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Lebanon: a Consociational Model to Be Refined ISSUE BRIEF 10.15.18 Lebanon: A Consociational Model to be Refined Maria Tannous, Lebanese American University As conflicts continue to rage throughout required to achieve a stable political process the Middle East in the wake of the 2010 and accommodate the concerns of sectarian Arab uprising, divisions across ethnic and groups (Hudson 1997, 106). religious lines in several regional countries In light of this renewed attention on have brought consociational models of the Lebanese model, it is necessary to governance back into the spotlight. In an re-evaluate Lebanon’s consociational system effort to reconcile inter-group conflicts and in order to gauge whether it would be useful regulate power sharing in the region, public for other countries in the region experiencing discussions have highlighted the role of similar ethnic or religious divisions. consociational arrangements in resolving conflict in Lebanon. Lebanon has 18 officially recognized sects. Under the Lebanese THE TAIF AGREEMENT consociational system, agreement among The Taif Agreement was meant to restore the leaders of the major sects (Sunni, Shia, the consociational model as the country’s and Maronite) is required to pass a policy, governing mechanism and reduce approve an official’s appointment, convene institutionalized sectarianism. It was verbally parliament, or for a president to be elected agreed that the president of Lebanon must (i.e., parliament does not convene and be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, elections are not held unless the sects agree and the speaker of parliament a Shia. To In light of this renewed on the winning candidate in advance). The this end, the accord tasked the Chamber of attention on the Lebanese model, or the “Lebanese formula” Deputies with organizing a national dialogue as described by Hudson (1997, 107), has Lebanese model, on the country’s political transition. The regained prominence. it is necessary to parliament was to establish a national The Lebanese consociational structure committee that included the leaders of the re-evaluate Lebanon’s was first implemented after the National three sectarian communities mentioned consociational system in Pact of 1943. The sectarian-consociational above as well as other national political model was subsequently amended in the Taif order to gauge whether figures. The accord stated that after the Agreement, which ended the civil war in 1989. it would be useful for election of a national non-sectarian-based Most recently, the principles of this model Chamber of Deputies, a Senate that would other countries in the were re-confirmed in the Doha Agreement include religious leaders and would have region experiencing in 2008. Lebanon’s political history indicates authority only on the most important similar ethnic or that these consociational agreements reflect national issues was to be formed (Salamey a common understanding that no viable religious divisions. and Payne, 2008, 461). Yet this transitional alternative to consociationalism that would phase, as it were, has instead become the ensure the functionality and continuity of status quo, from which leaders of Lebanon’s Lebanon exists. It was clear for the fathers of religious communities have little incentive independence in Lebanon that a “communal to deviate. While initially formulated to representation” and power-sharing model is RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 10.15.18 establish a consociational democracy in system in which populist sectarian leaders which the role of sectarian leaders in the rule, strengthening their communities country was to be limited to certain national and establishing transnational ties that issues, the Taif Agreement has trapped undermine the central government. In this Lebanon in a cycle of sectarian tension, system, the sectarian leaders’ chief interest conflicts of interest, and occasional violence. is to maintain the status quo, thereby ensuring their hold onto power. One of the key mechanisms by which they achieve BASICS OF THE ACCORD this is to focus the public’s attention on the provision of daily needs such as The Taif Agreement was negotiated in Taif, electricity and water, which Lebanon has Saudi Arabia, in September 1989 to end the been suffering shortages of for more than Lebanese civil war. It introduced political, four decades. By providing these services administrative, and other reforms aimed via established communitarian sectarian at re-establishing political and economic networks—including schools, hospitals, stability in Lebanon. It maintained the general NGOs, media channels, and religious characteristics of the existing power-sharing institutions—the sectarian groups further system, but redistributed domestic political reinforce the existing system. Each caters Communitarian power among the major sects—Maronite, to its respective members, which further Sunni, and Shia. Its main provisions state networks undermine underscores a sense of belonging to a that Lebanon is Arab in identity and that its the efficacy of the specific sect rather than belonging to the political system is a parliamentary democracy larger Lebanese state. central government, based on the principles of separation, balance, As a communitocracy, Lebanon thereby elevating their and cooperation among the three branches lacks both a unified national identity and of government. And, most importantly, the positions as providers of national goals. Instead, communitarian accord lists abolishing political sectarianism as services for their own networks undermine the efficacy of the a basic national goal, to be achieved gradually central government, thereby elevating communities. Lebanese over time, although no specific deadline or their positions as providers of services citizens’ persistent plan of action was provided for its execution. for their own communities. Lebanese Almost three decades after the Taif identification with their citizens’ persistent identification with their Agreement, the population is still divided, sectarian communities sectarian communities leads to recurrent parliament is still sectarian-based, and internal conflicts and intolerance among the leads to recurrent the electoral system reinforces sectarian Lebanese population. internal conflicts and representation. Public offices are allocated Many observers have come to view this intolerance among the in accordance with sectarian divisions. The confessional system as a major source of central government has weakened, and Lebanese population. political gridlock in Lebanon. Yet others see sectarian communities are taking over this sectarian communitarian structure as its role by providing in-group services, a necessity to protect minorities, maintain as discussed below. The trash crisis that political stability, and give each community a Lebanon has struggled with over the fair share of the political power. Scholars who past three years—whereby the country’s study the Lebanese formula debate whether landfills have reached capacity, and there the consociational model of governance is no agreement on alternative ways to that was refined after the Taif Agreement manage this issue, leading to garbage was an adequate solution or if it conversely piling up around Lebanon—is a perfect was part of the problem (Hudson 1997, 106). illustration of the government’s inefficiency While both views have their merits, what in handling its basic duties. The crisis is remains obvious is that in such a deeply the result of high levels of corruption and divided population, within which various gridlock inside the government. sectarian communities mobilize around rival In this sense, Lebanon has moved political visions and interests, the state and away from democratic governance. What national identity are greatly undermined. This can be observed instead is the rise of is particularly true because “the struggle a consociational communitocracy—a for democracy requires the eradication 2 LEBANON: A CONSOCIATIONAL MODEL TO BE REFINED of political clientelism, nepotism and threatens civil peace in the country. How patronage, and the establishment of national can Lebanon move beyond communitocracy institutionalism” (Plattner 2010, as cited in and establish its democratic governance in Salamey and Tabar 2012). If a population is line with a consociational structure? Key divided along sectarian lines, mobilized by steps include strengthening the parliament sectarian leaders, served by sectarian-based and introducing a proportional electoral networks, and focused on communitarian- system in place of the current majoritarian defined interests, then favoritism, corruption, one to undermine the rigid confessional and a weak central authority will hinder power-sharing structure. efforts to establish an effective and legitimate The comprehensive implementation state organization. of consociational democracy in Lebanon Lebanon’s inability to develop such a hinges on establishing a proportional state stems from two issues: the societal representation system—an essential fragmentation in a rigid confessional system condition for consociational systems—in of governance, and the country’s high order to move away from confessional susceptibility to external influences (Salamey representation toward a more responsive and Payne 2008, 453). These sectarian model that allows for newly emerging and groups, dubbed as sub-state communities, independent candidates to win seats. The have formed strong ties with trans-border 2018 parliamentary elections, which
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