Updated October 28, 2020 Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a December 2019, Díaz-Canel appointed tourism minister trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime minister. toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the government. The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by Venezuela’s economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuela’s support for In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift Cuba; increased U.S. economic sanctions, which have hurt moving away from sanctions toward engagement and the Cuba’s nascent private sector; and the economic decline normalization of relations. Changes included the rescission associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international pandemic. The Economist Intelligence Unit is forecasting terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic an 8.3% economic contraction in 2020. relations (July 2015); and an easing of restrictions on travel, Cuba’s public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and financial services (2015 and 2016), accomplished through appears to have been effective. As of October 28, 2020, the amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations country reported 128 deaths, with a mortality rate of 1.13 (CACR), administered by the Treasury Department, and the per 100,000 people (among the lowest rates in the hemisphere), according to Johns Hopkins University. Cuba Export Administration Regulations, administered by the Commerce Department. The restoration of relations led to has provided international assistance to respond to the increased government-to-government engagement, with pandemic by sending over 3,700 medical professionals to over 20 bilateral agreements and numerous dialogues. almost 40 countries worldwide. President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump 2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back efforts to issued a national security presidential memorandum in June 2017 that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions normalize relations. By 2019, the Administration largely abandoned engagement by increasing economic sanctions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban significantly to pressure the Cuban government on human military. The State Department issued a list of “restricted rights and for its support of the Venezuelan government of entities” in 2017, which has been updated several times, most recently in September 2020. The “Cuba restricted list” Nicolás Maduro. In 2020, the Administration has ratcheted up restrictions on travel and family remittances. On October includes 230 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries, 27, the Administration announced new sanctions that could 5 holding companies and 54 of their subentities, 111 hotels, lead to the curtailment of most remittances in late 2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and November, when the restrictions become effective. 41 entities serving defense and security sectors. Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April Since 2019, the Administration has imposed increasingly strong sanctions against Cuba. In addition to the sanctions 2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice president, succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro noted below, the Administration has increased efforts continues to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021. (including visa restrictions) to call attention to allegations The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 60 years old, reflected the of coercive labor practices in Cuba’s foreign medical missions, a major foreign exchange earner for Cuba. In generational change in Cuban leadership that began several years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban May 2020, the State Department (pursuant to Section 40A revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government. of the Arms Export Control Act) added Cuba to its annual While in power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to list of countries certified as not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, the first time since 2015. implement significant economic policy changes, moving toward a more mixed economy with a stronger private  Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba. sector, but his government’s slow, gradualist approach did Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed not produce major economic improvements. sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels In a February 2019 referendum, Cubans approved a new that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it sanctioned Cuba’s state-run oil import/export company. constitution that introduced such changes as an appointed prime minister to oversee government operations; limits on  Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective the president’s tenure (two five-year terms) and age (60, May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file beginning first term); and market-oriented economic lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property reforms, including the right to private property and the in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and promotion of foreign investment. However, the new Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. constitution ensures the state sector’s dominance over the 104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national, economy and the predominant role of the Communist Party. including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time In October 2019, Cuba’s National Assembly appointed of the confiscation. Previous Administrations had Díaz-Canel as president under the new constitution. In suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such

https://crsreports.congress.gov Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

lawsuits. The European Union and Canada criticized the concern for many years. As of October 1, 2020, the human Trump Administration’s action, vowing to ban rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders listed 138 political enforcement or recognition of any judgement and allow prisoners, with 76 imprisoned for reasons of conscience; counterclaims. To date, 28 lawsuits have been filed Amnesty International designated six of these as prisoners against U.S. and foreign companies, including cruise of conscience in 2019. After six months of detention, José ship operators, airlines, travel booking companies, and Daniel Ferrer, leader of the opposition Patriotic Union of hotels; several lawsuits have been dismissed by federal Cuba, was released in April 2020 to house arrest. courts or by plaintiffs. Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.  Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. On travel, in According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy June 2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people- community members suffered a series of unexplained to-people educational travel and the Commerce injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private between late 2016 and May 2018. The State Department and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from maintains that the investigation has not reached a going to Cuba. The Transportation Department conclusion regarding the cause or source of the injuries, for suspended commercial flights to cities other than which Cuba strongly denies responsibility. In September Havana in December 2019; charter flights to cities other 2017, the State Department ordered the departure of than Havana in January 2020 (which were capped to nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to 3,600 flights annually in June 2020); and all private minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff charter flights to Havana in October 2020 (public was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has charter flights to Havana remain permitted). In affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.

September 2020, the Treasury Department prohibited th th U.S. travelers from staying at properties identified by 116 Congress Action. The 116 Congress has continued to fund Cuba democracy assistance and U.S.-government the State Department as owned or controlled by the Cuban government; the ban includes over 400 hotels sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 million for democracy (essentially all Cuban hotels) and privately owned programs and $29.1 million for broadcasting in FY2019 residences for rent (casas particulares) if they are (P.L. 116-6) and $20 million for democracy programs and $20.973 million for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94, controlled by a prohibited government official or Communist Party member (or close relative). Division G). P.L. 116-94 (Division J) included benefits for U.S. government employees and dependents injured while On remittances, in September 2019, the Treasury stationed in Cuba. For FY2021, the Administration requested $10 million for democracy programs and $12.973 Department capped family remittances (not previously limited) to $1,000 per quarter per Cuban national and million for broadcasting. The House-passed version of the eliminated the category of donative remittances. In June FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bill, Division A of H.R. and September 2020, the State Department added to its 7608 (H.Rept. 116-444), approved July 24, 2020, would provide $20 million for democracy programs and fully fund “Cuba restricted list” two Cuban companies that facilitate the processing of remittances. On October 27, the broadcasting request. In other legislative action, the 2020, the Treasury Department prohibited, effective Senate approved S.Res. 454 in June 2020, calling for the November 26, the processing of remittances through any release of democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer (a similar entities on the “Cuba restricted list.” resolution, H.Res. 774, was introduced in the House). Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September Among other bills, several would ease or lift U.S. sanctions: 2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R. 1898/S. 1447 transactions, which allowed banking institutions to (U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overall embargo); process certain funds transfers originating and and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884 would reinstate terminating outside the United States. In October 2019, the Cuban Family Reunification Program. S. 3977 would the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to require the State Department to report on countries with leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de Cuban medical missions. S. 4635 would require an annual minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based report on Cuba’s medical missions and reinstate the Cuban company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10% Medical Professional Parole program. U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed licensing requirements for the export of certain donated Several resolutions would address the following: the release items to organizations controlled by the Cuban of Cuban political prisoner Silverio Portal Contreras government or Communist Party and items for (H.Res. 1172); Cuba’s medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res. telecommunications infrastructure. 136); U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232); Cuban religious/political freedom (S.Res. 215); Las  Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa Damas de Blanco human rights group (S.Res. 531); and the restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross 35th anniversary of Cuba broadcasting (H.Res. 971/S.Res. violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela. 637). Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, and CRS Report Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress. minister (January 2020) for human rights violations. Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights IF10045 violations in Cuba have been a fundamental U.S. policy

https://crsreports.congress.gov Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 75 · UPDATED