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B R I E F I R IRMO Institut za razvoj i međunarodne odnose Institute for Development and International Relations I R M O Ured u Zagrebu B R E F 12 2020 I From Pariah to Partner: A View from Israel on a Realigned Middle East By Or Yissachar Introduction Flight number LY971 on Monday 31 August Tel Aviv from using their airspace, much less land 2020, was in many respects anything but in their airports, even referring to it merely as “the Zionist entity”. Much more fundamentally another Middle East destination. Traditionally, than technical disagreement over policy items a mundane commercial flight traveling to the Arab world’s maximum pressure campaign or territorial arrangements, the Arab world against Israel was designed not only to call into has made clear what was best enunciated in question its existence militarily, but crumble its the infamous 1967 Khartoum “Three No’s”: legitimacy diplomatically – prohibiting Israeli “No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, citizens from entering their territories, banning no negotiations with Israel.” Despite episodic Israeli and other airlines traveling to and from under-the-radar contacts, the Arab world had IRMO BRIEF 12/2020 1 operated under the assumption that any cracks relationship with Israel is but one component. construed as de facto recognition of a country mirrors the formation of the three new regional in this well-fortified wall could have been Challenging the status quo, this reconfiguration considered a red rag. axes: Iran and its proxies, Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood and other radical Islamist Yet recently, this red rag has paled considerably. movements, and unprecedently, the Israeli- moderate Sunni-American axis. Dhabi were Israeli Head of National Security Aboard that debut flight from Tel Aviv to Abu Council Meir Ben-Shabbat, US National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, and Senior Advisor A perfect storm Jared Kushner, traveling to meet their Emirati This novelty, Israeli-Arab normalization as basis on an El Al carrier in order to put together a détente as well as for counterparts while flying over Saudi airspace peace deal. Both sides hailed this Arab-Israeli the formation of a likeminded regional security for a mutually beneficial coalition facing Iran, has been the result of of a century; the UAE now welcomes thousands the intersection of three main geopolitical “historic peace”, the first of its kind in a quarter of Israeli tourists, rolled out the red carpet developments: Iran’s hegemonic aspirations for Israeli business leaders during the recent and military nuclear program; domestic unrest GITEX, and mutual investments are expected to or even radical Islamist coups d’état in multiple soon reach 10 billion USD. Arab leaders have Arab countries, mistakenly dubbed “the Arab congratulated the move, and the Arab League Spring”; and steadfast determination alongside rejected the Palestinian Authority’s motion an off-protocol strategy by Washington. to condemn it, a previously-unimaginable Together, these conditions have created a scenario – while by contrast, 40 years earlier it perfect storm, used by its protagonists to lead condemned Egypt for its peace deal with Israel, to these unprecedented outcomes: four Israeli- suspending its membership for 10 years. Arab normalization agreements to date, a visible anti-Iran coalition such as during the Warsaw This anecdote can be seen as a forerunner of Summit, acquiescence to previously-scandalous an unprecedented realignment of the Middle propositions such as repeated Israeli airstrikes East’s deep-seated axes of power. In recent against Iranian military infrastructure in Syria, years, moderate Sunni countries’ orthodox and a complete disinterest – beyond lip service national security strategy has gone through – toward the Palestinian question. a tectonic geopolitical shift, of which their a transformative recalculation reflective of IRMO BRIEF 12/2020 2 The combination of common being viewed as the region’s pariah, isolated challenges with straightforward and menaced, a political byword for the Arab World’s multiple issues, to its key partner to and pragmatic Arab, American tackle primary security and economic concerns. and Israeli leaders has led to Such a dramatic strategic development thus unprecedentedly close ranks. sheds new light on orthodox approaches to international relations more broadly as well, This heterodoxical approach comes as a in a way that behooves critically rethinking polar contrast to the ruling orthodoxy, concepts which are at times minimized in hitherto suggesting pre-conditioning regional today’s march toward globalization: religion, tribe, national interest, and power. normalization and cooperation by first through a list of demands Israel could not addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict accept. Long controlled by the protocol – as Hard reality disrupts the status quo outlined by the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, the European Union’s statements and elsewhere – Former National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes, Arab leaders have been increasingly showing once described as “Obama’s foreign-policy amanuensis”, famously stated that “President deep-seated principles. With Iranian forces Obama has taken on some sacred cows.” Indeed, jarring flexibility on previously-considered on their doorstep and sprouting inside their Obama’s pride of “rejecting the Washington territories, Arab leaders have effectively attempting to restart relations with Russia, warehoused the protocol to prioritize their playbook” is not entirely unjustified: by own national interests, while taking a serious relaunch relations with Cuba, and take a more gamble with regards to their prestige and holistic view on free trade between the US and reputation. From an Israeli perspective, this Asia and the Americas, his administration has new reality would also create a leverage on demonstrated its willingness to think outside the Palestinian Authority leading to a more the box and challenge old paradigms. favorable compromise, rather than the other The same cannot be said, however, on its way around. approach to Israel’s place in the Middle East. The The combination of common challenges with Obama administration has made clear it viewed straightforward and pragmatic Arab, American the ruling orthodoxy as the “only solution” to and Israeli leaders has led to unprecedentedly pre-conditioning of Israeli-Arab normalization close ranks. Israel has thus transitioned from the conflict. By recognizing as “hard reality” the IRMO BRIEF 12/2020 3 by an Israeli-Palestinian peace delivered solely Yet while the Obama Doctrine may have been according to the existing paradigm, it effectively heartly welcomed by the Arab World in 2009, institutionalized the decades-long status quo in the same was no longer true as from 2011. Be it disinterest in the Middle East, the “Pivot to which Arab leaders had benefited from their leverage in order to self-legitimize and reorient administration has failed to supply the Israelis- significant diplomatic, political, and resource Asia”, or the firm belief in diplomacy, the Obama international priorities. Sunnis with what they considered quintessential survival guarantees facing the genuine hard Firstly, a quasi-automatic majority in reality – in particular, Iran’s regional aspirations international halls of power by Arab League and domestic Arab uprisings. and the Non-Aligned Movement members has led, for instance, to an astronomical 86% of Obama’s rapprochement to Iran, culminating in the adopted UN General Assembly’s country- the 2015 JCPOA (the “Iran Nuclear Deal”), was crises such as the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, leaders, who interpreted it as appeasement and specific resolutions to target Israel. Secondly, a red flag for both Israel and moderate Sunni following the Nixon administration’s decision containment of Iran’s behavior. While vowing to back Israel during the Yom Kippur War, to prevent Iran from attaining deliverable highlighted the West’s heavy dependence nuclear weapons and imposing sanctions, on Middle East crude oil. Put together, this the Obama administration’s record has led leverage has not only made Israel the ideal regional countries to suspect a rhetoric-action culprit – domestic stability in Arab countries by gap. The Iranian regime’s outspoken goal to reuniting the people around a common enemy – annihilate Israel alongside its regional strategy it also greatly contributed to the establishment of “exporting the revolution” by militarily of widespread notions regarding the region and supporting Syria’s Assad, Yemen’s Houthis, Israel’s place in it. Iraq’s Shi’ite militias, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Gaza’s Hamas, and domestic resistance groups Obama’s rapprochement to Iran, in Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan culminating in the 2015 “Iran and elsewhere, has alarmed the Israelis-Sunnis Nuclear Deal” was a red flag for as to the changing regional balance of power. both Israel and moderate Sunni as a state sponsor of terrorism, going through leaders. A regime flagged by the US State Department missiles, Iran noted Obama’s orders to cease significant rearmament by long-range ballistic Project Cassandra that targeted its protégé IRMO BRIEF 12/2020 4 Hezbollah’s narco-terrorist network, in order to phone call, demanding him to resign and allow conclude the nuclear deal. A regime previously open election to all citizens – which ultimately violating a series of agreements such as the NPT led to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to was viewed by Israeli-Sunnis as untrustworthy power. with diplomacy;
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