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Download This Publication Chr. Michelsen Institute Conflictual Peacebuilding: Afghanistan Two Years after Bonn Astri Suhrke Kristian Berg Harpviken Arne Strand Report R 2004: 4 Conflictual Peacebuilding: Afghanistan Two Years after Bonn Astri Suhrke Kristian Berg Harpviken Arne Strand Prepared for The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs R 2004: 4 Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights CMI Reports This series can be ordered from: Chr. Michelsen Institute P.O. Box 6033 Postterminalen, N-5892 Bergen, Norway Tel: + 47 55 57 40 00 Fax: + 47 55 57 41 66 E-mail: [email protected] www.cmi.no Price: NOK 50 ISSN 0805-505X ISBN 82-8062-074-5 This report is also available at: www.cmi.no/public/public.htm Indexing terms Afghanistan Democratisation Peacebuilding Reconstruction Security Sector Reform Project title Afghanistan two years after Bonn Project number 23058 © Chr. Michelsen Institute 2004 Contents ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................................................. IV EXCECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................................ VI INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................................1 1. THE PEACEBUILDING DESIGN AND ITS CONTEXT.....................................................................3 1.1. CONFLICTUAL PEACEBUILDING AND THE LEGACY OF THE WAR..........................................................3 1.2. WAGING WAR WHILE BUILDING PEACE...................................................................................................5 1.3. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SUPPORT ..............................................................................................5 2. STATE-BUILDING...........................................................................................................................................8 2.1. CREAT ING CENTRAL STATE CAPACITY.....................................................................................................8 2.2. THE CENTRAL STATE AND THE REGIONS................................................................................................11 2.3. CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................................16 3. RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION ....................................................................................................... 18 3.1. THE AID PRESENCE: A ‘LIGHT FOOTPRINT ’?..........................................................................................18 3.2. RELIEF VERSUS RECONSTRUCTION..........................................................................................................19 3.3. PRIORITIES OF RECONSTRUCTION ............................................................................................................20 3.4. PRINCIPLES OF RECONSTRUCTION...........................................................................................................22 3.5. REASSESSING NEEDS AND COSTS.............................................................................................................25 3.4. CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................................26 4. POLITICAL TRANSITION........................................................................................................................ 27 4.1. THE TRANSITIONAL CABINETS.................................................................................................................27 4.2. THE EMERGENCY LOYA JIRGA .................................................................................................................28 4.3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS ..............................................................................................................30 4.4. ELECTIONS...................................................................................................................................................33 4.5. CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................................34 5. RULE OF LAW ............................................................................................................................................... 36 5.1. RULE OF LAW AND THE STATE.................................................................................................................36 5.2. THE BONN AGREEMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW..................................................................................37 5.3. CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................................41 6. SECURITY ....................................................................................................................................................... 43 6.1. SECURITY IN THE BONN AGREEMENT .....................................................................................................43 6.2. THE SECURITY SITUATION ........................................................................................................................44 6.3. THE ISAF FORCE ........................................................................................................................................46 6.4. CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................................50 7. THE REGION.................................................................................................................................................. 52 7.1. THE FRAMEWORK.......................................................................................................................................52 7.2. CHANGING ALIGNMENTS...........................................................................................................................53 7.3. CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................................54 8. NORWAY’S ROLE........................................................................................................................................ 55 8.1. THE MILITARY ENGAGEMENT ..................................................................................................................55 8.2. ASSISTANCE.................................................................................................................................................57 8.3. CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................................59 9. CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................................. 60 9.1. THE BONN AGREEMENT ............................................................................................................................60 9.2. A SCRIPT FOR PEACEBUILDING................................................................................................................62 9.3. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTERVENTION..............................................................................................66 9.4. THE POLICY AGENDA AHEAD...................................................................................................................66 NOTES .................................................................................................................................................................... 68 iii ABBREVIATIONS AACA Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority AG Advisory Group AIA Afghan Interim Administration AIHRC Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission ANA Afghan National Army ANBP Afghan New Beginnings Program AREU Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit ARTF Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund ASG Afghan Support Group ATA Afghan Transitional Administration CG Consultative Group CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation CLT Constitutional Loya Jirga CMI Chr. Michelsen Institute DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration EC European Commission ELJ Emergency Loya Jirga EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal EU European Union GTZ Deutche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit IARCSC Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission ICG International Crisis Group IDP Internally Displaced Person IFI International Finance Institutions IMF International Monetary Fund ISAF International Security Assistance Force LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund MAPA Mine Action Program for Afghanistan MDG Millennium Development Goals MoC Ministry of Communication MoD Ministry of Defense MoF Ministry of Finance MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MoI Ministry of Interior MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development NABDP National Area Based Development Program NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDB National Development Budget NDP National Development Plan NEEP National Emergency Employment Program NGO Non-Governmental Organization NSP National Solidarity Program NWFP North West Frontier Province (Pakistan) OEF Operation Enduring Freedom PAREM Public Administration and Economic Management PMU Program Management Unit PRIO International Peace Research Institute,
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