Information to Users

INFORMATION TO USERS While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted. For example: • Manuscript pages may have indistinct print. In such cases, the best available copy has been filmed. • Manuscripts may not always be complete. In such cases, a note will indicate that it is not possible to obtain missing pages. • Copyrighted material may have been removed from the manuscript. In such cases, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, and charts) are photographed by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is also filmed as one exposure and is available, for an additional charge, as a standard 35mm slide or as a 17”x 23” black and white photographic print. Most photographs reproduce acceptably on positive microfilm or microfiche but lack the clarity on xerographic copies made from the microfilm. For an additional charge, 35mm slides of 6”x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography. O rder N um ber 87X7695 The Japanese merchant marine in World War II Parillo, Mark Philip, Ph.D. The Ohio State University, 1987 Copyright ©1987 by Parillo, Mark Philip. All rights reserved. UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106 PLEASE NOTE: In all cases this material has been filmed in the best possible way from the available copy. Problems encountered with this document have been identified here with a check mark V . 1. Glossy photographs or pages_____ 2. Colored illustrations, paper or print______ 3. Photographs with dark background _____ 4. Illustrations are poor copy______ 5. Pages with black marks, not original copy i / 6. Print shows through as there is text on both sides of p a g e______ 7. Indistinct, broken or small print on several pages i f 8. Print exceeds margin requirements______ 9. Tightly bound copy with print lost in spine_______ 10. Computer printout pages with indistinct print_______ 11. Page(s)____________ lacking when material received, and not available from school or author. 12. Page(s)____________ seem to be missing in numbering only as text follows. 13. Two pages num bered . Text follows. 14. Curling and wrinkled pages______ 15. Dissertation contains pages with print at a slant, filmed as received ^ 16. Other_______________________________________ _______________________________ University Microfilms International I THE JAPANESE MERCHANT MARINE IN WORLD WAR II DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Mark Philip Parillo, B.A., M. A. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ The Ohio State University 1987 Dissertation Committee: Approved by A.R. M illett J.R. Bartholomew Advi ser W.L. Murray Department of History I Copyright by Hark Philip Parillo 1987 I To Marcella, who made it all possible i i VITA February 7, 1955 Born - Youngstown, Ohio 1978 B.S., University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana 1981 H.A., The Ohio State U niversity, Columbus, Ohio FIELDS OF STUDY Major Fields American Military History, Dr. A. Millett Studies in Japanese History, Dr. J. Bartholomew European M ilitary History, Dr. W. Murray American Diplomatic History, Dr. M. Zahn i ser i i i I TABLE OF CONTENTS VITA .................................................................................... i i i CHAPTER PAGE 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1 2. JAPAN AND TOTAL WAR ........................................................................... 21 3. THE JAPANESE MERCHANT MARINE BEFORE WORLD WAR II .......................................................................................... 56 4. JAPANESE SHIPBUILDING DURING WORLD WAR II .......................................................................................................... 8 3 5. EMPLOYMENT AND PROTECTION OF THE MERCHANT MARINE IN WARTIME ........................................................ 109 6. ADMINISTRATION AND FATE OF THE MERCHANT MARINE IN WARTIME ........................................................ 151 7. THE JAPANESE NEGLECT OF ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE ............................................................................. 181 8. SUMMATION ................................................................................................... 229 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................... 234 iv CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION As delegates of the Imperial Japanese government signed the surrender documents ending World War II aboard the USS Missouri on September 2, 1945, their nation lay postrate from as total a defeat as any belligerent has suffered in modern times. Serious scholars, popular writers, and parti- cipants have written innumerable books probing the reasons for that catastrophic outcome. Yet few have more than cur so rily probed one of the c r i t i c a l elements in the whole Japanese war effort: the merchant marine. The failure of Japan’s maritime transport is well known, but the nature and causes of that failure still beg exploration. Though in explaining Japan’s defeat in World War II historians list a wide variety of causes, time and again they point to certain of them as prime factors. Numerical and m aterial in fe rio rity is the most common of a ll the rea sons given. Many also lay the blame on technological defi ciencies, inadequacies in intelligence and counterintelligence, overconfidence, missed tactical and strategic opportunities, geographic overextension because of "victory d isease," and the fa ilu re to adapt quickly enough to the fast-paced air power and carrier campaigns of the Pacific war. Host at least mention the sad fate of Japan’s merchant marine, but none examine the reasons for and full implications of the maritime transport disaster. Considerations of the material situation are the begin ning or eventual focal point of nearly all discussions of World War II in the Pacific. The consensus is that the Allied advantage in production and manpower was decisive once mobilization was fully underway. "Once America’s strength developed," wrote Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, "and Russia survived to develop hers, the defeat of the Axis powers — Germany, Italy, and Japan — became certain , as their combined military potential was so much smaller."1 Some historians drop all qualifications and claim unequivo cally that Japan’s relatively weak economic strength assured defeat: "Japan had no chance of winning a war against the combined strength of the United States and Great Britain,"z and the United States "defeated the Japanese by superior lB.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1970), p .711. 2Ito Hasanori with Roger Pineau, The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1956), p .201. 3 numbers, superior equipment, and superior firepower."® One writer even described Japan’s war potential as "pitifully insignificant."* This is an extreme view, but few histories fail to list Allied material superiority as a major cause of Japan’s defeat.® Technological inferiority also unquestionably undermined the Japanese war effort. Though the Imperial Navy in 1941 was unexpectedly more advanced than the Allies in some tech nical fields, including optics, pyrotechnics, torpedoes, and some aircraft and warship types,® they were behind in most 3Charles Bateson, The War with Japan: A Concise History, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), p .394. *Masuo Kato, The Lost War, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p .157. ®C.L. Sulzberger, World War II. (New York: American Heritage Press, 1970), p .116; Martha Bird Hoyle, A World in Flames. (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p .x i i i ; T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, Editors, A Military History of World War I I , (West Point: United S tates M ilitary Academy, 1953), p p .188-189; Quincy Howe, Ashes of V ictory, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p .274; Samuel Eliot Morison, Strategy and Compromise, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958), p. 118; and Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, (New York: Macmillan, Inc., 1985), pp. 177-178,560. ®Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931 - April 1942, Volume III of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II , (Boston: L ittle , Brown and Company, 1948), pp.23-24; Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p.303; and Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp.30-32. scientific research. The technological gap only widened as the war progressed. Radar, minesweeping gear, communications equipment, synthetic fuel, and aviation gasoline were just some of the crucial items that were technically deficient.'T This contributed sig n ific a n tly to the outcome of some major fleet engagements, such as Leyte Gulf, the Philippine Sea, and others.® Hasanori Ito points out that backwardness in radar alone served to negate the excellent night combat c ap ab ility which the

Load more