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Job Name:2223196 Date:15-04-20 PDF Page:2223196cbc.p1.pdf Color: Cyan Magenta Yellow Black PANTONE 7509 C A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDEAST: HOW CAN IT BE ACHIEVED? First in the fifth series of Rational Debate Seminars sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute held at The Madison Hotel Washington, D.C. PETER LISAGOR Moderator A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDEAST: HOW CAN IT BE ACHIEVED? I. L. Kenen Elmer Berger Allen Pollack Christopher Mayhew RATIONAL DEBATE SEMINARS American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Washington, D.C. Distributed to the Trade by National Book Network, 15200 NBN Way, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214. To order call toll free 1-800-462-6420 or 1-717-794-3800. For all other inquiries please contact the AEI Press, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 or call 1-800-862-5801. © Copyright 1971 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1200 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 73-171219 FOREWORD Since Israel's creation in 1948, the conflict between Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East has been making the headlines. The difficult problems underlying t~is conflict have plagued all efforts at establishing a work able peace and, at times, have threatened the peace of the world. This debate brings together four men who are in sharp disagreement over both the issues of this contro versy and the conditions necessary to a just peace. They agree only on the urgent need to reach an enduring settlement-and on the fact that such a settlement is not likely to come easily or soon. ((Just Peace in the Mideast: How Can It Be Achieved?" represents the first seminar in AEI's fifth rational debate series. These debates are designed to explore in depth the facts, conflicts and opinions sur rounding the important public issues of our time. September 1971 William J. Baroody President American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research CONTENTS I FIRST LECTURE-I. L. KENEN 1 II SECOND LECTURE-Elmer Berger 35 III THIRD LECTURE-Allen Pollack 73 IV FOURTH LECTURE Christopher Mayhew 105 V REBUTTALS 129 VI DISCUSSION 147 VII NOTES 165 FIRST LECTURE I. L. KENEN I. The Current Crisis The standstill cease-fire agreement accepted by Egypt, Jordan, and Israel seemed to offer a slim ray of hope for peace. But that ray soon faded out when the Soviet Union and Egypt rushed to build missile sites and moved dozens of missiles into the prohibited zone. They con spired to exploit the breathing spell in order to prepare for a new military or diplomatic showdown when the cease-fire ended-to dictate Israel's surrender and to impose a pro-Arab settlement. Our State Department has insisted that Egyptian President Nasser wants a peaceful solution-that he does not really want to drive Israel into the sea. But on the very day that Secretary of State Rogers announced his peace initiative, Nasser said: The Arab masses know that their strength lies in their unity ... and unity means the end of im perialism and its collaborators and the liquidation of Israeli aggression and the Zionist entity. Moreover, as the talks began, the Arabs said once again: no negotiations, no peace treaties, and no sur render of the claims of the Palestinians. That is what 2 A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDEAST they tell their own people. Why do our diplomats always deceive themselves into believing the Arab leaders lie to their people but confide the truth to us? Within the first few days of the cease-fire, Israel called upon the United States to enforce President Nixon's commitment that a military buildup would not occur. But the United States was slow in acknowl edgment, weak in action. Indeed, our government seemed to be more displeased with Israel for the com plaint than with the Egyptians for the violation. The United States was the victim of a hoax, did not want to admit it, and was angry with the fellow victim who refused to accept the growing peril to her survival and who had acted on U.s. representations. And that dereliction raises grave doubts about the credibility of the U.s. commitment. Can Israel rely on any kind of u.S. commitment or guarantee? Often in the past-in 1948 after the partition deci sion, in 1951 after the Security Council ordered Egypt to open the canal, and again, in 1967, after Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran-Israellearned that she could not rely on third parties or agencies to enforce and safeguard ephemeral guarantees. This time, Israel insists there must be genuine peace treaties, signed by the parties and obligating them to each other-in indel ible, not invisible, ink. It appears now that the Israelis are facing a peace at-any-price pressure to make dangerous concessions as in the disastrous rollback of 1957. In one critical FIRST LECTURE 3 aspect the danger is much worse today than it was in 1957, because now the Russians are massed-with men and missiles-on Israel's doorstep. The danger which Israel faces and about which she is trying to alert the world resembles the crisis our own country faced in Cuba in 1962. II. Background: The Role of the Great Powers It is frequently said that Israel is caught up in the crossfire of three wars: the war between the Arab states and herself; the Arab-Arab conflict between the radical Soviet-supported states and the conservative Western oriented states; and the cold war between East and West, where she finds herself defending the interests of the free world but without its active support. The Great Powers compete for influence and prestige and power. The maldistribution of resources in the Arab world drives the dispossessed and revolutionary ((have-nots" towards conflict with the ((haves." It is a conflict between states. It is also a conflict inside the states between the rich and the poor. It is a vast over simplification to suggest that our support for Israel has been the reason for Western setbacks. In the cold war, the West has been at a disadvantage, not only because the Russians fight Israel but because we have always been identified with reactionary rulers and because our large oil companies have extracted huge profits from the region, thus exposing America to left-wing attack. Israel has been imperiled as the Arabs played off 4 A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDEAST Great Power rivalries. Before World War II, the Arabs flirted with the Nazis, and the British were ready to sacrifice the Jewish national home. Since World War II, the Arabs have tried to blackmail the West by threat ening to transfer their allegiance, their oil, and their political and propaganda power to Moscow. Obviously, Russia must bear primary guilt because she backs and leads the Arabs on the diplomatic and military fronts as part of her strategy to dominate the Near East and Africa. She is unscrupulous in her harass ment of Israel, cynical in her deception of Washington. But Washington and London also have much to answer for. Western support for Israel has been a frail reed, swaying weakly before every Arab threat, suc cumbing to every Arab blackmail. The British reneged on their commitment and responsibility under the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations Man date. And, as for the United States, our policy has been equivocal, erratic, and inconsistent for a quarter of a century. We have raised expectations in Arab capitals that the United States might ultimately abandon Israel. In 1947, the UN Special Committee on Palestine recommended partition offering self-rule to both the Jews and the Arabs in separate states. The Arabs rejected the compromise; the Jews reluctantly agreed. The UN General Assembly voted for it. President Truman en dorsed the concept of partition, despite the hostility of the Departments of State and Defense and the lobby- FIRST LECTURE 5 ing of oil and missionary interests. The partition pro posal was to be implemented by a special Palestine com mission. Obstruction would constitute a breach of the peace enabling the Security Council to take appropriate action. All UN debate and documents confirm that the Arab states resisted implementation. The partition com mission never went to Palestine. In 1948, we tried to set aside the UN partition resolution. In 1949, we again brought pressure on Israel to make territorial concessions to the Ar.abs, even threat ening to reconsider U.S. relations with Israel. In 1956, the United States joined with the Soviet Union in forcing Israel to withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines without requiring the Arab states to renounce bellig erence and to enter into peace treaties with Israel. While we gave generous economic assistance to both Israel and the Arab states, we repeatedly refused Israel's requests for arms, even after the Soviet Union began arming the Arab states. We detoured her to other coun tries. In lieu of arms we offered guarantees-the Tri partite Declaration, the Middle East Eisenhower Doc trine, a succession of promises and commitments from Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. But these commitments all vanished like mirages when ever crises came close. And often over the years we seemed to be in com petition with the Soviet Union for the favor of the Arab states and certain charismatic Arab leaders like 6 A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDEAST President Nasser of Egypt. Today, a major objective of our policy seems to be the restoration of diplomatic relations with Nasser-as well as economic aid-which explains our diffidence in calling him to account for his breach of faith.

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