ISSUE BRIEF 10.15.18 : A Consociational Model to be Refined

Maria Tannous, Lebanese American University

As conflicts continue to rage throughout required to achieve a stable political process the Middle East in the wake of the 2010 and accommodate the concerns of sectarian Arab uprising, divisions across ethnic and groups (Hudson 1997, 106). religious lines in several regional countries In light of this renewed attention on have brought consociational models of the Lebanese model, it is necessary to governance back into the spotlight. In an re-evaluate Lebanon’s consociational system effort to reconcile inter-group conflicts and in order to gauge whether it would be useful regulate power sharing in the region, public for other countries in the region experiencing discussions have highlighted the role of similar ethnic or religious divisions. consociational arrangements in resolving conflict in Lebanon. Lebanon has 18 officially recognized sects. Under the Lebanese THE consociational system, agreement among The Taif Agreement was meant to restore the leaders of the major sects (Sunni, Shia, the consociational model as the country’s and Maronite) is required to pass a policy, governing mechanism and reduce approve an official’s appointment, convene institutionalized . It was verbally parliament, or for a president to be elected agreed that the must (i.e., parliament does not convene and be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, elections are not held unless the sects agree and the speaker of parliament a Shia. To In light of this renewed on the winning candidate in advance). The this end, the accord tasked the Chamber of attention on the Lebanese model, or the “Lebanese formula” Deputies with organizing a national dialogue as described by Hudson (1997, 107), has Lebanese model, on the country’s political transition. The regained prominence. it is necessary to parliament was to establish a national The Lebanese consociational structure committee that included the leaders of the re-evaluate Lebanon’s was first implemented after the National three sectarian communities mentioned consociational system in Pact of 1943. The sectarian-consociational above as well as other national political model was subsequently amended in the Taif order to gauge whether figures. The accord stated that after the Agreement, which ended the civil war in 1989. it would be useful for election of a national non-sectarian-based Most recently, the principles of this model Chamber of Deputies, a Senate that would other countries in the were re-confirmed in the Agreement include religious leaders and would have region experiencing in 2008. Lebanon’s political history indicates authority only on the most important similar ethnic or that these consociational agreements reflect national issues was to be formed (Salamey a common understanding that no viable religious divisions. and Payne, 2008, 461). Yet this transitional alternative to consociationalism that would phase, as it were, has instead become the ensure the functionality and continuity of status quo, from which leaders of Lebanon’s Lebanon exists. It was clear for the fathers of religious communities have little incentive independence in Lebanon that a “communal to deviate. While initially formulated to representation” and power-sharing model is RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 10.15.18

establish a consociational democracy in system in which populist sectarian leaders which the role of sectarian leaders in the rule, strengthening their communities country was to be limited to certain national and establishing transnational ties that issues, the Taif Agreement has trapped undermine the central government. In this Lebanon in a cycle of sectarian tension, system, the sectarian leaders’ chief interest conflicts of interest, and occasional violence. is to maintain the status quo, thereby ensuring their hold onto power. One of the key mechanisms by which they achieve BASICS OF THE ACCORD this is to focus the public’s attention on the provision of daily needs such as The Taif Agreement was negotiated in Taif, electricity and water, which Lebanon has , in September 1989 to end the been suffering shortages of for more than . It introduced political, four decades. By providing these services administrative, and other reforms aimed via established communitarian sectarian at re-establishing political and economic networks—including schools, hospitals, stability in Lebanon. It maintained the general NGOs, media channels, and religious characteristics of the existing power-sharing institutions—the sectarian groups further system, but redistributed domestic political reinforce the existing system. Each caters Communitarian power among the major sects—Maronite, to its respective members, which further Sunni, and Shia. Its main provisions state networks undermine underscores a sense of belonging to a that Lebanon is Arab in identity and that its the efficacy of the specific sect rather than belonging to the political system is a parliamentary democracy larger Lebanese state. central government, based on the principles of separation, balance, As a communitocracy, Lebanon thereby elevating their and cooperation among the three branches lacks both a unified national identity and of government. And, most importantly, the positions as providers of national goals. Instead, communitarian accord lists abolishing political sectarianism as services for their own networks undermine the efficacy of the a basic national goal, to be achieved gradually central government, thereby elevating communities. Lebanese over time, although no specific deadline or their positions as providers of services citizens’ persistent plan of action was provided for its execution. for their own communities. Lebanese Almost three decades after the Taif identification with their citizens’ persistent identification with their Agreement, the population is still divided, sectarian communities sectarian communities leads to recurrent parliament is still sectarian-based, and internal conflicts and intolerance among the leads to recurrent the electoral system reinforces sectarian Lebanese population. internal conflicts and representation. Public offices are allocated Many observers have come to view this intolerance among the in accordance with sectarian divisions. The confessional system as a major source of central government has weakened, and Lebanese population. political gridlock in Lebanon. Yet others see sectarian communities are taking over this sectarian communitarian structure as its role by providing in-group services, a necessity to protect minorities, maintain as discussed below. The trash crisis that political stability, and give each community a Lebanon has struggled with over the fair share of the political power. Scholars who past three years—whereby the country’s study the Lebanese formula debate whether landfills have reached capacity, and there the consociational model of governance is no agreement on alternative ways to that was refined after the Taif Agreement manage this issue, leading to garbage was an adequate solution or if it conversely piling up around Lebanon—is a perfect was part of the problem (Hudson 1997, 106). illustration of the government’s inefficiency While both views have their merits, what in handling its basic duties. The crisis is remains obvious is that in such a deeply the result of high levels of corruption and divided population, within which various gridlock inside the government. sectarian communities mobilize around rival In this sense, Lebanon has moved political visions and interests, the state and away from democratic governance. What national identity are greatly undermined. This can be observed instead is the rise of is particularly true because “the struggle a consociational communitocracy—a for democracy requires the eradication 2 LEBANON: A CONSOCIATIONAL MODEL TO BE REFINED

of political clientelism, nepotism and threatens civil peace in the country. How patronage, and the establishment of national can Lebanon move beyond communitocracy institutionalism” (Plattner 2010, as cited in and establish its democratic governance in Salamey and Tabar 2012). If a population is line with a consociational structure? Key divided along sectarian lines, mobilized by steps include strengthening the parliament sectarian leaders, served by sectarian-based and introducing a proportional electoral networks, and focused on communitarian- system in place of the current majoritarian defined interests, then favoritism, corruption, one to undermine the rigid confessional and a weak central authority will hinder power-sharing structure. efforts to establish an effective and legitimate The comprehensive implementation state organization. of consociational democracy in Lebanon Lebanon’s inability to develop such a hinges on establishing a proportional state stems from two issues: the societal representation system—an essential fragmentation in a rigid confessional system condition for consociational systems—in of governance, and the country’s high order to move away from confessional susceptibility to external influences (Salamey representation toward a more responsive and Payne 2008, 453). These sectarian model that allows for newly emerging and groups, dubbed as sub-state communities, independent candidates to win seats. The have formed strong ties with trans-border 2018 parliamentary elections, which were groups, organizations, or states and sought held under a new proportional law, offered What complicates the protection to compensate for the state’s hope in this regard. Lebanon tested a new malfunctioning. The two main examples proportional list voting system instead of a prospects for moving include the -backed and the bloc vote majoritarian one; however, the beyond confessionalism Saudi-backed . sectarian quota feature was left intact in in Lebanon is lack What complicates the prospects for the new electoral law. Among its main of competition. The moving beyond confessionalism in Lebanon shortcomings was the fact that votes in confessional elites is lack of competition. The confessional elites some districts had more weight than in other do not face much competition for power districts. Under the new law, voters cast do not face much or even calls for accountability from within two votes: one for a fixed electoral list in competition for their own communities. Disproportionate their district and a second for their preferred power or even calls majorities in each sectarian community view candidate within that list. Hence, the degree for accountability their respective sectarian leaders positively. A of proportionality varied from one district to survey conducted at the Lebanese American another. If a list wins five out of eight seats, from within their own University (LAU) revealed strong sectarian for example, the top five candidates on the communities. populist sentiments among residents, which list will each win a seat. The sixth candidate explain the lack of motivation among the might have a total of 8,000 votes but will general public to hold their leaders to not get a seat because the list the candidate account. The survey finds that 70 percent belongs to has already filled its five allocated of Shiites, 53 percent of the Sunnis, and 41 seats. This will allow a candidate from a percent of the believe that “their different list with significantly fewer votes to leader has rarely or never committed a win this seat. mistake over the past five years” (Salamey The electoral turnout in 2018 was 49.7 and Tabar 2012, 505). percent, 5 percent less than that of 2009. Only six women were elected, compared to four women in 2009. Several independent LOOKING FORWARD candidates and lists appeared on the ballots but only one candidate, Paulette Changes to the confessional system in Yacoubian, won. Populist sectarian leaders Lebanon is urgently needed because the and patronage networks still dominated persistence of the existing confessional the political game, and the new electoral power structure has stalled progress law continued to work in their favor as it toward the realization of consociationalism largely inhibited independent electoral lists as a democratic form of governance and from winning. As a result, a majority of 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 10.15.18

the previous members of parliament were their efforts to establish peace and stability. re-elected. However, for various reasons discussed Another crucial step to resolve the above, Lebanon falls short of being an ideal sectarian-driven conflicts and gridlock in model for Arab states. Although Lebanon’s Lebanon is moving toward a more secular consociational system helped mitigate form of governance. The religious and conflicts within a deeply divided population, public spheres in Lebanon are not separated. it remains stalled in a transitional phase This issue brief is part Personal status courts are still managed by almost three decades after the Taif religious laws. Lebanese citizens must follow Agreement was signed. of a two-year research the laws of their specific sects in regard to project on pluralism in issues such as inheritance, marriage, and the Middle East after divorce, among others. Unifying the personal REFERENCES the Arab uprisings. status laws, of which there are 18 separate laws, will help in gradually moving toward a Hudson, M.C. 1997. “Trying Again: Power- The project is generously secular government. Such a move would aid Sharing in Post-Civil War Lebanon.” supported by a grant in de-emphasizing the sectarian identities of International Negotiation 2(1): 103-122. from the Carnegie Lebanese citizens, which can boost citizens’ Salamey, I., and R. Payne. 2008. Corporation of New York. sense of belonging to and identification with “Parliamentary Consociationalism in Lebanon. Likewise, it can create a greater Lebanon: Equal Citizenry vs. Quotated sense of equality under the law. Confessionalism.” Journal of Legislative Studies 14 (4): 451-473. IMPLICATIONS Salamey, I., and P. Tabar. 2012. “Democratic There are several problems associated Transition and Sectarian Populism: The with the Lebanese system that hinder case of Lebanon.” Contemporary Arab Lebanon from becoming a better democratic Affairs 5 (4): 497-512. state: well-established and deep-rooted

See more issue briefs at: communitarian networks that more and www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs more resemble states within the state, an AUTHOR electoral system that reinforces sectarian Maria Tannous is a graduate student at the This publication was written by a divisions and communitarian power, and the Lebanese American University pursuing an researcher (or researchers) who religious repercussions Lebanese citizens participated in a Baker Institute project. M.A. in international affairs. She received her face over personal status issues. Wherever feasible, this research is bachelor’s degree in journalism with a minor Lebanon remains a complex model reviewed by outside experts before it is in political science and international affairs to study due to its multilayered structure. released. However, the views expressed from LAU. herein are those of the individual The fact that no single group is capable of author(s), and do not necessarily establishing hegemony implies that power represent the views of Rice University’s sharing remains an essential prerequisite Baker Institute for Public Policy. for an alternative to the current system. © 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute Simultaneously, however, it is in itself a for Public Policy major obstacle, hindering the country from reaching stability and further development. This material may be quoted or The latest elections were unable to induce reproduced without prior permission, change, and the same political figures provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker remained in power. Institute for Public Policy. As the response to the Arab Spring continues to unfold in the Middle East, a Cite as: large number of dormant ethnic and Tannous, Maria. 2018. Lebanon: religious divisions have regained significance A Consociational Model to be Refined. Issue brief no. 10.15.18. in recent years. It is within this context Rice University’s Baker Institute for that Lebanon has become the subject of Public Policy, Houston, Texas. discussions on whether it can serve as a model for other countries in the region in 4