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Ners. Also, Both Sides Frequently Hold Contrary Views with Respect To Articles / Country Page peans to support staff rather than part- challenge of a double enlargement: pares the agenda for the twice a year ners. Also, both sides frequently hold Despite its obvious faults, it continues meetings of the Defense Ministers, over- to be one of the most important and sees the training courses, and can coordi- contrary views with respect to politi- nate the organization of a peace operation cal hot spots such as Iran, the Middle reliable instruments of control in a in which more than one Scandinavian East, China or even Iraq. state community desperately short of contingent participates.3 Howcver, this has such anchors. not been an integrated decision making While the US are too predominant to system. Rather it has been a process of give in, Europe is too divided to assert close consultation and informal coopera- itself. A kind of fission fungus grows Curt Gasteyger* tion. from these exceedingly high demands * Prof. Dr. jur., Director of the Programme for The Post Cold War Era on a mission not at all clear in its Strategic and International Studies, The The period since the end of the Cold War subjects and boundaries - namely Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. has seen a vast expansion in UN opera- collective defence of an area subject to tions. The number of peacekeepers dedi- common responsibility. The long-term I A German version of this article was pub- cated to UN service has mushroomed effects of such an affliction may be lished in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 eightfold. And the UN is involved in March 1999, p. 12; i..e. several weeks before massive operations simultaneously all fatal. the actual adoption of the New Stretegic Con- around the globe. Overstraining content and geographi- cept (translation by Katarina Mose). But it is not only the sheer scope and cal limits of the Alliance entails a sweep of these operations which challenge danger that must be taken seriously as the United Nations. It is the fundamental it is now being increasingly chal- change in the nature of global conflict that lenged by another side, too. Unspoiled Country page confronts the UN with its most intractable problems. The dominant form of conflict by the pioneer spirit of an Alliance has become the intrastate pattern, fueled formed during the Cold War era, a The Scandinavian Role in by fierce ethnic strife. As Simon Duke new generation has grown up. Very points out: 'In 1993, 34 armed conflicts matter-of-factly, it perceives the Alli- International Peace Opera- were waged in 28 locations around the world, all intrastate conflicts.'4 Such con- ance to be a useful albeit thinning tie tions flicts are often atrocious, and prolonged, between the US and Europe. While and strain UN impartiality, patience, and the strategic and protective role of the The United Nations and its peacekeeping credibility to the utmost.5 missions have enjoyed immense support former is being diminished, the latter among the Scandinavian peoples. In the Intrastate peace operations are often very is gaining more economic power, thus era of the Cold War, one quarter of all the complex. Indeed, peace operations must tipping the balance. troops in UN missions were furnished by now be defined as a wide range of activi- the Scandinavian. Of course, the first ties along the spectrum of conflict, a con- Alarming as it may be for Europe, it UN Secretary General, Trygve Lie, was a tinuum with many 'gray' areas. In his cannot be denied that technological Norwegian; and the second Secretary Agenda for Peace, former Secretary Gen- superiority in the US is growing. The General, Dag Hammarskj6ld, came from eral Boutros Boutros-Ghali described European Monetary Union, on the Sweden. Moreover, all of the northern these actions as preventive diplomacy, other hand, may create a new dimen- nations, whether members of NATO or peacekeeping, preventive deployment, neutral, found in UN operations a common peace enforcement, and peace building. z sion, and, thus, possibly tension, in venture in which they could all unite. For Traditional peacekeeping operations in transatlantic relations. The US dollar, neutral Sweden and Finland, the UN was a conflicts between states required imparti- symbol of American economic prow- valuable opportunity to act upon the world ality, minimum force, and the consent of ess and only global reserve currency, stage and gain needed experience in inter- all interested parties. It has proven neces- is now being challenged in an un- national functions. sary to discard impartiality and the consent In the course of the 1960s, Scandinavian of all parties in cases where human rights precedented manner. Perhaps it is this are viciously abused, such as 'ethnic monetary reshuffling that has led to efforts on behalf of the UN took on a greater degree of formal structure and cleansing' or genocide. the US insisting upon a broader Euro- institutionalized cooperation. By 1964, it Currently, the largest deployments of pean responsibility in the field of was agreed that each country would estab- Scandinavian troops are to be found in UN security policy. Washington knows lish a stand-by force dedicated to UN forces in Lebanon and in the former the price of such responsibility only service. They are not standing forces. Yugoslavia. A Nordic Battalion was too well. Therefore, watching the Euro Rather they represent regular officers and formed for duty in Croatia, Bosnia, and reserves who have signed special contracts Macedonia. Much common planning and play up, the US is seeking co- for UN service. Joint training courses have training was involved in preparing this operation. been developed with each country special- unit for deployment in the Balkan conflict. Europeans should for this reason izing in a different function. Military When the Dayton agreement was imple- observers are trained by Finland; Denmark mented, NATO formed the Implementa- closely scrutinise the new Strategic runs the program for military police; Nor- Concept with regard to cost and con- tion Force dedicated to operations in way offers the course in logistics; and Bosnia. IFOR was duly succeeded by the sequence. They will want to keep it as Sweden is responsible for the training of Stabilization Force. Scandinavian units flexible and as little binding as possi- civil police and staff officers,2 The key were grouped, along with a Polish battal- ble. Having reached a mature age, the element of Scandinavian military UN ion, into a Nordic Brigade. This Brigade is cooperation is the Joint Nordic Committee integrated into the US First Armored Alliance must none the less face the for Military UN Matters. This body pre- Division. For the first time, a Scandina- full range of peace operations, whether under a new military plan. A new lnterna- vian unit is thus committed to European with the UN, the OSCE, or NATO. tional Command will be established. This operations. The newly formed International Brigade is command will be able to furnish a force of the centerpiece of Denmark's current 800 to 1,400 troops within 15 to 30 days. 21 Norway approach to peace operations. It is dedi- The Command will draw upon the re- Norwegian involvement in UN peace cated to service in UN missions and with sources of the Swedish Armed Forces operations began with the very first such NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps. this International Center. The mandate of mission in 1947. In June 1997, 1,459 meehanized infantry formation numbers Swedish peacekeeping forces, moreover, is Norwegian troops were deployed in eight 4,560 soldiers and includes two mecha- now explicitly expanded to include mis- operations around the world 7. nized infantry battalions, one tank battal- sions `. that can involve greater risks In 1992, the Norwegian Government and authority as regards the use of ion, one self-propelled artillery battalion, force.'22 proposed a substantial expansion of Nor- one supply battalion, one service battalion, way's role in post Cold War peacekeeping. and air defense engineer, and reconnais- A formal committee report to Parliament sance elements.is One-fifth of the brigade Finland Finland has been active in UN was implemented by legislation in June of troops are regulars. The rest of the soldiers 1994.8 peacekeeping missions since 1956, one are trained volunteers on a three year term year after her admission to the United of enlistment. Fifteen hundred troops can Norway has now raised the number of Nations. More than thirty-five thousand soldiers in its Stand-By Force to 2020, a be continuously deployed by the brigade Finnish troops have served with the UN considerable increase from 1330.9 These in sustained operations. from 1956 to the present.23 Currently, assets include the Telemark infantry battal- Much new equipment has been secured for some 1200 Finns are on duty in nine UN ion : engineer, medical, and supply com- the DIB. Such items range from helmets missions, including units posted to SFOR panies, and movement control and military made by a German firm to assault rifles in Bosnia. police platoons.1 manufactured in Canada. Reconnaissance Finland is now engaged in a reorganiza- It should be noted that the Parliamentary vehicles have been purchased from tion of the structure of the Finnish Army. Committee Report indicated that Norwe- Mowag of Switzerland. Denmark has Three motorized infantry brigades will be gian experience was primarily in ordered 51 used Leopard 2 main battle organized and armed to be ready for action peacekeeping operations. Consequently, tanks from Germany.' The Danes are now at any time. One of these high readiness the Report strongly recommended that : 'It planning to acquire twelve transport heli- units will be especially configured and will be desirable also in the future to con- copters for swift movement of a company trained as an International Brigade.
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