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Israeli-Turkish Tensions and Their International Ramifications

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Israeli-Turkish Tensions and their International Ramifications by Efraim Inbar Efraim Inbar is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin- Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. Abstract: The deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey, culminat- ing in the ‘‘Gaza flotilla’’ affair of June 2010, are part of a reorientation in the Turkish foreign policy over the past several years: a move away from the West and toward Muslim states and non-state groups, including such radical actors as Iran, Hamas and Hizballah. This article reviews the rationale for the Israeli- Turkish strategic partnership in the 1990s and the early years of this century. It then documents deviations in Turkish foreign policy from Western patterns. Next it examines how changes in Turkey’s twenty-first century strategic environment, as well as in the domestic arena, led to a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy and to current tensions in bilateral relations. And finally, it assesses the impact of the changes in Turkish foreign policy on the Greater Middle East and global politics. ensions between Ankara and Jerusalem have escalated since Turkey harshly criticized Israel following its invasion of the Gaza Strip in T December 2008 (Operation Cast Lead). The operation aimed to halt continuous missile attacks on Israel’s civilian population by Hamas. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s subsequent outburst at Israeli President Shimon Peres during a panel at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2009 was indicative of further cooling between the two powers.1 Then in October 2009 Turkey abruptly canceled Israel’s participation in the multi- national ‘‘Anatolian Eagle’’ air exercise. This was followed by Turkish political leaders’ severe criticism of Israeli policies. Subsequently, an inflammatory anti-Israeli drama series on Turkey’s state-controlled television station, depict- ing Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers as cold-blooded murderers and rapists, only exacerbated tensions. Since Fall 2009, hardly a week passes without Erdogan slamming Israel. Finally, Israeli military action to prevent the The author acknowledges the research help of Elizabeth Stull. 1 Asli Aydintasbas, ‘‘Erdogan’s Davos Outburst is Nothing New," Forbes, January 1, 2009. # 2010 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute. Winter 2011 | 132 Israeli-Turkish Tensions ‘‘Gaza Flotilla’’ from breaking the blockade on the Hamas-ruled Strip in June 2010, which ended with nine Turkish Islamists dead on board one of the ships, provided Erdogan’s government another opportunity to condemn Israel and champion the cause of Hamas. These actions represent a serious deterioration of the once vibrant strategic relationship between Israel and Turkey. The Israeli-Turkish Strategic Partnership Turkey has a very important regional presence due to its mere size, geographical location and political history. For Israel, a state with a history of conflict with many of its Arab neighbors, good relations with Turkey, a country 99 percent Muslim, has been one way to break free from regional isolation and to minimize the religious dimension of its conflict with the Arabs. From the beginning of statehood, Jerusalem stressed the importance of good relations with Ankara. However, for a variety of political reasons, Turkey kept Israel at arm’s length. This dynamic changed with the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, Kemalist Turkey looked for partners in the Middle East that could help meet the growing security challenges from Iran, Iraq, and Syria.2 The decreasing relevance of the NATO alliance, of which Turkey was a member, in dealing with Middle East contingencies, augmented this search. Moreover, Turkey’s turn to Israel was the perfect choice, since Israel shared Turkey’s threat assessment and was a strong pro-Western country with considerable clout in the United States, the new hegemonic power in the world. Jerusalem could provide military technology that the West was reluc- tant to sell to its NATO ally because of Ankara’s controversial war against the Kurdish insurgency. As a result, Turkey upgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel to the ambassadorial level in 1992. Furthermore, during the 1990s, Turkey signed numerous bilateral military agreements, which turned this relationship into a strategic partnership.3 In the mid-1990s, relations with Israel bloomed economically, diplo- matically, and militarily. Defense trade during that time was worth several million dollars. Major programs included a $700 million deal to modernize Turkey’s aging fleet of F-4 Phantoms and a $688 million deal to upgrade its M-60 tanks and an array of other sophisticated weapons systems. The Israeli Air Force was allowed to use Turkish air space to practice complex operations and the countries collaborated on issues of counter terrorism and intelligence. 2 For the Turkish predicament and its foreign policy in the post-Cold War Era, see Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey. The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington: Brookings, 2000); F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003). 3 For an elaborate analysis of the reasons for the strategic partnership, its content and its implications see Efraim Inbar, The Israeli-Turkish Entente (London: King’s College Mediterra- nean Program, 2001). Winter 2011 | 133 INBAR For Jerusalem, the intimacy between the two governments was second only to U.S.-Israel relations. A strategic partnership between Ankara and Jerusalem emerged, reinforced by a common strategic agenda based on similar concerns about Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and complementary interests in central Asia. The two states also displayed a similar outlook on global affairs, including foreign policy alignment with the United States, mixed feelings about Europe, and suspicion of Russia. The Israeli-Turkish entente became an important feature of post-Cold War politics in the Middle East. Jerusalem received the news of the electoral victory of the Islamic- rooted AK Party (AKP) in October 2002 apprehensively. Yet, the AKP-led government maintained Turkey’s good relationship with Israel. Visits from the Turkish leadership, including Premiere Erdogan (May 2005), continued, and cooperation continued, even in the strategic field. The bilateral relationship seemed to have weathered successfully several tests, such as Turkish fears over Israeli support for the establishment of a Kurdish state in fractured Iraq, the slowdown in the peace process, and the acceptance of a Hamas delegation in Ankara (January 2006).4 The latest manifestation of this ‘‘business as usual’’ attitude was the joint Israel-Turkey naval exercise in August 2009. Yet, recent developments have cooled this the bilateral relationship. High level visits have decreased, while official Turkish criticism of Israel, often quite strident, has increased. Israel, under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, seems to have disappointed the AKP government for not informing Turkey about its impending attack on Gaza and for not making enough concessions to Syria in the Turkish mediation effort. Moreover, in September 2009, Jerusalem turned down a request from Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to enter the Gaza Strip from Israel, where he planned to meet Hamas officials before crossing back into the Jewish state.5 This decision was part of Israel’s policy of not meeting with foreign statesmen who, on the same trip, met with Hamas officials. Israel’s refusal infuriated the Turks, who showed their displeasure by cancelling the participation of the Israeli Air Force in the international ‘‘Anatolian Eagle’’ exercise in October 2009.6 The volume of defense trade has also decreased. Israel’s growing apprehensions about the direction of Turkish foreign policy even led officials in Jerusalem to consider withholding export licenses for the sale of defense items and services to Turkey, and demoting the country’s standing from ‘‘preferred’’ to ‘‘presumption of denial.’’7 In August 2010, Israel’s Defense 4 Efraim Inbar, ‘‘Israel’s Strategic Relations with Turkey and India," in Robert O. Freedman, ed., Contemporary Israel: Political, Economic and Security Challenges (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), pp. 228-36. 5 Herb Keinon, ‘‘Turkish FM Cancels Visit over Gaza Row," Jerusalem Post, September 8, 2009. 6 ‘‘Turkey Cancels Air Force Drill Because of Israeli Participation,’’ Hu¨rriyet Daily News, October 11, 2009. 7 Barbara Opall-Rome and Vago Muradian, ‘‘Israel-Turkey Rift Derails Defense Trade,’’ Defense News, October 18, 2009. 134 | Orbis Israeli-Turkish Tensions Minister Ehud Barak expressed apprehensions about the appointment of a pro-Iranian to head the MIT (Turkey’s spying agency), reflecting Israel’s fears that Turkey is losing its pro-Western foreign policy orientation. One explanation may be that the Palestinian issue has gained greater resonance in Ankara since the AKP came to power, leading to greater tensions with Israel. Erdogan stressed that ‘‘Turkey sees solving the Palestinian issue as key to achieving peace and stability in the region.’’8 Yet, the increased animosity between Jerusalem and Ankara also dovetailed with Turkey’s growing diver- gence from the West. This reorientation in Turkey’s foreign policy—leaving the Western fold—had a large influence on its attitude toward Israel. A New Foreign Policy Orientation As international circumstances change and domestic preferences redefine national interests, cooler relations and even international
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