THE GREAT WAR: COLONIALISM, NATIVE PEOPLES, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND ______

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

California State University, Fullerton ______

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

in

History ______

By

Joey Hwang

Thesis Committee Approval:

Nancy Fitch, Department of History, Chair Jasamin Rostam-Kolayi, Department of History Kristine Dennehy, Department of History

Fall, 2017

ABSTRACT

The popular perception of the Gallipoli campaign, and the Great War as a whole, as the birthplace of Australia and New Zealand as distinct nations from Britain is not inaccurate. The stories of the ANZACs bravely storming the beaches in Turkey remain a sacred part of their national histories. While most historians recognize that the First

World War shaped the two nations, the popular narratives of the war tend to come from a distinctly European perspective. The native peoples of both nations also had a major impact on the development of their national identities, as well as their views of each other. The exploits of the Maori at Gallipoli and the Western Front, as well as continued discrimination against Aboriginal Australians on the home front, had a much stronger influence on the national mythos of both nations than is commonly portrayed.

Furthermore, the war’s impact eroded the “colonials’” opinion of Britain, the mother country, and served to only further exacerbate the growing divisions within the empire.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

LIST OF FIGURES ...... iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... v

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

A Battle in Turkey ...... 1 An Overview of the ANZACs in the Great War ...... 3

2. TRANS-TASMAN RIVALRIES: MAORI AND ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIANS ...... 13

Colonialism and Indigenous Peoples in War ...... 13 Social Darwinist Perspectives ...... 26 Blaming the British ...... 30 The Middle East Theater and the Western Front ...... 31 The Home Front and Post-War Impacts ...... 37 Beginning of the End ...... 47

3. CONCLUSION ...... 51

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 53

iii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. Attestation of Thomas Talbott ...... 19

2. Volunteers or Quitters? ...... 21

3. The Spirit of His Fathers ...... 24

4. The War-Dog of New Zealand ...... 25

5. Pioneer Battalion Performing a Haka for Joseph George Ward at Bois-de- Warnimont, 30 June, 1918 ...... 36

6. Australians Arise! Save Her from this Shame! ...... 39

7. Keep Australia White and Free – Vote No ...... 45

8. Australian Beach Pattern...... 48

9. View upon the South Esk River, Van Diemens Land ...... 49

10. At Templestowe ...... 49

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many people I must thank for their input, support, and encouragement while completing this project. First, I need to thank my Thesis Committee for their support and encouragement regarding such a rather unusual thesis topic and their confidence that such a topic can result in a viable thesis. Dr. Nancy Fitch has been a great source of support throughout the process and aided immensely by loaning me research material and focusing the theme of the thesis as a whole. I also must thank Dr. Jasamin

Rostam-Kolayi and Dr. Kristine Dennehy, who both provided advice and encouragement throughout my time at Cal State, Fullerton, including as an undergraduate. Outside of my committee, I must express my gratitude to Dr. Vanessa Gunther, who as faculty advisor of the Welebaethan, essentially retaught me how to write, without which I never would had finished graduate school, let alone a thesis. Lastly, I must thank Dr. Jochen Burgtorf, who provided many opportunities for me to present my research at conferences and for ensuring such opportunities continue for other history students.

Next, I need to acknowledge all the support I received from my colleagues at the

United States Forest Service, without their encouragement, this project would never be complete. First, I thank my supervisor, Fabian Garcia, whose flexibility regarding my scheduling allowed me to focus on the thesis. Next, I express my gratitude to Ronnisha

Holden, Adrian Mendoza, Marissa Ibarra, Lizbeth Williams, Jessie Ayala, Jonar Rodrigo,

v Dave Herman, David Iniguez, Jason Martin, Lily Nieves, Natosha Mauer, and Jim

Oftedal, all of whose regular encouragement helped push me to the finish line.

My classmates have always been there, all of us moving towards the same goal:

Ben Cartwright, Matt Snider, Dane Royster, Art Tell, Tim Barrette, Eric Ortega, Lindsey

Huysentruyt-Ortega, and others too numerous to mention. Of special note is the one person that almost single-handedly dragged me along the process, my classmate, colleague, and great friend, Johnathan Lozano. It is no exaggeration to say that much progress on this thesis would never have happened without his regular badgering and for that I am forever grateful.

Finally, I thank my family for all their support during the long graduate school years. To my parents, Jimmy and Aileen, and my brothers, Willy and Cory, I owe everything. My aunt, Wen Li, and my maternal grandmother, Shu Er, who help raise me to the person I am today. And lastly, this project is in memoriam to my paternal grandmother, Yu Tsai, who was always there for me before she passed away.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A Battle in Turkey

In the early morning darkness of August 8, 1915, while charging enemy machine guns uphill and despite suffering horrendous casualties, the battle cry, “Ka mate, ka mate!

Ka ora, ka ora!” sounded for each Turkish trench taken.1 The Allies undertook yet another bold attempt to break the stalemate on the Gallipoli Peninsula. With help from naval bombardment and other allied units, by the end of the day, New Zealanders from the Wellington Battalion held the summit of Chunuk Bair. This battle marked the only major Allied victory during the Gallipoli campaign. However, contrary to the popular image of those at the battle, these men not only consisted of Pakeha, or New Zealanders of European descent, but also included Maori, the native peoples of the islands, serving together under arms. While the memory of the Maori at the battle eroded with time, this victory is still commemorated in the local Maori tribes to the present day, as are the contributions of Maori during the Great War as a treasured part of New Zealand’s cultural memory.

On the other hand, Private Michael Flick of the Australian Imperial Force also fought on the peninsula that day. However, unlike almost all of his fellow Australian

1 Maori for “We may die, we may die! We may live, we may live!” JB Condliffe, Te Rangi Hiroa: The Life of Sir Peter Buck (Christchurch: Whitcombe & Tombs, 1971), 132.

2 soldiers, he hid his identity as an Aboriginal Australian, having completed a difficult enlistment process during one of the most racist periods in one of the most racist territories within the British Empire. Despite serving on the front lines and sustaining four wounds during the war, he was still not “a respected soldier as the white man.” After the war, Private Flick returned home with the hope that life would improve for his people. However, when he came back, he got nothing, and was even barred from joining the Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial League of Australia.2

In the grand scheme of the Great War, Chunuk Bair was an insignificant victory.

The Ottomans under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk retook the summit a few days later and the

Allies ended up evacuating the region in December. However, the battlefield contributions of the Maori Contingent during their heroic charge reflects both New

Zealand and Imperial attitudes towards the Maori before the war and shaped their post- war treatment. In contrast, the post-war treatment of Private Flick remains a shameful representation of the racist policies of the Australian government from before the war that carried over into the twentieth century. This divergent treatment of native peoples by the

New Zealand and Australian governments during the war remains an important part of both nations’ history and shapes their history and national identities to this day.

In the context of the Great War, the Gallipoli campaign remains popularly known as the birthplace of Australia and New Zealand as countries separate from the British

Empire due to the contributions of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps

2 Barbara Flick, “They Weren't Allowed In The Gate” (speech, Australian Education Union Annual Federal Conference, January, 2001), Australian Peace Committee. http://www.peacecourier.com/NewslettersSA/werentallowed.htm

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(ANZAC). While the Anzacs represented a minority of the troops at Gallipoli, the casualty ratios suffered on the peninsula by the Anzacs marks the area as sacred ground for peoples ten thousand miles away. Indeed, thousands of New Zealanders and

Australians visit the site for Anzac Day commemorations. However, the popular memory of the war tends to remain distinctly European in nature despite the significance of the war to the two nations’ native populations. The story of native peoples at war is just as much a part of the national mythos as those of Europeans. Even today, the contribution of

Maori soldiers remains comparatively invisible in the national mythos of New Zealand.

Indeed, in many ways, the treatment of native peoples in wartime influenced the national identities of both nations. I hope to show the process by which the peoples of Australia and New Zealand lost their respect for Britain through their experiences in the war and how the development of their nationhood was affected by the presence, or lack thereof, of their respective native populations.

An Overview of the ANZACs in the Great War

The first military action conducted by Australians involved the quick capture of

German New Guinea in September 1914. This early victory severely weakened the

German presence in the Pacific, which was already precarious in any case. Many of these early Australian volunteers also served at Gallipoli.3 However, despite the strategic advantage gained during the attacks, Australians considered the battles were a sideshow and felt “the real war was in Europe.”4 These early campaigns in New Guinea coincided

3 Joan Beaumont, Australia's War 1914–18 (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995), 8.

4 Ibid.

4 with the unopposed New Zealand occupation of German Samoa in August 1914. 5 On

August 15, 1914 the main Australian military formation in the war, the First Australian

Imperial Force (1st AIF), was formed. Initially, the Australian government selected only men in top physical shape for the 1st AIF, resulting in a high number of rejections at the onset of war.6 British plans called for this force to merge with recruits from New Zealand to form a single military unit from the two Pacific Dominions. On October 16, 1914, the main body of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) departed Wellington, New

Zealand’s capital, to link with the Australian forces.7 Departing amid cheers and fanfare, military leaders expected that the war would be quick, with few casualties on both sides.

At the time, the final destination for the Australians and New Zealanders was unknown.

The British command set forth several possibilities, including garrison duty in British

India to replace British Regulars returning to Europe, reinforcements for the

Commonwealth units fighting revolting Boers during the ongoing Maritz rebellion in

South Africa, and deployment in Egypt to check the Ottomans. In the end, the military

5 While the New Zealanders and Australians effectively removed the German forces in the South Pacific, New Guinea also included the last German military holdouts. Major Hermann Detzner and twenty of his soldiers spent the next four years in the New Guinea jungle and did not surrender to Australian forces until January 1919, two months after the armistice. Hermann Detzner, Four Years Among the Cannibals (Pacific Press: Gold Coast, QLD, 2008).

6 P. L. Murray, Official records of the Australian military contingents to the war in South Africa (Melbourne: A.J. Mullett, Australian Government Printer, 1911), 123.

7 Notably, the protection for the troop convoys included the Japanese armored cruiser Ibuki along with the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy, which were instrumental in covering the defenseless troop ships during the Battle of Cocos. The Royal New Zealand Navy was not founded until 1941 and all New Zealand based ships during World War I were organized as part of the Royal Navy. Phillips O’Brien, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922 (London: Routledge, 2009), 142.

5 leadership decided that the combined force would train in England and fight in France due to manpower needs on the Western Front.8

On the way to the front, several ports of call were made in Australia to complete the formation of the combined ANZAC force.9 The troop convoys from New Zealand made several stops in Australian coastal cities to pick up additional recruits. Due to unforeseen circumstances, the military leadership diverted the ANZACs to Egypt for training to escape the English winter. These commanders still assumed that the ANZACs would serve in France, with the stay in Egypt treated as practical training in good weather conditions. In the Unit Diary, Godley wrote, “we shall escape the inclement English winter and have … the best of weather in which to train … then get to the front … the short voyage to Marseilles and in the meantime our troops may have the practical reality of a brush with the Turks or Bedouins.”10

In early 1915, German-Ottoman advances on the British-held Suez Canal led to the first combat action for the ANZACs during the war. However, the Raid on the Suez

Canal resulted in a complete disaster for the Central Powers. While several Ottoman units managed to cross the canal, they took heavy casualties attacking the heavily fortified

British positions and inflicted minimal British Empire casualties. The decisiveness of the battle and disappointment at fighting only smaller battles led to questions as to where the

8 Christopher Pugsley, Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story (Auckland: Reed Books, 1998), 61-62.

9 Despite the name, the ANZACs often included units from other parts of the British Empire, including India and Ireland. It also maintained a substantial proportion of British officers, including its commander, General Sir Alexander Godley, who himself was also of Irish descent.

10 General Sir Alexander Godley, “1 December 1914,” New Zealand Expeditionary Force (Europe) 1914 War Diary (Wellington: New Zealand Government Printer, 1915).

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ANZACs would be deployed next. Rumors circulated that they were not being deployed to France, but would take the fight to the Turks at the Dardanelles.11

The British War Cabinet’s plan, devised by then-First Sea Lord of the Admiralty

Winston Churchill, against the Ottoman Empire involved a decisive strike at

Constantinople. They believed that the quick capture of the Ottoman capital would force a surrender, securing the Suez Canal and allowing for direct Entente assistance to Russia.

The Gallipoli Campaign thus began as a joint British Empire, French, and Russian Naval bombardment against Ottoman fortifications on the outermost forts on the peninsula. As the well protected Ottoman guns required direct hits to destroy, the initial bombardments did little damage. However, the naval attack only served as the precursor to the amphibious invasion that made the Gallipoli Peninsula famous in World War I history.

Optimistic about the initial naval attack, the Greeks offered three divisions for a land invasion, the Russians began preparations for a push from the East, and defensive planning continued in Constantinople.12

Of course, the Dardanelles were a well-defended and narrow waterway, allowing for heavy naval mining and formidable artillery defenses on both sides. The naval operation stalled as Ottoman defenses gained the upper hand, sinking or severely damaging six Entente warships on March 18, 1915. The Allies decided on March 22 that the navies would cease their attacks and instead support an amphibious invasion of the

Gallipoli Peninsula in an attempt to clear the waterway by land in the largest amphibious

11 Richard Stowers, Bloody Gallipoli: The New Zealanders’ Story (Auckland: David Bateman Ltd., 2005), 26.

12 Pugsley, Gallipoli, 91-93.

7 assault in the war.13 The leadership planned for two landings, the ANZACs in the north of the peninsula, and a British-French force in the south. Given the poor performance of

Ottoman troops at Suez, the Entente powers remained confident of a quick victory.

However, this overconfidence evaporated in the coming months.

On April 25, 1915, the ANZACs landed at what is now known as ANZAC Cove, a part of the region that offered substantial terrain advantages to the Ottomans. The beachhead remained in range of Ottoman guns for the duration of the eight-month battle.

Groups of Australians made the first wave, with New Zealanders arriving in later waves.

The initial landing was chaotic, the Ottomans had the upper hand,14 and men had no idea with whom they were fighting. Australian and New Zealand units jumbled together during the attack, despite the structured attack waves. These early combat experiences led to a relaxation of the New Zealand-Australian rivalry as a result of mutual admiration for each other’s bravery. The first day at ANZAC Cove resulted in a bloodbath, with heavy casualties on both sides. Throughout the campaign, Navy guns remained ineffective against the entrenched Turks and failed to properly support the exposed ANZACs on the beaches.

However, the ANZACs and the other Allies successfully secured a relatively stable beachhead. When news of the first day reached Australia, the government concealed the high casualty lists, resulting in a mix of anguish at the losses and pride at the role of the ANZACs at the front. In Australia and New Zealand, the bravery of the

13 Stowers, Bloody Gallipoli, 27-28.

14 The commander of the Ottoman forces, the famed Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, correctly anticipated the ANZAC attacks and deployed his defensive forces accordingly.

8

ANZACs began the legend of the “ANZAC Spirit,”15 the imagined and idealized bravery and heroism of their young men at the front.16 A dispatch by British war correspondent,

Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett17 in 1915 referred to the operation as “no finer feat in the war” and praised the “gallantry” of the ANZAC forces, starting the national myth.18 The perceived successes at Gallipoli and the contribution of “colonials” soon became a celebrated event and a rallying call for more people to enlist.

For the rest of the campaign, attacks and counter-attacks by the combined Entente forces and Atatürk’s Ottoman army essentially resulted in a stalemate and a grind of attrition similar to the trenches on the Western Front. In August, the Entente attempted a series of offensives against the Ottomans and all resulted in failure. Of these offensives, the Battle of Chunuk Bair remains of particular importance to the ANZACs. Chunuk

Bair, a steep hill, represented a major defensive position for the Ottomans. A British

Empire formation took the hill amid heavy casualties, the only real Entente success of the campaign. However, their attacks were for nothing, as the Ottomans retook the hill days later.

15 The concept of the ANZAC Spirit, while an important aspect of Australian National Identity, can be seen as deeply flawed due to the presence of soldiers of other nationalities in the region. Furthermore, Alan Moorehead’s 1956 history of the campaign only perpetuated the myth, only being partially rationalized in Robert Rhodes James more balanced history in 1965. Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (London, H. Hamilton. 1956), Robert Rhodes James, Gallipoli (New York, Macmillan. 1965).

16 Pugsley, Gallipoli, 105-55.

17 Ashmead-Barlett, a British war correspondent at Gallipoli, is credited with perpetuating the legend of the ANZAC Spirit with his continued and glowing praise of the ANZACs during the war.

18 Ellis Ashmead-Barlett, “The Landing, A Stirring Story,” The Lyttelton Times (Canterbury, NZ), May 8th, 1915.

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The failure at Chunuk Bair exemplified the growing resentment against British command on the part of the rank and file. Those killed at the hill included British regulars, ANZACs, Gurkhas, and Indians.19 A sense of solidarity grew among the diverse groups of lower-ranked men, cemented by their mutual animosity towards the generals, the famed “lions led by donkeys.”20 The various peoples who fought at Chunuk Bair began to waver in their recognition of British authority and to see themselves as distinct.

Exemplifying these nationalist attitudes, Second Lieutenant Ormond Edward Burton, an officer from New Zealand, wrote, “the way men died on Chunuk is shaping the deeds yet to be done by the generations still unborn . . . When the August fighting died down there was no longer any question, but that New Zealanders had commenced to realize themselves as a nation.”21

In the ANZAC context, the contributions of Maori soldiers at Gallipoli and especially Chunuk Bair cannot be understated. The responsibility for the initial attacks up the hill fell to New Zealand Mounted Rifles, to which the 500-strong Maori contingent was attached. With their Pakeha comrades, the Maori both took and inflicted heavy casualties against the Ottoman defenders and were instrumental in the initial assaults on

19 Pugsley, Gallipoli, 301.

20 While the origins of the phrase pre-date World War I, it remains unclear when it was popularized. A similar phrase, “An army of sheep led by a lion is better than an army of lions led by a sheep,” is attributed to Alexander the Great, though it remains most likely that the term originated from the Crimean War in reference to the 1855 Siege of Sevastopol and the many failed British attacks during the battle. During World War I, the phrase was first used by German officers to praise the bravery and fighting ability of their foes while disparaging their leaders. After the war, the phrase was popularized by MP Alan Clark’s 1961 The Donkeys, which focused on the political maneuverings of British commanders during the war. Alan Clark, The Donkeys (London: Hutchinson, 1961).

21 Ormond Edward Burton, The Silent Division: New Zealanders at the Front 1914-1919 (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1935), 120.

10 the foothills. Indeed, these initial attacks represented the only real “victories” during the

Battle of Chunuk Bair, and by extension, the entire Gallipoli campaign. However, the successful Ottoman counterattacks days later made such gains pointless. In the end,

Maori soldiers lost 17 dead, 89 wounded, and two missing fighting in the foothills, but, despite the small number of Maori present, forever earned the respect of their Pakeha countrymen. One New Zealand officer wrote, “They fought beside me on the peninsular and by jove they are marvelous fighters. I don't think I shall ever see better. In New

Zealand I never gave them a single thought. I have changed.”22 After the battle, Apirana

Ngata,23 then a member of the New Zealand Parliament, wrote the song Te ope tuatahi, or Our First War Band, to honor those Maori who fell during the battle. The first verse translates as: “We greet our first war band, From Aotea-roa, From the Island of

Greenstone, We sing of our warriors, Our gallant Five Hundred, The chosen heroes, Of

Tu-mata-uenga, The Angry-Eyed War God. Some fell in Egypt, Some on Gallipoli; Now pangs of sharp sorrow, Our sad hearts are piercing.”24 Maori leaders later used the song to encourage Maori enlistments, and the Maori Pioneer Battalion later adopted it as their battalion anthem in France.

22 Australian Associated Press, “Maori battalion terrified the Turkish at Gallipoli.” News Hub, last modified April 11, 2015, http://www.newshub.co.nz/nznews/maori-battalion-terrified-the-turkish-at- gallipoli-2015041209.

23 Sir Apirana Ngata remains known as one of the foremost Maori leaders from the period, protecting Maori interests, while working closely with his Pakeha partners.

24 James Cowan, The Maoris in the Great War (Auckland: Maori Regimental Committee, 1926), 179-80.

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On December 20, 1915, the British Secretary of State for War, Herbert Kitchener, finally decided to evacuate the peninsula. The evacuation, arguably the most “successful” aspect of the entire campaign, saved men who would likely have perished had they stayed, though the idea of any retreat was seen as a major failure. The Entente forces essentially snuck out, utilizing ruses, including self-firing rifles devised by Australian

Private William Scurry,25 in order to disguise the timing of the retreat. While the fleeing forces left behind substantial materiel, Ottoman forces only inflicted minimal casualties during the retreat, thus the so-called “success.”

After the evacuation, the ANZACs returned to Egypt for reorganization and reassignment. The vast majority of ANZACs, both veterans of Gallipoli and fresh recruits from home, transferred to Bulford Camp in England to prepare for combat in Europe.

However, the ANZAC Mounted Division remained in Egypt and took part in the Sinai and Palestine campaigns26 as part of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF).27 On

August 3, 1916, the Ottomans and Germans made a final attempt at capturing the Suez

Canal. The resulting Battle of Romani resulted in an Allied victory, with a substantial proportion of the defenders being members of the EEF. The unit was decisively successful against the Ottomans for the rest of the war, essentially reversing their fortunes

25 Harvey Broadbent, Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore (Camberwell, Vic: Viking, 2005), 260.

26 Of note, both sides included veterans of the Gallipoli Campaign. Indeed, Atatürk was in command of the defending Ottoman forces for various periods of time during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign.

27 New Zealand Ministry for Culture & Heritage, “Overview – Sinai Campaign,” New Zealand History Online, December 20, 2012, nzhistory.net.nz

12 from Gallipoli. During the three-year campaign, the EEF pushed north from the Sinai and knocked the Ottomans out of the war a month before Armistice Day.28

While the ANZACs in Palestine enjoyed continued success, the majority of their fellow countrymen, sent to Europe, went through much the same fate as most other soldiers of the British Empire—Fstuck in the trenches on the Western Front. Most notably, the Battles of Passchendaele and Fromelles bear special mention due to the high cost of human life. New Zealanders took part in two attacks during the battle, only the first successful. However, the second, on October 12, 1917, remains the bloodiest day in

New Zealand history. Six percent of all New Zealand casualties during the war happened on the 12th. More New Zealanders died that day than on any other, including the early

Maori Wars (including Maori casualties) and the entirety of World War II.29 In addition,

Fromelles remains the bloodiest day in Australian history and resulted in the only exclusively Australian war cemetery of World War I.30

28 Sir Frederick Maurice, The Armistices of 1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), 85-87.

29 Glyn Harper, Massacre at Passchendaele: The New Zealand Story (Auckland: Harper Collins, 2000), 10.

30 Commonwealth War Graves Commission, “V.C. Corner Australian Cemetery and Memorial.” https://www.cwgc.org/find-a-cemetery/cemetery/78900/v.c.-corner-australian-cemetery-and-memorial,- fromelles/

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CHAPTER 2

TRANS-TASMAN RIVALRIES: MAORI AND ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIANS

Colonialism and Indigenous Peoples

British colonization in Australia followed a similar path compared to the other white setter colonies in the Commonwealth. The pre-war, and much of the post-war, history of Australia is essentially one of racism and the subjugation of non-white minorities. Conflict and violence between Europeans and indigenous Australians were commonplace from the onset of penal colonization in 1788 and persisted intermittently until 1934.31 The legacy of the Frontier Wars remains contentious as a political “History

War” debate regarding how to treat the subject in Australian schools that continues to this day.32 With the mass immigration stemming from the Australian gold rushes in the second half of the nineteenth century, white Australians, as part of the White Australia

31 While 1934 marked the end of violent confrontation, legal racial discrimination persisted until the 1980s, with many other indigenous rights issues remaining unresolved. John Coates, An Atlas of Australia’s Wars, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 12.

32 The term “History War” refers to the debate over how Aboriginal history should be portrayed. This is exemplified by the backlash over the National Museum of Australia’s focused exhibits on the Indigenous history of Australians after 1980. While the debate is treated as political, it also contains elements of the fight against “history from below” as commentators from the Australian right claim the renewed focus on Aboriginals takes away from the achievements of individual white Australians. Kylie Message, “Culture, Citizenship and Australian Multiculturalism: The Contest Over Identity Formation at the National Museum of Australia,” Humanities Research 15, no. 2 (2009): 29-32.

14

Policy, pushed for the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 to limit immigration from non-

European migrants.33

In contrast, British colonization in New Zealand followed a somewhat different path compared to the rest of the Commonwealth, it never being a penal colony as one major difference. While war and violence between Europeans and the indigenous people known as the Maori were commonplace at the onset of colonization, the 1840 Treaty of

Waitangi legally recognized Maori as full British subjects.34 While certain provisions of the treaty remain controversial today, especially in regard to the loss of Maori territorial rights, it remains notable as one of the first treaties to grant a group of indigenous peoples equal status to Englishmen. This allowed the “civilized” Maori to become accepted into mainstream Western society more readily compared to other native peoples. Indeed, in

1867, Maori men were granted universal suffrage through the Maori Representation Act, which exempted land ownership requirements for voters due to Maori tribes owning their territories communally. The act also allocated four seats in the New Zealand Parliament to Maori.35 Notably, this had the radical effect of providing universal suffrage for Maori men three years before all men of European descent. Non-landowning white men were only granted the vote in 1867.36 That said, New Zealand would later be the first country

33 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Immigration Restriction Act 1901. National Archives Australia.

34 Treaty of Waitangi. Archives New Zealand.

35 New Zealand Parliament, Maori Representation Act 1867. Archives New Zealand.

36 New Zealand Parliament, Qualification of Electors Act 1879. Archives New Zealand.

15 in the world with universal suffrage, granting women, including Maori, the right to vote in 1893.37

In another odd twist, even before the war, Australians treated Maori better than they treated their own indigenous people. The Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902, intended to give women the right to vote, also legally restricted the vote in Australia only to European and Maori British subjects, stating, “No aboriginal native of Australia Asia

Africa or the Islands of the Pacific except [emphasis added] New Zealand shall be entitled to have his name placed on an Electoral Roll.”38 As Parliament debated the act,

King O'Malley, a Member of the Australian Parliament and later Minister of Home

Affairs, declared, “An aboriginal [Australian] is not as intelligent as a Maori. There is no scientific evidence that he is a human being at all.”39 While the cultural exploitation of the Maori is evident, especially the narrative of “civilizing” natives, they could maintain their traditions and were clearly much better off than the aboriginal Australians or Indians in the British Raj.

Like the citizens of most nations involved in the conflict, Australians and New

Zealanders greeted the outbreak of war with enthusiasm, immediately pledging support to the “mother country.” A day after Britain’s declaration of war on August 4, 1914, Prime

Minister Joseph Cook stated, “Australia is part of the empire to the full. Remember that

37 New Zealand Parliament, Electoral Act 1893. Archives New Zealand.

38 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902. National Archives Australia.

39 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Official Hansard, 23 April 1902. National Archives Australia.

16 when the empire is at war, so is Australia at war.”40 This early pro-war enthusiasm would die down as the conflict unfolded, with dire consequences for Australian society. The same was true for New Zealand: writing after the war, Lieutenant Burton stated, “When

New Zealanders went to war, they were ignorant of its causes and innocent of its meaning. No alternative was suggested by the politicians or the press or the [clergy].”41

Burton, decorated for gallantry during the conflict, became disillusioned with war after the Treaty of Versailles. He later became a pacifist and was imprisoned during World

War II for opposition to war.42 While his pacifist stance put him at odds with the government and other New Zealanders, his initial response to the war exemplifies the early pro-war enthusiasm in 1914.

Despite the similarities in their response to the war, the differing colonial histories certainly impacted the formation of separate identities between New Zealanders and

Australians to a small degree. While being transported to the front, New Zealanders were granted shore leaves on the Australian coast. During these leaves, early indications of splits between the two countries emerged. In the Tasmanian capital of Hobart, the populace welcomed the New Zealanders and later paraded with their Australian counterparts, but the unprofessional conduct of Australian soldiers created a sense of superiority among the Kiwis. British General Sir Alexander Godley, commander of the

ANZACs, in a letter to New Zealand’s Defense Minister, James Allen, wrote of the

40 Les Carlyon, Gallipoli (Sydney: Macmillan, 2001), 109.

41 Burton, 121.

42 David Grant, “Burton, Ormond Edward,” Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, June 5, 2013, teara.govt.nz.

17

Australians, “the Tasmanian ships that left yesterday . . . had a great many absentees . . . a considerable number of men had to be put forcibly onboard . . . Their behavior was so bad that they were forced to send them out to Norfolk Bay [Convict Station].”43 This also played into the cultural stereotypes of Australians being the descendants of British convicts. Trooper44 Roderick McCandlish, in a letter to his mother, noted, “we are all

New Zealanders and now that we are away from our own country we all stick together like glue . . . [Australian civilians] say . . . we are a better and smarter looking lot of troops than their own.”45

The Kiwi treatment of Maori also emerged as a major source of friction between them and both the British and Australians. Overcoming fierce opposition from British officers against so-called “native” troops, the New Zealand (Maori) Pioneer Battalion was among the first non-white and non-Indian units deployed in France.46 Indeed, British authorities remained reluctant to accept Maori military units until they first recruited

Indian troops.47 This comparatively mild treatment of the Maori stands in strong contrast to the then-ongoing violence and repression against Australian Aborigines. Thus, while

43 General Sir Alexander Godley to Sir James Allen, GCMG, KCB, October 21, 1914. Archives New Zealand.

44 “Trooper” and “Private” are equivalent ranks in the New Zealand military. Military trade dictates which rank is used.

45 Trooper Roderick McCandlish to Mrs. M.A. McCandlish, October 1, 1914. New Zealand National Army Museum Archives.

46 While the British historically utilized native troops throughout the growth of the British Empire, Indian sepoys tended to be the most widespread non-White soldiers deployed.

47 P.S. O’Connor, “The Recruitment of Maori Soldiers, 1914-1918,” Political Science 19 (1967): 49.

18 on shore leave in Australia, New Zealanders gained a reputation for being too soft on natives. Australian soldiers perceived them as unable to deal with the so-called “real niggers,” in this case Aboriginal Australians and other native populations.48

This closeness between white New Zealanders and the Maori later contributed to cultural clashes with the Australians and British. In stark contrast, the Australians disallowed Aboriginal Australians, and indeed, most non-Europeans, from enlisting in any capacity. Those who wished to serve had to disguise their identities as Maori or

Indians in order to fight and even then, they would serve in either the New Zealand’s or

Indian armed forces, not the Australian Army. 49 Indeed, Aboriginal Australians saw serving in an overseas campaign as one of the few ways they could escape racial discrimination at the time, by leaving Australia.50 As seen in Figure 1, the Australian

Imperial Force only permitted enlistment from peoples of European descent, automatically rejecting all others. With similar enlistment policies in other British territories, this resulted in New Zealand having a much higher proportion of its native peoples under arms compared to the rest of the British Empire, with the exception of

India, while Australia had almost none. This ethical superiority, imagined or otherwise, in regards to racial issues also contributed to stronger differentiation between the “morally superior” Kiwis and “racist” Australians in a postcolonial narrative of nonracist

48 Suzanne Welborn, Lords of Death: A People, A Place, A Legend (Freemantle: Freemantle Press, 1982), 61.

49 Over time, casualties increased and Australian enlistment rules were relaxed later in the war. While this allowed for more white Australians to qualify, Aboriginal Australians were still not permitted to serve openly and still had to disguise their identities.

50 “Lest We Forget,” Message Stick. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (Sydney:ABC1, April 23, 2007).

19 governance of both colonial and independent New Zealand. In short, this narrative was grounded in a supposed “better” history of race relations.

Figure 1. Attestation of Thomas Talbott. 1917. National Archives of Australia.

20

Given that indigenous Australians had to conceal their identities to enlist and that they often served in other nation’s militaries, the true numbers of those serving remains difficult to determine. Indeed as seen in Figure 2, the Australian government promoted retaining a “white Australia” in its recruitment material and appealed to Australian’s perceived racial superiority. Ironically, Aboriginal Australians who attempted to enlist often did so out of loyalty to King and Country, and many believed that by joining the war effort, they would gain rights previously denied.51

In Egypt, however, the British and Australians again considered the positive treatment of the “natives” by Kiwis negatively and as “too soft.” As a result, General

Godley issued a special order to the New Zealand contingent in regard to their contact with the “natives” in the British Protectorate in Egypt:

. . . The natives in Egypt have nothing in common with the Maoris. They belong to races lower in the human scale, and cannot be treated in the same manner. The slightest familiarity with them will breed contempt which is certain to have the most far-reaching and harmful consequences. Every member of the Force in Egypt is charged with the enormous responsibility of maintaining the prestige of the British race . . . their point of view being so different from that of Europeans or Maoris . . . All ranks are asked to co-operate in preventing . . . men mixing with the natives . . . In connection with the foregoing the extreme danger of having any intercourse with native women is to be brought to the notice of the men. Syphilis in a most virulent form is rampant in Cairo, and men having connection with prostitutes are running the gravest possible risks. Forms of venereal disease are far more severe in Oriental countries than in New Zealand or England, and such diseases are certainly far more common. The native drinks are generally the vilest concoctions possible; are most potent, an almost certain cause of illness, and cannot be taken with impunity.52

51 Philippa Scarlett, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Volunteers for the AIF (Macquarie, ACT: Indigenous Histories, 2015), 67.

52 General Sir Alexander Godley, Special General Order, 30th November 1914 at Suez. Archives New Zealand.

21

Figure 2. J. Newland. Volunteers or Quitters?. 1916. State Library of South Australia.

22

Godley’s order reveals two important trends in his and the British leadership’s mindset. First, despite being British, he appeared to have accepted Maori as possibly on par with Europeans, at least compared to Egyptians. There seems to be a tacit understanding that “civilized” Maori can be seen as part of the “British race,” at least to some degree, as he addressed the entire NZEF. Secondly, despite his acceptance of Maori soldiers, he still maintained the stereotypical British attitude towards other native peoples, a trait seemingly absent from his Kiwi subordinates; otherwise, he would not have needed to give such an order. Indeed, much of his order focuses on sexual relations with Egyptians and the prevention of “race mixing” and venereal disease. Due to regular intermarriage between Europeans and Maori, mixed race New Zealanders were quite common. Indeed, Te Rangi Hiroa, or Sir Peter Buck, who served at Gallipoli and later became a prominent Maori leader—and himself mixed race—believed intermarriage allowed for “a future type of New-Zealander in which . . . the best features of the Maori race will be perpetuated forever.”53 However, imperial British authority generally remained racist towards Maori military units. While Maori were legally equal, even having representation in the New Zealand Parliament, they were initially only permitted to serve in garrison duty. Thus, this reflected a degree of internal racism on the part of the British, not the Kiwis themselves. White New Zealander solidarity with Maori, especially in regard to their military acumen, in contrast to British attitudes, reflects the belief of a unified “New Zealander race.”

53 Angela Wanhalla, “Intermarriage - Intermarriage in colonial society,” Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, May 5, 2011, teara.govt.nz.

23

Furthermore, as with certain ethnic groups in British India, such as the Sikhs, the

British considered Maori a “martial race,” thereby supporting the belief that certain races and tribes were inherently better suited for combat. Furthermore, Maori saw military service as a way to show white New Zealanders they deserved their equal citizenship rights in a period when the British Empire denied other native people said rights. As seen in Figure 3, a Maori soldier charges a Turkish trench with the fighting spirit of his ancestors. In Figure 4, the English bulldog, popularly a mascot for the United Kingdom

(and, by extension, the British Empire), portrayed with a Maori face tattoo, headdress, and pendant atop the Union Jack and the New Zealand flag, is called the “War-dog of

New Zealand.” These depictions further emphasized the “acceptance” of Maori within the framework of the British Empire. Indeed, compared to the other white-settler colonies, New Zealand uniquely portrayed their native population as fighting men in wartime propaganda. In stark contrast, no similar depictions of indigenous Australians exist from the war, further emphasizing this divergent treatment of native peoples.

24

Figure 3. William Blomfield, The Spirit of His Fathers. 1915. National Library of New Zealand.

25

Figure 4. John Douglas Perrett, The War-Dog of New Zealand. 1914. Christchurch City Libraries.

26

Despite the ANZAC acronym and their union in a combined military unit, relations between the Australians and New Zealanders in Cairo remained tepid at best.

While natural competitiveness was part of it, a growing sense of national pride defined both sides. New Zealanders were jealous of the size of the Australian force, while

Australians saw the Kiwis as “pale imitations” of themselves.54 The diaries and letters of

New Zealand soldiers reveal this animosity. Lieutenant Colonel William George Malone, an English immigrant to New Zealand and commander of the Wellington Infantry

Battalion, wrote of the Australians, “They seem a slack lot. Perhaps it is my prejudice against Australians. I have it, I know, but I cannot say why.”55 On the other hand, Charles

Bean, the Australian war correspondent, wrote of the New Zealanders, “There is no question that the Australian leaves the N. Zealander behind.”56 However, despite such dislike, New Zealand provided too few troops to form a separate division, and military necessity required joining the Australians.

Social Darwinist Perspectives

The idea of a shared “Britishness” with Great Britain at the onset of the war gradually diminished as the war dragged on. The poor decisions by British military leaders and the resulting casualties certainly contributed to these changing attitudes, but represents only part of this growing cultural rift. In many ways, the diminishing

54 Pugsley, Gallipoli, 80.

55 Lieutenant Colonel William George Malone, Diary Entry, November 11, 1914. New Zealand National Army Museum Archives.

56 C. E. W. Bean, Gallipoli Correspondent: The Frontline Diary of C. E. W.Bean (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1983), 82-83.

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“Britishness” also exacerbated the existing rifts between Australia and New Zealand.

Interestingly, much of these divergences can be rooted in a degree of racist and Social

Darwinist thinking against the British and each other.

As British colonies since the late eighteenth century, both Australia and New

Zealand had majority native-born populations by the time of the Great War. While the earliest period of colonization resulted in the characterization of Great Britain as the

“protector and benefactor” of the colonies, the population growth of “native-born” people caused a noticeable shift in their perceptions. As early settlers tended to be those from the less the well-off (and convicts in the case of Australia), the class system present in the

Mother country was less pronounced in the Dominions. This paradigm initially created the belief that “colonials” represented inferior peoples. The British believed white civilization would be inhibited in the colonies without the presence of “cultured” elites and upper classes. However, this paradigm was turned on its head by the war, as the

“colonials” believed that they, not those born in the UK, represented the superior version of the British race because they had tamed their “savage” lands for the empire.57 This colonial “frontiersman” symbolized men in the British pre-industrial past, with industrialization supposedly weakening the British working classes.

In his frontline diary, Charles Bean’s descriptions of Australian soldiers played a large role in shaping this perception of the “superior” Australian man compared to the other parts of the British Empire. While serving on the Gallipoli Peninsula, Bean believed that, with the exception of upper classes, the British race degenerated over time, that

57 Mark David Sheftall, Altered Memories of the Great War: Divergent Narratives of Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 39-40.

28

“after 100 years of breeding in slums, the British race was not the same, as in the days of

Waterloo.” Bean felt that British colonists from the white Dominions were superior because of living in a more hostile environment and believed, “The only hope is that those punt, narrow-chested little men [referring to the British] may, if they come out to

Australia, N.Z. or Canada, within 2 generations breed men again. England herself . . . cannot hope to do so.” Notably, Bean also considered Nepali Gurkhas, as well as other

“martial races,” as militarily superior to the British, especially those groups considered

“civilized”—those who served the empire in her colonial campaigns (though, as non- whites, not as equals in society).58

However, Bean also revealed a degree of disdain for the New Zealanders’ treatment of the Turks. “There is a clear and interesting difference between the N.

Zealander and the Australian. The New Zealander regards the Turk much more kindly than our men. ‘Kind hearted beggars, the N. Zealanders,’ said one of our chaps the other day; ‘a Turk snipes them and they catch the beggar and take him by the hand and lead him down to the beach.” Bean is referring to New Zealanders disregarding orders to take no prisoners. As such, this further cements the perception that New Zealanders remained less racist in thinking than their Australian counterparts. To Bean and other Australians, these attitudes represented a troubling future for the so-called British Race.

In addition, Bean considered New Zealander soldiers to be less effective than

Australians, though still better than British ones, partially by copying them. “The N.Z. man is a good trustworthy soldier; but has not the devil of the Australians in him; the

58 Bean, 155-156.

29 wild, pastoral independent life of Australia . . . makes superb soldiers . . . The N.Z. men came to imitate the Australians.”59

However, Bean’s biased view of the British and, to a lesser extent, the New

Zealanders was not unique. The idea of the “superior” colonist in the Dominions certainly appeared in New Zealander’s thinking as well. One New Zealand soldier wrote, “I don’t think much of the Tommies and there are great tales told of their bravery . . . I can’t stand them myself; that is the class we have fighting with us.”60 Due to the peace after the New

Zealand Wars61 and the high proportion of intermarriage following, New Zealanders now saw themselves as a blend of the “martial” Maori and European stock, creating the ideal soldier.62 While an important romantic view in establishing New Zealand identity, it conveniently ignores that it was British troops that did much of the fighting during the colonial wars, not the New Zealand militias or other colonial units as commonly believed. This romanticized view again appeared in Gallipoli, with Maori teaching their white counterparts the traditional Haka war dance, which was performed before attacking enemy positions.63

59 Ibid., 82-83.

60 Nancy Croad, My Dear Home: The Letters of Three Knight Brothers Who Gave Their Lives During World War I (Auckland: Nancy Croad, 1995), 61.

61 The final colonial wars on the islands ended in 1872. The last few skirmishes were generally over land disputes between the Maori tribes and the Crown.

62 Sheftall, 41-42.

63 E. C. Buley, Glorious Deeds of Australasians in the Great War (London: Andrew Melrose, Ltd., 1916), 183-86.

30

Blaming the British

Just as in Britain itself, the Dominions greeted the start of war with enthusiasm, believing it would end in victory “before Christmas.” Of course, at the time no one could foresee the coming bloodshed, which disproportionately affected the British colonies.

Indeed, some leaders expressed concern that the war would end before colonial troops could even make it to the Western Front.

Of course, the first taste of real combat for the Australians and New Zealanders did not take place in Western Europe, but on the Gallipoli Peninsula in modern-day

Turkey. Churchill envisioned an easy victory: the capture of Constantinople to knock the

Ottoman Empire out of the war and to open a link to the Russian Empire. The belief that the Turks remained the “sick man of Europe” led to the delusion that such an operation would be simple. As noted before, the majority of troops sent to Gallipoli were not

ANZACs, though given the Dominions’ small populations, rising casualties on the peninsula disproportionally affected Australians and New Zealanders. Apart from the initial landings, little territory was gained, and the situation in the peninsula devolved into a Western Front style stalemate. The British generally took the blame for these operational failures, from the leadership to the enlisted ranks. New Zealand Private

Alfred Edward Smith penned, “The men are horribly bitter against Winston Churchill.

They say we are sent here with no guns, little ammunition, no airplanes, and the whole adventure is a betrayal.”64 An Australian soldier wrote of the Tommy, “[F]or me the

British soldier is ever branded as all that is incompetent, useless, lazy and good for

64 Private Alfred Edward Smith., Letter dated June 20, 1978. National Library of New Zealand.

31 nothing . . . Once I used to worship the British soldier as a hero and was proud to be a

Briton, but jigger me if I am now . . . for we see nothing but British blundering, boasting, bullying, bluff and blasting failure and doing nothing.”65

While the criticisms against British troops and leadership were not completely without merit, their more immediate effect was the complete breakdown of trust

ANZACs had for their British commanders and comrades in arms. This resulted in the insistence after the Gallipoli campaign that colonial officers lead colonial troops.

Notably, this arrangement resulted in the creation of separate commands for Australian and New Zealand units. Despite British insistence that there be a single Australasian command, after the “splendid failure” at Gallipoli, the New Zealand government insisted on the creation of their own headquarters despite their comparatively small number of troops. When the British agreed to this arrangement, New Zealand commanders jealously guarded their military independence in the rest of the war from any further attempts to amalgamate them with Australian command, further crystallizing these divergent national identities.66

The Middle East Theater and the Western Front

After the Gallipoli evacuation, with most of the ANZACs moved to England to prepare for combat on the Western Front, only the mounted units remained in the Middle

East with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. As noted before, the EEF greatly contributed to the victory at the Battle of Romani. However, the British commander in Egypt,

65 Sheftall, 57.

66 Pugsley, Gallipoli, 347.

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General Sir Archibald Murray, while praising the EEF’s fighting ability, downplayed its role in official government dispatches. General Sir Harry Chauvel, the first Australian promoted to general, recommended several of his men for decorations for actions during the battle. However, Sir Murray cancelled the recommendations and instead only awarded medals to the British soldiers present. The clear snubbing of “colonial” servicemen generated more anger among the men given that Murray was far from the front lines and that the British soldiers made up a smaller proportion of the British

Empire troops involved in the battle. While Murray agreed that the ANZACs and their commander were the keystones of Egypt’s defense, not even Sir Chauvel received the decorations he deserved; he ended up turning down a lesser decoration to show solidarity with his men.67

When the final dispatch of the battle, which omitted several details regarding actions by the Australian and New Zealand contingents, was published, Sir Chauvel wrote to his wife Sibyl, “I am afraid my men will be very angry when they see it. I cannot understand why the old man [Sir Murray] cannot do justice to those to whom he owed so much . . . ”68 After 1916, Allied victories in the Middle East continued for the rest of the war. Australians and New Zealanders regularly provided combat veterans for the campaign, men with combat experience in Gallipoli. However, lack of recognition remained a problem. Denials of awards and medals persisted, and the ANZACs remained forgotten in Egypt, stirring up anti-British sentiment among the ranks.

67 Alec Jeffery Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse (Melbourne: Melbourne University, 1978), 86, 93.

68 Ibid. , 86.

33

Despite being British subjects, such resentment solidified the belief that the

British simply did not care about the “colonials” and were taking their sacrifices for granted. Thus, while Sir Chauvel mixed ANZAC and British troops in his military formations for the sake of military effectiveness, the general lack of respect and recognition of the non-British complements prompted formal complaints by the

Australian government. Sir Chauvel wrote of his repeated requests for recognition of his men, “A good many of my recommendations were cut out and . . . those recommended for decorations were not even mentioned in dispatches . . . it is difficult to do anything to right this, but [Sir Murray] should know that there is a great deal of bitterness [among the men].” 69

Of note, a limited number of Australian Aborigines did serve in the EEF, a rare exception to the general restriction on their enlistment. Due to the Aborigines’ familiarity with horses as a result of their mandatory agricultural occupations, they were generally represented in the mounted units serving in the Middle East, including fighting at the

Battle of Beersheba in Southern Palestine.70 Surprisingly, Elyne Mitchell, General

Chauvel’s daughter, recalled of the Aboriginal soldiers:

The 11th [Light Horse] received a batch of reinforcements among whom were thirty Aboriginals, who proved to be very good soldiers. Because of their superb sight and hearing, they were excellent on outpost duty, though one troop sergeant who had four Aborigines on a listing post one night, said that they heard so many

69 Ibid., 122.

70 Timothy C. Winegard, Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions and the First World War (Cambridge: University Press, 2012), 197-98.

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suspicious sounds inaudible to anyone else, that he was compelled to ‘stand to’ all night.71

Despite the bitterness towards the British, the EEF’s successes in the Middle East reversed their fortunes from Gallipoli. On June 27, 1917, Murray was replaced by Field

Marshal Sir Edmund Allenby, a significantly fairer commander. Unlike Murray, Allenby commanded from the front and earned the respect of his men. Invited to write a forward for a book on New Zealand’s contribution to the campaign after the war, he wrote:

[The] New Zealanders were already veteran troops proved in many a battle. Two more years of hardship and danger were to pass before they saw the end of their labors. Two years of unceasing toil, crowned with much glory . . . the men of New Zealand fought and marched to final and complete victory. Nothing daunted these intrepid fighters; to them nothing was impossible. I am proud to have had the honor of commanding them; and they have my congratulations, my thanks and my good wishes.72

On the Western Front, most Maori were reorganized into one military unit, the

New Zealand Pioneer Battalion, though a limited number refused and remained with their original units. Contrary to popular belief, the battalion was not all Maori and had a large number of white New Zealanders in its ranks. The unit did become more Maori during the course of war as all future Maori reinforcements were sent to the battalion.73

Maori served with distinction on the Western Front. Indeed, the Pioneer Battalion was the first New Zealand military unit to arrive at the front during the Battle of the

71 Elyne Mitchell, Light Horse: The Story of Australia’s Mounted Troops (Melbourne: Macmillan Press, 1978), 86.

72 Field Marshal Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby, GCB, GCMG, introduction to The New Zealanders in Sinai and Palestine, by Lieutenant Colonel C. Guy Powers (Auckland: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd., 1922), xiii-xiv.

73 Winegard, 108-09.

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Somme in 1916, digging trenches while exposed to German artillery and gas attacks, the same dangers as their white counterparts. While engaged at the Somme, the battalion was instrumental in constructing an eight-kilometer communication trench called “Turk

Lane.”74

At Passchendaele, again, the bloodiest day in New Zealand’s history, the Pioneers served alongside the white New Zealand infantry. Of note is how Maori saw themselves and their countrymen. Maori Lance Corporal Wiremu Maopo, wrote during the battle, “ .

. . we have been giving Fritz another death knock at Yreps. Our Infantry lost very heavily.”75 Maopo clearly considers the white New Zealand infantry “our” infantry, in contrast to the “Fritzes.” Maori did not see themselves as distinct from their white comrades in arms. This is most clearly seen when Lieutenant Colonel George Augustus

King, commander of the Pioneer Battalion, was killed in action during the battle. Highly regarded by both Maori and whites under his command, at his funeral, the Maori who served under him performed Oiko nei te Matenga, a lament normally reserved for highly- ranked chiefs, a rare tribute for a white man.76

Without a doubt, the Maori were generally more accepted by their comrades and the local populations in France and Belgium. During recreational periods, Maori soldiers played alongside their white New Zealand counterparts in rugby matches against the

74 Cowan, 89-93.

75 Tania Te Rangingangana Simpson, The Last Maopo : The Life and First World War Sacrifice of Wiremu Maopo (Auckland: Libro International, 2014), 103.

76 Ibid., 101.

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French, with haka dances before the match. In Figure 5, Maori soldiers perform the haka for New Zealand Prime Minster Sir Joseph George Ward and other government dignitaries.77

Figure 5. Henry Armytage Sanders, Pioneer Battalion Performing a Haka for Joseph George Ward at Bois-de-Warnimont, 30 June, 1918. 1918. National Library of New Zealand.

In the end, despite the final British victory in the war, the lower ranks, both white and colonial, were generally presented as victims of an aristocratic and uncaring British leadership. Public outcry among those in the colonies, the “victims,” eventually led the

77 Today, the haka is performed for visiting dignitaries to New Zealand, in a continuation of the tradition established on the battlefields of France. Ibid., 119.

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British leadership to acknowledge of their failures. British Prime Minister David Lloyd

George even confirmed the anti-British sentiments in the newly independent colonies.78

The Home Front and Post-War Impacts

As the war went on, increasing numbers of casualties, both New Zealand and

Australia faced the need for more soldiers to replace those lost at the front. As the early enthusiasm for war waned, the number of volunteers plummeted. This forced both nations to consider mandatory conscription, a move that brought the reality of the global war home. The general populace on the home front during these overseas ventures had a dramatic effect on the development of national identity during the war, especially as news from the battlefields trickled into Australia and New Zealand throughout the war. The presentation of such news, and, arguably, propaganda, as well as responses to local crises caused societal divisions with a direct effect on the war effort and the battlefields themselves. Chief among these conflicts involved conscription and industrial strife, with the conscription issues resulting in very different results throughout the British Empire.

Furthermore, the internment of “enemy” aliens by the Australian government added to the problematic racial thinking of Australians during the war. Indeed, labor disputes, conscription, and German internment were all intertwined concepts that threatened the

Australian connection to the British Empire, in stark contrast to the New Zealand home front.

78 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London: Odhams Press Limited, 1938), 909-38.

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After the outbreak of war, the Australian government passed the War Precautions

Act 191479, granting the federal Parliament expanded powers far exceeding those granted in peacetime. It essentially permitted the government to regulate anything that affected the war effort and resulted in a large number of new regulations. During the stalemate at

Gallipoli and as news of the disaster arrived, these regulations became more stringent.

Controversially, the government interned nearly 7000 “enemy” aliens without trial, including British subjects of German or Austrian descent and made it illegal to hide a

German.80 Furthermore, those German-Australians not interned were subject to harassment due to the wartime hysteria. These measures included closing of German schools, clubs, and churches, banning of German foods and music, and the changing of

German place names to British ones.81

These measures became more prevalent and harassment more commonplace as the war wore on as casualty figures from Gallipoli and, later, Ypres, Passchendaele and

Pozieres arrived. With widespread anti-German propaganda, exemplified in Figure 6, these measures had a profound effect on the German population. Ironically, the poster shows Australian cities with German names, a direct reversal of the name change measures done by the Australians.

79 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, War Precautions Act 1914. National Archives Australia.

80 Stephen Thompson, curator. “The Enemy at Home: German Internees in World War I Australia,” Migration Heritage Centre: Powerhouse Museum, Government of New South Wales, 2011. http://www.migrationheritage.nsw.gov.au/exhibition/enemyathome/the-enemy-at-home/index.html

81 Gerhard Fischer, Nadine Helmi, and Stephen Thompson, Internment at Trial Bay during World War One (Ultimo, NSW: Government of New South Wales, 2005.), 30.

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Figure 6. State Recruiting Committee of South Australia, Australians Arise! Save her from this Shame!. 1916. National Library of Australia.

40

In addition to this wartime hysteria, the War Precautions Act created problems in the Australian economy. While the war economy allowed Australian commerce to expand during the war years, quality of life went down as most production moved towards the war effort. The Act allowed the government to perform certain actions previously impossible under the Constitution, such as acquiring the full wheat and wool harvests to feed and clothe the troops.

While government control of the economy faced little opposition in the beginning, soon government overreach resulted in mass strikes and labor disputes. From the late

1890s, Australian trade unions slowly gained political control and by 1914 were a major force in the country.82 The government used the act extensively throughout the war years and beyond to break up and weaken the unions in the name of the war effort. Despite this, trade union membership actually increased from 1914 to 1919, and angry workers continued to conduct strikes throughout the war in response to enforced wage freezes and the later conscription crisis. In the end, despite government actions, the Australian labor disputes resulted in 1,945 industrial disputes, 8,533,061 lost working days and a

£4,785,607 wage deficit. Furthermore, a high proportion of these disputes occurred in

New South Wales, where a large German population resided; indeed, the Australian government later located their internment camps there due to the “enemy” population in the area.83

82 Ernest Scott. Australia During the War. (Canberra, ACT: Australian War Memorial, Government of Australia, 1941), 649-651.

83 Ibid., 667.

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It is unfair to say that the labor disputes were only due to the government fighting laborers and union interests. The fighting in Gallipoli and Europe poured fuel on the fire of anti-German hysteria, especially when the Allies evacuated the Dardanelles. Australian workers refused to work with people of German descent, which resulted in the lost productivity of the first two years of war. This obviously weakened the war effort and a famous instance involved 3,000 coal miners in Western Australia refusing to work with

“enemy” Germans resulting in a Royal Commission to check if the workers the miners opposed were even German nationals.84

Other than affecting wartime production, labor disputes also contributed to the most divisive wartime issue: conscription. The Australian Imperial Force, as an all- volunteer army, experienced a severe shortage of manpower after the high casualty rates in Turkey and the Somme on the Western Front. The Australian government already instituted universal military training since 1911,85 but did not obligate men to serve overseas in times of war. Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes, originally opposed to conscription, after visiting London and the front with the Prime Ministers of Canada and

New Zealand in January 1916, realized that Australia needed more soldiers and began public debate on the issue.86

84 Ibid., 667-68.

85 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth Defence Act 1911. National Archives Australia.

86 Leslie Lloyd Robson, The First A.I.F.: A Study of its Recruitment, 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1982), 85.

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Conscription proponents believed that the honor and safety of the country was at stake; the Allies were fighting militaristic enemies and the country was dependent on the

British Empire for protection. They believed victory alone could ensure this safety and protection and nothing should be spared to secure it. Furthermore, compulsion was needed as, without conscription, the benefits of peace would only be paid by “those young men . . . brave enough to bear it for the benefit of the whole nation.”87

Surprisingly, those opposed to conscription generally agreed that an Allied victory was needed to ensure Australia’s territorial integrity. However, given Australia’s remoteness from the battlefields, the objectors did not see themselves as sufficiently endangered to submit to conscription. Indeed, one of the most active opponents of conscription wrote, “If the country had really been threatened with invasion, there would have been no need for conscription; all but a negligible fraction of those who opposed conscription would have hastened to defend her.”88 Indeed, the main argument against conscription was quite simple; it was not justifiable to force a man to kill another man.89

As mentioned before, labor remained vehemently opposed to conscription, considering it “an instrument of working class subjugation” and “a slavish imitation of the laws, regulations, verbiage, and practices of the Imperial Government.”90 Among the

87 Scott, Australia During the War, 342.

88 Ibid., 343.

89 Ibid.

90 J.M. Main, Conscription: The Australian Debate, 1901 -1970. (Melbourne: Cassel Ltd., 1970), 85.

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Irish-Australian community, a vocal and significant portion of the Dominion’s population, the conscription crisis simply fanned the flames of the community’s historical anti-British sentiment, especially after failure of the Easter Rising in April 1916. In light of expected opposition, any attempt to introduce conscription through Parliament would have been impossible. Thus, Hughes decided to put the question to voters through a public referendum.

Each side of the conscription debate contributed to the creation of an Australian identity after the war as they tried to appeal to voters. The imagery both sides invoked remains part of this identity to this day. Pro-conscription factions utilized abstract concepts such as “freedom and democracy” and loyalty to British civilization. In many cases, conscription opponents invoked their own versions of idealism, encouraging

Australians to unite against oppression and find common cause with the workers in

Germany and Turkey. To them, “freedom and democracy” was not threatened by the

Germans, but by growing authoritarianism at home due to the War Precautions Act.91

Both the pro- and anti-conscription factions also utilized fear and prejudice to further their views. The Australian labor groups and trade unions quickly warned of

“colored” immigration and the use of Aboriginal Australians to replace white workers if conscription was introduced, in a hypocritical reversal of their socialist rhetoric. Indeed, as seen in Figure 7, such views created an effective image for the anti-conscription side.

If the government implemented conscription, the country would be replaced with non- whites, especially Aborigines, and Germans, representing the “unfree,” represented in the

91 Sheftal, 114.

44 phrase “Keep Australia White and Free.” On the other hand, supporters of conscription portrayed the labor activists as “anarchists” who wished to overthrow capitalism. The pro-conscription side also painted Irish-Australian Catholics, a major minority population, as supporters and fellow travelers of Sinn Fein, the Irish Republican Party.92

In the end, the referendum for conscription failed to pass by a narrow margin and did so again in a subsequent vote in 1917.93

In a further division with their Tasman neighbors, the New Zealand government went a different route with regards to conscription. After the failure of the first referendum in Australia, the New Zealand government wished to avoid the “blunder” of allowing a public vote. That said, New Zealand society was rather more pro-conscription to begin with. Labor interests, while also opposed to conscription, tended to be more moderate, with strike actions being more limited in scope and symbolic in nature compared to those in Australia. Furthermore, a higher proportion of anti-conscription workers were in essential fields, such as mining, exempting them in any case.94

92 At the time, Sinn Fein was accused regularly of terrorism, regardless of whether or not they were actually responsible. Given the Easter Rising in 1916, such views were increasingly common in the British Empire.

93 Sheftal, 116-19.

94 Ibid., 121.

45

Figure 7. Australasian Typographical Union, Keep Australia White and Free – Vote No. 1915. Leaflet.

46

That said, conscription did cause some tension on the home front. While the debate was arguably just as polarizing and threatening to national unity, the scale of social upheaval remained far below that in Australia. In stark contrast with Australia, where opposition to conscription included racist attitudes against non-whites, one of the few issues with conscription in New Zealand involved inter-Maori tribal disagreements.

Indeed, there was no equivalent “Keep New Zealand White and Free” sentiment in the country. The government initially exempted Maori from conscription, but leaders from tribes with higher proportions of voluntary enlistments opposed the exemption.

Generally, these pro-conscription tribes consisted of the tribes that allied themselves with the British during the colonial wars and, thus, those considered most “civilized.” They argued that all tribes should contribute equally and that Maori military sacrifices should not be borne by only a few “loyal” tribes. Among tribes with little or no voluntary recruitment, generally those that initially fought the British during the colonial wars, the exemption was supported as a result of opposition to a government that withheld certain rights from natives. 95 It is no coincidence that tribes with higher enlistments were among the earliest considered “civilized” during and after the New Zealand Land Wars. Even after Maori conscription was finally introduced in 1917,96 it exempted several tribes and no conscripted Maori ended up serving overseas.

95 Ibid., 121-23

96 New Zealand Parliament, Military Service Act 1916. Archives New Zealand.

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Beginning of the End

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the patriotic fervor observed from the outbreak of hostilities remained. However, rather than a reflection of support for the

British Empire, there was an outbreak of new nationalistic pride. The glorification of colonial military units certainly had a major impact on the cultural fabric of Australia and

New Zealand upon the return of the troops home.

As mentioned before, a Social Darwinist perspective of a superior colonial soldier emerged during the war. These perspectives gained new currency after the war in conjunction with the vision of a declining British Empire as a result of the war. The

Dominions produced men better, smarter, and stronger than “Tommy” and would soon reign supreme over the Old World. This belief was reflected in the art and literature of the colonies after the war; these works began to focus the distinctiveness of New Zealand or Australian culture, in particular popular depictions of athletic frontiersmen and women as seen in Figure 8. In Australia, these romanticized portrayals had a strong unifying effect among the population. Given the wartime conflicts over conscription exposing ethnic, class, and religious divisions in the country, these post-war works emphasized shared “national” characteristics of all Australians. For example, the Heidelberg School, an art movement that emerged in the 1890s that strove to capture landscapes in a distinctively Australian character, only gained traction after the war. Pre-war depictions of Australia ended up looking like the English countryside due to heavy use of European painting styles. After the war, the Heidelberg School became recognized as a distinct and

48 authentic Australian style that better portrayed the country over the Old World styles.97

Figure 9 exemplifies the early portrayal of Australia as similar to England, while Figure

10 portrays the rugged frontier, replacing the green look of the English countryside with the image of the Australian outback. However, these artistic interpretations also reveal the continued exclusion of Indigenous Australians. Just as these images portray beaches are full of athletic people and the taming of the outback, none of these depictions of

“real” Australia show the native people.

Figure 8. Charles Meere, Australian Beach Pattern. 1940. Art Gallery of New South Wales.

97 Sheftal, 162-63.

49

Figure 9. Joseph Lycett, View upon the South Esk River, Van Diemens Land. 1825. National Library of Australia.

Figure 10. Arthur Streeton, At Templestowe. 1889. Art Gallery of South Australia.

50

Of course, the treatment of native peoples during the war also directly impacted the nature of both nations in the following years. Returning Maori servicemen celebrated and paraded with their Pakeha comrades upon arriving home, but Australian Aborigines only came back to continued discrimination. Indeed, during World War II, the 28th

(Maori) Battalion served with distinction and ended up as the most decorated New

Zealand battalion in that war. In contrast, the Australian government continued to bar

Aborigines from enlisting.

While part of the British Empire and not yet formally independent, both

Dominions signed the Treaty of Versailles and joined the League of Nations with separate membership from Britain. While remaining under British influence and partially dependent on them for defense, both New Zealand and Australia pursued more independent foreign policies. While generally supportive of British policy during the interwar era, Australia and New Zealand did not always vote with the Mother Country in the League. This fomenting distrust and dissent accelerated the push towards full independence.98

98 Gerald Chaudron, “The League of Nations and Imperial Dissent: New Zealand and the British Labour Governments, 1924–31,” Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History 39, no. 1 (2011): 47–71.

51

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSION

The Great War remains among the most transformative events in human history: countless dead and maimed, the fall of empires, and the rise of new nations. The “births” of Australia and New Zealand were only part of the world-shaking events that resulted from the conflict. The people of these far off Pacific islands ended up shaping their own destinies and redefined the meaning of the Mother Country, the colonized, and the colonizer.

Pre-war racial relations cemented as Maori became more accepted within

“civilized” society and served alongside their white counterparts in battle, a rare example of a colonized people granted legal equality to white Europeans. Despite continuing grievances regarding indigenous rights, both the myth and reality of New Zealand race relations served as a symbol of the perceived moral superiority of New Zealanders over both their Australian neighbors and the Mother country. To the Australians, this treatment of Maori was looked down upon, and the military service of indigenous people did little to change the situation of indigenous Australians.

British military incompetence and the perceived genetic inferiority of the

“Tommy” further drove the wedge between the Dominions and the United Kingdom. The lack of recognition and general disrespect on the part of the British leadership and aristocracy only made things worse. The unnecessary loss of life in the Middle East and

52

Europe and the supposed uselessness of the British soldier convinced Australians and

New Zealanders that Britain was doomed and that their lands represented the future of the empire and the only hope to stop further degeneration of the British Race.

The loss of life at the front resulted in a divided response on the part of

Australians and New Zealanders. The conscription crisis in Australia threatened to tear the country apart while enflaming anti-British sentiment and resulted in a dramatic decrease of enlistments after Gallipoli. In contrast, New Zealanders accepted the draft and could argue they contributed more to the war than their Tran-Tasman neighbor in yet another symbol of nationalist fervor.

However, it is the divergent treatment of native peoples that continues, even today, that forms the greatest contrast. Maori served openly and with distinction during the Great War, and were treated largely as close to equals, both at home and at the front.

Aboriginals remained discriminated against, and even those that served were not given their rights when they returned home. The treatment of the native populations remains an important aspect of the national identities of both nations. It is telling that New Zealand enshrines the Maori language as a national language, while that is certainly not the case for Aboriginal languages in Australia.

In the end, underneath the racial strife, loss of life, and blame game, the Great

War cultivated two distinct countries and cultures. However, despite their differences, one can expect millions of New Zealanders and Australians, including Maori and

Aborigines, to commemorate Anzac Day next April 25th.

53

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