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Donald Trump's New Strategy for Afghanistan

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Donald Trump's New Strategy for Afghanistan THINK TANK ANALYSIS Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. USA DR. CÉLINE-AGATHE CARO Donald Trump’s New Strategy for MARKUS HEHN Afghanistan November 2017 REACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM LEADING US THINK TANKS www.kas.de/usa His original instinct was, in fact, to pull of the withdrawal of US soldiers will not be out of Afghanistan, explained Donald determined by a fixed date set by politi- Trump on August 21, 2017 in the intro- cians, but exclusively by the conditions on ductory remarks of his speech in Fort the ground. Trump prefers not to talk about Myer. The US president then went on to troop numbers nor the details of his military present the objectives and measures of strategy. The enemies must never know US his “path forward in Afghanistan and plans, he said, so that they could not use South Asia”. 1 The community of ex- that knowledge to their advantage. perts in Washington welcomes some of his decisions, but is generally skeptical In addition, the US president aims at reach- and subsequently recommends further ing a political solution in Afghanistan by in- possible courses of action to the ad- tegrating diplomatic, economic, and military ministration. power instruments and does not rule out potential involvement of the Taliban. But he One Strategy for the Entire Region stressed that the role played by the US would be clearly limited: ”We are not na- Donald Trump’s “new strategy” is founded tion-building again. We are killing terror- on five main pillars. ists.” At the very top of the agenda based on his A further part of the strategy addresses Pa- change of course is the idea that the timing kistan, which neighbors Afghanistan. Trump stated that the United States could no long- er be silent about Pakistan providing safe havens for terrorist organizations and called 1 The New York Times, “Full Transcript and Video: Trump’s Speech on Afghanistan”, August 21st, upon Pakistan to change its course. 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/asia With regard to South Asia, he said that it /trump-speech-afghanistan.html was important to further develop the stra- 2 tegic partnership with India and strengthen hough he still needs to define those condi- Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. its role in Afghanistan, especially in the area tions in detail.4 of economic assistance and development. USA Killing Terrorists instead of Nation-Building DR. CÉLINE-AGATHE CARO To the US soldiers, President Trump prom- MARKUS HEHN ised better equipment and relaxed rules of With Trump having repeatedly emphasized engagement. To this end, Washington a new focus on the fight against terror while should grant greater decision-making au- distancing himself from the aim of nation- November 2017 thority to military personnel who are closer building, many think tank representatives to the front line. consider the revision of US interests a done www.kas.de/usa deal. Conservative think tanks, in particular, Honest Analysis with Good Ideas are very pleased about this. James Jay Carafano from the Heritage Foundation Generally speaking, the conservative think gives one of his commentaries the title 5 tanks are showing greater enthusiasm for “Trump Puts America First in Afghanistan”. the president’s new strategy than the left- leaning ones. But in view of the difficulties Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center ar- of the longest war the US has ever been gues that to be effective, a strategy needs engaged in, the latter have also welcomed clearly defined objectives. He believes that some of Donald Trump’s decisions. Trump has now fulfilled this condition by focusing on the fight against terror.6 In this “Conditions” instead of “Time” context, Roger L. Simon calls attention to the lessons learned from the attacks of Sep- An overwhelming majority across all think tember 11, 2001. Afghanistan must not tanks agree that the US engagement should once again become a staging area for inter- continue in principle because it is against national terrorism, stresses the expert from the US’ own interests to leave the conflict to the Hoover Institution in justification of his 7 local forces or private contractors in the be- support for a continued US engagement. lief that doing so could increase the chances But Simon goes on to say that this does not of success. This is the position put forward mean that the US should waste one minute by Max Boot from the Council on Foreign trying to “turn places like Afghanistan or Relations (CFR), for example, who warns Iraq into Denmark”. that the use of private contractors would add fresh hazards due to the lack of clarity It is predominantly conservative experts about the relationship between them and who approve this rejection of nation- regular forces, such as in the event of illegal building as a goal. “So the endgame is not conduct or emergency situations. 2 to rebuild the Afghan nation,” emphasizes James Carafano (Heritage), for example.8 Calls by think tank experts for more US “The chief result of nation-building pro- troops or, conversely, for a complete Ameri- grams under Bush and Obama has been to can withdrawal from Afghanistan are few and far between. 4 Michael Rubin, “There’s too much at stake in Af- “The best part of Trump’s speech was what ghanistan for Trump to fail”, AEI, August 21st, he did not say,” comments Shuja Nawaz 2017. http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/theres-too- from the Atlantic Council, meaning that, un- much-at-stake-in-afghanistan-for-trump-to- like his predecessor, Donald Trump had not fail/article/2632185 5 James Jay Carafano, “Trump Puts America First declared a date for the withdrawal of US rd 3 in Afghanistan”, Heritage Foundation, August 23 , troops from Afghanistan. On behalf of the 2017. American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Michael http://www.heritage.org/middle- Rubin writes that Trump is absolutely cor- east/commentary/trump-puts-america-first- afghanistan rect in his conditions-based approach, alt- 6 Michael Kugelman, “Trump Gets Counterterror- ism Strategy Right on Afghanistan”, Wilson Cen- ter, August 24, 2017. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/trump-gets- counterterrorism-strategy-right-afghanistan 2 Max Boot, “Trump’s Path to Indefinite Afghan 7 Roger L. Simon, “Trump Makes the Right Deci- War”, CFR, August 22nd, 2017. sion on Afghanistan... and Pakistan”, Hoover Insti- https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/trumps-path- tution, August 21st, 2017. indefinite-afghan-war https://pjmedia.com/rogerlsimon/2017/08/21/tru 3 Shuja Nawaz, “Trump Misses an Opportunity in mp-makes-right-decision-afghanistan-pakistan/ Afghanistan”, Atlantic Council, August 22nd, 2017. 8 James Jay Carafano, „Afghanistan by the Num- http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new- bers“, Heritage Foundation, August 26, 2017. atlanticist/trump-misses-an-opportunity-in- http://www.heritage.org/middle- afghanistan east/commentary/afghanistan-the-numbers 3 spark corruption, which corrodes security”, Coffey (Heritage Foundation) sees Trump’s Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. thinks Michael Rubin (AEI).9 But for Anthony firmness in his stance towards Pakistan as Cordesman from the Center for Strategic crucial to his regional approach and suc- USA and International Studies (CSIS): “It is one ceeding where his predecessors’ endeavors 14 DR. CÉLINE-AGATHE CARO thing to give up the futile US efforts to use failed. aid to transform the political, legal, and MARKUS HEHN economic system of a nation from the out- Much Military and Little Governance side and do so regardless of its cultural val- November 2017 ues and the views and needs of its deeply Despite a certain amount of positive feed- divided peoples. It is quite another not to back, the picture overall is dominated by www.kas.de/usa help and push them into shaping and exe- criticism – criticism that relates not only to cuting their own reform programs when the content of the new strategy but also to these are vital to their survival, progress, Washington’s so-called “swamp”. unity, and stability.”10 Laurel Miller from the RAND Corporation, however, emphasizes Trump Repeats Predecessors’ Mistakes that Trump’s strategy would require the US to continue with its engagement in nation- building. In her eyes it is not, as many Alyssa Ayres from the CFR titles her ana- maintain, a matter of re-making the country lysis “The Not-So-New ‘New’ South Asia Strategy”15, reflecting the sentiment of “in our own image”. Instead, nation-building is part of the US counter-insurgency strate- some of her colleagues, who do not accept the word “new” in this context. In terms of gy – the idea being that the Afghan gov- ernment must have the political and institu- content, their criticism is aimed at station- tional wherewithal to win and maintain the ing “new” US troops in Afghanistan, and this 11 applies across the board, whatever their po- population's support. litical orientation. Pakistan is Part of the Picture “If we couldn’t win with 100,000 troops un- der President Obama, how will just one-fifth There is a greater consensus among the ex- as many prevail?”, asks Rich Barlow from pert community on the idea that there is a the Hoover Institution, for instance.16 His need for a regional strategy to solve the opinion is shared by experts at the Cato In- conflict in Afghanistan and that Pakistan stitute, among others. Doug Bandow also plays a crucial role. Daniel L. Byman from makes reference to the substantially higher the Brookings Institution writes that even numbers of troops in the pre-Trump era and though a change of course in Islamabad’s adds that the increase in troop levels that dealing with terrorists would be difficult to seems to be envisaged would not help the achieve, Trump has at least taken a step Afghan forces.
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