for the AU will have a specific focus on African Union Peacebuilding efforts. While the UN will probably work on the establishment of a standing working group in order to develop an agenda of consultations between the UN Peacebuilding architecture and all the African regional and subregional organizations, the SG recently emphasized the need to develop institutional
15 United Nations, Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security , S/2008/186.
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linkages between post-conflict reconstruction and development activities of the African Union and the PBC 16 . However, the key issue is linked to the dimension of the UN support in building up African Union capacity for planning, coordination, oversight and implementation of strategic Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction programs . Coordination mechanisms: the first joint UN SC-AU PSC meeting held at the UN Headquarters in New York (17 April 2008) confirmed the political will to further strengthen consultation and coordination mechanism between the United Nations and the African Union. As requested by SC resolution 1809 (16 April 2008), the UN-AU cooperation will involve a stronger and more structured relationship between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council on conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and Peacebuilding. Nevertheless , sharing of experiences and working methods between the two organs, training programme for AU Peace and Security Council Secretariat staff and the extension to the AU of the desk-to-desk dialogue on conflict prevention - already operational with EU - could further strengthen the UN-AU partnership in crisis management in the coming months.
16 Report of the Secretary-General, S/2008/186, cit. , page 23.
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