Article Party Politics 1–23 Political realignment and ª The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav democratic breakdown DOI: 10.1177/1354068812458613 in Argentina, 1916–1930 ppq.sagepub.com Eduardo Alema´n University of Houston, TX, USA Sebastian Saiegh UCSD, La Jolla, CA, USA Abstract This article revisits one historical event that has been repeatedly discussed in the literature on democratic breakdown: the rise and fall of Argentine democracy between 1916 and 1930. First, we demonstrate why the claim that demands for drastic redistribution led to democratic breakdown is not a convincing explanation for the 1930 coup. Instead, we contend that the coup was the product of a polarizing political realignment that led to a legitimacy crisis. We evaluate this argument using estimates of Argentine legislators’ latent preferences (ideal points) between 1916 and 1930. Our roll-call data analysis suggests that disputes over socio-economic issues did not precipi- tate the breakdown of the regime. What mattered was the allocation of political power. These findings support the view that stable democracy requires that all major groups in society have a sufficiently large chance of being in power. Keywords Argentina, polarization, regime breakdown, roll-call votes Paper submitted 28 November 2011; accepted for publication 28 July 2012 Introduction Understanding what makes democracies fragile and more likely to break down has generated a great deal of scholarly interest in the field of comparative politics. In the past Corresponding author: Sebastian Saiegh, UCSD, 9500 Gilman Dr. 0521, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA. Email:
[email protected] Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at UNIV CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO on September 20, 2012 2 Party Politics decade alone, several important works in political economy have focused on whether economic development and income inequality affect the stability of democracy.