Here a MAGAZINE of the AMERICAS VOLUME 17 • FALL 2006 •

Hemisphere A MAGAZINE OF THE AMERICAS VOLUME 17 • FALL 2006 • HTTP://LACC.FIU.EDU

The New Old Cuba Hemisphere VOLUME 17 • FALL 2006 • HTTP://LACC.FIU.EDU

IN THIS ISSUE

FROM THE GUEST EDITOR The New Old Cuba Damián J. Fernández 3

REPORTS Changes From Below Katrin Hansing 4 The New Politics of Opposition Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat 8 Cuba and China Daniel P. Erikson and Adam Minson 12 Young Blood Frank O. Mora 16

FEATURES Poverty and Inequality in Cuba Lorena G. Barberia 20 Cuba’s New Daddy Javier Corrales 24 The End of Rationing? Carmelo Mesa-Lago 30

PHOTO ESSAY Everything Old Is New Again Uva de Aragón 36

REVIEW FORUM Plus ça change... Anthony P. Maingot 42

PUBLICATIONS UPDATE Cuba’s New Society Marian Goslinga 46

COVER: Ismael Gómez Peralta, “El fénix” de la Serie Iluminaciones, 2006 Mixed media on canvas, 69 x 59 inches. Photograph by Pedro Portal. The artist is represented exclusively by Cernuda Arte, Coral Gables, Florida. Hemisphere

EDITORIAL STAFF

Founding Editor Anthony P. Maingot Editor Eduardo A. Gamarra Associate Editors Mark B. Rosenberg Richard Tardanico Patricia Price Managing Editor Pedro D. Botta Book Review Editor Ivelaw Griffith Bibliographer Marian Goslinga

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Uva de Aragón Sarah Mahler Ana María Bidegain Félix E. Martín David Bray Lisandro Pérez Janet M. Chernela Timothy J. Power Michael W. Collier Ana Roca Carol Damian Andrea Mantell Seidel Damián J. Fernández Victor Uribe

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Don Bohning Guido Pennano Ettore Botta Alejandro Portes Wolf Grabendorff Sally Price Alistair Hennessy David Ronfeldt Harry Hoetnik Selwyn Ryan Franklin W. Knight Steven E. Sanderson Vaughan Lewis Saskia Sassen Larissa A. Lomnitz Andrés Serbín Abraham F. Lowenthal Carol A. Smith Terry L. McCoy Lourdes Sola Andrés Oppenheimer Yolande Van Eeuwen Robert A. Pastor Arturo Villar Anthony J. Payne Juan Yañes

Hemisphere (ISSN 08983038) is published twice a year by the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University. Copyright © 2006 by the Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.

Hemisphere is dedicated to provoking debate on the problems, initiatives and achievements of the Americas. Responsibility for the views expressed lies solely with the authors. Editorial, Circulation and Advertising Offices: Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University Park, DM 353, Miami, Florida, 33199, Tel.: (305) 348-2894, Fax: (305) 348-3593, E-mail: [email protected]. FROM THE GUEST EDITOR The New Old Cuba

s there a new Cuba? The traditional perspective suggests that Cuba is frozen in time, based on a view from the top: a political system that has remained quite unchanged if not atrophied. But, if one looks deep into the macro-structures of power, one will find that things have dramatically changed among political institutions and leaders outside the inner circle. Particularly at the grassroots level, these changes will have a decisive impact on the island’s future. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 15 years of the Special Period, and Isignificant demographic changes, there is a new Cuba emerging. This new Cuba has become clearer with the recent news that Fidel Castro’s illness has caused him to cede power to his brother, Raúl Castro. We will now see the contours of newness even sharper. Despite the dynamics of social change, the island of Cuba is often perceived to be suspended outside real space and time, beyond the parameters of global social life. Such a portrayal highlights the tendency to feature and magnify Cuba’s uniqueness. As this issue of Hemisphere reveals, transnational norms, capital, identities, and mass culture have not stopped short of Cuban shores. Moreover, within Cuban society, economics, and politics, significant sources of change will perhaps play out in unexpected, but important ways. In “Poverty and Inequality in Cuba,” Lorena Barberia reveals that new trends in consumption, income generation, and social mobility represent significant challenges for the egalitarianism embraced by Cuban leaders for nearly half a century. Without a critical reassessment of social policy, Barberia maintains, the stratification of society will continue to widen the gap between Cubans with and without access to remittances and sectors of the economy driven by foreign direct investment. In examining the Cuban-Venezuelan relationship, Javier Corrales writes that while the island’s alliance with its South American neighbor offers enormous material benefits without the obligation to modify domestic policies, Cuba will eventually pay the price for its new dependence, just as the country paid for its dependence on the former Soviet Union. In “Cuba and China,” Dan Erikson and Adam Minson explore how China represents a new lifeline for the island’s economy. Yet, while Cuban leaders perceive relations with China as an example of social solidarity, the two countries are separated by an increasing ideological divide regarding the benefits of economic liberalization. The increasing ideological divide, however, transcends elite politics and foreign affairs. In “The New Politics of Opposition,” Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat analyzes changes in the island’s dissident movement, and concludes that a resurgent sense of citizen solidarity noted among some sectors of Cuban society may indicate that a new phase in the struggle for nonviolent change has begun. A nuanced view of everyday resistance and accommodation is offered by Katrin Hansing in “Changes from Below.” Hansing reflects on the transformations experienced by all levels of Cuban society since the Special Period. By seeking new ways of connecting to the outside world and creating alternative spaces, Cubans are increasingly demonstrat- ing an independent attitude that may prove to be one of the greatest challenges faced by the state. Another continuing challenge for state leaders is Cuba’s economy. In “The End Rationing?,” Carmelo Mesa-Lago explores the inception and evolution of rationing, and assesses the feasibility of five strategies to fulfill Castro’s promise made in November 2005 that the island’s 43-year old rationing system would soon be terminated. Mesa-Lago concludes that this promise may be yet another symbolic ingredient of the official discourse designed to assure Cubans that a bright future lies ahead. Whether that future is bright or cloudy, will depend in part on the role of the armed forces—arguably the strongest institution on the island—and the subtle transformations taking place deep in ranks of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias. In “Young Blood,” Frank Mora examines whether the armed forces are an agent of change or continuity. In the meantime, we will continue to see the contours of a new old Cuba emerge ever so clearly.

DAMIÁN J. FERNÁNDEZ

Hemisphere Volume 17 3 REPORTS Changes From Below by Katrin Hansing

alking through world’s political, economic and high cost and difficulties in acquir- the streets of social events, popular cultural ing a taxi license, Juan, however, Havana, one is influences, and consumer culture. works illegally. Despite the risks of immediately Since the Special Period, and par- a high fine if caught, Juan never- struck by a ticularly in the past decade, Cuba theless drives his old Lada around myriadW of contradictory images, has experienced fundamental and town every day and night looking sounds, and sensations. Five-star enormous changes on all levels of for potential clients, preferably for- hotels, fancy cafés, bars and shops society. In this article I will reflect eigners, who will pay in hard cur- offering imported foods, modern on some of these transformations rency. “What can I do?,” he asks. appliances, mountain bikes, and and their consequences, particular- “We need to live. I don’t like work- perfumes from Paris stand side by ly those that have and continue to ing illegally but the state has liter- side dilapidated and decaying occur at the grassroots social level. ally pushed me into being dishon- apartment blocks, empty peso It is 9 am and Dalia is anxiously est.” shops, and local bodegas, where waiting for Carlos, a local street Cuba’s economic crisis over the Cubans can be seen standing in vendor, to pick up her freshly past 15 years has brought about long lines waiting for their month- made croquetas. Over the past few tremendous social and economic ly food rations. Flashy Mercedes months, Dalia has stayed up every changes, which, among other fac- Benz, Toyota, and funny egg- night making around 200 cheese, tors, include: the legalization and shaped taxis bustle through the fish, and/or chicken croquetas, increasing dependence on the US$ streets next to overcrowded which Carlos then tries to sell to dollar (now CUC or Cuban con- guaguas, camellos, and particulares hungry habaneros during the day. vertible peso); the partial official (different types of local public Dalia is an accountant by training opening of certain economic sec- transport). Churches, new and and until recently worked for a tors such as tourism; a major old, Catholic, Protestant, and espe- Cuban state-owned company. increase in living expenses but stag- cially Pentecostal are being rebuilt, Although she enjoyed her work, nation of people’s salaries; the for- restored, and revived, while Afro- she could no longer survive on her mation of a double economy; the Cuban religions have become so meager income and had to leave increasing dependence on remit- popular that many foreigners are her profession. “I had no choice,” tances and formation of new social now flocking to the island to she says, “I only earned 280 pesos classes; the demise in the quality of become initiated. In many of the and could not feed my mother, social services; and the continuing city’s tourist areas more and more daughter, and myself on that wage. control and repression of any inde- people, especially the elderly and I now make croquetas but at least pendent activity and thought, children, can be seen begging for we can get by.” which was most visibly witnessed money, clothes, toiletries, or just Juan, an accomplished neurosur- in the March 2003 crackdown of asking for chicle (chewing gum), geon, who has served as a doctor 75 dissidents. while tourists and members of the on several internationalist missions As the examples of Dalia and newly emerging Cuban nouveau to Africa, has a different yet similar Juan show, these changes have not riche class can be seen lounging situation: He can no longer pro- only altered Cubans’ lives in very around one of the five-star hotel vide for his family of five on his practical, everyday kinds of ways, pools or bars. Although Havana is monthly peso income. Having but also provoked major changes in not Cuba, these contradictions are earned the right to buy a car after people’s attitudes and actions emblematic of many of the changes his first mission to Zambia, Juan, toward their lives, their futures, the island is currently undergoing. like many other Cubans who are and the state. Cuba is no longer the isolated lucky enough to own a car, has Before the economic crisis, most island, cut off from the rest of the become a taxi driver. Due to the Cubans relied on the government

4 Hemisphere Volume 17 Reports

New spaces, attitudes, and actions in contemporary Cuba

and, arguably, many still had faith in the system. The stagnating economy, eroding quality of health care and education, growing corruption, and continuing repressive government policies have led more and more people to no longer count on the state to help them solve their problems. Weariness, skepticism, and distrust have instead kicked in, forcing many people to look for alternatives. Although apathy, depression, and leaving the country are some of the more drastic and dramatic measures people have resorted to, many, if not most Cubans are responding by creating and carving out their own spaces, networks, and mechanisms—whether economic, social, or cultural in nature—independently from the state. Like every Sunday morning, the Salvación Pentecostal Church’s 11 am service in Boyeros, on the out- skirts of central Havana, is packed. Most congregants have already attended Sunday school or Bible study classes since 9 am and many will spend the rest of the day on the church grounds taking part in one of the many recreational activities or meals offered by the church. “The church has become my second home,” says María, who has been a member of the congregation for three years. “I come here almost every other day. Sometimes to eat, to see my friends, watch a film, and of course to pray.” In search of community, food, medicine, and entertainment, but also to fill their spiritual void, more and A man drives a bicycle-taxi through the streets of Santa Clara, Cuba. Cubans have more Cubans, like María, are seek- found creative ways to survive the economic hardships that afflict the island and, ing out religious communities. in so doing, are fostering a growing sense of indepedence and self-reliance. Whether Catholic, Protestant,

Hemisphere Volume 17 5 Reports

Pentecostal, Afro-Cuban, Jewish, A few months ago I was standing so are deemed illegal, people have Buddhist, Hindu, Masonic, or at a street corner stall having a cof- to be very creative in outwitting the Muslim, many of these and other fee, when I overheard a group of system and must constantly be on faith-based organizations have people talking about a special news their toes not to be caught. These turned into important alternative program on the current situation in are skills that can and should not spaces of spiritual refuge and social Venezuela. I assumed that they be underestimated, let alone the upliftment, as well as material sup- were making reference to the mesa energy and determination that go port based on self aid and solidari- redonda session, a daily news pro- into them. Moreover, these activity. gram on Cuban television, when I ties are acts of defiance—defiance Increasing numbers of Cuban suddenly realized that they were in against a system that prohibits peo- youth, which make up more than fact talking about a program that ple from making an honest, decent half of the island’s current popula- had been aired on Miami’s Channel living. And that takes courage. tion, are also searching for alterna- 51, which all of them had watched. In short, a qualitative difference tives. Despite having been brought When I asked one of the men in the way many people think and up to be like Comrade Che, many about the program, I learned that a act has emerged and is growing have a strong craving to be them- certain individual in the neighbor- more and more each day. Despite selves. There is among many a hood has a cable TV antenna to the crackdowns on dissidents and growing sense of wanting to be dif- which about three dozen or more the Varela Project, as well as the ferent and a curiosity about differ- households are connected. Each continuing everyday repression and ent lifestyles and values; in short, a individual household pays the restrictions people live under, many desire for options. One of the owner of the antenna $5 a month, no longer are afraid to speak their more visible signs of this is the which helps him make a living, mind among each other, engage in growing presence of a number of while the others get to watch highly illicit activities, or find new and both older and newer youth cul- sought out foreign movies, telenove- creative ways of forging their own tures, which include expressions las, and news programs. spaces. It is this independent atti- such as the hippie, freakie, roquero, Although highly illegal and thus tude and its accompanying actions rapero, as well as Rastafari move- very risky, activities such as con- that I would argue are among the ments. Through their alternative necting to cable television and the most important social changes that lifestyles, body cultures, and out- internet are becoming more and have occurred on the island in the looks on life, these subcultures more common. Besides offering last 10 years. Cubans may not yet offer many young people the possi- different types of news, informa- be turning to the streets to express bility to question and explore who tion, and entertainment, these their frustrations and discontent, they are and what they want. media allow people to connect with but it is this newfound and growing These examples represent some the outside world and, in so doing, independence among many that of the more institutionalized or experience a completely different may just turn out to be one of the semiorganized forms in which peo- reality, however momentarily. greatest challenges to the state. Q ple are searching for and finding So what do these examples show alternative answers and spaces to us? For one, they demonstrate how the official state rhetoric and sys- more and more people are carving Katrin Hansing is currently director tem. The search for news, infor- out and creating alternative spaces of a research project on Cuba’s social mation, and knowledge beyond and parallel mechanisms to the collaboration ties to Africa, based at that provided by the state has state. In so doing, they are acting the University of Bayreuth in become particularly important. independently. This not only shows Germany and funded by the German While contact with family mem- that many are taking initiatives but Research Council. She has worked as bers abroad, interacting with for- also responsibility for themselves— a consultant for think tanks and poli- eigners, involvement in grassroots i.e., people are taking their own cy institutes on numerous Cuba-relat- organizations, and listening to lives into their own hands, which, ed issues and is an associate fellow of Radio Martí are among the more after decades of depending on a the Cuban Research Institute at established forms of doing so, cradle-to-grave system, is a huge Florida International University. increasing numbers of individuals step. are finding new ways of connecting Given that many of the activities to the outside world. and mechanisms involved in doing

6 Hemisphere Volume 17 Latin American and Caribbean Center Florida International University

Founded in 1979, LACC is a leader in the field of Latin American and Caribbean studies. As a federally funded Title VI National Resource Center for Language and Area studies, LACC has a mandate to promote graduate and undergraduate education, faculty research, and public education on Latin American and Caribbean affairs.

Florida International University has one of the largest concentrations of Latin American and Caribbean studies scholars of any university in the United States. LACC’s faculty associates range across many fields and have produced important works on such topics as migration, US-Latin American relations, trade and integration in the Americas, indigenous cultures, economic stabilization and democratization, sustainable development, and envi- ronmental technology. FIU Latin Americanists include highly regarded social scientists, humanists, artists, business experts, and engineers.

LACC’s base in Miami also provides the center with certain unique assets. As its programs have grown, LACC has become in many ways a microcosm of the city itself: a mosaic of Caribbean, Mexican, Central American, and South American influences. This inter-American setting provides an ideal field-like environment for research and study. LACC’s partnerships with a long list of universities and research centers in the Americas also bring the region closer to home. Through these networks, LACC co-sponsors research projects, major conferences, and faculty and student exchanges.

For more information, please visit http://lacc.fiu.edu or call 305-348-2894. Reports

The New Politics of Opposition by Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat

n July 26, 2005, Fidel A Patchwork of Unrest Berta Antúnez and her family Castro addressed a The international community has from Placetas, Villa Clara, are exam- closed-door gathering recognized Cuban dissident leaders ples of the role played by provincial of hand-picked fol- such as the Ladies in White, dissidents in mobilizing protests lowers. Half of his Oswaldo Payá, Vladimiro Roca, against the government. Berta’s Otwo-hour speech was dedicated to Marta Beatriz Roque, Oscar Elías brother, Jorge Luis García Pérez attacking an internal pro-democracy Biscet, Gustavo Arcos, and Elizardo “Antúnez,” has been imprisoned movement which he described as an Sánchez Santacruz, offering them since 1990 for speaking out in favor “illusion,” orchestrated from abroad. honors and awards. These well- of glasnost and perestroika. His tena- The Revolution, he promised, “will known men and women, however, cious struggle from behind bars has not concede a millimeter of ground” do not constitute the “body” of the turned him into an icon of the pro- to these individuals. The streets Cuban opposition. The pillars of democracy movement and a leader belong to the Revolution and will civil resistance to the Castro regime of the political prisoners. Berta’s stay that way, he concluded. In the lie deep within the island’s popula- uncle, Omar Pernet, is also in jail, cavalcade of violence following these tion, spread out across the provinces: one of the 75 civic activists arrested words, government-organized mobs among disaffected youth and blacks, in March 2003. across the island heckled, spit upon, Catholics and Protestants, and, Berta has organized family mem- and sometimes even beat peaceful increasingly, former Communists bers of political prisoners in the dissidents outside their homes. disenchanted with the regime’s rejec- provinces to support their impris- Some observers claim to be per- tion of economic and political oned relatives. They have published plexed by Castro’s recurrence to reform. In 1997, the Steps to and circulated newsletters, carried street violence against a pro-democ- Freedom report counted 44 civic out sit-ins in front of prisons, held racy movement that they do not see resistance actions across the island; weekly prayer vigils, and collected as a serious threat to the communist in 2004, the number was 1,805. signatures for the Varela Project ref- regime’s 47-year old hold on power. Intensely active, fueled by rising erendum drive. Others argue that Castro’s resort to social discontent and increased inter- Berta has paid a high price for her public violence against a movement national support from abroad, the activities. In addition to the pro- that the government has repeatedly Cuban civic movement itself is a longed incarceration of her brother pronounced dead demonstrates the patchwork of individuals, families, and uncle, Berta’s daughter, resiliency of Cuba’s embryonic groups, and religious denominations Damaris, has been expelled from opposition. spreading across regions and sectors school and barred from further pur- The Cuban case is perhaps best where opposition to Castroism has suing her education. Government- understood in the context of the traditionally been high. organized mobs have demonstrated dynamics of nonviolent, grassroots Year after year, a greater percent- outside the family’s home. social struggle. Throughout history, age of actions occur outside Havana. The Sigler family in Matanzas lone dissidents manage to coalesce In 2004, 81.5% of civic resistance province is another example of a into increasingly effective commit- activities took place in the country’s nucleus of democratic resistance. Of tees, coalitions, and movements. interior. Of the 75 civic leaders Gloria Sigler’s four sons, two are in These articulated channels of social arrested in March 2003, 43 were prison and one is in exile. power reshape civil society, which, in from the provinces. After Havana, Communist Party officials have ran- turn, becomes the platform for sus- the provinces with the highest level sacked the Siglers’ house and Gloria tained and ultimately successful civic of activity were Villa Clara and herself, a frail 76-year-old, was defiance. Cuban dissidents are on Matanzas, the sites of deep-rooted hurled to the floor and beaten in her this path, and the Cuban govern- campesino rebellions against the own home by government thugs. ment is bent on stopping them. Castro regime in the 1960s. This aggression hasn’t deterred the

8 Hemisphere Volume 17 Reports

Civil resistance to the Castro regime

A group of Cuban demonstrators are harassed by pro-government thugs during a march in Havana on July 13, 2005. The demonstrators were marching to commemorate the anniversary of the sinking by the Cuban Navy of a tug with 43 people on board who were attempting to reach Florida.

Siglers from carrying on with their human rights activist Elizardo inside the island, it counted 283 dis- activities. They have organized pub- Sánchez Santacruz, estimate that sident groups. Of these, 86 are inde- lic demonstrations, set up independ- there may be 5,000 activists across pendent libraries, 29 are independent ent libraries, and collected signatures the island. Oswaldo Payá agrees, press agencies, 107 are groups for the Varela Project’s referendum describing the movement as “several engaged directly in some type of drive. Their defiance of the regime thousand strong.” political activity, and 61 are labor in Matanzas has turned them into In 2001, the Cuban Democratic groups, think tanks or civic institu- national opposition leaders. Directorate, together with the tions. The census further showed It is difficult to calculate how University of Miami’s Cuba that some type of dissident organiza- many dissidents like the Antúnez or Transition Project, conducted a cen- tion exists in all of the island’s major Sigler families are active in the sus of the internal opposition in cities, all of its provinces, and in provinces. Some observers, such as Cuba. Working closely with activists most municipalities.

Hemisphere Volume 17 9 Reports

Many analysts have pointed out that this may not be the case, given ambitious plans implemented by the dictatorship to guarantee totalitarian continuity. The listlessness caused by the waiting game over Castro’s death hurts the dissidents in their efforts to mobilize citizen participation in social change. To overcome this problem, the movement must do more to reach out and connect with the basic social grievances and aspirations of Cubans on the street. “Our hope does not lie in the bio- logical finality of any one man, but in the fact that we are struggling,” Oswaldo Payá has said. Something of this sort may have already begun. As acts of sanctioned violence against dissidents have esca- lated, their neighbors have come out of their homes to defend them. Members of the Cuban dissident group, Ladies in White, walk through Havana Berta Antúnez is proud that no one on March 18, 2006, to protest against the government and demand amnesty for from her neighborhood participated imprisoned dissidents. Despite the international recognition that the group and in the demonstrations against her other Cuban dissidents have attained, the pillars of the Cuban opposition are family. “They had to bring them in found within the disaffected segments of the island’s population. from the outside, people who didn’t know us,” she says smiling. On his way to his version of cul- Strategy and Prospects attempts at incorporation into the tural revolution, Castro may have The Castro dictatorship has been EU’s Lomé Accord, which would stumbled upon a resurgent sense of forced into a tense tug of war with have meant millions of dollars in citizen solidarity in Cuba. It may the internal pro-democracy move- loans and credits. However, some mark a new phase in the struggle for ment. The regime has tried to bal- informed observers, such as author nonviolent change on the island. Q ance its need to repress social dis- and journalist Carlos Alberto content with its desire to grow closer Montaner, have argued that Castro economically to the United States doesn’t really care about normalizing Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat teaches and the European Union. political and economic ties with the courses in political science and Dissidents have used the latitude United States and the European international studies at Florida afforded by this juggling act to reach Union because of the possible politi- International University and Barry out to the general population. cal consequences. In this totalitarian University. He is co-founder and The regime has proven adept at political scenario, the pro-democracy National Secretary of the Cuban blocking the growth of the pro- movement holds out the potential Democratic Directorate (Directorio democracy movement at critical for an alternative democratic future Democrático Cubano), and the junctures, but it has paid a high for Cubans. author of La República Invisible political cost for doing so. The A factor adversely affecting the (“The Invisible Republic”), a book- 1996 repression of the Concilio development of the movement is the long collection of essays on Cuban Cubano meeting and the murder of widespread perception, inside and national identity, exile politics, and the Brothers to the Rescue pilots outside the island, that change will the civic movement on the island. resulted in the enactment of the not take place until Fidel Castro’s Helms-Burton bill. The 2003 death, and that once this has hap- crackdown doomed the regime’s pened, change will be inevitable.

10 Hemisphere Volume 17 FORTHCOMING FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS PRESS

A comprehensive analysis of corruption in Cuba and prescriptions for minimizing it in the post-Castro era CORRUPTION IN CUBA: Castro and Beyond

BY SERGIO DÍAZ-BRIQUETS AND JORGE PÉREZ-LÓPEZ

Although Fidel Castro maintains his longtime grip on Cuba, revolutionary scholars and policy analysts have turned their attention to life after Castro. Among the many questions to be answered is how the new government will deal with the corruption that has become endemic in Cuba. While combating corruption cannot be the central aim of post-Castro policy, Sergio Díaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López suggest that, without a strong plan to thwart it, corruption will under- mine the new economy, erode support for the new government, and encourage organized crime. In short, unless measures are taken to stem corruption, the new Cuba could be as messy as the old Cuba. Fidel Castro did not bring corruption to Cuba; he merely institutionalized it. Official corruption has crippled Cuba since the colonial period, but Castro's state-run monopolies, cronyism, and lack of accountability have made Cuba one of the world's most corrupt states. The former communist countries in Eastern Europe were also extremely corrupt, and analy- ses of their transitional periods suggest that those who have taken measures to control corruption have had more successful transitions, regardless of whether the leadership tilted toward socialism or democracy. To that end, Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, both Cuban Americans, do not advocate any particular system for Cuba's next government, but instead prescribe uniquely Cuban policies to minimized corruption whatever direction the country takes after Castro.

SERGIO DÍAZ-BRIQUETS is Senior Vice President of the international management consulting firm Casals and Associates in Alexandria, Virginia, which provides anticorruption advice to governments and organizations throughout the world.

JORGE PÉREZ-LÓPEZ is Director of Monitoring at the Fair Labor Association, a collaborative effort among companies, civil society organizations, and universities to improve working conditions in factories around the world.

October 2006 • 6 x 9 in., 272 pp. • ISBN: 0-292-71482-3, $21.95, paperback • ISBN 0-292-71321-5, $55.00, hardcover

A collection of original essays on ten modern Latin American heroes, their legacies, and the societies that produced them HEROES AND HERO CULTS IN LATIN AMERICA

EDITED BY SAMUEL BRUNK AND BEN FALLAW

Latin American history traditionally has been defined by larger-than-life heroes such as Símon Bolívar, Emiliano Zapata, and Evita Perón. Recent scholarship, however, tends to emphasize social and cultural factors rather than great leaders. In this new collection, Samuel Brunk and Ben Fallaw bring heroes back to the center of the debate, arguing that heroes not only shape history, they also "tell us a great deal about the places from which they come." The original essays in this collection examine ten modern Latin American heroes whose charisma derived from the quality of their relationship with admirers, rather than their innate personal qualities. The rise of mass media, for instance, helped pave the way for populists such as radio actress-turned-hero Evita Perón. On the other hand, heroes who become president often watch their images crumble, as policies replace personality in the eye of citizens. In the end, the editors argue, there is no formula for Latin American heroes, who both forge, and are forged by, unique national events. The enduring (or, in some cases, fading) influence of those discussed in this volume validates the central placement of heroes in Latin American history.

SAMUEL BRUNK is Associate Professor of History at the University of Texas at El Paso.

BEN FALLAW is Assistant Professor of History and Latin American Studies at Colby College in Maine.

December 2006 • 6 x 9 in., 350 pp. • ISBN: 0-292-71481-5, $22.95, paperback • ISBN: 0-292-71437-8, $55.00, hardcover Reports

Cuba and China by Daniel P. Erikson and Adam Minson

uba’s international that has sparked anxiety in some ture. If those investments material- relations have changed quarters. More than 30,000 ize, China could become Cuba’s remarkably in recent Cuban medical and other highly- top foreign investor. years, with old trained specialists have been dis- alliances unraveling patched to Venezuela in exchange Early Ties Cand new partnerships emerging. for 90,000 barrels per day of pref- On September 1, 1960, Fidel Since 2001, Cuba has experienced erentially-financed petroleum. The Castro severed diplomatic ties with its most important realignment of efforts of the two leaders to counter Taiwan in favor of a relationship foreign relations since the collapse US influence in the region have with the People’s Republic of of the Soviet Union in the early ensured that simmering tension China. The two countries formally 1990s. The European Union with Washington will not abate established relations on September remains an important economic anytime soon. 28, 1960, making Cuba the first partner, but diplomatic relations Against this backdrop of shifting Latin American country to recog- soured following Cuba’s crackdown geopolitical alliances, China’s nize Mao’s China. However, on dissidents in 2003. When renewed interest in Cuba has been Cuba’s close alliance with the Soviet European embassies responded by the subject of considerable intrigue. Union took shape against the back- inviting opposition leaders to Of course, Cuba’s relations with the drop of the Moscow-Beijing rivalry, important embassy receptions, the People’s Republic of China are which stymied any deeper alliance Cuban government cut all contacts hardly novel; the two countries first with China. In fact, Castro with European ambassadors and established diplomatic ties more became openly critical of Mao’s refused EU aid. Only days after an than 45 years ago. In recent years, China in the 1960s, and con- official rapprochement was however, China’s stunning econom- demned the country’s invasion of announced in January 2005, Fidel ic growth and increasing global Vietnam in 1978. Relations began Castro told reporters that “Cuba power have cast a new light on this to improve in the 1980s, as the does not need Europe.” historic bond. Since 2001, China Chinese and Soviet governments Cuba’s relations in Latin America has emerged as an increasingly rele- inched closer to a détente and a are also in flux. Governments in vant actor in Latin America, and new generation of leadership took Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay Cuba is an important part of this the helm in Beijing. have moved left-of-center and panorama. Beijing’s renewed inter- In December 1984, China dis- increased diplomatic engagement est in Cuba has produced more fre- patched resident military attachés with Havana. The election of left- quent high-level meetings, rapidly to Cuba, initiating a series of wing indigenous leader Evo expanding levels of economic coop- friendly military contacts. Four Morales in Bolivia continues this eration, and numerous exchanges years later, China and Cuba ceased trend. Meanwhile, Cuba’s once in the areas of science, technology, to require passport visas of citizens staunch alliance with Mexico has and defense. Most critically for traveling between the countries. verged on total breakdown during Cuba, China represents a vital new The two countries signed a trade the term of President Vicente Fox, lifeline for the island’s flagging protocol in 1988 under which who has backed successive UN res- economy. Trade between the two China would buy nearly 100,000 olutions condemning the state of countries has surged to the point tons of Cuban sugar largely on human rights in Cuba. Without that China is now Cuba’s second barter for Chinese products. By question, the rise of Venezuela’s largest trading partner after 1990, annual Cuba-China trade Hugo Chávez led to the most dra- Venezuela. The Chinese have also topped $600 million, and China matic change in Cuba’s hemispheric pledged hundreds of millions of became second only to the Soviet relations. Chávez and Castro have dollars in investments in nickel, Union in trade with the island. forged a strong political alliance petroleum exploration, and agricul- Among the bartered goods were the

12 Hemisphere Volume 17 Reports

The new face of an old relationship

Cuban President Fidel Castro salutes an honor guard as he walks with then Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the Palace of the Revolution in Havana on April 12, 2001. famous Chinese bicycles that increasing closeness between the ment. At the time, Castro was replaced many of Cuba’s automo- governments. State relations reported to be quite taken with biles during the country’s post- reached a milestone in 1993 when China’s “market socialism,” and Soviet economic crisis, known as President Jiang Zemin became the speculation abounded that the the “Special Period.” first Chinese head of state to visit increasing trade and diplomatic ties Havana was one of the few capi- Cuba. Two years later, Castro would lead to a Chinese-style open- tals to express support for Beijing’s reciprocated with his first visit to ing in Cuba. But the island was brutal repression of protestors in China. While his itinerary includ- entering a severe recession caused Tiananmen Square in 1989, when ed perfunctory stops at the Great by the end of Soviet subsidies, and the Cuban foreign minister com- Wall of China and Mao’s Tomb, he trade with China dwindled, in part mended Chinese authorities for also visited Shanghai and due to the collapse of Cuba’s sugar “defeating the counterrevolutionary Guangzhou, two cities at the epi- industry. Trade relations began a acts.” The response signaled center of China’s capitalist experi- slow rebound in 1996, when China

Hemisphere Volume 17 13 Reports

agreed to begin paying for Cuban exploration were signed during for espionage against the US. goods with hard currency, but President Hu Jintao’s visit to Cuba Indeed, there has been speculation Cuba’s conservative central planners in 2004. In addition, China that Beijing has taken over the increasingly distanced themselves pledged to invest over $500 million Lourdes spy base after Russia ended from the Chinese economic model. in a new Cuban nickel plant in its lease in 2001 and is operating Moa, based in the Holguín another base, Bejucal, near The Wonder Years province. This would make China Santiago de Cuba. A 2001 visit to Cuba by Chinese the largest investor in Cuba’s flour- President Jiang Zemin played a ishing nickel market. With the China and Cuba’s Future crucial role in reinvigorating the help of Chinese investment, Cuba Perhaps the most intriguing commercial links. During this trip, could double its nickel and cobalt aspect of the Cuba-China alliance the two countries signed an eco- output, which is already the fourth concerns the potential impact on nomic and technical cooperation highest in the world. Hu also Cuba’s eventual transition process agreement, which granted Havana offered credit for 1 million more once Fidel Castro leaves power. a $6.5 million line of interest-free Chinese “Panda” brand televisions, For many years, the United States credit and an additional $200 mil- known in Cuba to be rewards for has positioned itself as the single lion loan to modernize and expand Communist Party loyalists. In most important actor shaping Cuba’s telecommunications at the 2005, collaboration between China Cuba’s post-Castro politics. While local level. Another $150 million and Cuba even reached into the other countries – especially credit was given for Cuba to island’s oil sector with a major con- Canada, Spain, and others in import Chinese televisions. tract for production with petrole- Europe - conducted business in In 2003, China made Cuba its um giant Sinopec. Cuba, they basically agreed with first approved tourist destination in Beyond trade ties, China and the U.S. objective of supporting the Western Hemisphere. The Cuba are close diplomatic allies. the island’s evolution towards a World Tourism Organization pro- China has consistently opposed US market-oriented democracy, even jected that China would be the sanctions on Cuba at the United though they disagreed with a sanc- world’s fourth-largest supplier of Nations. In October 2004, China’s tions-based approach. With the tourists by 2020. However, China deputy representative to the UN notable exception of Venezuela has since added nearly 40 new Zhang Yishan rebuked the US for (and now Bolivia), Latin American approved destinations, including its decision to maintain the embar- countries have generally distanced several other Caribbean islands and go and, in so doing, “obstinately themselves from the Cuban model South American countries. stick to the wrong position and since the 1990s. After the collapse Although some visitors from main- ignore the just demand of the of the Soviet Union, Cuba found land China can be spotted in international community.” In itself with trading partners but no Havana nightclubs, the island has April 2005, China reiterated its true allies interested in supporting not yet seen any large influx of longstanding opposition to US-led Cuba’s communist system. Chinese tourists and the special efforts to condemn Cuba for its China, the emerging superpower, designation remains largely symbol- repression of civil and political lib- has now undertaken significant ic. That may change if the much- erties. For its part, Cuba has investments in Cuba and may have discussed direct flights from Beijing strongly backed China’s goal of an interest in maintaining the to Havana become a reality. eventually reclaiming its “renegade island’s current political order once The first joint venture between province” of Taiwan under the Fidel Castro leaves the stage. Cuba and China was a plastic slip- “One China” policy. During a visit Chinese diplomatic engagement in per factory in Cuba that opened in to Beijing in March 2005, Cuba’s Cuba is a consensus policy for 1997. By last year, the two coun- Minister of Government Ricardo China’s Communist Party. It suits tries shared 10 operative joint ven- Cabrisas Ruiz vowed support for two of China’s most important for- tures and three “cooperative pro- China’s widely condemned Anti- eign policy goals: securing natural duction contracts,” many with Secession Law, which contemplated resources for a rapidly growing higher-value production like phar- military action against Taiwan. economy, and rewarding countries maceuticals and biotechnology. Some analysts even suspect that that uphold a “One China” policy, Sixteen cooperation agreements in China is using its telecommunica- which precludes diplomatic sup- nickel and mineral processing and tions involvement in Cuba as cover port for Taiwan. History has

14 Hemisphere Volume 17 Reports

shown that trade and commercial condemned market forces at every Daniel P. Erikson is senior associate relations between China and Cuba turn. In his 2003 visit to Beijing, a for US policy and director of ebb and flow in response to chang- bemused Castro told the head of Caribbean programs at the Inter- ing economic circumstances. the Chinese legislature, that “I can’t American Dialogue. He is the author China’s support of the Cuban econ- really be sure just now what kind of of more than 20 articles on Cuban omy could quickly diminish if its China I am visiting, because the and hemispheric affairs, which have investments do not yield dividends first time I visited, your country appeared in such publications as The or if China’s own growth slows, as appeared one way and now when I Miami Herald, National Interest, some analysts have predicted. visit it appears another way.” By and World Policy Journal. He is Although Cuba’s diplomatic rela- contrast, Cuba has resisted embrac- the co-editor of Transforming tions with China are firmly rooted, ing the type of change that has Socialist Economies: Lessons for its commercial ties have been cycli- fueled China’s enormous growth. Cuba and Beyond. His recent work cal, and this newest peak of trade In fact, as Chinese trade, aid, and has focused on China’s relations with and investment is by no means investment have grown, Havana has Latin America and the Caribbean. irreversible. recentralized control over its econo- The Cuban leadership touts my. Unfettered by concerns over Adam Minson is program assistant China’s friendship as an example of free markets or human rights, for the Caribbean at the Inter- socialist solidarity, but the two China’s burgeoning ties with Cuba American Dialogue. His writings and countries are separated by an have helped to breathe new life into interviews on the Caribbean increasing ideological divide. the most retrograde tendencies of have appeared in the Baltimore Sun, China has progressively liberalized Fidel Castro’s aging revolution. Q Boston Globe, and Journal of its economy, while Fidel Castro has Democracy.

New from the University of North Carolina Press... CUBA AND THE TEMPEST LITERATURE AND CINEMA IN THE TIME OF DIASPORA

by Eduardo González

In a unique analysis of Cuban literature inside and outside the country’s borders, Eduardo González looks closely at the work of three important contemporary Cuban authors: Guillermo Cabrera Infante (1929-2005), who left Cuba for good in 1965 and established himself in London; Antonio Benítez-Rojo (1931-2005), who settled in the United States; and Leonardo Padura Fuentes (b. 1955), who still lives and writes in Cuba. Through the positive experiences of exile and wandering that appear in their work, these three writers exhibit what González calls “Romantic authorship,” a deep connection to the Romantic spirit of irony and complex sublimity crafted in literature by Lord Byron, Thomas De Quincey and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. In González’s view, a writer becomes a belated Romantic by dint of exile adopted creatively with comic or trag- ic irony. González weaves into his analysis related cinematic elements of myth, folktale and the grotesque that appear in the work of filmmakers such as Alfred Hitchcock and Pedro Almodóvar. Placing the three Cuban writers in conversation with artists and thinkers from British and American literature, anthropology, philosophy, psychoanalysis and cinema, González ultimately provides a space in which Cuba and its literature, inside and outside its borders, are deprovincialized.

“A major work of scholarship and reflection by a uniquely talented critic in his prime. Employing an eclectic approach that blends myth criticism and psychoanalysis, González, at his best, is nothing short of dazzling.” -Gustavo Pérez Firmat, Columbia University

Eduardo González teaches literature and cinema at The Johns Hopkins University. He is author of three other books, including The Monstered Self: Narratives of Death and Performance in Latin American Fiction.

Hemisphere Volume 17 15 Reports

Young Blood by Frank O. Mora

erhaps no other institu- begs the question, is the FAR an cadet Camilo Cienfuegos Military tion of the Cuban regime agent of change or continuity? Schools located in each province) in has undergone such fun- Answering this question can help their mid to late 40s, replaced the damental changes in its shed light on future prospects for históricos, and since then have con- mission, structure, and democracy and market economy in solidated their position as the future Ppersonnel in the last decade-and-a- a post-Fidel Cuba. power brokers of Cuba. Raúl half than the Fuerzas Armadas An illustrative way of addressing Castro acknowledged in 2000 that Revolucionarias (FAR). The Cuban this question is by focusing on the from their positions of command armed forces shifted its focus from dramatic changes that have taken and political influence within the proletarian internationalism to place in the leadership of the FAR’s FAR, economy, party, and govern- assuming responsibility for reform- military command structure. New ment, these officers “have the ing and managing the economy in generations of general officers with opportunity, according to their an effort to survive the Special very unique experiences and out- experiences and interests, to rethink Period. It is the institution respon- looks have assumed critical positions their own formulas of continuity sible for introducing and imple- in the general staff, regional com- and change in Cuba.” In late 2001, menting the sistema de perfec- mands, and key economic industries Raúl elaborated “there are already cionamiento empresarial (SPE), a sys- managed by the Ministry of the camilitos that are generals and tem that introduces principles of FAR (Minfar). Since the mid- colonels commanding important capitalist organization and manage- 1990s, a number of generals, with combat units and in a majority of ment as a means of making the strong credentials as históricos, died key positions in the general staffs of economy more efficient and com- or retired, and were replaced by gen- the regional commands.” This gen- petitive. Troop strength declined eral officers (promoted in 1992 and erational shift in the general officer significantly after 1990 from over 1998) that were all born between corps over a span of less than a 200,000 to approximately 45,000 the mid-1940s and 1952. Members decade-and-a-half has led to a num- active soldiers in 2004, and its of this group where either too ber of public policy changes—albeit budget was equally slashed by nearly young to have been in the Rebel at times vacillating because of Fidel 50 percent over a period of almost a Army or, as in the case of Brigadier Castro’s resistance to reform—that decade. Finally, since the early General Rafael Borjas Ortega, only can be described by an axiom often 1990s new generations of FAR offi- toddlers when Fidel Castro and his repeated by some in the military cers have been promoted to general men departed for Cuba on the leadership: “the more things change, officer rank, holding key positions Granma. Only some were old the greater the chance of continu- in the military high command and enough to have served as milicianos ity.” In other words, peaceful in state-controlled economic indus- or members of other paramilitary change and continuity (i.e., preserv- tries. Such change in what is groups that fought against domestic ing the Revolution’s accomplish- arguably the Cuban Revolution’s counterrevolutionary forces in the ments) depends on implementing most important and powerful insti- 1960s. and consolidating some key reforms. tution—key to its consolidation and Raúl Castro—defense minister There is a slightly older genera- survival—is worthy of careful analy- and heir apparent—worked to bring tion of general officers that fought sis. Yet, despite the restructuring in younger officers with special skills as young combatants in the July 26 and the reformist economic outlook to help reform the economy and movement and are today between of many of its leaders, the Cuban ensure stability and institutional 60 and 65 years of age. They are military remains very much an insti- cohesion within the FAR, key not the camilitos that Raúl referred tution loyal to the regime and to its requirements of any succession strat- to, nor are they agents of retrench- succession strategy when Fidel egy. Many of these camilitos, (the ment. Their formative experience in Castro passes from the scene. It name given to graduates of the pre- the Sierra and their close bonds with

16 Hemisphere Volume 17 Reports

Continuity and change within Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces

the históricos is what defines these so-called “Young Rebels.” The better known officers in this group are Rogelio Acevedo (president of the Civil Aviation Institute), Abelardo Colomé Ibarra (Minister of Interior and First Deputy Minister of Minfar), Leopoldo Cintra Frías (commander of Western Army), Joaquín Quintas Solá (commander of Central Army), and Ramón Espinosa Martín (commander of Eastern Army). As heads of commands and key ministries, these generals see their primary role as defense of the Revolution and nation against armed aggression from abroad. These officers fully recognize that defense of the home- land is tied to economic revitaliza- tion. Their outlook and focus is on issues related to the military and defense, but within their strategic understanding of regime survival and orderly succession is the need for economic restructuring. The next two generations—promoted in 1992 and 1998 to brigadier general—have a distinct outlook and responsibility. Their loyalty to the Revolution and its leadership is unequivocal. Those in the 1992 generation—Álvaro López Miera (chief of the general staff and first deputy minister of Minfar), Leonardo Andollo Valdés (deputy chief of the general staff), Pedro Mediondo Gómez (head of the Air

Defense Minister Raúl Castro has brought in young officers with special skills to reform the economy and maintain stability within the FAR, and, ultimately, ensure regime continuity.

Hemisphere Volume 17 17 Reports

Defense and Air Force, DAAFAR), this generation’s outlook is shaped group of senior officers. But despite and José Antonio Carrillo Gómez by the education they received in this experience and their predilec- (chief of Minfar’s political direc- business management programs in tion for military-led economic torate)—are very close to Raúl Europe, Asia, and Latin America. reform, these colonels—such as Castro and his succession project, These “technocrat-soldiers” are man- Colonel Oscar Basulto Torres which involves expanding and deep- agers and administrators, in addi- (Habanos, S.A.), Colonel Jose ening economic reforms and tion to being soldiers. Through the Manuel Vivo (Aero Gaviota), engagement with the international application of Western business Colonel Manuel Marrero Cruz economic system. Since 1998 many techniques (i.e. SPE), they are (Minister of Tourism), and Lt. of these officers have been promoted attempting to enhance the efficiency Colonel Rene Rojas Rodríguez to the rank of division generals. and productivity of military and (Tecnotext)—have not necessarily Because of their age and close bonds civilian industries during a period of turned against Fidel, his retrench- to Raúl, they are likely to remain in crisis and change for the regime. ment, or the Revolution. Quite the positions of military and political Not all of these officers participate contrary. Perhaps more than any influence for the next seven to 12 in the military’s economic endeav- other generation, these senior offi- years. ors, however. Some like BG Ermio cers are convinced and committed Like the previous generation, Hernández Rodríguez (chief of staff to the notion that the survival and those promoted to flag officer rank Western Army), BG Miguel Abud continuity of the regime depends on in 1992 are quite enthusiastic about (Eastern Army), and Navy CAPT economic reform, albeit without adapting the Chinese and José Rosello Pérez hold key positions political liberalization. The lesson Vietnamese model to Cuba. Again, in the regional commands; however, that these and the previous two gen- the central tenet of the model is that the technocrats—the most visible erations draw from the Chinese and by expanding and deepening eco- group—manage enterprises or head Vietnamese cases is that unless the nomic reforms, the regime is able to ministries. Some of the more material well-being of the Cuban improve the standard of living of notable of this promotion include; people is improved, the legitimacy Cubans and thus, establish new BG Luis Pérez Rospide (Gaviota, and popular support of the regime bases of legitimacy for the regime in S.A.), BG Eladio Fernández Cívico are likely to wane. a post-Fidel Cuba. This core of (Grupo Empresarial Geocuba), BG Liberalization and reform is not military leaders have always been Luis Bernal León (Military viewed as a betrayal to the principles less interested in the Soviet military Industrial Union), BG Moisés Sio of the Revolution. The pragmatism economic model, preferring the Wong (former president of Institute of these officers is, in fact, perceived structures of China and Vietnam, of State Reserves), and BG Silvano as evidence of their steadfast com- particularly in terms of the military’s Colas Sánchez (former Minister of mitment to finding alternative and role in economic reform and reorga- Communications). effective means of defending and nization. They experienced first- Below in rank and age lies an strengthening the Revolution in the hand the material difficulties and influential cohort of colonels and post-Soviet era and, inevitably, in a disappointments of the late 1980s lieutenant colonels, most of them post-Fidel Cuba. The survival and and early 1990s. They suffered up between 40 and 45 years old, who continuity of the regime hinges on close the intensity and the magni- have very similar backgrounds and the ability to reform and make nec- tude of the hardships associated experiences to their superiors. In essary adjustments. The technocrats with this period. As a result, these the last 12 years they, too, were of the FAR and many of their supe- “technocrats” (many of them engi- exposed to a considerable number of riors understand that Fidelismo neers and logistic experts) are more exchanges and interactions with mil- without Fidel is a guarantee that pragmatic and receptive to the need itary institutions and officers in succession or continuity will fail. Q for economic reforms as a means of China and Vietnam, as well as tak- not only mitigating the impact of ing courses on business management Frank O. Mora is professor of national the Special Period on themselves methods in Latin America and security strategy at the National War and the FAR, but, more important- Europe. The socioeconomic hard- College, National Defense University. ly, on society and the future of the ships associated with the Special He is the author of several studies on regime. Period of the 1990s—particularly the Cuban military. In addition to the transformative the downsizing of the FAR—had a experiences of the Special Period, profound and lasting impact on this

18 Hemisphere Volume 17 New from Penn State University Press...

Out of the Shadows New in Paperback Political Action and the Informal Economy Rethinking Development in Latin America in Latin America

EDITED BY PATRICIA FERNANDEZ-KELLY EDITED BY CHARLES H. WOOD AND JON SHEFNER AND BRYAN R. ROBERTS

“With few exceptions, scholars from Left to Right have pre- “At no point in recent memory are we more in need of fresh sented simplistic accounts of the political ramifications of thinking about development strategies for Latin America economic informality in the underdeveloped world. Such than today. The distinguished authors in this volume chal- depictions have been curiously out of synch with the salu- lenge existing paradigms and offer provocative insights to tary influence of the 'bringing the state back in' scholarship stimulate renewed debate about how Latin America might of the last couple of decades or so. This volume makes a move ahead and, indeed, once again provide a develop- crucial contribution to the scholarly and policy literatures ment model for other regions in the world.” by emphasizing the embeddedness of informal economies --Gary Gereffi, Duke University in state-society arrangements that cut across local, national, and transnational terrains of the Latin American and “A dozen very accomplished social scientists here global political economies. The volume represents essen- reassess the theories that have informed the study of Latin tial reading for scholars, policy specialists, students, and American societies over the past forty years or so. The others who seek to make sense of the politico-social con- authors also consider analytic revisions that may be need- sequences of deepening inequality and poverty in the con- ed to address new social issues or paradigmatic gaps. temporary world.” The text conveys a subtle picture of contemporary societal --Richard Tardanico, Florida International University and political dilemmas in Latin America, stressing the inter- play among social issues, public policies, and evolving Since the beginning of scholarly writing about the informal analytic models.” economy in the mid-1970s, the debate has evolved from --Christopher Mitchell, New York University addressing survival strategies of the poor to considering the implications for national development and the global Understanding development in Latin America today economy. Simultaneously, research on informal politics requires both an awareness of the major political and eco- has ranged from neighborhood clientelism to contentious nomic changes that have produced a new agenda for social movements basing their claims on a variety of social social policy in the region and an appreciation of the need identities in their quest for social justice. Despite related to devise better conceptual and methodological tools for empirical and theoretical concerns, these research tradi- analyzing the social impacts of these changes. Using as a tions have seldom engaged in dialogue with one another. reference point the issues and theories that dominated Out of the Shadows brings leading scholars of the informal social science research on Latin America in the period economy and informal politics together to address how 1960-80, this volume contributes to " rethinking develop- globalization has influenced local efforts to resolve political ment" by examining the historical events that accounted and economic needs-and how these seemingly separate for the erosion or demise of once-dominant paradigms and issues are indeed deeply related. by assessing the new directions of research that have emerged in their place. In addition to the editor, contributors are Javier Auyero, Miguel Angel Centeno, Sylvia Chant, Robert Gay, In addition to the editors, contributors are Marina Ariza and Mercedes González de la Rocha, José Itzigsohn, Orlandina de Oliveira, Diane Davis, Vilmar Faria, Joe Alejandro Portes, and Juan Manuel Ramírez Sáiz. Foweraker, Elizabeth Jelin, Alejandro Portes, Joe Potter and Rudolfo Tuirán, Juan Pablo Pérez Sáinz, Osvaldo Patricia Fernandez-Kelly is Senior Lecturer in Sunkel, and Peter Ward. Sociology at Princeton University, where she also holds an appointment with the Office of Population Research. Charles H. Wood is Professor of Sociology at the University of Florida. Jon Shefner is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Tennessee. Bryan R. Roberts is C. B. Smith Centennial Chair in U.S.-Mexican Relations and Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas. 272 pages | 6 x 9 | April 2006 ISBN 0-271-02750-9 | cloth: $75.00 ISBN 0-271-02751-7 | paper: $25.00 384 pages | 6 x 9 | Available now ISBN 0-271-02894-7 | paper: $25.00 FEATURES Poverty and Inequality in Cuba by Lorena G. Barberia

s Cuba’s labored emergence from the eco- Confronting the challenges of nomic crisis of the 1990s continues, social and economic change important new trends inA household consumption and socioeconomic mobility have Latin American countries that expe- ity and economic opportunities, and emerged. For many households with rienced severe economic contractions difficulties in capturing the adequacy access to remittances from abroad or in the last two decades and during of the state’s provision of universal to tourism and other sectors of the which gains in social reforms were social policies. These factors are fur- economy driven by foreign direct reversed or halted, Cuban social poli- ther complicated by emerging differ- investment, the past decade has cre- cy was responsive. The Cuban state ences among individuals in their sub- ated new opportunities for income countered economic shocks based on jective perceptions of needs and the generation and social mobility. Yet, a three-pronged strategy: the reallo- cultural and political norms of equal- for those whose economic fortunes cation of government resources, the ity embedded in Cuba’s social fabric are tied more closely to the cash- adoption of innovative social poli- over the course of the last four strapped state, real income has cies, and the increase in social expen- decades. declined and mobility prospects have ditures to reinforce the social safety In light of these changes, the ques- narrowed. There is an evolving spa- net. In the aftermath of the crisis tion of whether lower real incomes tial dimension to these divergent for- sparked by the collapse of the Soviet (or expenditures) and limited tunes as well: poorer and more eco- Union in 1989, strong political will progress on social mobility for signif- nomically isolated households tend and the proactive role of the state icant portions of the population, sep- to concentrate in particular regions, have continued to guarantee mini- arately or combined, have con- such as the rural eastern areas of the mum levels of welfare and social pro- tributed to increased poverty in island, and even in particular neigh- tection. As CEPAL highlights, Cuba Cuba since 1989 has become central. borhoods, such as those on the spends 32% of its GDP in social There are some signs that formal periphery of metropolitan Havana. programs, the highest investment in wage income and market segmenta- Combined with lackluster economic Latin America. tion have limited the coverage of growth and fiscal over-extension for Yet, evidence has also emerged consumption needs for the popula- the nation as a whole, these striking showing that the restructuring of the tion. Relative to pre-1989 levels, new patterns represent challenges for Cuban economy has increased consumption fell dramatically Cuba’s economic and social policy, income inequality and altered the between 1990 and 1993, with a for its political life, and for the egali- pathways to social mobility in Cuban modest decline in social and govern- tarianism that Cuba’s leaders have society, creating new pockets of ment spending and a much larger endeavored to defend for almost half poverty and fewer options for mobil- drop in private spending. In subse- a century. ity. While it is clear that income quent years, although total expendi- inequality has undoubtedly risen, the tures have risen, consumption by Social Mobility, Poverty, and exact scope of poverty remains an Cuban households continues to Inequality since the 1990s issue of significant debate. remain below pre-1989 levels. The In spite of its status as a low- Measurements of the impact of the available evidence also indicates that income developing country, Cuba’s multifaceted changes taking place are Cuba’s recovery in household con- social policy has been recognized for complicated by the need to account sumption, but not household its conquest of significant gains in for new patterns, such as the marked income, has been largely driven by social indicators. In the 1990s, con- differences in formal and informal social and government expenditures. trary to what happened in many earnings, the changes in social mobil- For some, there are significant con-

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Features

cerns that official income estimates (and related) challenges stand out. ted with televisions and computers, may be understating the real level of First, in the long run, unless eco- and the salaries of teachers were unmet needs and inequality. nomic growth is enhanced, it is increased. In health care, policlinics The scope and magnitude of these unlikely that the state will have the and family doctor’s offices were reno- transformations, however, are much resources and ability to continue its vated and some clinics were outfitted more difficult to measure today than expenditures and financing of social with high technology medical equip- they were prior to 1989. Not only is services at current levels. Coupled ment, bringing high-tech medicine there a general shortage of publicly with multiple natural and political closer to local communities. At the available data, but the emergence of adversities pounding the island, same time, targeted interventions diversified survival strategies has Cuba has struggled to sustain its eco- have been introduced and aimed at complicated data gathering and nomic recovery. While social spend- addressing the needs of the most vul- analysis due to the increase in nonof- ing investments have continued to nerable. Some examples include the ficial sources of income included in grow, GDP growth has remained deployment of social workers in vul- measures of the population’s real lackluster. With the state being the nerable barrios and new workforce income and expenditures (GDP, only social program provider, the training initiatives. household budget surveys and risks of a collapse in the safety net Central to these strategies is the macroeconomic wage and income are even greater as individuals have role of government, which remains data). These factors present a chal- no other options for education, the sole actor in the field of social lenge to measuring income, poverty, health care, and other needs. policy. By examining social policy and inequality among Cuban house- Sustainability is also clearly essential innovations that have been strength- holds. for political reasons as the state’s ened and tracking policy effective- In addition to difficulties associat- legitimacy is undoubtedly tied to the ness, debates are surfacing on ed with the measurement of these conditions of these services. whether social policy should be uni- trends, challenges also exist with Second, large-scale initiatives, versal or targeted, and whether cen- respect to what paradigms should be designed centrally, have been the tralized or decentralized models of used to measure development and hallmark of Cuban social policy and social service delivery would be most progress. Increasingly, poverty have helped it swiftly address long- effective in the new economic con- research worldwide has sought to standing social problems. While rec- text. On the one hand, the central- move beyond traditional economic ognizing the state’s fundamental role ized character of social policy has measures of GDP and household as the architect and guarantor, some assured access to minimum levels of consumption toward alternative indi- question the effectiveness of this certain consumption goods, such as cators, such as the Human strategy as Cuba surges ahead, with a food. Moreover, the government has Development Index, that capture more complex economy and a rapid- been able to mobilize the preparation multiple aspects of human well- ly differentiating population. As and response to natural disasters, as being, many of which are not cap- income inequality translates into witnessed during the active 2005 tured by economic indicators. unequal distribution of social prob- Atlantic hurricane season, through Scholars have also sought to capture lems—as it does all over the world— centralized planning. other critical dimensions, including there will be diversified demand for On the other hand, centralized social exclusion and capabilities, social services: social assistance, med- planning, as successful as it has been thus, broadening what constitutes ical care, education and programs for in addressing some social problems, development. The Cuban experience adolescents, workforce development has proven inflexible in addressing continues to speak to long-standing and re-training. Can universal pro- the specific needs of communities or debates about the inadequacies of grams hope to address the prolifera- sectors of the population. “One size poverty rates, which compares house- tion and diversification of needs? fits all” interventions have only suc- hold incomes to a market basket of In recent years, Cuban policy has ceeded in reproducing inequality. basic needs, as an appropriate meas- begun to increase investment in uni- For those who raise these concerns, urement tool. versal programs while adding target- targeted interventions that protect ed interventions for the neediest. and support the individuals most The Fundamental Challenges First education and then health have affected by the decade-long econom- As Cuba continues to seek to con- experienced large investments. In ic crisis are urgently needed. For solidate its development with priority education, classes were reduced, some, social policy must be linked to given to social policy, three essential schools were refurbished and outfit- new definitions of inequality and the

22 Hemisphere Volume 17 Features

construction of a new policy of cators between provinces and munic- latter has resulted in many families equality. What level of equality— ipalities more integrated into the remaining in the same “place” not egalitarianism—is desirable and new economy and those further although their status and their life under what conditions can it be removed from the stream of invest- chances have changed substantially. attained? It also requires recogni- ment dollars. The easternmost Place did not necessarily represent a tion that economic differences are provinces are clearly the most disad- barrier to mobility and status in today an organizing factor of Cuban vantaged. socialist Cuba. But what role will it social structure and, therefore, must The dynamics within Cuba’s cities play as new socioeconomic structures be at the center of the design of are also marked and perhaps this is emerge in the country? social policy. more so in the case of the country’s And what about race or class back- Finally, after decades of attention capital. A closer look at Havana ground? Is it possible that the poli- to the economic, social, and cultural reveals an interesting story because cies of “equal treatment” that have consequences of uneven develop- the usual assumptions about poverty been in place for decades today are ment, new spatial inequalities have and place miss the reality of the situ- reproducing inequality? As new made themselves felt with consider- ation in this city. The absence of socioeconomic patterns emerge, able force once again. Cuba’s limited investment in the nation’s capital as a should more individualized attention reinsertion into international tourism result of decades of policies that be given to the most disadvantaged? and other economic growth sectors is favored development in the country- As these questions suggest, there is a distributing investment and jobs in side may lead one to think that pressing need to take a deeper look distinct territorial patterns. To be poverty is extremely widespread in at the concepts that drive and the sure, the tourism industry is drawn Havana. Despite the extreme physi- process that distribute the benefits of to localities with certain assets, such cal deterioration of Havana’s build- social policy. Addressing income as historical treasures, beaches, or ings, streets, and homes, the city’s inequality and poverty, and its nature preserves, that are difficult or, residents have a quality of life that uneven distribution across the island, in some cases, impossible to dupli- one would not expect. It is not just will require finely tuned interven- cate from one place to the next. the urban poor that live in the city’s tions that rely on the intimate under- Similarly, there is some evidence to dilapidated neighborhoods; doctors, standing of the local political econo- suggest that access to the other main engineers, and other professionals my and the conditions it spawns, source of US dollars in Cuba’s dual make their homes here as well, giv- and the active participation of those economy—remittances from ing Havana’s communities a remark- affected by them. In order to not abroad—also follows a spatial pat- able mix of human capital. reproduce inequality, solutions will tern. With higher historic migration Conversely, some old housing of the have to go beyond the palliative and from urban areas, particularly upper and middle class, who no address structural conditions. Havana, and with geographic mobil- longer live in Cuba, are now occu- Without a critical reassessment of ity very limited on the island since pied by persons from the humblest social policy, the process of stratifica- 1959, it is reasonable to expect that of extractions, as many peasants tion taking place in Cuba will con- receipt of remittance dollars and the occupied that housing early on in the tinue. Q consumer networks generated from revolution. these flows are concentrated in There is a clear disjuncture Lorena G. Barberia is a program asso- Havana and a small number of other between income/status and housing. ciate at the David Rockefeller Center cities. Furthermore, a racial skew in This is a reflection of the tremen- for Latin American Studies at Harvard the population of Cubans abroad dous social mobility that universally University. She is co-editor of The may be contributing to unequal available education, access to health Cuban Economy at the Start of the remittance income by race on the care (and other benefits), and policies Twenty-First Century (with Jorge I. island. of nondiscrimination in employment Domínguez and Omar Everleny Pérez The market driven investment in and housing have made possible for Villanueva). She wishes to thank tourism and ancillary industries has those who were poor prior to 1959. Xavier de Souza Briggs and Miren meant that some areas of the country Havana’s housing paradox is also the Uriarte, co-authors of “The End of have obtained great economic benefit result of policies that have for Egalitarianism?: Economic Inequality while others have lagged behind. decades discouraged the sale of hous- and the Future of Social Policy in Studies have documented the growing and even the use of income to Cuba,” an earlier and extended version ing gap in human development indi- improve housing conditions. The of this article.

Hemisphere Volume 17 23 Features

Cuba’s New Daddy by Javier Corrales

ver since the collapse of alliance with Venezuela represents For Cuba, on the other hand, the Soviet bloc in the an enviable political accomplish- 92,000 bpd represents an invaluable early 1990s, Cuba has ment. The deal offers the Cuban lifeline. It allows Cuba to satisfy its been desperately seeking government enormous material rather unusual, surplus-maximizing a new “daddy,” an exter- benefits without the obligation to energy policy. Most oil-importing Enal patron willing to provide mate- modify domestic policies. But in countries have a straightforward rial resources with few strings the medium term, the Cuban state, energy policy: They use interna- attached. The Soviet Union played whether headed by Fidel Castro or tional trade agreements to acquire this role beautifully for Cuba by his successor, will have to pay dear- the energy that they need domesti- offering trade subsidies and other ly for its new dependence on cally; and this need is, in turn, aid with few conditions on how to Venezuela, just as it paid dearly for determined by the pace of economic run domestic political affairs. After its dependence on the Soviet development and the energy effi- the demise of the USSR, Cuba Union. ciency of its industrial and trans- looked to the European Union portation sectors. Cuba follows a (EU) as a potential replacement The Nature of the Exchange: different approach. More than satis- patron. In the interest of making a Cheap Contributions, Valuable fying its domestic energy needs, political statement against the US Gifts Cuba seeks to maximize energy sur- policy of isolating Cuba, the EU Cuba and Venezuela have signed pluses—i.e., acquire far more oil adopted a policy of economic and three rounds of cooperative agree- than is domestically needed so as to diplomatic constructive engage- ments: in 2000, shortly after the re-export surpluses in exchange for ment, which Cuba hoped to exploit election of Hugo Chávez Frías hard currency. To achieve this, to its advantage. But Cuba’s dream (1999-present); in September 2004; Cuba represses industrial and trans- never fully materialized: Europe’s and in April 2005. Very little is portation development (so as to level of material support was gener- known about the content of these keep domestic energy needs low) ous in the 1990s, but never as mas- agreements, but this much is clear: while simultaneously trying to find sive or as unconditional as the sup- The agreements benefit both coun- vast quantities of oil abroad. port delivered by the Soviet Union, tries by enabling them to exchange During the Cold War, the USSR And starting in 2000, the EU even assets that are inexpensive for the provided this excess oil, which Cuba began to impose some sanctions on sender but of enormous strategic re-exported for a profit. But for Cuba for human rights violations. value to the recipient, with oil as Cuba, this Soviet gift was not Around the same time that the the most important component for enough; the more oil it could international environment was start- Cuba. secure, the more it could re-export. ing to look dark for Cuba again, Venezuela sends approximately This surplus-seeking energy policy along came Venezuela, eager to 92,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil explains many of Cuba’s boldest for- serve as Cuba’s new “daddy.” What to Cuba. For Venezuela, a country eign policies. As exiled Cuban gen- began as a seemingly innocuous set with enormous oil reserves, this is eral Rafael del Pino y Díaz of agreements between both coun- far from an onerous contribution. explained, it is the reason that Cuba tries is today a major alliance Table 1 on page 26 provides some financed an armed insurrection in involving the exchange of strategic reference points. Venezuela’s oil oil-rich Venezuela in the 1960s, and assets, including energy resources, contribution to Cuba in 2005 rep- when that failed, tried to keep a 15- large financial operations, informa- resented less than 3.5% of its total year, heavy-handed military pres- tion technology, development aid, oil production (which is currently ence of 40,000 troops or more in intelligence services, highly trained far below actual capacity). For oil-rich Angola (while disregarding personnel, military assets, and joint Venezuela, this is an easily afford- Mozambique’s request for similar business ventures. For Cuba, the able subsidy. levels of support).

24 Hemisphere Volume 17 Features

Venezuelan-Cuban relations since 2000

Hemisphere Volume 17 25 Features

TABLE 1: VENEZUELA’S OIL INDICATORS IN RELATIVE TERMS

Index Average Barrels (Venezuela’s IQ05 Per Day production = 100)

Saudi Arabia’s Production (a) ...... 9,000,000 ...... 340.91 Venezuela’s 2012 Production Target (b) ...... 5,800,000 ...... 219.70 Venezuela’s Total Production in 2002 (a) ...... 3,300,000 ...... 125.00 Venezuela’s Total Production IQ05 (a) ...... 2,640,000 ...... 100.00 PDVSA’s share (c) ...... 1,700,000 ...... 64.39 Venezuela’s Exports to the US...... 1,500,000 ...... 56.82 Venezuela’s Domestic Consumption, 2004 ...... 522,000 ...... 19.77 Targeted Exports to China (d) ...... 135,000 ...... 5.11 Estimated Exports to Cuba, 2005 (e)...... 92,000 ...... 3.48 Exports to China (d)...... 68,000 ...... 2.58

Sources: (a) Energy Information Administration, www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international (b) www.pdvsa.com (c) Veneconomía estimates (d) El Universal, August 24, 2005 (e) El Universal, September 10, 2005

The main benefit of Cuba’s new international guarantees and a sig- enues of US$1.3 million per day deals with Venezuela is that it allows nificant part of the debt can be from the resale of unused Soviet oil. Cuba to fulfill again its surplus- repaid in services. In April 2006, If today Cuba is reselling 40,000 maximizing energy policy. Cuba Venezuela rewarded Cuba with yet bpd of Venezuelan oil at the 2005 produces approximately 80,000 bpd another subsidy: an agreement to average price of $58.16, its revenue of oil, which is 40,000 bpd short of finance the refurbishing of the is near US$2.3 million per day, the country’s domestic needs, cur- Cienfuegos oil refinery, which was almost twice what it made during rently estimated at approximately completed in 1990 with obsolete the Soviet era. 120,000 bpd. The agreements with Soviet technology, but left idle In return for oil, Cuba sends Venezuela thus provide Cuba shortly thereafter because of its inef- Venezuela between 30,000 and enough to cover this shortfall and ficiency. Refurbishing this refinery 50,000 technical workers, of which still leave some 40,000-50,000 bpd could cost more than US$100 mil- about 30,000 are medical doctors. for re-exporting. Furthermore, lion (and may never prove worth- The rest include sport coaches, Venezuela is offering oil under gen- while). teachers, and arts instructors, as well erous subsidies. Oil expert Gustavo Cuba has thus essentially regained as an undisclosed number of intelli- Coronel estimates that because pay- the lucrative oil business that it gence, political, and military advis- ment terms are so favorable to enjoyed with the USSR prior to ers. There is debate about how Cuba, Venezuela is providing Cuba 1991, with only one difference: many of the presumed doctors limit approximately 20,000 to 26,000 This time, Cuba is making more their role to practicing medicine bpd of free oil, amounting to a money. In 1989, the USSR sent and how many are political-military “gift” of $6 billion to $8 billion Cuba approximately 260,000 bpd, advisers in disguise, but if we accept over the next 15 years. The arrange- of which Cuba used 200,000 bpd, official statements that they are sim- ment allows Cuba to pay 25% of oil and then resold the 60,000 bpd sur- ply doctors, then Cuba is exporting shipments over 15 years at interest plus. At US$22.05 per barrel (the one-fifth of its medical profession- rates of 2% and with a two-year average world price for oil in 1989), als. This is a large number, but one grace period. Payment requires no Cuba was probably generating rev- still affordable for Cuba, which has

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medical treatment. More than TABLE 2: CUBA’S MEDICAL SURPLUS 100,000 Venezuelans have traveled to Cuba in 2005 to receive eye No. of doctors per Infant mortality per treatment. In addition to the med- 10,000 inhabitants, 1000 live births, ical benefits they provide, these trips 1995 near 1995 also serve a political purpose by allowing the Venezuelan state to Japan...... 17.7 ...... 4 also reward loyalists with travel USA...... 24.5 ...... 7 opportunities. From Venezuela’s point of view, Germany...... 31.0 ...... 5 the deal with Cuba involves more Norway...... 24.0 ...... 4 than oil-for-labor/services. Leaving Switzerland ...... 30.1 ...... 5 aside the “intelligence” assets the Netherlands ...... 23.8 ...... 5 two countries trade, which are hard Canada ...... 22.1 ...... 6 to quantify because they are secret, Chile...... 12.0 ...... 12 Venezuela derives enormous eco- Cuba...... 40.0 ...... 11 nomic and military benefits that are easy to observe. Source: Madrid-Aris (2002) First, Venezuela’s rapprochement with Cuba is helping Chávez in his latest effort to reform the military. This most recent military reform, launched in 2004, involves two an extraordinary surplus of doctors. and even convenient because it dimensions. First, the government As Table 2 shows, Cuba has a far allows the government to meet is seeking to replace the NATO- greater number of doctors per capita some of the demand for exit oppor- compliant Belgian rifles that the relative to rich countries and relative tunities (both from the country or army has used for more than three to its own health achievements, as from state-controlled jobs). It also decades with approximately measured by infant mortality rates. offers the Cuban state one more 100,000 Russian AK-103s and AK- Furthermore, Cuba has significant chance to reward well-behaving citi- 104s. Venezuela will build factories underemployment and a high zens by deciding who gets to travel to produce ammunition for these demand for exit visas, especially on to a freer and richer country. rifles. There is talk in 2006 of the part of professionals. According acquiring Russian helicopters and to James Cason, former head of the What Venezuela Gains Sukhoi advanced fighter jets. The US Interests Section in Havana, For the Venezuelan government, second pillar of the current reform since 2002 more than 100,000 the deals with Cuba also yield polit- is the creation of urban reservists to Cubans have entered the consular ical payoffs. Cuban workers are sta- defend the nation in the event of section and refugee annex in that tioned in poor areas where few international aggression. The city seeking to emigrate to the highly trained Venezuelans render reservists are also supposed to help United States and another 81,400 social services. This allows the gov- with “the maintenance of internal have requested non-immigrant visas. ernment to establish a presence in order.” Estimates place the num- Furthermore, Cuba has also been areas where political competition ber of current reservists at 300,000; experiencing a serious “domestic (and thus political accountability) is the government’s goal is two mil- brain drain” since the mid 1990s, low and the rewards, in terms of lion. Both initiatives require the with high-skill workers (in the med- potential new voters, are high. help of Spanish-speaking experts ical and engineering professions) There is evidence that many recipi- capable of training Venezuelan sol- migrating from state-controlled jobs ents of these medical services are diers in the Russification of their toward informal sector jobs, where appreciative. arsenals and helping the govern- incomes are much higher. For The agreement also calls for edu- ment train and organize the new Cuba, therefore, sending highly cational and medical exchanges, reservists. Cuban military person- trained personnel, especially doc- including trips to Cuba by nel, with their more than 40 years tors, to Venezuela is thus affordable Venezuelans and their relatives for of experience in Russian military

Hemisphere Volume 17 27 Features

equipment and training urban tions free of scrutiny. As a country the need to meet the demands of reservists, are a perfect source of where conventional, international business groups looking for favor- technical advice. Some analysts financial and trade laws hardly exist, able investment facilities and donors even argue that in organizing its Cuba provides the perfect hiding who make aid conditional on urban reservists, Chávez is copying place. This explains why Chávez human rights. For Castro, the Territorial Troop Militia, Cuba’s has selected Havana as the head- Venezuela represents the perfect own paramilitary units. quarters for PDVSA’s Caribbean political gift: an international Second, the relationship with office and for PETROCARIBE, a patron who makes no domestic Cuba provides the Chávez adminis- proposed Caribbean energy agree- demands. tration with additional avenues to ment. Chávez has also established a This autonomy is only short evade oversight mechanisms on his new Industrial Bank in Havana term, however. In the medium government’s financial operations. charged with financial intermedia- term, Cuba is heading toward a The Venezuelan state owns PDVSA, tion of foreign exchange trades degree of economic dependence the state-oil company that holds a involving everything related to oil that will ultimately hurt the state’s monopoly on oil exports. With net and its derivatives. In September political autonomy. One of the sales of US$58 billion in 2004, 2005, the president of Venezuela’s enduring insights of the dependency PDVSA is the second largest com- Industrial Bank in Cuba, Luis theorists of the 1970s is that nations pany in Latin America next to Quiaro, reported that the bank’s can gain control of other nations by Mexico’s PEMEX and the fifth official line of credit was US$200 becoming their benefactors. While largest state-owned oil company in million. Chávez can now conduct the dependencia literature overstated the world. Whoever controls multimillion dollar oil-based trans- many claims, their basic insight that PDVSA controls one of the world’s actions away from the scrutiny of overreliance on external windfalls most formidable cash cows. international and Venezuelan and patrons hurts development is a Previous Venezuelan presidents observers. serious proposition. At the never quite enjoyed total control moment, Cuba is suffering from at over PDVSA. The company had What Cuba Loses least three forms of dependency. significant independence from the Most analysts in Venezuela believe First, Cuba is accumulating a executive branch. Venezuelan law that the new relationship with Cuba huge debt with Venezuela. In used to stipulate that PDVSA’s rev- is disproportionately favorable to February 2005, The Miami Herald enues be transferred to the Central Cuba. This is true, but only in the reported Cuba’s debt to the country Bank, and in 1998, Venezuela creat- short term. In the medium term, as US$2.5 billion and rising. It ed a rule mandating a savings mech- Cuba’s new relationship with may reach US$3 billion by mid anism in times of high oil revenues Venezuela hurts Cuba’s development 2006, which makes Venezuela (the FIEM). Chávez has under- prospects. Cuba’s top creditor nation, followed mined both rules. In addition to For Cuba, the main advantage of by Japan and Argentina. A lot of failing to make the obligatory trans- its relationship with Venezuela is the this debt comes from Cuba’s issue of fers of PDVSA revenues into the illusion of political autonomy. long-term IOUs to PDVSA, defer- Central Bank and reforming the Unlike the European Union, which ring all payments for at least 15 FIEM to allow the government to has provided trade agreements and years, which violates the original use saved resources, he has eliminat- bilateral aid to Cuba since 1993, 2000 accord stipulating that no ed the autonomy of PDVSA’s gov- Venezuela offers more substantial more than 25% of petroleum erning board. Yet, PDVSA still and less conditional aid. The aid is exports to Cuba would be financed. retains some degree of exposure to more substantial because it includes Second, by allowing the govern- external scrutiny. PDVSA’s offshore the lucrative oil deal as well as other ment to meet its energy and finan- operations must still comply with undisclosed state-to-state transfers cial needs, the agreements are elimi- international laws and the laws of that are exempt from scrutiny both nating the incentives the Cuban host countries, and its domestic in Cuba and in Venezuela, where government faced in the early 1990s operations continue to be covered accountability of government trans- to develop new sources of revenue. by the press, which frequently actions is quickly eroding. It is less One positive trend of the Special reports on PDVSA’s irregularities. conditional because Cuban- Period of the 1990s was that Cuba Chávez, therefore, needs a place to Venezuelan relations involve few began to rethink its economic strat- conduct oil-related financial transac- private investments, sparing Cuba egy, identifying new areas for invest-

28 Hemisphere Volume 17 Features

ment and export promotion the agreements with Cuba are enor- market, and one foreign govern- (tourism, agro-exports, biomedical mously unpopular, even among ment ends up restricting rather than services, film/cultural production, government sympathizers, precisely expanding any state’s room for energy exploration), new forms of because they appear so dispropor- maneuvering. As long as the Cuban business organization (joint ventures tionately beneficial to Cuba. This government continues to uphold a with international firms, some discontent is bad for Cuba. It personalist view of political sover- forms of self-employment, restruc- means that in the event of a change eignty, real freedom for Cubans will turing of state-owned enterprises, of government in Venezuela, the remain a dream. legalization of dollars), and new new leaders may want to act on this That Cuba has become markets (the European Union). For discontent and reduce, or possibly Venezuela’s new colony has implica- the first time in decades, Cuba was terminate, Venezuela’s deals with tions for US-Cuban relations. beginning to diversify its economic Cuba. This possible pulling of the These deals will give Chávez enor- relations. To use present-day jar- plug would mean a repeat of the mous leverage during Cuba’s post- gon, the Cuban state was finally severe blow that Cuba received in Castro transition. Venezuela’s pres- managing (rather than eschewing) the late 1980s, when Mikhail ence in Cuba is increasing not only globalization. The alliance with Gorbachev abruptly terminated sub- economically, but also militarily. Venezuela is eroding the incentives sidies to Cuba, plunging the island The number of Venezuelan military to stay on this path. It is no coinci- into a depression. personnel and state officials in resi- dence that since 2000, Cuba has dence in Cuba is at an all-time allowed the number of foreign ven- The Price of Castro’s Sovereignty high. Venezuela’s current ambassa- tures and liberalized sectors to and Implications for the US dor in Havana is none other than decline, has launched crackdowns One of the most consistent Adan Chávez, Hugo’s brother. on self-employment activities, has themes of the leaders of the Cuban Cuba’s future leader will inherit the banned the use of dollars by Revolution, even before they came obligations and dependence that the Cubans, and has been complacent to power, has been the defense of Castros and Chávezes are cultivat- about provoking tensions with the island’s sovereignty. For Fidel ing. And any regime succession in Europe and Mexico, its most Castro, this slogan seems to mean Cuba will also occur with signifi- important trading partners. By nothing more than maximizing his cant US involvement—either by US making Cuba’s economy even less personal freedom to rule the island citizens acting privately or by gov- diversified, Venezuela is further with no accountability. He has con- ernment figures carrying out official delaying Cuba’s capacity to compete stantly searched for some interna- policy. The Cuban transition may in today’s world economy. tional patron willing to shower his even descend into a military con- Finally, the Cuba-Venezuela deal government with benefits while frontation, possibly involving is giving rise to significant political simultaneously allowing him to dic- Cuban-Americans, and thus, the discontent in both countries. The tate with impunity. Luckily for United States. It is impossible to departure of so many Cuban doc- him, he has always found one, and predict the outcome of such a con- tors for Venezuela is seen at home as Venezuela is his latest find. flict, but we can now be certain that a form of economic loss that the While the deals with Venezuela the Venezuelans will be part of it. Q Cuban government cannot blame have been fortunate for Fidel on the US embargo. Furthermore, Castro’s local freedom, they repre- Cubans cannot help but wonder sent a political curse for Cuba. The Javier Corrales is associate professor of why the now legendary apagones deals have eliminated the pressures, political science at Amherst College in (power outages) across the island strong in the 1990s, that were push- Amherst, Massachusetts. In 2005 he have become increasingly frequent ing Cuba to restructure its economy was a Fulbright Scholar in Caracas since 2004, just at around the same and manage globalization more and a visiting lecturer at the Center time that Venezuelan oil imports ingeniously. Paradoxically, granting for Research on Latin America in almost doubled. It is hard for the the Cuban government more politi- Amsterdam. Corrales is the author of government to escape blame for cal autonomy has served to rein- Presidents Without Parties: The what seems to be a clear failure to force rather then lessen its historical Politics of Economic Reform in use available imports for domestic proclivity toward mono-dependen- Argentina and Venezuela in the needs. In turn, most public opin- cy. In the end, Castro should know, 1990s (Penn State Press 2002). ion polls in Venezuela reveal that dependency on one commodity, one

Hemisphere Volume 17 29 Features

The End of Rationing? by Carmelo Mesa-Lago

he rationing system Inception and Evolution of 63%, fish 65%, sugar 69%, milk was introduced in Rationing 51%, eggs 32%, citrus 22%, tex- Cuba in 1962 and The official justification for tiles 87% and tobacco 42%. Only gradually expanded in rationing was that the population’s production of beans, some vegeta- the following 43 years purchasing power had increased bles, and tubers was higher in 2004 Tto include most food and selected much faster than the domestic pro- than in 1989. As a result, the gov- manufactured goods. The economic duction of consumer goods and the ernment was unable to maintain crisis that followed the collapse of state’s capacity to import them: if rationing quotas and cut them so the socialist camp led to a drastic allowed to be set by supply and that by 2005 they only covered cut in rationed quotas and, despite demand, prices would have from seven to 10 days of monthly the partial recovery since 1995, increased significantly and hurt the food needs and considerably less in rationing monthly quotas in 2005 poor and lowest income groups. In manufactured-good needs. only met seven to 10 days of food order to protect these groups the The first three columns of the needs. Surprisingly, at a speech at government fixed prices centrally table on page 32 show monthly the University of Havana in and secured minimum quotas for rationed quotas per person of 20 November 2005, Fidel Castro all the people at subsidized prices, consumer goods in Havana in three announced that rationing would in some cases below production years: 1962 at the start of rationing, soon end. In February 2006, costs. On the positive side, in the 1980s before the crisis, and Francisco Soberón, president of rationing was an equalizer and wel- at the end of 2005. In 1962, seven Cuba’s Central Bank, referred to fare tool in the midst of scarcity. goods were sold “free” (without that speech and explained that On the negative side, it was costly quotas) but its number had been there is a contradiction in Cuba for the state, did not avoid long cut to four by the 1980s and no between those who live only from queues in front of state shops, and goods were sold free in 2005. With their salary, which is insufficient to stimulated the emergence and rapid a couple of exceptions, the quotas buy goods at market prices, and expansion of the black market, of all goods steadily declined in the those who receive non-labor where goods were sold at several period. Gasoline, cigars, toilet income (legal such as remittances as times the rationing price. In the paper, and beer were sold free in well as illegal) that allows them to 1970s and the first half of the 1962 but were unavailable through live comfortably, but both groups 1980s, the government fought the rationing in 2005; bread was sold benefit from rationed goods at state black market by introducing paral- free in 1962 but restricted to a subsidized prices. Soberón lel official markets, as well as peas- small daily roll in 2005, while sugar remarked that “this is catastrophic ant markets, where prices of goods went from free to five pounds and for the nation and economy, and were set by supply and demand. cigarettes from free to three pack- ethically unacceptable.” He further But those two markets were abol- ages monthly; the quotas of oil, stated that the situation has “led us ished during the antimarket chicken, tubers, coffee, and deter- to the gradual extinction of the “Rectification Process” in the sec- gent shrank between 50% and rationing booklet.” ond half of the 1980s. 75%. Rationed milk is only sold to This article traces the background The major problem has been that children age seven and younger or of rationing in Cuba, compares production of food and other con- adults under a medically-prescribed prices in rationed and nonrationed sumer goods, after an increase in diet (one liter daily). It used to be markets, calculates the purchasing the 1970s and 1980s, decreased sold also to elderly people (six cans power of wages and pensions, and sharply during the crisis of the of condensed or evaporated milk assesses the feasibility of five alter- 1990s and by the end of 2004 monthly) but was discontinued in native strategies to fulfill Castro’s were, in most cases, below the out- the early 1990s. Butter is not avail- promise. put level of 1989, for instance: beef able through rationing and potatoes

30 Hemisphere Volume 17 Features

Despite the rhetoric, Cubans need the government dole to survive

A person holds out a food rationing booklet while standing in line at a government store in the province of Pinar del Rio. are the only tuber occasionally and self-employment, and the market or the informal sector. offered. The quota of beef was introduction of state hard-currency Nevertheless, a new antimarket three pounds in 1962 but in 2005 shops (“shoppings” or TRD) open wave that started in 2003 and con- the quota was a half pound for a to nationals. By 2004 about 62% tinued in 2006 reversed the most mixture of ground soy, beans, and of the population received dollar- important reform measures: The meat; very few medicines are remittances from relatives and circulation of the dollar was obtainable in state pharmacies. friends abroad that permitted banned; a fee of 10% to change The people survived the severe Cubans to buy goods in agricultural dollars into “convertible” Cuban cut in rationed quotas thanks to the markets and TRD. Income and pesos was imposed (two pesos cir- government reforms implemented access to these markets came from culate in the island: the regular and in 1993-96 that allowed the circu- self-employment, family restau- the “convertible” whose value is not lation of the dollar, foreign remit- rants, dollar incentives paid under- set in the international market but tances in that currency, the resur- the-table to employees in joint ven- arbitrarily by the government at a rection of free agricultural markets tures, and speculation in the black rate of 24 pesos to buy one convert-

Hemisphere Volume 17 31 Features

Monthly Quotas of Rationed Goods per Person in Havana (1962, 1980s, 2005) and Prices in Regular Pesos at Rationed and Non-rationed Markets (2005)

Goods Rationed Quotas (years) Prices in Regular Pesos (2005)

1962 1980s 2005 Rationing Agriculture TRD

Beef, mixed with soy (pound) 3 1 0.50 0.80 No 43-215 Chicken (pound) 3 2 1 0.70 No 29-53 Fish (pound) 1 Free 0.688 0.70 No 68-135 Rice (pound) 6 5 5 0.25 4-5 11-14 Beans (pound) 1.5 1.25 1.875 0.40 8-20 30-40 Tubers (pound) 14 5 4 0.40 2-4 No Lard (pound) and soy oil (liter) 2 1.5 0.50 0.20 10-18 54 Eggs (units) 5 Free 8 0.15 1-2 2-3 Milk (liter, powder in TRD) 6 3 0 No 6 64 Bread (roll) Free Free 30 0.05 10 No Sugar (pound) Free 6 5 0.10-0.15 No 16-22 Coffee(pound) 1 0.375 0.25 5.00 No 145-158 Cigarettes (package) Free 4 3 2-2.50 No 9-57 Cigars (unit) Free 4 0 No No Vary Gasoline (gallon) Free 10 0 No No 73-86 Bath or wash soap (tablet) 2 1.5 1 0.20-0.25 No 8 Detergent (bottle) 1 0.5 0.25 0.90 No 24 Toilet paper (roll) Free 1 0 No No 26 Tooth paste (small tube) 1 1 1 0.65 No 60 Beer (national, bottle or can) Free Free 0 No No 20-26

NOTE: Data sent by Cuban independent economist Oscar Espinosa Chepe and a researcher who requested anonymity, as well as articles in Havana internet, December 2005 and January 2006. TRD prices in convertible pesos have been estimated in regular pesos at the current official exchange rate of 24 to one. “No” means that the good is not offered in a given market.

32 Hemisphere Volume 17 Features

($16.70 at the official exchange rate of 20 pesos per one dollar), the minimum wage 225 pesos ($11.25), the average monthly pension 180 pesos ($9), and the minimum received by half of the pensioners 150 pesos ($7.50). The whole basket of rationed goods for the first seven to 10 days of the month costs only about 30 pesos, but monthly elec- tricity rates adds 10 to 20 pesos, bus transportation 12 to 20 pesos (one taxi drive costs 10 to 20 pesos), and phone and water eight to 10 pesos; the bulk of the population owns a dwelling but a minority pays 10% of salary, an average of 33 pesos; the total ranges from 60 to 115 pesos. With the income left, everyone must Food and other goods unavailable through the rationing system can be purchased buy food unavailable through at hard-currency shops, or TRDs, such as the one pictured above. But for an over- rationing at agricultural markets or whelming majority of Cubans—who cannot afford to shop at the TRD—the mea- TRD for the remaining 20-23 days ger basket of rationed food and goods is essential for their survival. of the month, as well as other food and manufactures not available through rationing at all. That is ible peso in 2005); the convertible the ratios of nonrationed to rationed impossible to minimum and average peso was appreciated by 8% (pro- prices, for instance, 100 times in pensioners, as well as minimum portionally reducing the value of the fish, 200 times in bread and 92 wage earners, without foreign remit- dollar); the number of self-employed times in toothpaste; 18 and 52 tances, family help, or extra income activities and family restaurants was times in rice (the first between (many pensioners sell stuff in the reduced; controls over agricultural rationing and agricultural market streets or do similar tasks). With markets were tightened, and TRD prices and the second between what is left, average salary earners prices were raised between 10% and rationed and TRD prices), and 90 can buy about one-half of their 30% and set them in convertible and 270 times in oil. Furthermore, remaining food needs at agricultural pesos (thus adding another 10% many rationed items disappear for and TRD markets. One pound increase due to the exchange fee for months (soap, detergent) and the each of beef, chicken, and fish, four the dollar). As a result of these quality of rationed and some nonra- pounds of rice, two pounds of measures, as well as the tightening tioned goods has badly deteriorated: beans, two onions, one bottle of soy of the embargo by the Bush admin- beef has been substituted by a oil, and four eggs cost 213 pesos— istration, the amount of remittances ground mixture of soy, beans, and two-thirds of the average wage. and the access to goods in TRD meat; rationed rice is small and of Additional essential toiletries bought declined sharply in 2005. bad quality; potatoes are often rot- at the TRD (one each soap tablet, ten; fish is small and full of bones; bag of detergent and deodorant bot- Prices in Rationed and Non- bath soap lacks perfume and easily tle) costs 84 pesos, one-fifth of the Rationed Markets and Purchasing disintegrates; the rationed bottle of average salary; a pound of ham or a Power of the People detergent is only good for washing pressure cooker wipes out almost The last three columns of the dishes, a bag of powder from TRD half of the monthly average wage or table compare prices in regular pesos must be bought for washing clothes; the whole minimum pension, and a of goods in rationed and nonra- shoes break after a few months of light bulb bought at a TRD takes tioned markets (agricultural and use. 30% of the average wage and 50% TRD) in Havana in December The average monthly wage at the of the average pension. Many cars 2005. There are huge differences in end of 2005 was 334 regular pesos are immobilized because spare parts,

Hemisphere Volume 17 33 Features

only available in TRD, are highly would create chaos because produc- groups and leave the rest of the pop- priced or because a gallon of gaso- tion and services would be disrupt- ulation to purchase goods at prices line takes 22% of the average ed as people abandon jobs to hunt set by supply and demand, with monthly wage. for food everywhere, generating the supplemental buying at agricultural longest queues under the revolu- markets and TRD. Such action, Feasibility of Five Alternative tion, and unleashing a potentially however, would be harmful to the Strategies to End Rationing volatile political situation, all of middle-income group, particularly All of the above shows that, as which makes this alternative highly those who do not receive remit- insufficient as the meager basket of improbable. tances. In order to compensate rationed food and a few manufac- The government could also abol- them, further increases of average tured goods is, it is essential for the ish the rationing booklet but allow wages would be necessary, leading to survival of the immense majority of prices to be set by supply and similar adverse fiscal and stability Cubans. According to the govern- demand, and let those people who consequences as in the previous sce- ment, the basket of rationed foods have enough money to buy the lim- nario. Castro estimated that the guarantees half of the daily con- ited goods sold at considerably elimination of rationing would cost sumption of calories although it higher prices. This strategy would 600 million pesos, a flagrant under- actually covers one third at best. In badly harm the poor and lowest estimation based on the previous any case, the intriguing question is income groups (poverty is estimated analysis. how rationing could be terminated? to afflict from 20% to 67% of the In view of the lack of easy alterna- Five potential strategies to tackle total population), precisely the jus- tives, Fidel’s announcement of the that problem are evaluated below. tification that the government gave end of rationing might well be The logical way to eliminate to introduce rationing back in another symbolic ingredient in the rationing would be to increase the 1962. In addition, it would signifi- official discourse aimed at getting supply of consumer goods either cantly expand the inequality of food support for the ongoing economic through domestic production, access in favor of the highest recentralization process, the cam- imports, or a combination of both. income group and provoke severe paign against corruption, and to This alternative is unfeasible in nutritional deficiencies in a large assure the Cuban people that the Cuba in the mid term for various part of the population. In view of revolution is on the right track with reasons: domestic production in the current official criticism of a bright future ahead. Such prom- 2005 was below the 1989 level in inequalities, chances of this alterna- ise, along with abundant energy in most consumer goods (see above) tive are poor. 2006, could go astray as many other and the population has grown 7% The previous alternative, however, promises made by the Maximum in the last 16 years; imports of food could be combined with an increase Leader have done so in the past 47 have significantly increased in the of social assistance to the poor and years: the largest industrial output last three years, mostly from the lowest income groups to allow them per capita in Latin America and a United States, but still are grossly to purchase goods at market prices. fourfold increase in milk production insufficient to compensate for the The government seemed to take by 1965; a sugar harvest of 10 mil- poor domestic output and Cuba this path in 2005 by raising mini- lion tons and the creation of an lacks convertible currency to buy mum wages, minimum pensions, unselfish “New Man” in 1970; and the needed additional quantities and social assistance; but the cost of a fourfold jump in nickel output, a (the merchandise trade deficit in 2 billion pesos (10% of GDP) pro- world power in biotechnology, and 2005 surpassed $4 billion, a histori- voked a significant jump in state food self-sufficiency in the 1980s. Q cal record). budget expenditures, and probably Accepting its present restrictions, in monetary liquidity and inflation. the government could terminate the Still, that largesse was grossly insuf- Carmelo Mesa-Lago is Distinguished rationing booklet but maintain the ficient to improve food access of Service Professor Emeritus of econom- current subsidized prices, eliminate these vulnerable groups (as shown ics and Latin American studies at the the compulsory adscription of fami- above); further increases in social University of Pittsburgh and was visit- lies to the neighborhood state gro- welfare would be extremely costly ing professor at FIU from 1999 to cery, and free consumers to pur- and provoke financial instability. 2003. chase the existing limited goods Finally, rationing could be restrict- anywhere they are offered. This ed to the poor and lowest income

34 Hemisphere Volume 17 New from the University of North Carolina Press... War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898

War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898 by John Lawrence Tone takes as its focal point the Cuban war for independence from Spain prior to the United States’ entry into the conflict in 1898. Tone con- tends that the events in Cuba before American intervention are paradigmatic of warfare in Latin America and elsewhere in the 19th and 20th centuries and are ultimately more interesting than the “splendid little war” of 1898. Employing Spanish and Cuban sources to recover the experiences of civilians and common soldiers during wartime, the author takes a fresh look at well-known figures such as José Martí, Máximo Gómez, Valeriano Weyler, and Antonio Cávanos and contributes to ongoing historiographical debates about the nature of war, the attitudes of its participants, the methods of combat, and the necessity of US involvement to defeat Spain.

Through his careful examination of the Spanish and Cuban positions prior to US involvement, Tone offers new answers to old questions concerning the attitudes of the Cuban people toward the war and War and Genocide in Cuba, the ways in which the conflict was a civil war as well as a war of lib- 1895-1898 eration. Tone also explores the Spanish policy of “reconcentration,” by John Lawrence Tone which called for the forcible relocation of thousands of Cubans to 352 pp., 8 illustrations, 4 tables, concentration camps, raising the question of whether this policy con- 3 maps, notes, bibliography, index ISBN 0-8078-3006-2 stituted genocide or whether it represented an acceptable level of $35 hardcover violence toward a civilian population within the standard rules of Publication Date: March 13, 2006 engagement. In addition, Tone examines how Spaniards and University of North Carolina Press Cubans fought one another, challenges the widely held notion that the Cuban’s had defeated Spain before the US declared war, and “Tone deals with not only the military explores the necessity of US intervention. aspects of the Cuban-Spanish- American war, but also the internal Tone treats the “splendid little war” as but a single chapter in the political complexities of those coun- longer war that preceded the 1898 conflict, involving participants tries and the social and economic backdrop on which the story unfolds. who hailed from Havana, Madrid, and the Cuban countryside. His The author’s narrative technique approach depends greatly on newly released evidence from Spanish makes for easy reading, with some government and military archives, including hospital records that tell chapters centered around the per- a different story about how battles were fought; intercepted Cuban sonal life of one of the main charac- letters that reveal the war’s effect on civilians; battle diaries kept by ters in the drama and other chapters on political and social problems or commanders on both sides that cast new light on the condition of military history. Tone masters all of the troops; and administrative records that provide fresh insight into these fields.” the tragedy of reconcentration.

-José Alvarez Junco Centro de Estudios Políticos y By telling this more complete story, Tone fleshes out the existing nar- Constitucionales, Madrid rative of the war for Cuban independence and underscores the com- plexity of the issues that lay at the heart of the conflict.

John Lawrence Tone is Associate Professor of History at the Georgia Institute of Technology. P H O T O E S S A Y Everything Old Is New Again by Uva de Aragón

f revolution means radical change, then the Cuban Despite efforts to eradicate the Revolution has lived up to its name—but only in part. past, its appeal is palpable in the Since its earliest days in I1959, the leaders of the Revolution proclaimed a new future for Cuba, Cuba of today even insisting on creating el hombre nuevo. Along with the call for revolution was the exhortation to automobiles and late-model campaigns, slogans, and decrees. It bury what was considered an igno- European and Japanese cars to car- is a place that has suffered isolation minious past: the Catholic Church, riages pulled by horses and the from the world, but, yet, the signs tourism and its ills, bourgeois soci- odd-looking camellos. Within the of modernity are starting to appear, ety and values, and class and racial same block one can contemplate albeit slowly. In its essence, how- disparities. The Revolution’s intent the renovated splendor of Havana’s ever, Cuba clings to the past rather to create a radically different social, magnificent colonial architecture, than embrace an elusive future. political, and economic order has as well as crumbling buildings. Even that effervescent and hopeful certainly succeeded. Cuba today is Tourists and natives can easily be time when the Revolution was in a fundamentally different country distinguished from one another by its infancy is not part of the collec- than it was 45 years ago. the way they dress, the places they tive memory of young Cubans. Yet, almost five decades after visit, and where they eat. A new The irony is that what is being Fidel Castro marched triumphantly luxury hotel can suddenly sprout renewed today in Cuba is precisely into Havana at the head of his in the countryside, a short distance the past that the Revolution had rebel army, Cuba remains a coun- away from old “bohíos” and hoped to bury. One more contra- try virtually frozen in time. The clotheslines draped with colorful diction in the new old Cuba. pervasive winds of revolution have sheets, underwear, and T-shirts. The following photographs were not managed to blow away deep- But, the contradictions run deeper taken during several trips to the rooted beliefs and traditions. than what the eye can see. Families island from 2002 to 2005 and Cubans cling to the past both that have suffered the pain of sepa- hope to capture, much better than physically and emotionally. From ration for years now communicate these words, the paradoxes of life antique cars to old wives´ tales, by e-mail, and even collaborate in in Cuba. Q from yellowed family photos to creating family trees or sharing web momentary recollection of the pages. Family visits, care packages Uva de Aragón is associate director of glamour and genteelness of a and remittances, and the internet the Cuban Research Institute at bygone era, the new men and are healing the wounds and forging Florida International University. A women of Cuba seem to find even stronger ties among relatives. prolific writer, she has published sev- greater comfort in old customs and While the US travel restrictions eral books on literary criticism, poet- memories, than in the hope of the implemented in 2005 have had a ry, short stories, essays, and a novel, elusive new Cuba once promised to negative effect on this family rec- Memoria del silencio. Her most them. onciliation, they have not brought recent work is Morir de exilio, pub- Today, Cuba is a country of con- it to a halt. lished June 2006. tradictions. Any visitor to the Cuba, of course, is not entirely island will immediately see its myr- frozen in time. It is also a country iad forms of transportation: from of constant change, for the govern- shiny, as if new, old American ment reacts with continuous new

36 Hemisphere Volume 17 Photo Essay

A billboard in Havana with the images of revolutionary figure Camilo Cienfuegos, student leader Julio Antonio Mella, and the iconic Ché Guevara—all of whom met violent deaths—promises that a better world is possible.

Cubans have learned to perform miracles to keep their old American cars running. This one, parked in Centro Habana, shines like new.

A cochero awaits to transport tourists in his horse and carriage around Old Havana. The renova- tion of old buildings can be seen in the background.

Hemisphere Volume 17 37 Photo Essay

Havana’s Café de Oriente, an imi- tation of the famous Madrid land- mark, caters to tourists. The Cuban government started to wel- come visitors to the island as part of its modest economic reforms of the mid 90s. Jobs serving tourists are highly coveted.

Prices in this small coffee shop in Centro Habana are more in tune with the meager salaries of most Cubans.

At the hotel Los Jazmines, adjacent to the Valle de Viñales in Matanzas, Cubans can enjoy the restaurant and other facilities, but are forbid- den to stay at the hotel, even if they can pay for it.

38 Hemisphere Volume 17 Photo Essay

Not far from the luxury hotel, there are indications that life in Cuba’s countryside has not changed significantly.

Tourists walk through the cobble- stone streets of Old Havana.

With the passing of time, the promise of an egalitarian society has become elusive. Beggars can again be seen in the streets of Havana.

Hemisphere Volume 17 39 Photo Essay

Built in the 16th century, Castillo de la Fuerza is Cuba’s oldest military fortress and one of the archi- tectural jewels attracting foreigners to the island.

School children and their coach take a stroll in Plaza Vieja, which is being restored to look the way it did when it was first built in the 17th century.

Quinceañeras pose for photographs under the shade of old trees. The lavish celebration of a young girl becoming 15 is a stark reminder of a more elegant era once highly criti- cized by the Revolution.

40 Hemisphere Volume 17 Photo Essay

Since 1997, when the government allowed Christmas to be celebrated once again, families immediately started to display their old trees, ornaments, and nativity sets, which had been hidden for decades.

Amelia Goyri de Adot was buried in this tomb in the Cementerio de Colón when she died during child- birth in 1901. Legend has it that when the casket was opened years later, the body was intact and Amelia was holding the baby in her arms. According to the popular myth, “La Milagrosa,” as she is known, has special healing powers, and is particularly helpful to moth- ers and their children. Her tomb is always adorned by flowers and notes from devoted visitors.

Young Cubans, dressed in jeans, stroll by a mural in Old Havana depicting distinguished 19th century Cuban men and women of letters.

Hemisphere Volume 17 41 REVIEW FORUM Plus ça change... by Anthony P. Maingot

Brian Latell, After Fidel: The Inside Story of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Opera- tions Against Cuba, 1959-1965. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005.

Jorge I. Domínguez, Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva and Lorena Barberia (ed.), The Cuban Economy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López, Cuba’s Aborted Reform: Socioeconomic Effects, International Comparisons, and charismatic leader continues cautious with Latell’s heavily psy- Transition Policies. Gainesville: unabated. On balance, there is chologistic slant on Castro’s style University Press of Florida, 2005. more biography than macro-socio- and modus operandi as well as his logical analysis on the shelves. take on Raúl, which, let it be said, Joining this trend toward critical is the most important contribution t is said that after a particu- biography is Brian Latell’s After of the book. larly heated exchange with Fidel. Latell has been for decades To be sure, Latell is quite persua- Neville Chamberlain, the senior CIA analyst on Cuba, sive when he argues that in Castro Winston Churchill vowed “fascinated” (his word) since his we have a classical case of the child that “History will not be kind graduate student days with Cuban being father to the man. Presented Ito Neville Chamberlain. I know communism. On his own admis- here is the illegitimate Fidel in an because I’m going to write it.” sion, this book has been in the oven early and single-minded—even And, he did indeed write it solidify- since at least 1986. Given his long obstinate—struggle to overcome ing, perhaps for ever after, the asso- career with the CIA, his access to this family shame and a myriad of ciation between clichéd portrayals recently released ex-Soviet files, and other obstacles to social and educa- of “Chamberlain” and “Munich.” his acquaintance with the recent tional mobility. The end result of Will history be kind to Fidel slew of hefty volumes on Castro, the many battles to overcome his Castro and his revolution now in one was expecting a ponderous “pariah” status was a deep-rooted its 47th year? It is a fact that the encyclopedia-like tome. What he authoritarian personality. Listen to tendency among non-Cuban finally delivered, rather, is a fast- Latell: authors has been to be increasingly paced and elegantly written critical of the path taken. And yet, account, in every way a terrific The survival skills that Fidel began to the fascination with the revolution’s good read. That said, one has to be develop as a child – being on his

42 Hemisphere Volume 17 Review Forum

A review essay on Cuba

luck…” (18). Rather, we can piece an alternative interpretation from occasional concessions the author makes to Fidel’s “exceptional intelligence” (38) and to his total dedica- tion to understanding US politics so as to thwart it at every turn. “With the exception of a succession of Israeli leaders,” says Latell, “there is probably no other political figure anywhere in the world who has been more knowledgeable in assessing American politics and accurate in predicting American gyrations” (69). Thus, what we have here is not a leader divorced from reality but rather one inflexibly fixed on his chosen path and determined to devote his considerable talents to short-circuit any and all attempts at stopping him. Clearly not an adver- sary to be taken lightly which, one guard, fearing betrayal and rejection, Fidel could have held power so long suspects, is precisely what the US improvising solutions, seizing initia- without Raúl’s steady control of the consistently did. tives, trusting almost no one, threat- armed forces” (21). After Fidel, That there have been no major ening and committing acts of vio- Latell predicts, it will be Raúl who US leaders equally dedicated to a lence, and relying on his instincts will have the occasion and the deep understanding of Cuban poli- rather than waiting for fate to be capacity to set the revolution in a tics and gyrations is evident in the dealt him – have carried over more rational and conciliatory tightly argued book by Don through the rest of his life (53). (with the US) course. Bohning. Writing in the straight- The problem with the author’s forward, unadorned style of the None of this of course, is new. psychological approach to both journalist, Bohning makes extensive What is new and interesting is the Fidel and Raúl is that it does not use of newly unclassified materials way Latell compares and contrasts explain why and how a leader (in to describe what he calls “one of Fidel’s personality with that of his this case, Fidel) variously described the most extensive sustained, and younger brother Raúl. Also born as “paranoid” (49, 51), operating ultimately futile covert action pro- out-of-wedlock and without any of under a “permanent link” with a grams by one country against the the attractive physical and social “fantasy world of historical heroes” government of another in the post- attributes of Fidel, Raúl emerges (59), “vain, spoiled and narcissistic” World War II era” (1). He skillfully from these pages as the more stable (84), in short, a “sociopath” (89), dissects the eight known CIA plots and dependable of the two. As managed to out-maneuver the to assassinate Fidel Castro between such, he is “the linchpin” of Fidel’s world’s greatest power for over four 1960 and 1965 as well as the succession strategy, the “guarantor” decades. We can disregard Latell’s broader attempts at bringing about of political stability in Cuba. “It is throw-away explanation that Fidel popular uprisings, including the highly unlikely,” says Latell, “that has had “exceptionally good disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.

Hemisphere Volume 17 43 Review Forum

Two of Bohning’s conclusions are nearly five decades of developmen- consensus that the reforms of the worthy of reflection 40 years after tal frustration. This is, of course, 1990s did not go far enough in all the plots and destabilization not a new revelation. Decades ago, restructuring the economy. What attempts. First, Bohning concludes socialist friends of Cuba, such as is urgently needed are changed that on restudy, it is difficult to see René Dumont, K. S. Karol, and property relations, decentralization “how grown men could have taken Charles Bettelheim, bemoaned the of economic decision-making, and (all these anti-Castro plans) serious- voluntaristic and often hare-brained the promoting of production effi- ly” (8). Secondly, and here one schemes of the Cuban leader. ciencies through increased competi- cannot help but think of the Iraq Today, the view that such schemes tion and appropriate incentives. fiasco, Bohning records how the have for four decades fallen short of They all agree that the existing nat- sober CIA assessments of the their goals seems to be the consid- ural resources economy is exhausted Castro regime’s strengths and its ered view of a new generation of and, as Pérez Villanueva puts it, urgent counsels against excessive Cuban economists. Eschewing the “physically run down” (Domínguez, optimism about impending implo- tired old Marxist, “world system” 66). “The traditional model—sup- sions of the system were consistent- and “dependency” paradigms and ported by antiquated methods and ly ignored by the political leader- language of the 1960s and 1970s, already obsolete administrative ship. they show a solid grasp of modern practices,” he says, “exists alongside Bohning ends by quoting a CIA developmental economics and of a second one based on decentral- report from 1963 which argued the global realities, which present ized models of self-financing with that US programs at their present real challenges to all countries, new economic actors” (67). This levels were not likely, barring including their own. was of course before Fidel dropped unforeseen events such as the sud- The enormous value of the the guillotine on that decentralized den death of Castro, to result in the Domínguez reader is that it model. early overthrow of the Castro- includes some solid essays by the So, one has again to ask: Who in Communist regime. Having care- most outstanding of these econo- Cuba listens to their best economic fully and dispassionately reviewed mists, i.e. Omar Everleny Pérez thinkers? Certainly not President the record of the US “obsession,” Villanueva (two essays), Pedro Fidel Castro. He never has. Writing Bohning concludes that the CIA’s Monreal, Jorge Mario Sánchez in 1971, a very sympathetic US 1963 assessment “remained valid Egozcue, Mayra Espina Prieto, economist, Bertrand Silverman, more than four decades later” Viviana Togores, and Anicia García. noted that in Cuba the economy (263). This “obsession” with the Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López analyze was being directed by “individuals leader’s reasoning and intentions the work of most of these, plus without previous experience, tech- has obviously not produced strate- those of other outstanding Cuban nical know-how, or reliable infor- gies to defeat, or at least neutralize, economists such as Julio Carranza, mation.” Even where there was a that leader. Latell, however, Alfredo Gonzalez Gutierrez, formal economic team in place, believes that the focus on Fidel is Hidiam Marquette, and Juan Silverman noted, Fidel Castro made essential even though he confesses Triana. all final decisions through a parallel that dealing with, for instance, how To a man and woman, these planning apparatus (Bertrand the economy was faring “would economists deal with the economic Silverman, Man and Socialism in have been easier” (184). Would it reforms implemented in the early Cuba [1971], p. 22). This contin- now? Not if the books by 1990s in order to confront the dis- ues to be his modus operandi: Domínguez, Pérez Villanueva and astrous collapse of the economy fol- reforms are implemented only Barberia, and Mesa-Lago and lowing the removal of Soviet subsi- when circumstances force a sort of Pérez-López are good measures. dies, the opening of the economy “law of necessity” only to be uncer- Although both books attest to the to foreign investment, the restruc- emoniously pulled back as soon as fact that while external factors (fun- turing of foreign trade, the conse- relief is in sight. Sustaining “social- damentally the US embargo) have quences of an expanding tourist ist morality” is invariably the justifi- played a part in Cuba’s economic sector, and the free circulation of cation. That sustained develop- failures, it is mostly the same “rea- hard currency. ment is impossible under such cir- soning and intentions” of Fidel Arguing well within the ideologi- cumstances is made evident by Castro, which bedeviled Latell (and cal parameters of the socialist state Jorge Domínguez. In a succinct his US bosses), that account for they all appear to support, there is analysis of the gains and deficien-

44 Hemisphere Volume 17 Review Forum

cies of the reforms of the 1990s, and eventually reversed pro-market Cuban revolution “under Fidel” Domínguez argues that “Several of policies and launched anti-market will be vindicated. The question Cuba’s economic reforms were only cycles – actions certain to bring about becomes: Will Raúl listen to his partial. Partial reform equilibrium adverse economic performance – is economists any more than his is a long-term recipe for disaster; it the fear of losing political control as a brother did? It is most intriguing delays microeconomic reforms result: decentralization of economic that Latell seems to be betting that indefinitely” (Domínguez, 41). policymaking, expansion of the mar- he will. Those in the US adminis- And, this was written before the ket the private sector, and the subse- tration still “obsessed” with a “clean draconian measures against “neo- quent surge in economic behavior transition” in Cuba better read his liberalism” pushed by Fidel Castro independent of the state. Political book. Q in November, 2005. logic, therefore, has trumped econom- Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López note ic logic, even though the results have this cycle of on-again off-again been the deterioration of economic Anthony Maingot is Professor attempts at reform and leave no conditions and standard of living. Emeritus of Sociology at Florida doubts as to where the problem (xii-xiii). International University. His most lies: recent publication (with Wilfredo As of now it appears that Latell’s Lozano) is The United States and We believe that the core reason why biographical approach to the politi- the Caribbean: Transforming the leadership limited, closed down, cal and economic history of the Hegemony and Sovereignty (Routledge 2004).

New from the University of North Carolina Press... THE ORIGINS OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED

by Samuel Farber

Analyzing the crucial period of the Cuban Revolution from 1959 to 1961, Samuel Farber challenges dominant scholarly and popular views of the revolution’s sources, shape, and historical trajectory. Unlike many observers, who treat Cuba’s revolutionary leaders as having merely reacted to US policies or domestic socioeconomic conditions, Farber shows that revolutionary leaders, while acting under serious constraints, were nevertheless autonomous agents pursuing their own independent ideological visions, although not necessarily according to a master plan.

Exploring how historical conflicts between US and Cuban interests colored the reactions of both nations’ leaders after the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista, Farber argues that the structure of Cuba’s economy and politics in the first half of the 20th century made the island ripe for radical social and economic change, and the ascendant Soviet Union was on hand to provide early assistance. Taking advantage of recently declassified US and Soviet documents as well as biographical and narrative literature from Cuba, Farber focuses on three key years to explain how the Cuban rebellion rapidly evolved from a multiclass, antidictatorial movement in to a full-fledged social revolution.

“A first-rate synthesis and interpretation of the Cuban revolutionary experience--both the rebellion against the Batista regime and the consolidation of power in 1959-60. It is intelligent, well written, and well organized...it is a major contribution to the field of Cuban studies.” --Jorge Domínguez, Harvard University

Samuel Farber is Professor of Political Science at Brooklyn College.

Hemisphere Volume 17 45 PUBLICATIONS UPDATE Cuba’s New Society by Marian Goslinga

Baldassarri, Mario, and Sergio Chávez, Lydia. “Adrift: An Foley, Julian. “Trinidad: Life on Cararo, eds. Cuba: Orgoglio e Introduction to Contemporary the Margins.” In: Capitalism, God, Pregiudizi. Verona, Italy: Achab, Cuba.” In: Capitalism, God, and a and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters the 2005. 254 pp. (Collection of Good Cigar: Cuba Enters the Twenty-First Century, edited by papers, in Italian, on contemporary Twenty-First Century, edited by Lydia Chávez, 45-61. Durham NC: Cuba.) Lydia Chávez, 1-14. Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2005. Duke University Press, 2005. Barbassa, Juliana. “The New González, Angel. “Son de Cuban Capitalist.” In: Capitalism, Chakarova, Mimi. “Interlude: A Camaguëy.” In: Capitalism, God, God, and a Good Cigar: Cuba Photo Essay.” In: Capitalism, God, and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters the Enters the Twenty-first Century, and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters the Twenty-First Century, edited by edited by Lydia Chávez, 17-30. Twenty-First Century, edited by Lydia Chávez, 222-234. Durham Durham NC: Duke University Lydia Chávez, 110-128. Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2005. Press, 2005. NC: Duke University Press, 2005. Hodge, G. Derrick. “Sex Workers Bray, Donald W., and Marjorie W. Coté, John. “Cubans Log On of Havana: The Lure of Things.” Bray. “Cuba Dreaming: On a Behind Castro’s Back.” In: NACLA Report on the Americas 38, Park Bench in Havana With Capitalism, God, and a Good Cigar: no. 4 (Jan-Feb 2005): 12-15. John Lennon.” Latin American Cuba Enters the Twenty-first Perspectives 32, no. 6 (November Century, edited by Lydia Chávez, Kapcia, Antoni. Havana: The 2005): 5-21. (Maintains that the 160-173. Durham NC: Duke Making of Cuban Culture. Cuban Revolution has achieved a University Press, 2005. Oxford, Eng.; New York, NY: Berg, new form of democracy based 2005. 236b pp. upon shared social goals.) Delgado Torres, Alejandro Eddy. El Gran Libro de la Santería en Klepak, Hal P. Cuba’s Military, Caballero, Rufo. Un Hombre Solo Cuba: Introducción a la Cultura 1990-2005: Revolutionary Soldiers y una Calle Oscura: Los Roles del Yoruba. Madrid: Esfera de los During Counter-Revolutionary Genero en el Cine Negro. Havana: Libros, 2005. 250 pp. Times. New York, NY: Palgrave Editorial Unión, 2005. 166 pp. MacMillan, 2005. 349 pp. Estrada Montalván, Joaquín, ed. Campoy, Ana. “Dancers Who Iglesia Católica y Nacionalidad Lardner, Megan. “The Spanish Are Stretch the Limits.” In: Cubana: Encuentros Nacionales Back.” In: Capitalism, God, and a Capitalism, God, and a Good Cigar: de Historia. Miami, FL: Ediciones Good Cigar: Cuba Enters the Cuba Enters the Twenty-First Universal, 2005. 2 vols. Twenty-First Century, edited by Century, edited by Lydia Chávez, Lydia Chávez, 191-206. Durham 95-109. Durham NC: Duke Fernández, Damián J., ed. Cuba NC: Duke University Press, 2005. University Press, 2005. Transnational. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005. Meerman, Jacob. “Oppressed Centeno, Miguel Angel. “El People: Economic Mobility of the Regreso de Cuba a América Fernández-Larrea, Ramón. Socially Excluded.” Journal of Latina: El fin del excepcionalis- Kabiosiles: Los músicos de Cuba. Socio-Economics 34, no. 4 (August mo cubano?” Bicentenario 4, no. 1 Barcelona, Spain: Linkguam 2005. 2005): 542-567. (Compares mobil- (2005): 5-20. 235 pp. ity histories of four minorities: Cuban blacks, Indian Dalits, Burakumin, and US blacks.)

46 Hemisphere Volume 17 Publications Update

Mercader Uguina, Jesús R. La Ramirez, Ronaldo. “State and Sawyer, Mark Q. Racial Politics in realidad laboral en Cuba y la Civil Society in the Barrios of Revolutionary Cuba. Cambridge: responsabilidad social de los Havana, Cuba: The Case of Cambridge University Press, 2005. inversores extranjeros. Valencia: Pogolotti.” Environment and Tirant Lo Blanch, 2006. Urbanization 17, no. 1 (April Serra, Ana. “The New Woman in 2005): 147-171. Cuban Revolutionary Discourse: Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. La econo- Manuel Cofiño’s The Last mía cubana hoy: ¿Salvación o Roca, Alicia. “The Old Cuban Woman and the Next Combat condenación? 2006. Cadre: Four Women Survive (1971).” Journal of Gender Studies Manzanillo.” In: Capitalism, God, 14, no. 1 (March 2005): 33-44. Mesa-Lago, Carmelo and Jorge and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters the Pérez López. Cuba’s Aborted Twenty-First Century, edited by Sigler, Bret. “God, Babalawos, and Reform: Socioeconomic Effects, Lydia Chávez, 31-44. Durham NC: Castro.” In: Capitalism, God, and a International Comparisons, and Duke University Press, 2005. Good Cigar: Cuba Enters the Transition Policies. Gainesville: Twenty-First Century, edited by University Press of Florida, 2005. Rodríguez, Olga R. “True Lydia Chávez, 207-221. Durham Believers.” In: Capitalism, God, NC: Duke University Press, 2005. Minaya, Ezequiel. “Authors Who and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters the Knew or Know the Limits.” In: Twenty-First Century, edited by Thompson, Frank W. “Cuban Capitalism, God, and a Good Cigar: Lydia Chávez, 131-146. Durham Economic Performance in Cuba Enters the Twenty-First NC: Duke University Press, 2005. Retrospect.” Review of Radical Century, edited by Lydia Chávez, Political Economics 37, no. 3 78-94. Durham NC: Duke Rojas, Rafael. Tumbas sin sosiego: (Summer 2005): 311-324. University Press, 2005. Revolución, disidencia y exilio del intelectual cubano. Barcelona: Tulchin, Joseph [et al.], eds. Mohor, Daniela. “Socialism and Editorial Anagrama, 2006. Changes in Cuban Society Since the Cigar.” In: Capitalism, God, the Nineties. Washington, DC: and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters the Rojas, Rafael, ed. Cuba hoy y Woodrow Wilson International Twenty-First Century, edited by mañana: Actores e instituciones Center for Scholars, Latin Lydia Chávez, 147-159. Durham de una política en transición. American Progrm, 2005. 291 pp. NC: Duke University Press, 2005. Mexico City: Centro de Investigación y Docencias Valdés Hernández, Dagoberto. Perera Pintado, Ana Celia. Económicas/Editorial Planeta Cuba: Libertad y Responsabili- “Religion and Cuban Identity in Mexicana, 2005. dad; Desafíos y Proyectos. Miami, a Transnational Context.” Latin FL: Ediciones Universal, 2005. 414 American Perspectives 32, no. 1 Rojas, Ricardo Manuel. Los pp. (January 2005): 147-173 Derechos Fundamentales y el Orden Jurídico e Institucional de Wunderlich, Annerlise. “Hip Hop Pérez, Louis A. To Die in Cuba: Cuba. Buenos Aires. Argentina: Pushes the Limits.” In: Capitalism, Suicide and Society. Chapel Hill, CADAL [y] Konrad-Adenauer God, and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters NC: University of North Carolina Stiftung, 2005. 283 pp. the Twenty-First Century, edited by Press, 2005. 463 pp. Lydia Chávez, 65-77. Durham NC: Sanguinetty, Jorge A. Cuba: Duke University Press, 2005. Pyati, Archana. “The New Realidad y Destino; Presente y Immigrants Don’t Hate Fidel.” Futuro de la Economía y la In: Capitalism, God, and a Good Sociedad Cubana. Miami, FL: Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri- Cigar: Cuba Enters the Twenty-First Ediciones Universal, 2005. 332 pp. can and Caribbean bibliographer at Century, edited by Lydia Chávez, Florida International University’s 177-190. Durham NC: Duke Sastre, Alfonso [et al.]. Cuba 2005. Green Library. University Press, 2005. Hondarribia, Spain: Editorial Hiru, 2005. 270 pp.

Hemisphere Volume 17 47 Forthcoming from VERSO... The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the Americas by Robin Blackburn

The slave systems of the Americas were to become as large as any in human history, and the huge profits they engendered stimulated capitalist growth in Europe and fos- tered war and colonial revolt. The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the Americas explores both why Europe’s conquest and colonization of the Americas were accompanied by the construction of a variety of racially defined slave systems, and why they were eventually suppressed in a century of abolitionism from 1788-1887. US and British governments have long basked in the view that they played a special role in the eventual victories of anti-slavery. Blackburn insists that we should see the advance of anti-slavery as rooted in much wider social struggles and movements propelled by free people of color, political and religious radicals, and slave rebels. He shows how these movements were most effective when they challenged both racism and private property, and that their greatest triumphs coincided with deep-going crisis of the entire social order. This fascinating book distills Blackburn’s extensive and original research into a concise and accessible introduction to the subject.

Available March 2007

160 pages • 5.5 x 8.25 inches Paperback $19.95 • ISBN 1 84467 569 6 Hardcover $84.95 • ISBN 1 84467 113 5

Robin Blackburn is Visiting Distinguished Professor at the Committee on Historical Studies, The New School University, New York; and Professor of Sociology at the University of Essex, United Kingdom.