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Frontier Technologies for Sustainable Development
E/2018/50/Rev.1 ST/ESA/370 Department of Economic and Social Affairs World Economic and Social Survey 2018 Frontier technologies for sustainable development United Nations New York, 2018 Department of Economic and Social Affairs The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (UN/DESA) is a vital interface between global policies in the economic, social and environmental spheres and national action. The Department’s mission is to promote and support international cooperation in the pursuit of sustainable development for all. Its work is guided by the universal and transformative 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, along with a set of 17 integrated Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. UN/DESA’s work addresses a range of cross- cutting issues that affect peoples’ lives and livelihoods, such as social policy, poverty eradication, employment, social inclusion, inequalities, population, indigenous rights, macroeconomic policy, development finance and cooperation, public sector innovation, forest policy, climate change and sustainable development. To this end, UN/DESA: analyses, generates and compiles a wide range of data and information on development issues; brings together the international community at conferences and summits to address economic and social challenges; supports the formulation of development policies, global standards and norms; supports the implementation of international agreements, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; and assists States in meeting their development challenges through a variety of capacity development initiatives. In carrying out its work, UN/DESA engages with a variety of stakeholders around the world—non-governmental organizations, civil society, the private sector, research and academic organizations, philanthropic foundations and intergovernmental organizations—as well as partner organizations in the United Nations system. -
The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989
FORUM The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989 ✣ Commentaries by Michael Kraus, Anna M. Cienciala, Margaret K. Gnoinska, Douglas Selvage, Molly Pucci, Erik Kulavig, Constantine Pleshakov, and A. Ross Johnson Reply by Mark Kramer and V´ıt Smetana Mark Kramer and V´ıt Smetana, eds. Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014. 563 pp. $133.00 hardcover, $54.99 softcover, $54.99 e-book. EDITOR’S NOTE: In late 2013 the publisher Lexington Books, a division of Rowman & Littlefield, put out the book Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989, edited by Mark Kramer and V´ıt Smetana. The book consists of twenty-four essays by leading scholars who survey the Cold War in East-Central Europe from beginning to end. East-Central Europe was where the Cold War began in the mid-1940s, and it was also where the Cold War ended in 1989–1990. Hence, even though research on the Cold War and its effects in other parts of the world—East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, Africa—has been extremely interesting and valuable, a better understanding of events in Europe is essential to understand why the Cold War began, why it lasted so long, and how it came to an end. A good deal of high-quality scholarship on the Cold War in East-Central Europe has existed for many years, and the literature on this topic has bur- geoned in the post-Cold War period. -
'Europe First' Strategy, 1940-1941
Why ‘Europe First’? The Cultural, Economic and Ideological Underpinnings of America’s ‘Europe First’ Strategy, 1940-1941 “That those threats to the American way of life and to the interests of the United States in Europe, Latin America and the Far East – against which threats the huge new defence program of this country is directed – all stem, in the last analysis from the power of Nazi Germany.”1 “The Atlantic world, unless it destroys itself, will remain infinitely superior in vigor and inventive power to the too prolific and not too well-nourished Orientals.”2 “Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre.”3 Nearly seventy years have passed since the Roosevelt administration tacitly accepted the 'Europe First' policy as the controlling element of American grand strategy in the Second World War. Three generations of historians have traced the genesis and evolution of “the most important strategic concept of the war”.4 Most of the scholarship centres on how the official documents and reports shaped American strategic policy. We know that American war planning began before the US was actively engaged in battle and that the Navy had a prominent voice in matters of strategy. We know that President Franklin D. Roosevelt stayed aloof from the hypothetical discussions of his military 1 Resolution of the Miller Group at the Century Club in New York City on 11 July 1940. As quoted in Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), pp. -
Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-War World Order: Planning for the Conference, the Big Three’S Strategies
YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE’S STRATEGIES Matthew M. Grossberg Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Department of History, Indiana University August 2015 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Master’s Thesis Committee ______________________________ Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair ______________________________ Michael Snodgrass, Ph. D. ______________________________ Monroe Little, Ph. D. ii ©2015 Matthew M. Grossberg iii Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many of the History Department at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. Their contributions are greatly appreciated and sincerely acknowledged. However, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the following: Dr. Anita Morgan, Dr. Nancy Robertson, and Dr. Eric Lindseth who rekindled my love of history and provided me the push I needed to embark on this project. Dr. Elizabeth Monroe and Dr. Robert Barrows for being confidants I could always turn to when this project became overwhelming. Special recognition goes to my committee Dr. Monroe Little and Dr. Michael Snodgrass. Both men provided me assistance upon and beyond the call of duty. Dr. Snodgrass patiently worked with me throughout my time at IUPUI, helping my writing progress immensely. Dr. Little came in at the last minute, saving me from a fate worse than death, another six months of grad school. Most importantly, all credit is due Dr. -
Escaping from the Commodity Dependence Trap Through Technology and Innovation
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT COMMODITIES & DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2021 Escaping from the Commodity Dependence Trap through Technology and Innovation Geneva, 2021 © 2021, United Nations All rights reserved worldwide Requests to reproduce excerpts or to photocopy should be addressed to the Copyright Clearance Center at copyright.com. All other queries on rights and licences, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to: United Nations Publications 405 East 42nd Street New York, New York 10017 United States of America Email: [email protected] Website: https://shop.un.org/ The designations employed and the presentation of material on any map in this work do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Mention of any firm or licensed process does not imply the endorsement of the United Nations. United Nations publication issued by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. UNCTAD/DITC/COM/2021/1 ISBN: 978-92-1-1130188 eISBN: 978-92-1-403046-1 ISSN: 2519-8580 eISSN: 2524-2709 Sales No.: E.21.II.D.14 COMMODITIES & DEVELOPMENT Escaping from the Commodity Dependence Trap through Technology and Innovation REPORT 2021 Acknowledgements The Commodities and Development Report 2021: Escaping from the Commodity Dependence Trap through Technology and Innovation was prepared by Janvier D. Nkurunziza (team leader), Stefan Csordás and Marco Fugazza, from the Commodities Branch of the Division on International Trade and Commodities of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). -
Public Opinion, Foreign Influences and Military Strategists: Why the United States Pursued a Europe First Strategy in World War II
Public Opinion, Foreign Influences and Military Strategists: Why the United States Pursued a Europe First Strategy in World War II Undergraduate Research Thesis Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with honors research distinction in History in the undergraduate colleges of The Ohio State University by Michael Rueger The Ohio State University April 2015 Project Advisor: Professor David Steigerwald. Department of History War strategizing is a long and complicated process that requires extensive planning and analysis. Many different factors come into play with multiple variables changing constantly. As Commander in Chief, the President of the United States is responsible for the definitive decision on war strategy and is required to make decisions in the best interests of American security. World War II proved to be quite complicated and required President Franklin D. Roosevelt to consider many options. Ultimately, Roosevelt was forced to choose between a Europe-first strategy and a Pacific-first strategy in World War II. He chose a Europe-first strategy, with three major factors heavily influencing his decision-making process. The first factor was public opinion. The American people needed to support not only entering World War II, but also the government’s decision on which Axis power to pursue first. Second, foreign representatives from all around the world met with Roosevelt and his aides in an attempt to persuade the President to follow their advice. Finally, Roosevelt’s military advisers consulted with the President and determined which war strategy made the most sense in terms of manpower, tactics, supplies, and firepower. Roosevelt had to weigh all three influences as he made the difficult decision to pursue a Europe-first strategy over a Pacific-first strategy throughout World War II. -
Neville Chamberlain
Neville Chamberlain Arthur Neville Chamberlain was born in Birmingham, England, on March 18, 1869. Neville Chamberlain was Prime Minister of Great Britain in September 1939 at the start of World War II. In May 1940, after the disastrous Norwegian campaign, Chamberlain resigned and Winston Churchill became prime minister. Why did Chamberlain resign as prime minister? Members of the House of Commons saw him as an uninspiring war leader. He was blamed for loss of Norway to the Germans. Chamberlin realised that a National Government of all political parties was mandatory. In May 1940 members of the Labour Party and Liberal Party refused to serve in his proposed National Government. Chamberlain resigned realisng that a National Government would not be possible as long as he was leader. He was replaced by Winston Churchill. His business acumen raised him in the eyes of his father, who told a friend that of his two sons, "Neville is really the clever one" and but for his disinterest in politics, "I would back him to be Prime Minister". Chamberlain's business interests did not completely fill his time, and he indulged his love of natural history and other pursuits. He spent many Sundays working in the gardens and greenhouses at Highbury. He enjoyed long walks in the countryside, and developed a passion for hunting and fishing. Early days (May 1937 – March 1938) Chamberlain sought to conciliate Germany, and make it a partner in a stable Europe.[133] He believed Germany could be satisfied by the restoration of some of her colonies and during the Rhineland crisis of March 1936, had stated that "if we were in sight of an all-round settlement the British Government ought to consider the question [of restoration of colonies]".[134] The following month, however, he wrote his sisters, "I don't believe myself that we could purchase peace and a lasting settlement by handing over Tanganyika to the Germans, but if I did I would not hesitate for a moment to do so." 1 Chamberlain (center, hat and umbrella in hands) leaves for home after the Berchtesgaden meeting, 16 September 1938. -
World at War and the Fires Between War Again?
World at War and the Fires Between War Again? The Rhodes Colossus.© The Granger Collection / Universal Images Group / ImageQuest 2016 These days there are very few colonies in the traditional sense. But it wasn't that long ago that colonialism was very common around the world. How do you think your life would be different if this were still the case? If World War II hadn’t occurred, this might be a reality. As you've already learned, in the late 19th century, European nations competed with one another to grab the largest and richest regions of the globe to gain wealth and power. The imperialists swept over Asia and Africa, with Italy and France taking control of large parts of North Africa. Imperialism pitted European countries against each other as potential competitors or threats. Germany was a late participant in the imperial game, so it pursued colonies with a single-minded intensity. To further its imperial goals, Germany also began to build up its military in order to defend its colonies and itself against other European nations. German militarization alarmed other European nations, which then began to build up their militaries, too. Defensive alliances among nations were forged. These complex interdependencies were one factor that led to World War I. What Led to WWII?—Text Version Review the map description and the descriptions of the makeup of the world at the start of World War II (WWII). Map Description: There is a map of the world. There are a number of countries shaded four different colors: dark green, light green, blue, and gray. -
Information to Users
INFORMATION TO USERS While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted. For example: • Manuscript pages may have indistinct print. In such cases, the best available copy has been filmed. • Manuscripts may not always be complete. In such cases, a note will indicate that it is not possible to obtain missing pages. • Copyrighted material may have been removed from the manuscript. In such cases, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, and charts) are photographed by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is also filmed as one exposure and is available, for an additional charge, as a standard 35mm slide or as a 17”x 23” black and white photographic print. Most photographs reproduce acceptably on positive microfilm or microfiche but lack the clarity on xerographic copies made from the microfilm. For an additional charge, 35mm slides of 6”x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography. O rder N um ber 87X7695 The Japanese merchant marine in World War II Parillo, Mark Philip, Ph.D. The Ohio State University, 1987 Copyright ©1987 by Parillo, Mark Philip. All rights reserved. UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106 PLEASE NOTE: In all cases this material has been filmed in the best possible way from the available copy. -
Coversheet for Thesis in Sussex Research Online
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis Available online via Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/ This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details Explaining the paradox of market reform in communist China: the uneven and combined development of the Chinese Revolution and the search for ‘national salvation’ Luke Cooper University of Sussex July 2013 Thesis submitted for the fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations at the University of Sussex. 2 Abstract This thesis addresses the paradox of capitalist market reform being introduced by a politically undefeated communist state in China. It does so by developing an historical account of the Chinese polity’s relationship with the modern world. Chapter one offers a critique of existing explanations; these tend to focus narrowly on the immediate circumstances surrounding the decision to reform and thereby eschew analysis of the specific dynamics of the Chinese Revolution. In so doing, they also ignore its origins within the welter of contradictions arising from the process of capitalist internationalization, giving no causal efficacy to ‘the international’ in explaining this dramatic social transformation. -
Fighting World War II/EQ: What Military Strategies Did the United States and Its Allies Pursue to Defeat the Axis Powers in World War II?
Outline Ch. 36 – Fighting World War II/EQ: What military strategies did the United States and its allies pursue to defeat the Axis powers in World War II? 36.1 – Introduction After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States began mobilizing troops for war. Some of these soldiers would end up in Europe, fighting the German army. o First, though, they had to cross the Atlantic Ocean on troop ships, braving attacks by Germany’s deadly U-boat fleet. o Since the start of the war, in 1939, German U-boats had been working to disrupt and destroy Allied shipping in the Atlantic. When the United States entered the war, its Atlantic coastal waters were relatively unprotected. o During the first several months of 1942, U-boats sank dozens of American ships off the Atlantic Coast. o These losses would not continue, however. o As in World War I, the Allies reduced their losses by using the convoy system. By 1943, it was churning out enough ships to replace lost vessels and to defend against U-boat attacks. This new U.S. fleet would play a key role in naval battles and in supporting ground and air forces during World War II. 36.2. – Preparing for War in Europe In late December 1941, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill met in Washington, D.C. Their purpose was to devise a strategy to help the … o Allies [Allies: the countries that fought against the Central Powers during World War I and the countries that fought against the Axis Powers during World War II] o defeat the o Axis powers [Axis Powers: the alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan during World War II] They would concentrate most of their forces on winning back Europe, while initially fighting a defensive war against Japan in the Pacific. -
USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture #6 “Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars: FDR As War Leader” Maurice Matloff, 1964 It Is a Privilege To
'The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, Department of Defense or the US Government.'" USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture #6 “Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars: FDR as War Leader” Maurice Matloff, 1964 It is a privilege to be invited to the Academy, to participate in the distinguished Harmon Lecture series, and to address the members of the Cadet Wing and their guests from Colorado College. This occasion is particularly pleasurable since it brings back memories of my own introduction to the field of military history during my service in World War II- as a historian on the staff of the Fourth Air Force Headquarters. The early interest of your service in military history has now become a tradition fittingly carried on here in the Academy and in this series, which bears your founder's name. I welcome the opportunity to speak to you this morning on the important subject that your Department of History has selected-one that has long interested me, that has affected all our lives, and that has bearing on your future careers.' Let me begin by going back to March 1, 1945, when a weary President, too tired to carry the ten pounds of steel that braced his paralyzed legs, sat down before the United States Congress to report on the Yalta Conference-the summit meeting in the Crimea with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill-from which he had just returned. "I come from the Crimea Conference," he said, "with a firm belief that we have made a good start on the road to a world of peace… "This time we are not making the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace.